The Most Important Principle to Keep in Mind When Thinking About Large Government Debts and Deficits
思考鉅額政府債務與赤字時，務必謹記的最重要原則
思考鉅額政府債務與赤字時，務必謹記的最重要原則
It is:
When countries have too much debt, lowering interest rates and devaluing the currency that the debt is denominated in is the preferred path government policy makers are most likely to take, so it pays to bet on it happening.
當國家債務過高時，降低利率並讓債務計價的貨幣貶值，是政府決策者最可能採取的首選途徑，因此押注其發生是明智之舉。
當國家債務過高時，降低利率並讓債務計價的貨幣貶值，是政府決策者最可能採取的首選途徑，因此押注其發生是明智之舉。
At the moment of my writing, we know that the projections are for big deficits and big increases in government debt and debt service expenses ahead. (You can see these numbers in my writings, including my new book How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle; I also shared last why I believe the political system in the US won’t be able to get its debt problems under control). We know how debt service costs (paying back interest and principal) will grow rapidly to squeeze out spending, and we also know that, at best, it is highly doubtful that there will be an increase in demand for the debt commensurate with the supply that needs to be sold. I laid out in detail what I think the implications of all this are in How Countries Go Broke, where I offer a description of the mechanics behind my thinking. Others have stress tested it, and thus far there has been almost total agreement that the picture I am painting is accurate. Of course, that doesn’t mean that I can’t be wrong. It’s up to you to decide what’s likely true. I am just giving you and others my thinking to assess.
在我寫這篇文章的當下，我們知道，各項預測都顯示未來將出現龐大的赤字，政府債務和償債費用也將大幅增加。（你可以在我的著作中看到這些數字，包括我的新書《國家如何破產：大週期》；我上週也分享了為什麼我認為美國的政治體系將無法控制其債務問題）。 我們知道償債成本（也就是償還利息和本金）將如何迅速增長，進而排擠其他支出；我們也知道，往最好的情況想，市場對這些債務的需求能否跟上必須出售的供給量，這點也相當令人懷疑。 我在《國家如何破產》一書中詳細闡述了我認為這一切將帶來的影響，並在書中描述了我思考背後的運作機制。其他人已對此進行壓力測試，而到目前為止，大家幾乎都完全同意我所描繪的景象是準確的。 當然，這不代表我不可能出錯。什麼情況可能為真，將由您自行決定。我只是將我的想法分享出來，讓各位評估參考。
在我寫這篇文章的當下，我們知道，各項預測都顯示未來將出現龐大的赤字，政府債務和償債費用也將大幅增加。（你可以在我的著作中看到這些數字，包括我的新書《國家如何破產：大週期》；我上週也分享了為什麼我認為美國的政治體系將無法控制其債務問題）。 我們知道償債成本（也就是償還利息和本金）將如何迅速增長，進而排擠其他支出；我們也知道，往最好的情況想，市場對這些債務的需求能否跟上必須出售的供給量，這點也相當令人懷疑。 我在《國家如何破產》一書中詳細闡述了我認為這一切將帶來的影響，並在書中描述了我思考背後的運作機制。其他人已對此進行壓力測試，而到目前為止，大家幾乎都完全同意我所描繪的景象是準確的。 當然，這不代表我不可能出錯。什麼情況可能為真，將由您自行決定。我只是將我的想法分享出來，讓各位評估參考。
My Principles
As I explained, based on the experiences I have had and the research I have done over the last 50+ years of investing, I have developed and written down principles that help me anticipate events so that I can successfully bet on them. I am now at a stage in my life in which I want to pass along these principles to help others. Also, I believe that in order to understand what is happening and what’s likely to happen, one needs to understand how the mechanics work, so I am also trying to explain my understanding of the mechanics behind the principles. Here are a few more principles along with the explanations of how I believe the mechanics work. I believe that the following are true and good principles:
如我所解釋的，根據過去五十多年的投資經驗與研究，我歸納出一套原則，幫助我預測事件，以便成功押注。我人生的現階段，希望能將這些原則傳承下去，幫助他人。此外，我相信為了要了解正在發生的事以及未來可能的走向，我們必須先了解其運作機制，因此我也試著解釋我所理解的、這些原則背後的運作機制。以下是另外幾項我認為真實且有益的原則，以及它們背後運作機制的解釋：
如我所解釋的，根據過去五十多年的投資經驗與研究，我歸納出一套原則，幫助我預測事件，以便成功押注。我人生的現階段，希望能將這些原則傳承下去，幫助他人。此外，我相信為了要了解正在發生的事以及未來可能的走向，我們必須先了解其運作機制，因此我也試著解釋我所理解的、這些原則背後的運作機制。以下是另外幾項我認為真實且有益的原則，以及它們背後運作機制的解釋：
- The most hidden way, hence the most preferred and common way, for government policy makers to deal with having too much debt is to lower both real interest rates and real currency rates.
對政府決策者而言，處理過高債務最隱蔽、因此也是最受青睞且最常見的方式，就是同時降低實質利率和實質匯率。 - While lowering interest and currency rates in response to too much debt and the problems it creates can be a short-term palliative, it can reduce demand for the currency and the debt and create longer-term problems because it reduces the returns of holding the currency/debt, which reduces the value of the debt as a storehold of wealth. And over time, it usually leads to higher debts since the lower real interest rates are stimulative, making the problem worse.
雖然為了應對過高的債務及其所引發的問題而調降利率和匯率，可以是一種短期的權宜之計，但這會降低市場對該國貨幣和債務的需求，並造成更長期的問題，因為這會減少持有該貨幣／債務的報酬，從而降低債務作為財富儲存工具的價值。而且，長期來看，這通常會導致更高的債務，因為較低的實質利率具有刺激作用，反而讓問題更加惡化。
In summary, when there is too much debt, interest rates and currency rates tend to be driven down.
總而言之，當債務過多時，利率和匯率往往會被壓低。
總而言之，當債務過多時，利率和匯率往往會被壓低。
Is that good or bad for economic conditions?
這對經濟狀況是好是壞？
這對經濟狀況是好是壞？
It’s both, tending to be good and well-received in the short term but bad and leading to worse problems down the road. Lowering real interest rates and real currency exchange rates is…
這是一體兩面的，短期內看似有利且廣受歡迎，但長期來看卻有害，且會導致更糟的問題。降低實質利率和實質匯率是……
這是一體兩面的，短期內看似有利且廣受歡迎，但長期來看卻有害，且會導致更糟的問題。降低實質利率和實質匯率是……
…beneficial over the short term because it is stimulative and tends to lift asset prices…
……短期內有利，因為它具有刺激作用，且往往會推高資產價格……
……短期內有利，因為它具有刺激作用，且往往會推高資產價格……
…while it is…
……雖然……
……雖然……
…detrimental over the intermediate and long term because a) it gives holders of these assets lower real returns (because of the currency devaluation and the lower yield), b) it produces higher inflation rates, and c) it leads to greater debt.
……在中長期則有害，因為 a) 它讓這些資產的持有者因貨幣貶值和收益率下降而獲得較低的實質回報，b) 它會產生更高的通膨率，以及 c) 它會導致更龐大的債務。
……在中長期則有害，因為 a) 它讓這些資產的持有者因貨幣貶值和收益率下降而獲得較低的實質回報，b) 它會產生更高的通膨率，以及 c) 它會導致更龐大的債務。
In any case, it certainly doesn’t avoid the painful consequences of overspending and getting deeper into debt. Here are the mechanics of how it works:
無論如何，這都無法避免因過度支出和債務加深所帶來的痛苦後果。其運作機制如下：
無論如何，這都無法避免因過度支出和債務加深所帶來的痛苦後果。其運作機制如下：
When interest rates fall, borrower-debtors benefit because it reduces debt service costs, making it cheaper to borrow and buy things, which raises investment asset prices and stimulates growth. That’s why most everyone is happy with lowering interest rates over the short term.
當利率下降時，借款人（債務人）會受益，因為這降低了償債成本，使借貸和消費變得更便宜，進而推高投資資產價格並刺激成長。這就是為什麼短期內大多數人都樂見降息。
當利率下降時，借款人（債務人）會受益，因為這降低了償債成本，使借貸和消費變得更便宜，進而推高投資資產價格並刺激成長。這就是為什麼短期內大多數人都樂見降息。
But at the same time, those price increases hide the bad consequences of lowering interest rates to undesirably low levels, which is detrimental to lenders and creditors. These things are true because reducing interest rates (most importantly real interest rates), including central banks pushing bond yields down, raises the prices of bonds and most other assets, which leads to lower future returns (for example, when interest rates went to negative levels, bond prices went up). It also leads to more debt, which creates bigger debt problems down the road. So, lender-creditors get less return on the debt assets they hold, and more debt is created.
但與此同時，這些價格的上漲掩蓋了將利率降至不合意低點所帶來的不良後果，而這對放款人（債權人）是不利的。之所以如此，是因為降低利率（尤其是實質利率），包括央行壓低債券殖利率，會推高債券和大多數其他資產的價格，從而導致未來的回報降低（例如，當利率降至負值時，債券價格上漲）。這也會導致更多債務，在未來造成更嚴重的債務問題。因此，放款人（債權人）從其持有的債務資產中獲得的回報減少了，而債務卻更多了。
但與此同時，這些價格的上漲掩蓋了將利率降至不合意低點所帶來的不良後果，而這對放款人（債權人）是不利的。之所以如此，是因為降低利率（尤其是實質利率），包括央行壓低債券殖利率，會推高債券和大多數其他資產的價格，從而導致未來的回報降低（例如，當利率降至負值時，債券價格上漲）。這也會導致更多債務，在未來造成更嚴重的債務問題。因此，放款人（債權人）從其持有的債務資產中獲得的回報減少了，而債務卻更多了。
Lower real interest rates also tend to lower the real value of the currency because it makes the currency/credit yield lower relative to other countries’ alternatives. That brings me to my explanation of how lowering currency rates is the preferred and most common way for government policy makers to deal with having too much debt.
較低的實質利率也往往會降低貨幣的實質價值，因為相較於其他國家的替代方案，這會使該貨幣／信貸的收益率更低。這就帶到了我的解釋：為何降低匯率是政府決策者處理過高債務的首選及最常見方式。
較低的實質利率也往往會降低貨幣的實質價值，因為相較於其他國家的替代方案，這會使該貨幣／信貸的收益率更低。這就帶到了我的解釋：為何降低匯率是政府決策者處理過高債務的首選及最常見方式。
- Lower currency rates are preferred and seem good when explained by policy makers to their constituents for two reasons:
當決策者向其選民解釋時，較低的匯率是首選，而且看似有利，原因有二：
1) Lower currency exchange rates make countries’ goods and services less expensive relative to those from countries that have rising currencies, so they stimulate economic activity and foster rising asset prices (particularly in nominal terms), and…
1) 較低的匯率使該國的商品和服務相對於貨幣升值的國家更便宜，因此能刺激經濟活動並推升資產價格（尤其以名目價值計算），而且…
1) 較低的匯率使該國的商品和服務相對於貨幣升值的國家更便宜，因此能刺激經濟活動並推升資產價格（尤其以名目價值計算），而且…
2) …they make it easier to pay off debt in a way that is more painful to foreigners holding the debt assets than for the countries’ own citizens. That is because the alternative “hard money” approach requires tighter money and credit, which keeps real interest rates higher, which constricts spending and typically means painful service cuts and/or tax increases and tougher lending conditions that citizens don’t like. In contrast, as I will explain below, lower currency rates are a “hidden” way of paying debts because most people don’t realize that their wealth is going down.
2) …這讓償還債務變得更容易，但這種方式對持有債務資產的外國人來說，比對本國公民更為痛苦。這是因為另一種「硬通貨」方法需要更緊縮的貨幣和信貸，這會使實質利率維持在較高水準，進而抑制支出，通常也意味著痛苦的服務削減和／或增稅，以及公民不喜歡的更嚴格放貸條件。相比之下，我將在下面解釋，較低的匯率是一種「隱性」的償債方式，因為大多數人沒有意識到他們的財富正在減少。
2) …這讓償還債務變得更容易，但這種方式對持有債務資產的外國人來說，比對本國公民更為痛苦。這是因為另一種「硬通貨」方法需要更緊縮的貨幣和信貸，這會使實質利率維持在較高水準，進而抑制支出，通常也意味著痛苦的服務削減和／或增稅，以及公民不喜歡的更嚴格放貸條件。相比之下，我將在下面解釋，較低的匯率是一種「隱性」的償債方式，因為大多數人沒有意識到他們的財富正在減少。
- A lower currency rate also typically raises the value of foreign assets when looked at through the lens of the depreciated currency.
此外，若從已貶值的本國貨幣角度來看，較低的匯率通常也會提高海外資產的價值。
For example, if the dollar devalues by 20% percent, US investors will be able to pay foreign holders of dollar-denominated debt with money that is worth 20% less (i.e., the foreign holders of the debt assets will have currency losses of 20%). What is less apparent and harmful about a weaker currency is that those with the weaker currency have less buying power and borrowing power—less buying power because their currency goes less far and less borrowing power because buyers of debt assets don't want to buy debt assets (i.e., promises to receive money) or money when they believe the value of the money the debt is denominated in (and the money itself) is going down. The reason this isn’t apparent is because most people in the country whose currency is being devalued (e.g., Americans dealing in dollars) don’t see their buying power and wealth decline because they measure the value of their assets in their own currency, which gives the illusion that their assets are going up even though the currency they are valued in is going down. For example, if the dollar falls by 20%, US investors won’t directly see that they lost 20% in their buying power of foreign goods and services if they focus only on the fact that the assets they own have gone up in dollars. However, for foreign holders of US dollar-denominated debt, it will be obvious and painful. As they increasingly worry about this, they hedge (sell) the currency that the debt is in and/or sell out of the debts, leading to more weakness in the currency and/or the debt.
例如，如果美元貶值 20%，美國投資者將能用價值少了 20% 的貨幣，來償付給持有美元計價債務的外國人（也就是說，持有該債務資產的外國人將承受 20% 的匯兌損失）。弱勢貨幣一個較不為人知且有害的影響是，持有弱勢貨幣的人購買力和借貸能力會下降——購買力下降，因為他們的貨幣能買到的東西變少了；借貸能力下降，因為當債務資產的買家認為計價貨幣（以及貨幣本身）的價值正在下跌時，他們就不想購買債務資產（即承諾收取資金）。這點之所以不明顯，是因為貨幣貶值國家的多數人（例如，使用美元交易的美國人）看不出自己的購買力和財富下降，因為他們用本國貨幣來衡量資產價值，這就產生一種錯覺，認為即使計價貨幣正在貶值，他們的資產仍在升值。例如，如果美元下跌 20%，若美國投資者只關注自己擁有的資產以美元計算的價值有所上升，他們不會直接看出自己在購買外國商品和服務上的購買力損失了 20%。然而，對於持有美元計價債務的外國人來說，這將是顯而易見且痛苦的。當他們越來越擔心這一點時，他們會避險（賣出）該債務的計價貨幣，和／或賣出債務，導致該貨幣和／或債務進一步走弱。
例如，如果美元貶值 20%，美國投資者將能用價值少了 20% 的貨幣，來償付給持有美元計價債務的外國人（也就是說，持有該債務資產的外國人將承受 20% 的匯兌損失）。弱勢貨幣一個較不為人知且有害的影響是，持有弱勢貨幣的人購買力和借貸能力會下降——購買力下降，因為他們的貨幣能買到的東西變少了；借貸能力下降，因為當債務資產的買家認為計價貨幣（以及貨幣本身）的價值正在下跌時，他們就不想購買債務資產（即承諾收取資金）。這點之所以不明顯，是因為貨幣貶值國家的多數人（例如，使用美元交易的美國人）看不出自己的購買力和財富下降，因為他們用本國貨幣來衡量資產價值，這就產生一種錯覺，認為即使計價貨幣正在貶值，他們的資產仍在升值。例如，如果美元下跌 20%，若美國投資者只關注自己擁有的資產以美元計算的價值有所上升，他們不會直接看出自己在購買外國商品和服務上的購買力損失了 20%。然而，對於持有美元計價債務的外國人來說，這將是顯而易見且痛苦的。當他們越來越擔心這一點時，他們會避險（賣出）該債務的計價貨幣，和／或賣出債務，導致該貨幣和／或債務進一步走弱。
In summary, looking only through the lens of one’s own currency clearly creates a distorted perspective. For example, if the price of something (e.g., gold) goes up by 20% in dollars, we see that as the price of that thing going up rather than the value of dollars going down. The fact that most people have this distorted perspective is what makes these ways of dealing with having too much debt “hidden” and more politically acceptable than the alternatives.
總而言之，單純透過本國貨幣的視角看待事物，顯然會產生扭曲的觀點。例如，如果某樣東西（如黃金）的美元價格上漲 20%，我們會視為是該物品價格上漲，而非美元價值下跌。正是因為大多數人都有這種扭曲的觀點，才使得這些處理過高債務的方式變得「隱蔽」，並且在政治上比其他替代方案更容易被接受。
總而言之，單純透過本國貨幣的視角看待事物，顯然會產生扭曲的觀點。例如，如果某樣東西（如黃金）的美元價格上漲 20%，我們會視為是該物品價格上漲，而非美元價值下跌。正是因為大多數人都有這種扭曲的觀點，才使得這些處理過高債務的方式變得「隱蔽」，並且在政治上比其他替代方案更容易被接受。
This way of looking at things has changed a lot over the years, especially from when people were accustomed to there being a gold-backed monetary system to today when they are used to a fiat/paper money monetary system (i.e., one in which money is not backed by gold or any hard asset, which became the case after Nixon de-linked the dollar from gold in 1971). When money existed as paper notes that were claims on gold (let’s call this gold-backed money), people viewed the value of paper money as rising and falling. Its value almost always fell, and the only question was whether it fell faster than the interest rates one received by holding the fiat currency in a debt instrument. Now that the world has gotten used to viewing prices through the lens of fiat/paper money, they have the reverse view—they view the prices of things going up rather than the value of money going down.
多年來，這種看待事物的方式已發生巨大變化，尤其是從人們習慣金本位貨幣體系，到現在習慣法定／紙幣貨幣體系（也就是說，貨幣不由黃金或任何硬資產支持，這種情況始於 1971 年尼克森總統讓美元與黃金脫鉤之後）。當貨幣以可兌換黃金的紙幣形式存在時（我們稱之為金本位貨幣），人們認為紙幣的價值會漲跌。它的價值幾乎總是在下跌，唯一的問題是，其下跌速度是否快過持有法定貨幣債務工具所能獲得的利率。現在，當世界習慣用法定／紙幣的角度看待價格時，他們的看法則相反——他們認為是物價在上漲，而非貨幣價值在下跌。
多年來，這種看待事物的方式已發生巨大變化，尤其是從人們習慣金本位貨幣體系，到現在習慣法定／紙幣貨幣體系（也就是說，貨幣不由黃金或任何硬資產支持，這種情況始於 1971 年尼克森總統讓美元與黃金脫鉤之後）。當貨幣以可兌換黃金的紙幣形式存在時（我們稱之為金本位貨幣），人們認為紙幣的價值會漲跌。它的價值幾乎總是在下跌，唯一的問題是，其下跌速度是否快過持有法定貨幣債務工具所能獲得的利率。現在，當世界習慣用法定／紙幣的角度看待價格時，他們的看法則相反——他們認為是物價在上漲，而非貨幣價值在下跌。
Because a) the prices of things in gold-backed money and b) the quantity of gold-backed money have historically been much more stable than a) the prices of things in fiat/paper money and b) the quantity of fiat/paper money, I think that viewing the prices of things in gold-backed money is probably the more accurate way to view things. Apparently, central banks have a similar perspective because gold has become the second largest money (reserve asset) that they own after dollars and ahead of euros and yen, partly for these reasons and partly because gold is at less risk of being confiscated.
因為 a) 以黃金掛鉤貨幣計價的物價，和 b) 黃金掛鉤貨幣的數量，在歷史上都遠比 a) 以法定／紙面貨幣計價的物價，和 b) 法定／紙面貨幣的數量來得穩定，所以我認為，透過黃金掛鉤貨幣來觀察事物價格，可能是更準確的方式。顯然，各國央行也抱持類似的觀點，因為黃金已成為他們持有的第二大貨幣（準備資產），規模僅次於美元，但領先歐元和日圓，這部分是出於上述原因，部分則是因為黃金被沒收的風險較低。
因為 a) 以黃金掛鉤貨幣計價的物價，和 b) 黃金掛鉤貨幣的數量，在歷史上都遠比 a) 以法定／紙面貨幣計價的物價，和 b) 法定／紙面貨幣的數量來得穩定，所以我認為，透過黃金掛鉤貨幣來觀察事物價格，可能是更準確的方式。顯然，各國央行也抱持類似的觀點，因為黃金已成為他們持有的第二大貨幣（準備資產），規模僅次於美元，但領先歐元和日圓，這部分是出於上述原因，部分則是因為黃金被沒收的風險較低。
The magnitude of the declines in the fiat currency and the real interest rate as well as the magnitude of the gains in the non-fiat monies (e.g., gold, bitcoin, silver, etc.) have historically been, and logically should be, a function of their relative supplies and demands. For example, big debts that can’t be supported with hard money lead to big easings of money and credit, which lead to big declines in both real interest rates and the real currency rates. The most recent major period when this happened was during the stagflationary period from 1971 until 1981, and it caused big shifts in wealth, financial markets, economies, and political circumstances. Based on the existing sizes of debts and deficits (not only in the US, but also in most fiat-currency countries), the potential for similar very big shifts exists in the years ahead.
從歷史上看，且從邏輯上來說，法定貨幣和實質利率的下跌幅度，以及非法定貨幣（例如黃金、bitcoin、白銀等）的上漲幅度，皆是其相對供需關係的函數。例如，無法由硬通貨支撐的巨額債務，會導致大規模的貨幣和信貸寬鬆，進而造成實質利率和實質匯率的大幅下降。最近一次發生這種情況的主要時期，是在 1971 年至 1981 年的停滯性通膨期間，它在財富、金融市場、經濟和政治環境方面引發了巨大轉變。根據現有的債務和赤字規模（不僅在美國，也包括大多數使用法定貨幣的國家），未來幾年也存在發生類似巨大轉變的可能。
從歷史上看，且從邏輯上來說，法定貨幣和實質利率的下跌幅度，以及非法定貨幣（例如黃金、bitcoin、白銀等）的上漲幅度，皆是其相對供需關係的函數。例如，無法由硬通貨支撐的巨額債務，會導致大規模的貨幣和信貸寬鬆，進而造成實質利率和實質匯率的大幅下降。最近一次發生這種情況的主要時期，是在 1971 年至 1981 年的停滯性通膨期間，它在財富、金融市場、經濟和政治環境方面引發了巨大轉變。根據現有的債務和赤字規模（不僅在美國，也包括大多數使用法定貨幣的國家），未來幾年也存在發生類似巨大轉變的可能。
Regardless of whether that is right or not, it appears indisputable that the magnitudes of the debt and budget issues are very large. In such times, it’s good to have hard money. As of now and for many centuries across the world, gold has been hard money. Much more recently, some cryptocurrencies have been viewed as hard currencies. For reasons I won’t digress into again, I prefer gold, though I do have some crypto.
不論這種看法是否正確，債務和預算問題的規模之大，似乎是無可爭議的。在這種時候，持有硬通貨是件好事。從古至今數個世紀以來，黃金在世界各地一直都是硬通貨。近期，一些加密貨幣也被視為硬通貨。基於一些我不再贅述的理由，我個人偏好黃金，儘管我也持有一些加密貨幣。
不論這種看法是否正確，債務和預算問題的規模之大，似乎是無可爭議的。在這種時候，持有硬通貨是件好事。從古至今數個世紀以來，黃金在世界各地一直都是硬通貨。近期，一些加密貨幣也被視為硬通貨。基於一些我不再贅述的理由，我個人偏好黃金，儘管我也持有一些加密貨幣。
How Much Gold Should One Have?
應該持有多少黃金？
應該持有多少黃金？
While I’m not trying to give you advice on specific investments, I will share the principles that help inform my perspective on this question. When thinking about what amount of gold relative to bonds I want to have, I think of their relative supplies and demands and the relative costs and returns of holding them. For example, with Treasury bonds now giving about a 4.5% interest rate and gold giving a 0% interest rate, it is logical to prefer to hold gold if one thinks its price will rise by more than 4.5% over the next year—and illogical to own gold if one doesn’t think it will rise by 4.5%. To help me make that assessment, I look at the supplies and demands for both.
雖然我並非要提供具體的投資建議，但我將分享一些有助於我形成觀點的原則。在思考相對於債券我想要持有多少黃金時，我會考量它們的相對供給與需求，以及持有它們的相對成本與回報。例如，目前美國國債的利率約為 4.5%，而黃金的利率為 0%，如果一個人認為明年金價將上漲超過 4.5%，那麼持有黃金便是合乎邏輯的——反之，若不認為金價會上漲 4.5%，持有黃金便不合邏輯。為了幫助我做出評估，我會觀察兩者的供給與需求。
雖然我並非要提供具體的投資建議，但我將分享一些有助於我形成觀點的原則。在思考相對於債券我想要持有多少黃金時，我會考量它們的相對供給與需求，以及持有它們的相對成本與回報。例如，目前美國國債的利率約為 4.5%，而黃金的利率為 0%，如果一個人認為明年金價將上漲超過 4.5%，那麼持有黃金便是合乎邏輯的——反之，若不認為金價會上漲 4.5%，持有黃金便不合邏輯。為了幫助我做出評估，我會觀察兩者的供給與需求。
I also know that gold and bonds diversify each other, so I think about how much of each I should have for good risk control, and I know that a gold holding of roughly 15% can be an effective diversifier over time in that it produces a better return/risk ratio for the portfolio. Inflation-linked bonds do the same, so it is worth considering adding both to a typical portfolio.
我也知道黃金和債券能互相分散風險，所以我會思考各自應該持有多少才能有效控制風險，而且我知道，長期來看，持有大約 15% 的黃金可以成為一個有效的風險分散工具，因為它能為投資組合帶來更好的報酬／風險比。抗通膨債券也有同樣的效果，所以值得考慮將這兩者都加入一般的投資組合中。
我也知道黃金和債券能互相分散風險，所以我會思考各自應該持有多少才能有效控制風險，而且我知道，長期來看，持有大約 15% 的黃金可以成為一個有效的風險分散工具，因為它能為投資組合帶來更好的報酬／風險比。抗通膨債券也有同樣的效果，所以值得考慮將這兩者都加入一般的投資組合中。
I am sharing this perspective with you rather than telling you what I think the markets will do or suggesting exactly how much of each asset you should have because my goal is to “teach you how to fish rather than give you fish.”
我與你分享這個觀點，而非告訴你我認為市場將如何發展，或建議你應持有多少各類資產，因為我的目標是「與其給你魚，不如教你如何釣魚」。
我與你分享這個觀點，而非告訴你我認為市場將如何發展，或建議你應持有多少各類資產，因為我的目標是「與其給你魚，不如教你如何釣魚」。
PS- If you would like a much more complete view of my investment thinking, I will refer you to this course on my Investment and Economic Principles created by . I promise you that you can easily learn these principles and that they will prove invaluable in your understanding of what’s going on and what’s likely to happen—and what that means for your investment approach. 100% of the people who have taken it said that they would recommend it to others.
P.S. 如果您想更完整地了解我的投資思維，我推薦您參考這門由新加坡財富管理學院所開設的「投資與經濟原則」課程。我向您保證，您能輕鬆學會這些原則，而它們對於理解當前局勢、未來可能的發展，以及這對您的投資策略意味著什麼，將非常有價值。百分之百上過這門課的人都表示，會將它推薦給別人。
P.S. 如果您想更完整地了解我的投資思維，我推薦您參考這門由新加坡財富管理學院所開設的「投資與經濟原則」課程。我向您保證，您能輕鬆學會這些原則，而它們對於理解當前局勢、未來可能的發展，以及這對您的投資策略意味著什麼，將非常有價值。百分之百上過這門課的人都表示，會將它推薦給別人。
The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of Bridgewater.
此處表達的觀點為我個人意見，不必然代表橋水公司。
此處表達的觀點為我個人意見，不必然代表橋水公司。
Bridgewater Daily Observations is prepared by and is the property of Bridgewater Associates, LP and is circulated for informational and educational purposes only. There is no consideration given to the specific investment needs, objectives, or tolerances of any of the recipients. Additionally, Bridgewater's actual investment positions may, and often will, vary from its conclusions discussed herein based on any number of factors, such as client investment restrictions, portfolio rebalancing and transactions costs, among others. Recipients should consult their own advisors, including tax advisors, before making any investment decision. This material is for informational and educational purposes only and is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy the securities or other instruments mentioned. Any such offering will be made pursuant to a definitive offering memorandum. This material does not constitute a personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual investors which are necessary considerations before making any investment decision. Investors should consider whether any advice or recommendation in this research is suitable for their particular circumstances and, where appropriate, seek professional advice, including legal, tax, accounting, investment, or other advice. No discussion with respect to specific companies should be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular investment. The companies discussed should not be taken to represent holdings in any Bridgewater strategy. It should not be assumed that any of the companies discussed were or will be profitable, or that recommendations made in the future will be profitable.
《橋水每日觀察》由橋水聯合公司（Bridgewater Associates, LP）編製且為其財產，僅為資訊和教育目的流通。內容未考量任何收件人的特定投資需求、目標或風險承受能力。此外，基於客戶投資限制、投資組合再平衡和交易成本等多種因素，橋水的實際投資部位可能（且經常）會與本文討論的結論有所不同。收件人在做出任何投資決策前，應諮詢自己的顧問，包括稅務顧問。本資料僅供參考及教育之用，並非出售或招攬購買所述證券或其他工具的要約。任何此類發行將根據最終的發行說明書進行。本資料不構成個人推薦，亦未考量個別投資者的特定投資目標、財務狀況或需求，而這些都是在做出任何投資決策前所必要的考量。投資者應衡量本研究中的任何建議或推薦是否適合其特定情況，並在適當時尋求專業意見，包括法律、稅務、會計、投資或其他建議。任何關於特定公司的討論，均不應被視為購買或出售任何特定投資的建議。所討論的公司不應被視為代表橋水任何策略中的持股。不應假設所討論的任何公司過去或未來會獲利，或未來提出的建議將會獲利。
《橋水每日觀察》由橋水聯合公司（Bridgewater Associates, LP）編製且為其財產，僅為資訊和教育目的流通。內容未考量任何收件人的特定投資需求、目標或風險承受能力。此外，基於客戶投資限制、投資組合再平衡和交易成本等多種因素，橋水的實際投資部位可能（且經常）會與本文討論的結論有所不同。收件人在做出任何投資決策前，應諮詢自己的顧問，包括稅務顧問。本資料僅供參考及教育之用，並非出售或招攬購買所述證券或其他工具的要約。任何此類發行將根據最終的發行說明書進行。本資料不構成個人推薦，亦未考量個別投資者的特定投資目標、財務狀況或需求，而這些都是在做出任何投資決策前所必要的考量。投資者應衡量本研究中的任何建議或推薦是否適合其特定情況，並在適當時尋求專業意見，包括法律、稅務、會計、投資或其他建議。任何關於特定公司的討論，均不應被視為購買或出售任何特定投資的建議。所討論的公司不應被視為代表橋水任何策略中的持股。不應假設所討論的任何公司過去或未來會獲利，或未來提出的建議將會獲利。
The information provided herein is not intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment decision and investment decisions should not be based on simulated, hypothetical, or illustrative information that have inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record simulated or hypothetical results do not represent actual trading or the actual costs of management and may have under or overcompensated for the impact of certain market risk factors. Bridgewater makes no representation that any account will or is likely to achieve returns similar to those shown. The price and value of the investments referred to in this research and the income therefrom may fluctuate. Every investment involves risk and in volatile or uncertain market conditions, significant variations in the value or return on that investment may occur. Investments in hedge funds are complex, speculative and carry a high degree of risk, including the risk of a complete loss of an investor’s entire investment. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a complete loss of original capital may occur. Certain transactions, including those involving leverage, futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have material adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived from, certain investments.
本文提供的資訊無意作為做出投資決策的充分依據，且投資決策不應基於具有內在限制的模擬、假設或說明性資訊。與實際績效紀錄不同，模擬或假設的結果不代表實際交易或實際管理成本，且可能對某些市場風險因素的影響補償不足或過度。Bridgewater 不保證任何帳戶將會或可能實現與所示相似的回報。本研究中提及的投資標的之價格與價值及其收益可能會波動。每項投資都涉及風險，在動盪或不確定的市場條件下，該投資的價值或回報可能會出現顯著變化。投資避險基金是複雜、具投機性且帶有高度風險的，包括投資者可能損失全部投資的風險。過往績效並非未來表現的指引，未來回報不獲保證，且可能發生原始資本的完全損失。某些交易，包括涉及槓桿、期貨、選擇權和其他衍生性金融商品的交易，會產生重大風險，不適合所有投資者。匯率波動可能對某些投資的價值、價格或其所產生的收益產生重大的不利影響。
本文提供的資訊無意作為做出投資決策的充分依據，且投資決策不應基於具有內在限制的模擬、假設或說明性資訊。與實際績效紀錄不同，模擬或假設的結果不代表實際交易或實際管理成本，且可能對某些市場風險因素的影響補償不足或過度。Bridgewater 不保證任何帳戶將會或可能實現與所示相似的回報。本研究中提及的投資標的之價格與價值及其收益可能會波動。每項投資都涉及風險，在動盪或不確定的市場條件下，該投資的價值或回報可能會出現顯著變化。投資避險基金是複雜、具投機性且帶有高度風險的，包括投資者可能損失全部投資的風險。過往績效並非未來表現的指引，未來回報不獲保證，且可能發生原始資本的完全損失。某些交易，包括涉及槓桿、期貨、選擇權和其他衍生性金融商品的交易，會產生重大風險，不適合所有投資者。匯率波動可能對某些投資的價值、價格或其所產生的收益產生重大的不利影響。
Bridgewater research utilizes data and information from public, private, and internal sources, including data from actual Bridgewater trades. Sources include Absolute Strategy Research, BCA, Bloomberg Finance L.P., Bond Radar, Candeal, CEIC Data Company Ltd., Ceras Analytics, China Bull Research, Clarus Financial Technology, CLS Processing Solutions, Conference Board of Canada, Consensus Economics Inc., DTCC Data Repository, Ecoanalitica, Empirical Research Partners, Energy Aspects Corp, Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp), Enverus, EPFR Global, Eurasia Group, Evercore ISI, FactSet Research Systems, Fastmarkets Global Limited, The Financial Times Limited, Finaeon, Inc., FINRA, GaveKal Research Ltd., GlobalSource Partners, Gordon Haskett Research Associates, Harvard Business Review, Haver Analytics, Inc., Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Insync Analytics, The Investment Funds Institute of Canada, ICE Derived Data (UK), Investment Company Institute, International Institute of Finance, JP Morgan, JSTA Advisors, LSEG Data and Analytics, MarketAxess, Medley Global Advisors, Metals Focus Ltd, MSCI, Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research, Neudata, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pensions & Investments Research Center, Pitchbook, Political Alpha, Renaissance Capital Research, Rhodium Group, RP Data, Rubinson Research, Rystad Energy, S&P Global Market Intelligence, Sentix GmbH, SGH Macro, Shanghai Metals Market, Smart Insider Ltd., Sustainalytics, Swaps Monitor, Tradeweb, United Nations, US Department of Commerce, Visible Alpha, Wells Bay, Wind Financial Information LLC, With Intelligence, Wood Mackenzie Limited, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, World Economic Forum, YieldBook. While we consider information from external sources to be reliable, we do not assume responsibility for its accuracy. Data leveraged from third-party providers, related to financial and non-financial characteristics, may not be accurate or complete. The data and factors that Bridgewater considers within its research process may change over time.
Bridgewater 的研究利用來自公開、私有和內部來源的數據和資訊，包括來自 Bridgewater 實際交易的數據。來源包括 Absolute Strategy Research、BCA、Bloomberg Finance L.P.、Bond Radar、Candeal、 CEIC Data Company Ltd.、Ceras Analytics、China Bull Research、Clarus Financial Technology、CLS Processing Solutions、Conference Board of Canada、Consensus Economics Inc.、DTCC Data Repository、Ecoanalitica、Empirical Research Partners、Energy Aspects Corp、Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp)、Enverus、EPFR Global、Eurasia Group、Evercore ISI、FactSet Research Systems、Fastmarkets Global Limited、The Financial Times Limited、Finaeon, Inc.、FINRA、GaveKal Research Ltd.、GlobalSource Partners、Gordon Haskett Research Associates、Harvard Business Review、Haver Analytics, Inc.、Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)、Insync Analytics、The Investment Funds Institute of Canada、ICE Derived Data (UK)、Investment Company Institute、International Institute of Finance、JP Morgan、JSTA Advisors、LSEG Data and Analytics、MarketAxess、Medley Global Advisors、Metals Focus Ltd、MSCI, Inc.、National Bureau of Economic Research、Neudata、Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development、Pensions & Investments Research Center、Pitchbook、Political Alpha、Renaissance Capital Research、Rhodium Group、RP Data、Rubinson Research、Rystad Energy、S&P Global Market Intelligence、Sentix GmbH、SGH Macro、Shanghai Metals Market、Smart Insider Ltd.、Sustainalytics、Swaps Monitor、Tradeweb、United Nations、US Department of Commerce、Visible Alpha、Wells Bay、Wind Financial Information LLC、With Intelligence、Wood Mackenzie Limited、World Bureau of Metal Statistics、World Economic Forum、YieldBook。雖然我們認為來自外部來源的資訊是可靠的，但我們不對其準確性承擔責任。從第三方供應商獲得的、與財務和非財務特徵相關的數據，可能不準確或不完整。Bridgewater 在其研究過程中考量的數據和因素可能會隨時間而改變。
Bridgewater 的研究利用來自公開、私有和內部來源的數據和資訊，包括來自 Bridgewater 實際交易的數據。來源包括 Absolute Strategy Research、BCA、Bloomberg Finance L.P.、Bond Radar、Candeal、 CEIC Data Company Ltd.、Ceras Analytics、China Bull Research、Clarus Financial Technology、CLS Processing Solutions、Conference Board of Canada、Consensus Economics Inc.、DTCC Data Repository、Ecoanalitica、Empirical Research Partners、Energy Aspects Corp、Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp)、Enverus、EPFR Global、Eurasia Group、Evercore ISI、FactSet Research Systems、Fastmarkets Global Limited、The Financial Times Limited、Finaeon, Inc.、FINRA、GaveKal Research Ltd.、GlobalSource Partners、Gordon Haskett Research Associates、Harvard Business Review、Haver Analytics, Inc.、Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)、Insync Analytics、The Investment Funds Institute of Canada、ICE Derived Data (UK)、Investment Company Institute、International Institute of Finance、JP Morgan、JSTA Advisors、LSEG Data and Analytics、MarketAxess、Medley Global Advisors、Metals Focus Ltd、MSCI, Inc.、National Bureau of Economic Research、Neudata、Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development、Pensions & Investments Research Center、Pitchbook、Political Alpha、Renaissance Capital Research、Rhodium Group、RP Data、Rubinson Research、Rystad Energy、S&P Global Market Intelligence、Sentix GmbH、SGH Macro、Shanghai Metals Market、Smart Insider Ltd.、Sustainalytics、Swaps Monitor、Tradeweb、United Nations、US Department of Commerce、Visible Alpha、Wells Bay、Wind Financial Information LLC、With Intelligence、Wood Mackenzie Limited、World Bureau of Metal Statistics、World Economic Forum、YieldBook。雖然我們認為來自外部來源的資訊是可靠的，但我們不對其準確性承擔責任。從第三方供應商獲得的、與財務和非財務特徵相關的數據，可能不準確或不完整。Bridgewater 在其研究過程中考量的數據和因素可能會隨時間而改變。
This information is not directed at or intended for distribution to or use by any person or entity located in any jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability, or use would be contrary to applicable law or regulation, or which would subject Bridgewater to any registration or licensing requirements within such jurisdiction. No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied, or duplicated in any form by any means or (ii) redistributed without the prior written consent of Bridgewater® Associates, LP.
本資訊不針對、也不擬分發或提供給位於任何司法管轄區的任何個人或實體使用，若於該地區進行此類分發、出版、提供或使用將違反適用法律或法規，或將使 Bridgewater 需遵守該司法管轄區的任何註冊或授權要求。未經 Bridgewater® Associates, LP 事先書面同意，不得以任何方式 (i) 複製、影印或以任何形式重製本資料的任何部分，或 (ii) 進行轉發。
本資訊不針對、也不擬分發或提供給位於任何司法管轄區的任何個人或實體使用，若於該地區進行此類分發、出版、提供或使用將違反適用法律或法規，或將使 Bridgewater 需遵守該司法管轄區的任何註冊或授權要求。未經 Bridgewater® Associates, LP 事先書面同意，不得以任何方式 (i) 複製、影印或以任何形式重製本資料的任何部分，或 (ii) 進行轉發。
The views expressed herein are solely those of Bridgewater as of the date of this report and are subject to change without notice. Bridgewater may have a significant financial interest in one or more of the positions and/or securities or derivatives discussed. Those responsible for preparing this report receive compensation based upon various factors, including, among other things, the quality of their work and firm revenues.
本文所表達的觀點僅為 Bridgewater 截至本報告發布之日的觀點，如有變更，恕不另行通知。Bridgewater 可能在所討論的一個或多個部位及／或證券或衍生性金融商品中擁有重大的財務利益。編寫本報告的人員所獲得的報酬，是基於多種因素，其中包括其工作品質和公司收入等。
本文所表達的觀點僅為 Bridgewater 截至本報告發布之日的觀點，如有變更，恕不另行通知。Bridgewater 可能在所討論的一個或多個部位及／或證券或衍生性金融商品中擁有重大的財務利益。編寫本報告的人員所獲得的報酬，是基於多種因素，其中包括其工作品質和公司收入等。
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