“Don’t Know About Them 24%”,"5
“不知道他们的占 24%”，5

In June 1938, the AIPO asked “Which do you think is worse, Communism or Fascism?” ${}^{60}$${}^{60}$^(60){ }^{60} Of those asked, $31\mathrm{\%}$$31\mathrm{\%}$31%31 \% said Communism was the worst, $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% said Fascism was the worst, and $47\mathrm{\%}$$47\mathrm{\%}$47%47 \% said they had no opinion. In February 1939, the AIPO asked participants “Which do you think is the greater danger to America-the Communists living in this country or the Nazis living in this country?” ${}^{61}32\mathrm{\%}$${}^{61}32\mathrm{\%}$^(61)32%{ }^{61} 32 \% believed that Communists were a danger, 29 said that Nazis were a danger, $4\mathrm{\%}$$4\mathrm{\%}$4%4 \% believed that both were dangers, $1\mathrm{\%}$$1\mathrm{\%}$1%1 \% felt that neither presented any danger, and $34\mathrm{\%}$$34\mathrm{\%}$34%34 \% had no opinion on the subject. The results were interesting, although it is difficult to imagine that any participants felt any real threat from Communism or Fascism in this country. Both ideologies were abstract concepts that were the politics of countries on another continent. America still possessed an isolationist attitude at this point in history.
1938 年 6 月，AIPO 问道：“你认为哪个更糟，共产主义还是法西斯主义？” ${}^{60}$${}^{60}$^(60){ }^{60} 在被调查者中， $31\mathrm{\%}$$31\mathrm{\%}$31%31 \% 认为共产主义更糟， $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% 认为法西斯主义更糟， $47\mathrm{\%}$$47\mathrm{\%}$47%47 \% 表示没有意见。1939 年 2 月，AIPO 问参与者：“你认为对美国威胁更大的是生活在本国的共产主义者还是生活在本国的纳粹？” ${}^{61}32\mathrm{\%}$${}^{61}32\mathrm{\%}$^(61)32%{ }^{61} 32 \% 认为共产主义者是威胁，29 认为纳粹是威胁， $4\mathrm{\%}$$4\mathrm{\%}$4%4 \% 认为两者都是威胁， $1\mathrm{\%}$$1\mathrm{\%}$1%1 \% 觉得两者都没有威胁， $34\mathrm{\%}$$34\mathrm{\%}$34%34 \% 对此没有意见。结果很有趣，尽管很难想象有参与者真的感受到共产主义或法西斯主义在本国的威胁。这两种意识形态都是抽象的概念，是另一个大陆国家的政治。此时的美国仍然持有孤立主义态度。

In comparing Stalin and Hitler, and of the effects that perception may have had on American opinions of both leaders, Ralph Levering wrote “Joseph Stalin may well have stood for equally bad or even worse things, but he was a kitten compared to the German tiger in his ability as well as his apparent aspiration to upset the international status quo.” ${}^{62}$${}^{62}$^(62){ }^{62} Levering also points out that in mid-1939, American attitudes toward Russian ideology, as compared to Germany, took on three varying kinds. The first was apathy. America was still feeling the effects of the Great Depression and was holding its collective breath in hopes that another recession was not coming. Most Americans were too focused on the
在比较斯大林和希特勒，以及这种认知可能对美国人对两位领导人的看法产生的影响时，拉尔夫·莱弗林写道：“约瑟夫·斯大林可能代表着同样糟糕甚至更糟的东西，但与德国老虎相比，他更像是一只小猫，无论是在能力上还是在明显想要颠覆国际现状的愿望上。” ${}^{62}$${}^{62}$^(62){ }^{62} 莱弗林还指出，1939 年年中，美国人对俄罗斯意识形态的态度与对德国的态度相比，呈现出三种不同的类型。第一种是冷漠。美国仍在感受大萧条的影响，正屏息以待，希望不会再有一次经济衰退。大多数美国人过于专注于...

events at home to really care about the matters of foreign countries. The second variation was a position held by many conservatives in Congress, Nazism was born out of Communism. However, the liberals, who held the third varying attitude, believed that the differences between Communism and Nazism were too great and therefore could not coexist.
国内的事件使人们无法真正关心外国事务。第二种观点是许多国会保守派持有的立场，认为纳粹主义是共产主义的产物。然而，持第三种不同态度的自由派则认为共产主义和纳粹主义之间的差异太大，因此两者无法共存。

According to Benjamin Alpers, “American understandings of dictatorship were rooted in interpretations of events abroad especially in Europe.” ${}^{63}$${}^{63}$^(63){ }^{63} In looking at history, and specifically at Russia, most of the European dictatorships have always had leaders who were shrouded in mystery. The only notable exception is Il Duce, Benito Mussolini. Mussolini’s ego would not permit him to pass up an interview during which he would talk only about himself and his own accomplishments. But Stalin and Hitler were very secretive. Any press releases about them, and indeed their respective regimes, were prepared so that they would not look bad in the eyes of the world.
根据本杰明·奥尔珀斯的说法，“美国人对独裁的理解根植于对海外事件，特别是欧洲事件的解读。” ${}^{63}$${}^{63}$^(63){ }^{63} 回顾历史，特别是俄罗斯，大多数欧洲独裁政权的领导人总是笼罩在神秘之中。唯一显著的例外是领袖贝尼托·墨索里尼。墨索里尼的自负不允许他错过任何一次只谈论自己及其成就的采访。但斯大林和希特勒则非常神秘。关于他们以及各自政权的任何新闻发布，都是经过精心准备的，以确保他们在世界眼中不会显得糟糕。

Alpers also explains how the term “dictatorship” began to have a negative connotation in the United States. He writes, “In the early years of the Great Depression, dictatorship was an important political fantasy for a heterogeneous group of Americans. Although most Americans were not attracted to dictatorship, for some it seemed necessary in light of the socioeconomic crisis, wither as a permanent, more efficient solution to the problems of modern life or, in the classical sense, as a temporary measure to put democracy back on course.” ${}^{"64}$${}^{"64}$^("64){ }^{" 64} Indeed, Roosevelt’s presidency was viewed by many as a potential dictatorship, especially when he was elected for an unprecedented fourth term in office. It was only in
Alpers 还解释了“独裁”一词在美国开始带有负面含义的过程。他写道：“在大萧条初期，独裁对一群异质的美国人来说是一种重要的政治幻想。虽然大多数美国人并不被独裁吸引，但对一些人来说，鉴于社会经济危机，独裁似乎是必要的，无论是作为解决现代生活问题的永久且更有效的方案，还是作为一种临时措施，以使民主重新走上正轨。” ${}^{"64}$${}^{"64}$^("64){ }^{" 64} 确实，罗斯福的总统任期被许多人视为潜在的独裁，尤其是在他获得史无前例的第四个任期时。直到

the latter half of the 1930’s that “dictatorship became the evil against which nearly everyone in American political life struggled.” ${}^{65}$${}^{65}$^(65){ }^{65}
1930 年代后半期，“独裁才成为几乎所有美国政治生活中人们所抗争的邪恶。” ${}^{65}$${}^{65}$^(65){ }^{65}

In 1934, Stalin pursued the policy of Collective Security. It was then that Stalin realized that Nazism was a threat to Russia. He aimed to build an Eastern European alliance to protect Russia’s western borders. However, this plan hit a snag. Poland refused to agree to such an alliance. But he was able to establish relations with the United States. In September of the same year, Russia joined the League of Nations. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet ambassador to the US, used the League of Nations to articulate and communicate Stalin’s wishes for peace, collective security and disarmament. However, when the League was unable to stop Italy from invading Ethiopia, its failure as a peacekeeping body was once again apparent.
1934 年，斯大林推行集体安全政策。正是在那时，斯大林意识到纳粹主义对俄罗斯构成威胁。他旨在建立一个东欧联盟，以保护俄罗斯的西部边界。然而，这一计划遇到了阻碍。波兰拒绝同意这样的联盟。但他成功与美国建立了关系。同年九月，俄罗斯加入了国际联盟。苏联驻美大使马克西姆·利特维诺夫利用国际联盟表达和传达斯大林关于和平、集体安全和裁军的愿望。然而，当国际联盟未能阻止意大利入侵埃塞俄比亚时，其作为维和机构的失败再次显现。

In 1935, the Comintern espoused the Popular Front policy. At the Seventh Congress in July-August of that year, the Comintern “announced that all ‘progressive forces’ (workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia) should cooperate against fascism…” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Communists, socialist and liberals were all ordered to work together. In 1936, collective security failed and Germany blatantly defied the Versailles Treaty and invaded the
1935 年，共产国际倡导人民阵线政策。在当年七月至八月召开的第七次代表大会上，共产国际“宣布所有‘进步力量’（工人、农民、小资产阶级和知识分子）应联合起来反对法西斯主义……” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 共产主义者、社会主义者和自由主义者都被命令共同合作。1936 年，集体安全失败，德国公然无视《凡尔赛条约》并入侵了…

Rhineland. In doing so, the invasion shattered the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. At this point in time, Stalin realized he could not count on the West to fight Nazi aggression. When the West was apathetic toward the Spanish Civil War, he grew even more suspicious and distrustful of the West. Stalin provided military air to Spain to fight off Franco and his fascists. In 1937, he stopped most aid to Spain and began purging the Communist Party.
莱茵兰。在此过程中，入侵打破了 1935 年的法苏条约。在这个时候，斯大林意识到他不能指望西方来对抗纳粹的侵略。当西方对西班牙内战漠不关心时，他对西方更加怀疑和不信任。斯大林向西班牙提供了军事航空力量，以抵御佛朗哥及其法西斯势力。1937 年，他停止了对西班牙的大部分援助，并开始清洗共产党。

In 1939, the West and Germany both courted Stalin for Russia’s support in the war. France and England extended a guarantee to protect Poland and Romania, but did so too late. By this time, Stalin held out little hope they could be counted on to fight Hitler. In his speech at the Eighteenth Party Congress, Stalin accused “the West of trying to provoke a SovietGerman conflict…” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} We now know that Germany was already negotiating with Russia at this point. Hitler was planning to invade Poland and was looking to get an agreement in place with Stalin before doing so.
1939 年，西方和德国都争取斯大林支持俄罗斯参战。法国和英国承诺保护波兰和罗马尼亚，但为时已晚。此时，斯大林几乎不抱希望他们能被指望来对抗希特勒。在第十八次党代会的讲话中，斯大林指责“西方试图挑起苏德冲突……” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 我们现在知道，德国当时已经在与俄罗斯谈判。希特勒计划入侵波兰，并希望在行动前与斯大林达成协议。

On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was officially ratified. Stalin firmly believed that this agreement had guaranteed Russia would not be invaded by Hitler. It also encouraged Hitler to attack Poland. The pact promised neutrality if either party was attacked by a third party. As part of this pact, Russia was bound to supply Germany with raw materials and, as a result, became economically dependent on Germany. There were secret protocols to the treaty. They were:
1939 年 8 月 23 日，德国与苏联之间的《互不侵犯条约》正式获得批准。斯大林坚信这项协议保证了俄罗斯不会被希特勒入侵。它也鼓励了希特勒攻击波兰。该条约承诺如果任何一方遭到第三方攻击，另一方将保持中立。作为该条约的一部分，俄罗斯必须向德国供应原材料，因此在经济上依赖德国。条约中还有秘密议定书。内容如下：

"1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States…the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of Germany and the USSR. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
“1. 如果波罗的海国家所属地区发生领土和政治重组……立陶宛的北部边界将作为德国和苏联势力范围的分界线。在这方面，双方都承认立陶宛对维尔纳地区的利益。”
“2. In the event of a territorial and political arrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San. The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only definitely determined in the course of further political developments…” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
“2. 在对属于波兰国家的地区进行领土和政治安排时，德国和苏联的势力范围大致以纳雷夫河、维斯瓦河和桑河为界。双方利益是否需要维持一个独立的波兰国家，以及这样一个国家应如何划界，只有在进一步的政治发展过程中才能最终确定……” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
G.E.R. Gedye authored an article that was printed in the New York Times on September 1, 1939 recounting Molotov’s speech about the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact. Of this speech, Mr. Gedye said, “Mr. Molotoff’s speech left the impression that the Soviet’s decision to sever relations with the Western democracies had been taken reluctantly after considerable snubbing, contrasted with assiduous courting by the Germans.” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} According to Gedye, Molotoff explained that “the Soviet Union stood for mutual non-interference in internal affairs between Stats. It followed the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries.” ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3}
G.E.R. Gedye 撰写了一篇文章，于 1939 年 9 月 1 日刊登在《纽约时报》上，回顾了莫洛托夫关于签署互不侵犯条约的演讲。Gedye 先生说：“莫洛托夫先生的演讲给人的印象是，苏联决定与西方民主国家断绝关系是经过相当冷遇后勉强作出的决定，而与德国则是热情追求的对比。” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 根据 Gedye 的说法，莫洛托夫解释说，“苏联主张国家间相互不干涉内政。它遵循列宁主义的社会主义国家与资本主义国家和平共处原则。” ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3}

Molotov’s justification for the pact with Germany, according to Gedye, was that “history…showed that the peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany had suffered mutual hostility and needed a treaty of peace. The difference in their ideologies and political systems should not cause hostile political relations any more than with other capitalist States. Only enemies of the Soviet Union fermented hostility between the Soviet Union and Germany.” ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} Molotov also parroted Stalin’s comments made at the Eighteenth Party Congress by saying, “Those attacking the pact are enemies of both the Soviet Union and Germany, seeking to provoke trouble between them.” ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}
根据 Gedye 的说法，莫洛托夫为与德国签订条约辩护称，“历史……表明苏联和德国人民曾经相互敌视，需要一份和平条约。他们的意识形态和政治制度的差异不应导致敌对的政治关系，就像其他资本主义国家一样。只有苏联的敌人才煽动苏联和德国之间的敌意。” ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 莫洛托夫还重复了斯大林在第十八次党代会上所说的话：“那些攻击条约的人是苏联和德国的敌人，企图挑起两国之间的麻烦。” ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}

Two months later, the New York Times printed an article regarding Stalin’s belief that the Allies were to blame for World War II. He raged against France and England, saying they had rejected Germany’s olive branch and Soviet attempts to end the war early. The article incorporated a statement, issued by Stalin that had been printed in Pravda. The statement is as follows:
两个月后，《纽约时报》刊登了一篇关于斯大林认为二战责任在于盟国的文章。他怒斥法国和英国，称他们拒绝了德国的橄榄枝和苏联早期结束战争的努力。文章引用了斯大林在《真理报》上发表的一份声明。声明内容如下：
"First, it was not Germany who attacked France and England, but France and England who attacked Germany, thus assuming responsibility for the present war.
“首先，攻击法国和英国的不是德国，而是法国和英国攻击了德国，因此应对当前战争负责。
"Second, after the outbreak of hostilities Germany addressed France and England with peace proposals while the Soviet Union openly supported Germany’s peace proposals because it believed and continues to believe that the earliest termination of the war would fundamentally alleviate the position of all countries and nations.
“其次，在敌对行动爆发后，德国向法国和英格兰提出了和平建议，而苏联公开支持德国的和平提议，因为苏联相信并且仍然相信，尽早结束战争将从根本上缓解所有国家和民族的处境。

“Third, the ruling circles of England and France rudely declined both Germany’s peace proposals and the attempts of the Soviet Union to attain the earliest termination of the war.” ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6}
“第三，英格兰和法国的统治阶层粗暴地拒绝了德国的和平提议以及苏联为尽早结束战争所做的努力。” ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6}

The Non-Aggression Pact surprised the international community. Both the Soviet Union and Germany had two diametrically opposed political ideologies and a long standing mutual hatred of one another. According to Geoffrey Roberts in his book The Unholy Alliance, "A more concrete picture of Soviet-German trade is given by the following figures of raw materials supplied to Germany between January 1940 and June 1941:
《不圣洁的联盟》一书的作者杰弗里·罗伯茨指出，苏德互不侵犯条约令国际社会感到惊讶。苏联和德国拥有截然相反的政治意识形态，并且长期相互仇恨。根据罗伯茨的说法，“以下是 1940 年 1 月至 1941 年 6 月期间苏联向德国提供的原材料的具体数据：
" 1.5 million tons of grain
“150 万吨谷物
"100,000 tons of cotton
"10 万吨棉花
"2 million tons of petroleum products
"200 万吨石油产品
" 1.5 million tons of timber
"150 万吨木材
"140,000 tons of manganese
"14 万吨锰矿石
“26,000 tons of chromium” ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7}
“26,000 吨铬” ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7}

When compared to the materials that the Soviet Union received from Germany, it is clear there is a discrepancy, with Germany receiving a greater bounty. But, as Roberts points
与苏联从德国获得的物资相比，显然存在差异，德国获得的物资更多。但正如 Roberts 指出的那样，

out, “it is …very difficult to weigh up the economic value of raw materials relative to manufactures, particularly in the absence of any detailed inventory of the manufactures.” ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}
“在没有任何详细制造品清单的情况下，衡量原材料相对于制造品的经济价值是非常困难的。” ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}

David E. Murphy in his book What Stalin Knew, presented a very plausible theory as well. Murphy wrote of Stalin’s reason for signing the treaty, "Actually, Stalin’s underlying motivation for the 1939 treaty was to render the German conquest of Poland inevitable. This, he hoped would result in a major conflict between Germany and Poland’s allies, France and Great Britain. ${}^{,9}$${}^{,9}$^(,9){ }^{, 9}
David E. Murphy 在他的著作《斯大林所知》中也提出了一个非常合理的理论。Murphy 写道斯大林签署条约的原因：“实际上，斯大林签署 1939 年条约的根本动机是使德国征服波兰成为必然。他希望这将导致德国与波兰的盟友法国和英国之间爆发重大冲突。” ${}^{,9}$${}^{,9}$^(,9){ }^{, 9}

One area that did not benefit from this agreement was military cooperation. Russian pleas for armaments from Germany went unfulfilled. They needed hulls for their submarines, 3 in all. They only received the hull for one of them. They did not fare any better when requesting aircraft. They only received 10 combat aircraft from the Germans. The Germans did manage to supply tanks, ammunition, and other artillery, but there is no evidence of the final numbers. Despite all the broken promises, the Soviets did allow German ships to dock at Murmansk.
一个没有从这项协议中受益的领域是军事合作。俄罗斯向德国请求的军备未能得到满足。他们需要三艘潜艇的艇体，但只收到了其中一艘的艇体。在请求飞机时情况也没有好转，他们只从德国人那里获得了 10 架战斗机。德国人确实设法供应了坦克、弹药和其他火炮，但没有关于最终数量的证据。尽管所有承诺都被打破，苏联人还是允许德国船只停靠在摩尔曼斯克。

In his book, Mein Kampf, published years before, Hitler clearly stated his intention to invade Russia and claim it for lebensraum for the German people. One of his justifications of this was that the Communists and Bolsheviks were filled with Jews. So, it should not have been a surprise to learn that Hitler began planning this invasion of Russia in December 1940, even though it was not executed until June 22, 1941. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the directive for what was called “Operation Barbarossa” with an
在他多年前出版的《我的奋斗》一书中，希特勒明确表示了入侵俄罗斯并将其作为德国人民生存空间的意图。他的一个理由是共产党人和布尔什维克充满了犹太人。因此，得知希特勒早在 1940 年 12 月就开始策划这次入侵俄罗斯的行动并不令人惊讶，尽管直到 1941 年 6 月 22 日才付诸实施。1940 年 12 月 18 日，希特勒签署了被称为“巴巴罗萨行动”的指令，...

original date for the invasion being set at May 15, 1941. Hitler expected to be victorious in only a few short months and was unprepared for the harshness of the Russian winters. German soldiers possessed inadequate clothing and supplies. Many would freeze or starve to death. Hitler’s fervent belief that Russia would not put up much of a fight would prove to be his downfall.
原定入侵日期定于 1941 年 5 月 15 日。希特勒预计几个月内就能取得胜利，却没有准备好应对俄罗斯严酷的冬季。德国士兵的衣物和补给不足，许多人会冻死或饿死。希特勒坚信俄罗斯不会进行激烈抵抗，这一信念最终成为他的致命弱点。

Despite warnings of a negative economic impact on Germany, Hitler, determined to march on Russia, was still able to see benefits for Germany. If he could defeat Russia quickly, German soldiers could finally return to the labor force. He also realized that the Ukraine was a good source of agriculture and oil. And finally, not only would he succeed in isolating the Allies, hew would have a plethora of Russians he would use as slave labor to help bolster the Germany economy.
尽管有人警告这将对德国经济产生负面影响，希特勒决心进军俄罗斯，仍然看到了对德国的好处。如果他能迅速击败俄罗斯，德国士兵就能重新回到劳动力市场。他还意识到乌克兰是农业和石油的良好来源。最后，他不仅能成功孤立盟军，还能拥有大量俄罗斯人作为奴隶劳工，帮助振兴德国经济。

Stalin had severely weakened the Red Army beginning in 1936 when he purged the military of almost 30,000 members, a number that included almost all of his generals. This left Russia vulnerable to an attack by Germany. Additionally, Stalin had reliable intelligence from one of his many spies, Dr. Richard Sorge, that Hitler was amassing troops on the borders and a plan to invade was in place. However, much like Roosevelt chose to ignore his intelligence on Stalin, Stalin ignored the intelligence presented to him on the impending attack. As a result, the Red Army was ill prepared to fend off the earliest hours of the attack. Roberts offers up a theory on Stalin’s lack of action on this intelligence. “The most popular explanation for Stalin’s catastrophic misreading of the situation is that it was a combination of psychological and institutional factors…” ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10}
斯大林从 1936 年开始大幅削弱红军，当时他清洗了近 3 万名军人，其中几乎包括了他所有的将军。这使得俄罗斯在面对德国的攻击时变得脆弱。此外，斯大林从他的众多间谍之一理查德·索尔格博士那里获得了可靠的情报，得知希特勒正在边境集结军队，并且已有入侵计划。然而，就像罗斯福选择忽视关于斯大林的情报一样，斯大林也忽视了关于即将来袭的攻击的情报。因此，红军在攻击的最初几个小时内准备不足，难以抵御。罗伯茨提出了一个关于斯大林未对这些情报采取行动的理论。“对斯大林对局势灾难性误判最流行的解释是，这是心理和体制因素的结合……” ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10}
${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} The Unholy Alliance, Geoffrey Roberts, pg 211
${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 《不圣洁的联盟》，杰弗里·罗伯茨，第 211 页

Hitler had underestimated Stalin and Russia. Because of Stalin’s Five Year Plans, Russia experienced an era of rapid industrialization and an increase in the production of military equipment. As the war waged on, the Red Army grew stronger. Even though Germany had the numerical advantage over Russia, the Red Army possessed more weaponry and had immediate access to tanks, whereas the German Army was forced to wait for additional tanks and weapons to arrive from Germany. As an example, the Red Army had 23,106 tanks in use versus the 3,350 tanks the German Army had spread out over the region. Two of the major disadvantages the Red Army possessed were that their artillery units had no way of moving guns to regions that needed them the most and a severe shortage of ammunition. Some statistics show that only one out of every 10 guns the Red Army possessed actually had ammunition and if someone was killed in action, the person next to him was expected to pick up the gun and continue fighting.
希特勒低估了斯大林和俄罗斯。由于斯大林的五年计划，俄罗斯经历了快速工业化的时代，军事装备的生产也有所增加。随着战争的进行，红军变得更加强大。尽管德国在兵力上占有优势，但红军拥有更多的武器，并且能够立即使用坦克，而德军则不得不等待更多坦克和武器从德国运来。举例来说，红军使用的坦克有 23,106 辆，而德军在该地区分布的坦克只有 3,350 辆。红军的两个主要劣势是炮兵部队无法将火炮调动到最需要的地区，以及弹药严重短缺。一些统计数据显示，红军拥有的每 10 门火炮中只有 1 门配备了弹药，如果有人在战斗中阵亡，旁边的人就必须捡起他的枪继续战斗。

The New York Times printed an article on June 23, 1941 that told of the invasion. The tone of this article is interesting in that it is somewhat mocking, at times jubilant over the invasion. Buried on page 16, the writer painted a most unflattering and inaccurate picture of Stalin, “To appease him [Hitler], Stalin had broken the so called ‘democratic front’ which Russia itself had sponsored; he betrayed the international Communist movement of which he was the leader; he had groveled in the Nazi dirt at Hitler’s feet. Small good it did him.” ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} The author also commented on the moral implications of Stalin’s actions. "Equally clear is the moral of Stalin’s own double-dealing. He had broken faith with his potential allies, France and Britain. He had deliberately give Hitler the signal to start this
《纽约时报》于 1941 年 6 月 23 日刊登了一篇报道入侵的文章。该文的语气颇为有趣，时而带有嘲讽，时而对入侵表现出欢欣鼓舞。埋藏在第 16 版的文章中，作者描绘了一个极不讨喜且不准确的斯大林形象：“为了安抚他[希特勒]，斯大林打破了所谓的‘民主阵线’，而这正是俄罗斯自己所支持的；他背叛了自己领导的国际共产主义运动；他在希特勒脚下卑躬屈膝。对他来说，这些都毫无益处。” ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} 作者还评论了斯大林行为的道德含义。“斯大林的两面派行为的道德教训同样清晰。他背弃了潜在的盟友法国和英国。他故意向希特勒发出了开始这场战争的信号。”

war in 1939, by promising a hands-off attitude toward Poland." ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} Toward the end of the article, the author’s derision for both regimes became extremely clear. “This is not time for idle satisfaction in the news that two violent totalitarian regimes, both of which are detestable to us, are now engaged in the pleasant process of destroying one another.” ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} The comments would be repulsive if the author wasn’t merely channeling public sentiment at that time.
1939 年战争爆发时，他承诺对波兰采取不干涉的态度。” ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} 在文章结尾，作者对这两个政权的嘲讽变得非常明显。“现在不是对两个暴力极权政权相互残杀这一令人愉快的过程感到无所事事的满足的时候，这两个政权我们都极为厌恶。” ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 如果作者不是仅仅在传达当时的公众情绪，这些评论本身会令人反感。

Six days later, the New York Times printed another article about the German invasion of Russia. Edwin James wrote about how Hitler had violated yet another agreement and struck at Russia, Germany’s economic trade partner for the last two years. James commented on the surprise of the timing of the attack, and speculated on what Germany stood to gain in its defeat of Russia. "It is fair enough to call the German campaign against Russia sensational. Few expected it yet, although many had believed that eventually Russia would be a target of the ambition of the dictator of the Third Reich. The land of the Soviets offers enormous booty. There are the rich grain fields of the Ukraine and, further on, there are the copious oil fields of Batum and Baku., ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14}
六天后，《纽约时报》刊登了另一篇关于德国入侵俄罗斯的文章。埃德温·詹姆斯写道，希特勒再次违反协议，袭击了俄罗斯——德国过去两年的经济贸易伙伴。詹姆斯评论了袭击时机的突然性，并推测德国在击败俄罗斯后能获得什么利益。“称德国对俄国的战役为轰动一时是恰当的。虽然许多人曾相信最终俄罗斯会成为第三帝国独裁者野心的目标，但几乎无人预料到这次行动。苏维埃的土地提供了巨大的战利品。那里有乌克兰富饶的粮田，更远处还有巴统和巴库丰富的油田。”

During the Soviet counteroffensive during 1943 and 1945, tensions between Russia and the West were growing. Each side was afraid the other would make a separate peace, even though no evidence existed to fuel that fear. The more ground gained by the Soviets only
在 1943 年至 1945 年苏联反攻期间，俄罗斯与西方之间的紧张关系日益加剧。双方都担心对方会单独和谈，尽管没有证据支持这种担忧。苏联夺取的地盘越多，紧张局势就越加剧。

12 The New York Times, June 23, 1941, pg. 16
12 《纽约时报》，1941 年 6 月 23 日，第 16 页
${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} Ibid, June 23, 1941, pg. 16
${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 同上，1941 年 6 月 23 日，第 16 页
${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} Ibid, June 29, 1941, pg. E3
${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 同上，1941 年 6 月 29 日，第 E3 页
toughened Stalin’s attitude. At this point, it was clear that Stalin’s war ambitions were to keep the communist regime and the Soviet frontiers in tact and to remain in total control. While the Soviet Union was part of the formation of the United Nations in 1942, Stalin had no intentions of accepting democratic ideals. He would not make any major concessions to other countries.
斯大林的态度变得更加坚决。此时，显然斯大林的战争目标是保持共产主义政权和苏联边界的完整，并保持完全控制。虽然苏联是 1942 年联合国成立的成员之一，但斯大林无意接受民主理念。他不会对其他国家做出任何重大让步。

This section is going to deal with the three most well known conferences of World War II: Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. Within each section, I will discuss the goals, agendas and achievements of each conference as well as the impact on the political relations between each attending country.
本节将讨论二战中最著名的三次会议：德黑兰会议、雅尔塔会议和波茨坦会议。在每个部分，我将讨论每次会议的目标、议程和成果，以及对各参会国政治关系的影响。

The conference in Tehran was he first wartime conference in which all “Big Three”, the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, had attended at the same time. Taking place at the Soviet embassy in Tehran November 28, 1943 and December 1, 1943, the main point on the agenda was the establishment of a second front in Europe. The conference also included a separate agreement to recognize Iran’s independence. Robert Conquest wrote of Roosevelt’s feelings toward Stalin upon meeting him for the first time at Tehran, “This was Roosevelt’s first encounter with Stalin, and it is hard to see why Stalin summed him up as a pick pocket…Roosevelt had formed the impression that Stalin was ‘get-at-able’, by which he meant that personal persuasion would induce him to change his mind.” ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} But what of Churchill’s opinion of Stalin? According to Edvard Radzinsky, "Churchill knew very well
德黑兰会议是二战期间第一次所有“三巨头”——美国、英国和苏联——同时出席的会议。会议于 1943 年 11 月 28 日至 12 月 1 日在苏联驻德黑兰大使馆举行，议程的主要内容是建立欧洲第二战场。会议还包括一项单独协议，承认伊朗的独立。罗伯特·康奎斯特写道，罗斯福在德黑兰首次见到斯大林时的感受：“这是罗斯福第一次与斯大林会面，很难理解斯大林为何将他归为扒手……罗斯福的印象是斯大林是‘可接触的’，他的意思是通过个人劝说可以使斯大林改变主意。” ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} 那么丘吉尔对斯大林的看法如何呢？据埃德瓦尔德·拉津斯基说，“丘吉尔非常清楚

15 Stalin: Breaker of Nations, Robert Conquest, pg. 262
15 斯大林：民族的破坏者，罗伯特·康奎斯特，第 262 页
that Stalin could not be trusted, and he tried to act in the way they both [Roosevelt and Churchill] both favored." ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16}
斯大林不可信，他们试图按照两人（罗斯福和丘吉尔）都支持的方式行事。 ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16}

Before the conference, Roosevelt made several concessions to Stalin in order to make the conference happen. One of the concessions was the location of the conference itself. Roosevelt and Churchill preferred a Mediterranean location. However Stalin, being afraid to fly, preferred to stay close to home and take a train to the conference. So, Roosevelt was willing to give that to him.
在会议之前，罗斯福为了促成会议召开，向斯大林做出了一些让步。其中一项让步就是会议地点的选择。罗斯福和丘吉尔更倾向于地中海地区。然而，斯大林害怕飞行，更愿意留在家附近乘火车前往会议地点。因此，罗斯福愿意满足他的这一要求。

Several plans were agreed upon and made during the session at Tehran. Some of the conclusions were:
在德黑兰会议期间，达成并制定了若干计划。一些结论包括：

16 Stalin…, Edvard Radzinsky, pg. 498
16 斯大林……埃德瓦尔德·拉津斯基，第 498 页
8. Russia greed to battle Japan once Germany was defeated.
8. 俄罗斯同意在德国被击败后对日作战。
9. The Axis powers would be split up and controlled by the Big Three after the war.
9. 战后轴心国将被三大国分割和控制。

Stalin agreed to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain on the above outlined points. However, it would be on his terms. Conquest commented on those terms, “As to the results of Tehran, the Western powers now in effect agreed to Stalin’s frontiers…Stalin got ‘exactly what he wanted’, while Great Britain and the United States had a few vague promises in exchange.” ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17}
斯大林同意与美国和英国在上述要点上合作。然而，这将以他的条件为准。康奎斯特评论这些条件时说：“至于德黑兰会议的结果，西方列强实际上同意了斯大林的边界……斯大林‘得到了他想要的全部’，而英国和美国则换来了一些模糊的承诺。” ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17}

As to what the specific demands were, Stalin insisted that Churchill and Roosevelt espouse Stalin’s regime and his supporters in Yugoslavia. He also insisted that they permit him control of the borders between Poland and the Soviet Union. They acquiesced. They also agreed to allow Stalin to set up puppet regimes throughout Eastern Europe. Radzinsky summed up the truth of the controlling interests of the Axis powers after defeat, “The percentages-the idea that the Boss would accept anything less than one hundred percent authority-were a comic fiction.” ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18}
至于具体的要求，斯大林坚持要求丘吉尔和罗斯福支持斯大林的政权及其在南斯拉夫的支持者。他还坚持要求他们允许他控制波兰与苏联之间的边界。他们默许了。他们还同意允许斯大林在整个东欧建立傀儡政权。拉津斯基总结了轴心国战败后控制利益的真相：“百分比——即老板不会接受低于百分之百权威的想法——是一种滑稽的虚构。” ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18}

It was during the Tehran conference that Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed Operation Overlord, aka “D-Day.” They spent several days trying to decide when it should be, who should be in charge of the Allied troops, and where it should all begin.
正是在德黑兰会议期间，斯大林、罗斯福和丘吉尔讨论了霸王行动，也就是“D 日”。他们花了几天时间试图决定行动的时间、谁应指挥盟军部队以及行动应从何处开始。

The next meeting of the “Big Three” was at Livadia Palace in Yalta on February 4, 1945 through February 11, 1945. This would be the final meeting for Roosevelt, who died two months after the end of this conference. All three leaders came into this meeting with their own agendas. Roosevelt wanted Soviet assistance in invading Japan and had hoped he could get Stalin to agree to participate in the United Nations. Churchill wanted free elections and democracy in Eastern Europe (he was alone in this demand). Stalin insisted on a Soviet sphere of political influence in Eastern Europe. Together they worked on a plan to govern Germany after the war ended. Stalin believed he had the upper hand in the discussions and thought he could dictate the course of the conference.
“大战三巨头”的下一次会议于 1945 年 2 月 4 日至 2 月 11 日在雅尔塔的利瓦迪亚宫举行。这将是罗斯福的最后一次会议，他在会议结束两个月后去世。三位领导人各自带着自己的议程参加了这次会议。罗斯福希望苏联协助入侵日本，并希望能够让斯大林同意参与联合国。丘吉尔希望东欧实现自由选举和民主（他在这一要求上是孤立的）。斯大林坚持苏联在东欧拥有政治影响力范围。他们共同制定了战后德国的治理计划。斯大林认为自己在讨论中占据上风，认为自己可以主导会议进程。

Before Stalin went into Yalta, there was a cloud over his head. After the fall of Poland, 20,000+ Polish officers were arrested and imprisoned on Russian soil. Keeping so many enemies in Russia worried Stalin. He ordered most of them to be executed. He released about $1/{10}^{\text{th}}$$1/{10}^{\text{th }}$1//10^("th ")1 / 10^{\text {th }} of them. Poles began inquiring about their loved ones who had served in the Polish military but had seemed to vanish. The Polish Government is Exile in London demanded an answer to the missing officers’ whereabouts. Stalin told them that the missing men had run away at the early stages of the war. Still not believing his version of events, the Polish government in exile pushed for more. Stalin, in the presence of a Polish ambassador, rang up Beria and Molotov to ask if all of the prisoners had been released. They answered yes. However, this deception would come back to haunt Stalin.
在斯大林前往雅尔塔之前，他头上笼罩着一层阴云。波兰沦陷后，超过 2 万名波兰军官被逮捕并关押在俄罗斯境内。斯大林对关押如此多的敌人感到担忧。他下令处决大部分人，只释放了大约 $1/{10}^{\text{th}}$$1/{10}^{\text{th }}$1//10^("th ")1 / 10^{\text {th }} 人。波兰人开始询问那些曾在波兰军队服役但似乎消失的亲人。流亡伦敦的波兰政府要求对失踪军官的下落作出解释。斯大林告诉他们，这些失踪人员在战争初期就已经逃跑了。流亡的波兰政府仍不相信他的说法，继续施压。斯大林在一位波兰大使的见证下，打电话给贝利亚和莫洛托夫，询问是否所有囚犯都已释放。他们回答是的。然而，这场欺骗最终会成为斯大林的噩梦。

During the German occupation of Poland, the Germany army discovered mass graves in the Katyn forest. The graves contained the bodies of the “missing” Polish officers. They had
在德国占领波兰期间，德国军队在卡廷森林发现了集体坟墓。坟墓中埋葬着那些“失踪”的波兰军官的尸体。他们被...
been shot, most multiple times in the head and neck. Upon hearing about the discovery, Stalin was quick to blame the Germans and “…of course accused Hitler of a grotesque provocation.” ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} Once caught, Stalin retracted his statement. He said the prisoners had been sent to Smolensk to work on construction projects in that area. To complete the lie, set up a special investigative committee to look into what really happened. Of course, the committee members were all Stalin loyalists and unsurprisingly, issued a finding that supported Stalin’s version of events. Upon receiving the committee’s report, "Roosevelt and Churchill had to take their ally’s word."20
被枪杀，大多数是头部和颈部多次中弹。听说这一发现后，斯大林迅速将责任归咎于德国人，并“……当然指责希特勒进行了一场恶劣的挑衅。” ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} 一旦被揭穿，斯大林收回了他的说法。他说囚犯们被送往斯摩棱斯克，在该地区从事建筑工程。为了完成谎言，他成立了一个特别调查委员会，调查事情的真相。当然，委员会成员全是斯大林的忠实支持者，结果不出所料，发布了支持斯大林版本的调查结果。收到委员会报告后，“罗斯福和丘吉尔不得不相信他们盟友的话。”20

Stalin agreed to enter into the war again Japan under one condition-American had to recognize Mongolia’s independence as well as Soviet interest in Manchurian railways. Roosevelt agreed to this condition. However, it was a decision that many Americans believed gave Stalin a green light to expand Russia’s influence to China and Japan. Eventually, Stalin would violate the agreements in order to for the Soviet bloc.
斯大林同意再次对日宣战，但有一个条件——美国必须承认蒙古的独立以及苏联对满洲铁路的利益。罗斯福同意了这一条件。然而，许多美国人认为这一决定实际上给了斯大林扩展俄罗斯对中国和日本影响力的绿灯。最终，斯大林为了苏联集团的利益，违反了这些协议。

The main goals of Yalta were the following:
雅尔塔会议的主要目标如下：

5. Nazi war criminals would be captured and stand trial for their crimes.
5. 纳粹战犯将被逮捕并因其罪行受审。

The meeting seemed to have ended on a good note. The leaders believed they had achieved success in the agreements made. Roosevelt left “convinced that there would be peaceful relations ‘as far into the future as any of us could imagine’.” ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} How did Stalin achieve his goals? There are some who believe that "When the Big Three met again at Yalta, in February 1945, it is sometimes believed that Stalin achieved his aims in part because a Soviet spy was present in the American delegation in the form of Alger Hiss…"22
会议似乎在良好的氛围中结束。各国领导人认为他们在达成的协议中取得了成功。罗斯福离开时“确信未来‘只要我们能想象得及，就会保持和平关系’。” ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} 斯大林是如何实现他的目标的？有人认为，“当三巨头于 1945 年 2 月再次在雅尔塔会晤时，有时认为斯大林部分实现其目标，是因为美国代表团中有一名苏联间谍阿尔杰·希斯……”22

But that wouldn’t last. Once the conference ended, "Stalin reverted to, or rather continued, his old ways. He deeply offended the Americans by refusing to allow them to send officers into Poland to look after American prisoners of war released by the Soviet advance.,"23
但这种情况不会持续。一旦会议结束，“斯大林恢复了，或者说继续了他以往的做法。他拒绝允许美国派军官进入波兰照看苏联推进中获释的美国战俘，令美国人深感冒犯。”23

Stalin did not stop there. According to Conquest, “He soon infuriated Roosevelt with a barrage of accusations that the West was conducting secret negotiations with the Germans, intending to use them against the USSR.” ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} Finally, Roosevelt had had enough of Stalin and his deceptions. His lies were too late realized, though as “…only a few days before his death, he said in private, 'We can’t do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises made at Yalta.,” ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25}
斯大林并未就此止步。根据康奎斯特的说法，“他很快用一连串指控激怒了罗斯福，称西方正在与德国秘密谈判，打算利用德国对付苏联。” ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} 最终，罗斯福对斯大林及其欺骗行为忍无可忍。尽管他的谎言被发现得太晚，但“…就在他去世前几天，他私下说，‘我们无法与斯大林做生意。他违背了在雅尔塔会议上作出的每一项承诺。’” ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25}

Held July 16, 1945 through August 2, 1945, this would be the final Western-Soviet meetings. With Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, he was replaced by the new President of the United States, Harry Truman. And while Churchill attended the opening days of the conference, he was called back to London to take part in the general election, which he lost to Clement Attlee. Attlee returned to Potsdam to continue the conference with the other leaders.
会议于 1945 年 7 月 16 日至 8 月 2 日举行，这将是最后一次西方与苏联的会谈。随着罗斯福于 1945 年 4 月去世，他被新任美国总统哈里·杜鲁门取代。虽然丘吉尔参加了会议的开幕日，但他被召回伦敦参加大选，最终败给了克莱门特·艾德礼。艾德礼返回波茨坦，与其他领导人继续会议。

Before Potsdam, Averill Harriman met with President Truman to give him some valuable information on Stalin. He had “informed Truman that Stalin attached importance to aid from the Allies, that he needed to rebuild his ruined country, and that consequently pressure could be brought to bear on him at Potsdam.” ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} But it turned out to be incorrect information. Stalin “not only did not want help from the Allies, he was eager to party company with them.” ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27}
在波茨坦会议之前，阿弗里尔·哈里曼会见了杜鲁门总统，向他提供了一些关于斯大林的宝贵信息。他“告诉杜鲁门，斯大林重视盟国的援助，他需要重建被毁坏的国家，因此可以在波茨坦对他施加压力。” ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} 但事实证明这是错误的信息。斯大林“不仅不想要盟国的帮助，他还渴望与他们共度时光。” ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27}

The goals of this conference pertained to the occupation of Germany, and the prospects of Poland. During the discussion of the occupation of Germany, several things were accomplished…demilitarization, democratization, decentralization and the zones of occupation. It was also determined that any industry that had military applications, such as shipyard and aircraft factories, would be destroyed. When it came to Poland, Stalin was firm in his demands. He wanted the West to recognize Soviet control of Poland as legitimate and he wanted Polish nationals in the British Army to be permitted to return to
这次会议的目标涉及德国的占领以及波兰的前景。在讨论德国占领问题时，达成了几项成果……非军事化、民主化、权力下放以及占领区的划分。还确定了任何具有军事用途的工业，如造船厂和飞机制造厂，都将被摧毁。至于波兰，斯大林在他的要求上态度坚决。他希望西方承认苏联对波兰的控制是合法的，并希望允许在英国军队中的波兰国民返回波兰。

Poland. However, according to Radzinsky “Truman and Churchill in a joint demarche had stood firm for a democratic Poland.” ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28}
然而，据拉津斯基所述，“杜鲁门和丘吉尔在一次联合交涉中坚定支持一个民主的波兰。” ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28}

Stalin had decided to see just how much he could get out of the Allies. He was shrewd in his methods. “Stalin had won every round. He had done so as in the past by contriving, at least part of the time, to be likeable. He played the card of Russia’s titanic battles to press for concessions from the West. In fact, he overplayed it, thought the West usually forgave him.” ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29}
斯大林决定看看他能从盟国那里获得多少利益。他的方法很精明。“斯大林赢得了每一轮较量。他像过去一样，至少部分时间里，设法让自己显得讨人喜欢。他利用俄罗斯的巨大战争贡献作为筹码，向西方争取让步。事实上，他过度强调了这一点，但西方通常都原谅了他。” ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29}

In the end, Stalin felt victorious with his gains at Potsdam. “…while making ‘concessions’ when pushing and abandoning various implausible claims to territory in Allied or neutral hands…Stalin in effect secured his position in Eastern Europe.” ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} As a typical con man, Stalin was done trying to work with the Allies. The ruse was not unnoticed. Conquest wrote, “…it was now that revulsion began to set in on the part of his Western colleagues. Truman found him impressive, good-natured, polite and willing to listen to views straightforwardly put. But Truman decided at once that the Soviet Union should not be allowed to occupy any part of Japan.” ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31}
最终，斯大林对他在波茨坦的收获感到胜利。“……在推动‘让步’的同时，放弃了对盟军或中立国手中领土的各种不合理主张……斯大林实际上巩固了他在东欧的地位。” ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} 作为一个典型的骗子，斯大林不再试图与盟国合作。这一诡计并未被忽视。康奎斯特写道，“……正是在这时，他的西方同僚开始感到厌恶。杜鲁门觉得他令人印象深刻，性格温和，有礼貌，愿意听取直截了当的意见。但杜鲁门立刻决定，不应允许苏联占领日本的任何部分。” ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31}

Potsdam was significant in that Truman told Stalin of the A-bomb. After a successful testing in the Nevada desert during the conference, Truman decided to inform the Soviet leader of a powerful new weapon the US had developed and tested. Of course, Stalin was not very surprised. He had been receiving regular intelligence from Soviet spies regarding
波茨坦会议的重要性在于杜鲁门向斯大林透露了原子弹的消息。在会议期间，美国在内华达沙漠成功测试了原子弹，杜鲁门决定将这一强大新武器的开发和测试情况告知苏联领导人。当然，斯大林并不感到非常惊讶。他一直通过苏联间谍定期获得关于

the bomb. "With such a devastating weapon, Truman no longer needed Stalin in the Far East, and Allied discussions became distinctly frosty with Truman, Stalin and Churchill met at Potsdam…, ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32}
这枚炸弹的情报。“有了这样一件毁灭性的武器，杜鲁门在远东就不再需要斯大林，盟国之间的讨论变得明显冷淡，杜鲁门、斯大林和丘吉尔在波茨坦会面……， ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32}

1939 was a year of surprises for the United States, as well as the rest of the world, when Russia and German signed a treaty with each other. Americans had a hostile reaction to this event. When Russia invaded Finland, the American opinion of Russia deteriorated. According to Levering, “If Stalin and Molotov had stayed up nights during the fall of 1939 thinking of ways to antagonize Americans, they could hardly have found a more successful one than the attack on Finland. Many Americans thought that Finland was a noble outpost of democracy In Europe; they did not realize that in recent years many of its leaders had developed pronounced profascist tendencies.” ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} This attitude was apparent in a Gallup poll that was conducted in December 1939. He found a profound acrimony toward Russia and American supporters of Russia. Additionally, he found that $99\mathrm{\%}$$99\mathrm{\%}$99%99 \% of those involved in this poll preferred Finland to win the battle with Russia.
1939 年对美国以及世界其他地区来说是充满惊喜的一年，当时俄罗斯和德国签署了一项条约。美国人对这一事件反应敌对。当俄罗斯入侵芬兰时，美国人对俄罗斯的看法恶化了。根据 Levering 的说法，“如果斯大林和莫洛托夫在 1939 年秋天为了激怒美国人而彻夜难眠，他们几乎找不到比攻击芬兰更成功的方式。许多美国人认为芬兰是欧洲民主的高贵前哨；他们没有意识到近年来芬兰的许多领导人已经表现出明显的亲法西斯倾向。” ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} 这种态度在 1939 年 12 月进行的一项盖洛普民意调查中表现得很明显。他发现美国人对俄罗斯及其支持者抱有深刻的敌意。此外，他发现 $99\mathrm{\%}$$99\mathrm{\%}$99%99 \% 参与调查的人更希望芬兰赢得与俄罗斯的战斗。

In 1940, Time named Stalin their Man of the Year, not because he was a great man who did great things. He was named as such “because it seemed to be one of those years when evil triumphed over good. In Time’s opinion, Stalin had 'matched himself with Adolf Hitler as the world’s most hated man.” ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34} How shocking it must have been for American readers to
1940 年，《时代》杂志将斯大林评为年度人物，并非因为他是一个伟大的人，做了伟大的事情。他之所以被评为年度人物，“是因为那似乎是邪恶战胜善良的一年。在《时代》看来，斯大林‘与阿道夫·希特勒齐名，成为世界上最令人憎恨的人’。” ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34} 对美国读者来说，这一定是多么震惊的事情

see this. After all, not only did Americans hate Stalin because he outlawed religion and personal property in Russia, but he had forced Europe even deeper into the war by signing the agreement with Hitler.
看到这一点。毕竟，美国人不仅因为斯大林在俄罗斯禁止宗教和个人财产而憎恨他，而且他与希特勒签署协议，迫使欧洲更加深陷战争。

In July 1940, a year before Russia was attacked by Germany, Fortune asked participants in a survey, “Which one of these comes closest to what you think the government should do about Communist sympathizers? Nazi sympathizers?” The results were interesting. $16.6\mathrm{\%}$$16.6\mathrm{\%}$16.6%16.6 \% of the respondents believed that we should keep track of Communist sympathizers’ activities so they could be arrested if necessary and $13.1\mathrm{\%}$$13.1\mathrm{\%}$13.1%13.1 \% believed the same should be done for Nazi sympathizers. $32.9\mathrm{\%}$$32.9\mathrm{\%}$32.9%32.9 \% responded that the Communists should be prevented from organizing and agitating and $28.2\mathrm{\%}$$28.2\mathrm{\%}$28.2%28.2 \% responded the same about Nazis. By far, the most interesting result is that $37.8\mathrm{\%}$$37.8\mathrm{\%}$37.8%37.8 \% of the respondents said they think Communist sympathizers should be jailed or deported. Almost half, $46.1\mathrm{\%}$$46.1\mathrm{\%}$46.1%46.1 \% to be exact believed that Nazi sympathizers should be deported or jailed. It would have been interesting to see if any of the results would have changed to the same set of question after Germany invaded Russia and after the end of the war.
1940 年 7 月，在俄罗斯被德国攻击的一年前，《财富》杂志对参与调查的人问道：“以下哪一项最接近你认为政府应该如何对待共产主义同情者？纳粹同情者？”结果很有趣。 $16.6\mathrm{\%}$$16.6\mathrm{\%}$16.6%16.6 \% 的受访者认为我们应该监视共产主义同情者的活动，以便在必要时逮捕他们， $13.1\mathrm{\%}$$13.1\mathrm{\%}$13.1%13.1 \% 认为对纳粹同情者也应如此。 $32.9\mathrm{\%}$$32.9\mathrm{\%}$32.9%32.9 \% 的受访者认为应阻止共产主义者组织和煽动， $28.2\mathrm{\%}$$28.2\mathrm{\%}$28.2%28.2 \% 对纳粹持相同看法。最有趣的结果是， $37.8\mathrm{\%}$$37.8\mathrm{\%}$37.8%37.8 \% 的受访者表示他们认为共产主义同情者应该被监禁或驱逐出境。几乎一半，确切地说是 $46.1\mathrm{\%}$$46.1\mathrm{\%}$46.1%46.1 \% ，认为纳粹同情者应该被驱逐或监禁。如果在德国入侵俄罗斯后以及战争结束后对同一组问题进行调查，结果是否会有所变化，那将非常有趣。

In October 1941, just four short months after Germany invaded Russia, Fortune posed the question, “Which one of the following statements most nearly describes your present feelings about the Russian and German governments?” ${}^{35}4.6\mathrm{\%}$${}^{35}4.6\mathrm{\%}$^(35)4.6%{ }^{35} 4.6 \% of the respondents answered that they believed the Russian government was worse than that in Germany. 35.1% answered they were equally wicked while $35\mathrm{\%}$$35\mathrm{\%}$35%35 \% said that, given the choices, Russia was a
1941 年 10 月，就在德国入侵俄罗斯仅四个月后，《财富》杂志提出了这样一个问题：“以下哪种说法最能描述您目前对俄罗斯和德国政府的看法？” ${}^{35}4.6\mathrm{\%}$${}^{35}4.6\mathrm{\%}$^(35)4.6%{ }^{35} 4.6 \% 的受访者认为俄罗斯政府比德国政府更糟糕。35.1%的人回答说两者同样邪恶，而 $35\mathrm{\%}$$35\mathrm{\%}$35%35 \% 的人则表示，在这些选择中，俄罗斯稍好一些，

little better than Germany and $8.5\mathrm{\%}$$8.5\mathrm{\%}$8.5%8.5 \% of those responding said that they thought the Russian government was a lot better than Germany.
比德国好一点， $8.5\mathrm{\%}$$8.5\mathrm{\%}$8.5%8.5 \% 的受访者认为俄罗斯政府比德国好很多。

Another question posed to Fortune readers in October 1941 was, “Regardless of how you feel toward Russia, which of these policies do you think we should pursue toward her now?” ${}^{36}51.4\mathrm{\%}$${}^{36}51.4\mathrm{\%}$^(36)51.4%{ }^{36} 51.4 \% of respondents thought the United States should work with Russia and provide aid in a concerted effort to defeat Germany. $13.5\mathrm{\%}$$13.5\mathrm{\%}$13.5%13.5 \% thought the United States should adopt a “hands off” policy and provide nothing to Russia. $21.9\mathrm{\%}$$21.9\mathrm{\%}$21.9%21.9 \% believed we join Russia and England in fighting Hitler. 13.2% had no opinion on the subject.
1941 年 10 月，《财富》杂志还向读者提出了另一个问题：“无论您对俄罗斯的感情如何，您认为我们现在应该对她采取哪种政策？” ${}^{36}51.4\mathrm{\%}$${}^{36}51.4\mathrm{\%}$^(36)51.4%{ }^{36} 51.4 \% 的受访者认为美国应该与俄罗斯合作，提供援助，共同努力击败德国。 $13.5\mathrm{\%}$$13.5\mathrm{\%}$13.5%13.5 \% 的人认为美国应该采取“袖手旁观”的政策，不向俄罗斯提供任何援助。 $21.9\mathrm{\%}$$21.9\mathrm{\%}$21.9%21.9 \% 的人认为我们应该与俄罗斯和英国一起对抗希特勒。13.2%的人对此没有意见。

There is little variance in American opinions about Stalin and the Soviet Union between the end of 1939 and the German invasion in June 1941. "The changes that occurred were largely favorable. But even these resulted not from any friendly overtures by either Russia or the United States, but rather from the fact that Russia largely disappeared from the public spotlight as well as for the obvious reason that attitudes could hardly have become more unfavorable than they were at the end of $1939."$$1939."$1939."1939 . " " ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37}
在 1939 年底到 1941 年 6 月德国入侵之间，美国人对斯大林和苏联的看法变化不大。“发生的变化大多是有利的。但即使如此，这些变化也并非源于俄罗斯或美国的任何友好姿态，而是因为俄罗斯在公众视野中基本消失，以及显而易见的原因——态度几乎不可能比 $1939."$$1939."$1939."1939 . " 末尾时更为不利了。” ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37}

On June 22, 1941, Churchill’s speech on Great Britain’s position on the invasion of Russia was broadcast on the radio. He described the attack and called Hitler a bloodthirsty monster. In his speech, he also denied any connection to Communism, stating that he had been against it for over 20 years. He did, however, say that he had compassion for the Russian soldiers who were willing to sacrifice their lives to protect and defend their country. He pleaded with the United States to join Great Britain in fighting against the
1941 年 6 月 22 日，丘吉尔关于英国对俄罗斯入侵立场的演讲在广播中播出。他描述了这次袭击，并称希特勒为嗜血的怪物。在演讲中，他还否认与共产主义有任何联系，表示自己反对共产主义已有 20 多年。然而，他表示对那些愿意为保护和捍卫祖国而牺牲生命的俄罗斯士兵怀有同情。他恳请美国加入英国，共同对抗

Nazis. But “most Americans were still unwilling to heed Churchill’s plea to jump into the battle again Hitler, but undoubtedly were moved by his words…” ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38}
纳粹。但“大多数美国人仍不愿听从丘吉尔的呼吁，再次投入对抗希特勒的战斗，但无疑被他的话语所感动……” ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38}

When asked by Gallup who they would like to win the war between Germany and Russia, $72\mathrm{\%}$$72\mathrm{\%}$72%72 \% of the respondents indicated Russia, $4\mathrm{\%}$$4\mathrm{\%}$4%4 \% asked indicated Germany, $17\mathrm{\%}$$17\mathrm{\%}$17%17 \% didn’t care and $7\mathrm{\%}$$7\mathrm{\%}$7%7 \% had no opinion on the subject. When asked who they thought would win, $47\mathrm{\%}$$47\mathrm{\%}$47%47 \% said Germany, whereas only $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% responded Russia. According to the same Gallup poll, $21\mathrm{\%}$$21\mathrm{\%}$21%21 \% believed that the United States should have entered the war immediately. “By early June $1941\dots$$1941\dots$1941 dots1941 \ldots Americans have concluded by the overwhelming margin of eighteen to one that they would like to see the Soviet Union defeat Nazi Germany.” ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39}
当盖洛普问及受访者希望德国和俄罗斯之间的战争由谁获胜时， $72\mathrm{\%}$$72\mathrm{\%}$72%72 \% 的受访者表示支持俄罗斯， $4\mathrm{\%}$$4\mathrm{\%}$4%4 \% 表示支持德国， $17\mathrm{\%}$$17\mathrm{\%}$17%17 \% 表示无所谓， $7\mathrm{\%}$$7\mathrm{\%}$7%7 \% 对此没有意见。当被问及他们认为谁会获胜时， $47\mathrm{\%}$$47\mathrm{\%}$47%47 \% 表示德国，而只有 $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% 回答俄罗斯。根据同一盖洛普民意调查， $21\mathrm{\%}$$21\mathrm{\%}$21%21 \% 认为美国应该立即参战。“到六月初， $1941\dots$$1941\dots$1941 dots1941 \ldots 的美国人以压倒性的十八比一的比例得出结论，他们希望看到苏联击败纳粹德国。” ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39}

In February 1942, Fortune asked the same question it originally asked in October 1941, “Regardless of how you feel toward Russia, which of these policies do you think we should pursue toward her now?” ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40} The responses were a little different this time around. $4.4\mathrm{\%}$$4.4\mathrm{\%}$4.4%4.4 \% of the respondents believed the United States should have stopped assisting Russia; the percentages fell $9.5\mathrm{\%}$$9.5\mathrm{\%}$9.5%9.5 \% from the October 1941 poll. $43.2\mathrm{\%}$$43.2\mathrm{\%}$43.2%43.2 \% felt we should work with Russia and provide any aid needed to defeat the Axis powers; $8.2\mathrm{\%}$$8.2\mathrm{\%}$8.2%8.2 \% lower than October 1941. $41.1\mathrm{\%}$$41.1\mathrm{\%}$41.1%41.1 \% responded that we should treat Russia as full partner; up from $21.9\mathrm{\%}$$21.9\mathrm{\%}$21.9%21.9 \% from the previous October.
1942 年 2 月，《财富》杂志再次提出了 1941 年 10 月最初提出的问题：“不论你对俄罗斯的看法如何，你认为我们现在应该采取哪种政策？” ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40} 这次的回答有所不同。 $4.4\mathrm{\%}$$4.4\mathrm{\%}$4.4%4.4 \% 的受访者认为美国应该停止援助俄罗斯；这一比例较 1941 年 10 月的调查有所下降 $9.5\mathrm{\%}$$9.5\mathrm{\%}$9.5%9.5 \% 。 $43.2\mathrm{\%}$$43.2\mathrm{\%}$43.2%43.2 \% 认为我们应该与俄罗斯合作，提供任何必要的援助以击败轴心国；比 1941 年 10 月低 $8.2\mathrm{\%}$$8.2\mathrm{\%}$8.2%8.2 \% 。 $41.1\mathrm{\%}$$41.1\mathrm{\%}$41.1%41.1 \% 回答我们应该将俄罗斯视为完全的合作伙伴；比上一次 10 月上升了 $21.9\mathrm{\%}$$21.9\mathrm{\%}$21.9%21.9 \% 。

In April 1943, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) asked a cross section of Americans, "What would you say is the main thing that might cause trouble between the
1943 年 4 月，全国舆论研究中心（NORC）向一部分美国人询问：“你认为可能引发麻烦的主要原因是什么？”

United States and Russia after the war?" ${}^{41}26\mathrm{\%}$${}^{41}26\mathrm{\%}$^(41)26%{ }^{41} 26 \% of the respondents said that the difference in politics would prove to be troublesome. 13% said they thought that Russia’s demands for additional territory would be a potential source of trouble for the two countries.
战后美国和俄罗斯的关系如何？ ${}^{41}26\mathrm{\%}$${}^{41}26\mathrm{\%}$^(41)26%{ }^{41} 26 \% 的受访者表示，政治上的分歧将成为麻烦。13%的人认为，俄罗斯对额外领土的要求可能会成为两国之间的潜在问题。

By the war’s end, it seemed inevitable that Russia and the United States would turn on each other. The ideological battle that ensued would span five decades. But before the end of the war, there seemed to be a bit of optimism left in the US for a more cordial relationship with Russia. In January 1945, Fortune asked “Thinking back for a moment to our relations with Russia a few years before the war, do you think that we shall get along better with Russia in the future than we did in the past, not so well, or about the same?” ${}^{42}48.3\mathrm{\%}$${}^{42}48.3\mathrm{\%}$^(42)48.3%{ }^{42} 48.3 \% of those who responded said they believed the US and Russia would definitely get along better. $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% thought the opposite and $20.1\mathrm{\%}$$20.1\mathrm{\%}$20.1%20.1 \% thought the relationship would stay the same. In March 1945, the AIPO asked what Americans thought we would gain from Russia. 33% thought we would gain a trade relationship with Russia, $15\mathrm{\%}$$15\mathrm{\%}$15%15 \% thought we would gain the friendship of Russia, while $21\mathrm{\%}$$21\mathrm{\%}$21%21 \% voiced distrust of Russia. The same March AIPO survey also asked Americans what we had to fear from Russia. 19% felt that the political ideas of Russia were a threat to us. $12\mathrm{\%}$$12\mathrm{\%}$12%12 \% thought that the domination of Europe was a valid fear, $14\mathrm{\%}$$14\mathrm{\%}$14%14 \% feared Russia would start a war with us and $29\mathrm{\%}$$29\mathrm{\%}$29%29 \% believed that we had nothing to fear because Russia would never cooperate with us.
到战争结束时，俄罗斯和美国相互对立似乎已成必然。随之而来的意识形态斗争将持续五十年之久。但在战争结束前，美国似乎对与俄罗斯建立更友好关系仍抱有一丝乐观。1945 年 1 月，《财富》杂志问道：“回想几年前我们与俄罗斯的关系，您认为未来我们与俄罗斯的关系会比过去更好、更差，还是差不多？” ${}^{42}48.3\mathrm{\%}$${}^{42}48.3\mathrm{\%}$^(42)48.3%{ }^{42} 48.3 \% 的受访者表示他们相信美俄关系肯定会更好。 $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% 持相反观点， $20.1\mathrm{\%}$$20.1\mathrm{\%}$20.1%20.1 \% 认为关系将保持不变。1945 年 3 月，AIPO 调查了美国人对我们将从俄罗斯获得什么的看法。33%认为我们将获得与俄罗斯的贸易关系， $15\mathrm{\%}$$15\mathrm{\%}$15%15 \% 认为我们将获得俄罗斯的友谊，而 $21\mathrm{\%}$$21\mathrm{\%}$21%21 \% 则表达了对俄罗斯的不信任。同一份 3 月的 AIPO 调查还问美国人我们应当害怕俄罗斯什么。19%的人认为俄罗斯的政治理念对我们构成威胁。 $12\mathrm{\%}$$12\mathrm{\%}$12%12 \% 认为欧洲的统治是一个合理的担忧， $14\mathrm{\%}$$14\mathrm{\%}$14%14 \% 害怕俄罗斯会与我们开战， $29\mathrm{\%}$$29\mathrm{\%}$29%29 \% 认为我们无需担心，因为俄罗斯永远不会与我们合作。

There are some who believe the origins of the Cold War are firmly rooted in World War I. Others believe it took hold in 1947. The distrust of Russia, one of the main causes of the Cold War, goes back to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. In 1917, the Russian Revolution takes place. One of Lenin’s first acts was to negotiate peace with Germany, one which gave Germany a large section of territory in Western Europe. In 1918, the Allies intervened in the Russian Civil War. They assisted the White Army, but to no avail. The Bolsheviks were victorious. Because of the Allied involvement, Russia not longer trusted the Western powers. Throughout the years, relations between the two countries would be strained and tenuous, at best.
有人认为冷战的起源牢牢根植于第一次世界大战。也有人认为它始于 1947 年。对俄罗斯的不信任，是冷战的主要原因之一，可以追溯到 1914 年第一次世界大战爆发。1917 年，俄罗斯革命爆发。列宁的首要行动之一是与德国谈判和平，这使德国获得了西欧大片领土。1918 年，盟军干预了俄罗斯内战。他们援助白军，但无济于事。布尔什维克取得了胜利。由于盟军的介入，俄罗斯不再信任西方列强。多年来，两国关系一直紧张且脆弱，充其量只能算是勉强维持。

In September 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk for the Soviet embassy in Canada, defected to the West. When he made the decision to do so, he walked out of the Soviet embassy with a briefcase containing over 100 documents about Soviet espionage efforts in the West. He first went to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. No one there believed what he had to say. He
1945 年 9 月，苏联驻加拿大大使馆的密码员伊戈尔·古岑科叛逃到西方。当他决定这样做时，他带着一个装有 100 多份关于苏联在西方间谍活动的文件的公文包走出了苏联大使馆。他首先去了加拿大皇家骑警局。那里没有人相信他所说的话。他
next approached the Ottawa Journal but the night editor there was not interested and told Gouzenko to go to the Department of Justice. He did but no one was on duty at night. He went home and gathered his family. His neighbor across the hall hid them, as he feared for his family’s safety.
接着他联系了《渥太华日报》，但那里的夜班编辑不感兴趣，告诉古岑科去司法部。他去了，但夜间没有人值班。他回家召集家人。他们的楼对面邻居将他们藏了起来，因为他担心家人的安全。

When he finally found someone who would take him seriously and review the evidence he had, the results were the arrests of 39 Canadians suspected of being Soviet spies and 18 convictions. A Royal Commission of Inquiry informed other countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, as to what was happening. These countries were warned that Soviet spies had likely infiltrated their governments as well. Gouzenko proved invaluable in assisting with multiple espionage investigations. He helped to expose numerous Soviet agents worldwide. By this time, Americans were already anti-Communist and this whole affair did nothing to quell those fears. If anything, it intensified them.
当他终于找到愿意认真对待他并审查他所掌握证据的人时，结果是 39 名被怀疑为苏联间谍的加拿大人被逮捕，其中 18 人被定罪。皇家调查委员会向美国和英国等其他国家通报了正在发生的情况。这些国家被警告，苏联间谍很可能已经渗透进了他们的政府。古岑科在协助多起间谍调查中发挥了不可估量的作用。他帮助揭露了全球众多苏联特工。到那时，美国人已经反共，这整个事件丝毫没有减轻他们的恐惧，反而加剧了这种恐惧。

Because of the tremendous amount of respect earned by the Red Army and Russia, communism was highly popular immediately following World War II. Great Britain and the United States were concerned by this popularity. They were afraid that communist party victories would lead to sweeping political changes in Western Europe. In 1946, in an effort to contain the spread of communism, the United States and Great Britain made efforts to consolidate Germany under Western rule. That ambition only caused the Soviet Union to tighten its grip and expand its reach by creating satellite governments. Stalin was using communism to control half of Europe by now.
由于红军和俄罗斯赢得了极大的尊重，二战结束后共产主义非常受欢迎。英国和美国对此感到担忧。他们害怕共产党的胜利会导致西欧发生翻天覆地的政治变革。1946 年，为了遏制共产主义的扩散，美国和英国努力将德国统一在西方的统治之下。这一野心只促使苏联加强控制，并通过建立卫星政府扩大其影响力。此时，斯大林已经利用共产主义控制了半个欧洲。

In 1947, the civil war in Greece was raging. Stalin kept his promise to Churchill and did not intervene. However, Albania and Yugoslavia had their own ideas. They went against Stalin and sent aid to the National Popular Liberation Army; The British retaliated by sending aid to the royalist Greek troops. But being nearly bankrupt, the British government could not maintain such a commitment. The Brits withdrew from Greece and Turkey, leaving them vulnerable to the forces of communism. Truman stepped in to keep the communists from winning in Greece and Turkey. So, on March 12, 1947, Truman personally addressed Congress, asking for $\mathrm{\$}400$$\mathrm{\$}400$$400\$ 400 million in aid to battle the spread of the dreaded disease, Communism. Congress almost unanimously voted to approve the aid Truman, known as the Truman Doctrine, had requested. The president’s impassioned speech had a strong effect on the American people. Already staunchly anti-communist and anti-Soviet Union, the United States took a stand and made a commitment to fight communism.
1947 年，希腊内战正如火如荼地进行着。斯大林遵守了对丘吉尔的承诺，没有进行干预。然而，阿尔巴尼亚和南斯拉夫有自己的想法。他们违背斯大林，向民族人民解放军提供援助；英国则以向希腊王室军队提供援助进行报复。但由于几近破产，英国政府无法维持这样的承诺。英国人从希腊和土耳其撤军，使这两个国家易受共产主义势力的威胁。杜鲁门介入，阻止共产主义者在希腊和土耳其获胜。因此，1947 年 3 月 12 日，杜鲁门亲自向国会发表讲话，要求提供 $\mathrm{\$}400$$\mathrm{\$}400$$400\$ 400 百万美元的援助，以对抗令人畏惧的疾病——共产主义的蔓延。国会几乎一致投票批准了杜鲁门所请求的援助，这一政策被称为杜鲁门主义。总统慷慨激昂的演讲对美国人民产生了强烈影响。美国本已坚定反共、反苏，现更明确立场，承诺与共产主义作斗争。

On June 5, 1947, following in the footsteps of President Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall introduced the European Recovery Plan, also called the Marshall Plan. The goals of this plan was for the United States to aid in the rebuilding and strengthening of the Allied countries of Western Europe, while continuing its fight against the spread of Communism. The Soviet Union was offered aid under the Marshall Plan, but refused it. Stalin forbade all countries of the Soviet Union from participating in the Marshall Plan as well.
1947 年 6 月 5 日，继杜鲁门总统之后，国务卿乔治·马歇尔提出了欧洲复兴计划，也称为马歇尔计划。该计划的目标是美国协助重建和加强西欧盟国，同时继续抗击共产主义的扩散。苏联被邀请接受马歇尔计划的援助，但拒绝了。斯大林也禁止苏联所有国家参与马歇尔计划。

In an article that was printed in the Saturday Evening Post on July 14, 1951, Stewart Alsop wrote that he had interviewed the Secretary General of the Czech Foreign Office, Arnhost
1951 年 7 月 14 日《星期六晚邮报》刊登的一篇文章中，斯图尔特·奥尔索普写道，他采访了捷克外交部秘书长阿尔诺斯特

Heidrich. Heidrich detailed a meeting he had with Stalin regarding the Marshall Plan. In this meeting, Stalin was telling the Czech delegation what he believed the intentions of the United States were. “You must understand…what the Americans intend with this Marshall Plan. The Americans are determined not to allow the Western European powers to become mortally weakened. They are determined, on the contrary, to renew the strength of the European powers.” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Stalin believed there were two main aims for the Marshall Plan: 1. We wanted to strengthen our economy because we knew that another depression was coming (proven to be untrue) and 2. We wanted to dominate Western Europe.
海德里希。海德里希详细描述了他与斯大林关于马歇尔计划的一次会面。在这次会谈中，斯大林向捷克代表团讲述了他认为美国的意图。“你们必须明白……美国人对这个马歇尔计划的意图。美国人决心不让西欧列强变得致命虚弱。相反，他们决心恢复欧洲列强的实力。” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 斯大林认为马歇尔计划有两个主要目的：1. 我们想加强我们的经济，因为我们知道另一场经济大萧条即将来临（事实证明这是错误的）；2. 我们想主导西欧。

According to Heidrich, Stalin continued with this train of thought by revealing a plot to destroy America. Per Heidrich’s recollection, Stalin said, “Our first task must be to tear down the power positions of the United States in both Europe and Asia. Once this is done, England and France will be too weak to resist the pressure.” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} Stalin’s theory that the Soviet Union could broaden her reach throughout Europe was based on three closely held beliefs. The first was that the United States was facing an impending depression. The second was that if our power could be contained in the Western hemisphere, England and France would be powerless to fight off Soviet advances. The third was that the American government could be destroyed without exciting American opinion. However, all three of Stalin’s beliefs were wrong.
根据海德里希的说法，斯大林继续沿着这个思路，揭露了一个摧毁美国的阴谋。根据海德里希的回忆，斯大林说：“我们的首要任务必须是在欧洲和亚洲撕毁美国的权力地位。一旦完成，英格兰和法国将太弱，无法抵抗压力。” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 斯大林认为苏联可以扩大其在欧洲的影响力，这一理论基于三个坚定的信念。第一个是美国正面临即将到来的经济大萧条。第二个是如果我们的力量能被限制在西半球，英格兰和法国将无力抵御苏联的进攻。第三个是美国政府可以在不激起美国舆论的情况下被摧毁。然而，斯大林的这三个信念都是错误的。

The United States State Department published Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office in January 1948. This
美国国务院于 1948 年 1 月出版了《纳粹-苏联关系，1939-1941：德国外交部档案文件》。这本书

publication caused our relationship with the Soviet Union to deteriorate even further. Used were documents that were found in the German Foreign Offices in Nazi Germany that detailed Nazi-Soviet discussions of the Non-Aggression Pact and its secret protocol that would carve up Eastern Europe and the possibility of Russia joining the Axis powers. One month later, the Soviet Union struck back with its own publication, Falsifiers of History. Ironically, this publication had been heavily edited and re-written by Stalin himself. It did not repudiate the evidence in the State Department’s publication. Instead, it hurled accusations at the West, saying the West was liable for the outbreak of World War II. This publication blamed the West for helping to increase Nazi armaments and encouraging Hitler’s expansionist tendencies. Not surprisingly, Stalin made no mention, either to confirm, deny or defend, of the proposal that the Soviets were asked to join the Axis powers.
该出版物使我们与苏联的关系进一步恶化。所使用的文件是在纳粹德国的德国外交部发现的，详细记录了纳粹-苏联关于《互不侵犯条约》及其秘密议定书的讨论，该议定书将瓜分东欧，并涉及苏联可能加入轴心国的可能性。一个月后，苏联以自己的出版物《历史伪造者》进行了反击。具有讽刺意味的是，这本出版物经过斯大林本人大量编辑和重写。它并未否认美国国务院出版物中的证据。相反，它指责西方，称西方应对第二次世界大战的爆发负责。该出版物指责西方帮助增加纳粹军备并鼓励希特勒的扩张倾向。不出所料，斯大林没有提及，也没有确认、否认或辩护苏联被邀请加入轴心国的提议。

The next big step in containment was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. It was born of the European fears of resurgence in Soviet aggression. Stalin was viewed as being as dangerous as Hitler and needed to be stopped. Western Europe needed assurances that the United States would protect it from aggression during its economic recovery. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, was the driving force of NATO’s creation. And on April 4, 1949, the American Treaty was signed. The two main features of the treaty were that the United States made a firm promise to defend and safeguard Europe and reaffirmed its commitment of protection.
遏制政策的下一大步是 1949 年北大西洋公约组织（NATO）的成立。它诞生于欧洲对苏联侵略复苏的恐惧。斯大林被视为与希特勒同样危险，必须加以遏制。西欧需要美国的保证，在其经济复苏期间保护其免受侵略。英国外交大臣欧内斯特·贝文是北约成立的推动力。1949 年 4 月 4 日，美国条约签署。条约的两个主要特点是美国作出坚定承诺，保卫和保护欧洲，并重申其保护承诺。

The American public accepted NATO. It was seen as a way to participate in world affairs and fiercely oppose Soviet power. Americans believed that NATO would provide some
美国公众接受了北约。它被视为参与世界事务并强烈反对苏联势力的一种方式。美国人相信北约将提供某种
type of collective security. NATO also meant that the United States would no longer take an isolationist stance in European matters. Now, both American and European affairs were linked.
集体安全。北约还意味着美国不再在欧洲事务中采取孤立主义立场。现在，美国和欧洲的事务紧密相连。

There was a downside to NATO. The United States was the only one in any position to provide armed assistance. With extensive foreign commitments and dwindling territory, Great Britain and France were unable to actively participate for several years. West Germany’s military presence was almost non-existent. But what helped in the 1940’s and the 1950’s was the American nuclear weapons. They helped stave off Soviet attacks because of the stalemate that our respective arsenals created.
北约也有其缺点。美国是唯一有能力提供武装援助的国家。由于广泛的海外承诺和不断缩小的领土，英国和法国在数年内无法积极参与。西德的军事存在几乎不存在。但在 1940 年代和 1950 年代，帮助维持局势的是美国的核武器。正是由于我们各自的武器库造成的僵局，它们帮助阻止了苏联的攻击。

The alliance of Western powers only served to yet again escalate the Cold War. Many historians believe that NATO was a gross over-reaction to perceived Soviet aggression. There exists little evidence that Stalin plotted to invade Western Europe. NATO only intensified already unrealistic fears of the West in the Soviet minds, resulting in extremely high tension within the international community.
西方列强的联盟反而再次加剧了冷战。许多历史学家认为，北约是对苏联被认为的侵略行为的过度反应。几乎没有证据表明斯大林策划入侵西欧。北约只加剧了苏联心中对西方已经不切实际的恐惧，导致国际社会内部极度紧张。

As the rivalry and mistrust between the United States and Russia grew, both countries began to bulk up their militaries. After World War II, the United States wanted military reforms. The two goals that existed were the unification of our armed forces and a need for new institutions for their coordination. These goals led to the creation of the National Security Act.
随着美国和俄罗斯之间的竞争与不信任加剧，两国开始加强各自的军事力量。二战结束后，美国希望进行军事改革。存在的两个目标是统一我们的武装力量以及建立新的机构以协调它们。这些目标促成了《国家安全法》的制定。

Initially refused by Truman in 1950, NSC-68 was based on the assertion that the Soviets were trying to impose absolute authority over the entire world and the United States had to
1950 年，杜鲁门最初拒绝了 NSC-68，该文件基于苏联试图对全世界施加绝对权威的断言，而美国必须
stand up to them. In simple terms, this Act meant no more appeasement and no more isolation. The Act argued for U.S. military buildup as a way to fight off communism as a whole, not just the Soviet Union. The policies underscored in this Act were that of military might over diplomacy. It also outlined the creation of a military that could defend the West and allied areas, provide and protect a mobilization base, conduct offensive operations, defend and maintain communication and provide aid to allies. Truman finally approved the NSC-68 in 1951.
站出来对抗他们。简单来说，这项法案意味着不再绥靖，也不再孤立。该法案主张美国军事力量的增强，作为抵御整个共产主义，而不仅仅是苏联的手段。该法案强调的政策是以军事力量优先于外交。它还概述了建立一支能够保卫西方及其盟友地区、提供和保护动员基地、执行进攻行动、维护通信并向盟友提供援助的军队。杜鲁门最终于 1951 年批准了 NSC-68。

The first Red Scare in American started sometime during World War I. Fears and tensions built up during this time because of the violence attributed to the Bolsheviks and the Russian Revolution. Many Americans feared a Bolshevik revolution would happen on our soil, threatening to rip apart the fabric of the values of our society such as religion and marriage. Xenophobia in America was at an all time high during this time. There was a rash of factory strikes. The media called the strikes criminal and accused the organizers of plotting against the government. The Sedition Act of 1918 was one of the major pieces of legislation passed as a result of this domestic unrest.
美国的第一次红色恐慌始于第一次世界大战期间。由于布尔什维克和俄国革命所引发的暴力事件，人们的恐惧和紧张情绪在这段时间不断积累。许多美国人担心布尔什维克革命会在美国土地上发生，威胁撕裂我们社会价值观的基础，如宗教和婚姻。那时，美国的排外情绪达到了历史最高点。工厂罢工频发。媒体称这些罢工为犯罪行为，并指控组织者密谋反对政府。1918 年的煽动法案是因这场国内动荡而通过的主要立法之一。

In 1919, a plot to mail over thirty bombs to wealthy, prominent business men was discovered. JD Rockefeller, JP Chase and Attorney General Mitchell Palmer were just three of the alleged targets. A man was able to break into Palmer’s house and detonate a bomb. Palmer was unhurt, but the bomber was killed in the blast. Following the bombing of Attorney General Palmer’s house, Palmer instituted the “Palmer Raids.” These were
1919 年，发现有人密谋向富有且显赫的商人邮寄三十多个炸弹。JD Rockefeller、JP Chase 和司法部长 Mitchell Palmer 只是被指控的目标中的三位。一名男子闯入 Palmer 的住所并引爆了一枚炸弹。Palmer 未受伤，但炸弹袭击者在爆炸中丧生。在司法部长 Palmer 住所遭炸弹袭击后，Palmer 发起了“Palmer 突袭”。这些是
mass arrests of immigrants suspected of being leftists who would also be deported to their home countries. In two years, an estimated 4,000 to 10,000 people were arrested.
大规模逮捕被怀疑为左翼分子的移民，这些人也将被驱逐回原籍国。两年内，估计有 4,000 到 10,000 人被捕。

A young J. Edgar Hoover was appointed to oversee this operation. Per Hoover’s directive, prisoners were interrogated without benefit of counsel and bails were set exorbitantly high. And, ironically, much like the GPU, many of the detainees were subjected to physical violence during their arrest and interrogation. At first, the arrests were welcomed and highly praised in the press. But eventually the arrests began drawing sharp criticism. A group of twelve powerful attorneys issued a report that stated these arrests had violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights of the prisoners. Shortly after the release of this report, Palmer issued a dire warning that a massive revolutionary plot to usurp our government would be initiated on May 1, 1920. When no such attempt came to fruition, Palmer was ridiculed and it cost him his Presidential bid. A review of the evidence against those arrested and deported found that only about 600 of them were justified.
年轻的 J.埃德加·胡佛被任命负责监督这项行动。根据胡佛的指示，囚犯在没有律师帮助的情况下被审讯，保释金被定得极高。具有讽刺意味的是，就像 GPU 一样，许多被拘留者在逮捕和审讯过程中遭受了身体暴力。起初，逮捕行动受到欢迎并在媒体上大加赞扬。但最终，这些逮捕开始引发尖锐批评。十二位有影响力的律师组成的团体发布了一份报告，指出这些逮捕侵犯了囚犯的第四、第五、第六和第八修正案权利。该报告发布后不久，帕尔默发出严厉警告，称一场大规模革命阴谋将于 1920 年 5 月 1 日发动，意图篡夺我们的政府。然而，当没有任何阴谋实现时，帕尔默遭到嘲笑，这也使他失去了总统竞选资格。对被捕和驱逐者的证据审查发现，只有大约 600 人被捕是有正当理由的。

The second Red Scare coincided with the heightened fears in American after the end of World War II. These fears were brought on by Russian espionage, the Berlin Blockade, the Korea War and the Chinese Civil War. These fears spawned blacklisting, deportations, and red-baiting of suspected Communists. At the end of the 1940’s, there were several affairs that riveted the public and increased their fears of a Soviet nuclear attack on America. The trial, conviction and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for espionage, the Soviet achievement of an atomic bomb and the “Iron Curtain” that fell on Eastern Europe are a few of the most memorable.
第二次红色恐慌与二战结束后美国日益加剧的恐惧感同时发生。这些恐惧源于俄罗斯间谍活动、柏林封锁、朝鲜战争和中国内战。这些恐惧引发了对疑似共产党员的黑名单、驱逐出境和红色恐吓。20 世纪 40 年代末，有几起事件吸引了公众的注意，并加剧了他们对苏联核攻击美国的恐惧。埃塞尔和朱利叶斯·罗森伯格因间谍罪被审判、定罪和处决，苏联成功制造原子弹，以及落在东欧的“铁幕”，都是最令人难忘的事件之一。

The American people also feared the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). During their testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), ex-CPUSA members Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley told of Soviet spies and Communist sympathizers who had successfully infiltrated the American government and its agencies during and after World War II. Their testimonies were used as evidence of active Soviet infiltration.
美国人民也害怕美国共产党（CPUSA）。在众议院非美活动委员会（HUAC）作证时，前 CPUSA 成员惠特克·张伯伦和伊丽莎白·本特利讲述了苏联间谍和共产主义同情者如何在二战期间及战后成功渗透美国政府及其机构。他们的证词被用作苏联积极渗透的证据。

The HUAC, originally formed in 1938 and named the Dies Committee, after Rep. Martin Dies, investigated activities of a variety of groups, including American Nazis during the war. Communism soon became its focus, first investigating the Federal Theater Project for communist activities in 1938. A major step forward for the HUAC was the 1948 investigation of Alger Hiss. The investigation resulted in Hiss’ conviction of perjury. It also convinced a lot of Americans of the usefulness and necessity of such committees in order to root out Communist subterfuge. However, the HUAC’s darkest hour had yet to arrive. And arrive it did in October 1947 when it began an assault on Hollywood.
众议院非美活动调查委员会（HUAC）最初成立于 1938 年，最初名为戴斯委员会，以众议员马丁·戴斯命名，调查了包括美国纳粹在内的各种团体的活动。共产主义很快成为其重点，1938 年首次调查联邦剧院项目中的共产主义活动。HUAC 的一个重大进展是 1948 年对阿尔杰·希斯的调查。调查导致希斯因伪证罪被定罪。这也使许多美国人相信设立此类委员会以根除共产主义渗透的必要性和有效性。然而，HUAC 最黑暗的时刻尚未到来。1947 年 10 月，当它开始对好莱坞发动攻击时，这一时刻终于到来。

Screenwriters, directors, producers, actors and other in the entertainment industry were targeted. The HUAC claimed its only intention was to ascertain if Communists had been covertly putting propaganda in U.S. movies. Ten people who appeared on the HUAC’s witness list refused to answer if they were current for former members of the Communist Party. They refused to answer citing it was a violation of their First Amendment rights. Congressional contempt proceedings began against them in the House of Representatives. But their refusal to answer did not stop the UHAC.
编剧、导演、制片人、演员以及娱乐行业的其他人员成为了目标。众议院非美活动调查委员会（HUAC）声称其唯一目的是查明共产主义者是否秘密地在美国电影中植入宣传。十位出现在 HUAC 证人名单上的人拒绝回答他们是否是现任或前任共产党员。他们拒绝回答，理由是这违反了他们的第一修正案权利。众议院对他们启动了藐视国会的程序。但他们的拒绝回答并未阻止 HUAC。

Political pressure increased significantly on Hollywood to prove that it was truly antiCommunist. It worked. On November 17, 1947, the Screen Actors Guild passed a vote that required its officers sign a non-Communist pledge. On November 25, 1947, the House of Representatives passed a vote to issue citations against the ten entertainers who refused to answer questions, now known as the “Hollywood Ten.” The next day, the MPAA president released a statement saying the ten would be not be employed until they cleared themselves of the contempt charges and signed sworn statements that they were not Communists. This was officially the first Hollywood blacklist.
对好莱坞的政治压力显著增加，要求其证明自己是真正的反共者。此举奏效。1947 年 11 月 17 日，电影演员协会通过一项投票，要求其官员签署非共产主义者誓言。1947 年 11 月 25 日，众议院通过投票，对拒绝回答问题的十位艺人发出谴责，这些人后来被称为“好莱坞十君子”。次日，电影协会主席发表声明称，这十人将在澄清藐视法庭指控并签署非共产主义者宣誓书之前，不得受雇。这正式成为好莱坞黑名单的开端。

Fig. 3-1 Image of cover of Red Channels, a pamphlet-style book issued by the journal Counterattack in 1950 Source: Authentic History Center
图 3-1 《红色频道》封面图像，该书为 1950 年由《反击》杂志发行的小册子式书籍 来源：真实历史中心

In 1948, the persecution of Hollywood intensified. The HUAC continued its search for Communists in Hollywood, but failed to find any evidence to support its claim. However,
1948 年，对好莱坞的迫害加剧。众议院非美活动调查委员会继续在好莱坞寻找共产党员，但未能找到支持其指控的证据。然而，
that did not stop organizations such as the American Legion, from continually adding names to the Hollywood Blacklist. Some of the names on this list are surprising. Examples of the names are Aaron Copland, Jose Ferrer, Burl Ives, Dorothy Parker, Edward G. Robinson, Zero Mostel, Pete Seeger, Artie Shaw, Henry Morgan and Orson Welles. The list was extensive. So much so that it seemed the whole of the entertainment industry was on it at one time or another. In 1950, the list grew yet again, this time adding names such as Barbara Bel Geddes, Eddie Albert, Sir Richard Attenborough, Kim Hunter, and Charlie Chaplin.
这并没有阻止诸如美国军团这样的组织不断地将名字加入好莱坞黑名单。名单上的一些名字令人惊讶。举例来说，有亚伦·科普兰、何塞·费雷尔、伯尔·艾夫斯、多萝西·帕克、爱德华·G·罗宾逊、泽罗·莫斯特尔、皮特·西格、阿蒂·肖、亨利·摩根和奥森·威尔斯。名单非常庞大，以至于似乎整个娱乐行业在某个时间点都曾被列入其中。1950 年，名单再次扩大，这次加入了芭芭拉·贝尔·格迪斯、埃迪·阿尔伯特、理查德·阿滕伯勒爵士、金·亨特和查理·卓别林等名字。

On February 9, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered a speech in Wheeling, WV that would unleash a new level of persecution in this country. During this speech, he held up a piece of paper claiming it contained the names of over 200 State Department employees who were Communists. He vowed to fight them and keep them from destroying our country. This speech would garner a mountain of media coverage and would send his political star rising. But soon he would be accused of revising the numbers continually. In a telegram he sent to Truman regarding this matter, he changed the totals to 57.
1950 年 2 月 9 日，参议员约瑟夫·麦卡锡在西弗吉尼亚州惠灵发表了一场演讲，这场演讲将在美国掀起新一轮的迫害浪潮。在演讲中，他举起一张纸，声称上面列有 200 多名国务院雇员的名字，这些人是共产党员。他誓言要与他们斗争，防止他们摧毁我们的国家。这场演讲引起了大量媒体关注，使他的政治星途迅速上升。但不久后，他被指控不断修改数字。在他给杜鲁门关于此事的电报中，他将总数改为 57 人。

Because of the inconsistencies in his claims, he went before the Senate and het yet again changed the number to 81 . He spent five hours reading each case from a list that he had most likely farmed from a three year old list; called the “Lee list.” He would not reveal the source of the list he was using. During his epic recitation, he took liberties with the
由于他所声称数字的不一致，他再次出现在参议院，并将数字改为 81 人。他花了五个小时逐一宣读名单上的每个案例，这份名单很可能是他从一份三年前的名单中获得的，该名单被称为“李名单”。他拒绝透露他所使用名单的来源。在他那场史诗般的宣读中，他对信息进行了随意处理，将传闻当作事实陈述。
information by presenting hearsay as facts. This enraged many in the Democratic Party and they looked forward to using his own words to discredit him.
这激怒了许多民主党人，他们期待利用他自己的话来揭露他的不实。

A political cartoonist for the Washington Post, Herbert Block, coined the term “McCarthyism”. The cartoon appeared in the paper on March 29, 1950. Its original intention was to mock McCarthy and his beliefs. Unfortunately, it only seemed to further McCarthy’s cause and unite those who believed in him. McCarthyism had a loyal base of supporters such as the American Legion.
《华盛顿邮报》的政治漫画家赫伯特·布洛克创造了“麦卡锡主义”一词。这幅漫画于 1950 年 3 月 29 日刊登在报纸上。其最初目的是嘲讽麦卡锡及其信念。不幸的是，这反而似乎推动了麦卡锡的事业，并团结了那些信奉他的人。麦卡锡主义拥有忠实的支持者基础，如美国军团。

Fig. 3-2 Editorial cartoonist Herbert Block created the term “McCarthyism” in this cartoon which was printed in the Washington Post on March 29,1950
图 3-2 编辑漫画家赫伯特·布洛克在这幅于 1950 年 3 月 29 日刊登在《华盛顿邮报》上的漫画中创造了“麦卡锡主义”一词

One group of supporters was radical anti-communist women’s organizations, for instance the Minute Women of the U.S.A. Thousands upon thousands of homemakers were organized into patriotic clubs and directed endeavors to locate and stamp out Communist subterfuge. These far-right extremists were not alone in their support for McCarthyism. The support base was an alliance of many who felt distressed. They were united in their
其中一批支持者是激进的反共妇女组织，例如美国一分钟妇女。成千上万的家庭主妇被组织成爱国俱乐部，致力于寻找并铲除共产主义的阴谋。这些极右翼激进分子并非麦卡锡主义的唯一支持者。其支持基础是许多感到不安者的联盟。他们团结一致，反对
opposition for such things as welfare programs, efforts to reduce disparities among social classes in the United States, and their opposition in the United Nations.
福利项目、减少美国社会阶层差异的努力，以及他们在联合国的反对立场。

One focal point of McCarthyism was that of public health services such as vaccinations, mental health care and fluoridation of the tap water. All of these provisions were seen as Communist plots to poison us or destroy our government. This view led to many heated debates and clashes between “McCarthyites” and those who supported the public health programs.
麦卡锡主义的一个焦点是公共卫生服务，如疫苗接种、心理健康护理和自来水氟化。所有这些措施都被视为共产主义阴谋，目的是毒害我们或摧毁我们的政府。这种观点导致了“麦卡锡主义者”与支持公共卫生项目的人之间的许多激烈辩论和冲突。

Fig. 3-3 “At the Sign of the UNHOLY THREE”, flier issued by the Keep America Committee, May 16, 1955.
图 3-3 “在不圣洁三位一体的标志下”，由“保卫美国委员会”于 1955 年 5 月 16 日发布的传单。

By the mid-1950’s, McCarthyism was losing its momentum. One event that helped the decline of such an ugly era was the Army-McCarthy hearings. In late 1953, he decided to
到了 1950 年代中期，麦卡锡主义正在失去势头。促使这一丑陋时代衰落的一个事件是陆军-麦卡锡听证会。1953 年底，他决定...
take on the US Army. He began investigating the Army Signal Corps but was unsuccessful in finding any indication of espionage. But he wouldn’t let that deter him in his delusional quest. His next target was Dr. Irving Peress, a dentist from New York. He was accused of being a member of the American Labor Party, a left-wing organization. Because Peress refused to answer questions regarding his political beliefs and affiliations on a loyalty form, he was given a discharge within 90 days. McCarthy immediately subpoenaed Peress to testify before his subcommittee. Once there, Peress refused to answer any of McCarthy’s questions, using the Fifth Amendment as his reason. McCarthy was infuriated. He sent a scathing telegram to Robert Steven, Secretary of the Army and demanded that Peress be court-martialed. General Ralph Zwicker granted Peress’ request that his discharge be effective immediately, further infuriating McCarthy.
与美军对抗。他开始调查陆军信号兵团，但未能找到任何间谍活动的迹象。但这并未阻止他在妄想中的追查。他的下一个目标是来自纽约的牙医欧文·佩雷斯博士。佩雷斯被指控是美国劳工党成员，该党是一个左翼组织。由于佩雷斯拒绝在忠诚度表格上回答有关其政治信仰和隶属关系的问题，他被要求在 90 天内退役。麦卡锡立即传唤佩雷斯出庭作证。在庭上，佩雷斯拒绝回答麦卡锡的任何问题，理由是援引第五修正案。麦卡锡勃然大怒，向陆军部长罗伯特·史蒂文发出严厉电报，要求对佩雷斯进行军事法庭审判。拉尔夫·兹维克将军批准了佩雷斯立即生效的退役请求，这进一步激怒了麦卡锡。

McCarthy then turned his venom on Zwicker, a decorated World War II hero. This caused an outrage in the press, military, veterans, and both political parties. But more dangerously for McCarthy, he upset President Eisenhower. Stevens ordered Zwicker not to return to the hearings. McCarthy, along with several other Republican senators, had a lunch with Stevens in an attempt to calm the turbulent waters between them. The lunch resulted in Stevens signing a document that gave in to most of McCarthy’s demands, humiliating Stevens. A couple of months later, under the direction of the Eisenhower Administration, the Army launched an attack again McCarthy by charging him for issues not related to his hostile behavior.
麦卡锡随后将他的毒舌转向了兹维克，一位荣获二战勋章的英雄。这在新闻界、军方、退伍军人以及两大政党中引起了轩然大波。但对麦卡锡来说，更危险的是，他激怒了艾森豪威尔总统。史蒂文斯下令兹维克不得返回听证会。麦卡锡和其他几位共和党参议员与史蒂文斯共进午餐，试图平息双方之间的紧张局势。午餐后，史蒂文斯签署了一份文件，满足了麦卡锡的大部分要求，令史蒂文斯颜面尽失。几个月后，在艾森豪威尔政府的指示下，陆军再次对麦卡锡发起攻击，指控他与其敌对行为无关的问题。

In 1954, the Army accused McCarthy, and his main counsel Roy Cohn, for attempting to pressure the Army into giving preferential treatment to a friend of Cohn’s, David Schine.
1954 年，陆军指控麦卡锡及其主要律师罗伊·科恩试图施压陆军，对科恩的朋友大卫·施因给予优待。

McCarthy screamed that this was a simple retaliatory move designed to save face for Stevens. For 36 days, the hearing dragged on, being televised for the entire nation to watch. The committee did determine that McCarthy did nothing wrong but that Roy Cohn was the guilty one. The exposure due to the hearing severely damaged McCarthy’s popularity. At this point, many Republicans saw McCarthy as a liability to the party.
麦卡锡大喊这只是一个简单的报复行动，旨在为史蒂文斯挽回面子。听证会持续了 36 天，全程在全国电视上播出。委员会最终认定麦卡锡没有做错事，而罪魁祸首是罗伊·科恩。听证会的曝光严重损害了麦卡锡的声望。此时，许多共和党人开始认为麦卡锡对党派是一种负担。

Just like the victims of Stalin, it is difficult to accurately determine just how many people McCarthyism adversely affected. Thousands of people lost their jobs because of unfounded accusations. Hundreds of people lost their freedom. Often, employers would fire employees just for being subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee. The persecution even extended to those who were suspected of being homosexuals. Ironic considering that McCarthy was once accused of that himself and J. Edgar Hoover had a live in boyfriend. If a person was suspected of being a homosexual, he/she was also suspected of being involved in espionage. This particular suspicion caused thousands of individuals to be harassed and unable to gain employment. A stigma would follow them.
就像斯大林的受害者一样，很难准确确定麦卡锡主义到底影响了多少人。成千上万的人因为毫无根据的指控失去了工作。数百人失去了自由。雇主们常常仅仅因为员工被众议院非美活动委员会传唤就将其解雇。迫害甚至扩展到了那些被怀疑是同性恋的人。具有讽刺意味的是，麦卡锡自己曾被指控是同性恋，而 J·埃德加·胡佛则有一个同居男友。如果一个人被怀疑是同性恋，他/她也会被怀疑参与间谍活动。这种特殊的怀疑导致成千上万的人受到骚扰，无法找到工作。耻辱的标签会一直伴随他们。

In September 1945, just a few months after the end of World War II, Fortune asked readers “Would you describe Russia as a peace-loving nation, willing to fight only if she thinks she has to defend herself, or as an aggressive nation that would start a war to get something she wants?” ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} The results were very close. $38.6\mathrm{\%}$$38.6\mathrm{\%}$38.6%38.6 \% of the respondents said they believed Russia
1945 年 9 月，二战结束仅几个月，《财富》杂志问读者：“你会把俄罗斯描述为一个爱好和平的国家，只在认为必须自卫时才会战斗，还是一个为了得到想要的东西会主动发动战争的侵略性国家？” ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 结果非常接近。 $38.6\mathrm{\%}$$38.6\mathrm{\%}$38.6%38.6 \% 的受访者表示他们认为俄罗斯

was a peace-loving country. $37.8\mathrm{\%}$$37.8\mathrm{\%}$37.8%37.8 \% believed Russia was aggressive. $8.4\mathrm{\%}$$8.4\mathrm{\%}$8.4%8.4 \% believed that Russia had the tendency to be both peaceful and aggressive.
是一个爱好和平的国家。 $37.8\mathrm{\%}$$37.8\mathrm{\%}$37.8%37.8 \% 认为俄罗斯具有侵略性。 $8.4\mathrm{\%}$$8.4\mathrm{\%}$8.4%8.4 \% 认为俄罗斯既有和平倾向，也有侵略倾向。

In the same Fortune poll, participants were asked “Which of these things have you liked about Russia and which haven’t you like so well?” ${}^{4}18\mathrm{\%}$${}^{4}18\mathrm{\%}$^(4)18%{ }^{4} 18 \% liked the way she handled her diplomacy, while $42.6\mathrm{\%}$$42.6\mathrm{\%}$42.6%42.6 \% didn’t. $66.9\mathrm{\%}$$66.9\mathrm{\%}$66.9%66.9 \% liked her management of military campaigns and only $4.2\mathrm{\%}$$4.2\mathrm{\%}$4.2%4.2 \% did not. $16.1\mathrm{\%}$$16.1\mathrm{\%}$16.1%16.1 \% approved of the way she deals with the legal rights of the Russian citizens, but $24.1\mathrm{\%}$$24.1\mathrm{\%}$24.1%24.1 \% disapproved. The results were only critical of a couple of key points.
在同一份《财富》调查中，参与者被问到：“你喜欢俄罗斯的哪些方面，又有哪些方面不太喜欢？” ${}^{4}18\mathrm{\%}$${}^{4}18\mathrm{\%}$^(4)18%{ }^{4} 18 \% 喜欢她处理外交的方式，而 $42.6\mathrm{\%}$$42.6\mathrm{\%}$42.6%42.6 \% 不喜欢。 $66.9\mathrm{\%}$$66.9\mathrm{\%}$66.9%66.9 \% 喜欢她对军事行动的管理，只有 $4.2\mathrm{\%}$$4.2\mathrm{\%}$4.2%4.2 \% 不喜欢。 $16.1\mathrm{\%}$$16.1\mathrm{\%}$16.1%16.1 \% 赞同她对俄罗斯公民法律权利的处理方式，但 $24.1\mathrm{\%}$$24.1\mathrm{\%}$24.1%24.1 \% 不赞同。结果仅在几个关键点上持批评态度。

In a March 1946 poll, the AIPO asked “If the Russian government were prepared, do you think it would go to war to get what it wants?” ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} A resounding $65\mathrm{\%}$$65\mathrm{\%}$65%65 \% said yes, while $25\mathrm{\%}$$25\mathrm{\%}$25%25 \% didn’t believe she would. In the same poll, the AIPO asked, “Do you think the United States is being too soft or too tough on its policy toward Russia?” ${}^{6}60\mathrm{\%}$${}^{6}60\mathrm{\%}$^(6)60%{ }^{6} 60 \% believed the US was being too soft on Russia, while only $3\mathrm{\%}$$3\mathrm{\%}$3%3 \% thought the US government was too tough on Russia.
1946 年 3 月的一项民意调查中，AIPO 问道：“如果俄罗斯政府准备好了，你认为它会为获得想要的东西而发动战争吗？” ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 中有压倒性的 $65\mathrm{\%}$$65\mathrm{\%}$65%65 \% 表示会，而 $25\mathrm{\%}$$25\mathrm{\%}$25%25 \% 则不相信会。在同一项调查中，AIPO 还问道：“你认为美国对俄罗斯的政策是过于软弱还是过于强硬？” ${}^{6}60\mathrm{\%}$${}^{6}60\mathrm{\%}$^(6)60%{ }^{6} 60 \% 认为美国对俄罗斯过于软弱，而只有 $3\mathrm{\%}$$3\mathrm{\%}$3%3 \% 认为美国政府对俄罗斯过于强硬。

In June of the same year, the AIPO asked, “For the next ten years which do you think America should fear more-Fascism or Communism?” ${}^{7}57\mathrm{\%}$${}^{7}57\mathrm{\%}$^(7)57%{ }^{7} 57 \% of the participants indicated Communism while only $20\mathrm{\%}$$20\mathrm{\%}$20%20 \% believed that Fascism was a more realistic fear. It is evident that tensions about the Soviet Union are rising in America by this point.
同年 6 月，AIPO 问道：“在接下来的十年里，你认为美国应该更害怕法西斯主义还是共产主义？” ${}^{7}57\mathrm{\%}$${}^{7}57\mathrm{\%}$^(7)57%{ }^{7} 57 \% 的参与者表示害怕共产主义，而只有 $20\mathrm{\%}$$20\mathrm{\%}$20%20 \% 认为法西斯主义是更现实的威胁。显然，到此时美国对苏联的紧张情绪正在上升。
${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 765
${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 同上，Mildred Strunk，第 765 页
${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 765
${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 同上，Mildred Strunk，第 765 页
${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} American Public Opinion 1935-1946, Mildred Strunk, pg. 963
${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 美国公众舆论 1935-1946，Mildred Strunk，第 963 页
${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 870
${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} 同上，Mildred Strunk，第 870 页

In August 1946, the AIPO asked participants “Do you think countries under the capitalistic system and countries under the communistic system can get along peacefully?” ${}^{8}35\mathrm{\%}$${}^{8}35\mathrm{\%}$^(8)35%{ }^{8} 35 \% of the participants answered yes, while $49\mathrm{\%}$$49\mathrm{\%}$49%49 \% answered no. Not surprising considering the anti-communist sentiment in the United States at this time was ramping up and American were highly suspicious of the Soviet Union.
1946 年 8 月，AIPO 询问参与者：“你认为资本主义体系下的国家和共产主义体系下的国家能和平相处吗？” ${}^{8}35\mathrm{\%}$${}^{8}35\mathrm{\%}$^(8)35%{ }^{8} 35 \% 的参与者回答是， $49\mathrm{\%}$$49\mathrm{\%}$49%49 \% 回答否。考虑到当时美国反共情绪高涨，美国人对苏联高度怀疑，这并不令人惊讶。

The AIPO, in September 1946, asked, “Are your feelings toward Russia more friendly or less friendly that they were a year ago?” ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} Here is were we can actually feel the anticommunist and anti-Soviet sentiment that was growing in American society. $62\mathrm{\%}$$62\mathrm{\%}$62%62 \% of the participants said their feelings were less friendly toward Russia while a miniscule $2\mathrm{\%}$$2\mathrm{\%}$2%2 \% said they were more friendly. Three months later, in December 1946, the AIPO asked the same question, only substituting the time frame of six months for one year. $48\mathrm{\%}$$48\mathrm{\%}$48%48 \% responded that their feelings were the same as they were six months ago. 13% said they were more friendly and $32\mathrm{\%}$$32\mathrm{\%}$32%32 \% same they were less friendly.
1946 年 9 月，AIPO 问道：“你对俄罗斯的感情比一年前更友好还是更不友好？” ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 这里我们实际上可以感受到美国社会中日益增长的反共和反苏情绪。 $62\mathrm{\%}$$62\mathrm{\%}$62%62 \% 的参与者表示他们对俄罗斯的感情变得不那么友好，而极少数的 $2\mathrm{\%}$$2\mathrm{\%}$2%2 \% 表示更友好。三个月后，即 1946 年 12 月，AIPO 问了同样的问题，只是将时间范围从一年改为六个月。 $48\mathrm{\%}$$48\mathrm{\%}$48%48 \% 的受访者表示他们的感情与六个月前相同。13%表示更友好， $32\mathrm{\%}$$32\mathrm{\%}$32%32 \% 表示更不友好。

In NORC’s September 1946 poll, participants were asked, “Do you think our government is telling us enough about what is going on between Russia and the United States, or should it tell us more?” ${}^{10}29\mathrm{\%}$${}^{10}29\mathrm{\%}$^(10)29%{ }^{10} 29 \% thought we were being told enough while $60\mathrm{\%}$$60\mathrm{\%}$60%60 \% though we should be told more. The same poll asked, “Do you think the present disagreements between Russia and the United States are serious enough to consider going to war about, or aren’t they that serious?” ${}^{11}68\mathrm{\%}$${}^{11}68\mathrm{\%}$^(11)68%{ }^{11} 68 \% said they did not believe our disagreements were serious enough
在 NORC 1946 年 9 月的民意调查中，参与者被问到：“你认为我们的政府是否告诉了我们足够多关于俄罗斯和美国之间发生的事情，还是应该告诉我们更多？” ${}^{10}29\mathrm{\%}$${}^{10}29\mathrm{\%}$^(10)29%{ }^{10} 29 \% 认为我们被告知的信息已经足够，而 $60\mathrm{\%}$$60\mathrm{\%}$60%60 \% 认为我们应该被告知更多。同一项调查还问道：“你认为目前俄罗斯和美国之间的分歧是否严重到需要考虑开战，还是并没有那么严重？” ${}^{11}68\mathrm{\%}$${}^{11}68\mathrm{\%}$^(11)68%{ }^{11} 68 \% 表示他们不认为我们的分歧严重到那个程度。
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 376
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} 同上，Mildred Strunk，第 376 页
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 962
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 同上，Mildred Strunk，第 962 页
10 American Public Opinion 1935-1946, Mildred Strunk, pg. 963
10 美国公众舆论 1935-1946，Mildred Strunk，第 963 页
${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 964
${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} 同上，Mildred Strunk，第 964 页
to go to war over while $17\mathrm{\%}$$17\mathrm{\%}$17%17 \% wanted to see us go to war with Russia. To go along with the previous question, participants were also asked, “In the disagreements between Russia and the United States, do you think one of the countries is entirely to blame, or do you think both countries have something to do with the misunderstanding?” ${}^{12}74\mathrm{\%}$${}^{12}74\mathrm{\%}$^(12)74%{ }^{12} 74 \% said they thought both countries bore the blame and $17\mathrm{\%}$$17\mathrm{\%}$17%17 \% believed only one country was to blame. However, the results do not indicate which specific country is to blame.
为了发动战争，而 $17\mathrm{\%}$$17\mathrm{\%}$17%17 \% 希望我们与俄罗斯开战。为了配合前一个问题，参与者还被问到：“在俄罗斯和美国之间的分歧中，你认为是某一个国家完全应负责任，还是你认为两个国家都有责任导致误解？” ${}^{12}74\mathrm{\%}$${}^{12}74\mathrm{\%}$^(12)74%{ }^{12} 74 \% 表示他们认为两个国家都有责任， $17\mathrm{\%}$$17\mathrm{\%}$17%17 \% 则认为只有一个国家应负责任。然而，结果并未指明具体是哪个国家应负责任。

1946 was a period of growing fears in the United States. The HUAC had not even begun its full-scale persecution of the entertainment industry and McCarthy had not begun his war on the government. Some of the answers here are surprising. Although, it would be interesting to see how the answers to the same questions would change every six months from 1945 to 1954.
1946 年是美国恐惧情绪日益增长的时期。众议院非美活动调查委员会（HUAC）尚未开始对娱乐业的全面迫害，麦卡锡也尚未开始对政府的清洗运动。这里的一些回答令人惊讶。不过，如果能看到 1945 年至 1954 年间每六个月对同一问题的回答变化，将会非常有趣。

Beginning with America’s intervention in the Russian Civil War, we had maintained a very contentious relationship with each other. The refusal to recognize the Soviet Union as legitimate in Lenin’s lifetime kept the relations icy at best. With Russia being such a closed, secretive society, especially after the rise of Stalin, Americans have had a sense of fear and mistrust of the Soviet Union.
从美国介入俄国内战开始，我们之间就一直保持着非常紧张的关系。在列宁在世期间拒绝承认苏联的合法性，使得双方关系充其量也只是冷淡。由于俄罗斯是一个封闭且秘密的社会，尤其是在斯大林上台之后，美国人对苏联一直抱有恐惧和不信任感。

With public opinion being so important to everyone from a product marketer to politicians, it is not surprising they want to keep track of them and try to influence them to their advantage by using the media. Throughout this paper, it is easy to see just how the media is used to further agendas, be it Stalin’s or McCarthy’s. The shift in opinions can be tracked through the biases and shifting attitudes in the print media. The accuracy of the reports from American journalists in Russia is questionable at best. Between the deliberate lies of Walter Duranty and others, and the complete control over the media by Stalin, it is no wonder our opinions were more than likely skewed or confused.
鉴于公众舆论对从产品营销人员到政治家等各方都极为重要，想要监控并利用媒体影响舆论以谋取利益也就不足为奇了。贯穿本文，可以清楚地看到媒体是如何被用来推动各种议程的，无论是斯大林的还是麦卡锡的。通过印刷媒体中的偏见和态度变化，可以追踪到舆论的转变。美国记者在俄罗斯的报道准确性充其量也只能说是值得怀疑。在沃尔特·杜兰蒂等人故意撒谎，以及斯大林对媒体的完全控制之间，难怪我们的看法很可能被扭曲或混淆。

The signing of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany in 1939 sent shockwaves through the world, especially here in the United States. The writing was on the wall and Stalin’s intentions were clear. He wanted to carve up Eastern Europe and reclaim what the BrestLitvosk Treaty took from Russia in 1918. However, many saw the expansionist desires that Hitler possessed.
1939 年与德国签署《互不侵犯条约》震惊了全世界，尤其是在美国。形势已明，斯大林的意图十分清楚。他想瓜分东欧，收回 1918 年《布列斯特-立陶夫斯克条约》从俄罗斯夺走的领土。然而，许多人看到了希特勒同样的扩张野心。

With the breaking of the treaty by Hitler, American regained hope that the Soviet Union was turning a corner and ready to become a democracy, even though she retained isolationist sentiments. Stalin’s manipulation of Roosevelt and Churchill produced results that were almost unimaginable at that time. Americans were not pleased with Roosevelt over some of the concessions and agreements he made to Stalin.
随着希特勒撕毁条约，美国人重新燃起希望，认为苏联正在转变，准备成为一个民主国家，尽管她仍保留孤立主义情绪。斯大林对罗斯福和丘吉尔的操控产生了当时几乎难以想象的结果。美国人对罗斯福因对斯大林做出的一些让步和协议感到不满。

After the war ended, and Stalin had received everything he wanted from the West in concessions, the Cold War seemed to exist almost over night, even though it was rooted in the early days of the twentieth century. With all of the reports of defectors having evidence that our government had been infiltrated by Soviet spies in an all out effort to destroy our way of life, it’s no wonder peoples’ opinions were hostile and pessimistic about Russia and her leader. In the end, it was all about just co-existing. However, when you analyze the numbers and the polls, it’s clear that there was much healing to do before that would happen.
战争结束后，斯大林从西方获得了他想要的一切让步，冷战似乎几乎一夜之间就出现了，尽管它的根源可以追溯到二十世纪初。随着大量叛逃者报告提供证据，表明我们的政府已被苏联间谍渗透，进行全面努力以摧毁我们的生活方式，难怪人们对俄罗斯及其领导人持敌对和悲观的看法。最终，这一切都关乎共存。然而，当你分析数字和民意调查时，很明显在那之前还有很多伤痕需要愈合。

With the passage of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, tensions and suspicions between the US and the Soviet Union continued to rise. Both plans, aimed at containing the spread of Communism throughout the whole of Europe incensed Stalin. With the Gouzenko Affair and the espionage trials of those such as the Rosenbergs, Americans were on edge. The fear of a nuclear strike by Russia was weighing heavy on everyone’s mind even though the presence of nuclear arsenals in both Russia and United States guaranteed a stalemate.
随着杜鲁门主义和马歇尔计划的通过，美苏之间的紧张和猜疑持续加剧。这两项计划旨在遏制共产主义在整个欧洲的扩散，激怒了斯大林。随着古岑科事件和罗森伯格等人的间谍审判，美国人变得紧张不安。尽管俄罗斯和美国都拥有核武库，确保了僵局，但人们心中仍沉重地担忧俄罗斯可能发动核打击。

A
Alpers, Benjamin, 34
American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), 30, 31, 32, 33, 55, 56, 72, 73
美国民意研究所（AIPO），30，31，32，33，55，56，72，73
Attlee, Clement 49  阿特利，克莱门特 49
B
Bazhanov, Boris 19, 20
巴扎诺夫，鲍里斯 19，20
Bevin, Ernest, 61  贝文，欧内斯特，61
C
Churchill, Winston 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 59, 76
丘吉尔，温斯顿 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 59, 76
Cold War, 57, 62, 76
冷战，57, 62, 76
Collective Security, 35, 61
集体安全，35, 61
Collectivization, 1, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26
集体化，1, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26
Comintern, 9, 35  共产国际，9，35
Communism, 21, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 54, 58, 59, 65, 72, 76
共产主义，21，26，30，31，33，34，54，58，59，65，72，76
Communist Party, 2, 4, 9, 14, 16, 30, 36, 58, 64, 65
共产党，2，4，9，14，16，30，36，58，64，65
Conquest, Robert, 19, 44
罗伯特·康奎斯特，19，44
CPUSA. 64  美国共产党。64

D
Denny, Harold, 13, 15, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30
丹尼，哈罗德，13，15，17，18，28，29，30
Duma, 5  杜马，5
Duranty, Walter 2, 9, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 75
杜兰蒂，沃尔特 2，9，11，21，22，23，24，25，26，27，28，30，75
E
European Recovery Plan, 60
欧洲复兴计划，60
F
Fascism, 30, 31, 33, 35, 72
法西斯主义，30，31，33，35，72
Famine, 1, 13, 23, 24, 25, 27
饥荒，1，13，23，24，25，27
First Five Year Plan 11, 12, 13
第一个五年计划，11，12，13
Five Year Plans, 41
五年计划，41
Fortune, 52, 53, 54, 55, 71
财富，52，53，54，55，71

Gallup, 52, 54  盖洛普，52，54
Gouzenko, Igor, 57, 58, 76
古岑科，伊戈尔，57，58，76
GPU, 12, 27  GPU，12，27
Great Terror, The, 14, 19
大清洗，14，19
Hiss, Alger, 49, 65
阿尔杰·希斯，49，65

Harriman, W. Averill, 50  W. 阿弗里尔·哈里曼，50
Heidrich, Arnhost, 59, 60
Heidrich, Arnhost，第 59 页，第 60 页
Hitler, Adolf,1, 33, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 47, 52, 53, 54, 61, 75
希特勒，阿道夫，第 1 页，第 33 页，第 35 页，第 36 页，第 40 页，第 41 页，第 42 页，第 47 页，第 52 页，第 53 页，第 54 页，第 61 页，第 75 页
Hollywood Blacklist, 66  好莱坞黑名单，第 66 页
Hollywood Ten, 66  好莱坞十人组，第 66 页
Hoover, J. Edgar, 63, 71
胡佛，J.埃德加，63，71
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 64, 65, 66, 74
众议院非美活动委员会（HUAC）64，65，66，74

Kamenev, Lev, 9, 16, 17
卡梅涅夫，列夫，9，16，17
Kerensky, Alexander, 5, 6, 7
克伦斯基，亚历山大，5，6，7

Lenin, Vladimir 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 26, 37, 57, 75
列宁，弗拉基米尔 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 26, 37, 57, 75
Levering, Ralph, 33, 51
莱弗林，拉尔夫，33, 51

Marshall, George, 59  马歇尔，乔治，59
Marshall Plan, 59, 60, 76
马歇尔计划，59, 60, 76
McCarthy, Senator Joseph, 2, 3, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75
麦卡锡，参议员约瑟夫，2，3，67，69，70，71，74，75
McCarthyism, 3, 67, 68, 69, 71
麦卡锡主义，3，67，68，69，71
Molotov, Vycheslav, 37, 38, 47, 51
莫洛托夫，维切斯拉夫，37，38，47，51

National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 55, 73
国家舆论研究中心（NORC），55，73
National Security Act, 62
国家安全法案，62
NSC-68, 62, 63  NSC-68，62，63
New Economic Policy (NEP), 26
新经济政策（NEP），26
Nikolaev, leonid, 14, 26
尼古拉耶夫，列昂尼德，14，26
NKVD, 14, 17  NKVD，14，17
Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, 2, 35, 36, 37, 38, 60, 76
1939 年互不侵犯条约，2，35，36，37，38，60，76
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 61, 62
北大西洋公约组织（NATO），61，62

OGPU, 17  OGPU，17
Operation Barbarossa, 40
巴巴罗萨行动，40

Palmer Raids, 63  帕尔默突袭，63
Palmer, Mitchell, 63  帕尔默，米切尔，63
Potsdam, 43, 49, 50, 51
波茨坦，43，49，50，51
Purges, 1, 19, 22, 23
清洗，1，19，22，23

Red Army, 28, 41, 42, 58
红军，28，41，42，58
Red Scare, 3, 63, 64
红色恐慌，3，63，64
Roberts, Geoffrey, 39  罗伯茨，杰弗里，39
Roosevelt, Franklin, 34, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 76
罗斯福，富兰克林，34，41，44，46，47，48，49，76

Second Five Year Plan, 11
第二个五年计划，11
Sedition Act of 1918, 63
1918 年煽动叛乱法案，63
Strakhovsky, Leonid, 5  斯特拉霍夫斯基，列昂尼德，5

Tehran, 43, 44, 45, 46
德黑兰，43，44，45，46
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1
布列斯特-立托夫斯克条约，1
Trotsky, Leon, 9, 16, 20
托洛茨基，列昂，9，16，20
Truman Doctrine, 59, 76
杜鲁门主义，59，76
Truman, Harry S., 49, 50, 51, 59, 62, 63, 67, 76
杜鲁门，哈里·S.，49，50，51，59，62，63，67，76
Tuchachevsky, Mikhail, 17, 18
图哈切夫斯基，米哈伊尔，17，18

Wartime Conferences, 3, 43
战时会议，3，43

Yalta, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49
雅尔塔，43，46，47，48，49

Zinoviev, Grigorii, 9, 16, 17
Zinoviev，Grigorii，第 9 页，第 16 页，第 17 页

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