世界对关税的误解

The writer is chair of Rockefeller International. His latest book is ‘What Went Wrong With Capitalism’
本文作者是洛克菲勒国际公司主席，其最新著作为《资本主义出了什么问题》

At the beginning of the year, the world was in striking agreement on one point: if Donald Trump went ahead with tariffs, it would strengthen the dollar and trigger stagflation. Chief executives, investors and commentators all said the same. Economists estimated that every percentage point increase in the tariff rate would shave 0.1 per cent off US growth and add 0.1 per cent to inflation. But so far, the consequences have been far less disruptive than just about anyone expected.
今年年初，全球在一个问题上达成了惊人共识：如果唐纳德·特朗普执意推行关税政策，将导致美元走强并引发滞胀。企业首席执行官、投资者和评论人士都持相同观点。经济学家们估算，关税税率每提高 1 个百分点，就会使美国经济增长减少 0.1%，同时推高通胀 0.1%。但迄今为止，实际影响远比几乎所有人预期的都要轻微。

Some analysts still think that’s because Trump’s threats have been mostly posturing. But the effective US tariff rate has already risen from 2.5 per cent to 15 per cent. Tariff revenue is rolling in at an annual rate above $300bn, roughly four times the pace this time last year.
部分分析人士仍认为，这是因为特朗普的威胁多半只是虚张声势。但美国实际关税税率已从 2.5%升至 15%。关税收入正以每年超过 3000 亿美元的速度涌入国库，约为去年同期的四倍。

Many economists had assumed that, by lowering imports, tariffs would strengthen the dollar almost automatically, as an accounting identity. Instead, it suffered its worst fall over the first half of a year since the early 1970s.
许多经济学家曾认为，通过减少进口，关税几乎会自动强化美元——这是会计恒等式的必然结果。但事实上，美元经历了自 1970 年代初以来最惨淡的上半年跌幅。

This unexpected turn is now attributed to the fact that the dollar started the year historically overvalued. Many foreigners were heavily exposed to dollar assets. Of late, they have been hedging those risks and investing more outside the US. Many countries are increasingly attractive places to park money, in part because tariff threats inspired them to push economic reform and cut trade deals with non-US partners.
这一出人意料的转变如今被归因于美元年初时处于历史性的高估状态。许多外国投资者此前过度持有美元资产，近期他们开始对冲这些风险并加大在美国以外的投资。不少国家正成为更具吸引力的资金避风港，部分原因是关税威胁促使这些国家推进经济改革并与非美伙伴签订贸易协定。

The bigger mystery is why the stagflationary impact of tariffs has yet to materialise in the aggregate data. Is the US really enjoying a free lunch, taking in $300bn a year in tariff revenues with none of the expected heartburn? By some estimates, foreign exporters are indeed absorbing 20 per cent of the costs — a much larger share than they did in response to tariffs in Trump’s first term. The remaining 80 per cent, however, is still getting paid in roughly equal shares by US corporations and consumers.
更大的谜团在于，为何关税的滞胀效应尚未在整体数据中显现。美国难道真能免费享用每年 3000 亿美元的关税收入，却不必承受预期中的阵痛？据部分估算，外国出口商确实承担了约 20%的成本——这一比例远高于特朗普首个任期内关税措施实施时的水平。然而剩余 80%的成本，仍由美国企业和消费者近乎均摊。

The likely answer is that the negative economic effect of tariffs is being countered by other forces, including the mania for artificial intelligence and more government stimulus. Since January, estimates of what the big tech companies will spend this year on building out AI infrastructure have risen $60bn to $350bn. Smaller businesses are scrambling to catch the wave too, further boosting growth. And all this excitement is neutralising the fear that trade policy uncertainty would dampen animal spirits and freeze new capex.
可能的答案是，关税带来的负面经济影响正被其他力量所抵消，包括人工智能热潮和政府更多刺激措施。自 1 月份以来，大型科技公司今年在构建人工智能基础设施上的预计支出已增加 600 亿美元，达到 3500 亿美元。中小企业也争相追赶这股浪潮，进一步推动经济增长。所有这些热潮正在抵消贸易政策不确定性会抑制投资热情并冻结新资本支出的担忧。

AI-driven bullishness is also lifting growth by keeping financial conditions loose, even with higher interest rates. According to a new index from the Federal Reserve, those conditions would be neutral, not loose, were it not for the stock market, which has continued rising this year due largely to AI stocks.
人工智能驱动的乐观情绪还通过保持金融环境宽松来提振增长，尽管利率较高。根据美联储的一项新指数，如果不是因为股市（今年主要受人工智能股票推动持续上涨），这些金融环境本应是中性而非宽松的。

Meanwhile, the promise of tax relief makes it easier for US corporations to absorb a larger than expected share of the tariff costs, rather than pass it all on to consumers. Trump’s “big, beautiful bill” is expected to save US businesses around $100bn this year and more than that in 2026, mainly in tax breaks.
与此同时，减税承诺使美国企业更容易承担比预期更大份额的关税成本，而非将其全部转嫁给消费者。特朗普的"宏伟而美妙的法案"预计今年将为美国企业节省约 1000 亿美元，到 2026 年节省更多，主要形式为税收减免。

That is not to say tariffs have no negative economic effect. The costs are in fact starting to show up in higher prices for major household appliances, sporting goods and toys.
这并非意味着关税不会产生负面经济影响。事实上，主要家电、运动器材和玩具等商品的价格上涨已开始显现相关成本。

Yet the overall inflation rate has been held in check by falling rents and prices for other kinds of goods, including used cars and energy. And those prices are declining for reasons unrelated to tariffs; used-car prices are still retreating from highs created by supply disruptions during the pandemic.
然而整体通胀率仍受控于租金下跌及其他商品（包括二手车和能源）价格下降。这些价格下跌与关税无关：二手车价格仍在从疫情期间供应链中断造成的高位回落。

So economists were not entirely wrong about the tariffs. And stagflation may yet materialise, particularly if the average effective rate continues to climb. But so far even a much higher rate has not been enough to overwhelm the larger forces sustaining growth and containing inflation.
因此经济学家对关税的看法并非全错。滞胀仍有可能出现，尤其是如果平均实际税率持续攀升的话。但迄今为止，即便是高得多的税率也不足以压倒支撑经济增长和抑制通胀的更强大力量。

In a way what we are seeing is a replay of 2023. That year, too, many expected a big shock (then mainly from Fed rate rises) to dramatically slow US growth, only to find the impact offset by the AI spending boom and the US government’s seemingly bottomless capacity to keep doling out fiscal support.
从某种程度上说，我们正在见证 2023 年的重演。那年同样有许多人预期重大冲击（当时主要来自美联储加息）会大幅拖累美国经济增长，结果却发现人工智能投资热潮和美国政府似乎取之不尽的财政支持能力抵消了这些影响。

What the world got wrong, then and now, starts with its mental frameworks. The timeworn mistake of employing simple models, in which a headline-grabbing input A leads in a straight line to outcome B, has been greatly magnified by the global obsession with Trump. He is the only input anyone cares to analyse anymore. But complex economies are rarely shaped by just one factor, not even a shock as big as Trump’s tariffs.
世人过去和现在的误解，根源在于思维框架。采用简单模型的陈旧错误——即某个引人注目的输入 A 会直线导致结果 B——因全球对特朗普的痴迷而被无限放大。如今他是唯一值得分析的变量。但复杂经济体很少仅受单一因素影响，即便是特朗普关税这样巨大的冲击也不例外。