A Thesis entitled
"Uncle Joe": What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II by
Kimberly Hupp
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
The Masters of Liberal Studies
题为《"乔大叔"：二战前后美国人对约瑟夫·斯大林看法》的论文 作者：金伯利·赫普 本论文作为申请文科硕士学位部分要求的提交材料

Advisor: Dr. Michael Jakobson
指导教授：迈克尔·雅各布森博士

College of Graduate Studies
研究生院

University of Toledo  托莱多大学

May 2009  2009 年 5 月

May 2009  2009 年 5 月

A thesis presented on the American public opinion of Josef Stalin before and after World War II beginning with how Russia and Stalin was portrayed in the media before the war began, covering how opinions shifted with major events such as the famine, collectivization, the Great Terror, wartime conferences, the Cold War and McCarthyism.
本论文探讨二战前后美国公众对约瑟夫·斯大林看法的演变，从战前媒体对俄罗斯及斯大林的刻画切入，分析重大历史事件（包括饥荒、集体化运动、大清洗、战时会议、冷战及麦卡锡主义）如何影响舆论转向。

Abstract … ii  摘要 … ii
Table of Contents … iii
目录 … iii
Acknowledgements … v  致谢 … v
List of Figures … vii
图表目录 … vii
List of Abbreviations … viii
缩略语列表…viii
Introduction … 1  引言…1
Chapter I: In the Beginning … 4
第一章：最初阶段…4
Russia and Stalin in the Media before World War II … 4
二战前媒体中的俄罗斯与斯大林…4
The Lies the Media Told Us … 20
媒体对我们撒的谎……20
American Public Opinion of Stalin and Russia Before World War II … 30
二战前美国公众对斯大林和苏联的看法……30
Chapter II: Russia Becomes an Ally … 35
第二章：苏联成为盟友……35
Russia Betrayed: Hitler Breaks the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 … 35
被背叛的苏联：希特勒撕毁 1939 年互不侵犯条约……35
Wartime Conferences … 43
战时会议…43
Tehran … 44  德黑兰会议…44
Yalta … 47  雅尔塔会议…47
Potsdam … 50  波茨坦会议…50
What Did America Think of Stalin? … 52
美国如何看待斯大林？…52
Chapter III: The Cold War: Where Did It All Go Wrong? … 57
第三章：冷战：何处出了错？…57
The Origins of the Cold War … 57
冷战的起源…57
The Red Scare … 63
红色恐慌…63
McCarthyism … 67  麦卡锡主义…67
American Opinion of the Soviet Union After World War II. … 71
二战后美国对苏联的看法…71
Conclusion … 75  结论…75
Index … 77  索引…77
References (Bibliography) … 80
参考文献 … 80

I would like to thank Dr. Michael Jakobson for being an amazing teacher and mentor, Dr. Larry Connin for his insights on the political side of history, Dr. Jay Passias, Marie Adkins and Lacy Cooper for their incredible support. Most of all, I thank my parents, Jim and Linda Hupp for giving me two of the greatest gifts…the love of reading and the passion for history, and for believing in me even when I doubted myself.
我要感谢迈克尔·雅各布森博士这位杰出的导师，感谢拉里·康宁博士对历史政治维度的深刻见解，感谢杰伊·帕西亚斯博士、玛丽·阿德金斯和莱西·库珀给予的鼎力支持。特别要感谢我的父母吉姆和琳达·赫普，他们赋予了我两份最珍贵的礼物——对阅读的热爱与对历史的激情，并在我自我怀疑时始终坚信我的潜力。

For Sydney  献给西德尼

Fig. 3-1 Cover of Red Channels …pg. 66
图 3-1 《红色频道》封面…第 66 页

Fig. 3-2 Editorial cartoon from the Washington Post…pg. 68
图 3-2 《华盛顿邮报》社论漫画…第 68 页

Fig. 3-3 “A Sign of the Unholy Three”…pg. 69
图 3-3 "邪恶三巨头之兆"…第 69 页

AIPO American Institute of Public Opinion
AIPO 美国民意研究所
BIPO British Institute of Public Opinion
BIPO 英国民意研究所
CP Crossley, Inc.  CP 克罗斯利公司
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
苏联共产党（CPSU）
CPUSA Communist Party of the United States of America
美国共产党（CPUSA）
FOR Fortune Magazine  《财富》杂志（FOR）
GPU State Political Administration
国家政治保卫局（GPU）
GULAG Main Administration of Camps
古拉格（劳改营管理总局）
HUAC House Un-American Activities Committee
非美活动调查委员会（HUAC）
NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs
内务人民委员部（NKVD）
NORC National Opinion Research Center
全国民意研究中心（NORC）
NYHT New York Herald Tribune
《纽约先驱论坛报》
OGPU Unified State Political Administration
苏联国家政治保卫总局
OMGUS American Military Government-Germany
美国驻德军政府
OPOR Office of Public Opinion Research
民意调查办公室

The old adage of hindsight being 20/20 is so true. Today we know the truth of Stalin and his regime. We know that he was a bigger monster than Hitler, only without the need for ‘Lebensraum’ (added territory deemed necessary to Nazi Germany, for its continued existence or economic well-being). While Stalin did want expansion of the Russian empire, he simply wanted the land that was taken from Russia in the Treaty of BrestLitovsk in 1918. But before, during and immediately after World War II, what exactly did Americans think of Stalin? Did leaders know the threat that Stalin posed to his own people before World War II? In an age where we get out news instantaneously, it is difficult to fully understand the delays in reporting that once existed. However, in simpler times such as the 1920’s, 1930’s, 1940’s and the 1950’s, it would typically take a day or so to get the news out of other countries. Just how did the delays and, in some countries such as the Soviet Union, state censoring affect our perceptions and opinion?
事后诸葛亮的古谚确实不假。如今我们已了解斯大林及其政权的真相。我们知道他是比希特勒更可怕的恶魔，只是不需要"生存空间"（纳粹德国认为对其持续存在或经济福祉所必需的额外领土）。虽然斯大林确实想扩张俄罗斯帝国，但他只想夺回 1918 年《布列斯特-立托夫斯克条约》中俄国失去的土地。但在二战前、战争期间及战后初期，美国人对斯大林究竟有何看法？二战前各国领导人是否知晓斯大林对自己人民的威胁？在这个新闻即时传播的时代，我们很难完全理解过去存在的报道延迟。然而在 20 世纪 20 至 50 年代这样信息传播较慢的时期，通常需要一天左右才能获取其他国家的新闻。这种延迟以及苏联等国家的新闻审查，究竟如何影响了我们的认知与判断？

With the Soviet Union being controlled by Joseph Stalin, any news reports were first read and then censored, even completely rewritten. Stalin feared looking bad or weak in the world’s eyes. He did not want the “secrets” of the Soviet Union, such as collectivization, the purges, and famines to be realized by anyone, even his own people. He was so convinced that he was right that he would not hear of anything to the contrary.
在约瑟夫·斯大林掌控下的苏联，所有新闻报道都需先经审阅和审查，甚至会被彻底重写。斯大林唯恐在世界眼中显得不堪或软弱。他不愿任何人——甚至本国人民——意识到苏联的"秘密"，比如集体化、大清洗和饥荒。他如此坚信自己正确，以至于听不进任何反对意见。

Walter Duranty, the Pulitzer Prize winning journalist who was the Russian correspondent for the New York Times for many years, was guilty of misleading the American public about the situation in Russia at that time. He made it seem as if all was well and Russia was a thriving society. Once must wonder if this was a deliberate act or an act of selfpreservation. Just how many other reports were forced into the same position as Duranty? Foreign journalists stationed in the Soviet Union during that time period knew if anything was written and it rankled the Communist Party, which was ruled by Stalin, his/her press credentials would be revoked and immediately expelled from the country. With all news reports out of Russia being heavily censored, Americans could only base their opinions on what they were reading.
沃尔特·杜兰蒂这位曾获普利策奖的记者，作为《纽约时报》驻俄通讯员多年，当时在向美国公众传达俄罗斯真实状况方面存在误导之过。他将苏联描绘成一片繁荣祥和的景象。人们不禁要问，这究竟是刻意为之还是迫于自保？又有多少其他记者陷入了与杜兰蒂相同的困境？当时派驻苏联的外国记者都清楚，任何触怒斯大林领导的共产党的报道，都将导致其记者证被吊销并立即驱逐出境。由于所有来自俄罗斯的新闻报道都受到严格审查，美国人只能根据这些被过滤的信息形成认知。

In the 1940’s, we were at war with Germany and Japan. Stalin, being burned by Hitler who broke the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, had joined the Allies in fighting Germany. With many conferences being held, and Roosevelt seeming to trust Stalin, we were given a favorable picture of Stalin himself. He seemed to put on the perfect show when the media was around. Jovial, friendly and trusting were the characteristics he wanted to convey to the rest of the world. There are even reports that Roosevelt had intelligence on Stalin’s true nature but chose to ignore it because he thought he could persuade Stalin to change.
20 世纪 40 年代，我们正与德国和日本交战。斯大林因希特勒撕毁 1939 年《苏德互不侵犯条约》而遭受背叛，随后加入盟军对抗德国。随着多次会议的召开，加上罗斯福似乎对斯大林颇为信任，我们看到的都是斯大林的光辉形象。当媒体在场时，他总能上演完美表演——向世界展现出一副开朗、友善且值得信赖的面孔。甚至有报道称罗斯福掌握着斯大林真实本性的情报，却选择视而不见，因为他相信自己能说服斯大林改变。

During the 1950’s, the Unites States was in fear of anything that could be construed as Communist. Senator Joseph McCarthy led the charge of purging anyone and anything that could possibly be Communist. By this time, America and Russia were in the midst of the Cold War.
到了 20 世纪 50 年代，美国对任何可能被解读为共产主义的事物都充满恐惧。参议员约瑟夫·麦卡锡带头清洗任何可能与共产主义有关联的人或事物。此时美俄已陷入冷战泥潭。

While it was more a war of words and rhetoric, utilizing propaganda instead of bullets and bombs, we were terrified that our borders would be breached by the Red Army. From blacklisting celebrities to suing the Army, McCarthy’s paranoia struck a nerve in and infected John Q. Public. This irrational fear manifested itself from the rush to build bomb shelters in our backyards to the Civil Defense drills that schools and offices practiced on a regular basis. It was painfully clear what Americans thought of Russia and her leaders during that time.
尽管这更多是一场言辞与宣传的较量，用传单替代了子弹与炮火，我们仍恐惧红军会突破国境。从将名人列入黑名单到起诉军方，麦卡锡的偏执不仅触动了公众神经，更感染了普通民众约翰·Q。这种非理性恐惧体现在后院匆忙修建的防空洞里，也显现在学校和办公室定期进行的民防演练中。那个年代美国人对俄罗斯及其领导人的态度可谓昭然若揭。

The subjects discussed, some briefly, herein include Stalin’s image in the eyes of the American public before World War II, manipulation of the American people by the media, the relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin, the wartime conferences and their outcomes, the origins of the Cold War, the effects of McCarthyism and the Red Scare, and tracking the shift in American opinion of Stalin before and after World War II. I will be using opinion poll archives, magazine and newspaper articles and other various publications to discuss these topics.
本文简要探讨的主题包括：二战前斯大林在美国公众眼中的形象、媒体对美国民众的操控、罗斯福与斯大林的关系、战时会议及其成果、冷战起源、麦卡锡主义与红色恐慌的影响，以及追踪二战前后美国对斯大林看法的转变。我将运用民意调查档案、报刊文章及其他各类出版物来论述这些议题。

It seems the American public was somewhat interested in Russia, as evidenced by the number of articles in The New York Times, Time Magazine, The Saturday Evening Post and The Washington Post to name a few. A search through The New York Times’ online archives reveals over 10,000 references to Stalin and/or the Soviet Union between January 1, 1916 and December 31, 1955. In the early years of the ${20}^{\text{th}}$${20}^{\text{th }}$20^("th ")20^{\text {th }} century, the articles deal mainly with the Russian Revolution, the Provisional Government and the Communist Party. But after Lenin’s death, it seems as if Stalin is suddenly everywhere. Time ran an article on August 30, 1926 which provided a brief portrait of Stalin. It alludes to him as being seen as some kind of great being by Lenin. The article notes: “Amid the purging flames of revolution, the great Dictator Lenin tested and tempted the Georgian’s metal, gave him the prophetic name of Stalin, installed him in the office which he has made the focus of all Russia, the Secretariat of the Communist Party.” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} It would seem the author of the article, who is not listed, was unaware of the true origins of Stalin’s name. But the most interesting tidbit is that he was cast in a good light. Not one disparaging word was
从《纽约时报》、《时代周刊》、《星期六晚邮报》和《华盛顿邮报》等媒体的报道数量来看，美国公众对俄罗斯似乎颇感兴趣。通过检索《纽约时报》线上档案库发现，在 1916 年 1 月 1 日至 1955 年 12 月 31 日期间，提及斯大林和/或苏联的报道超过一万篇。在 ${20}^{\text{th}}$${20}^{\text{th }}$20^("th ")20^{\text {th }} 世纪初期，这些文章主要聚焦俄国革命、临时政府和共产党。但列宁逝世后，斯大林仿佛突然无处不在。1926 年 8 月 30 日《时代》周刊刊登的人物速写中，将斯大林描述为被列宁视为非凡人物的存在。文章写道："在革命净化的烈焰中，伟大的独裁者列宁考验了这位格鲁吉亚人的意志，赐予他'斯大林'这个具有预言性的名字，并让他执掌已成为全俄权力核心的共产党书记处。" ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这位匿名作者显然不了解斯大林名字的真实由来，但最耐人寻味的是文章对斯大林持正面评价。 关于斯大林没有一句贬损之词

written about Stalin. Not one mention was made of how he was feared by his comrades and he was building his power base under the nose of Lenin.
文中只字未提同志对他的畏惧，以及他在列宁眼皮底下培植个人势力的事实

According to Leonid Stakhovsky’s study, American Opinion about Russia 1917-1920, published in 1961, America supported the Provisional Government in early 1917. Major news publications at that time, such as the Washington Evening Star and Literary Digest sang the praises of Alexander Kerensky and his government. There were hopes that a democracy would be established. On March 16, 1917 the Evening Star expressed concern that the revolution would weaken the Russian army to the point of uselessness in the war with Germany, citing infighting as the main reason. The New York Times expressed a more optimistic outlook of the situation. This article was hopeful the Duma would be able to heal and strengthen Russia as a whole. The Evening Star continued to hold to its cautious course by stating in its March 17, 1917 edition, “Whether Russia can revolutionize itself and while in the throes of transformation effectively fight Germany remains to be seen.” ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} The optimism shown by the New York Times was echoed, according to Strakhovsky, by other publications such as those printed in Iowa, Texas and Georgia.
根据列昂尼德·斯塔霍夫斯基 1961 年发表的《1917-1920 年间美国对俄国的看法》研究显示，美国在 1917 年初曾支持俄国临时政府。当时《华盛顿晚星报》《文学文摘》等主流报刊都对亚历山大·克伦斯基及其政府大加赞誉，人们期待民主政体能在俄国建立。1917 年 3 月 16 日，《晚星报》担忧革命会导致俄军实力削弱至无法对抗德国，并将内斗列为主因。《纽约时报》则持更为乐观的态度，该报文章期待杜马能全面治愈并振兴俄国。3 月 17 日的《晚星报》仍保持审慎立场："俄国能否在转型阵痛中完成自我革命并有效对抗德国，尚待观察。"斯塔霍夫斯基指出，《纽约时报》展现的乐观态度在爱荷华州、得克萨斯州和佐治亚州等地的出版物中得到了呼应。

The United States only took a week to recognize Kerensky’s government as legitimate. The March 23, 1917 edition of the Washington Evening Star summed up our nation’s sentiment when the editors published an article that stated, “It is the American hope that Russia will hold its new freedom, develop it and through it work out a great national destiny.” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} However, once Lenin seized power, the United States would not recognize the
美国仅用一周时间就承认了克伦斯基政府的合法性。1917 年 3 月 23 日的《华盛顿晚星报》刊文总结国民心声："美国希望俄罗斯能坚守新获得的自由，发展自由，并借此实现伟大的民族命运。" ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 然而当列宁夺取政权后，美国便拒绝承认

legitimacy of the Soviet Union until 1933. Even though the Provisional Government was still unstable and in danger of being toppled, the American media played this down as much as possible. It would seem the motivation was to encourage the American public to think that Germany would not get the upper hand in the then raging World War I. In April 1917, the New York Times made its position on Lenin and his followers clear. The editorial paints a picture of Lenin as being in league with Germany to ruin Russia’s push toward democracy. In this editorial, the New York Times writes:
直到 1933 年苏联政权合法性确立前。尽管临时政府仍不稳定且面临被推翻的危险，美国媒体却尽可能淡化这一事实。其动机似乎是为了让美国公众相信，德国不会在当时激战正酣的第一次世界大战中占据上风。1917 年 4 月，《纽约时报》明确表明了其对列宁及其追随者的立场。社论将列宁描绘成与德国勾结、意图破坏俄罗斯民主进程的形象。该社论这样写道：
"The Liberal Government in Russia visibly threatened by a formidable counterrevolutionary unrest, which has not yet mobilized into a movement but is skillfully marshaled by German agents. Many of these agents are Russian Socialists…
"俄罗斯自由派政府正面临一场来势汹汹的反革命骚动的明显威胁，这场骚动虽未形成大规模运动，但已被德国特工巧妙操控。其中许多特工是俄国社会党人……

Meanwhile the Socialists, headed by Lenin, an obvious German agent who was shipped back to Russia by Germany for the purpose, play Germany’s hand by glittering catchwords, such as Lenin’s ‘Dictatorship of the working class and democracy of the army,’ and seek to arouse hostility to the United States by representing her as a capitalist country…" ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3}
与此同时，以列宁为首的社会党人——这个被德国特意遣返俄国的明显德国代理人——正通过诸如列宁提出的'工人阶级专政与军队民主'等炫目口号为德国效力，并试图将美国描绘成资本主义国家以煽动对美敌意……" ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3}

The Washington Evening Star mimicked the New York Times’ previous concern about Lenin on July 24, 1917 by writing “It is definitely charged that Lenin, the Bolshevik agitator and leader… has been acting definitely as a German agent.” ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}
《华盛顿晚星报》在 1917 年 7 月 24 日效仿《纽约时报》先前对列宁的担忧，写道："有确凿指控表明，布尔什维克鼓动者及领袖列宁……始终明确以德国代理人身份行事。" ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}

The Bolsheviks were making their intentions known. Their revolutionary movement was picking up steam and creating great worry not only within the Provisional government, but in the United States as well. On July 23, 1917 The Washington Evening Star worried that,
布尔什维克党人正在公开宣示其意图。他们的革命运动势头渐猛，不仅令临时政府深感忧虑，也引发了美国的高度不安。1917 年 7 月 23 日，《华盛顿晚星报》忧心忡忡地指出，

“Russia is again a cause of keen anxiety.” ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} Kerensky had launched another (his third) offensive against Germany only three weeks prior. This was legitimate cause for the Evening Star’s concern. The Provisional government was also fighting off the growing Bolshevik threat. This proved worrisome to the American government and our high ranking military officials as they feared the Russian army was being spread too thin and, as a result, tremendously weakened.
"俄罗斯再度成为深切忧虑的根源。" ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 克伦斯基仅在 3 周前对德国发动了又一次（他的第三次）攻势。这成为《晚星报》合理担忧的缘由。临时政府同时还在抵御日益壮大的布尔什维克威胁。美国政府及我军高层官员对此深感不安，他们担心俄军战线拉得过长，导致实力严重削弱。

On July 24, 1917, the New York Times supported a dictatorship for Russia. Despite outlining the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Provisional government, the editorial expressed faith in Kerensky as being the most capable individual for that position. The paper praised Kerensky’s efforts to eradicate socialism by saying, “The infection spread until it was arrested by Kerensky, whose patriotism and noble courage for a moment inspired even the army with a loyal resolve to face the enemy and drive him back.” ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} In the same article, Lenin was once again accused of being a German spy. The article stated, “It has been abundantly proved that German agents were at work to being about the disaffection among the troops at the front, and among Russians everywhere, especially in Petrograd. Lenine [sic], who under a Government exercising any sort of authority in a rational way would have been deprived of all power to do mischief long ago, has been exposed as a worker for the German cause, and it has countless other workers.” ${}^{,7}$${}^{,7}$^(,7){ }^{, 7}
1917 年 7 月 24 日，《纽约时报》表态支持在俄国实行独裁统治。社论在指出临时政府的软弱与缺陷的同时，仍对克伦斯基担任该职位的能力表示信任。该报以"这场思想瘟疫持续蔓延，直至克伦斯基出手遏制——他的爱国热忱与崇高勇气甚至一度激励军队重拾忠诚信念，誓要击退来犯之敌"的评语，盛赞其铲除社会主义的举措。 ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 同一篇文章中，列宁再度被指控为德国间谍。文中宣称："已有充分证据表明，德国特工在前线部队、全俄各地（尤其是彼得格勒）策动叛乱。若是在任何正常行使职权的政府治下，早该被剥夺作乱能力的列宁，如今已被揭露是为德国效力的特工，而这样的敌特分子更是不计其数。" ${}^{,7}$${}^{,7}$^(,7){ }^{, 7}

November 1917 brought dismal news about Russia. On November 7, the Washing Evening Star bemoaned: "The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, have seized control of the capital, deposed
1917 年 11 月传来了关于俄罗斯的黯淡消息。11 月 7 日，《华盛顿晚星报》哀叹道："列宁领导的布尔什维克已夺取首都控制权，罢黜了

Kerensky and arrested some of the ministers, and with the aid of the garrison executed a coup d’état which completely overturns the Provisional government. It is a new revolution. The most serious aspect of the situation is that the new power in Russia declares for ‘an immediate just peace,’ which indicates that the German intrigue in Petrograd has succeeded." ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}
克伦斯基并逮捕了部分部长，在驻军协助下发动政变彻底推翻了临时政府。这是一场新的革命。局势最严峻的方面在于，俄罗斯新政权宣布要'立即实现公正和平'，这表明德国在彼得格勒的阴谋已经得逞。" ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}

By 1919, Lenin had already seized control of Russia and installed the Bolsheviki in all government positions. So mistrusted and hated was Lenin that an article printed in the New York Times in April 1919 called for Americans to help all who were fighting against Lenin. In its plea for assistance, this article defined Bolshevism as “the assault of greed, ignorance and brute force upon everything that Americans have learned to hold most sacred. It destroys liberty, property rights, law, order, marriage, the home and education. It is the murder of peace, enlightenment, and progress. Its loot enriches a few black-hearted and red-handed leaders and beggars everyone else.” ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9}
到 1919 年，列宁已夺取俄国政权并将布尔什维克党人安插进所有政府职位。当时列宁是如此遭人猜忌与憎恶，以至于 1919 年 4 月《纽约时报》刊文呼吁美国人援助所有反抗列宁的势力。这篇求援文章将布尔什维主义定义为"贪婪、愚昧与暴力对美国人奉为神圣的一切事物的践踏。它摧毁自由、财产权、法治、秩序、婚姻、家庭与教育。这是对和平、启蒙与进步的扼杀。其劫掠所得养肥了少数黑心染血的领袖，却使其他所有人沦为乞丐。"

In the same edition of the New York Times, another article appeared with the headline “Warned Not to Deal with Russian Reds.” It detailed a plea from the State Department that American businesses should not deal with the Bolshevik government. The State Department statement read: “As the Government of the United States has never recognized the Bolshevist regime at Moscow it is deemed proper to warn American business men that any concessions from the Bolshevist authorities probably could be recognized as binding on future Russian Governments.” ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} The tone of the article is clear that the State
同一期《纽约时报》还刊登了另一篇题为《警告勿与俄国赤党交易》的文章，详细报道了美国国务院呼吁本国企业不要与布尔什维克政府往来的声明。国务院声明称："鉴于美国政府从未承认莫斯科的布尔什维克政权，特此提醒美国商人注意，布尔什维克当局给予的任何特许权，未来俄罗斯政府很可能都不会承认其约束力。" ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 文章语气明确表明国务院

Department has no idea what the future of Russia holds and it does not want to have any ties to their current or future governments.
对俄罗斯的未来走向毫无把握，也不愿与其当前或未来的任何政府建立关联。

The earliest mention of Joseph Stalin in The New York Times is on June 15, 1924 in an article by Walter Duranty that summarized the agenda for the Comintern Congress. Stalin was only mentioned once in this article. He, along with Bukharin and Trotsky, was named a Russian Representative. Zinoviev was appointed as President of the “Presidium.” It is a rather unimportant and uneventful piece on the plans of the Communist Party. The next mention of Stalin in The New York Times is just as trivial. On November 26, 1924, there is an article which reported on the alienation of Trotsky within the Communist Party. The only reference to Stalin, and his involvement, is a few words that informed the reader that he and Kamenev were the originiators of the movement to oust Trotsky. Like the article above, this one made the reader think that Stalin is but a minor player.
《纽约时报》最早提及约瑟夫·斯大林是在 1924 年 6 月 15 日沃尔特·杜兰蒂的一篇文章中，该文概述了共产国际大会议程。斯大林在这篇文章中仅被提到一次，他与布哈林、托洛茨基一同被列为俄罗斯代表，季诺维也夫则被任命为"主席团"主席。这篇关于共产党计划的报道相当平淡无奇。该报下一次提到斯大林同样微不足道——1924 年 11 月 26 日有篇文章报道了托洛茨基在党内的边缘化，关于斯大林及其参与的描述仅有只言片语，告知读者他与加米涅夫是罢黜托洛茨基运动的发起者。与前文相似，这篇报道让读者以为斯大林不过是个小角色。
“Stalin Emerges as the ‘Dictator’ of Russia” proclaimed The New York Times on August 29, 1926, just two years after barely mentioning him. The article told of how Stalin had risen to his position of power as Lenin’s heir. Quite interesting, though, is the way Stalin was described in this article. He was presented as courageous, tenacious, and plain. The article also conveyed his years as a revolutionary and his arrests as a result, his escape from exile was told as a heroic tale. In discussing Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, the article made it seem as if they were ruthless and power hungry and that Stalin was the innocent. There is no mention of the cruel, merciless nature Stalin possessed. In reading this article, the reader gets the sense that Stalin only wanted to take care of the Russian people. There was no mention of his infamous paranoia or his desire for ‘socialism in one country.’ Yet,
"斯大林以俄罗斯'独裁者'身份崛起"，《纽约时报》在 1926 年 8 月 29 日如此宣告，此时距他们几乎未曾提及斯大林仅过去两年。文章讲述了斯大林如何作为列宁的继承人登上权力宝座。耐人寻味的是文中对斯大林的描述方式——他被刻画成勇敢、坚韧且朴实的形象。报道还提及他多年的革命生涯及因此遭受的逮捕，将他从流放中逃脱的经历渲染成英雄传奇。在讨论托洛茨基、加米涅夫和季诺维也夫时，文章将他们塑造成冷酷无情的权力追逐者，而斯大林则成了无辜者。文中丝毫未提及斯大林残忍无情的本性。读者通过这篇报道产生的印象是：斯大林只想照顾好俄罗斯人民。他那臭名昭著的偏执妄想，或是"一国建成社会主义"的野心，都未被提及。然而，
on November 5, 1926, The New York Times ran an article that gave America a glimpse into Stalin’s psyche. The article informed the reader that Stalin, frustrated by the slow progress of socialism in Russia, told the Communist Party he believed that America would soon replace England “as the head of the imperialistic States and as dominating the world.” This piece differs from the earlier ones as it showed his mistrust of the United States. Clearly, two vastly different articles written within two months of each other.
1926 年 11 月 5 日，《纽约时报》刊登了一篇让美国窥见斯大林心理的文章。该文向读者透露，斯大林对俄罗斯社会主义进程缓慢感到沮丧，他向共产党表示相信美国将很快取代英国"成为帝国主义国家的首领并主宰世界"。这篇报道与此前的文章不同，它显示出斯大林对美国的猜忌。显然，这两篇观点迥异的文章发表时间仅相隔两个月。

On July 6, 1931, the New York Times ran an article outlining a new plan that Stalin was introducing as a way to help the Russian economy. In an “about face,” Stalin actually called for unequal pay, contrary to Communist ideology, and individual responsibility. The focus of this policy moved away from agriculture and was set squarely on industry. According to this article, Stalin had six points of focus for the new plan:
1931 年 7 月 6 日，《纽约时报》刊文概述了斯大林为提振俄国经济推出的新计划。与共产主义意识形态相悖的是，斯大林竟"突然转向"呼吁实行差异薪酬制和个人责任制。这项政策的重点从农业领域彻底转向了工业。根据该报道，斯大林的新计划包含六大要点：
"Readjustment of wages to make the scale commensurate with the type of labor performed; the halt of workers from shifting from one place to another to improve their living conditions.
"调整工资标准，使报酬与劳动类型相匹配；禁止工人为改善生活条件而随意流动。"
"Remedy of the growing labor shortage by attracting more peasants to industries as agriculture progresses toward mechanization.
"随着农业逐步实现机械化，通过吸引更多农民进入工业领域来缓解日益严重的劳动力短缺问题。
"Improvement of the organization of labor in industry in order to distribute the proper strength among factories and to end ‘irresponsible’ methods.
"改进工业劳动组织，合理分配各工厂的人力资源，杜绝'不负责任'的工作方式。
"To have a working class develop its own ‘intelligentsia’ of such skilled workers as engineers and technicians.
"培养工人阶级自身的'知识分子'队伍，包括工程师和技术员等技能型工人。
"To change the policy toward specialists of the old order to attract more of them to industry.
"调整对旧秩序下专家的政策，吸引更多专业人才投身工业建设。
“To increase the interior sources of industry and develop the piece-work system.” ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11}
“增加工业内部资源并发展计件工资制度。” ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11}

This article drew a comparison between American business practices and Stalin’s ideas. It seemed to be almost giddy in the belief that Stalin is changing, giving the American public the same hope.
这篇文章将美国商业实践与斯大林的思想进行了对比。它似乎近乎欣喜地认为斯大林正在改变，这给美国公众带来了同样的希望。

In 1932, Stalin announced a second Five Year Plan, a year before the first one, announced in 1928, was set to be fulfilled. In a special section of the New York Times in April 1932, an article detailing the new plan was published. According to the article, the first plan was “fundamentally, a means of socialization, not merely the socialization of industry and commerce-and of agriculture, a far more difficult problem-but a moral socialization as well. Curiously enough, the aspect of the plan most pertinently obvious to Americans (that is, the regulation of production and consumption over a term of years), hardly presented itself to the Bolsheviki, except…as one of the principles of their Marxist creed.” ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} The Second Five Year Plan was “aimed principally at improving the living standard and comforts of the population.” ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} There was an attempt to make the American public understand, and possibly even sympathize with, the Russian people.
1932 年，斯大林宣布实施第二个五年计划，此时距 1928 年颁布的首个五年计划原定完成期限尚有一年。1932 年 4 月，《纽约时报》特刊专栏刊登了详述新计划的文章。文中指出，第一个五年计划"本质上是社会化的手段——不仅涉及工商业的社会化，还包括更为棘手的农业社会化，甚至涉及道德层面的社会化。耐人寻味的是，该计划最令美国人瞩目的方面（即对多年期生产与消费的规划），在布尔什维克党人眼中却不过是马克思主义信条的基本原则之一。" ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} 而第二个五年计划则"主要致力于提升民众生活水平与舒适度" ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 。这些报道试图让美国公众理解、甚至可能同情苏联人民的处境。

In explaining the differences and aims of the plans, an analogy of the American army was used. Duranty said that the First Five Year Plan was, essentially, a “training” plan in order
在阐释两个计划的差异与目标时，作者借用了美国军队作类比。杜兰蒂表示，第一个五年计划实质上相当于"练兵"计划，旨在
${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} The New York Times, July 6, 1931, pg. 2
${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} 《纽约时报》1931 年 7 月 6 日第 2 版
${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} The New York. Times, April 17, 1932, pg. SM1
${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} 《纽约时报》，1932 年 4 月 17 日，SM1 版
${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} Ibid April 17, 1932, pg. SM1
${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 同上，1932 年 4 月 17 日，SM1 版
to retrain the Russian people in their thinking and ways of life. This training was likened to what is “familiar to several million Americans, of army training, when they were forced by inflexible authority to do a whole lot of things which they had never done before, but which had been ordained by the authority with a definite and practical purpose. The fact that they were doing these things as volunteers…or as drafted me against their will, ceased to have any importance once they began doing them.” ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} Notice there was no mention of terror as a form of “encouragement” to get the Russian people to follow the plan.
旨在重塑俄罗斯人民的思维方式和生活方式。这种改造被比作"数百万美国人所熟悉的军事训练——在铁腕权威强制下，他们必须完成大量从未做过却具有明确实际目的的任务。无论最初是自愿参军...还是被迫应征入伍，一旦开始执行这些任务，个人意愿便不再重要。" ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 值得注意的是，文中只字未提用恐怖手段作为"激励"民众服从计划的工具。

Time ran an article on January 9, 1933 which discussed the end of and results of the First Five Year Plan. Even though Stalin announced the goals laid out had been met in four years instead of five, Time’s article illustrated some of the actual short comings of the plan, “In 1932 the Plan called for pig iron at an average rate of 25,000 tons per day. Actual production is 17,000 tons…In oil she has mounted from third place to second, in cold from sixth to third, in machine building from fourth to second, in production of electric energy from eight to third-yet in none of these categories except oil has Russia fulfilled her Plan.” ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15}
1933 年 1 月 9 日，《时代》周刊发表文章探讨苏联第一个五年计划的终结与成果。尽管斯大林宣布原定目标已在四年内达成（而非五年），但该文揭示了计划实施中的实际缺陷："1932 年计划要求生铁日产量达到 2.5 万吨，实际产量仅 1.7 万吨...在石油领域苏联从第三位升至第二位，煤炭从第六位升至第三位，机械制造从第四位升至第二位，发电量从第八位升至第三位——但除石油外，其他领域均未完成计划指标。" ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15}

Time’s article also detailed Stalin’s new measures in getting the peasants to comply with the plan. To summarize these tactics:
《时代》的报道还详述了斯大林迫使农民配合计划的新措施，其策略可概括为：

2. Everyone in every city needed to report to the GPU and have a valid reason for being in that city; and
2. 各城市居民均需向国家政治保卫局（GPU）报备，并提供在该城市居留的正当理由；
3. Stalin would end requisitioning objectives based on the variable size of the crops harvested. The new objectives that he introduced set the requisitioning goals based on the size of the farm. Under this new law, the peasant has a chance to do better as any excess crops could be sold at market for a profit.
3. 斯大林将根据农作物收成的变化幅度终止征购指标。他推行的新政策改为依据农场规模设定征购目标。根据这项新法令，农民有机会获得更多收益，因为超额收成的部分可以在市场上出售获利。

The measures obviously did not work. History shows that millions of peasants suffered and died from starvation. In a Letter to the Editor, published in the New York Times on October 23, 1934, Mr. Emil Hladky related a first hand detailed account of the famine in the Soviet Union. In this letter, he also exposed the fraud that is being perpetrated by the New York Times and another one of their writers, Harold Denny. Mr. Hladky’s letter started out with, “Harold Denny’s articles during the past two weeks on Soviet Russia would tend to leave the impression upon the casual reader that there is no real danger of starvation in the Soviet Union. To say that this is misleading would be putting the matter mildly.” ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} Mr. Hladky suggested that Mr. Denny was being misled by the Soviets and was only touring the collectives, not the private farms. “The real plight of these individuals has been carefully concealed from Mr. Denny.” ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} Mr. Hladky referred to an article written by Mr. Denny that outlined the new measures instituted by Stalin. He wrote of the taxes that were being levied against the peasants on their crops. He also wrote that any collective that sabotaged its harvest would be assessed double taxes, even though there would have been less crops available. The final measure Mr. Hladky wrote about was the arbitrary measure
这些措施显然没有奏效。历史表明，数百万农民因饥荒而遭受苦难并死亡。1934 年 10 月 23 日，《纽约时报》刊登的读者来信中，埃米尔·赫拉德基先生详细记述了他在苏联亲历的饥荒实况。在这封信中，他还揭露了《纽约时报》及其记者哈罗德·丹尼正在实施的欺骗行为。赫拉德基先生在信开头写道："哈罗德·丹尼过去两周关于苏维埃俄国的文章，很容易给普通读者留下苏联不存在真正饥荒威胁的印象。说这是误导都算轻描淡写了。" ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} 赫拉德基指出丹尼先生被苏联当局蒙蔽，只参观了集体农庄而非私人农场。"这些人的真实困境被刻意对丹尼先生隐瞒了。" ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} 赫拉德基提及丹尼某篇描述斯大林新政的文章，文中写到对农民收成征收的苛捐杂税。 他还写道，任何破坏收成的集体都将被课以双倍赋税，尽管可收获的作物本已减少。赫拉德基先生提到的最后一项措施是随意征税。当局被允许在收成高于正常水平的地区将税收提高 50%。"谁能说这不是蓄意制造的饥荒计划？"赫拉德基质问道。作者表示："乌克兰和俄罗斯正在闹饥荒，今年冬天将出现真正的饥荒。"至少还有一位《纽约时报》的读者看穿了这场骗局，并试图澄清苏联境内肆虐的饥荒真相。

of assessing taxes. The authorities were permitted to raise taxes by 50 percent in areas that had a higher than normal harvest. “Can any one state that this is not a deliberate plan of starvation” ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} queried Mr. Hladky. “There is starvation in the Ukraine and Russia and there will be a real hunger this Winter” ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} stated the writer. At least there was one reader of the New York Times who saw through the sham and tried to set the record straight about the rampant hunger in the Soviet Union.
当局被允许在收成高于正常水平的地区将税收提高 50%。"谁能说这不是蓄意制造的饥荒计划？"赫拉德基先生反问道。作者断言："乌克兰和俄罗斯正经历饥荒，今年冬天将出现真正的粮荒。"当时《纽约时报》的读者中，至少还有一人识破了这场骗局，并试图揭露苏联境内饥荒肆虐的真相。

On December 1, 1934, the Great Terror was conceived. The catalyst for the launch of this frightening campaign was the murder of the charismatic and extremely influential Sergei Kirov. Kirov, whose star was quickly rising, had successfully opposed Stalin on several occasions. At the 1934 Party Congress, Kirov was up for Central Committee membership. In their votes, the delegates only issued 3 negative votes from them. Stalin drew 292 negative votes. Not surprisingly, Stalin saw this as a clear threat to his power and regime. Afterward, Stalin promoted Kirov to work in Moscow but continually delayed his transfer from Leningrad. He assigned bodyguards to Kirov during this time.
1934 年 12 月 1 日，大清洗的序幕就此拉开。这场恐怖运动的导火索是极具个人魅力且影响力巨大的谢尔盖·基洛夫遇刺事件。这位政治新星曾多次成功反对斯大林。在 1934 年党代会上，基洛夫参选中央委员时仅获得 3 张反对票，而斯大林则收到 292 张反对票。斯大林显然将此视为对其权力与统治的明确威胁。事后斯大林虽将基洛夫调往莫斯科工作，却不断拖延其从列宁格勒的调任手续，期间还为他配备了贴身警卫。

Sometime in the last months of 1934, Stalin ordered the NKVD to find an assassin to take care of Kirov. Genrikh Yagoda, head of the NKVD at that time, appointed Vania Zaporozhets to find that assassin. As luck would have it, someone who knew someone who knew Leonid Nikolaev informed the NKVD that Nikolaev was extremely disgruntled about being expelled from the Communist Party and was hungry for revenge; any high level Party officer would do. According to Alexander Orlov, the NKVD passed along money and loaded weapon to Nikolaev by way of his friend who had informed on him.
1934 年末的某个月份，斯大林命令内务人民委员部物色刺客除掉基洛夫。时任内务人民委员部首脑的亨里希·雅戈达指派瓦尼亚·扎波罗热茨执行这项任务。机缘巧合，一个与列昂尼德·尼古拉耶夫有间接关联的线人向内务部举报，称尼古拉耶夫因被开除党籍而怀恨在心，正伺机报复——任何高级别党员干部都可能成为其目标。据亚历山大·奥尔洛夫所述，内务部通过告密者的朋友向尼古拉耶夫提供了资金和上膛的武器。
${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} Ibid, October 23, 1934, pg. 18
${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} 同上，1934 年 10 月 23 日，第 18 页
${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} Ibid, October 23, 1934, pg. 18
${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} 同上，1934 年 10 月 23 日，第 18 页

After an initial assassination attempt that failed on October 15, 1934, Nikolaev tried again…this time with success.
1934 年 10 月 15 日首次行刺未遂后，尼古拉耶夫再次实施刺杀……这次他得手了。

On December 17, 1934, Time ran an article about the unleashing of Stalin’s wrath over Kirov’s murder. “Last week Josef Stalin resorted to more drastic Bolshevik Terror, terror in its purest form. Because a member of the Soviet Politbureau or Red Big Ten had been assassinated, Soviet firing squads last week mowed down 66 Russians, one a woman, who were not accused of anything to do with Assassin Leonid Nicolaev or his crime,” ${}^{20}$${}^{20}$^(20){ }^{20} wrote the author.
1934 年 12 月 17 日，《时代》杂志刊登了一篇关于斯大林因基洛夫遇害而大发雷霆的文章。作者写道："上周约瑟夫·斯大林采取了更为极端的布尔什维克恐怖手段——最纯粹的恐怖形式。由于苏联政治局成员（或称红色十巨头）之一遇刺，苏联行刑队上周处决了 66 名俄罗斯人（其中一名女性），这些人与刺客列昂尼德·尼古拉耶夫或其罪行毫无关联。"

Using Kirov’s assassination as an attempt to discredit anyone who stood against him, Stalin began purging the Communist Party. According to a Time article, Stalin used Kirov’s assassination to justify the executions of 14 prisoners. “Last week the 14 accused at Leningrad were all young men in their 20’s and 30’s, Russians who have grown to manhood under the Red Flag, they were accused broadly of a major plot to assassinate not only ‘Dear Friend Sergei’ but the chief leaders of the Government, including Stalin. If such young me, all but one members of the Party at the time of their arrest, think Stalin should be assassinated, the inference of Red disillusionment is potent.” ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} Further on in the article, the author wrote, "Next thing Russia knew, the 14 tried at Leningrad had been taken out and shot before their sentence was announced. The Government stated that they had been denied legal defense to the last. The order to shoot was signed by famed Judge Ulrich who has been signing death warrants in batches these last few weeks during Stalin’s
借基洛夫遇刺事件之机，斯大林开始清洗共产党内所有反对者。据《时代》杂志报道，斯大林以基洛夫之死为由处决了 14 名囚犯。"上周在列宁格勒受审的 14 名被告均为二三十岁的青年，这些在红旗下成长起来的俄罗斯人被控策划重大阴谋，不仅要暗杀'亲爱的朋友谢尔盖'，还包括斯大林在内的政府高层领导人。若连这些被捕时几乎全是党员的年轻人也认为斯大林该被刺杀，可见红色理想幻灭的推论极具说服力。" ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21} 文章后续写道："紧接着俄罗斯民众便得知，列宁格勒审判的 14 人在判决公布前已被拖出去枪决。政府声称他们至死未获法律辩护权。处决令由著名法官乌尔里希签署——近几周斯大林清洗运动中，这位法官已批量签发多批死刑执行令。"

campaign of 'pure terror." ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} Even more interesting is the statement, "Under pretext of avenging Kirov, Stalin was able to have shot 117 Russians whom he considered dangerous. If so devious and Oriental a maneuver were in prospect, it would entail steps similar to those taken: 1) The course of Soviet Justice was distorted by a special decree depriving the accused of counsel; 2) for the first time a major Soviet trial of world interest was not broadcast or otherwise advertised and correspondents were not present."23
一场"纯粹的恐怖"运动。 ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} 更有趣的是文中指出："斯大林以替基洛夫复仇为借口，枪决了 117 名他认为危险的俄罗斯人。如果这种狡诈且充满东方权谋的手段属实，那么必然伴随着以下步骤：1）通过特别法令扭曲苏联司法程序，剥夺被告聘请律师的权利；2）首次出现未进行广播宣传、未允许记者到场报道的重大国际性苏联审判。"23

In a May 1935 New York Times article, Harold Denny told of the increase in government control in Russia. “The sense of spying and repression hangs over foreigners no less than over natives” ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} reported Denny. He continued, “The repression and spying would be less distasteful to a Westerner if he could believe they were temporary emergency policies which in the not too distant future would be dispensed with.” ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25}
1935 年 5 月，《纽约时报》记者哈罗德·丹尼在报道中描述了俄国政府管控的加剧。"无论对外国人还是本国人，监视与镇压的氛围同样令人窒息" ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} 丹尼写道。他继续评论道："如果西方人能相信这些只是暂时性的紧急政策，在不远的将来就会取消，那么这种镇压和监视或许还不至于如此令人反感。" ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25}

In 1936, Kamenev and Zinoviev were ärrested and tried for being in league with Trotsky to assassinate Stalin and other top Party leaders. They were also accused and tried for conspiracy in Kirov’s murder in December 1934. According to reports published in the New York Times, “Direct responsibility for the assassination of Sergei Mironovitch Kiroff, colleague of Joseph Stalin, was attributed to Mr. Trotsky, Leon Kameneff and Gregory Zinovieff.” ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} In this article, we found out that "Both Mr. Kameneff and Mr. Zinovieff now are serving ten-year prison sentences for counter-revolutionary activities coincident with
1936 年，加米涅夫和季诺维也夫因与托洛茨基合谋刺杀斯大林及其他党内高层领导人而被捕受审。二人还被指控参与 1934 年 12 月基洛夫遇刺案的阴谋策划。据《纽约时报》刊载的报道称："约瑟夫·斯大林同志的战友谢尔盖·米罗诺维奇·基洛夫遇刺案的直接责任，被归咎于托洛茨基、列昂·加米涅夫和格里戈里·季诺维也夫。" ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} 本文发现"加米涅夫与季诺维也夫目前均因从事与反革命活动相关的罪行，正在服十年有期徒刑"

the assassination of Mr. Kiroff."27 Toward the end of this article, the author stated that, “Kameneff and Zinovieff were among a group sentenced to prison terms in secret trials early in 1935, following which the Stalin regime abolished the Society of Old Bolsheviki, the collaborators of Lenin, and began a systematic purge of the Communist Party.” ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28}
基洛夫同志遇刺案。”27 在这篇文章接近尾声时，作者指出："1935 年初，加米涅夫和季诺维也夫等人经秘密审判被判处监禁，此后斯大林政权解散了列宁的战友组织——老布尔什维克协会，并开始对共产党进行系统性清洗。" ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28}

The next day, the New York Times ran another article about the trials and informed the American public that Zinoviev and Kamenev were expected to be executed after being found guilty of complicity in the plots to assassinate Kirov, Stalin and other top Party leaders. Allegedly “Zinovieff and Kameneff made abject confessions of these charges.” ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} They are even made to sound as if they are still a danger while imprisoned. Harold Denny wrote, “So far as is known there is no accusation that Zinovieff and Kameneff hatched a new plot while in prison.” ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} What was not written was that both men, and the others who were accused of the same crime, were either tortured, threatened or, as is more likely, both tortured and threatened, in order to gain these confessions. It was not uncommon for people to confess after long sessions that involved sleep deprivation, food and water deprivation, and physical and mental torture. However, the NKVD, which replaced the OGPU in 1934, were not know for being forthcoming with their interrogation techniques even though they weren’t exactly unknown to the public.
次日，《纽约时报》又刊登了一篇关于审判的报道，告知美国公众季诺维也夫和加米涅夫因被认定参与刺杀基洛夫、斯大林及其他党内高层领导人的阴谋而将被处决。据称"季诺维也夫和加米涅夫已对这些指控作出卑劣的供认"。 ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} 报道甚至刻意营造出二人即便在狱中仍具危险性的氛围。哈罗德·丹尼写道："就目前所知，尚未有指控表明季诺维也夫和加米涅夫在狱中策划了新阴谋。" ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} 未被提及的是，这两人与其他同案被告都是通过酷刑、威胁或更可能的两者兼施才获得这些供词。在长期遭受睡眠剥夺、断水断粮及身心折磨后认罪的情况并不罕见。然而 1934 年取代国家政治保卫总局的内务人民委员部，虽其审讯手段对公众而言并非完全陌生，却素来以手段隐秘著称。

1936 and 1937 saw the massive purge of the Red Army. Thousands of officers were dismissed from their posts on Stalin’s orders. The charge: conspiracy. Stalin believed the military was planning a coup to topple his regime. He also believed the Red Army had
1936 至 1937 年间，苏联红军经历了大规模清洗。根据斯大林的命令，数千名军官被解除职务，罪名是参与阴谋活动。斯大林认为军方正策划政变推翻其政权，还怀疑红军内部已

been infiltrated by German spies. One of the most notable victims of this purge was Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. He was a brilliant theorist and unfortunately, believed to be a threat to Stalin much like Kirov was…a political rival. By 1937, almost $10\mathrm{\%}$$10\mathrm{\%}$10%10 \% of the 114,300+ Red Army officers had been dismissed from their posts. By the end of the Red Army purge, $30,000+$$30,000+$30,000+30,000+ officers had been executed. The slaughter and dismissal of tens of thousands experience military commanders weakened the infrastructure of the Red Army. High ranking officials were replaced with those who had little to no experience and/or training. There are even reports that one military academy was forced to graduate their cadets one year early to fill the vast vacancies. But the damage had been done. During the war with Finland in the winter of 1940, the Red Army failed miserably.
被德国间谍渗透。这场清洗中最著名的受害者当属图哈切夫斯基元帅，这位杰出的军事理论家不幸像基洛夫一样，被斯大林视为政治对手和威胁。截至 1937 年，114,300 余名红军军官中已有近 $10\mathrm{\%}$$10\mathrm{\%}$10%10 \% 被撤职。清洗结束时， $30,000+$$30,000+$30,000+30,000+ 名军官遭到处决。数万名经验丰富的军事指挥官遭屠杀或解职，严重削弱了红军的组织架构。高级职位被毫无经验或未经训练的人员取代，甚至有记载显示某军事学院被迫让学员提前一年毕业以填补巨大空缺。但恶果已然酿成——在 1940 年冬季的苏芬战争中，红军遭遇了惨痛失败。

Harold Denny wrote of the arrests of Tukhachevsky and 3 other high ranking military officials. Despite Stalin’s own paranoia of a planned military coup, either real or imagined, many military leaders did not believe one existed. Wrote Denny, “Able foreign military experts of several countries are skeptical of anything hinting at a coup with the army. To support their skepticism they point out that Red Army leaders such as General Tukhachevsky have not been Communist theoreticians, as we many who have done down in disgrace in recent months. Thy have been military men occupied with technical duties and perhaps ever too neglectful of party politics.” ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} Bold were these statements because they obviously challenge the veracity of Soviet press releases.
哈罗德·丹尼撰文报道了图哈切夫斯基及其他三名高级军事将领被捕事件。尽管斯大林本人对可能存在的军事政变阴谋（无论真实或臆想）怀有偏执，许多军队领导人并不相信存在这样的阴谋。丹尼写道："多个国家有见地的外国军事专家对任何暗示军队政变的说法都持怀疑态度。为佐证其怀疑，他们指出像图哈切夫斯基将军这样的红军将领并非共产主义理论家——这与近几个月来那些身败名裂的政客截然不同。这些军人一直专注于技术职责，或许对党内政治甚至过于疏忽。" ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} 这些论断堪称大胆，因为它们显然挑战了苏联官方声明的真实性。

In a “special cable” that was published in the New York Times, the concern of other European countries over the dismissal and arrests of the Red Army commanders was
《纽约时报》刊载的一则"特约专电"显示，其他欧洲国家对红军指挥官遭解职和逮捕一事表现出深切忧虑

expressed. “Diplomatic observers in Europe are mystified by the new Soviet punitive measures in connection with the purge of the administrative and economic system of ‘Trotsyist and anti-State enemies,’ who, it is alleged have contributed largely to nonfulfillment of industrial plans.” ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32} It continued with, “Newspapers here are saying in headlines that the ‘Soviet riddle sets Europe guessing’ and that although the answer appears to be that the human element has failed in industry, the reason for the dismissal of the army chiefs remain unexplained.,” ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33}
欧洲的外交观察员对苏联因清洗行政和经济体系中的'托派及反国家敌人'而实施的新惩罚措施感到困惑，据称这些人对工业计划未完成负有重大责任。" ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32} 报道继续写道："此间报纸以头条宣称'苏联之谜让欧洲猜测不已'，虽然答案似乎指向工业领域的人为失误，但军队领导人被解职的原因仍不明朗。" ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33}

The sheer number of victims of Stalin’s purges should have warranted thousands of articles exposing the atrocities. However, there was no mention; possibly because of the intense secrecy of the Government and Stalin. According to Robert Conquest in “The Great Terror”, published in 1968, the estimated number of victims were:
斯大林大清洗的受害者数量之巨，本应引发成千上万篇揭露暴行的报道。然而却只字未提；这可能是由于苏联政府与斯大林严密的保密措施所致。根据罗伯特·康奎斯特 1968 年出版的《大恐怖》记载，预估受害者人数为：

Approximately 7 million arrested between 1937 and 1938
1937 至 1938 年间约 700 万人被捕

Approximately 1 million executed
约 100 万人被处决

Approximately 2 million died in the work camps
约 200 万人死于劳改营

Approximately 1 million people were in prison in late 1938
1938 年底约有 100 万人被监禁

Approximately 8 million were in the work camps in late 1938
1938 年底约有 800 万人身处劳改营

In 1990, Conquest made some revisions to those numbers based on new information:
1990 年，康奎斯特根据新信息对这些数字进行了部分修正：

Approximately 8 million arrested between 1937 and 1938
1937 至 1938 年间约 800 万人被捕

Approximately 1 million executed (no change)
约 100 万人被处决（数据无变动）

Approximately 2.6 to 2.7 million died in the work camps
约 260 至 270 万人死于劳改营

Approximately 1 million people were in prison in late 1938 (no change)
1938 年底约 100 万人被关押在监狱（数据无变动）

Approximately 7 million were in the work camps in late 1938
1938 年末约有 700 万人被关押在劳改营中

An accurate number of victims will never be known since most records were falsified and/or never existed. There is even speculation that many records were destroyed immediately following Stalin’s death.
由于大多数记录被篡改或根本不存在，受害者的确切数字将永远无法得知。甚至有推测称，许多档案在斯大林去世后立即被销毁。

In November 1928, the New York Times picked up an article that originally ran in a White Russian newspaper. The subject of the article was Boris Bazhanov. Bazhanov had been Stalin’s aide from 1923 to 1925. During this time with Stalin, Bazhanov witnessed many historic events. It was through his notes that one of the biggest mysteries in Bolshevik history: the reason Trotsky refused to succeed Lenin. According to Bazhanov’s notes, it was because Trotsky felt that his religion, Judaism, would hurt the newly formed Soviet government. Trotsky believed that he would hurt the cause, even though Lenin thought him worthy of being his heir.
1928 年 11 月，《纽约时报》转载了一篇原载于白俄报纸的文章。文章主角是鲍里斯·巴扎诺夫，这位 1923 至 1925 年间担任斯大林助手的人物，在任期间见证了诸多历史事件。正是通过他的笔记，揭开了布尔什维克历史上最大谜团之一——托洛茨基拒绝接替列宁的原因。巴扎诺夫的笔记显示，托洛茨基认为自己的犹太教信仰会损害新生的苏维埃政府，尽管列宁认为他足以继承大业，但托洛茨基仍坚信自己会拖累革命事业。

In the 1928 article, Bazhanov gave a very telling insight into Stalin’s meteoric rise to power. Of this rise, Bazhanov said, "It is generally thought…that in order to have attained his supreme position Stalin must be an extremely capable and talented man. It is not so.
在 1928 年的文章中，巴扎诺夫对斯大林迅速掌权的内幕给出了极具揭示性的见解。关于这次权力跃升，巴扎诺夫表示："人们普遍认为...要登上最高位置，斯大林必定是位能力超群、才华横溢之人。事实并非如此。

He is illiterate and knows nothing of Marxian tenets…"34 In this same article, Bazhanov enlightens us to the balance of power that existed at that time in Russia by saying “that the Soviets had completely lost their power as well as the Polit Bureau, and that the government of Russia was completely concentrated in the hand of one man-Stalin.” ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35}
他目不识丁，对马克思主义教义一无所知..."34 在同一篇文章中，巴扎诺夫揭示了当时俄国权力格局的真相："苏维埃和政治局都已彻底丧失实权，整个俄国政府完全集中在一个人——斯大林——的掌控之中。" ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35}

Being that Stalin was paranoid and apt to “purge” anyone who he saw as a threat to his power, it is surprising that Bazhanov would have been so bold as to grant such an interview that disparages Stalin. However, when one finds out that Bazhanov defected to Iran on January 1, 1928, it becomes clear that he felt safe from harm. Later he was granted asylum in France, where he lived until he passed away in January 1983. Bazhanov defected because he had become dissatisfied with communism and no longer wanted any part of it. He would be the first, and only, of Stalin’s aides to turn his back on the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, Bazhanov was the target of a hit, more than likely ordered by Stalin.
鉴于斯大林生性多疑，惯于"清洗"任何他视为权力威胁之人，巴扎诺夫竟敢如此大胆地接受这场贬损斯大林的访谈着实令人意外。然而当人们发现巴扎诺夫早在 1928 年 1 月 1 日就叛逃至伊朗时，便不难理解他为何有恃无恐。后来他获得法国政治庇护，直至 1983 年 1 月去世。巴扎诺夫叛逃是因为对共产主义幻灭，决意与之彻底割席。他成为斯大林助手团队中第一个也是唯一一个背弃苏联的人。不出所料，巴扎诺夫后来遭遇暗杀——极可能出自斯大林授意。

Vladislav Krasnov wrote Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List in 1985. In his final chapter, he includes a remark from Bazhanov regarding Marxism: "You know, as I do, that our civilization stands on the edge of an abyss…Those who seek to destroy it put forth an ideal. This ideal [of communism] has been proven false by the experience of the last sixty years…the problem of bringing freedom back to Russia is not insoluble…the youth of Russia no longer believe in the system, despite the fact that they have known nothing else.
弗拉迪斯拉夫·克拉斯诺夫在 1985 年出版了《苏联叛逃者：克格勃通缉名单》。他在最后一章引用了巴扎诺夫关于马克思主义的评论："你我都知道，我们的文明正站在悬崖边缘...那些企图摧毁它的人提出了一个理想。过去六十年的经验证明，这个[共产主义的]理想是虚假的...让自由重返俄罗斯的问题并非无解...尽管俄罗斯的年轻人除了这个体制外一无所知，但他们已不再相信它。

I the West [develops its] confidence and unity, [it] can win the battle for our civilization and set humanity on the true path to progress, not the twisted path of Marxism." ${}^{36}$${}^{36}$^(36){ }^{36}
只要西方[保持]信心与团结，[就]能赢得这场文明保卫战，将人类引向真正的进步之路，而非马克思主义的扭曲道路。" ${}^{36}$${}^{36}$^(36){ }^{36}

In 1929, Stalin began brutally enforcing his policy of collectivization. Under the guise of lessening the burden of the 1927-1928 grain shortage, Stalin implemented forced requisitioning, a throw back to Lenin’s war communism. On July 8, 1929, Walter Duranty, giving a brief history on collectivization, tells American readers that much is riding on the upcoming harvest. He makes us believe that the kolhozy is an idea that seems to be happily accepted by the Russians and that it is working for them. “This year it was realized that the collective farming system had something to offer—tractors, machinery, modern instructors, cleansed seed, fertilizers and the reduction of taxes. The Spring sowing, though delayed by the weather and begun under the pessimistic impression of a partial failure in the Winter grain supply, received a terrific impetus from the centre.” ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37} Duranty, unintentionally or by design, misleads the American public. He fails to convey the peasants had no choice in the matter. Those who resisted were arrested, exiled or shot. The process of collectivization was not easy, nor was it accepted by all.
1929 年，斯大林开始残酷推行农业集体化政策。以缓解 1927-1928 年粮食短缺为名，他实施了强制征粮政策——这实际上是列宁战时共产主义政策的翻版。1929 年 7 月 8 日，沃尔特·杜兰蒂在向美国读者简述集体化进程时表示，即将到来的收成至关重要。他让我们相信集体农庄制度似乎被俄罗斯人欣然接受，且运作良好。"今年人们意识到集体农庄体系能带来诸多好处——拖拉机、机械设备、现代指导员、精选种子、化肥以及减税政策。尽管春播因天气延误，且在冬季粮食供应部分失败的悲观情绪中开始，但中央给予了极大推动。" ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37} 无论有意无意，杜兰蒂都误导了美国公众。他未提及农民在这件事上毫无选择余地。抵抗者遭到逮捕、流放或枪决。集体化进程充满艰难，也并非人人接受。

Walter Duranty held the position of the Moscow correspondent for the New York Times for many years. He was the leading voice and authority on all things Russia. His articles on the First Five Year Plan earned him the highly coveted Pulitzer Prize. Turns out that Stalin’s genocidal plans were in full force, right under Duranty’s nose yet there were only minor mentions of purges. And the articles that did mention the purges minimized not only
沃尔特·杜兰蒂曾多年担任《纽约时报》驻莫斯科记者，是俄罗斯事务的首席发言人兼权威专家。他关于第一个五年计划的报道为其赢得了令人艳羡的普利策奖。然而事实是，斯大林的大清洗计划在杜兰蒂眼皮底下全面实施时，他的报道却对清洗运动仅轻描淡写。即便那些提及清洗运动的文章，也刻意淡化了

the scope but the breadth of the terror. Why would Duranty deliberately lie to the American public about such horrors? How could he, in good conscience, know the truth then make the conscious decision to turn a blind eye?
恐怖统治的范围与规模。杜兰蒂为何要就如此骇人听闻的事件向美国公众蓄意撒谎？他怎能明知真相却昧着良心，故意选择视而不见？

With the opening of the Soviet archives, historians now know that millions, approximately 20,000,000+ people died because of Stalinist policies such as collectivization and the purges. Duranty had the gall to declare that the purges didn’t exist and that Russia was a paradise for laborers. Just as appalling are the articles in which Duranty declared there was no famine in Russia even though it has been well documented. One would question whether he actually got into the provinces to witness the conditions first hand or if he just took it on “good authority” from a Kremlin insider.
随着苏联档案的公开，历史学家现已确认约 2000 多万人因集体化与大清洗等斯大林政策丧生。杜兰蒂竟厚颜宣称清洗运动纯属虚构，称俄罗斯是劳动者的天堂。更令人震惊的是，尽管饥荒已有充分记录，他仍发表文章坚称俄罗斯不存在饥荒。人们不禁质疑：他是否真正深入地方亲眼见证实情，还是仅凭克里姆林宫内部人士的"可靠消息"便妄下论断。

While many other journalists are probably just as guilty of the same falsehoods about the conditions in Russia (i.e. famine and terror), Walter Duranty was extremely well known and respected at that time. His work garnered him the Pulitzer Prize; work that was essentially built on lies and inaccuracies. With the Pulitzer Prize committee investigating Duranty and trying to decide whether or not his prize should be revoked over 70 years later, he should be held to a higher standard. Given the oppressive control that Stalin had on the media, it could be that Duranty was protecting his position, and more than likely his life, by writing only what the government wanted him to write. Or it could be that he eventually bought into the lies of the Soviet government. But given his background before he broke into journalism, his motives should be suspect.
尽管其他许多记者可能同样对俄罗斯的真实状况（如饥荒与恐怖统治）撒了谎，但沃尔特·杜兰蒂在当时享有极高声望。他凭借建立在谎言与失实报道上的作品获得了普利策奖——时隔七十余年，普利策奖委员会仍在调查杜兰蒂并考虑是否撤销其奖项，这正说明他本应受到更严格的职业标准约束。考虑到斯大林政权对媒体的高压控制，杜兰蒂或许是为了保全职位——更可能是为了活命——才只撰写政府要求的内容。又或许他最终全盘接受了苏联政府的谎言。但结合他踏入新闻业之前的背景，其动机确实值得怀疑。

Millions of Russian peasants starved to death during the years of 1928 and 1936. Unfortunately, most Americans were completely unaware of the dire situation in Russia
1928 至 1936 年间，数百万俄罗斯农民死于饥荒。可悲的是，绝大多数美国人对俄罗斯的惨状一无所知。
and the Soviet Union. But Duranty, who was charged with accurately reporting such conditions, chose to lie and tell Americans that the situation was a work of fiction. In March 1933, Duranty had the gall to write “…to put it brutally-you can’t make an omlette [sic] without breaking a few eggs, and the Bolshevist leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socialization…” ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38} He tries to legitimize his statements by presenting his “research” methods: “I have inquired in Soviet commissariats and in foreign embassies with their network of consuls, and I have tabulated information from Britons working as specialist and from my personal connections, Russian and foreign…All seems to me to be more trustworthy than I could get by a brief trip through any one area. The Soviet Union is too big to permit a hasty study, and it is the foreign correspondent’s job to present a while picture, not a part of it.” ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} Toward the end of the article, he reiterates his position on the famine by writing “…conditions are definitely bad in certain sections-the Ukraine, North Caucasus and Lower Volga…These conditions are bad, but there is no famine.” ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40}
与苏联。但杜兰蒂肩负着如实报道这些情况的责任，却选择撒谎，告诉美国人这一切都是虚构的。1933 年 3 月，杜兰蒂竟厚颜无耻地写道："……直白地说——不打碎几个鸡蛋就做不成煎蛋卷，布尔什维克领导人对他们推动社会化进程中可能涉及的伤亡同样漠不关心……" ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38} 他试图通过展示自己的"研究"方法来使其言论合法化："我咨询了苏联人民委员部和拥有领事网络的外国使馆，整理了英国专家和我个人关系网中俄罗斯及外国人士提供的信息……在我看来，这比短暂考察任何一个地区所获信息都更可靠。苏联幅员辽阔，不容仓促研究，而驻外记者的职责是呈现整体图景，而非局部。" ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} 在文章结尾处，他再次表明对饥荒的立场："……某些地区的情况确实很糟——乌克兰、北高加索和伏尔加河下游……这些情况很糟糕，但不存在饥荒。" ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40}

In May 1933, Duranty repeated his earlier assertions that the famine in Russia was a work of fiction. In this particular article he stated ,"…though conditions are terribly hard there is no sign of real famine conditions or that people are dying in the streets, as is reported in Moscow. The mortality figures jumped during the Winter, and there is always a concomitant of undernourishment in Russia, but it is not epidemic, a fact that is confirmed by resident foreigners." ${}^{41}$${}^{41}$^(41){ }^{41} As stated in his March 31 article, Mr. Duranty never went out
1933 年 5 月，杜兰蒂再次坚称俄罗斯的饥荒纯属虚构。在这篇特定文章中他写道："……尽管处境极为艰难，但并未出现真正饥荒的迹象，也没有如莫斯科报道所称的民众饿毙街头的现象。冬季死亡率确实激增，俄国长期存在营养不良的伴生问题，但这并未形成疫情，旅俄外侨均可证实此说。" ${}^{41}$${}^{41}$^(41){ }^{41} 正如他在 3 月 31 日文章所述，杜兰蒂先生从未实地

into the countryside to investigate the true situation. In the May 1933 article, Mr. Duranty also wrote briefly about the collectives. He wrote, “It is significant that local newspapers of Odessa, Kiev and other Ukrainian towns along the railroad all report a large new influx of individual peasants into the collectives, which is confirmed here not only by a member of the Presiding Council of the Odessa Provincial Government, but by peasants with whom the writer has talked.” ${}^{42}$${}^{42}$^(42){ }^{42}
考察过农村的真实状况。在 1933 年 5 月的文章中，杜兰蒂先生也简要提及集体农庄。他写道："值得注意的是，敖德萨、基辅及铁路沿线其他乌克兰城镇的地方报纸均报道个体农民正大规模新近加入集体农庄，这一情况不仅得到敖德萨省政府执行委员会成员的证实，笔者交谈过的农民们也予以佐证。" ${}^{42}$${}^{42}$^(42){ }^{42}

In September 1933, Mr. Duranty wrote an article about collectivization. In the opening paragraph of the article, he wrote “The writer has just completed a 200 -mile auto trip through the heart of the Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk of famine now is ridiculous.” ${}^{43}$${}^{43}$^(43){ }^{43} Given the article he wrote in March 1933 in which he stated that Russia was too vast in order to even pull off such a thing, it is ironic, almost hypocritical, that he decided to do this. Of his travels he reports, “The populace, from the babies to old folks, looks health and well-nourished.” ${}^{44}\mathrm{He}$${}^{44}\mathrm{He}$^(44)He{ }^{44} \mathrm{He} also said of the peasants’ attitudes of collectivization as a policy, “One thing, however, is sure-the peasants have accepted collectivization and are willingly obeying the Kremlin’s orders.” ${}^{45}$${}^{45}$^(45){ }^{45} It is clear; knowing what historians know now, that the peasants with whom he spoke must have been coerced, as was the rule of the day.
1933 年 9 月，杜兰蒂先生撰写了一篇关于集体化的文章。他在开篇写道："笔者刚完成穿越乌克兰腹地 200 英里的汽车旅行，可以明确表示今年收成极好，所有关于饥荒的言论如今都荒谬可笑。" ${}^{43}$${}^{43}$^(43){ }^{43} 考虑到他在 1933 年 3 月发表的文章中曾声称俄罗斯疆域过于辽阔以至于不可能发生饥荒，此时他做出这番表态显得极具讽刺意味，近乎虚伪。关于沿途见闻，他报道称："从婴儿到老者，民众看起来健康且营养充足。" ${}^{44}\mathrm{He}$${}^{44}\mathrm{He}$^(44)He{ }^{44} \mathrm{He} 他还如此描述农民对集体化政策的态度："但有一点是确定的——农民们已经接受集体化，并心甘情愿地服从克里姆林宫的命令。" ${}^{45}$${}^{45}$^(45){ }^{45} 根据历史学家现在掌握的资料，显然与他交谈的农民必定是受到了胁迫，这完全符合当时的统治手段。

Why would Duranty deliberately mislead the United States, and the whole world, about the conditions in Russia? According to Dennis Behrandt of The New American, he traces the origins of Duranty’s deception back to 1921 when the New York Times sent him to Riga,
为何杜兰蒂要刻意向美国和全世界隐瞒俄罗斯的真实状况？《新美国人》杂志的丹尼斯·贝兰特追溯其欺骗行为的源头至 1921 年，当时《纽约时报》派他前往里加，

Latvia. The American Relief Association would send the requested aid to the region on one condition…foreign journalists would be permitted to report from Russia. Once in Latvia, Duranty was instructed to apply for a visa for entry into Russia. However, he was denied “because of his anti-Soviet bias.” ${}^{46}$${}^{46}$^(46){ }^{46} In an effort to gain entry, Duranty authored a “propaganda” piece about Lenin’s NEP. In this article, Duranty deliberately omitted the failures of Communism. The article gained Duranty favor with the Soviet government and he was granted his visa. This new attitude of “pro-Communism” continued once he settled into Russia. In January 1923, Duranty published an article that praised Stalin. The article implies that Stalin is a better leader than Lenin and that the Soviet Union is thriving only because of Stalin and his mental acuity.
拉脱维亚。美国救济协会同意向该地区提供所需援助，但有一个条件……允许外国记者在俄罗斯进行报道。抵达拉脱维亚后，杜兰蒂接到指示申请进入俄罗斯的签证。然而，他因"反苏倾向"被拒签。 ${}^{46}$${}^{46}$^(46){ }^{46} 为获得入境许可，杜兰蒂撰写了一篇关于列宁新经济政策的"宣传"文章。在这篇文章中，他刻意回避了共产主义的失败。这篇文章使杜兰蒂获得了苏联政府的好感，他最终取得了签证。这种新的"亲共"态度在他定居俄罗斯后持续发酵。1923 年 1 月，杜兰蒂发表文章盛赞斯大林。文中暗示斯大林是比列宁更优秀的领导者，并声称苏联的繁荣完全归功于斯大林及其卓越才智。

After a few years as the New York Times’ leading correspondent on all things Russia, Walter Duranty was living the high life, so to speak. The Pulitzer Prize that he was awarded in 1931 allowed him much prestige. And at the pinnacle of the famine and its resulting casualties, Duranty was living with his mistress in comfort. Also during this time, Duranty was working overtime to make the public believe that the “de-kulakization” did not exist. He knew the truth but chose to continue the lie. According to Duranty’s own admission to A.W. Klieforth at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, Germany “…the New York Times, the most powerful, most respected news organization in the United States, served as a Soviet mouthpiece.” ${}^{47}$${}^{47}$^(47){ }^{47}
作为《纽约时报》驻俄首席记者的几年间，沃尔特·杜兰蒂可谓过着纸醉金迷的生活。1931 年获得的普利策奖为他带来了显赫声望。当饥荒肆虐导致大规模死亡时，他却与情妇过着优渥生活。与此同时，杜兰蒂正竭力向公众否认"消灭富农"运动的存在。他心知肚明却选择延续谎言。据杜兰蒂本人在德国柏林美国大使馆向 A·W·克利福斯亲口承认："......《纽约时报》这个美国最具影响力、最受尊敬的新闻机构，竟成了苏联的传声筒。" ${}^{47}$${}^{47}$^(47){ }^{47}

It was no secret that Stalin controlled the media in addition to every other aspect of Russia. As we know from an article referenced earlier in this section, Stalin had a firm grip on the
斯大林掌控着俄罗斯方方面面的权力，媒体自然也不例外。正如本节前文引述的文章所示，这位苏联领导人牢牢把控着

media well before Kirov’s assassination. According to Time, most journalists knew this as well. In their January 7, 1935 article about the trial of Leonid Nicolaev, the writer stated, "Not wishing to displease Josef Stalin, not a single foreign correspondent turned up in Leningrad last week to try to cover the trial of the assassin of the Dictator’s ‘Dear Friend Sergei’ Kirov., ${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48} Later in the same article, the author informed the readers, “Government press releases supplied the only details. Nicolaev was said t have laughed at his judges, perhaps hysterical after nearly a month under third degree. Another accused conspirator, said the Government, fainted dead away.” ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} It would seem that the author of this article was familiar with the “interrogation” techniques of the GPU. And it is almost implied that the absurdity of the statement that Nicolaev laughed at the judges was very clear to the journalist.
早在基洛夫遇刺前，媒体就已心知肚明。《时代》周刊指出，多数记者对此也心照不宣。在 1935 年 1 月 7 日关于列昂尼德·尼古拉耶夫审判的报道中，撰稿人写道："为免触怒约瑟夫·斯大林，上周竟无一名外国记者敢赴列宁格勒报道这位独裁者'挚友谢尔盖'基洛夫遇刺案的审判。" ${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48} 同篇报道后文透露："政府新闻稿成为唯一消息源。据称尼古拉耶夫当庭嘲笑法官——或许是在近一个月的酷刑逼供后精神失常。政府通报称，另一名同谋被告当场昏厥。" ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} 显然，本文作者深谙苏联国家政治保卫局的"审讯"手段。记者几乎是在暗示，所谓尼古拉耶夫嘲笑法官的荒诞说辞，明眼人都能看穿。

Was Duranty the only one to perpetuate these horrible lies? No. But was he one of the most respected journalists at the time, who was also considered to be the leading authority on such matters? Yes. He had a responsibility to tell the truth. Given his popularity and fame, there is little chance that he would have “disappeared” or been arrested had the truth been written. Yes, he would have been expelled and more than likely replaced with someone less scrupulous who would have been willing to continue lying to the public. But the truth would have been out there. And with his clout, possibly there would have been some kind of investigation by international relief agencies.
杜兰蒂是唯一散布这些可怕谎言的人吗？不是。但作为当时最受尊敬的记者之一，同时被视为该领域权威专家的他是否也参与其中？是的。他本有责任说出真相。以他的声望和地位，即便写出真相也不太可能"被失踪"或遭逮捕。诚然，他可能会被驱逐出境，并极有可能被某个更肆无忌惮、愿意继续向公众撒谎的记者取代。但真相终将大白于天下。凭借他的影响力，或许还能促使国际救援机构展开某种调查。

In a paradoxical twist, the New York Time’s own Harold Denny did write an article which discussed some of the repression in Russia at the time. “The press, radio, cinema, theatre
具有讽刺意味的是，《纽约时报》记者哈罗德·丹尼确实撰写过一篇讨论当时俄国镇压政策的文章。"报刊、广播、电影、戏剧
${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48} Time, January 7, 1935
${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48} 《时代》周刊，1935 年 1 月 7 日
${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} Ibid, January 7, 1935
${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} 同上，1935 年 1 月 7 日
and the educational system are all rigidly controlled. And should the Soviet citizen express unorthodox political views they may bring him very bad luck” ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} relayed Denny. He further observed, “Foreign residents, especially members of the diplomatic corps and newspaper correspondents, in whose acts and thought the Soviet authorities are especially interested, assume that their sayings and doings and goings and comings are observed and noted. They are so certain that their telephone calls are listened to that no one discusses anything private over the wire.” ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} Denny could be seen as being just as guilty as Duranty and other foreign journalists in writing favorable pieces about the Soviet government and Russia. This is one article that exemplifies that it was possible to get a critical article out of Russia and have it printed in the West.
教育体系也受到严格管控。如果苏联公民表达非正统的政治观点，可能会招致厄运。” ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} 丹尼转述道。他进一步观察到：“外国居民，尤其是外交官和新闻记者这类苏联当局特别关注其言行思想的群体，都认为自己的所作所为、行踪往来处于监视记录之中。他们确信电话遭到监听，因此没人会在通话中讨论任何私密事务。” ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} 丹尼与杜兰蒂等外国记者一样，都曾撰写过为苏联政府和俄罗斯说好话的报道。但这篇文章证明，当时仍有可能从俄罗斯发出批评性报道并在西方刊发。

In June 1937, the New York Times ran a lengthy article authored by Harold Denny in which he discussed the arrest of several Red Army Marshals and Generals. Denny wrote “The Soviet Government exerts such complete control over news at its source that it is utterly impossible to confirm rumors such as those current now. Experience here, however, enables one to judge much by the tone of the official press-by phrases used and, perhaps, best of all by the omissions. And the tone it used now certainly does not discourage the belief that momentous events are occurring behind the scenes.” ${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52}
1937 年 6 月，《纽约时报》刊登了哈罗德·丹尼撰写的长篇报道，文中讨论了几位红军元帅和将军被捕事件。丹尼写道："苏联政府对新闻源头实施如此彻底的管控，使得当前流传的种种谣言完全无法证实。但此地的经验让人能够通过官方媒体的措辞基调——或许最能说明问题的是那些刻意回避的内容——来作出诸多判断。而此刻官方媒体采用的基调，无疑助长了人们对幕后正发生重大事件的猜测。" ${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52}

Interestingly, an article appears in the New York Times on June 10, 1937, sent via “special cable” but no author listed, that makes a very blunt statement about the state of Russian politics by stating “If it is really the case that in the army, in the fleet, in industry, in the
值得注意的是，1937 年 6 月 10 日《纽约时报》通过"专线电报"刊发了一篇未署名的文章，对俄国政治局势作出极为直白的论断："如果军队、舰队、工业界确实存在......"
${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} The New York Times, May 5, 1935 pg. SM11
${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} 《纽约时报》1935 年 5 月 5 日 SM11 版
${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} Ibid, May 5, 1935 pg. SM11
${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} 同上，1935 年 5 月 5 日 SM11 版
${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52} The New York Times, June 10, 1937, pg. 1
${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52} 《纽约时报》1937 年 6 月 10 日头版
police, in party organizations and in the Communist International scores of trusted comrades in high and responsible posts have been acting as paid spies and saboteurs for foreign powers, then, Russia after hard on twenty years of Bolshevik rule must be more corrupt and more debased than any Stat in history—incredibly so.” ${}^{53}$${}^{53}$^(53){ }^{53}
"如果真如斯大林同志所言，在军队、警察、党组织和共产国际中，有数十名身居要职的可靠同志长期充当外国势力的有偿间谍与破坏者，那么经过近二十年布尔什维克统治的俄国，其腐败堕落程度必将超越历史上任何国家——这简直令人难以置信。" ${}^{53}$${}^{53}$^(53){ }^{53}

Four days later, on June 14, 1937, the New York Times published an article written by Anne O’Hare McCormick about the elimination of Red Army Marshals. She expressed an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that was enveloping foreign correspondents in Russia. All were clamoring for answers to the purge of the Red Army. She wrote, “And the whole point of the grim story unfolding in the U.S.S.R. is that the facts on which to form a judgment are not available.” ${}^{54}$${}^{54}$^(54){ }^{54} Quite clearly, American journalists in Russia were very aware of the situation. There were even those, such as Ms. McCormick and Harold Denny, who defied the Soviets and wrote articles depicting the truth as closely as possible…whether or not the Soviet Union and the Government were cast in a favorable light. On June 24, 1937, Harold Denny wrote of the purges, “The purge in the Communist party far overshadows the one whereby Stalin rid himself of oppositionists at the finish of his victory over Trotsky.,” ${}^{55}$${}^{55}$^(55){ }^{55}
四天后，即 1937 年 6 月 14 日，《纽约时报》刊登了安妮·奥黑尔·麦考密克关于红军元帅被清洗的报道。她描述了笼罩在驻俄外国记者身上的恐惧与不安氛围。所有人都在急切追问红军清洗事件的真相。她在文中写道："苏联正在上演的残酷事件关键在于——人们根本无从获取足以作出判断的事实依据。" ${}^{54}$${}^{54}$^(54){ }^{54} 显然，驻俄美国记者对局势心知肚明。甚至像麦考密克女士和哈罗德·丹尼这样的记者，敢于违抗苏联当局，尽可能真实地记录事件原貌——无论这些报道是否有利于苏联及其政府形象。1937 年 6 月 24 日，哈罗德·丹尼在描述清洗运动时写道："这次党内清洗的规模，远超斯大林在战胜托洛茨基后清除反对派的那次。" ${}^{55}$${}^{55}$^(55){ }^{55}

There were journalists who printed the truth of the situation in Russia. But others, like Walter Duranty, did not. They could not have been blind to the starvation, suffering and fear that had swallowed Russian society. We may never know if Duranty deliberately
曾有记者如实报道了俄国的真实状况。但像沃尔特·杜兰蒂这样的记者却刻意掩盖真相。他们不可能对吞噬俄国社会的饥荒、苦难与恐惧视而不见。我们或许永远无法知晓杜兰蒂是蓄意

printed those lies so he could curry favors from the Government or if he did so to protect himself and his position within the Soviet Union.
编造谎言以讨好政府，还是为保全自己在苏联的地位而违心行事。

With all the media reports and the omissions and manipulations of the facts, it is a wonder that Americans knew what was going on at all. Just what did Americans think of Russia and her leaders before World War II? How aware were they of the events and situations in Russia? There are a plethora of organizations that measure public opinion on almost any topic, from A to Z. In this section, I will be dealing solely with American opinions on topics that are related to Russia and her involvement in world affairs before World War II.
面对媒体铺天盖地的失实报道与刻意隐瞒，美国人竟能知晓部分真相实属奇迹。二战前美国民众究竟如何看待俄国及其领导人？他们对俄国境内发生的事件了解多少？从 A 到 Z，有无数机构测量着公众对各类议题的看法。本节将专门探讨二战前美国民众对俄国及其国际事务参与的观感。

In early 1937, the AIPO did a survey for American public opinion on totalitarianism. Below are a few results from that study:
1937 年初，美国民意研究所（AIPO）就极权主义问题开展了一项民意调查。以下是该研究的几项结果：
"Have you paid any attention to articles on Fascism and Communism?
"您是否关注过有关法西斯主义和共产主义的文章？
"Yes $41\mathrm{\%}$$41\mathrm{\%}$41%41 \% No $47\mathrm{\%}$$47\mathrm{\%}$47%47 \% No Opinion $12\mathrm{\%}$$12\mathrm{\%}$12%12 \%
"是 $41\mathrm{\%}$$41\mathrm{\%}$41%41 \% 否 $47\mathrm{\%}$$47\mathrm{\%}$47%47 \% 无意见 $12\mathrm{\%}$$12\mathrm{\%}$12%12 \%
"If you had to choose between Fascism and Communism, which would you choose? Asked of $41\mathrm{\%}$$41\mathrm{\%}$41%41 \% of the total sample who had paid attention to articles on Fascism and Communism.
"如果必须在法西斯主义和共产主义之间做出选择，您会选择哪一个？此问题仅针对样本中 $41\mathrm{\%}$$41\mathrm{\%}$41%41 \% 的、曾关注过法西斯主义和共产主义文章的受访者提出。
“Fascism 17% Communism 11% No Opinion 13%”,56
“法西斯主义 17% 共产主义 11% 无意见 13%”，56

56 American Public Opinion 1935-1946, Mildred Strunk, pg. 869
56 《1935-1946 年美国民意》，米尔德里德·斯特伦克，第 869 页

From the results, it would seem that Americans either had incorrect perceptions or an incomplete understanding of the tenets of each ideology. In June 1938, and again in January 1939, the AIPO again asked which form of government, Fascism or Communism, the respondents would prefer. Below are the results of the follow up studies:
从结果来看，美国民众似乎对这些意识形态的基本原则存在误解或认识不全。1938 年 6 月和 1939 年 1 月，美国民意研究所再次询问受访者更倾向于法西斯主义还是共产主义政府形式。后续研究结果如下：
"If you had to choose between Fascism and Communism, which would you choose?
"如果必须在法西斯主义和共产主义之间做出选择，您会选择哪个？"
"June 21, 1938:  1938 年 6 月 21 日：
"Fascism 24% Communism 24% No answer or no opinion 52%
法西斯主义 24% 共产主义 24% 未作答或无意见 52%
"January 20, 1939:  1939 年 1 月 20 日：
“Fascism 25% Communism 24% No answer or no opinion 50% Neither 1%”,"57
法西斯主义 25% 共产主义 24% 未作答或无意见 50% 两者皆非 1%

In June 1937, the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) polled participants about World War I. The questions related to Russia asked were:
1937 年 6 月，美国民意研究所（AIPO）就第一次世界大战对受访者进行了问卷调查。其中涉及俄罗斯的问题包括：
"Do you consider any nation or nations chiefly guilty of causing the World War?
"您认为哪个或哪些国家应对引发世界大战负主要责任？

" $45\mathrm{\%}$$45\mathrm{\%}$45%45 \% of a national sample who said they considered that one or more nations were guilty of causing the first World War were asked: Which?
"在全国样本中，有 $45\mathrm{\%}$$45\mathrm{\%}$45%45 \% 比例的受访者表示认为一个或多个国家应对引发第一次世界大战负责。当被问及具体是哪些国家时：
"Germany 77%  "德国 77%
"France 5%  法国 5%
${}^{57}$${}^{57}$^(57){ }^{57} Ibid, Mildred Strunk, pg. 869
${}^{57}$${}^{57}$^(57){ }^{57} 同上，米尔德丽德·斯特伦克，第 869 页

Surprising is the lack of specific mention of the United States as being an aggressor. Also surprising is that Americans placed more blame on Germany, France, Great Britain and Austria than they do Russia for causing World War I. At this point in history, we had only recognized the Soviet Union as a legitimate government four years prior whereas we had cordial diplomatic ties with Great Britain and France.
令人惊讶的是，美国并未被明确提及为侵略者。同样出人意料的是，美国人将引发第一次世界大战的责任更多地归咎于德国、法国、英国和奥地利，而非俄罗斯。在此时的历史节点上，我们仅在四年前才承认苏联为合法政府，而与英国和法国则保持着友好的外交关系。

The following month, the AIPO conducted yet another survey of American opinion. This time, they asked participants the following question:
次月，美国民意研究所再次开展了一项民意调查。这次他们向受访者提出了以下问题：
"If you had to choose, which kind of government would you prefer to live under: the kind in Germany or the kind in Russia?
"如果必须选择，您更愿意生活在哪种政府体制下：德国式的还是俄国式的？"
"Germany 33%  "德国 33%"
"Russia 21%  "俄国 21%"
"No Opinion 22%  "无意见 22%