India and Asean Are Growing Apart. Blame Tariffs
印度與東協漸行漸遠，關稅是元兇
Officials in New Delhi worry the bloc is drifting toward China.
新德里官員擔憂該集團正倒向中國
Workers in Haiphong, Vietnam.
Photographer: Linh Pham/BloombergIt’s still far from clear what President Donald Trump’s tariffs will eventually look like. But the pressures they will put on stable trading relationships — even those that don’t directly involve the US — are already visible. Ties between India and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations are already fraying: They’re being pushed into different camps, and the free-trade agreement they signed in 2010 could become an unexpected victim of the turmoil.
特朗普關稅形式不明，但壓力已現。印東協關係緊張，2010 年自貿協議恐成受害者
Trump might be the immediate cause of this rift, but, as always, China’s massive manufacturing overcapacity is at the heart of the problem. Even if no country knows what rates they or others will face, everyone can be reasonably certain that the mainland’s tariffs will be the highest of all. Unfortunately, this also means that there’s a big incentive to help Beijing game the system enough that we all trust each other less.
特朗普雖為直接導因，中國產能過剩才是核心。各國確信中國關稅最高，這鼓勵作弊，降低互信
Many Asian countries are reasonably pleased at the thought that duties on their exports will be lower than on those out of China: They’ve all been searching for a way to regain a sliver of competitiveness, and this might help. But the same nations are also a little scared. They fear a flood of underpriced Chinese goods, once meant for the US, will inundate their fledgling manufacturing sectors.
亞洲國家樂見出口關稅低於中國，以提升競爭力；但也擔心中國廉價商品湧入，衝擊新興製造業
In fact, that’s already happening to an extent, and policymakers are responding. Vietnam has introduced anti-dumping tariffs on certain kinds of Chinese steel; Indonesia has banned direct-shipping e-commerce apps like Temu.
此現象已部分發生。政策回應：越南對中國鋼鐵實施反傾銷稅；印尼禁止直運電商如 Temu
But, for some, there’s also the tempting possibility that China’s overcapacity can be turned from an enemy into an ally. Any country that remains integrated both with China and those that are putting up tariff walls could, if it wanted, become a location for the trans-shipment of goods. Instead of paying the higher China levies, importers would pay lower ones imposed on the third country — and share a bit of the take with local partners.
中國產能過剩可轉為盟友。整合中外的國家可成轉運點，進口商支付較低關稅，與當地夥伴分享利益
Tariff arbitrage could become as profitable in the future as interest rate arbitrage is today. The more countries that impose anti-dumping duties on China, the more money the successful trans-shipper would make. The US, for one, is already very concerned that parts of Asean might take this route — which is why Trump’s trade deal with Vietnam included a clause that any goods suspected of being trans-shipped would pay double tariffs.
關稅套利未來可能獲利豐厚。反傾銷國家越多，轉運者獲利越大。美國擔憂東協部分國家走此路，故在越南協議中加入條款，對疑似轉運商品徵雙倍關稅
For countries like India, it’s an even greater fear. India’s commerce minister caused a bit of a stir recently when he described Asean as “China’s B-team.” That was certainly impolitic. But, perhaps, not entirely unjustified.
印度尤其恐懼。商業部長稱東協為「中國 B 隊」，雖不禮貌，但未必無理
New Delhi has been trying to update its free trade agreement with Asean for a while. Its particular focus has been to tighten rules-of-origin requirements — the way in which you ensure that a free trade agreement only benefits local producers in both countries, not those shipping goods that originate elsewhere.
新德里長期試圖更新與東協自貿協議，重點加強原產地規則 ，確保僅惠及本地生產者，非他處商品
Indian officials feel that Asean has been going slow on these discussions. Meanwhile, news broke in May that the bloc had expanded the scope of its parallel FTA with China. They achieved that in double-quick time — negotiations only started in November 2022 — which raised a few eyebrows in New Delhi.
印度官員認為東盟在這些討論中進展緩慢。與此同時，五月消息傳出該集團擴大了與中國的平行自貿協定範圍，在談判僅於 2022 年 11 月開始後極速達成，引起新德里關注。
Some in India, clearly including its commerce minister, now seem to think that tariff-free trade with Southeast Asia is the same as opening your market to China. That isn’t true — or, at any rate, not yet. But the fact is that member states simply aren’t doing enough to reassure their other trading partners, including India.
印度一些人，包括其商務部長，認為與東南亞免關稅貿易等於向中國開放市場。
這不正確，或尚未如此。但成員國未盡力安撫其他貿易夥伴，包括印度。
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It would be a nightmare for most countries, including India, if closed-off blocs were to replace today’s open trading system. Yet Trump’s actions, when combined with China’s overcapacity, are taking us there. Any country that wants to trade with both sides of the divide — which, clearly, many in Southeast Asia would prefer — will also need to be able to be very transparent about the goods it is exporting, and how much value has been added domestically. In other words, it’s Asean’s move: They will have to step up and give most of their trading partners, not just India and the US, a clearer view into their supply chains.
封閉集團取代開放貿易體系對多國如印度將是噩夢。但特朗普行動與中國產能過剩正推動此趨勢。想與雙方貿易的國家（東南亞多數偏好）需透明展示出口商品及國內附加值。換言之，東盟需行動：提升透明度，向所有貿易夥伴提供供應鏈清晰視圖。
The US is clearly worried that some countries will evade its tariffs. Those concerns will be shared, especially by India. New Delhi seems to believe that, if world trade blocs form, then Asean has already chosen its side — and it won’t be the one India picks. Trade’s impossible without trust, and these two partners will have to work to rebuild it.
美國擔心一些國家逃避其關稅，印度尤其共享此擔憂。新德里認為，若世界貿易集團形成，東協已選擇非印度立場。貿易無信任則不可能，雙方須重建信任。
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