It’s been a good few months for TV executives, who are in the middle of upfront negotiations with advertisers for the 2016-2017 television season. Variety reports:
对于电视高管来说，这几个月是美好的时光，他们正在与广告商就 2016-2017 年电视季进行前期谈判。 品种报告 ：

After several years of moving money out of TV ad budgets to experiment with new digital outlets and social media, several big advertisers are spending more on the boob tube – and the result, according to ad buyers and other executives familiar with the pace of this year’s “upfront” negotiations, are a series of rate increases that TV has not won since the end of the last U.S. recession.
几年来，电视广告预算中转出资金，以尝试新的数字媒体和社交媒体，几家大型广告商在胸部管上投入了更多的资金——根据广告购买者和其他熟悉今年 “前期 ”谈判节奏的高管的说法，结果是电视自上次美国经济衰退结束以来从未赢得过的一系列加息。

“It’s all about money coming back into the marketplace,” said one media buying executive, noting that consumer packaged goods companies, quick-service restaurant chains and pharmaceutical companies are moving money into TV’s annual upfront market, when the nation’s big media companies try to sell the bulk of their ad inventory for the coming programming cycle. Some of the money is coming back from digital spending, and some of it is being moved from TV’s so-called “scatter” market, when advertisers pay for commercials much closer to their air date.
“这一切都与资金回到市场有关，”一位媒体购买高管说，并指出，当美国的大型媒体公司试图为即将到来的节目周期出售大部分广告库存时，消费包装商品公司、快餐连锁店和制药公司正在将资金转移到电视的年度前期市场。一些资金来自数字支出，还有一些是从电视所谓的 “分散 ”市场转移出来的，广告商在更接近播出日期的时候为广告付费。

Reports indicate those rate increases are running between 7% and 12%, and follow on a 2015-2016 season that saw scatter advertising — advertising purchased closer to the airing date — up 16% year-over-year. Apparently all that digital advertising hype was just a fad, right?
报告显示，这些费率增长在 7% 到 12% 之间 ，并且紧随 2015-2016 赛季之后，分散广告（在播出日期附近购买的广告） 同比增长了 16%。 显然，所有这些数字广告炒作都只是一种时尚，对吧？

I wouldn’t be so sure.
我不会那么确定。

Advertising and Attention
广告和关注

Despite all of the upheaval caused by the Internet, there are two truths about advertising that have remained constant:
尽管互联网引起了所有动荡，但关于广告的两个事实始终不变：

1. Advertising’s share of GDP has remained consistent for 100 years
   广告在 GDP 中的份额 100 年来一直保持不变¹

   Although this may be slowing; more on this tomorrow 

2. TV’s share of advertising, after growing for 40 years, has also remained consistent at just over 40% for the last 20 years
   电视的广告份额在增长了 40 年之后，在过去 20 年中也一直保持在略高于 40% 的水平

Those twenty years have seen the emergence of digital advertising generally, and, over the last five years, mobile advertising: while this emergence is likely responsible for the halt in growth for TV, the real victims have been radio, magazines, and especially newspapers, which have shrunk from a nearly 40% advertising share to about 10%.
这 20 年见证了数字广告的普遍出现，在过去五年中，移动广告也出现了：虽然这种出现可能是电视增长停滞的原因，但真正的受害者是广播、杂志，尤其是报纸，它们的广告份额已经从近 40% 下降到大约 10%。

Still, digital and mobile’s 33% share of advertising falls well short of the amount of attention attracted. Digital accounted for 47% of time spent with media in 2015, up from 32% in 2011, while TV has fallen from 41% in 2011 to 35% in 2015.
尽管如此，数字和移动广告 33% 的广告份额仍远低于所吸引的关注量。2015 年， 数字媒体占媒体时间的 47%，高于 2011 年的 32%，而电视从 2011 年的 41% 下降到 2015 年的 35%。²

This decline, though, is not evenly distributed: this jarring chart from Redef about the change in hours spent watching TV by age group shows that the situation for TV is much worse than the top-line numbers suggest:
然而，这种下降并不是均匀分布的： 这张来自 Redef 的关于各年龄组看电视时间变化的不和谐图表表明，电视的情况比收入数字所暗示的要糟糕得多。

The three age groups with the biggest declines — millennials, basically — are the most attractive to the brand advertisers that dominate TV advertising: for one, the younger you are the less likely you are to have developed affinity for a particular brand, and for another, the younger you are the more years a brand has to earn back the money spent building said affinity. Small wonder brands have been so eager to jump on new digital platforms where said millennials are actually spending their time.
下降幅度最大的三个年龄组（基本上是千禧一代）对主导电视广告的品牌广告商最具吸引力：一个，你越年轻，你就越不可能对某个品牌产生亲和力，而另一个年龄组，你越年轻，品牌就有更多的年限来赚回建立这种亲和力所花的钱。难怪品牌如此渴望跳上新的数字平台，据说千禧一代实际上正在这些平台上花费他们的时间。

So why is money suddenly flowing back to TV?
那么，为什么钱突然流回电视呢？

The Relationship Between TV and Advertisers
电视与广告商之间的关系

The most obvious reason for TV’s enduring appeal to advertisers is that it is a pretty fantastic advertising medium: relaxed viewers, immersive experience, etc. The appeal, though, goes deeper: the very institution of television advertising is intertwined with the kinds of advertisers that use it the most, the products they sell, and the way they are bought-and-sold. And what should be terrifying to television executives is that all of those pieces that make television advertising the gold mine that it has been are under the exact same threat that TV watching itself is: the threat of the Internet.
电视对广告商具有持久吸引力的最明显原因是，它是一种非常棒的广告媒介：轻松的观众、身临其境的体验等。然而，它的吸引力更深：电视广告的机构本身与使用它最多的广告商类型、他们销售的产品以及他们的买卖方式交织在一起。而让电视高管们感到恐惧的是，所有那些使电视广告成为金矿的文章都面临着与电视观看本身完全相同的威胁：互联网的威胁。

Start with the top 25 advertisers in the U.S. The list is made up of:
从美国排名前 25 位的广告主开始。该列表由以下部分组成：

• 4 telecom companies (AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, Softbank/Sprint)
  4 家电信公司（AT&T、Comcast、Verizon、Softbank/Sprint）
• 4 automobile companies (General Motors, Ford, Fiat Chrysler, Toyota)
  4 家汽车公司（通用汽车、福特、菲亚特克莱斯勒、丰田）
• 4 credit card companies (America Express, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Capital One)
  4 家信用卡公司（美国运通、摩根大通、美国银行、Capital One）
• 3 consumer packaged goods (CPG) companies (Procter & Gamble, L’Oréal, Johnson & Johnson)
  3 家消费包装商品（CPG）公司（宝洁、欧莱雅、强生）
• 3 entertainment companies (Disney, Time Warner, 21st Century Fox)
  3 家娱乐公司（迪士尼、时代华纳、21 世纪福克斯）
• 3 retailers (Walmart, Target, Macy’s)
  3 家零售商（沃尔玛、塔吉特、梅西百货）
• 1 from electronics (Samsung), pharmaceuticals (Pfizer), and beer (Anheuser-Busch InBev)
  1 来自电子产品 （Samsung）、制药 （Pfizer） 和啤酒 （Anheuser-Busch InBev）

Notice that the vast majority of the industries on on this list are dominated by massive companies that compete on scale and distribution. CPG is the perfect example: building a “house of brands” allows a company like Procter & Gamble to target demographic groups even as they leverage scale to invest in R&D, bring down the cost of products, and most importantly, dominate the distribution channel (i.e. retail shelf space). Said retailers, meanwhile, are huge in their own right, not only so they can match their massive suppliers at the bargaining table but also so they can scale logistics, inventory management, store development, etc. Automobile companies, meanwhile, are not unlike CPG companies: they operate a “house of brands” to serve different demographics while benefitting from scale in production and distribution; the primary difference is that they make money through one large purchase instead of over many smaller purchases over time.
请注意，此列表中的绝大多数行业都由在规模和分销方面竞争的大型公司主导。CPG 就是完美的例子：建立一个“品牌之家”可以让像宝洁这样的公司在利用规模投资研发、降低产品成本以及最重要的是主导分销渠道（即零售货架空间）的同时，也能瞄准目标人群。与此同时，上述零售商本身就很强大，这不仅使他们能够在谈判桌上与庞大的供应商相匹配，还可以扩大物流、库存管理、商店开发等的规模。与此同时，汽车公司与 CPG 公司没有什么不同：它们经营着“品牌之家”，为不同的人群提供服务，同时从生产和分销的规模中受益;主要区别在于他们通过一次大额购买而不是随着时间的推移通过许多小额购买来赚钱。

Similar principles apply to the other companies on this list: all are looking to reach as many consumers as possible with blunt targeting at best, all benefit from scale, and all are looking to earn significant lifetime value from consumers. And, along those lines, all can afford the expense of TV. In fact, the top 200 advertisers in the U.S. love TV so much that they make up 80% of television advertising, despite accounting for only 51% of total advertising (and 41% of digital).
类似的原则也适用于这份名单上的其他公司：所有公司都希望通过直率的定位来触达尽可能多的消费者，都受益于规模化，并且都希望从消费者那里获得巨大的生命周期价值。而且，按照这些思路，所有人都能负担得起电视的费用。事实上， 美国排名前 200 位的广告商非常喜欢电视，以至于他们占电视广告的 80%，尽管他们只占总广告的 51%（和数字广告的 41%）。

Note, though, that many of the companies on this list are threatened by the Internet:
但请注意，此列表中的许多公司都受到 Internet 的威胁：

• CPG companies are threatened on two fronts: on the high end the combination of e-commerce plus highly-targeted and highly-measurable Facebook advertising have given rise to an increasing number of boutique CPG brands that deliver superior products to very targeted groups. On the low end, meanwhile, e-commerce not only reduces the shelf-space advantage but Amazon in particular is moving into private label in a big way.
  CPG 公司面临两个方面的威胁：在高端市场，电子商务与高度针对性和高度可衡量的 Facebook 广告相结合，催生了越来越多的精品 CPG 品牌，这些品牌向非常有针对性的群体提供优质产品。与此同时，在低端市场，电子商务不仅减少了货架空间优势，而且亚马逊尤其正在大举进军自有品牌领域。
• Relatedly, big box retailers that offer few advantages beyond availability and low prices are being outdone by Amazon on both counts. In the very long run it is hard to see why they will continue to exist.
  与此相关的是，除了可用性和低价格之外，几乎没有其他优势的大型零售商在这两个方面都被亚马逊超越。从长远来看，很难看出它们为什么会继续存在。
• The automobile companies, meanwhile, are facing three separate challenges: electrification, transportation-as-a-service (i.e. Uber), and self-driving cars. The latter two in particular (and also the first to an extent) point to a world where cars are pure commodities bought by fleets, rendering advertising unnecessary.
  与此同时，汽车公司面临着三个不同的挑战 ：电气化、交通即服务（即 Uber）和自动驾驶汽车。特别是后两者（在某种程度上也是第一个）指向一个汽车是车队购买的纯粹商品的世界，因此广告变得没有必要。

The other companies face less of a long-term threat, some because they are already commoditized — telecoms, credit cards, electronics — and others because they will probably grow: big movies are only getting bigger (entertainment), and the population is getting older (pharmaceuticals). Still, the inescapable reality is that TV advertisers are 20th century companies: built for mass markets, not niches, for brick-and-mortar retailers, not e-commerce. These companies were built on TV, and TV was built on their advertisements, and while they are propping each other up for now, the decline of one will hasten the decline of the other.
其他公司面临的长期威胁较小，有些是因为它们已经商品化了——电信、信用卡、电子产品——而另一些则是因为它们可能会增长：大电影只会越来越大（娱乐），而人口越来越老龄化（制药）。尽管如此，不可避免的现实是，电视广告商是 20 世纪的公司：为大众市场而建，而不是为利基市场，为实体零售商而建，而不是为电子商务而建。这些公司建立在电视上，电视也建立在他们的广告上，虽然他们现在正在相互支持，但一家的衰落将加速另一家的衰落。

TV Advertising’s Dead Cat Bounce
电视广告的 Dead Cat Bounce

I also suspect the nature of the biggest TV advertisers explains TV’s dead cat bounce: brands uniquely suited to TV are probably by definition less suited to digital advertising, which at least to date has worked much better for direct response marketing. No one is going to click a link in their feed to buy a car or laundry detergent, and a brick-and-mortar retailer doesn’t want to encourage shopping to someone already online. So after a bit of experimentation, they’re back with TV.
我还怀疑最大的电视广告商的性质解释了电视的死猫反弹：根据定义，特别适合电视的品牌可能不太适合数字广告，至少到目前为止，数字广告在直接反应营销方面效果要好得多。没有人会点击他们信息流中的链接来购买汽车或洗衣粉，实体零售商也不想鼓励已经在网上的人购物。所以经过一些实验，他们又回到了电视上。

Still, I think Facebook and Snapchat in particular will figure brand advertising out: both have incredibly immersive advertising formats, and both are investing in ways to bring direct response-style tracking to brand advertising, including tracking visits to brick-and-mortar retailers. It wouldn’t surprise me if brand advertising on digital is following the hype cycle:
尽管如此，我认为 Facebook 和 Snapchat 尤其会弄清楚品牌广告：两者都有令人难以置信的沉浸式广告形式，并且都在投资为品牌广告带来直接反应式跟踪的方法，包括跟踪实体零售商的访问 。如果数字品牌广告遵循炒作周期，我不会感到惊讶：

This is the story of most things Internet-related, not just narrowly but broadly: it’s no accident many of today’s startups are repeating ideas from the dot com era; it’s not that they were wrong but that they were too early. And, when it comes to old world companies, if you turn that graph upside down, the “trough of disillusionment” looks a lot like a bounce-back!
这是大多数与 Internet 相关的事情的故事，不仅狭义上，而且广义上：当今许多初创公司都在重复 .com 时代的想法 ，这绝非偶然;不是他们错了，而是他们太早了。而且，当谈到旧世界的公司时，如果你把这个图表倒过来，“幻灭的低谷”看起来很像反弹！

Ultimately, given the shift in attention, the threats faced by their best advertisers, and the oncoming train that is Facebook and Snapchat, were I a TV executive I wouldn’t get too excited about one nice week of ad sales. Indeed, the industry has been shifting to subscriptions for years, and while advertising will hold up for a while, the big drama is who will be left without a chair when the music stops.
最终，考虑到注意力的转移、他们最好的广告商面临的威胁，以及迎面而来的 Facebook 和 Snapchat 列车，如果我是一名电视高管，我不会对一周的广告销售感到太兴奋。事实上， 该行业多年来一直在转向订阅 ，虽然广告会持续一段时间，但最大的戏剧性是当音乐停止时，谁将没有椅子。³

Coda: Aggregation Theory
尾声：聚合理论

One more thing: I wrote a piece earlier this year called The Fang Playbook that posited that Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google (plus Uber) were structurally very similar companies: all leveraged zero distribution costs and zero transaction costs to own users at scale via a superior experience that commoditized suppliers and let them skim off the middle, either through fees, subscriptions, or ads.
还有一件事：今年早些时候我写了一篇名为 The Fang Playbook 的文章，其中假设 Facebook、亚马逊、Netflix 和谷歌（加上 Uber）是结构上非常相似的公司：都利用零分销成本和零交易成本，通过卓越的体验来大规模拥有用户，将供应商商品化并让他们从中间省落。 通过费用、订阅或广告。⁴

What I described above is the opposite side of the coin: linear television and its advertisers were all predicated on owning distribution and thus owning customers. The Internet has or is in the process of destroying their business models for broadly similar reasons; for now the intertwinement of these models is keeping everyone afloat, but that only means that when the end comes it will come more swiftly and broadly than anyone is expecting.
我上面描述的是硬币的反面：线性电视及其广告商都以拥有分销，从而拥有客户为前提。由于大致相似的原因，互联网已经或正在摧毁他们的商业模式;目前，这些模式的交织使每个人都能漂浮在空中，但这只意味着，当末日到来时，它会比任何人预期的都更快、更广泛地到来。

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1. Although this may be slowing; more on this tomorrow 

2. Note that the advertising-free Netflix is categorized as digital; although the streaming service still serves a minority of U.S. households, its subscribers watch an average of 1 hour and 33 minutes a day, and are responsible for a good deal of TV’s fall-off. 

3. Viacom, for example 

4. Aka Aggregation Theory