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Nationalism and Gender  民族主义与性别

Chizuko Ueno  上野千鹤子

translated by  翻译
Beverley Yamamoto  贝弗利·山本

Nationalism and Gender  民族主义与性别

JAPANESE SOCIETY SERIES  日本社会系列

General Editor: Yoshio Sugimoto
总编辑:杉本义雄

Lives of Young Koreans in Japan
在日韩国青年的生活
Yasunori Fukuoka  福冈康则Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan
当代日本的全球化与社会变迁
J.S. Eades Tom Gill Harumi Befu
J.S. Eades 汤姆·吉尔 贝夫·晴美
Coming Out in Japan: The Story of Satoru and Ryuta
在日本出柜:悟与龙太的故事
Satoru Ito and Ryuta Yanase
伊藤悟 与 柳濑龙太
Japan and Its Others: Globalization, Difference and the Critique of Modernity
日本与“他者”:全球化、差异与现代性的批判
John Clammer  约翰·克拉默Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron
同质霸权:日本人论的人类学分析
Harumi Befu  部府晴美Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan
当代日本的外国移民
Hiroshi Komai  小舞浩A Social History of Science and Technology in Contempory Japan, Volume 1
当代日本科学技术社会史,第一卷
Shigeru Nakayama  中山茂Farewell to Nippon: Japanese Lifestyle Migrants in Australia
告别日本:澳大利亚的日本生活方式移民
Machiko Sato  佐藤真智子The Peripheral Centre: Essays on Japanese History and Civilization
边缘中心:日本历史与文明论文集
Johann P. Arnason  约翰·P·阿纳森A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-images
“日本人”自我形象的谱系
Eiji Oguma  小熊英二Class Structure in Contemporary Japan
当代日本的阶级结构
Kenji Hashimoto  桥本健二An Ecological View of History
历史的生态视角
Tadao Umesao  梅佐 忠夫Nationalism and Gender  民族主义与性别Chizuko Ueno  上野 千鹤子Native Anthropology  本土人类学

Takami Kuwayama

Nationalism and Gender   民族主义与性别

Chizuko Ueno   上野千鹤子

Translated by  翻译者Beverley Yamamoto

Trans Pacific Press  跨太平洋出版社

Melbourne  墨尔本
This English edition first published in 2004 by
本英文版首次出版于 2004 年

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由墨尔本数字环境设计和排版。

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由澳大利亚维多利亚州伯伍德 BPA 印刷集团印刷

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All rights reserved. No production of any part of this book may take place without the written permission of Trans Pacific Press.
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ISBN 1-8768-4353-5 (Hardback)
ISBN 1-8768-4353-5(精装本)

ISBN 1-8768-4359-4 (Paperback)
ISBN 1-8768-4359-4(平装)

National Library of Australia Cataloging in Publication Data
澳大利亚国家图书馆出版目录数据

Ueno, Chizuko, 1948-.  上野千鹤子,1948 年生。
Nationalism and gender.  民族主义与性别。
ISBN 1876843535 (pbk.).  ISBN 1876843535(平装本)。
ISBN 1876843594.  ISBN 1876843594。
  1. Comfort women - Asia. 2. World War, 1939-1945 - Atrocities. 3. Service, Compulsory nonmilitary - Asia. 4. Soldiers - Japan - Sexual behavior. 5. Japan - History - 1926-1945. I. Title.
    慰安妇——亚洲。2. 第二次世界大战,1939-1945——暴行。3. 强制非军事服务——亚洲。4. 士兵——日本——性行为。5. 日本——历史——1926-1945。I. 题名。

    940.54/05/095

Contents  目录

Translator's Introduction
译者介绍

Author’s Introduction to the English Edition
作者对英文版的介绍

Part I - Engendering the Nation
第一部分 - 性别化国家

Methodological Issues  方法论问题
Paradigm Change in Post-War History
战后历史的范式转变

Paradigm Change in Women’s History
女性历史中的范式转变

The Nationalisation of Women and Wartime Mobilisation
女性的国家化与战时动员

The Feminist Response  女性主义的回应
The Feminist Version of ‘Conquering the Modern’
“征服现代”的女性主义版本

Female Socialist or Socialist Feminist? The Case of Yamakawa Kikue
女性社会主义者还是社会主义女性主义者?山川菊枝的案例

The War Responsibility of Ordinary Women
普通女性的战争责任

The Dilemma of the Nation-State’s Gender Strategy
民族国家性别策略的困境

The Paradox of this Gender Strategy
这一性别策略的悖论

Women and the Issue of Conversion
女性与皈依问题

Ideas Capable of Transcending the State
能够超越国家的思想

A Critique of the Reflexive School of Women’s History
女性历史反思学派的批判

Going Beyond the ‘Nationalisation of Women’ Paradigm
超越“女性国家化”范式

Part II - The Military Comfort Women Issue
第二部分 - 军事慰安妇问题

A Triple Crime  三重罪行

The Patriarchal Paradigm of National Shame
国家耻辱的父权范式

The ‘Purity’ of Korean Women
韩国女性的“纯洁性”

The Military Rape Paradigm
军事强奸范式

The Prostitution Paradigm
卖淫范式

The Sexual Violence Paradigm
性暴力范式

The Nationalist Discourse
民族主义话语

The Grey Zone of Collaboration with Japan
与日本合作的灰色地带

A Uniquely Japanese or Universal Phenomenon?
一个独特的日本现象还是普遍现象?

Gender, Class and the Nation
性别、阶级与民族

‘Truth’ Amidst Multiple Histories
多重历史中的“真相”

Part III - The Politics of Memory
第三部分 - 记忆的政治

The Japanese Version of Historical Revisionism
日本版的历史修正主义

The Challenge to Gender History
对性别史的挑战

The Positivist Myth of Objective and Neutral History
客观中立历史的实证主义神话

Historicization versus an Ahistorical Approach
历史化与非历史化方法的对立

Oral History and Testimony
口述历史与证言

Narrating History  叙述历史
Reflexive Women’s History
反思性的女性历史

Going Beyond the Nation-State
超越民族国家

Can Feminism Transcend Nationalism?
女权主义能超越民族主义吗?

Part IV - Hiroshima from a Feminist Perspective: Between War Crimes and
第四部分 - 从女性主义视角看广岛:介于战争罪行之间

the Crime of War
战争罪行

Feminism, Peace Studies and Military Studies
女权主义、和平研究与军事研究

Hiroshima as a Symbol
广岛作为象征

Hiroshima as seen from an American Perspective
从美国视角看广岛

The Hague International Court of Justice and the De-Criminalization of
海牙国际法院与非刑事化

Nuclear Weapons  核武器
The Split in the Peace Movement
和平运动的分裂

The De-Criminalization of State Violence
国家暴力的非刑事化

Two Lawless Zones  两个无法无天的区域
Who is a Citizen?
谁是公民?

Public Violence and Gender
公共暴力与性别

Women’s Participation in the Military
女性参军
The Nationalisation of Women
女性的国家化

Between War Crimes and the Crime of War
介于战争罪与战争犯罪之间

Epilogue  结语
Chronology of Related Events
相关事件年表

Notes  注释
References  参考文献

Translator's Introduction
译者介绍

Even from the overly close perspective of the early 21 st 21 st  21^("st ")21^{\text {st }} century, it is clear that the final decade of the 20 th 20 th  20^("th ")20^{\text {th }} century, a century frequently described as the bloodiest in history, was a period of heady political change that brought with it massive political, economic and ideological shifts and re-alliances. The reunification of Germany in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which followed almost immediately after, heralded the beginning of the post-Cold War era. The symbolic ending of the Cold War era was also marked by the uncontested handover of Hong Kong to China and the extension of NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact nations (Hein and Selden, 2000:14). Just as the end of the Second World War brought in its wake new geo-political alliances that totally re-shaped the post-war international map, so too the collapse of communism and a world that had been organised around two ideologically opposed superpowers opened the way for new political, economic and security alliances to be forged across old Cold War lines. It also created a world order gravitating around a single superpower, the United States.
即使从 20 世纪初那个过于近距离的视角来看,20 世纪最后十年——一个常被描述为历史上最血腥的世纪——也是一个激动人心的政治变革时期,带来了巨大的政治、经济和意识形态的转变与重新结盟。1989 年德国的统一以及紧随其后的苏联解体,标志着后冷战时代的开始。冷战时代的象征性结束还体现在香港无争议地回归中国,以及北约成员国扩展到前华沙条约国家(Hein 和 Selden,2000:14)。正如第二次世界大战结束后带来了全新的地缘政治联盟,彻底重塑了战后国际格局一样,冷战时期围绕两个意识形态对立超级大国组织的世界的崩溃,也为跨越旧冷战界限建立新的政治、经济和安全联盟打开了道路。它还创造了一个围绕单一超级大国——美国——运转的世界秩序。

Post-Cold War Politics and Historical Memory
后冷战政治与历史记忆

The 1990s was, then, a period of adjustment to a new geo-political reality and also a waking up to the possibilities of this new post-Cold War era. It created the right conditions for the rise of democracy movements in much of Eastern Europe, and also in Taiwan and South Korea. These democracy movements in turn spurred feminist activism tied in with the international women’s movement, particularly in Taiwan and South Korea. As we will see, the rise of a strong women’s movement in South Korea and a lesser extent Taiwan, was to be a significant factor in events that would rip open an
1990 年代,是一个适应新的地缘政治现实的时期,也是对这一新的后冷战时代可能性的觉醒时期。它为东欧大部分地区以及台湾和韩国的民主运动的兴起创造了有利条件。这些民主运动反过来又推动了与国际妇女运动相关联的女权主义行动,特别是在台湾和韩国。正如我们将看到的,韩国强大的妇女运动的兴起,以及台湾在较小程度上的妇女运动,成为撕开日本社会结构中情感和意识形态裂缝的重要因素,

emotional and ideological hole in the fabric of Japanese society and expose areas that those on the political right, at least, had thought had been successfully covered over and lost to the deeper recesses of history.
暴露出那些政治右翼人士至少曾认为已被成功掩盖并遗忘于历史深处的领域。
Yet, unless one is a meticulous housekeeper, any moving of furniture immediately exposes to view dirt and forgotten spots and blemishes that had been covered over when these items had been in their former location. So too, this shifting of former Cold War alliances laid bare unresolved conflicts that had been covered over by the power structures that had been erected in the immediate post-World War II era. Of interest here, is the way in which unresolved issues of history surfaced with force, creating tensions both within and between nations in large areas of Eastern Europe and Asia. In the words of Hein and Selden:
然而,除非是一个一丝不苟的家务管理者,否则任何家具的移动都会立即暴露出之前被掩盖的污垢、遗忘的角落和瑕疵。同样,冷战时期旧有联盟的变动也揭示了那些被二战后立即建立的权力结构所掩盖的未解决冲突。这里值得关注的是,历史上未解决的问题如何强烈地浮现出来,在东欧和亚洲广大地区的国家内部及国家之间制造了紧张局势。正如 Hein 和 Selden 所言:
Historical memory of World War II suddenly gained new potency. Suppressed but not forgotten, old conflicts born of colonialism and war took on new urgency. This was particularly pertinent for the former Axis powers, which then had to bring to all future international negotiations not only the long neglected baggage they had accumulated during World War II but also that of the Cold War. As Germany and Japan moved from decades of political subordination to the United States (or in the case of East Germany, to the Soviet Union), they also lost the protection they had enjoyed from accepting full responsibility for their wartime acts. Grievances once swept under the rug by expensive American brooms in the name of anti-communist unity, (or by less expensive brooms in the name of Communist unity) were exposed to public view once again (Hein and Selden, 2000:15).
二战的历史记忆突然获得了新的力量。被压制但未被遗忘的殖民主义和战争所产生的旧冲突变得更加紧迫。这对于前轴心国尤为相关,这些国家不得不在所有未来的国际谈判中,不仅带上他们在二战期间积累的长期被忽视的包袱,还带上冷战时期的包袱。随着德国和日本从数十年对美国(或在东德的情况下,对苏联)的政治从属地位中转变,他们也失去了曾经享有的免于承担战争行为全部责任的保护。曾经以反共统一的名义被昂贵的美国扫帚掸到地毯下的怨恨,(或以共产主义统一的名义被较便宜的扫帚掸走的怨恨)再次暴露在公众视野中(Hein 和 Selden,2000:15)。
For Japan, the 1990s witnessed the bitterest battle yet, both within its borders and across borders with neighbouring Asian countries, over the issues of war responsibility and the politics of national narratives of history. These two issues spurned more academic and popular writing on the subject in Japan during this period than at any other time since the end of World War II, or what more accurately should be referred to as the Asia-Pacific war 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}. In Nationalism and Gender, Ueno Chizuko steps right into the middle of this discursive battle over how the Asia-Pacific war, a discredited war, should be remembered and adjudicated. In so doing, she not only explores the issues of war memory and war responsibility, but also questions the nature of the historical narrative itself and its guardianship largely by men of privilege and power both in the academy and government.
对于日本来说,1990 年代见证了迄今为止最激烈的争论,这场争论不仅在国内展开,也跨越国界与邻近的亚洲国家发生,围绕战争责任问题和国家历史叙事的政治展开。这两个问题在这一时期激发了日本学术界和大众对该主题的写作,数量超过了自第二次世界大战结束以来的任何时期,或者更准确地说,是亚太战争 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 。在《民族主义与性别》一书中,上野千鹤子直接介入了这场关于如何纪念和评判这场被否定的亚太战争的论述之争。她不仅探讨了战争记忆和战争责任的问题,还质疑了历史叙事本身的性质,以及这一叙事主要由学术界和政府中拥有特权和权力的男性所把持的状况。

The Comfort Women Issue and the Politics of Memory
慰安妇问题与记忆政治

The most highly contested and bitterly fought over issue within this debate over war responsibility and memory has been that of the euphemistically named military comfort women (jūgun ianfu). These women, more accurately re-named military sexual slaves by survivors, their support groups and United Nations special rapporteurs Radhika Coomaraswamy (1996) and Gay J. McDougall (1998), were systematically recruited, generally by force, deception or under conditions of debt slavery, during the period 1937 to 1945 and forced under slave-like conditions to serve the sexual ‘needs’ of the Japanese military during the Asia Pacific war (see Yoshimi, 2000, 29; Coomaraswamy, 1996). Conditions in fact were brutal, degrading and unhealthy with women often forced to serve several tens of soldiers every day. Many did not survive their ordeal, while many others were silenced for close to five decades by patriarchal norms that attempt to shame the victims rather than the perpetrators of sexual abuse and rape. The terrible physical and psychological injuries they sustained from this period including sexual transmitted infections, secondary infertility, pelvic inflammatory infection, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder - went undiagnosed, untreated and unnoticed as a direct result of the silence that was imposed upon the survivors. It is estimated that during the period 1937 to 1945 between 50,000 and 200,000 women were forced into military sexual slavery. Among the victims, Korean women were the most numerous, followed by women from China, Southeast Asia and Japan (Yoshimi, 2000:30).
在关于战争责任和记忆的辩论中,最具争议且争论最激烈的问题是那个被委婉称为“军慰安妇”(jūgun ianfu)的问题。这些女性,更准确地被幸存者、支持团体以及联合国特别报告员拉迪卡·库马拉斯瓦米(1996 年)和盖伊·J·麦克杜格尔(1998 年)重新命名为“军队性奴隶”,她们在 1937 年至 1945 年期间被系统性地招募,通常是通过强迫、欺骗或债务奴役的方式,被迫在类似奴隶的条件下为日本军队在亚太战争期间满足性“需求”(参见吉见义明,2000 年,第 29 页;库马拉斯瓦米,1996 年)。事实上,条件极其残酷、侮辱且不健康,女性们常常被迫每天为数十名士兵服务。许多人未能挺过这段苦难,而许多其他人则因父权制规范的压制而沉默了近五十年,这些规范试图羞辱受害者而非性虐待和强奸的施害者。 她们在这段时期遭受的严重身体和心理伤害,包括性传播感染、继发性不孕、盆腔炎症感染、创伤后应激障碍——由于对幸存者施加的沉默,这些伤害未被诊断、未被治疗,也未被关注。据估计,在 1937 年至 1945 年期间,有 5 万至 20 万名女性被强迫成为军队性奴隶。受害者中,韩国女性人数最多,其次是中国、东南亚和日本的女性(Yoshimi, 2000:30)。
The long and damaging silence of the former comfort women was finally and decisively broken in December 1991 when Kim Hak-sun and two other Korean survivors, who came forward under aliases, filed a suit at the Tokyo District Court seeking an apology and compensation from the Japanese government. It was this bold step by three survivors that unleashed an extremely bitter debate around the issue of war memory and responsibility, one that has yet to find a resolution even today. Yet the fact of the comfort women was not itself unknown. As historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki, 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} another central player in the dispute points out, the comfort women issue had been raised on a number of occasions prior to the 1991 lawsuit. The issue of Korean comfort women was raised in a novel written by Tamura Taijirō entitled Shunpuden (A prostitute’s story), published in 1947 and later made
前慰安妇长期而沉重的沉默终于在 1991 年 12 月被彻底打破,当时金学顺和另外两名以化名出现的韩国幸存者在东京地方法院提起诉讼,要求日本政府道歉并赔偿。正是这三位幸存者的大胆举动,引发了围绕战争记忆与责任的极为激烈的争论,这场争论至今仍未得到解决。然而,慰安妇的事实本身并非未知。正如历史学家吉见义明(Yoshimi Yoshiaki),这场争议中的另一位核心人物所指出的,慰安妇问题在 1991 年诉讼之前已多次被提及。韩国慰安妇的问题曾在田村泰次郎所著的小说《春风传》(一名妓女的故事)中被提出,该书于 1947 年出版,后来被改编成电影。

into a movie. In 1973, Senda Kakō published a series of two books under the title Jūgun ianfu (Military comfort women) where he investigated the actual conditions of the comfort women (Yoshimi, 1995:33). There also exist numerous diaries and personal letters of ex-soldiers who had written in a completely unashamed and largely untroubled manner about their relationships with comfort women.
被拍成电影。1973 年,千田夏光出版了一套两册书,题为《従軍慰安婦》(军中慰安妇),他在书中调查了慰安妇的实际情况(吉见,1995:33)。此外,还有许多前士兵的日记和私人信件,他们以完全不羞愧且大多无忧无虑的态度写下了与慰安妇的关系。
Despite an awareness of the existence of comfort women, ‘social concern about its gravity was never widespread’ (Yoshimi, 1995:33). Indeed, although the Allied Forces were fully aware of the comfort women system at the end of the war, they had even repatriated some of the survivors, those responsible for its design and execution were not brought to trial at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials). The exception here, which is of itself extremely telling, is the Batavia Trial 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} in which Dutch comfort women who had not formerly been prostitutes were offered some kind of justice. Thirteen officers were tried and 11 sentenced for their crimes, but that was the full extent of the justice that was handed down. The fact that Asian comfort women and Dutch women who had formerly worked as prostitutes were never considered as legitimate targets for even this kind of limited justice by the Allied Forces makes clear the interaction of racism and sexism (with its attendant double sexual standard) in the treatment of survivors. As John Dower makes clear, the trials were ‘fundamentally a white man’s tribunal’ (Dower, 1999:469), with little awareness of its own racist and sexist assumptions. It would take another 45 years before the oppressive double lenses of patriarchy and nationalism would be shattered, allowing for the dissemination of a different view of the comfort women system and its survivors; one seen through the lenses of feminism and a more gender-sensitive human rights perspective.
尽管人们意识到慰安妇的存在,“但对其严重性的社会关注从未广泛存在”(吉见,1995:33)。事实上,尽管盟军在战争结束时完全了解慰安妇制度,甚至遣返了一些幸存者,但设计和执行该制度的责任人并未在远东国际军事法庭(东京审判)受审。这里的例外是极具意义的巴达维亚审判 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} ,在该审判中,曾非妓女身份的荷兰慰安妇获得了一定程度的正义。十三名军官被审判,十一人因其罪行被判刑,但这就是所给予的全部正义。亚洲慰安妇和曾为妓女的荷兰女性从未被盟军视为这类有限正义的合法对象,这一事实清楚地表明了种族主义与性别歧视(及其伴随的双重性标准)在对幸存者待遇中的交织作用。 正如约翰·道尔所指出的,那些审判“本质上是白人男性的法庭”(道尔,1999:469),几乎没有意识到自身的种族主义和性别歧视假设。又过了 45 年,父权制和民族主义这两重压迫的视角才被打破,使得对慰安妇制度及其幸存者的不同看法得以传播;这种看法是通过女性主义和更具性别敏感度的人权视角来审视的。
In Nationalism and Gender, Ueno Chizuko applies the lenses of feminist theory and social constructionism to consider not only the comfort women issue per se, but also the various interpretations that have been applied to it. But before moving on to a more substantive introduction to its content, I would like to weave another thread into the historical tapestry that provides the backdrop to the comfort women issue emerging as a bitterly contested issue in the 1990s. By this ‘other thread’ I am referring to the incredible achievements of the international women’s movement in the 1990s
在《民族主义与性别》中,上野千鹤子运用女性主义理论和社会建构主义的视角,不仅考察慰安妇问题本身,还考察了对该问题的各种解读。但在更深入介绍其内容之前,我想在这幅历史画卷中再织入另一条线索,为慰安妇问题在 1990 年代成为激烈争议的背景提供补充。这里所说的“另一条线索”,是指 1990 年代国际妇女运动取得的非凡成就,

particularly in raising to the top of the human right’s agenda the issue of violence against women.
尤其是在将针对女性的暴力问题提升到人权议程的首位方面。

Violence Against Women  针对女性的暴力

As is discussed in Nationalism and Gender, the early 1990s witnessed a paradigm shift that created the right conditions for the comfort women system to be seen as a violation of the survivors’ human rights and, hand-inhand with this, a Crime against Humanity. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} This paradigm shift saw the shame associated with rape and sexual abuse move from the shoulders of the victims to the shoulders of the perpetrators. This in turn created the right conditions for the survivors to come forward. To understand this shift we need to look back at the steady progress made by feminist activists in the last two decades of 20 th 20 th  20^("th ")20^{\text {th }} century in redefining human rights in a way that included rather than excluded women.
正如《民族主义与性别》中所讨论的,20 世纪 90 年代初见证了一场范式转变,这为慰安妇制度被视为对幸存者人权的侵犯以及与之并行的人类罪行创造了合适的条件。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 这一范式转变使得与强奸和性虐待相关的耻辱从受害者身上转移到了施害者身上。这反过来又为幸存者挺身而出创造了合适的条件。要理解这一转变,我们需要回顾 20 世纪最后二十年女权主义活动家在重新定义人权方面所取得的稳步进展,这种定义是包容女性而非排斥女性的。 20 th 20 th  20^("th ")20^{\text {th }}
The United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985) represented both the culmination of feminist activists’ calls for the full integration of women in society and for gender equality, and the beginning of a new and more prominent place for the international women’s rights movement in the world. As Arvonne Fraser notes: ‘During the decade there was an explosive growth in the number, style and content of women’s organizations’ (Fraser, 2001). By the Third World Conference on Women held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985, the new international women’s movement was incredibly diverse, but there was also growing ‘solidarity among women in recognizing discrimination even across lines of intense political disparities’ (Fraser, 2001:53). Of interest to us here is the emergence of violence against women as an issue at a Non-Government Organisation (NGO) Forum at the conference. The achievement of daily discussions, which drew links between ‘violence in the home, violence in society, and violence between nations’, was two long paragraphs written into the Forward Looking Strategies that came out of the conference (Fraser, 2001:55). Looking back on this from the early 21 st 21 st  21^("st ")21^{\text {st }} century, where the issue of violence against women is now extremely prominent, it is perhaps difficult to appreciate just how radical it was for an issue that previously fell outside the parameters of human rights theory and activism to be placed on the agenda. Yet this was only the beginning, as
联合国妇女十年(1975-1985 年)既是女权活动家呼吁妇女全面融入社会和实现性别平等的高潮,也是国际妇女权利运动在世界上获得更显著地位的开端。正如阿尔沃恩·弗雷泽所指出的:“在这十年间,妇女组织的数量、风格和内容都呈爆炸式增长”(Fraser, 2001)。到 1985 年在肯尼亚内罗毕举行的第三次世界妇女大会时,新的国际妇女运动已经极为多样化,但同时也出现了“妇女之间的团结,认识到即使在激烈的政治分歧中也存在歧视”(Fraser, 2001:53)。我们这里关注的是,在大会的非政府组织(NGO)论坛上,针对妇女暴力问题的出现。通过每日讨论,成功将“家庭暴力、社会暴力与国家间暴力”联系起来,这一成果被写入了大会发布的《面向未来的战略》中的两段长文(Fraser, 2001:55)。 回顾早期 21 st 21 st  21^("st ")21^{\text {st }} 世纪,当时针对女性暴力的问题已变得极为突出,或许很难理解将这一此前不在人人权理论和行动范围内的问题纳入议程是多么激进。然而,这仅仅是个开始,因为

women were now networking across national borders on the issue of violence against women and drawing international attention. Once the ball was rolling, it was hard to stop the momentum with discussion and activism focusing on violence against women in all areas of society, leading ultimately to the redefining of what was meant by the word human in human rights. As Fraser notes:
女性们开始跨越国界就针对女性暴力的问题建立网络,并引起国际关注。一旦势头形成,便难以阻挡,讨论和行动聚焦于社会各领域的针对女性的暴力,最终促使“人权”中“人”的定义被重新界定。正如弗雷泽所指出的:
It was the violence against women issue, especially domestic violence, that finally drew international attention to the idea that women’s rights are human rights. The issue transcended race, class, and cultures and united women worldwide in a common cause. It dramatically illustrated women’s subordinate position as no other issue had (Fraser, 2001:56).
正是针对女性暴力的问题,尤其是家庭暴力,最终引起了国际社会对“女性权利即人权”这一理念的关注。该问题超越了种族、阶级和文化,将全球女性团结在共同事业中。它以其他任何问题都未曾有过的方式,生动地展示了女性的从属地位(弗雷泽,2001:56)。
At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, women’s rights as human rights emerged dramatically as the number one issue on the agenda. The tide had turned, and government and NGO delegates were at last paying lip service at least to the idea that violence against women was an important human rights issue. The Vienna Declaration and the Programme of Action specifically declared that ‘the human rights of women and the girlchild are inalienable and indivisible part of human rights’ (cited Fraser, 2001:57), radically expanding the concept of human rights itself. It also became clear that it was going to be impossible to deal with the issue of violence against women without a merging of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres in human rights theory and practice.
在 1993 年于维也纳举行的世界人权大会上,妇女权利作为人权问题戏剧性地成为议程上的头号议题。形势已经发生了转变,政府和非政府组织的代表们至少开始口头承认针对妇女的暴力是一个重要的人权问题。《维也纳宣言》和《行动纲领》明确宣称“妇女和女童的人权是不可剥夺且不可分割的人权组成部分”(引自弗雷泽,2001:57),从根本上扩展了人权的概念。同时也变得清晰,若不将人权理论和实践中的“公共”与“私人”领域合并,就不可能解决针对妇女的暴力问题。
The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (generally referred to as the Beijing Conference) further strengthened the gains that had been made at the Vienna Convention. From then on the issue seemed to take on a life of its own as women networked and campaigned for safety and security in their lives and that of their communities. Links began to be made between different forms of violence. In the words of Sally Engle Merry, violence against women:
1995 年在北京举行的联合国第四次世界妇女大会(通常称为北京大会)进一步巩固了维也纳大会所取得的成果。从那时起,这一议题似乎获得了新的生命力,女性们开始建立网络,开展运动,争取自身及其社区的安全与保障。不同形式的暴力之间开始建立联系。用萨莉·恩格尔·梅里的话来说,针对女性的暴力:
grew from a focus on rape and battering in intimate relationships to rape and gender violence enacted by states in warfare, torture, and imprisonment as well as during interethnic violence. Trafficking of sex workers, the AIDS pandemic, and particular social practices that have an impact on women such as female genital cutting have been defined as instances of violence against women (Merry, 2001:83).
从关注亲密关系中的强奸和殴打,发展到国家在战争、酷刑和监禁中实施的强奸和性别暴力,以及族群间暴力期间的暴力行为。性工作者的贩运、艾滋病大流行以及对女性产生影响的特定社会习俗,如女性生殖器切割,都被定义为针对女性的暴力实例(梅里,2001:83)。
By drawing links between different forms of violence it became clear that women’s vulnerability to violence stemmed in a large part from their
通过将不同形式的暴力联系起来,显而易见的是,女性对暴力的脆弱性在很大程度上源于她们的

subordinate position in society and from social and cultural definitions of masculinity and femininity. This in turn located many cultural practices as standing in complete opposition the right of women to protection from violence (Merry, 2001:91). Few would expect such a radical paradigm shift to be taken lightly by the, often male, gatekeepers of such cultures, and a predictable backlash ensued.
社会中的从属地位以及对男性气质和女性气质的社会文化定义。反过来,这使得许多文化习俗被视为与女性获得免受暴力保护的权利完全对立(Merry,2001:91)。很少有人会指望这些文化的守门人,通常是男性,会轻易接受如此激进的范式转变,因此随之而来的是可预见的反弹。
Ironically, it was at the Beijing Women’s Conference that feminist activists from Korea and Japan suddenly found themselves unable to transcend national boarders on one issue of violence against women; namely the comfort women issue. The Korean women’s movement, theorizing from the perspective of women who had been subjected to colonisation under Japanese rule, understood the comfort-women issue primarily as a national rather than a gender one. There was undisguised, raw anger from Korean delegates when one Japanese feminist, namely Ueno Chizuko, suggested to participants at an NGO forum on the comfort women that it was going to be important for feminism to transcend nationalism if progress on the issue was to be made. Just as Black feminist in the United States have told their white sisters in no uncertain in terms that they do not have the luxury of ignoring the issue of race in their lives, so too Korean women berated Ueno for not recognising that for women in Asia who had been the wrong end of colonialism and imperialism, nationalism was not something that could be left out of the debate.
具有讽刺意味的是,正是在北京妇女大会上,来自韩国和日本的女权主义活动家们在关于针对女性暴力的一个问题上突然发现自己无法超越国界;即慰安妇问题。韩国妇女运动从曾经在日本统治下被殖民的女性视角出发,将慰安妇问题主要理解为一个民族问题,而非性别问题。当一位日本女权主义者,即上野千鹤子,在一个关于慰安妇的非政府组织论坛上向与会者提出,如果要在这一问题上取得进展,女权主义必须超越民族主义时,韩国代表们表现出毫不掩饰的强烈愤怒。正如美国的黑人女权主义者曾明确告诉她们的白人姐妹们,她们没有奢侈的条件去忽视生活中的种族问题一样,韩国女性也严厉批评上野未能认识到,对于那些在亚洲遭受殖民主义和帝国主义压迫的女性来说,民族主义不是可以被排除在讨论之外的议题。
Yet, regardless of what was said at the NGO forum, there was networking and co-operation across traditional lines of national enmity on the comfort women issue. Even before the Beijing Conference, Korean and Japanese women’s groups were working together in the early stages of organising the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, which took place in Tokyo from December 8 th 8 th  8^("th ")8{ }^{\text {th }} to 12th 2000. This was a People’s Tribunal that was set up to judge the responsibility of the late Emperor Hirohito and high-ranking officials within the wartime Japanese government for military sexual slavery and rape as Crimes against Humanity. The Tribunal was a very successful and high profile attempt to make up for the failure of the Occupation Forces to prosecute those responsible for the comfort women system during the Tokyo Trials, and the continuing inaction of the Japanese state in this area
然而,不论非政府组织论坛上说了什么,在慰安妇问题上,跨越传统国家敌对界限的网络和合作依然存在。甚至在北京会议之前,韩国和日本的妇女团体就已经开始合作,初步组织了 2000 年关于日本军队性奴役的国际妇女战争罪行法庭,该法庭于 2000 年 12 月 8 th 8 th  8^("th ")8{ }^{\text {th }} 日至 12 日在东京举行。这个人民法庭旨在审判已故的裕仁天皇及战时日本政府高级官员对军事性奴役和强奸作为反人类罪行的责任。该法庭是一次非常成功且备受关注的尝试,旨在弥补占领军在东京审判期间未能起诉慰安妇制度责任人的失败,以及日本国家在这一领域持续的不作为。

over the past 55 years. Four inter-nationally renowned judges presided over the proceedings and 75 survivors from nine different countries and regions testified. At the heart of the organisation process was the Violence Against Women and War Network (VAWW-Net Japan) working closely with the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} (hereafter, Korean Council). Clearly in this instance support groups were able to transcend national borders and the confines of colonial history. Nevertheless, there can be no denying that nationalist rather than gender issues have dogged much of the debate on the comfort women issue on both sides.
在过去的 55 年里。四位国际知名法官主持了审理,来自九个不同国家和地区的 75 名幸存者作证。在组织过程中,核心是反对战争暴力侵害妇女网络(VAWW-Net Japan),与韩国“日本军性奴役妇女问题解决促进会”(以下简称韩国促进会)密切合作。显然,在这一案例中,支持团体能够超越国界和殖民历史的限制。然而,不可否认的是,民族主义而非性别问题一直困扰着双方关于慰安妇问题的许多辩论。

The Korean Women's Movement and the Comfort Women Issue
韩国妇女运动与慰安妇问题

The Korean Council has served as a central hub for women’s activism in Korea around the comfort women issue from the beginning. In May 1990, Korean Women’s Groups issued a joint statement timed to coincide with then Prime Minister Roh Te-Woo’s visit to Japan demanding an apology and compensation from the Japanese government over the Teishintai (volunteer corps) issue. It should be noted that, although the term Teishintai (Chôngshindae in Korean) refers to Korean men and women who were forcibly mobilised by the Japanese wartime regime, as this forced labour also included many women serving at military comfort stations, in the minds of most Koreans it has become a euphemism for the comfort women (Kovener in Yônghi, 1998).
韩国妇女联合会自始至终一直是韩国慰安妇问题妇女维权活动的核心枢纽。1990 年 5 月,韩国妇女团体发表联合声明,恰逢时任总理卢泰愚访问日本,要求日本政府就征兵团(志愿军团)问题道歉并赔偿。值得注意的是,虽然“征兵团”(韩语称“Chôngshindae”)一词指的是被日本战时政权强制动员的韩国男女,但由于这类强制劳役中也包括许多在军慰安所服务的女性,在大多数韩国人心中,这一词汇已成为慰安妇的委婉说法(引自 Yônghi 的 Kovener,1998 年)。
It was also the Korean Council that painstakingly recorded the testimony of former comfort women and paved the way for Kim Hak-sun and two other Korean survivors to come forward and demand an apology and compensation. The backdrop to the formation of the Korean Council as a support group of former comfort women are the successes of the international women’s movement and its impact on the fledgling Korean women’s movement.
同样是韩国妇女联合会,辛苦记录了前慰安妇的证词,为金学顺及另外两名韩国幸存者站出来要求道歉和赔偿铺平了道路。韩国妇女联合会作为前慰安妇支援团体的成立背景,是国际妇女运动的成功及其对初创的韩国妇女运动的影响。
As noted above, by the mid-1980s the voice of the international women’s movement was not only being heard, but also being taken seriously. The 1980s and 1990s saw an incredible shift in human rights politics and the way in which violence against women was understood. The energy and vision of
如上所述,到 1980 年代中期,国际妇女运动的声音不仅被听见,而且被认真对待。1980 年代和 1990 年代见证了人权政治的巨大转变,以及对针对女性暴力的理解方式的改变。国际妇女运动的活力和远见激励了韩国妇女运动的发展。

the international women’s movement spurred on the Korean women’s movement. The movement, which has close ties with the social reform movement, expanded greatly after democratisation in 1987. As Yamashita Yeong-ae has pointed out, the growing strength of the women’s movement and women’s studies led directly to the comfort women issue surfacing in Korea and then later in Japan.
该运动与社会改革运动关系密切,1987 年民主化后大幅扩展。正如山下英爱所指出,妇女运动和女性研究的不断壮大,直接促使慰安妇问题在韩国浮出水面,随后在日本也得到了关注。
Since the end of the 1980s, the expansion of the women’s movement under the civilian regime has been striking. Women’s studies has progressed both in quality and quantity, and slowly but surely women’s issues and the position of the women’s movement has begun to change. After the establishment of the Korean Sexual Violence Relief Centre in January 1991, studies of rape, sexual harassment, prostitution, and other issues of sexual violence emerged and Korean scholars began to pay attention to gender issues. One link in the chain of events occurred when students in the faculty of women’s studies asked women’s organizations to bring public attention the comfort women issue (Yamashita, 1998:60).
自 20 世纪 80 年代末以来,女性运动在文官政权下的扩展令人瞩目。女性研究在质量和数量上都有所进步,女性议题和女性运动的地位也开始缓慢但稳步地发生变化。1991 年 1 月韩国性暴力救助中心成立后,关于强奸、性骚扰、卖淫及其他性暴力问题的研究开始出现,韩国学者开始关注性别议题。事件链中的一个环节是女性研究系的学生请求女性组织将慰安妇问题带入公众视野(山下,1998:60)。
Despite the gender perspective among students of women’s studies, the comfort women issue generally was understood as a national one in the 1990s. It was another unresolved issue in the past relationship between Japan and Korean; colonizer and colonised. This goes a long way to explaining why a nationalist card was played when women’s activists finally took the comfort women issue to the public and the government, despite an awareness that the long silence surrounding the comfort women issue was in large part due to the fact that it was ‘a women’s issue in a male-centred society’ (Yamashita, 1998:60). The dominant nationalist perspective that the comfort women system was a crime committed against the Korean nation rather than the individual survivors specifically served to cloud the issue when it did emerge in the public domain. Yamashita Yeong-ae has daringly pointed out the anti-feminist consequences of constructing the comfort women issue in terms of an unresolved dispute between colonizer and colonised - Japan and Korea - rather than in terms of a gender analysis which recognises that women from other nations, including Japan, were also subjected to confinement and sexual abuse as a result of the comfort woman system (Yamashita, 1998).
尽管女性研究的学生们持有性别视角,但在 1990 年代,慰安妇问题通常被理解为一个国家层面的问题。这是日本与韩国之间过去关系中的另一个未解决的问题;殖民者与被殖民者之间的问题。这在很大程度上解释了为什么当女性活动家最终将慰安妇问题公之于众并提交给政府时,会打出民族主义牌,尽管人们意识到,围绕慰安妇问题长期沉默的原因很大程度上是因为这是“一个男性中心社会中的女性问题”(山下,1998:60)。主流的民族主义观点认为慰安妇制度是对韩国民族而非具体幸存者个人犯下的罪行,这种观点在慰安妇问题进入公共领域时,特别起到了模糊问题的作用。 山下英爱大胆指出,将慰安妇问题构建为殖民者与被殖民者——日本与韩国——之间未解决的争端,而非基于性别分析,忽视了包括日本在内的其他国家女性也因慰安妇制度而遭受拘禁和性虐待的事实,这种做法具有反女权主义的后果(山下,1998)。
The gender insensitive approach of the Korean women’s movement in building its case for the former comfort women, particularly in the early days, is something that Ueno Chizuko underscores in Nationalism and Gender, partly by drawing on the work of Yamashita. In particular she notes
韩国妇女运动在为前慰安妇争取权益时,尤其是在早期,采取的性别不敏感的方式,是上野千鹤子在《民族主义与性别》中强调的,部分内容借鉴了山下的研究。她特别指出

the inadvertent utilization of discrimination against prostitutes and a sexual double standard by Korean women’s activists in attempt to gain widespread sympathy for their cause.
韩国妇女活动家在争取广泛同情时,无意中利用了对妓女的歧视和性别双重标准。

The Response in Japan to the Comfort Women Issue
日本对慰安妇问题的回应

The comfort women issue barely generated any interest in Japan until Kim Hak-sun and the two Korean survivors came forward and gave testimony in 1991. The initial demand by Korean women’s groups for apology and compensation in May 1990 hardly created a stir at the time. The government’s initial response was to ignore the issue, but finally it offered the following statement at a House of Councillors Budget Committee meeting on 6 June 1990:
直到金学顺和另外两名韩国幸存者在 1991 年站出来作证,慰安妇问题在日本几乎没有引起任何关注。1990 年 5 月,韩国妇女团体最初要求道歉和赔偿,当时几乎没有引起轰动。政府最初的回应是忽视这一问题,但最终在 1990 年 6 月 6 日的参议院预算委员会会议上发表了以下声明:
In regard to comfort women…it appears that the persons thus treated were led around by civilian operators following the military forces. We consider it impossible for us to investigate and make a definitive statement as regards to the actual conditions pertaining to this practice (Dai 118 kai kokkai sangiin yosan iinkai kaigiroku, cited and translated in Yoshimi, 1995:34).
关于慰安妇……似乎被这样对待的人是由跟随军队的民间经营者带领的。我们认为不可能调查并对这一做法的实际情况作出明确声明(第 118 届国会参议院预算委员会会议记录,引用并翻译自吉见,1995:34)。
The government could be quite confident in its position, as it is certainly no state secret that the military government systematically destroyed official documentation in the closing days of the Asia-Pacific War. This act of a defeated government appears to have included the routine destruction of nearly all data concerned with the comfort stations and comfort women (Yoshimi, 1995:34). Moreover, the government could also be confident that there would be few who would question that official documentation was necessary to prove what went on, despite living proof in the form of the testimony of former comfort women, an army doctor and the few soldiers who have been willing to come forward. Indeed, much of the debate since Kim Hak-sun and the two other former comfort women filed suit in 1991 has been over standards of proof, with few challenging the privileging of official documentary sources. While those on the side of the survivors and their supporters have fought for oral testimony to be accepted as proof, even here there has been a tendency to bow to the higher authority of written documentation. Or at least, this is the argument of Ueno Chizuko in Nationalism and Gender.
政府对此立场相当自信,因为众所周知,军事政府在亚太战争结束前夕系统性地销毁了官方文件。这一战败政府的行为似乎包括了几乎所有有关慰安所和慰安妇的数据的例行销毁(吉见,1995:34)。此外,政府也有理由相信,很少有人会质疑必须依靠官方文件来证明所发生的事情,尽管有前慰安妇、军医以及少数愿意站出来的士兵的证词作为活生生的证据。事实上,自从金学顺和另外两名前慰安妇于 1991 年提起诉讼以来,争论的焦点多集中在证据标准上,几乎无人质疑官方文件资料的优先地位。虽然幸存者及其支持者一方一直争取口头证词被接受为证据,但即便如此,也存在向书面文件这一更高权威屈服的倾向。至少,这正是上野千鹤子的《民族主义与性别》一书中的论点。
This debate over standards of proof has focused overwhelmingly on the method of recruitment. Those on the right, including members of the government, argued that there was no proof (read official documentation) that the military, and as a result the wartime government, were directly involved in recruiting or running the comfort stations. When Yoshimi Yoshiaki dug up documents from the Japanese Self-Defence Agency offering evidence ‘attesting to the fact that’ the military had ‘planned, constructed and operated comfort stations’ (O’Brien in Yoshimi, 1995:7), the Japanese government was forced to admit involvement and issue an apology to the survivors. Despite this, Yoshimi’s evidence was not taken as conclusive by everybody involved, with those on the right bitterly opposed to any suggestion of liability or criminality on the part of the government. Some have even taken to threats of violence and/or actual violence in attempts to stop the public broadcast of anything that may present the comfort women as anything other than ‘lowly’ prostitutes (see Takahashi, 2001). They have used similar tactics to try and stop the publication of textbooks containing a brief mention of the comfort women (McCormack, 2000:64-65).
关于举证标准的争论主要集中在招募方式上。右翼人士,包括政府成员,主张没有证据(即官方文件)证明军方,因此也包括战时政府,直接参与招募或管理慰安所。当吉见义明从日本自卫队挖掘出文件,提供了“证明军方‘策划、建设并运营慰安所’的事实”的证据(O’Brien 引自吉见,1995:7)时,日本政府被迫承认参与其中,并向幸存者道歉。尽管如此,吉见的证据并未被所有相关方视为决定性证据,右翼人士强烈反对任何暗示政府负有责任或犯罪的说法。有些人甚至采取暴力威胁和/或实际暴力,试图阻止任何可能将慰安妇描绘成非“低贱”妓女的公开报道(参见高桥,2001)。 他们使用了类似的策略,试图阻止包含对慰安妇简要提及的教科书出版(McCormack,2000:64-65)。
Of particular note are the influential group calling themselves the Liberal View of History Group (Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai), a name that would appear to be a deliberate bid to mislead as their agenda is far from liberal (jiyūshugi) in the conventional usage of the word. The Liberal History Group, in order to serve their own nationalist agenda, have attempted to focus the debate myopically on the issue of recruitment. There argument is that the comfort women were prostitutes who had gone to the comfort stations of their own free will. They have challenged the former comfort women and their supporters, including historians like Yoshimi, to offer proof in the form of official documentation that there was systematic forced recruitment of the comfort women, knowing full well that such proof would be almost impossible to come by. According to Ueno, rather than challenge the terms of the debate, those on the side of the comfort women have attempted to fight by the rules of the Liberal View of History Group and, as a result, orthodox positivist history. When the method of recruitment should have been secondary to the slave-like conditions under which the women were forced to serve the sexual ‘needs’ of the Japanese military (after all, even if a marriage is entered into voluntarily it does not nullify the
特别值得注意的是一个自称自由主义历史观研究会(Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai)的有影响力团体,这个名字似乎是故意用来误导人的,因为他们的议程远非传统意义上的自由主义(jiyūshugi)。自由主义历史观研究会为了服务于他们自己的民族主义议程,试图狭隘地将辩论焦点集中在征募问题上。他们的论点是慰安妇是自愿前往慰安所的妓女。他们挑战前慰安妇及其支持者,包括像吉见这样的历史学家,要求提供官方文件形式的证据,证明存在系统性的强制征募慰安妇,明知这样的证据几乎不可能找到。根据上野的说法,支持慰安妇一方并没有挑战辩论的前提,而是试图按照自由主义历史观研究会的规则进行抗争,因此采用了正统的实证主义历史方法。 当招募方式本应是次要问题时,女性被迫在奴隶般的条件下满足日本军队的性“需求”(毕竟,即使婚姻是自愿缔结的,也不能否定这一点)

crimes of marital rape, confinement and abuse), it was this that became the focus of attention. Could systematic forced recruitment be proved or not? Ultimately, even Yoshimi Yoshiaki, cornered in a live television debate, had to admit that such ‘proof’ was not available 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} (Ueno, 1999:155). The background to this focus on methods of recruitment conceals what Ueno refers to as ‘discrimination against prostitutes’. The hidden ‘logic’ is as follows: If recruitment was forced then the women could justifiably be referred to as sexual slaves and indeed a Crime against Humanity had occurred. However, if the women went voluntarily with the recruiters they could justifiably be regarded as prostitutes and, as such, given a patriarchal logic that places prostitutes way beyond the category human, Crimes against Humanity cannot be said to have occurred.
(婚内强奸、禁闭和虐待的罪行),正是这一点成为了关注的焦点。是否能够证明存在系统性的强制征募?最终,即使是在电视直播辩论中被逼入绝境的吉见义明,也不得不承认没有这样的“证据” 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} (上野,1999:155)。对征募方式的关注背后隐藏着上野所称的“对妓女的歧视”。隐藏的“逻辑”如下:如果征募是强制的,那么这些女性就可以被合理地称为性奴隶,确实发生了反人类罪。然而,如果这些女性是自愿跟随征募者的,那么她们就可以被合理地视为妓女,按照将妓女置于人类范畴之外的父权逻辑,不能说发生了反人类罪。

Nationalism and Gender  民族主义与性别

Nationalism and Gender can be regarded as the product of Ueno’s scholarly frustration with a debate that has tended to confine itself within the limited parameters of positivist history and a patriarchal double standard that places women who have sex for money beyond the pale when it comes to protection and justice within the criminal law and human rights systems. Ueno has a reputation for the sharpness of her theorizing and the fearless way that she takes on those who she feels are reinforcing oppressive thought and power structures. Indeed, such is her notoriety for fearless confrontation that one male-write wrote a ‘tortured, self-searching’ book entitled Who’s Afraid of Ueno Chizuko?, which made the best seller lists in the early 1990s (Sand, 1999:121). Another bestseller that used her name was written by TV personality Haruka Yoko and entitled Tōdai de Ueno Chizuko ni kenka o manabu (Learning how to argue from Ueno Chizuko at Tokyo University). At a packed lecture that Ueno gave at the Kitakyushu City Women’s Centre MOVE 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}, where additional rooms with satellite links had to be set up to take the crowds that overflowed from the 500 -seater lecture theatre, Ueno joked that she was sure the high turn out was due to Haruka Yoko’s bestseller and not her own books, which she modestly said do not sell nearly as well. However, Ueno’s books do sell and her name is without a doubt an incredible crowd puller.
《民族主义与性别》可以被视为上野千鹤子的学术挫折的产物,这种挫折源于一场辩论,该辩论往往局限于实证主义历史的有限范畴和一种父权制的双重标准,在刑法和人权体系中,将以性交易为生的女性排除在保护和正义之外。上野以其理论的锋利和无畏挑战那些她认为在强化压迫性思想和权力结构的人而闻名。事实上,她因无畏对抗而声名狼藉,以至于一位男性作家写了一本“痛苦、自我反省”的书,名为《谁怕上野千鹤子?》,该书在 1990 年代初登上畅销书榜(Sand, 1999:121)。另一部以她名字命名的畅销书由电视名人遥阳子撰写,书名为《东大で上野千鹤子に喧嘩を学ぶ》(在东京大学向上野千鹤子学辩论)。 在北九州市妇女中心 MOVE 举办的一场座无虚席的讲座上,因 500 座的讲座厅人满为患,不得不设立带卫星链接的附加房间来容纳溢出的观众。上野开玩笑说,她相信高出席率是因为遥阳子的畅销书,而不是她自己的书,她谦虚地表示自己的书销量远不及那样。然而,上野的书确实畅销,她的名字无疑是极具吸引力的招牌。
In addition to public notoriety, Ueno is also a prolific and highly respected writer within the Japanese academic community and has gained a solid reputation as a feminist scholar internationally. Ueno has held the post of Professor in the Department of Sociology at Tokyo University since 1994, and was promoted to the post of Head of Department earlier this year. Sand suggests her appointment as professor at Japan’s most prestigious university is the ultimate mark of her acceptance by a male-dominated, conservative Japanese academy (Sand, 1999:120). Nevertheless, I would suggest that it shows less an acceptance and more the overwhelming respect she has generated as a result of her work even among those who do not share her political or theoretical perspective. Despite her elevation to the higher echelons of the academic hierarchy, Ueno continues to play the role of enfant terrible in her attempts to challenge and dismantle the male-dominated, conservative aspects of Japanese academia and society.
除了在公众中的声名狼藉之外,上野在日本学术界也是一位多产且备受尊敬的作家,并且作为一名女性主义学者在国际上赢得了坚实的声誉。自 1994 年以来,上野一直担任东京大学社会学系教授,今年早些时候晋升为系主任。Sand 认为,她被任命为日本最负盛名大学的教授,是她被以男性为主导、保守的日本学术界接受的最终标志(Sand,1999:120)。然而,我认为这更多地显示了她的工作所带来的巨大尊重,即使是在那些不认同她的政治或理论观点的人中也是如此。尽管她晋升到了学术阶层的高层,上野仍然扮演着“坏小子”的角色,试图挑战并拆解日本学术界和社会中以男性为主导、保守的部分。
Ueno’s popularity within Japan is attributed to ‘a combination of the high quality of her research, her choice of controversial research topics, her ability to write in an accessible prose style, and her frequent use of provocative images’ (Buckley, 1997:272). Nationalism and Gender is perhaps not one of her most accessible pieces of writing as it assumes an understanding of Japanese history in general and women’s history in particular. Yet, there can be little doubt that it is an extremely important piece of work, that it is provocative, interesting and relevant to current issues not only in Japan but to feminist theory generally, and well worth any effort involved in reading it.
上野在日本的受欢迎程度归因于“她高质量的研究、选择有争议的研究课题、能够以通俗易懂的文风写作,以及频繁使用挑衅性图像的综合作用”(Buckley,1997:272)。《民族主义与性别》或许不是她最易读的作品,因为它假设读者对日本历史,特别是女性历史有一定的了解。然而,毫无疑问,这是一部极其重要的著作,具有挑衅性、趣味性,并且与日本当前的问题以及女性主义理论普遍相关,值得付出任何阅读的努力。
The Japanese edition of Nationalism and Gender (Nashonarizumu to jendā) was first published in 1998 by Seidosha. Since then it has seen 13 reprints and sold over 21,500 copies. It was translated into Korean in 1999 and this edition has sold several thousand copies. Both the original Japanese and Korean editions have received good reviews in the media and generally provoked a positive response from popular audiences. However, in Japan Nationalism and Gender has also provoked some negative criticism from a few women’s activists, which is understandable as they themselves are targets of Ueno’s cutting analysis. As touched upon above, Ueno accuses comfort women support groups of reinforcing a sexual double standard that serves to draw a line between good women (virgins and mothers) and bad women (prostitutes) by insisting on the purity of the Korean comfort women at the
《民族主义与性别》(日文名:ナショナリズムとジェンダー)的日文版最初由青土社于 1998 年出版。此后,该书已重印 13 次,销量超过 21,500 册。1999 年,该书被翻译成韩文版,韩文版销量也达数千册。日文原版和韩文版均在媒体上获得了良好评价,并普遍引起了大众的积极反响。然而,在日本,《民族主义与性别》也引发了一些女性活动家的负面批评,这可以理解,因为她们本身正是上野千鹤子的尖锐分析对象。如上文所述,上野指责慰安妇支援团体强化了一种性别双重标准,通过坚持韩国慰安妇的纯洁性,将“好女人”(处女和母亲)与“坏女人”(妓女)划分开来。

time they are were abducted. She argues that in a bid to gain widespread support for the cause the support groups have fallen into the trap of creating the model victim, where the crime is the violation of a pure woman’s honour. As Ueno is aware, one of the many achievements of the international women’s movement in the 1990s was to make clear that rape is not an issue of honour, but of gendered sexual violence. Women’s activists in turn, and somewhat unfairly, have criticised Ueno for ignoring the issues of racism and nationalism.
她认为,为了获得广泛的支持,支持团体陷入了制造模范受害者的陷阱,将犯罪定义为对纯洁女性荣誉的侵犯。正如上野所意识到的,1990 年代国际妇女运动的诸多成就之一,就是明确指出强奸不是荣誉问题,而是性别化的性暴力问题。女性活动家们反过来,有些不公平地批评上野忽视了种族主义和民族主义的问题。
In a similar vein, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Suzuki Yūko and other historians dedicated to unearthing the truth of the comfort women system have also reacted angrily to Ueno’s depiction of them as ‘conscientious historians’ who despite their hard work have rather ineptly ended up reinforcing a naive positivist view of history and privileged documentary sources. In the recordings of a symposium on Nationalism and the Comfort Women Problem held at the Centre for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility in September 1997, Yoshimi accuses Ueno of making ‘rudimentary mistakes’ in Nationalism and Gender and several articles that preceded the book’s publication. He even goes as far as to suggest that she has not properly read his work, which is a criticism that can hardly be taken seriously given the meticulous nature of Ueno’s analysis (Yoshimi, 2003:124125). Despite the heated nature of the debate between Ueno and Yoshimi, the fruits of this kind of verbal sparring between two sharp-minded scholars cannot be overlooked. In the words of Suzanne O’Brien, in her translator’s introduction to the English edition of Yoshimi’s Comfort Women:
同样地,致力于揭露慰安妇制度真相的历史学家吉见义明、铃木裕子等人,也对上野将他们描绘成“良心的历史学家”表示愤怒。上野认为,尽管他们辛勤工作,却相当笨拙地强化了一种天真的实证主义历史观和对文献资料的偏重。在 1997 年 9 月于日本战争责任研究与资料中心举办的关于民族主义与慰安妇问题的座谈会录音中,吉见指责上野在《民族主义与性别》及其出版前的几篇文章中犯了“初级错误”。他甚至暗示她没有认真阅读他的著作,但鉴于上野分析的细致程度,这种批评几乎难以令人信服(吉见,2003:124-125)。尽管上野与吉见之间的辩论激烈,但这两位头脑敏锐的学者之间的口头交锋所产生的成果不容忽视。正如苏珊·奥布莱恩在吉见《慰安妇》英文版译者序言中所言:
The debates between Ueno and Yoshimi raise critical issues regarding survivors’ testimonies and their status in discussions of the comfort women issue. The challenge for survivors’ supporters is how to appreciate the varying and productive nature of survivor’s testimonies without undermining their power and coherence when they are taken up as evidence in the context of legal proceedings. It is through their testimonies and activism that survivors have been able to create new identities for themselves, and each of their testimonies illustrate that even an individual’s or a group’s memories of the past are plural. When this multiplicity is then brought to bear on the memories of people with a very different understanding of that past, it becomes clearer that all memories are necessarily limited and contextual, and that no one of them alone can suffice as historical truth. The question for discussion then becomes which memories, whose memories are given pride or place in history and accorded the status of truth (O’Brien, in Yoshimi, 1995:15).
上野与吉见之间的辩论提出了关于幸存者证词及其在慰安妇问题讨论中地位的关键问题。支持幸存者的人面临的挑战是如何在不削弱证词作为法律程序中证据的力量和连贯性的前提下,理解幸存者证词的多样性和富有成效的特性。正是通过她们的证词和行动,幸存者们得以为自己创造新的身份,她们的每一段证词都表明,个人或群体对过去的记忆是多元的。当这种多元性被带入对过去有着截然不同理解的人们的记忆中时,就更清楚地表明所有记忆必然是有限且有情境性的,没有任何一种记忆能够单独作为历史真相。讨论的问题因此变成了,哪些记忆、谁的记忆被赋予历史中的荣耀或地位,并被认可为真理(O’Brien,载于吉见,1995:15)。
It is this understanding of the multiple nature of historical truth and Ueno’s ‘feminist curiosity’, to borrow Cynthis Enloe’s wonderful term (Enloe, 2000), concerning whose memories have been given pride of place in history and how and why they have been accorded the status of truth, that represents not only the beginning but also the powerful conclusion of Nationalism and Gender.
正是对历史真相多重性质的这种理解,以及上野千鹤子的“女性主义好奇心”,借用辛西娅·恩洛(Cynthis Enloe)的精彩用语(Enloe, 2000),即关于谁的记忆被赋予历史的显赫地位,以及这些记忆如何和为何被赋予真理的地位,这不仅代表了《民族主义与性别》的开端,也构成了其有力的结论。

Structure of Nationalism and Gender
《民族主义与性别》的结构

The original Japanese version of Nationalism and Gender was divided into three sections, the titles of which have been translated as follows; Engendering the Nation; The Military Comfort Women Issue, and The Politics of Memory. In addition to these, the English version has a completely new section, Hiroshima from a Feminist Perspective: Between War Crimes and the Crimes of War. This is a translation of a paper given at a Symposium on Women, Nuclear Weapons and Peace (Josei, kaku, heiwa shinpojiumu) in Hiroshima in 2000. It was felt that this would provide a fitting conclusion to Ueno’s theorizing on the issues of war responsibility and war crimes. The English edition has an updated epilogue and a specially written author’s introduction. In translating the original Japanese version of Nationalism and Gender, I have contemporised the language to bring it up to date, however, no other revisions have been made.
《民族主义与性别》的日文原版分为三个部分,标题翻译如下:民族的性别化;军慰安妇问题;记忆的政治。除此之外,英文版新增了一个全新章节——《从女性主义视角看广岛:战争罪行与战争的罪行之间》。该章节是 2000 年在广岛举行的“女性、核武器与和平研讨会”(Josei, kaku, heiwa shinpojiumu)上发表的一篇论文的翻译。人们认为这为上野关于战争责任和战争罪行问题的理论化提供了一个恰当的结尾。英文版还更新了后记,并特别撰写了作者导言。在翻译《民族主义与性别》的日文原版时,我对语言进行了现代化处理以使其更符合当下,但未做其他修改。
The first section, Engendering the Nation, considers the way in which the Asia Pacific war, has been understood by historians and other social scientists. Ueno identifies three schools of thought - discontinuity, continuity and neo-continuity - and considers the implications of each for understanding both post-war Japanese society and the issue of war responsibility. The discontinuity school posits a sharp break between preand post-war Japanese society. The continuity school argues that there has been continuity in what Ueno refers to as the ‘modernisation project’, and views the war as a deviation from this path. The neo-continuity school recognises the through line in many aspects of Japanese society pre- and post-war, but regards the war less as a deviation, and more as an innovation that furthered certain aspects of the process of modernisation, especially in the strengthening of the nation-state.
第一部分《赋予国家性别视角》探讨了亚太战争如何被历史学家和其他社会科学家理解。上野千鹤子指出了三种学派——断裂论、连续论和新连续论——并考察了每种观点对理解战后日本社会及战争责任问题的影响。断裂论认为战前和战后日本社会之间存在明显的断层。连续论则主张上野所称的“现代化项目”是连续的,并将战争视为这一进程中的一次偏离。新连续论承认战前战后日本社会在许多方面存在延续性,但认为战争不只是一次偏离,更是一种创新,推动了现代化进程的某些方面,尤其是在强化民族国家方面。
Having made clear her own position within the neo-continuity school, Ueno moves on to the field of women’s history and examines the shift in perspective that occurred in the late 20 th 20 th  20^("th ")20^{\text {th }} century from viewing women as victims to active participants in history who in supporting the wartime regime bear some of the responsibility for the atrocities that were carried out in its name. This new approach in women’s history that recognises both women’s agency and, by extension, culpability in the war, Ueno refers as the reflexive school of women’s history (hanseiteki joseishi). She offers a critique of Suzuki Yūko and others who call for a reflexive women’s history, suggesting that in terms of analysis and conclusions it is trapped within the limitations of its own national history. Ueno asks whether it should be only women in Japan and other Axis countries who are obliged to reflect on their country-women’s support of the wartime regime, pointing out that women in the Allied Alliance countries similarly supported their governments during wartime playing a very similar role on the home front. Ueno throws out the rhetorical question, If the only difference between women in the Allied and Axis countries is that one group supported a just war while the other supported an unjust war, then on what basis were the latter able to judge that theirs’ was a bad war if not after the event?
在明确了自己在新连续性学派中的立场后,上野转向女性史领域,考察了 19 世纪末女性视角的转变——从将女性视为受害者转变为将其视为历史中的积极参与者,这些女性在支持战时政权的过程中,对以其名义实施的暴行负有一定责任。上野将这种承认女性能动性及其在战争中责任的新女性史方法称为反思性女性史学派(反省的女性史)。她对铃木裕子等呼吁反思性女性史的学者提出批评,认为其分析和结论仍受限于自身国家历史的局限。上野质疑,是否只有日本及其他轴心国的女性才有义务反思本国女性对战时政权的支持,并指出盟军国家的女性在战时同样支持其政府,在后方发挥了非常相似的作用。 上野抛出一个反问:如果盟国和轴心国的女性之间唯一的区别是,一方支持正义战争,而另一方支持非正义战争,那么后者又凭什么在事后判断他们的战争是错误的呢?
This exploration of women’s history incorporates the feminist project of engendering the nation. The states ‘gender strategy’ for nationalising women through the mobilisation process is examined showing clearly that, regardless of desperate circumstances, a rigid gendered division of labour was maintained throughout the wartime period, with women given the task of protecting the home front, while their men-folk fought the war on the front lines. The inherent dilemma of this approach is examined, along with the apparent willingness of leading feminist figures to go along with this gender strategy.
这段对女性历史的探讨融入了赋予国家性别视角的女性主义项目。文中考察了国家通过动员过程对女性进行国家化的“性别策略”,清楚地表明,无论环境多么绝望,战争期间始终维持着严格的性别劳动分工,女性被赋予保护后方的任务,而男性则在前线作战。文章分析了这种做法的内在困境,以及主要女性主义人物显然愿意配合这一性别策略的现象。
The second section of Nationalism and Gender deals specifically with the comfort women issue. Ueno examines in turn the various paradigms that have been employed in the discursive battle over the comfort women and, as such, traces the history of the comfort women issue itself. We are told that the former comfort women are the victims of a triple crime: first their forced incarceration and sexual abuse at the comfort’ stations; second the near 50 years of silence that was imposed upon them by patriarchal society; and
《民族主义与性别》的第二部分专门讨论慰安妇问题。上野依次考察了在慰安妇话语争论中所采用的各种范式,并由此追溯了慰安妇问题本身的历史。我们被告知,前慰安妇是三重罪行的受害者:首先是她们被强行关押并在慰安所遭受性虐待;其次是父权社会强加给她们近 50 年的沉默;以及

finally the defamation of character carried out by those on the right in Japan, particularly members of the Liberal View of History Group, after Kim Haksun and others finally came forward. In looking at the resistance both within Japan and Korea to the former comfort women coming forward and speaking out, Ueno underscores the power of patriarchal values to define rape and sexual abuse as the victim’s rather than the perpetrator’s shame, and to view it as an issue of male honour. In addition, she also points to the complexity of post-colonial politics where former Teishintai (volunteer corps), including comfort women, are apt to be viewed as collaborators with, rather than victims of, the imperial military regime.
最后,在金学顺等人最终站出来之后,日本右翼,特别是自由历史观团体成员,对她们进行的人身诽谤。在审视日本和韩国内部对前慰安妇站出来发声的抵制时,上野强调了父权价值观的力量,这种价值观将强奸和性虐待定义为受害者的耻辱而非施害者的耻辱,并将其视为男性荣誉的问题。此外,她还指出了后殖民政治的复杂性,前挺身队(志愿军团)成员,包括慰安妇,往往被视为与帝国军队政权的合作者,而非受害者。
The third section takes up the issue of the politics of public memory. Many of the issues that Ueno touches are not specifically Japanese, but universal ones. How does a nation remember its past, particularly when that past includes a recently executed discredited war? Ueno starts by taking on her natural adversaries, the so-called historical revisionists who seek to create a more positive Japanese history, particularly with respect to the Asia-Pacific War. Of particular interest here is the Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tuskurukai (a literal translation would be the committee to create new history textbooks, however their official English name is The Japanese Institute for Orthodox History Education, hereafter Orthodox History Group). This is a group created by members of the Liberal View of History Group in 1996 to try and influence government policy, particularly in relation to the content of history textbooks. The group have staunchly rejected ‘any need for official acknowledgement of Japanese wartime atrocities, let alone apologizing or paying reparations’ (Hein and Selden, 2000:26). They have been especially incensed by mention of the comfort women system in school history textbooks and have campaigned vigorously and very publicly, making full use of the media and Internet, to have all mention of comfort women removed from school textbooks. More recently they have increased tensions between Japan and its Asian neighbours by submitting and having accepted their own history school textbook; a textbook that attempts to restore national pride by whitewashing wartime events.
第三部分讨论了公共记忆的政治问题。上野触及的许多问题并非仅限于日本,而是具有普遍性。一个国家如何记忆其过去,尤其是当那个过去包括一场最近被执行死刑且名誉扫地的战争时?上野首先针对她的自然对手,即所谓的历史修正主义者,这些人试图创造一个更积极的日本历史,特别是关于亚太战争的历史。这里特别值得关注的是“新历史教科书制作会”(Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukkurukai,字面翻译为“制作新历史教科书委员会”,但其官方英文名称为“The Japanese Institute for Orthodox History Education”,以下简称“正统历史团体”)。该团体由自由历史观团体成员于 1996 年成立,旨在试图影响政府政策,特别是关于历史教科书内容的政策。该团体坚决拒绝“任何对日本战时暴行的官方承认,更不用说道歉或支付赔偿”(Hein 和 Selden,2000:26)。 他们对教科书中提及慰安妇制度尤为愤怒,积极且公开地展开运动,充分利用媒体和互联网,要求将所有关于慰安妇的内容从教科书中删除。最近,他们通过提交并使自己的历史教科书被接受,进一步加剧了日本与亚洲邻国之间的紧张关系;这本教科书试图通过美化战争时期的事件来恢复民族自豪感。
While the historical revisionists are Ueno’s obvious adversaries, her criticism of their approach is brief and blunt. She does not regard them as a
虽然历史修正主义者显然是上野的对手,但她对他们的批评简短而直率。她并不认为他们是一个

serious theoretical challenge, and therefore it is to her natural allies, ‘conscientious historians’ like Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Suzuki Yūko, that she directs her fullest attention. As already mentioned above, her attack on Yoshimi and Suzuki is on the basis of their positivism and the privileging of documentary sources. She argues for the recognition of multiple histories as a reflection of the multifaceted and essentially constructed nature of our experiences. As noted by Jordan Sands, ‘In her indictment of the methodology of academic historians, Ueno appears to veer dangerously towards ethical relativism’ (Sand, 1999:122). Yet as a feminist scholar, her ‘solution to the epistemological dilemma’ inherent in her arguments is to focus on ‘relations of power’ (Sand, 1999:122). Ueno places gender theory at the centre of her analysis and, as a result, she is able to avoid the extreme relativist strain of post-modernist thought while drawing on many of its insights (Sand, 1999:122).
这是一个严肃的理论挑战,因此她将全部注意力集中在她的天然盟友——像吉见义明和铃木裕子这样的“良心历史学家”身上。如上所述,她对吉见和铃木的批评基于他们的实证主义和对文献资料的优先重视。她主张承认多重历史,以反映我们经验的多面性和本质上的建构性。正如乔丹·桑兹所指出的,“在她对学术历史学家方法论的指控中,上野似乎危险地倾向于伦理相对主义”(桑兹,1999:122)。然而,作为一名女性主义学者,她对其论点中固有的认识论困境的“解决方案”是聚焦于“权力关系”(桑兹,1999:122)。上野将性别理论置于其分析的核心,因此她能够避免后现代思想中极端相对主义的倾向,同时借鉴其许多见解(桑兹,1999:122)。
The final part of the English edition of Nationalism and Gender, Hiroshima from a Feminist Perspective: Between War Crimes and the Crimes of War, is very different in style and tone from what comes before it. Firstly, it is aimed at a non-specialist audience. Secondly, it is in the form of a paper given at a symposium and, therefore, the audience is addressed directly. In the translation I have kept the chatty and informal style of the original. Finally, while the first three parts focus largely on issues and events within Japan, this final section steps quite consciously outside Japan to address international issues from a feminist perspective.
《民族主义与性别》英文版的最后一部分《从女性主义视角看广岛:介于战争罪行与战争的罪行之间》,在风格和语气上与之前的内容有很大不同。首先,它面向的是非专业读者。其次,它以在研讨会上发表的论文形式呈现,因此直接与听众对话。在翻译中,我保持了原文那种轻松随意的风格。最后,虽然前三部分主要关注日本国内的问题和事件,但这一部分则有意识地跳出日本,从女性主义视角探讨国际问题。
While the style, tone and focus may be different, the final section takes a step further the tentative conclusion that Ueno reached at the end of the original Japanese version of Nationalism and Gender; namely that from a feminist perspective there can be no such thing as war crimes as war itself is the crime. Her argument is simple and quite straight forward, in that she argues that in accepting certain acts as war crimes and, therefore, criminalizing them, we are at the same time legitimising other acts of war and therefore de-criminalizing them. As Ueno points out, rules are created such as ‘If we are going to have a war, let’s do it in a gentlemanly fashion’; ‘Let’s not use inhumane weapons’; ‘It’s okay to have a war, but let’s go about it in a fair way’, yet this diverts our attention from the reality of war, which has as its intention the murder of those on the ‘other side’ in order to achieve an
虽然风格、语调和重点可能不同,但最后一节更进一步地阐述了上野千鹤子在《民族主义与性别》日文原版结尾处得出的初步结论;即从女性主义的角度来看,战争本身就是罪行,因此不存在所谓的战争罪。她的论点简单而直接,她认为,在接受某些行为为战争罪并因此将其定罪的同时,我们也在合法化其他战争行为,从而使其不被视为犯罪。正如上野指出的,规则被制定出来,比如“如果我们要打仗,就以绅士的方式进行”;“不要使用不人道的武器”;“打仗可以,但要公平进行”,然而这些都转移了我们对战争现实的注意力,而战争的本质是为了实现对“对方”人员的杀戮。

end; however ‘noble’ or ‘right’ that end may appear at the time. While Ueno takes a no-holes-barred, anti-war position, she does not espouse a naïve pacifism. Her analysis uses the tools of gender theory to ask questions that de-construct the issue of violence and to make clear the links between violence carried out under very different circumstances. Ueno asks, ‘Under what conditions is violence criminalized and under what conditions is it decriminalized’? This question leads to an examination of both the shadowy ‘public’ domain where violence in the name of the state is de-criminalized and the ‘private’ domain where the same process of de-criminalization can be seen at work with regards to gender-based violence. Having argued that war is the execution of state violence, Ueno moves on to ask whether feminist activists and theorists demanding gender equality are really seeking ‘distribution justice’ in terms of equal opportunities to execute such violence by entering the military. In turning her attention to the recruitment of women in the U.S. army, Ueno underscores the cleverly disguised fact that the flip side of the noble act of ‘dying for one’s country’ is ‘killing for one’s country’. Arguing that the taking of life is the ‘folly of all follies’, Ueno asks whether this is the extent (or limits) of the feminist vision.
终结;然而,无论那个终结当时看起来多么“高尚”或“正确”。虽然上野采取了毫无保留的反战立场,但她并不主张天真的和平主义。她的分析运用性别理论的工具提出问题,解构暴力问题,并明确指出在非常不同的情境下实施的暴力之间的联系。上野问道:“在什么条件下暴力被定为犯罪,而在什么条件下暴力被非刑事化?”这个问题引导她考察了那个阴暗的“公共”领域,在那里以国家名义的暴力被非刑事化,以及“私人”领域,在那里针对基于性别的暴力也可以看到同样的非刑事化过程。她认为战争是国家暴力的执行,接着上野进一步探讨,要求性别平等的女权活动家和理论家是否真的在寻求“分配正义”,即通过进入军队获得执行此类暴力的平等机会。 在将注意力转向美国军队中女性的招募时,上野强调了一个巧妙掩饰的事实:为“为国捐躯”这一崇高行为的另一面是“为国杀戮”。她认为,夺取生命是“所有愚行中的愚行”,并质问这是否就是女权主义视野的全部(或极限)。
As I translated this final section in the build up to the war in Iraq, Ueno’s arguments seemed particularly pertinent and urgent. Her position that feminism should condemn all forms of violence, under all circumstances, is not one that will ‘rock the boat’ in terms of mainstream Japanese society, where peace and democracy has been the ‘great mantra of post-war Japan’ (Dower, 1999:30). Yet, I suspect that it will meet with strong resistance from mainstream feminism in the U.S. and perhaps some other Western countries where there continues to be strong support for ‘just’ wars. I can also hear feminist activists involved in protecting the victims of domestic violence, particularly those supporting women incarcerated for striking back at abusive partners, protesting Ueno’s argument that feminists should not support violence under any circumstances. Yet, it is hard to see where lines should be drawn if state or private forms of violence are to be supported under certain circumstances. Ueno’s careful analysis of the issue of war and war crimes, by taking arguments for violence to their logical conclusion, makes this extremely clear. As the conclusion to Ueno’s arguments surrounding the issue of Japanese war responsibility, this final section also
当我翻译这最后一节内容,正值伊拉克战争即将爆发之际,植野的论点显得尤为切中要害且紧迫。她主张女权主义应在任何情况下谴责一切形式的暴力,这一立场在以和平与民主为“战后日本伟大咒语”的主流日本社会中并不会“掀起波澜”(Dower,1999:30)。然而,我怀疑这一观点会遭到美国主流女权主义乃至某些其他西方国家的强烈抵制,因为这些地方仍然普遍支持“正义”的战争。我也能想象那些致力于保护家庭暴力受害者的女权活动家,尤其是支持因反击施暴伴侣而被监禁的女性的群体,会抗议植野关于女权主义者在任何情况下都不应支持暴力的论断。然而,如果在某些情况下要支持国家或私人形式的暴力,又很难界定应划定何种界限。植野通过将支持暴力的论点推向逻辑极致,对战争与战争罪问题的细致分析,使这一点变得极为清晰。 作为上野围绕日本战争责任问题论述的结论,最后这一部分也

redefines the parameters of the debate in a way that has the potential to open that proverbial can of worms. As such, it is striking piece of theorizing that bravely pushes forward the debate on war memory and war responsibility in the international arena as well as that in Japan.
重新定义了辩论的参数,有可能打开那句老生常谈的“潘多拉魔盒”。因此,这是一篇引人注目的理论作品,勇敢地推动了国际舞台上以及日本国内关于战争记忆和战争责任的辩论。

Notes on the Translation
翻译说明

I have tried as much as possible to keep the original style of Ueno’s writing, which moves between an almost chatty style, punctuated with hard-hitting rhetorical questions, to a the kind of academic theorizing that is more familiar to the English reader. The way I was taught to translate text at the University of Sheffield was to account for every word in a sentence and then to re-work the whole thing for readability in English. This is the rule I have followed here, meaning that somebody who cared to compare the two should be able to find everything in the original Japanese accounted for in the English translation.
我尽量保持上野写作的原有风格,她的文风在几乎像聊天般的轻松语调与带有犀利修辞疑问句的学术理论论述之间切换。谢菲尔德大学教我翻译文本的方法是对句子中的每个词都进行考量,然后重新组织整句以符合英语的可读性。这是我在此遵循的原则,意味着如果有人愿意对照两种语言文本,应该能在英文译文中找到原日文的所有内容。
In terms of general ‘housekeeping’, to borrow David Askew’s terminology (see Oguma, 2002), Japanese and Korean names are written in the conventional order for these countries; family name followed by given name. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: in the case of a Japanese person living outside the country who has chosen to follow the opposite (Western) order or where the Western order is followed in an English-language publication. Macrons have been used to indicate the long ‘o’ and ‘u’ vowel sounds in Japanese, except in words or place names that are familiar in English such as Tokyo or Osaka. The names of Japanese organisations have been given in English with a Romanised form of the original Japanese inside brackets. The same basic principle has been followed for the names of laws or government policies. While translations of names inserted by the translator appear inside brackets thus ( ), any additional comments or clarifications by the translator have been inserted inside the following kind of brackets [ ]. As a matter of policy, I have tried to keep additional comments by the translator to an absolute minimum so as not to intrude on the original text. Finally, although Ueno Chizuko used the Japanese equivalent of quotation marks around the a number of terms, including comfort women, throughout the book to indicate their
就一般的“整理”而言,借用 David Askew 的术语(参见 Oguma,2002),日文和韩文姓名按照这些国家的惯例书写;姓氏在前,名字在后。然而,这一规则有两个例外:一是居住在国外的日本人选择采用相反的(西方)顺序,二是在英文出版物中采用西方顺序。日语中的长“o”和“u”元音使用了长音符号,除非是英语中熟悉的词汇或地名,如 Tokyo 或 Osaka。日本组织的名称以英文呈现,括号内附有原日文的罗马字形式。法律或政府政策的名称也遵循同样的基本原则。译者插入的名称翻译置于括号内(),任何额外的译者注释或说明则置于方括号内[ ]。作为一项政策,我尽量将译者的额外注释保持在最低限度,以免干扰原文。 最后,尽管上野千鹤子在全书中使用了日文引号标示包括“慰安妇”在内的多个术语,以表明其构建性和问题性,

constructed and problematic nature, I have followed the minimalist tradition of Trans Pacific Press and omitted them on all but the first occasion.
我遵循跨太平洋出版社的简约传统,除首次出现外,均省略了引号。

Acknowledgements  致谢

I would like to thank Ueno Chizuko for first writing Nationalism and Gender and then for entrusting me with the important task of translating it into English. I am also grateful to Yoshio Sugimoto, our publisher, for his confidence in my ability to make a good job of the translation. It was a pleasure working with them both on this project, and I greatly appreciate their support and patience during the translation process. I am grateful to Martin Collick for his advice in the early stages of the project. Graham Healey’s close reading of the first section and generous feedback greatly improved the translation. Likewise, I am extremely grateful to Joe Banerjee for reading the remaining sections and offering sound advice throughout. I would like to thank Hiroko Takeda for first introducing me to Nationalism and Gender back in 1999 and for working with me to devise a post-graduate distance learning module around it for the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield. Likewise, I am extremely grateful for the stimulating input from students who have taken the module over the past three-and-half years. My heartfelt thanks goes to my husband, Yamamoto Yukishi, who supported me by doing more than his fair share of child care and by explaining some of the more difficult grammatical points. Finally, I would like to thank my two children, Shia Anne Yamamoto aged nine and Yujin David Yamamoto aged seven, who showed interest, patience and understanding well beyond their years.
我要感谢上野千鹤子首先撰写了《民族主义与性别》一书,并将将其翻译成英文这一重要任务托付给我。我也感谢我们的出版人杉本义雄对我有能力完成这项翻译工作的信任。与他们两位合作完成这个项目是一种愉快的经历,我非常感激他们在翻译过程中给予的支持和耐心。我感谢马丁·科利克在项目早期阶段给予的建议。格雷厄姆·希利对第一部分的细致审读和慷慨反馈极大地提升了翻译质量。同样,我非常感谢乔·班纳吉对剩余部分的审读以及始终如一的中肯建议。我还要感谢竹田裕子在 1999 年首次向我介绍《民族主义与性别》,并与我合作为谢菲尔德大学东亚研究学院设计了一个基于该书的研究生远程学习课程。同样,我非常感激过去三年半中选修该课程的学生们带来的启发性意见。 衷心感谢我的丈夫山本幸志,他不仅承担了超过公平份额的育儿工作,还为我讲解了一些较难的语法点。最后,我要感谢我的两个孩子,九岁的山本希亚·安妮和七岁的山本裕仁·大卫,他们表现出了超出年龄的兴趣、耐心和理解。

Author's Preface to the English Edition
英文版作者序言

It has been four years since the first publication of Nationalism and Gender appeared, and it is a great joy and honor to now have an English translation of the book. Nationalism and Gender provides a feminist intervention into the debate sparked by Japanese historical revisionists. The Japanese version of historical revisionism emerged in the post-Cold War era. It was triggered by, and has taken as its target, the military comfort women issue, and is sexist in nature. The military comfort women system has its roots in the Asia-Pacific War, but only emerged as a high profile issue as the result of the coming forward of living witnesses, Kim Haksun and two others, in 1991. In the guise of positivist historians, the historical revisionists have attempted to discredit the testimonies of these and other living witnesses, devaluing such testimony as a source of historical evidence. I took this attack to be a serious challenge not only to the women themselves, but also to what women’s history has achieved in recent years by using oral histories and life stories.
自《民族主义与性别》首次出版以来已经过去四年,如今能够有这本书的英文译本,令我感到非常高兴和荣幸。《民族主义与性别》对由日本历史修正主义者引发的争论进行了女性主义的介入。日本版本的历史修正主义出现在冷战后时代。它的触发点并以军事慰安妇问题为攻击目标,且本质上带有性别歧视。军事慰安妇制度起源于亚太战争,但直到 1991 年,随着金学顺及另外两位幸存者的公开揭露,这一问题才成为高度关注的焦点。历史修正主义者以实证主义历史学家的身份,试图诋毁这些及其他幸存证人的证词,贬低此类证词作为历史证据的价值。我认为这种攻击不仅是对女性本身的严重挑战,也是对近年来女性历史通过口述历史和生活故事所取得成就的挑战。
The Japanese historikerstreit 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} or historians’ debate has raised a number of questions including: What is history all about? Is there only one history or multiple histories? Is there such a thing as ‘truth’ in history? Who judges which history is ‘true’ in the presence of multiple histories? Are oral testimonies less valuable than written documents? Who is entitled to narrate history? To whom is it narrated? When one history contradicts another, who is eligible to judge the ‘truth’? Here, gender matters in relation to the answer to all these questions.
日本的历史学者争论(historikerstreit)提出了许多问题,包括:历史到底是什么?历史只有一个版本,还是有多个版本?历史中是否存在“真相”?在多重历史并存的情况下,谁来判断哪段历史是真实的?口述证词是否比书面文献价值更低?谁有权叙述历史?历史是向谁叙述的?当一段历史与另一段历史相矛盾时,谁有资格判断“真相”?在所有这些问题的答案中,性别因素都非常重要。
History can be rewritten and re-narrated. In this context I would dare to call myself a feminist revisionist, as I believe that women can revise the past by looking at it with different eyes and by hearing the voices of previously silenced witnesses. This is exactly what has taken place in Japan, when the voice of a survivor of military sexual slavery, Kim Hak-sun, was heard for
历史可以被重写和重新叙述。在这种背景下,我敢称自己为女权主义修正主义者,因为我相信女性可以通过不同的视角审视过去,倾听那些曾被沉默的见证者的声音,从而修正历史。这正是日本发生的事情,当军事性奴役幸存者金学顺的声音首次被历史听见时。

the first time in history. Following her testimony, history has been renarrated and rewritten from a totally different perspective of reality.
在她的证词之后,历史从一个完全不同的现实视角被重新叙述和重写。
As I will argue more substantively in this book, there was nothing new about this issue in terms of its existence as a historical fact since the comfort women system was widely known by soldiers and historians. What has changed is the way we view this fact, from something taken-for-granted as an inevitability of war to an intolerable inhuman act. What I saw here was how a testimony, the voice of a subaltern woman who had been silenced for nearly half a century, could change and challenge orthodox history.
正如我将在本书中更深入论述的那样,这一问题作为一个历史事实的存在并不新鲜,因为慰安妇制度早已为士兵和历史学家所知。变化的是我们看待这一事实的方式,从被视为战争不可避免的理所当然,转变为一种无法容忍的不人道行为。我在这里看到的是,一段证词——一个被沉默了近半个世纪的下层女性的声音——如何能够改变并挑战正统历史。
The entire book is dedicated to the effort of revising Japanese women’s history in response to the challenge posed by those Korean survivors of the comfort women system who have come forward. The comfort women issue has personally shaken me deeply and forced me to re-examine what Japanese women, both the elite and masses, have done, and made me rethink my own feminist heritage, positive or negative. This struggle coincided with the emergence of a reflexive women’s history here in Japan, in which feminist historians tried to restore women’s agency within the historical process.
整本书致力于回应那些挺身而出的韩国慰安妇幸存者所提出的挑战,修订日本女性历史。慰安妇问题深深震撼了我,迫使我重新审视日本女性,无论是精英还是大众,所做的事情,也让我重新思考自己作为女性主义者的传承,无论是积极的还是消极的。这场斗争恰逢日本女性史反思性兴起之时,女性主义历史学家试图在历史进程中恢复女性的能动性。
The structure of Nationalism and Gender consists of the following four sections exploring the nature of the historical project. Part one, Engendering the Nation, explores the historical heritage of Japanese feminism, a heritage which unfortunately failed to ask questions about the comfort women system until the victims spoke out for themselves. This re-examination of women’s history ended up leading me to question the place of women in the nation-state, since imperialism and colonialism are deeply wound up with this crime of the state.
《民族主义与性别》的结构由以下四个部分组成,探讨这一历史项目的本质。第一部分《赋予国家性别》探讨了日本女权主义的历史遗产,这一遗产遗憾地未能在受害者自己发声之前质疑慰安妇制度。对女性历史的这一重新审视最终使我开始质疑女性在民族国家中的地位,因为帝国主义和殖民主义与这一国家罪行紧密相连。
Part two, The Military Comfort Women Issue, examines the variety of discursive strategies that have been used to interpret the comfort women issue, from conservative to leftist and feminist, and makes clear that each contradict each other. Each paradigm is placed according to the chronological order in which it appeared giving the appearance that each new paradigm overcame the problems inherent in the last, but it is not this simple as every discursive strategy has its own possibilities and limitations. The lesson that we learn from this is that we can never avoid the politics of
第二部分《军队慰安妇问题》考察了用来解释慰安妇问题的各种话语策略,从保守派到左翼和女权主义者,并明确指出它们彼此矛盾。每种范式按照其出现的时间顺序排列,表面上看似每个新范式都克服了前一个固有的问题,但事实并非如此,因为每种话语策略都有其自身的可能性和局限性。我们从中学到的教训是,我们永远无法避免政治的影响。

category since we became more sensitive about discursive practice in historical studies since the linguistic turn.
自从语言转向以来,我们在历史研究中对话语实践变得更加敏感,这一范畴也随之产生了变化。
Part three, The Politics of Memory, deals with the Japanese version of historical revisionism focused on the comfort women issue. This is the actual political situation that brought me into a confrontation with conservative historians. I became deeply involved with the Japanese historikerstreit from the point of view of a feminist historian, as I took this controversy to be a serious challenge undermining the achievements of women’s history based on the use of oral histories and testimonies. The question that I address is rather methodological focusing on how history is constructed. This approach eventually led me to ask two additional questions: 1) Who narrates history? 2) To whom is it narrated? In the end these merged into a final question; Whose history is it? This is a question that inevitably obliges us all to ask questions about our own positionality in relation to history.
第三部分,《记忆的政治》,讨论了以慰安妇问题为中心的日本版历史修正主义。这正是将我置于与保守派历史学家对立的实际政治局势。我从女性主义历史学家的视角深度介入了日本的历史学者之争,因为我认为这场争论是对基于口述历史和证词的女性史成就的严重挑战。我关注的问题更多是方法论上的,聚焦于历史是如何被构建的。这种方法最终引导我提出了两个附加问题:1)谁在叙述历史?2)历史是向谁叙述的?最终,这些问题融合成一个终极问题:这是谁的历史?这个问题不可避免地迫使我们所有人反思自己在历史中的立场。
Part four, Hiroshima from a Feminist Perspective, was not included in the original publication of Nationalism and Gender, but fortunately with the positive support of both the translator and the publisher, we all agreed to include this chapter at the end. It contains a feminist vision of the future, looking at how we can criminalize all forms of state violence. It is particularly appropriate to include this chapter when we eyewitness the illegitimate use of the military force at the beginning of the 21 st 21 st  21^("st ")21^{\text {st }} century by the world’s most powerful nation-state, and at this historical juncture when women are trying to gain in the name of gender equality their share in the use of military force. The comfort women issue takes us to a point where it is clear that we need to go beyond the legitimacy of the nation-state.
第四部分,《从女性主义视角看广岛》,未包含在《民族主义与性别》的原始出版物中,但幸运的是,在译者和出版社的积极支持下,我们一致同意将本章作为结尾收录。该部分包含了对未来的女性主义展望,探讨如何将所有形式的国家暴力定为犯罪。在目睹世界上最强大的民族国家在 21 世纪初非法使用军事力量的情况下,尤其适合收录本章;同时,在这一历史关头,女性正试图以性别平等的名义争取在军事力量使用中的份额。慰安妇问题使我们认识到,必须超越民族国家的合法性。
At the very least, the historical lessons of Japanese women’s history teaches us the following, a learning process, which I repeat, was triggered by the breaking of the silence of the survivors of the comfort women system and as such I will be ever grateful to those brave, elderly women who came forward. What we learn is that the feminist goal of gender equality does not lie in the pursuit of the nationalization of women. This conclusion is reached as a logical consequence of engendering the nation. Japanese feminism, coming out of its specific historical context, can contribute to global feminism with this lesson.
至少,日本女性历史的教训告诉我们以下几点,这一学习过程,我再三强调,是由慰安妇制度幸存者打破沉默所引发的,因此我将永远感激那些勇敢站出来的年长女性。我们学到的是,女权主义追求的性别平等目标不在于女性的国家化。这一结论是作为赋予国家性别属性的逻辑结果得出的。日本女权主义,源于其特定的历史背景,可以以此教训为全球女权主义做出贡献。
Finally, I would like to show my deepest gratitude to my translator, Beverley Yamamoto, and my publisher, Yoshio Sugimoto, both of whom found my book worthy of English publication and who took painstaking efforts with all the detailed work involved in producing this edition. I would also like to give my special thanks for the financial support of the Japanese Council for the Promotion of the Social Sciences, without which this translation would not have been possible.
最后,我要向我的译者贝弗利·山本和我的出版人杉本义雄致以最深的感谢,正是他们认为我的书值得出版英文版,并在制作本版过程中付出了细致的努力。我还要特别感谢日本社会科学促进会的财政支持,没有他们,这次翻译是不可能完成的。
This book is dedicated to Irokawa Daikichi, a survivor of Kamikaze attackers, and relentless anti-imperialist historian, who guided me to reflect on the war-time experience for which I, belonging to the post war generation, have no memory.
本书献给伊良川大吉,一位神风特攻队幸存者和不懈的反帝国主义历史学家,他引导我反思那段我作为战后世代无从记忆的战争经历。
Spring 2003  2003 年春
Chizuko Ueno  上野千鹤子

Part I  第一部分

Engendering the Nation  赋予国家性别意义

Methodological Issues  方法论问题

Recently, historical revisionism targeting the wartime period has been the subject of considerable controversy. However, revising understandings of the past is not an activity limited to historical revisionists for example, in the German historians’ debate 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} or the much-criticised liberal historiography movement seen in Japan. History is something that is always being exposed to revision by those in the present.
近年来,针对战争时期的历史修正主义引发了相当大的争议。然而,修正对过去的理解并非仅限于历史修正主义者,例如德国历史学家辩论 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 或在日本备受批评的自由主义史学运动。历史始终是当下的人们不断进行修正的对象。
History, then, is the constant reconstructing of the past in the present. The naïve view that history is simply an exercise in narrating the events of the past as they actually happened is no longer tenable. Supposing there was only one truth in history, then a definitive history of say the French Revolution or the Meiji Restoration would only need to be written once. Once written, there would be no need to re-write them. In reality, however, our understanding of the past is constantly being revised according to contemporary concerns and interests. For this very reason, the appearance of an official history or an established theory concerning the French Revolution or the Meiji Restoration has not brought to an end the process of writing about these events. The histories of both have been written again and again as times and perspectives have changed. I think, fundamentally, that history is something we re-write. Consequently, as was made clear to me by Kurihara Yukio, I should also be described as a revisionist (Kurihara, 1997). While this may be the case, the question addressed here is: history for whom?
历史,因而,是在当下不断重构过去的过程。那种认为历史仅仅是叙述过去事件的天真观点已经不再站得住脚。假如历史中只有一个真相,那么关于法国大革命或明治维新的权威历史只需写一次。写成后,就无需再重写。然而,现实中,我们对过去的理解总是根据当代的关切和利益不断修正。正因为如此,关于法国大革命或明治维新的官方历史或既定理论的出现,并未终结对这些事件的书写过程。随着时代和视角的变化,这些历史被一次又一次地重写。我认为,根本上讲,历史是我们不断重写的东西。因此,正如栗原幸雄向我明确指出的,我也应被称为修正主义者(栗原,1997)。尽管如此,这里要探讨的问题是:历史是为了谁?
Since the linguistic turn, 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} each area of the social sciences has taken as its point of departure a serious epistemological questioning of the idea of objective fact. History is no exception here. There is a shared consensus within the social sciences that there is no fact or truth, only a reality that has been reconstructed as a result of the problematising of specific viewpoints.
自语言转向以来,社会科学的各个领域都以对客观事实观念的严肃认识论质疑作为出发点。历史学在这方面也不例外。社会科学内部普遍达成共识,认为不存在事实或真理,只有通过对特定视角的问题化而重构的现实。
This perspective, which we can also call social constructionism, has already become a matter of common knowledge within the social sciences. Again, history is no exception here.
这种观点,我们也可以称之为社会建构主义,已经成为社会科学中的常识。同样,历史学在这方面也不例外。
Following on from this, as in other fields of the social sciences, history is also the site of a discursive battle over the politics of categories. My objective here is to join this battle for discursive hegemony, and not to try and establish a single truth. I am not using the term politics here in the sense of politics with a capital ’ P ', as in class conflict Politics, but, in the sense of Michel Foucault’s politics of discourse, to mean politics with a small ’ p ’ that lies hidden within categories and descriptions. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
继而,正如社会科学的其他领域一样,历史学也是关于范畴政治的论述之争的场所。我的目标是加入这场话语霸权的争夺,而不是试图确立单一的真理。我这里使用“政治”一词,并非指大写的“P”政治,即阶级斗争政治,而是指米歇尔·福柯所说的话语政治,即隐藏在范畴和描述中的小写“p”的政治。
Given these parameters, social constructionism cannot avoid entering the dispute surrounding revisionists who claim, for example, that there were no Nazi gas chambers, or debates concerning the representation of history. If anything, it can be said that history is the site of a discursive battle over whether or not to allow limitless reinterpretation. For example, in response to historical accounts of the Japanese wartime period, there are those who exclaim, 'Do not accept historical fabrication! or 'Do not distort historical truth! 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} These comments sound to me as though they are tacitly premised upon the perspective of historical positivism, with the idea that there is a single truth in history that has to be discovered. However, do their proponents think that facts remain unchanged regardless of who is looking at them?
鉴于这些参数,社会建构主义无法避免卷入修正主义者的争论,例如那些声称纳粹没有毒气室的观点,或关于历史表述的辩论。可以说,历史本身就是一场关于是否允许无限制重新解释的话语之争。例如,针对日本战时历史的叙述,有人会喊道:“不要接受历史伪造!”或“不要歪曲历史真相!”这些言论在我看来,似乎默许了历史实证主义的视角,即历史中存在一个必须被发现的唯一真相。然而,他们的支持者是否认为事实无论被谁观察都不会改变呢?
Having said that I am a revisionist, it is not the case that I accept the Kantian view that fact is merely an idealised social construct. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} All I am saying is that those facts that have been positioned as facts, those facts that have been given greater importance than other facts, and that other reality unearthed from behind and standing in opposition to certain facts are all simply constructed viewpoints. Reality as a socially constructed phenomenon is something material, and what we are accustomed to calling fact from within this reality is simply that on which legitimacy has been bestowed. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
虽然我自称是修正主义者,但这并不意味着我接受康德的观点,即事实仅仅是理想化的社会建构。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 我所说的是,那些被定位为事实的事实,那些被赋予比其他事实更大重要性的事实,以及从背后挖掘出来并与某些事实对立的其他现实,都是简单的建构视角。作为一种社会建构现象的现实是有物质基础的,而我们习惯于在这种现实中称之为事实的东西,仅仅是被赋予合法性的东西。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
The construction of reality is a key issue in the study of women’s history. How do we reconstruct what amounts to another reality for women, lying behind the official histories written by men, when the possibility of obtaining historical facts is completely absent? The new field of study called
现实的建构是女性历史研究中的一个关键问题。当完全无法获得历史事实的可能性时,我们如何重建另一种属于女性的现实,这种现实隐藏在男性撰写的官方历史背后?一个被称为的新兴研究领域

women’s history, which is a product of second wave feminism that emerged in the 1970s, is a response to this problem. How to unearth this other reality is a particularly pressing issue within the field of medieval history where historical materials from the hands of women themselves are almost nonexistent. Even when historical accounts focusing on women do exist, they have generally been written by men and are limited to materials that have survived historical censorship (Perrot et Duby, 1990; Ueno, 1995a). In the field of modern and contemporary history where there are living subjects, the task of unearthing that other reality lying behind what is recognised as historical fact is being carried out with considerable vigour using oral history techniques.
女性史是 20 世纪 70 年代兴起的第二波女权主义的产物,是对这一问题的回应。如何发掘这一“另一种现实”是中世纪史领域中一个尤为紧迫的问题,因为几乎没有女性亲手留下的历史资料。即使存在以女性为中心的历史记载,通常也是由男性撰写,且仅限于那些幸存于历史审查的材料(Perrot et Duby, 1990;上野,1995a)。在现代和当代史领域,由于有活着的研究对象,利用口述历史技术发掘被公认为历史事实背后的“另一种现实”的工作正被积极开展。
In recent years, there is no example that demonstrates this issue (that is unearthing that other reality) in starker terms than that of the ‘comfort women’ problem. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} If we are simply talking about facts, many people have been aware of the existence of the comfort women. It is not something that has been hidden. What has changed is the way that this fact is dealt with. Nobody considered the comfort women system to be criminal until the women concerned defined themselves as victims and reconstructed it as a sexual crime. In more precise terms, the authenticity of historical fact as seen from the side of the assailants, who did not consider the comfort women system a crime (this fact moreover had been maintained by the silence of the victims) was first challenged and then overturned by the victims constructing a very different-looking other reality. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
近年来,没有哪个例子比“慰安妇”问题更鲜明地展示了这一问题(即揭示另一种现实)。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 如果仅仅谈论事实,许多人早已知道慰安妇的存在。这并非隐藏的秘密。变化在于对这一事实的处理方式。直到相关女性自我认定为受害者并将其重新构建为性犯罪,没人认为慰安妇制度是犯罪。更准确地说,从加害者一方来看,慰安妇制度并非犯罪的历史事实真实性(而且这一事实还被受害者的沉默所维持)首次被受害者挑战,随后被受害者构建的截然不同的另一种现实所推翻。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
This situation is not limited to the comfort women issue. Recently, as a result of the continuous efforts of a small group of conscientious historians, there is a growing body of painstaking empirical research and the discovery of facts based on primary sources concerning the period of the Asia-Pacific war. This has occurred precisely because ‘that war’ [meaning the AsiaPacific], has been exposed to historical revision.
这种情况并不限于慰安妇问题。近年来,得益于一小群良心历史学者的持续努力,关于亚太战争时期的细致实证研究和基于第一手资料的事实发现日益增多。这正是因为“那场战争”(指亚太战争)遭到了历史修正主义的挑战。
There are still many things concerning this war period that need to be made clear and, whether by accident or design, a considerable amount of material has vanished. My aim is not to even attempt to compete with the successes of such painstaking historical research. Indeed, I am not a historian and my own interest is in analysing why changes in historical interpretation occur and what the implications of this are for history. In
关于这段战争时期,仍有许多事情需要澄清,而且无论是偶然还是有意,大量资料已经消失。我的目标并不是试图与这些细致历史研究的成果竞争。事实上,我并非历史学家,我关注的是分析历史解释为何发生变化,以及这对历史意味着什么。

other words, I am interested in the changes of narratives of meta-history. My analysis is based largely on secondary sources and, as a result, has its own limitations. It is probably for this reason that sociologists have to suffer the bad reputation of being the usurpers of history using the work of historians as a springboard for their own.
换句话说,我关注的是元历史叙事的变化。我的分析主要基于二手资料,因此也存在自身的局限性。也许正因为如此,社会学家不得不承受“篡夺历史”的恶名,他们利用历史学家的研究成果作为自己研究的跳板。

Paradigm Change in Post-War History
战后历史的范式转变

The question of how post-war history should be viewed has already been widely discussed and a number of paradigms now exist.
关于战后历史应如何被看待的问题,已经被广泛讨论,目前存在多种范式。
The first of these emphasizes a sharp break between the pre- and postwar periods and should perhaps be called the discontinuity school of history. This viewpoint overestimates the value of post-war reforms. Here it is claimed that oppressive social structures typified by feudal practices and the emperor system were swept away with post-war democratisation and a new era began. Where problems are seen to exist in the post-war era, these are put down to the fact that the so-called post-war democratisation process was not complete and remnants from the pre-war era remain. This line of argument is very similar to the pre-war theory of ‘remnants of feudalism’. Given that anything negative is ascribed to the past, this could also be called the developmental school of history; the development being from oppression to liberation.
第一种观点强调战前与战后时期之间的鲜明断裂,或许应称之为历史断裂学派。该观点高估了战后改革的价值。这里主张,以封建习俗和天皇制度为代表的压迫性社会结构随着战后民主化被一扫而空,开启了一个新时代。若在战后时代存在问题,则归因于所谓的战后民主化进程尚未完成,战前时代的残余依然存在。这种论调与战前“封建残余”理论非常相似。鉴于所有负面因素都归咎于过去,这也可以称为历史发展学派;其发展过程即从压迫走向解放。
Words like tradition and national characteristics are also frequently employed to describe these remnants from the past, a legacy that cannot be easily swept away. As a consequence, they are refashioned into concepts that stand outside history. Tradition is explained in terms of something that cannot be explained [outside the confines of that tradition], therefore a ‘magic box’ or ‘black box’ category is invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).
诸如传统和民族特性之类的词语也经常被用来描述这些来自过去的遗迹,这是一种无法轻易抹去的遗产。因此,它们被重新塑造成超越历史的概念。传统被解释为某种无法被解释的东西【在该传统的范围之外】,因此发明了“魔盒”或“黑盒”类别(霍布斯鲍姆和兰格,1983 年)。
Examples of the invention of tradition 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} within the so-called Nihonjinron genre are too numerous to mention here. A number of self-referential social science works have appeared concerned with what should be referred to as the meta-history of the Nihonjinron (Aoki, 1990; Oguma, 1995), yet none are more stimulating than Oguma Eiji’s A Genealogy of 'Japanese’Self-Images (1995; 2002). Through the act of re-reading the Nihonjinron literature of the
所谓的日本人论体裁中传统发明的例子多得难以一一列举。出现了许多自我指涉的社会科学著作,关注的应称为日本人论的元历史(青木,1990;小熊,1995),但没有哪部作品比小熊英二的《“日本人”自我形象的谱系》(1995;2002)更具启发性。通过重新阅读日本人论文献的行为,

pre- and post-war periods, Oguma discovered that both the pre-war theory of a heterogeneous nation and the post-war theory of a homogeneous nation were legitimated in the name of national tradition. Through the process of re-reading secondary sources, Oguma made a discovery similar to that of Columbus’s egg. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
战前和战后时期,尾熊发现,战前的异质民族理论和战后的同质民族理论都以民族传统的名义获得了合法性。通过重新阅读二手资料,尾熊做出了类似哥伦布发现蛋的发现。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
The pre-war theory of a heterogeneous nation was mobilized in order to legitimate the policy of colonial expansionism by the Japanese imperial state. It was claimed that the Japanese had long been a people successful in bringing about ‘peace and harmony between different peoples’ and that this was even brought out in the Kojiki and the Nihon shoki. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} There was a complete reversal of this idea in the post-war period, with the fabrication of a new history where the Japanese emerged as a homogenous people with a continuous unbroken line of emperors. Furthermore, the post-war Nihonjinron resulted in the setting up of a supra-historical homogeneity and group-orientation of the Japanese people, just as if the preceding halfcentury had been forgotten.
战前的异质民族理论被动员起来,以合法化日本帝国国家的殖民扩张政策。有人声称,日本人长期以来一直是能够实现“不同民族之间和平与和谐”的民族,这一点甚至在《古事记》和《日本书纪》中有所体现。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 战后,这一观点被彻底颠覆,编造出一段新的历史,认为日本人是一个同质民族,拥有连续不断的天皇血统。此外,战后的日本人论导致了日本民族超历史的同质性和群体导向的确立,仿佛前半个世纪的历史被遗忘了一般。
The second paradigm emphasizes continuity between the preand postwar periods and therefore should perhaps be called the continuity school of history. This argument for continuity is offered on the grounds of the continuation of the ‘modernisation project’ since the Meiji era. This theory emphasizes continuity in development from the so-called period of the Taishō democracy through to post-war reforms. Consequently, from the perspective of this continuity school, the principles of post-war democratisation were not simply something imposed on Japan from the outside.
第二种范式强调战前与战后时期的连续性,因此或许应称之为历史连续性学派。支持连续性论点的理由是自明治时代以来“现代化项目”的延续。该理论强调从所谓的大正民主时期到战后改革的发展连续性。因此,从这一连续性学派的视角来看,战后民主化的原则并非单纯由外部强加于日本。
Now, if the modern is characterized by legal, political and economic rationality, then that ‘irrational war’ emerges as a stumbling block. For those proposing a continuity view of history, the war represents an unfortunate interruption in the modernisation project, an exceptional occurrence. Although there has been a modicum of self-reflection on the war, since post-war rehabilitation it is as though the Japanese have been a peace-loving people ever since ancient times and the modernisation project continued as if nothing had happened. Furthermore, the ‘miracle’ of post-war economic growth is viewed above all else as evidence of the success of the modernisation project.
如果现代性以法律、政治和经济的理性为特征,那么那场“非理性的战争”便成为一个绊脚石。对于那些主张历史连续性观点的人来说,战争代表了现代化进程中的一次不幸中断,是一种特殊事件。尽管对战争有过一定程度的自我反思,但自战后重建以来,日本人似乎一直是自古以来热爱和平的民族,现代化进程仿佛未曾受到任何影响而继续进行。此外,战后经济增长的“奇迹”被视为现代化进程成功的最有力证据。
Yamanouchi Yasushi (1996a) sums up the dominant view to date concerning contemporary Japanese history as follows:
山内康司(1996a)总结了迄今为止关于当代日本历史的主流观点如下:
Japanese history during the fascist era followed an abnormal course, straying from the natural path of maturation that a modern society should follow. The trend towards democratisation in the Taishō era (1912-1926) suffered a setback when it came to the period of fascism, and in its place came a system of state power, with irrational ultra-nationalism as its ideological pillar, that forcibly dragged the people down the track of wartime mobilisation. Post-war reforms that began with defeat in 1945 returned Japanese history to the true line of Taishō democracy. From 1945 through to the present, Japanese history takes as its starting point post-war reforms (Yamanouchi, 1996a:33). 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
日本法西斯时代的历史走上了一条异常的道路,偏离了现代社会应有的自然成熟轨迹。大正时代(1912-1926)民主化的趋势在法西斯时期遭遇挫折,取而代之的是以非理性的极端民族主义为意识形态支柱的国家权力体系,强行将人民拖入战争动员的轨道。1945 年战败后开始的战后改革,使日本历史回归了大正民主的正轨。从 1945 年到现在,日本历史以战后改革为起点(Yamanouchi, 1996a:33)。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
For the continuity school of history the war represents a litmus test. The question that it raises is whether in terms of the modernisation project the war was inevitable or coincidental and, following on from this, whether there existed the possibility of some other way than this ‘former madness’. In the case of it being coincidental, some factors of unique and external pressure are needed to explain the war. A frequent response, and one found among the familiar clichés of the right-wing, is the suggestion that as a latecomer to modernisation it was Japan’s destiny to follow this distorted zigzag course. It is the cliché that Japan’s intentions were not bad, only its methods, and that the international environment that forced that course of action on Japan was bad. In contrast, where the answer to the above question is that war was inevitable, theorists of the continuity school need to search for the intrinsic and unique factor within Japanese society that distorted the path of the modernisation project. What the post-war modernists Maruyama Masao and Kawashima Takeyoshi came up with was a kind of fate in the form of intrinsic pre-modern characteristics within Japanese society, in short, Japanese 'uniqueness. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
对于连续性学派的历史观来说,战争是一个试金石。它提出的问题是,就现代化进程而言,战争是必然的还是偶然的,继而是否存在除这场“昔日疯狂”之外的其他可能路径。如果战争是偶然的,就需要一些独特且外部的压力因素来解释战争。一个常见的回应,也是右翼熟悉的陈词滥调之一,是认为作为现代化的后来者,日本注定要走这条扭曲的曲折道路。这种陈词滥调认为,日本的意图并非恶劣,只有其方法有问题,而迫使日本采取这一行动路线的国际环境才是恶劣的。相反,如果上述问题的答案是战争不可避免,连续性学派的理论家们则需要在日本社会内部寻找扭曲现代化进程路径的内在且独特的因素。 战后现代主义者丸山真男和川岛武义提出的是一种命运观,即日本社会内在的前现代特征,简而言之,就是日本的“独特性”。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
Maruyama Masao wrote Chō-kokka shugi no ronri to shinri (The logic and psychology of ultra-nationalism) in 1946 in the immediate aftermath of defeat (Maruyama, 1946, 1995). In Maruyama’s arguments, which equate the modern with the West, even Nazism is regarded as embodying the qualities of individualism and the responsible subject, and Japanese ultra-nationalism is described as second-rate nationalism compared to this. Maruyama’s criticism of the irresponsible emperor system set the tone for the post-war Nihonjinron. Then the post-war Nihonjinron, making use of the same idea of uniqueness and by switching to the explanatory variables of peace and
丸山真男于 1946 年在战败后不久写下了《超国家主义的逻辑与心理》(Maruyama, 1946, 1995)。在丸山的论述中,他将现代等同于西方,甚至将纳粹主义视为体现个人主义和负责任主体特质的表现,而日本的极端民族主义则被描述为二流的民族主义。丸山对不负责任的天皇制度的批判为战后日本人论定下了基调。随后,战后日本人论利用同样的独特性观念,并转向以和平与繁荣为解释变量,

prosperity, was able to transform the thoroughly depressing and masochistic tone of Maruyama Masao’s theory into one of opportunism.
繁荣,能够将丸山真男理论中彻底令人沮丧和受虐倾向的基调转变为一种机会主义。
What the discontinuity and continuity schools of history (described above) have in common is that they both view wartime conditions as a deviation or abnormality in order to legitimise the post-war system. Challenging this position is what can perhaps be called the neo-continuity theory. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
上述的断裂派和连续派历史学派的共同点在于,他们都将战时状态视为一种偏差或异常,以此来合法化战后体制。挑战这一立场的,或许可以称之为新连续理论。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
The understanding of (ultra) state nationalism as a deviation of mass nationalism and its reduction to a problem of the war period is an indispensable and constituent factor in the discursive form that asserts the relative legitimacy of ‘post-war’ by ignoring the connection between the wartime mobilisation regime and post-war democracy, and by emphasising the abnormality of the wartime period. Recent research on the wartime mobilisation regime has grappled with this problem by paradoxically focusing on the dimension of continuity between the wartime and post-war periods when previously only the discontinuities had been discussed (Kasai, 1996:226; Sakai, De Bery, Iyotani 1996; Yamanouchi, Koschmann, and Narita 1995).
将(极端)国家民族主义理解为大众民族主义的偏离,并将其简化为战争时期的问题,是一种话语形式中不可或缺且构成性的因素,这种话语形式通过忽视战时动员体制与战后民主之间的联系,强调战时时期的异常性,从而主张“战后”相对的合法性。近期关于战时动员体制的研究通过矛盾地关注战时与战后时期之间的连续性维度,试图解决这一问题,而此前的研究仅讨论了断裂(Kasai, 1996:226;Sakai, De Bery, Iyotani 1996;Yamanouchi, Koschmann, and Narita 1995)。
The neo-continuity theory as represented by Yamanouchi Yasushi incorporates the following three points of debate. Firstly, neo-continuity theorists understand the wartime regime not as a deviation of the modernisation project, but as its continuation. Here the wartime regime is regarded as a new stage in the modernisation project and as a consequence is treated as an innovation. The continuities between the two are underscored. Second, they claim that a key variable in this innovation is the process of nationalisation. As a result of going through two world wars, classic modernity centring on the Industrial Revolution and civil society experienced the all-important innovation of nationalisation or the establishment of the nation-state. Today, neither the market nor the family can exist without the intervention of the state. Third, this analysis opens the way for comparative history going beyond the theory of Japan’s uniqueness. We are not only talking about the fascist states here as wartime mobilisation regimes were also established in the countries of the Allied Forces during both world wars. If anything, war was the violent opportunity that became the driving force in the innovation of the mobilizing system. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
以山内康司为代表的新连续性理论包含以下三个争论点。首先,新连续性理论家认为战时政权不是现代化进程的偏离,而是其延续。在这里,战时政权被视为现代化进程的新阶段,因此被视为一种创新,强调两者之间的连续性。其次,他们主张这一创新的关键变量是国家化过程。经过两次世界大战,围绕工业革命和市民社会的经典现代性经历了国家化或民族国家建立这一重要创新。如今,无论是市场还是家庭,都无法在没有国家干预的情况下存在。第三,这一分析为超越日本独特性理论的比较历史研究开辟了道路。这里讨论的不仅是法西斯国家,因为在两次世界大战期间,盟军国家也建立了战时动员政权。 如果说有什么的话,战争正是成为动员系统创新的推动力的暴力契机。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
The nation-state is a relatively new concept. Benedict Anderson (1985), Homi Bhabha (1993) and others working in the field of post-colonial studies advanced the idea of the nation-state in the 1980s, and at the same time
民族国家是一个相对较新的概念。班尼迪克特·安德森(1985 年)、霍米·巴巴(1993 年)以及其他从事后殖民研究领域的学者在 20 世纪 80 年代提出了民族国家的概念,同时

revealed its illusory nature. It is due to Nishikawa Nagao and others that the term came to be used in earnest in Japan. The market and civil society are not the only actors in the process of modernisation, as the nation-state has also played an indispensable role. The nation-state supplied not only ‘a variety of devices for integrating the state’, but also a ‘powerful ideology for integrating the people’(Nishikawa, 1995:6). In the words of Anderson, the nation-state, by inventing a homogenous people, created an ‘imagined community’ and this group identity came to form the nucleus of our concepts of culture and the nation (Anderson, 1985). We are not free from this unfinished nationalisation project even today.
揭示了其虚幻的本质。正是由于西川长夫等人的努力,这一术语才在日本被认真使用。市场和公民社会并非现代化进程中的唯一主体,民族国家也发挥了不可或缺的作用。民族国家不仅提供了“整合国家的多种手段”,还提供了“整合人民的强大意识形态”(西川,1995:6)。用安德森的话说,民族国家通过发明一个同质的民族,创造了一个“想象的共同体”,这一群体认同成为我们文化和民族概念的核心(安德森,1985)。即使在今天,我们仍未摆脱这一未完成的民族化项目。
The backdrop to the nation-state suddenly being placed under the spotlight as an analytical concept from the 1980s onwards was the tumultuous history of this period, when the nation was denaturalised for the first time and ceased to function as a form of fate. As such, we cannot forget our own position as actors in history. The relativisation of the nation-state resulted from a paradoxical movement questioning the enlarged role of the state and the supposed autonomy of civil society, which occurred as huge nation-states collapsed before our eyes. What was being questioned here was the common-sense notion that modernity establishes an autonomous sphere called civil society. It became clear that state was an important actor from the beginning of the modern period and pushed forward the nationalisation of the social domain. Conversely, only when long-established nation-states started to crumble before us did we realise the extent to which the nation had been regarded as unquestioned given. Moreover, when the nation finally ceased to be viewed as fate analysts did not possess a perspective to enable them to transcend it, and in pointing to the limitations of history they generally had to rely on hindsight (Scott, 1988; Ueno, 1995b).
从 20 世纪 80 年代起,作为分析概念的民族国家突然成为焦点,其背景是这一时期动荡的历史,在此期间,民族首次被去自然化,不再作为一种命运形式发挥作用。因此,我们不能忘记自己作为历史行动者的立场。民族国家的相对化源于一种矛盾运动,这种运动质疑国家日益扩大的角色以及所谓的公民社会的自主性,而这一切发生在庞大的民族国家在我们眼前崩溃之时。这里被质疑的是现代性建立一个名为公民社会的自主领域的常识观念。事实证明,国家从现代时期开始就是一个重要的行动者,并推动了社会领域的民族化。相反,只有当长期建立的民族国家开始在我们面前瓦解时,我们才意识到民族被视为不容置疑的既定事实的程度。 此外,当民族最终不再被视为命运时,分析者并没有具备超越它的视角,在指出历史的局限性时,他们通常不得不依赖事后诸葛亮的观点(Scott, 1988;Ueno, 1995b)。
The merit of using the nation-state as a key concept in our argument is that we can separate the modernisation project from its Euro-centric (more accurately Western European-centric) bias, thus making possible a historical comparison. The modernisation project can be discussed in terms of three components: economic capitalism, political democracy and civic individualism. There already exists within the field of economic systems theory a convergence theory that takes a concept of industrialisation as a variable, and views capitalism and socialism as two versions of this process.
将民族国家作为我们论证中的关键概念的优点在于,我们可以将现代化项目与其欧洲中心主义(更准确地说是西欧中心主义)偏见区分开来,从而使历史比较成为可能。现代化项目可以从三个组成部分来讨论:经济资本主义、政治民主和公民个人主义。在经济体系理论领域,已经存在一种趋同理论,它将工业化的概念作为变量,并将资本主义和社会主义视为这一过程的两种版本。
However, if we make use of the nation-state as an analytical concept, both the capitalist and socialist states emerge as two different versions of the nation-state. Furthermore, this approach makes possible a comparison of authoritarian states and military dictatorships from within the category nation-state. It is not simply that this approach overturns the idea that only states in one area of the West exhibiting the three components of modernisation are deserving of the name modern states, it also challenges the myth that socialist states are post states and the view that military dictatorships and authoritarian states are pre-modern.
然而,如果我们将民族国家作为一个分析概念来使用,那么资本主义国家和社会主义国家就会显现为民族国家的两种不同版本。此外,这种方法使得在民族国家这一范畴内比较威权国家和军事独裁成为可能。这不仅颠覆了只有西方某一区域内具备现代化三要素的国家才配得上“现代国家”称号的观念,也挑战了社会主义国家是后国家的神话,以及军事独裁和威权国家是前现代的看法。
In the words of Nishikawa:
用西川的话来说:
All bodies we call ‘nation-states’ share the same character and structure, and each individual nation-state is no more than a variation on this…I consider the nation-state a historical product that needs to be transcended, and the debate about the nation-state is linked to the search for a way to do this (Nishikawa, 1995:4).
我们所称的“民族国家”都具有相同的特征和结构,每一个具体的民族国家不过是这一结构的变体……我认为民族国家是一个需要被超越的历史产物,关于民族国家的讨论与寻找超越它的方法密切相关(西川,1995:4)。
What I would like to do here is not only to make use of Nishikawa’s concept of the nation-state, but also to add to this the analytical category ‘gender’. Therefore, this book is an attempt to engender [apply a category of gender] to the nation-state. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
我在这里想做的不仅是利用西川的民族国家概念,还要在此基础上加入分析范畴“性别”。因此,本书试图将性别范畴应用于民族国家。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
Gender has also been denaturalised as a result of historical change and is no longer seen as fate. The discovery of gender, through the discovery that the family was not nature but another society, exploded the myth of the ‘private’ sphere as a holy sanctuary from the public sphere and made clear that the family was not in the least bit autonomous from the state and the market. Here too, paradoxically, one must say that the invisible roles that had once been carried out by the family of ‘pre-ordained harmony’ became visible to us through the process of its functional paralysis and disintegration. Furthermore, the engendering of the so-called public sphere of state and society made clear the extent to which the public sphere was in fact depending upon a shadowy domain, namely, the private sphere, while at the same time revealing the secret that it had been able to assume the pretence of being public. It was precisely due to the fact that the public sphere was viewed as a public that the private sphere had to be separated from this and naturalized. Gender studies have made clear that not only the private sphere, which we can see even at a glance is gendered, but also the
性别也因历史变迁而被去自然化,不再被视为命运。通过发现家庭并非自然存在而是另一种社会,性别的发现打破了“私人”领域作为公共领域神圣避难所的神话,并明确指出家庭一点也不独立于国家和市场。同样,具有讽刺意味的是,曾经由“预定和谐”的家庭承担的无形角色,通过其功能瘫痪和解体的过程变得对我们可见。此外,所谓国家和社会的公共领域的生成,清楚地表明公共领域实际上在多大程度上依赖于一个隐秘的领域,即私人领域,同时揭示了它能够假装为公共的秘密。正是因为公共领域被视为公共,私人领域才不得不与之分离并被自然化。性别研究明确指出,不仅是我们一眼就能看出带有性别色彩的私人领域,而且...

public sphere, has been ingeniously gendered using the rhetoric of gender neutrality (Ueno, 1990).
公共领域,巧妙地利用性别中立的修辞手法进行了性别化(上野千鹤子,1990)。
What we refer to here as the public sphere actually consists of two different realms: the market and the state. If we were to point to the public sphere as a market it would be nothing more than an area of what Marx called ‘capitalist private activity’. In contrast, if we were to suggest that the public sphere were only a state sphere, this would not mean that the state would necessarily represent the public interests of its citizens. Indeed, the assumption is that civil society will eliminate as much as possible any interference by the state in the free activities of its citizens. Put another way, we can say that although the state and society were originally different domains, the two were deliberately conflated within a concept of a public sphere defined in terms of its separation from the private. In fact, a relationship of inter-dependency emerged between the market and the state in order to establish a national economy, with the boundary between the two difficult to discern.
我们这里所指的公共领域实际上由两个不同的领域组成:市场和国家。如果我们将公共领域指为市场,那它无非就是马克思所说的“资本主义私人活动”的一个区域。相反,如果我们认为公共领域仅仅是国家领域,这并不意味着国家必然代表其公民的公共利益。事实上,假设是公民社会将尽可能消除国家对公民自由活动的任何干预。换句话说,我们可以说,尽管国家和社会最初是不同的领域,但两者被有意地合并在一个以与私人领域分离为定义的公共领域概念中。实际上,为了建立一个国家经济,市场和国家之间形成了一种相互依赖的关系,两者之间的界限难以分辨。
If I might draw upon a previous piece of work, in Patriarchy and Capitalism (Ueno, 1990) I treated the public/private divide in modern society as equivalent to the separation of the market and the family, and thought that it was sufficient to analyse the dual dialectic between the two. From a Marxist-Feminist perspective, it is clear that the market is by no means autonomous, depending for its existence on the so-called external sphere of the family. Yet, external to the market is another non-market sphere in the form of the state. In response to my argument on the dialectics of the state versus the family, the criticism of Adachi Mariko really got to the heart of the matter when she pointed out that 'Ueno’s analysis lacks a concept of the state. Let us just say that I inherited both the strengths and weaknesses of a Marxist theory that understands the modern almost solely in terms of the capitalist system. However, inherent in Marxist theory is the state as a conceptual device. It is only now with the benefit of hindsight that I realise that I underestimated the state in my analysis 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}.
如果我可以借鉴之前的一篇作品,在《父权制与资本主义》(上野,1990)中,我将现代社会中的公共/私人分界视为市场与家庭的分离,并认为分析两者之间的双重辩证关系就足够了。从马克思主义女性主义的视角来看,市场绝非自主存在,它的存在依赖于所谓的家庭外部领域。然而,市场之外还有另一个非市场领域,即国家。针对我关于国家与家庭辩证关系的论点,安达千里子的批评真正触及了问题的核心,她指出“上野的分析缺乏国家的概念”。可以说,我继承了马克思主义理论的优点和缺点,这种理论几乎仅从资本主义体系的角度理解现代社会。然而,马克思主义理论本身就将国家作为一个概念工具。直到现在,借助事后的反思,我才意识到自己在分析中低估了国家的重要性 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
If we are talking in terms of the nation-state, then the modernisation project can be referred to by another name, the ‘nationalisation project’. Incidentally, the nation as defined geo-politically or demographically inevitably goes hand-in-hand with some kind of definition of exclusion. On
如果我们以民族国家的角度来谈,那么现代化项目也可以被称为“民族化项目”。顺便提一下,作为地缘政治或人口统计学定义的民族,必然伴随着某种排斥的定义。于此同时

reflection, from the very beginning the nationalisation project was a continuous definition and redefinition of the boundaries of the nation and those to be included in or excluded from it. For example, Les Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen (The Declaration of Human Rights - of the Rights of Man) of the French Revolution, that happened to be translated as jinken (human rights) in Japanese, literally amounted to nothing more than the human rights of homme (males) and citoyen (citizens). Women and workers were excluded from this. To enjoy these rights it was necessary to be a citizen who had been civilised (Nishikawa, 1992). 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} Hence, human rights always go hand-in-hand with a definition of boundaries concerning the scope of the definition of human. Then we have the term democracy, which frequently appears as a partner of the term human rights, and this too amounts to little more than democracy between citizens who have been granted equal human rights. This is not surprising given that the history of the modern era is tied in with slavery, racism and sex discrimination. These social injustices are not simply the vestiges of ancient times or feudalism, neither are they modern ‘noise’, but essential components of the modern nation-state and national economy and should therefore be referred to as modern slavery, modern racism and modern sex discrimination. Then, concerning the re-definition of boundaries, there are disputes over which group of second-class citizens should be civilised next. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
反思来看,从一开始,民族国家化项目就是对民族边界及其包含或排除对象的不断定义和重新定义。例如,法国大革命的《人权与公民权宣言》(Les Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen),在日语中被翻译为“人权”(jinken),字面意思不过是“homme”(男性)和“citoyen”(公民)的人权。女性和工人被排除在外。要享有这些权利,必须是一个被文明化的公民(Nishikawa,1992)。因此,人权总是与对“人”的定义范围的边界划定密切相关。接着是“民主”一词,它常常与“人权”一词并列出现,但这也不过是被赋予平等人权的公民之间的民主。鉴于现代史与奴隶制、种族主义和性别歧视密切相关,这一点并不令人惊讶。 这些社会不公不仅仅是古代或封建时代的残余,也不是现代的“噪音”,而是现代民族国家和民族经济的基本组成部分,因此应称之为现代奴隶制、现代种族主义和现代性别歧视。然后,关于界限的重新定义,存在着关于下一批应被“文明化”的二等公民群体的争论。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}

Paradigm Change in Women's History
女性历史的范式转变

With the relativisation of the nation-state, the modernisation project emerged as a prominent target of research. When it was realised that the state was not akin to fate, the construction of the nation was problematized for the first time. One after another institutions such as the national language, national history, national literature, national education and the national military ended up being problematized as media of nationalisation. It gave rise to analyses of how events such as imperial visits, state ceremonies and expositions were mobilized to create Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ (Nakamura, 1994; Yoshimi S., 1996), and also to the kind of work carried out by the young historian, Takashi Fujitani, looking at the physical techniques of nationalisation seen in military disciplining of soldiers (Fujitani, 1994).
随着民族国家的相对化,现代化项目成为了研究的一个重要目标。当人们意识到国家并非命中注定时,民族的建构首次被提出质疑。国家语言、国家历史、国家文学、国家教育和国家军事等一个又一个机构最终被视为民族化的媒介而受到质疑。这引发了对帝国访问、国家仪式和博览会等事件如何被动员以创造安德森所说的“想象的共同体”的分析(中村,1994;吉见寿一,1996),以及年轻历史学家藤谷隆所进行的研究,关注军事训练中对士兵进行民族化的身体技术(藤谷,1994)。
Looking back, it is clear that the modernisation project did not go smoothly even in the beginning. The fact that there was strong resistance can be understood from the immense effort it took to raise school attendance rates over a long period (after the compulsory education system was introduced in 1872), and the ‘blood tax’ riots that occurred all over Japan in response to the Conscription Ordinance of 1873 . 20 1873 . 20 1873.^(20)1873 .{ }^{20} However, Oku Takenori points out that even within the nationalisation agenda, ‘there was little awareness of the issue of women as targets of nationalisation’ (Oku, 1995). In terms of the task of engendering the nation-state, researchers in the field of women’s studies have at least taken up the challenge and have, for example, analysed the relationship between women’s suffrage and nationalisation. The work of Tachi Kaoru is representative. Tachi points out that when the Universal Suffrage Law came into effect in 1925, ‘Korean and Taiwanese males living in mainland Japan’ were included in the category of ‘Male Japanese Imperial Subjects’ entitled to vote, and concluded that ‘in the
回顾过去,可以清楚地看到,即使在一开始,现代化项目也并非顺利进行。1872 年义务教育制度引入后,长期以来为提高入学率所付出的巨大努力,以及因征兵令引发的遍及日本各地的“血税”骚乱,都表明存在强烈的抵抗。然而,奥武则指出,即使在国家化议程中,“对女性作为国家化对象的问题意识也很少”(奥武,1995)。在赋予民族国家性别特征的任务方面,女性研究领域的学者至少接受了这一挑战,例如分析了女性选举权与国家化之间的关系。立薰的研究工作具有代表性。立指出,1925 年普选法生效时,“居住在日本本土的朝鲜和台湾男性”被纳入有权投票的“日本帝国男性臣民”类别,并得出结论“在…

case of universal suffrage in Japan gender norms came into play more forcefully than those of class or ethnicity’ (Tachi, 1994:126-127). 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} In other words, the Universal (Manhood) Suffrage Law, in order to establish among men an equal community that transcended class and ethnicity, denied women the right to vote.
在日本普选权的案例中,性别规范比阶级或族群规范发挥了更强烈的作用(Tachi,1994:126-127)。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 换句话说,为了在男性之间建立超越阶级和族群的平等共同体,普选(男子)法剥夺了女性的投票权。
If we understand the nationalisation of women as an unfinished project that has continued throughout the modern era, then it is clear that the war was not an anecdote in the process of the nationalisation project, but an ‘innovation’ (a variation in the extreme) that actually advanced it.
如果我们将女性的国家化理解为一个贯穿现代时代、尚未完成的项目,那么显然战争并非国家化项目过程中的一个插曲,而是一种“创新”(极端的变异),实际上推动了该项目的发展。
Modern total war is the largest project a nation-state undertakes, and is the site of geo-political, demographic and symbolic struggle. Aiming at unification, the state in wartime ends up demanding the nationalisation of both society and the family (Wakakuwa, 1995). As a way of putting directly into words this intention, it can be said that the terms ‘national socialism’ and ‘ultra-nationalism’ are absolutely appropriate. War achieves a transparent community, and for a long time afterwards people reminisce nostalgically about the excitement of ‘togetherness’ and ‘national unity’.
现代全面战争是民族国家承担的最大项目,是地缘政治、人口和象征性斗争的场所。国家在战争时期以实现统一为目标,最终要求社会和家庭的国家化(Wakakuwa,1995)。作为直接表达这一意图的方式,可以说“国家社会主义”和“极端民族主义”这两个术语是绝对恰当的。战争实现了一个透明的共同体,且在很长一段时间里,人们怀着怀旧的情绪回忆起“团结”和“民族统一”的激动时刻。
A number of notable scholarly works have appeared since the 1980s concerned with the nationalisation of women. One reason for this is that the categories nation-state and gender were finally ‘discovered’ at this time. Yet, at the same time, it is exactly because the limits of the modernisation project became evident that these two categories were, for the first time, revealed to us. Again, this was due to the impact of feminism on women’s history in the 1980s. In other words, it was preceded by a paradigm shift in historical viewpoint where women were transformed from passive subjects into autonomous agents creating history. Within Japanese women’s history, this transformation went from the victim school to a perpetrator school of history, leading it to pursue the questions of women’s support of the war and war responsibility. This is because, if women’s agency in history is recognized, women cannot be exempted from responsibility in relation to history. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} I will call this new trend since the 1980 s in women’s history the reflexive school of women’s history. This is simultaneously both retrospective and self-reflexive. Ironically, the discovery of women’s historical agency also leads us to relentlessly pursue women’s war responsibility. Yet, at the same time, it also signifies the maturity of both feminism and women’s history as
自 20 世纪 80 年代以来,出现了许多关于女性国家化的著名学术著作。其原因之一在于,国家-民族和性别这两个范畴正是在这一时期被“发现”的。然而,正是因为现代化项目的局限性变得显而易见,这两个范畴才首次被揭示给我们。同样,这也归功于 20 世纪 80 年代女权主义对女性历史的影响。换句话说,这之前经历了一场历史视角的范式转变,女性从被动的主体转变为创造历史的自主行动者。在日本女性历史研究中,这种转变表现为从受害者学派转向加害者学派,进而探讨女性对战争的支持及战争责任问题。因为如果承认女性在历史中的能动性,女性就不能被免除与历史相关的责任。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 我将把自 20 世纪 80 年代以来女性历史中的这一新趋势称为女性历史的反思学派。它既是回顾性的,也是自我反思的。 具有讽刺意味的是,发现女性的历史能动性也使我们不断追究女性的战争责任。然而,同时这也标志着女权主义和女性史的成熟,

both are extricated from the victim school of history. As subsequent examination will make clear, there is a significant difference in the way issues are grasped depending on the target of reflexivity.
因为两者都摆脱了受害者历史学派的束缚。正如后续的分析将清楚表明的那样,问题的把握方式因反思对象的不同而存在显著差异。

The Nationalisation of Women and Wartime Mobilisation
女性的国家化与战时动员

We can consider the various media of women’s nationalisation on four levels. The first level is that of the state, namely politics, policy, regulation and public propaganda. The second level is that of ideas and discourses, and here I am referring to areas such as the discourse of the leadership class, and the media, and imagery. The third level is that of campaigns and action, namely the level of mass mobilisation. The fourth level is that of daily lifestyle and customs. There is now a body of research that has been carried out by women researchers concerned with each of these areas. Here I would like to discuss wartime mass mobilisation by the state, women’s policy and trends in state propaganda as one axis, and as another, the reaction of women to this, particularly tendencies within the feminist leadership.
我们可以从四个层面来考察女性的民族化媒介。第一个层面是国家层面,即政治、政策、法规和公共宣传。第二个层面是观念和话语层面,这里指的是领导阶层的话语、媒体和形象等领域。第三个层面是运动和行动层面,即群众动员的层面。第四个层面是日常生活方式和习俗层面。现在已有一批女性研究者针对这些领域开展了相关研究。在这里,我想以国家在战争时期的大规模动员、女性政策和国家宣传趋势为一条轴线,另一条轴线则是女性对此的反应,特别是女权主义领导层内部的倾向。
From the early stages of militarization through to total war, the Japanese government was fully aware that the cooperation of women on the ‘home front’ was indispensable, and pushed ahead with the organisation of the female population. In the year following the Manchurian Incident (1931), the Greater Japan Women’s Association for National Defence (Dainippon Kokubō Fujinkai) was hastily formed. When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 triggered full-scale aggression in the Sino-Japanese war, an ‘Outline for the Implementation of National Spiritual Mobilisation’ (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Jisshi Yōkō) was decided on. Then in October of the same year, Yoshioka Yayoi, Ichikawa Fusae and other women’s group leaders were appointed committee members when the Central League for National Spiritual Mobilisation (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chūō Renmei) was inaugurated. In 1940, a year after the Second World War broke out, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) was inaugurated with a Central Co-operation Committee (Chūō Kyōryoku Kaigi), also known
从军事化的早期阶段直到全面战争,日本政府充分意识到“后方”妇女合作的重要性,并推动了女性人口的组织工作。满洲事变(1931 年)发生后的第二年,大日本国防妇人会(Dainippon Kokubō Fujinkai)匆忙成立。1937 年卢沟桥事变引发中日战争全面侵略时,决定了《国民精神动员实施纲要》(Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Jisshi Yōkō)。同年十月,吉冈弥生、市川房枝等妇女团体领导人被任命为中央国民精神动员联盟(Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chūō Renmei)成立时的委员。1940 年,第二次世界大战爆发一年后,成立了大政翼赞会(Taisei Yokusankai)及其中央协作委员会(Chūō Kyōryoku Kaigi),也称为

as the National Family Committee (Kokumin Kazoku Kaigi). Immediately after the beginning of the Pacific War in 1942, the Women’s Patriotic Association (Aikoku Fujinkai), the Greater Japan Women’s Association for National Defence, and the Greater Japan Federated Women’s Association (Dainippon Rengō Fujinkai) merged to form the Greater Japan Women’s Association (Dainippon Fujinkai).
作为国民家庭会议(Kokumin Kazoku Kaigi)。太平洋战争于 1942 年爆发后不久,爱国妇人会(Aikoku Fujinkai)、大日本妇女国防协会和大日本联合妇女协会(Dainippon Rengō Fujinkai)合并,成立了大日本妇女协会(Dainippon Fujinkai)。
The Greater Japan Women’s Association formed as a part of government policy, and ‘all Japanese women over 20 years, except single women’ were made members. At the time, the Women’s Patriotic Association embraced a membership of 4 million, and the Greater Japan Women’s Association for National Defence, 9 million. It is clear that the Greater Japan Women’s Association was a military initiative. As has been frequently pointed out, the president was a woman called Marquioness Yamauchi Sachiko, the wife of Marquis Yamauchi, but the Chairman of the Board of Directors was a male bureaucrat from the Ministry of Home Affairs.
大日本妇女协会作为政府政策的一部分成立,“所有 20 岁以上的日本女性,除未婚女性外”都被纳入会员。当时,爱国妇人会拥有 400 万会员,大日本妇女国防协会则有 900 万会员。显然,大日本妇女协会是一个军事倡议。正如人们经常指出的那样,协会会长是一位名叫山内幸子的女性,她是山内侯爵的夫人,但董事会主席则是一位来自内务省的男性官僚。
Furthermore, as the war situation become more strained, a total mobilisation system began that incorporated women, including the Ordinance on Women’s Volunteer Labour Corps (Joshi Teishin Kinrō Rei) in 1944 and the National Labour Mobilisation Ordinance (Kokumin Kinrō Döin Rei) in 1945. On the 23 rd 23 rd  23^("rd ")23^{\text {rd }} June 1945, in the closing stages of the war and with the battle for the mainland anticipated following defeat in the Battle of Okinawa, the Volunteer Military Service Law (Giyūheieki Hō) was promulgated. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} This organized all ‘men aged 15-60 and women aged 17-40’ into National Volunteer Combat Corps (Kokumin Giyū Sentōtai), and brought about the Greater Japan Women’s Association’s dissolution into several sections within this new organisation. Wakakuwa Midori, who has analysed visual propaganda concerned with women’s wartime mobilisation concludes, drawing on the words of Kōketsu Atsushi, that ‘the total war regime did not demolish the gender division of labour’ (Kōketsu, 1981; Wakakuwa, 1995:83).
此外,随着战争形势日益紧张,开始实行包括妇女在内的全面动员体制,其中包括 1944 年的《妇女志愿劳动团条例》(Joshi Teishin Kinrō Rei)和 1945 年的《国民劳动动员条例》(Kokumin Kinrō Döin Rei)。1945 年 23 rd 23 rd  23^("rd ")23^{\text {rd }} 月,在战争的最后阶段,随着冲绳战役的失败后预计将展开本土战斗,颁布了《志愿军事服务法》(Giyūheieki Hō)。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 该法将“15 至 60 岁的男性和 17 至 40 岁的女性”组织成国民志愿战斗队(Kokumin Giyū Sentōtai),并导致大日本妇女协会解散,分为该新组织内的若干部门。对妇女战时动员视觉宣传进行分析的若川翠(Wakakuwa Midori)借鉴高月敦(Kōketsu Atsushi)的话总结道,“全面战争体制并未摧毁性别劳动分工”(高月,1981;若川,1995:83)。
This raises questions about the definition of the boundaries of both nationalisation and gender. In other words, it would appear that when the nation is defined in terms of masculinity, there are two possibilities for resolving the dilemma of total mobilisation and the designation of gender differentiated domains. If I can begin by offering my conclusion here, it is
这就引发了关于民族化和性别界限定义的问题。换句话说,当国家以男性气质来定义时,解决全面动员与性别区分领域这一困境似乎有两种可能性。如果我可以先在这里提出我的结论,那就是

probably reasonable to say that this resolution can be defined in terms of an integration model and a segregation model. To avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize that within the limits of both frameworks women are secondclass citizens.
大致可以说,这种解决方案可以用整合模式和隔离模式来定义。为了避免误解,我要强调的是,在这两种框架的范围内,女性都是二等公民。
In both Japan and Germany the model was that of segregation 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}. At the beginning of the war in both countries women were prohibited from engaging in political activity. In Germany, a law banning women from political activity was approved some time after the Nazis came to power. In Japan, a Women’s Civil Right’s Law was initially passed by the House of Representatives in 1931, the year of the Manchurian Incident, but it met with rejection in the House of Peers. Immediately after the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the Greater Japan Federated Women’s Association’s youth section began campaigning for the formation of a ‘young women’s volunteer corps’. It is reported that an increasing number of young women came forward volunteering to go to the war front, but the authorities announced that they would not allow this (Wakakuwa, 1995).
在日本和德国,两国的模式都是隔离 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 。战争初期,两国都禁止女性参与政治活动。在德国,纳粹上台后不久通过了一项禁止女性从事政治活动的法律。在日本,1931 年,即满洲事变那年,众议院最初通过了《妇女民权法》,但在贵族院遭到拒绝。1937 年中日战争爆发后,大日本联合妇女会青年部开始倡导组建“青年妇女志愿队”。据报道,越来越多的年轻女性自愿前往战场,但当局宣布不允许这样做(若川,1995)。
Japan did not consider the possibility of female soldiers even in the final stages of the war when there was a shortage of military personnel. At the very end of the war in 1945, women were hired as aviation maintenance staff and were even recruited as medical orderlies for the air force. However, in neither case were they hired as combatants, but as auxiliary staff offering rearguard support. The question of how to interpret the National Volunteers (Kokumin Giyūhei) is a delicate matter. However, in Okinawa, which had become the front line, local people had already built up experience preparing for national militarization through participating in the Local Volunteer Corps (Tekkestu Giyūtai) and the Women’s Volunteer Corps (Joshi Teishintai). The American Army were no doubt surprised when they landed in Okinawa to find that their prisoners-of-war included young boys and old men who were unequal to the demands of war. However, even in these extreme conditions, female volunteer corps like the Star Lily Corps (Himeyuri Butai) were positioned as rearguard support corps offering relief, and were not regarded as combatants. With the aim of turning the whole nation, including women, into soldiers, the National Volunteers were, in short, the final self-defence force and blurred the distinction between combatants and civilians in preparation for the battle of the mainland.
即使在战争的最后阶段,当军事人员短缺时,日本也没有考虑女性士兵的可能性。1945 年战争即将结束时,女性被雇佣为航空维修人员,甚至被招募为空军的医务勤务兵。然而,在这两种情况下,她们都不是作为战斗人员被雇佣的,而是作为提供后方支援的辅助人员。如何解读国民义勇兵(Kokumin Giyūhei)是一个微妙的问题。然而,在已成为前线的冲绳,当地人通过参加地方义勇队(Tekkestu Giyūtai)和女子挺身队(Joshi Teishintai)积累了为国家军事化做准备的经验。当美军登陆冲绳时,毫无疑问他们感到惊讶,因为他们的战俘中包括了不适合战争需求的少年和老人。然而,即使在这些极端条件下,像星百合队(Himeyuri Butai)这样的女性义勇队也被定位为提供救护的后方支援部队,而不被视为战斗人员。 为了将包括女性在内的整个民族转变为战士,国民义勇军简而言之,是最终的自卫力量,并在为本土战斗做准备时模糊了战斗人员与平民之间的界限。
However, it would arguably be pushing it too far to characterise these women as a kind of female soldier. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
然而,将这些女性称为某种女性士兵,恐怕有些言过其实。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
When a nation-state makes an increase in military and manufacturing capacity a state goal, and reduces the nation to its population (in other words, troop strength and labour power), military service becomes the key to nationalisation. When this happens, the nation is divided into those who have the honour of dying for their country and those who do not, and only the former are qualified as members of the nation. War makes clearly visible those gender boundaries advanced during peacetime. Consequently, women seeking equality of the integration model hope to overcome the gender boundaries of wartime by taking part in the fighting. In reality, in the case of the United States where female troops have been enthusiastically employed and the United Kingdom where a female draft was put into practice, on the state side there has been a positive adoption of a strategy of integration and women have responded to this. The American case refutes the view that female soldiers are a last resort to supplement a shortfall in troop strength. The reason for this is that, unlike Japan and Germany, there was no real concern over the possibility of a severe shortfall in troop strength. If a shortage of troops was not the reason for employing female soldiers, then we must search for another reason. The United States sent female soldiers into battle in the Gulf War, but a long experience of female military participation preceded this. This difference between the strategy of integration or segregation is extremely familiar to us even today in the form of the confrontation between the equality and difference factions within feminism. However, we collide with the unexpectedly deep-rooted reality of the close correspondence between the different routes taken by feminism and the context of the national culture. Thus, we can see that contemporary feminism is bound within the confines of both nationality and culture.
当一个民族国家将增加军事和制造能力作为国家目标,并将民族简化为其人口(换句话说,即兵力和劳动力)时,军事服役便成为民族化的关键。当这种情况发生时,民族被划分为那些有荣誉为国捐躯的人和那些没有的人,只有前者才被视为民族成员。战争清晰地显现出和平时期所推进的性别界限。因此,寻求平等整合模式的女性希望通过参与战斗来突破战时的性别界限。实际上,在美国女性军队被积极使用以及英国实行女性征兵的情况下,国家方面积极采纳了整合策略,女性也对此作出了回应。美国的例子驳斥了女性士兵只是为弥补兵力不足的最后手段的观点。原因在于,与日本和德国不同,美国并未真正担心兵力严重不足的可能性。 如果兵力短缺不是使用女兵的原因,那么我们必须寻找另一个原因。美国在海湾战争中派遣了女兵参战,但这之前已有女性参军的长期经验。这种融合策略与隔离策略之间的差异,即使在今天,也以女权主义内部平等派与差异派的对立形式极为熟悉。然而,我们会碰到一个出乎意料的根深蒂固的现实,那就是女权主义所走的不同道路与国家文化背景之间的密切对应关系。因此,我们可以看到,当代女权主义被束缚在国籍和文化的双重范围之内。
It probably comes as some surprise that faced with total mobilisation Japan, to the very end, did not demolish the system of gender segregation and, moreover, there did not arise from women themselves a demand for integration. When it comes to wartime experiences, there are numerous uplifting accounts of how women could also contribute to the war, but to the best of my knowledge only Morisaki Kazue speaks of the ‘the sense of humiliation of women during the war’. In the short phrase ‘men with
这可能会让人感到有些惊讶:面对全面动员的日本,直到最后都没有废除性别隔离制度,而且女性自身也没有提出融合的要求。谈及战争时期的经历,有许多鼓舞人心的叙述讲述女性如何为战争做出贡献,但据我所知,只有森崎和江提到了“战争中女性的屈辱感”。在那简短的“男人们与

exclusive possession of guns owned the war’, she testifies to the shame of women ‘who were not able to die in battle’ (Morisaki, 1965; 1992:44).
“独占枪支的人拥有战争”,她见证了那些“无法在战斗中牺牲”的女性的羞耻(Morisaki,1965;1992:44)。
In honour of Morisaki, I would like to add that she definitely was not a militaristic young woman. Far from it, having spent her girlhood in colonized Korea she reacted with a keen sensitivity to the injustices of colonial rule. While everyone was aware of the extreme definitions given to gender by war, to be so totally frank in the face of such an overwhelming reality and to be able to describe the gender asymmetry instead of pretending it was not there suggests, at the very least, that Morisaki had some distance from it.
为了纪念森崎,我想补充一点,她绝对不是一个军国主义的年轻女性。恰恰相反,她在被殖民的朝鲜度过了童年,对殖民统治的不公表现出敏锐的感受力。虽然大家都意识到战争对性别的极端定义,但在如此压倒性的现实面前能够如此坦率,并能够描述性别不对称而不是假装它不存在,至少表明森崎对这一切保持了一定的距离。
Whether or not you can become the military hero who turns into a ‘god of war’ after death, depends on the powerful and, moreover, asymmetrical definitions given to gender by war. The seat reserved for Japanese women by the gender strategy of segregation was not that of god of war but the 'mother of a god of war enshrined at Yasukuni. In the opening page of her book Sensō ga tsukuru josei zō (Images of women created by war) Wakakuwa Midori (1995), a feminist art historian, has placed a picture of a young mother with a baby boy in her arms visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. The illustration shows the solemn picture of a young widow meeting with her late husband who has become a god of war. This was the only colour illustration in the whole book, making it easy to appreciate the high value Wakakuwa placed on the symbolism of this icon. It revealed the resolve of the woman to offer her son to the nation, despite having lost her husband. For the first time, women who carried the humiliation of not being able to die in battle were able to rival the heroism of the gods of war by becoming the mother of a god of war. Wakakuwa indicates that here the child is little more than something belonging to the nation that the woman happens to be looking after; perfectly demonstrating the patriarchal idea of the ‘borrowed womb’. Wakakuwa compares this with Michelangelo’s Pieta statue of the Virgin Mary returning to god the child she had been entrusted to look after, and comes to the following conclusion:
你是否能够成为那个死后化为“战神”的军事英雄,取决于战争赋予性别的强大且不对称的定义。日本女性在性别隔离策略中被预留的位置,不是战神,而是靖国神社中供奉的“战神之母”。在她的著作《战争创造的女性形象》(Sensō ga tsukuru josei zō)开篇,女性主义艺术史学家若川翠(Wakakuwa Midori,1995 年)放置了一张年轻母亲怀抱婴儿男孩参拜靖国神社的照片。插图展现了一位年轻寡妇与已成为战神的亡夫相会的庄严画面。这是整本书中唯一的彩色插图,彰显了若川对这一象征图标的高度重视。它揭示了这位女性尽管失去了丈夫,仍决心将儿子奉献给国家。女性首次能够通过成为战神之母,挑战那些无法战死的耻辱,媲美战神的英雄主义。 若川指出,这里的孩子不过是属于国家的某样东西,而女人恰好负责照顾它;这完美地展示了父权制中“借来的子宫”的观念。若川将此与米开朗基罗的《圣母哀悼基督》雕像作比较,后者表现的是圣母玛利亚将被托付照顾的孩子归还给上帝,并得出以下结论:
Wakakuwa does not only indicate what is present in each picture, but also refers to images that are not included:
若川不仅指出了每幅画中所呈现的内容,还提及了未被包含的图像:
As part of their image strategy for mobilising women, the state and those leaders with orders from the state, opinion leaders, and propagandists definitely did not offer women ‘scenes’ of the front line, a battle-inprogress, or victory. Neither did they proffer women such images as the triumphal return, defeat or occupation. War scenes with a capital ’ W W WW ’ were aimed at men, and bloody scenes of battle that were frequently featured in men’s magazines were a male domain (Wakakuwa, 1995:244).
作为动员女性的形象策略的一部分,国家及其下达命令的领导者、舆论领袖和宣传者绝不会向女性展示前线场景、正在进行的战斗或胜利的画面。他们也不会向女性提供凯旋归来、失败或占领的图像。带有大写“ W W WW ”的战争场面是针对男性的,而经常出现在男性杂志中的血腥战斗场景则是男性的领域(若川,1995:244)。
The fact of the matter is that there was a route for women to be worshiped at the Yasukini Shrine. This was the route of being killed in the performance of one’s duties as a nurse attached to the military. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} Drawing on the work of Kameyama Michiko, a historian of medical nurses, Wakakuwa suggests that the masculine virtues demanded of military nurses such as courage, coolness and composure (self-possessed even at the sight of human blood), were perceived as contrary to women’s essential femininity. Yet as nurses were persons serving to restore fighting strength in the front line, the role was considered to be the most appropriate to women’s ‘innate character’ (Kameyama, 1984a).
事实是,女性在靖国神社被崇拜是有途径的。这个途径就是作为军队附属护士,在履行职责时牺牲。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 根据医疗护士史学家龟山美智子的研究,若川建议,军护士所要求的男性美德,如勇气、冷静和镇定(即使面对鲜血也能自持),被认为与女性的本质女性气质相悖。然而,由于护士是为前线恢复战斗力而服务的人,这一角色被认为最符合女性的“天性”(龟山,1984a)。
Another group supposedly serving to restore fighting strength were the military comfort women, yet their contribution was overlooked. At the same time, given the sexual double standard (the separation between mothers and prostitutes) it was necessary to distinguish clearly between the category military nurse and military comfort woman. Higuchi Keiko, a renowned feminist social critic, suggests that military nurses were probably exposed to a considerable amount of sexual harassment while working, but the saintliness of the category nurse would have obstructed the problematising of sexual harassment in the workplace. This, then, is the exact reverse of the discrimination towards the comfort women. In reality, many comfort women at the front were required to act as nursing personnel, but the military nurses were not happy about this and demanded that a stop be put to prostitutes acting as nurses.
另一个据称用于恢复战斗力的群体是军中慰安妇,但她们的贡献被忽视了。与此同时,鉴于性别双重标准(母亲与妓女的区分),有必要明确区分军护士和军中慰安妇这两个类别。著名女权主义社会评论家樋口恵子指出,军护士在工作中可能遭受了相当多的性骚扰,但护士这一圣洁的身份阻碍了对职场性骚扰问题的讨论。这正好与慰安妇所遭受的歧视相反。实际上,许多前线慰安妇被要求充当护理人员,但军护士对此并不满意,要求停止妓女充当护士的行为。

The Feminist Response  女权主义的回应

How did women react to the type of policies mentioned above? There has been a rapid accumulation of research concerned with this question, focusing on the ideas and discourses of the leadership class and, in addition, the support and involvement of the female masses.
女性对上述政策类型有何反应?关于这个问题的研究迅速积累,重点关注领导阶层的思想和话语,以及广大女性群众的支持和参与。
In terms of questioning the war responsibility of the female intelligentsia of the pre-war period, a paradigm shift has occurred in women’s history moving from the victim school to a perpetrator school of history and, along with this, a re-reading of the literature on the subject. The thoroughness of this process is such that the past of each and every female thinker who bears responsibility for prewar feminism, without exception, is being examined.
在质疑战前女性知识分子的战争责任方面,女性史学领域发生了范式转变,从受害者学派转向加害者学派,随之对相关文献进行了重新解读。这个过程的彻底性体现在对每一位对战前女权主义负有责任的女性思想家的过去,无一例外地都被审视。
From among these, three leading feminists are frequently singled out; Ichikawa Fusae, Hiratsuka Raichō and Takamure Itsue. I am picking out these three women not simply because they are prominent figures that cannot be overlooked when discussing prewar feminism, but because they are also stand as representatives of the integrationist and segregationist strategies within feminism. Ichikawa as an advocate of women’s suffrage is a classic example of the former, while Hiratsuka as a maternalist represents the latter strategy. As Hiratsuka’s maternalist successor and, moreover, as an ultra-nationalist who was an even more fanatical supporter of ‘the holy war’, Takamure cannot be forgotten. Even so, it is not the discourses produced by these women that I am interested in here. I would like to focus on the metahistory, the interpretations given to the discourses and activities of these feminist thinkers by scholars of women’s history, and then the changes that have occurred in the interpretive paradigm.
在这些人中,有三位著名的女权主义者经常被单独提及;她们是市川房枝、平塚雷鸟和高群逸枝。我选择这三位女性,不仅因为她们是讨论战前女权主义时不可忽视的重要人物,更因为她们代表了女权主义内部的融合主义和分离主义策略。作为女性选举权的倡导者,市川是前者的经典例子,而平塚作为母性主义者则代表了后者的策略。作为平塚的母性主义继承者,更作为一位极端民族主义者和“圣战”的狂热支持者,高群也不可被遗忘。尽管如此,我在这里并不关注这些女性所产生的话语。我想关注的是元历史,即女性史学者对这些女权思想家的话语和活动所做的诠释,以及诠释范式所发生的变化。
In 1937 when the second Sino-Japanese war broke out, Ichikawa Fusae (1893-1971) formed the Federation of Japanese Women’s Organisations (Nippon Fujin Dantai Renmei) embracing eight women’s groups including
1937 年第二次中日战争爆发时,市川房枝(1893-1971)成立了日本妇女团体联合会(Nippon Fujin Dantai Renmei),联合了包括八个妇女团体在内的组织

the Women’s Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei), and in response to the National Mobilisation Law she created a support structure to ‘strengthen the defence of the home front’. In the same year, Ichikawa was appointed committee member of the Central League for National Spiritual Mobilisation (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chūō Renmei). In 1939 she became Secretary of the National Spiritual Mobilisation Committee, in 1940 a councillor at the National Spiritual Mobilisation Central Headquarters, and in 1942 an officer on the deliberative council of the Greater Japan Women’s Association (Dainippon Funjinkai) and a Director of the Greater Japan Patriotic Speech Society (Dainippon Genron Hōkokukai).
妇女参政权联盟(Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei),并针对国家动员法,她建立了一个支持结构以“加强后方防御”。同年,市川被任命为中央国民精神动员联盟(Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chūō Renmei)委员会成员。1939 年,她成为国家精神动员委员会秘书,1940 年成为国家精神动员中央总部顾问,1942 年成为大日本妇人会(Dainippon Funjinkai)审议会官员及大日本爱国演讲会(Dainippon Genron Hōkokukai)理事。
As a result of this kind of support and participation, Ichikawa was purged from public office by the post-war occupation forces. Her support and participation were highly visible and, moreover, Ichikawa herself and researchers have acknowledged this ‘stain’ on her career. At the Ichikawa Fusae Memorial Hall wartime documents are open to the public and Ichikawa is respected as a woman of integrity because, if for no other reason, she did not try to cover up this stain. The interpretation is that, given the level of state oppression, Ichikawa had little choice but to cooperate if she wanted to protect the women’s suffrage movement.
由于这种支持和参与,市川被战后占领军从公职中清除。她的支持和参与非常明显,而且市川本人及研究者们都承认这是她职业生涯中的“污点”。在市川房枝纪念馆,战争时期的文件向公众开放,市川被尊为一位正直的女性,至少因为她没有试图掩盖这段污点。对此的解释是,鉴于国家压迫的程度,如果市川想保护妇女选举权运动,她几乎别无选择,只能合作。
In contrast, Hiratsuka Raichō (1886-1971) lacked enthusiasm for the ‘intergrationist ideal’, and it is widely known that she chose from the beginning the segregationist strategy of maternalism. As Hiratsuka did not participate as energetically in public activity as Ichikawa during the war, the question of her ‘war responsibility’ was not raised until very recently. Nevertheless, through a rereading of the wartime literature, the underside of Hiratsuka’s maternalism, namely her eugenic ideology, has recently come under attack. Unexpectedly, it has become clear that she had written prose enthusiastically praising the emperor and, along with a reevaluation of Hiratsuka as a theorist, a movement has arisen to reexamine the unique features of the strand of Japanese feminism led by her (Furukubo, 1991; Suzuki, 1989b; Miyake 1994; Ōmori, 1997).
相比之下,平塚雷鸟(1886-1971)对“融合主义理想”缺乏热情,众所周知,她从一开始就选择了母性主义的隔离策略。由于平塚在战争期间没有像市川那样积极参与公共活动,因此她的“战争责任”问题直到最近才被提出。然而,通过对战时文学的重新解读,平塚母性主义的阴暗面,即她的优生学意识形态,最近受到了批评。出人意料的是,已经明确她曾热情地写过赞美天皇的散文,随着对平塚作为理论家的重新评价,一场重新审视她所领导的日本女性主义独特特征的运动也随之兴起(古久保,1991;铃木,1989b;宫崎,1994;大森,1997)。
Incidentally, Suzuki Yūko, a scholar of the reflexive school of women’s history, raised the following questions concerning the war responsibility of these two leaders typically regarded as representative feminists of,
顺便提一下,女性史反思学派学者铃木裕子提出了以下关于这两位通常被视为代表性女权主义者的领导者的战争责任问题,

respectively, the integrationist and segregationist models that came out of the first wave of feminism.
分别代表了第一波女权主义中出现的融合主义和隔离主义模式。
Why did somebody who had previously been considered outstanding end up committing such a mistake during the war?..What caused (these women) to get caught up in cooperating with the imperialist war? (Suzuki, 1989b45-46)
为什么一个曾被认为是杰出人物的人会在战争期间犯下如此错误?……是什么原因导致(这些女性)卷入了与帝国主义战争的合作?(铃木,1989b45-46)
Behind the words ‘the mistake’ made by Raichō, Ichikawa and others is, firstly, the assumption that theirs was a choice based on free will rather than on the unavoidable compulsion of circumstances. Secondly, if indeed a mistake was made, the question this raises is whether the mistake was avoidable or not. If it was avoidable, then there is the awareness that by learning from the mistake these women made we should be able to avoid falling into this pitfall a second time. Finally, the judgement of the war as ‘that bad war’ is presupposed within this idea of a mistake, but I would like to save discussion of this until later.
雷鸟、市川等人所说的“错误”背后,首先是假设她们的选择是基于自由意志,而非不可避免的环境强迫。其次,如果确实犯了错误,那么问题在于这个错误是否可以避免。如果可以避免,那么就意味着通过学习这些女性所犯的错误,我们应该能够避免再次陷入同样的陷阱。最后,将战争判断为“那场坏战争”是这一错误观念的前提,但我想把这部分讨论留到后面。
In taking the standpoint that they want to provide as consistent an explanation as possible of the inherent logic of this mistake, it can be said that these scholars of women’s history have, without clearly stating the fact, adopted the standpoint of the continuity school of history.
从他们希望尽可能一致地解释这一错误内在逻辑的立场来看,可以说这些女性史学者在未明确说明的情况下,采纳了历史连续性学派的立场。
According to Suzuki Yūko, Ichikawa’s path can be summed up as ‘women’s rights equalling participation in the public sphere, which in turn equals women’s liberation’ (Suzuki, 1989b). Within these limits, Ichikawa’s path can be seen as the consistent life of a female suffragist with the sense of an outstanding activist. For Ichikawa this meant consistently supporting the participation of women in public activities. The mistake made by her turns out to be her failure to question the content of this public activity (that bad war!). On top of this, Ichikawa’s powerful sense of mission as a women’s suffragist and, the reverse of this, her own elitism meant that she could not tolerate seclusion from what was going on.
据铃木优子所说,市川的道路可以总结为“女性权利等同于参与公共领域,而这又等同于女性解放”(铃木,1989b)。在这些限制范围内,市川的道路可以被看作是一位杰出活动家意识下的女性参政权运动者的一贯生活。对市川来说,这意味着始终支持女性参与公共活动。她的错误在于未能质疑这些公共活动的内容(那场糟糕的战争!)。此外,市川作为女性参政权运动者强烈的使命感,以及与之相反的她自身的精英主义,使她无法容忍与正在发生的事情隔绝。
A re-reading of the literature is similarly moving in the direction of demonstrating the through-line in Hiratsuka’s ideas. Eugenic statements made during the war have been tied in with Hiratsuka’s position on the ‘motherhood protection debate’ 27 that took place before this, and are viewed as the inevitable consequence of her maternalism. Serving the state through motherhood, as a matter of course, includes the selection of ‘superior
重新阅读相关文献同样令人感动,显示出平塚的思想贯穿线索。战争期间发表的优生学言论与平塚在此前进行的“母性保护论争”27 的立场联系在一起,被视为她母性主义的必然结果。通过母性为国家服务,理所当然地包括了对“优良者”的选择。

descendants’ from ‘inferior descendants’, and the position of demanding the protection of motherhood by the state can all too easily result in approval of the state’s controlling motherhood. In fact, the protection/control of motherhood by the state through such measures as the passing of the Mother and Child Protection Law in 1938, the National Eugenics Law in 1940, and the issuing of Expectant and Nursing Mothers Notebooks in 1942 were welcomed by Hiratsuka, for at last the arguments she had been advancing over many years had been acknowledged. Once again, Suzuki suggests that the background here is Hiratsuka’s own elitism (causing her to separate women into those fit to give birth and those who are unfit) 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}.
将“后代”与“劣等后代”区分开来,并要求国家保护母性的立场,很容易导致对国家控制母性的认可。事实上,通过 1938 年《母子保护法》的通过、1940 年《国家优生法》的实施以及 1942 年发放孕产妇手册等措施,国家对母性的保护与控制,得到了平塚的欢迎,因为她多年来一直主张的观点终于得到了认可。铃木再次指出,这背后的原因是平塚自身的精英主义(使她将女性分为适合生育和不适合生育两类) 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
According to scholars of women’s history such as Suzuki and Yoneda Sayako, the cause of Hiratsuka moving in the direction of praising the emperor can be found in her anti-modernism. Behind this lies a reinterpretation of the motherhood protection debate, which precedes it as a kind of pre-history, resulting in an understanding of the confrontation between Yosano Akiko (1878-1942) and Hiratsuka as one between individualism and maternalism, on the one hand, and modernism and antimodernism, on the other. It is well known that even before she launched the journal Seitō (Bluestocking), known as the pioneering feminist journal of the first wave in Japan, Hiratsuka was, among other things, a Zen Buddhist who sought enlightenment through the guidance of a priest of the Rinsai sect, someone who emphasized spiritual values, and a great believer in nature (for example, she ate brown rice). 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
根据女性历史学者如铃木和米田佐也子的观点,平塚向赞美天皇方向转变的原因可以在于她的反现代主义。其背后是对母性保护论争的重新解读,这场论争作为一种前史先行,导致了对与之相关的与谢野晶子(1878-1942)与平塚之间对立的理解:一方面是个人主义与母性主义,另一方面是现代主义与反现代主义。众所周知,早在她创办被誉为日本第一波女权主义先锋期刊《青踏》(Bluestocking)之前,平塚就是一位禅宗佛教徒,曾在临济宗僧侣的指导下寻求开悟,这位僧侣强调精神价值,她本人也非常信奉自然(例如,她食用糙米)。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
While indicating that she is repelled by Suzuki’s ‘accusatory view of history’, Yoneda also offers her strong support for the notion of Hiratsuka’s ‘continuity’. She goes as far as saying that ‘Raichō was not a traitor [to her cause] who willingly snuggled up to the state; it was the emperor state system that “seized” Raichō!’ Yoneda then asks ‘Is it not the case that statements made by Raichō represent not a temporary shakiness but something fundamental to her?’ and then answers this question herself saying, ‘I dare to say yes even with the fear of misunderstanding.’
虽然表示她对铃木的“指责性历史观”感到反感,米田也强烈支持平塚的“连续性”观点。她甚至说“莱蝶并非一个主动投靠国家的叛徒;恰恰是天皇国家体制‘抓住’了莱蝶!”米田随后问道:“莱蝶的言论难道不是她根本性的表现,而非一时的动摇吗?”并且她自己回答说:“即使害怕被误解,我也敢说是的。”
Due to her continuous anti-modernism and anti-rationalism, Raichō rebelled against the existence of a total control system (the modernist, rationalist system created by the modern nation-state). However, this kind of critical spirit, that is to say taking on the authority of the state as an adversary, and her own position as an anti-modernist and anti-rationalist made it
由于她持续的反现代主义和反理性主义,莱蝶反抗了一个全面控制体系的存在(由现代民族国家创造的现代主义、理性主义体系)。然而,这种批判精神,也就是说将国家权威视为对手,以及她作为反现代主义者和反理性主义者的立场,使得

highly conceivable that she would literally be ‘seized’, when she found her own ideas in the dominant ideology grounded in the imperial view of history (Yoneda:1996:50).
当她发现自己的思想被根植于以天皇历史观为基础的主流意识形态时,她被字面意义上的“抓住”是非常可以想象的(米田:1996:50)。
Suzuki also displays perplexity at some of Hiratsuka’s remarks, such as ‘the Emperor, living descendant of the Sun Goddess’ and ‘the imperial policy as devine will’, and resigns herself to the fact that it was as if in Hiratsuka 'there was another world that had transcended logic, so that ‘from the start it is probably impossible to try and understand her logically’ (Suzuki, 1989b:43).
铃木对于平塚的一些言论也感到困惑,比如“天皇,太阳女神的在世后裔”和“帝国政策作为神意”,并且无奈地接受了这样一个事实:仿佛在平塚身上存在着另一个超越逻辑的世界,因此“从一开始大概就不可能用逻辑去理解她”(铃木,1989b:43)。
It is worth noting that there are a couple of problems in Suzuki’s interpretation. First, there is the question of whether Hiratsuka was truly an anti-modernist. Although there is a repeated tendency to hastily position maternalism as anti-modernism, on the basis that it rejects modern individualism, recent feminist research on the subject has made clear that motherhood is also an invention of modernity. The view taken is that maternalism as product of the modern era is one possible form feminism can take. This position can be verified through a detailed re-examination of Hiratsuka’s arguments in the motherhood protection debate. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} In response to Yosano Akiko’s calls for ‘the complete independence of young women’, Raichō insisted that, ‘the claim for the protection of motherhood was not one for dependency’. At this time, Hiratsuka’s target for the ‘dependency’ of motherhood protection was not the husband but the public sphere of the state. It is exactly because women could contribute to the public sphere of the state through motherhood that women had a right as citizens to be provided with motherhood security by the state. This line of thinking would have been inconceivable before the foundation of the state as a public body. Hiratsuka and Ellen Key [1849-1926] 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} shared similar ideas about motherhood security and, tied in with this, the role of the welfare state. In the context of the times, these ideas in many ways constituted the development of a progressive argument, because they amounted to nothing less than placing hopes on an enlargement of the public sphere at a time when this kind of public aspect of the state had yet to be fully established. Consequently, we can understand Yosano and Hiratsuka’s argument as a battle between Yosano’s realism, as a self-supporting person, and Hiratuska’s ‘idealism divorced from reality’, which placed its hopes in a public realm that did not yet exist. Following on from this, what Hiratsuka saw happening
值得注意的是,铃木的解读存在几个问题。首先,平塚是否真的是反现代主义者值得商榷。尽管人们常常急于将母性主义定位为反现代主义,理由是它拒绝现代个人主义,但近年来关于这一主题的女性主义研究已经明确指出,母性也是现代性的发明。观点认为,作为现代产物的母性主义是女性主义可能采取的一种形式。通过对平塚在母性保护辩论中的论点进行详细重新审视,可以验证这一立场。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 针对与谢野晶子的“年轻女性完全独立”呼吁,雷鸟坚持认为,“对母性的保护诉求并非依赖性的要求”。此时,平塚所针对的母性保护中的“依赖”并非丈夫,而是国家的公共领域。正因为女性能够通过母性为国家的公共领域做出贡献,女性作为公民才有权利由国家提供母性保障。 这种思路在国家作为公共实体成立之前是难以想象的。平塚和艾伦·基(1849-1926) 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 在母亲保障以及与之相关的福利国家角色方面有着相似的观点。在当时的背景下,这些观点在许多方面构成了进步论述的发展,因为它们无异于在公共领域尚未完全建立之时,将希望寄托于公共领域的扩大。因此,我们可以将与谢野晶子和平塚的论争理解为与谢野作为自立者的现实主义与平塚“脱离现实的理想主义”之间的较量,后者将希望寄托于尚不存在的公共领域。紧接着,平塚所看到的战争年代所发生的事情

during the war years was, in a manner of speaking, the enlargement of the ‘public domain’.
在某种意义上,是“公共领域”的扩大。
Yosano was able to see through Hiratuska’s overestimation of the state:
与谢野能够看穿平塚对国家的高估:
Although Hiratuska placed great hopes in the state…the ‘state’ that Hiratsuka was talking about was not the state as it actually was, but refers to a state that has been re-modelled in an ideal way (Yosano 1918a; Kouchi, 1984:102).
虽然平塚对国家寄予厚望……但平塚所谈论的“国家”并非现实中的国家,而是指经过理想化改造的国家(与谢野 1918a;河内,1984:102)。
Incidentally, the Scandinavian women’s theorist and maternalist feminist, Ellen Key, acquired an even higher standing in Japan among leading participants in the motherhood protection debate, than in the West, by virtue of the enthusiasm with which she was introduced here by Yamada Waka [1879-1957] and Hiratsuka. However, it would be incorrect to take the view, simply for this reason, that first wave feminism was an imported ideology brought from the West. Translation as a means of introducing culture always includes a screening process. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} From when it was first established, Japanese feminism held an affinity for Scandinavian maternalism and rejected Anglo-Saxon individualism and egalitarianism. For example, Hiratsuka translated Ellen Key’s work in Bluestocking, but this was less to do with Key’s influence over Hiratsuka and more because Hiratsuka discovered shared ideas in Key’s writing. At the time, Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} Anglo-Saxon ideas of individualism were also widely known, but were not introduced into Japan with such enthusiasm.
顺便提及,斯堪的纳维亚的女性理论家和母性主义女权主义者艾伦·基(Ellen Key)在日本母性保护辩论的主要参与者中所获得的地位,甚至比在西方更高,这得益于山田若(1879-1957)和平塚雷鸟对她的热情介绍。然而,仅仅因此就认为第一波女权主义是从西方引进的意识形态,是不正确的。作为引介文化的手段,翻译总是包含一个筛选过程。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 自日本女权主义初创以来,就对斯堪的纳维亚的母性主义抱有亲和力,并拒绝盎格鲁-撒克逊的个人主义和平等主义。例如,平塚雷鸟在《青踏》中翻译了艾伦·基的作品,但这与基对平塚的影响关系不大,更多是因为平塚在基的著作中发现了共同的思想。当时,夏洛特·珀金斯·吉尔曼 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 的盎格鲁-撒克逊个人主义思想也广为人知,但并未在日本受到如此热烈的引介。
As part of a fascinating attempt to locate the motherhood protection debate within the context of contemporary international feminism, Miyake Yoshiko (1994) discusses the Yosano-versus-Hiratsuka debate, referring to the differences in the ideological backgrounds of Ellen Key and Perkins Gilman. Pre-dating this, Anglo-Saxon feminism, that is individualistic feminism aiming at economic independence and political equality, was already known in Japan through the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft [1759797] and Olive Schreiner [1855-1920]. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} From the beginning, Key-style maternalistic feminism was something that appeared at the second stage within the current of first wave feminism as a criticism of individualistic feminism. ‘Western feminism’ itself was not a single stratum. Feminism in Japan, a late-comer to capitalism, was, in the words of Yosano, like ‘the momentary springtime blossoming of all flowers at once in a cold country’,
作为试图将母性保护辩论置于当代国际女权主义背景中的一部分,宫崎良子(1994)讨论了与平塚雷鸟的辩论,提及了艾伦·基(Ellen Key)和珀金斯·吉尔曼(Perkins Gilman)意识形态背景的差异。早于此,盎格鲁-撒克逊女权主义,即旨在实现经济独立和政治平等的个人主义女权主义,已经通过玛丽·沃斯通克拉夫特(Mary Wollstonecraft)[1759-1797]和奥利芙·施赖纳(Olive Schreiner)[1855-1920]的著作为日本所知。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 从一开始,基式的母性主义女权主义就是作为对个人主义女权主义的批判,在第一波女权主义浪潮中的第二阶段出现的。“西方女权主义”本身并非单一层次。日本作为资本主义的后进者,用与谢野晶子的说法,是“寒冷国度中所有花朵瞬间齐放的春天”,

but there did undoubtedly result from it a selective acceptance of 'Western feminism. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} The debate between Yosano and Hiratsuka was not a war by proxy for Western feminism to be played out on the Japanese stage.
但无疑由此产生了对“西方女权主义”的选择性接受。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 与谢野与平塚之间的辩论并非西方女权主义在日本舞台上的代理战争。
Secondly, a question has arisen over whether Yosano (who is viewed as the voice of individualism within the motherhood protection debate) was really an advocate of modern individualism. The following statement is frequently cited from the motherhood protection debate:
其次,出现了一个问题,即被视为母性保护论争中个人主义声音的与谢野晶子,是否真的是现代个人主义的倡导者。以下这段话常被引用于母性保护论争中:
I do not believe a child is either a ‘thing’ or a ‘tool’. I consider each child an individual with his or her own independent character. A child belongs to his or her self. In contrast to Hiratsuka, I certainly do not view a child as the property of ‘society’ or ‘the nation’ (Yosano, 1918b; Kouchi, 1984:188). 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
我不认为孩子是“物品”或“工具”。我认为每个孩子都是具有独立个性的个体。孩子属于他或她自己。与平塚相比,我绝不认为孩子是“社会”或“国家”的财产(与谢野,1918b;幸内,1984:188)。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
This is offered as proof of Yosano’s ‘individualism’, but surely it is worth investigating whether her position pre- or post-dates the state. For example, Yosano’s famous anti-war poem There’s Nothing to Die for, Brother!, written during the Russo-Japanese war, can be understood as an expression of the values of pre-modern familism, the fore-runner of nationalism. In a sense, Yosano’s intuition is correct when she describes her impression of Hiratsuka as a nationalist who expresses herself like a high-handed militarist. Conversely, it is conceivable that the reason Yosano was able to distance herself from nationalism was her embodiment of the communal ethic that preceded the state. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} In 1918, at the time of the motherhood protection debate, the women’s suffrage movement was still not established. It is well known that the maternalists, starting with Hiratsuka, were indifferent to the demands for women’s right to vote. In 1920, Hiratsuka joined with Ichikawa Fusae to form the New Women’s Society (Shin Fujin Kyōkai) and set about demanding political rights for women. 1924 saw the start of the Association for the Promotion of Women’s Suffrage (Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Dōmei) by Ichikawa Fusae and Kubushiro Ochimi among others. In the course of the motherhood protection debate it was suggested to Yosano by the male socialist Sakai Toshihiko, popularly known as Sakai Kosen, that she ‘set up a women’s suffrage movement and take a leading part in it’, and that ‘[Yosano] was most qualified to be an advocate’, but she firmly declined on the basis that her present lifestyle left no room to avail herself of such an opportunity (Yosano, 1919; Kouchi, 1984:223-9). It is clear from Dear Sakai
这被用来证明与谢野晶子的“个人主义”,但有必要探究她的立场是在国家之前还是之后形成的。例如,与谢野在日俄战争期间写下的著名反战诗《没有什么值得去死,兄弟!》可以被理解为前现代家族主义价值观的表达,而家族主义是民族主义的前身。从某种意义上说,与谢野的直觉是正确的,她将平塚雷鸟印象为一个以专横军国主义者方式表达自己的民族主义者。相反,可以想象,与谢野能够与民族主义保持距离的原因,是她体现了先于国家的共同体伦理。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 1918 年,在母性保护辩论时期,妇女选举权运动尚未确立。众所周知,以平塚为首的母性主义者对妇女选举权的诉求漠不关心。1920 年,平塚与市川房枝联合成立了新妇人协会(Shin Fujin Kyōkai),开始争取妇女的政治权利。 1924 年,由市川房枝和久保代千美等人发起了妇女参政权促进协会(Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Dōmei)。在母性保护的辩论过程中,男性社会主义者坂井敏彦(俗称坂井光泉)建议与谢野晶子“成立妇女参政权运动并在其中发挥领导作用”,并认为“[与谢野]最有资格成为倡导者”,但她坚决拒绝,理由是她目前的生活方式没有余地利用这样的机会(与谢野,1919;河内,1984:223-9)。从《亲爱的坂井》一书中可以清楚看出
Kosen Sama (Yosano, 1919) that Yosano supported women’s suffrage, and that it is appropriate to position her along with Ichikawa in the genealogy of the integration model.
关于高千穗大人(与谢野,1919 年),与谢野支持妇女选举权,将她与市川一同置于整合模式的谱系中是恰当的。
The third problematic point is that as a result of their emphasis on Hiratsuka’s consistency and still more the irrationality of the wartime regime, both Suzuki and Yoneda presume a rupture in the modernisation project during the crisis of wartime. Then in order to demonstrate the inevitability of feminist thinkers’ support for the war, they adopt the position that the war was a deviation from the modernisation project. As a result, Suzuki and Yoneda end up going back once again to the old paradigm where the war is viewed as an irrationality or moment of madness in Japan’s modern history. In this sense, the view of these women, which emphasizes the consistency of pre-war feminists, falls within the former Continuity School paradigm and is unrelated to the neo-continuity theory.
第三个问题点在于,由于他们强调平塚的连贯性,更甚者强调战时政权的非理性,铃木和米田都假定在战时危机期间现代化项目出现了断裂。然后,为了证明女权思想家支持战争的必然性,他们采取了战争是现代化项目偏离的立场。结果,铃木和米田最终又回到了旧的范式,即将战争视为日本现代史上的非理性或疯狂时刻。从这个意义上说,这些女性的观点强调战前女权主义者的连贯性,属于前者的连续性学派范式,与新连续性理论无关。

The Feminist Version of 'Conquering the Modern'
“征服现代”的女权主义版本

I would like to consider one more important figure here, Takamure Itsue [1849-1964]. In a sense it is much easier to see why Takamure was treated as an anti-modernist, because of her fanatical glorification of the war and support of the emperor ideology. Moreover, as the self-professed ideological successor of Hiratsuka and due to her emphasis on a ‘maternal self’ that transcends modern individualism, Takamure is considered the most enthusiastic female promoter of ultra-nationalism. In a way, she has been regarded as the ideological leader of the feminist version of the ‘conquering the modern’ school and on this point her treatment in critical biographies leaves little room for her defence (Kano and Horiba 1977; Kanō, 1987, 1995d; Nishikawa, 1982a, 1990; Yamashita E., 1988).
我想在这里再考虑一个重要人物,高群逸枝(1849-1964)。从某种意义上说,高群被视为反现代主义者的原因更容易理解,因为她对战争的狂热颂扬以及对天皇意识形态的支持。此外,作为自称是平塚雷鸟的思想继承人,并且强调超越现代个人主义的“母性自我”,高群被认为是极端民族主义最热情的女性推动者。在某种程度上,她被视为女性主义版“征服现代”学派的思想领袖,而在这一点上,她在批判性传记中的描述几乎不给她辩护的余地(加野和堀场 1977;加野,1987,1995d;西川,1982a,1990;山下 E.,1988)。
From the period when everyone felt cowed into silence through to the revival of the ‘Japanese spirit’, many thinkers went down the road of enthusiastically involving themselves in the Imperial Rule Assistance system during the fifteen years of war…When one considers the results of Takamure linking together women’s liberation and the quest to ‘conquer the modern’, and that she pursued these with all her heart and soul, I cannot help feeling sorry for her (Kanō, 1987, 1995d:180-1).
从人人都被吓得噤声的时期,到“日本精神”复兴的阶段,许多思想家都热情地投身于十五年战争期间的皇国协力体制……当人们考虑到高群连结女性解放与“征服现代”的追求,并且她全心全意地追求这些时,我不禁为她感到惋惜(加纳,1987,1995d:180-1)。
However, there is room for a re-investigation of Takamure’s so-called antimodernism. From when she made her debut as a poet in Jitsu getsu no ue ni (Above the sun and the moon) in 1920, Takamure presented herself as an enemy of the evils of urbanisation and capitalism, and protector of nature and the rural and pastoral. Incidentally, the history of modernist discourse reveals that the ‘rural ideal’ is itself a reactionary ideology born out of opposition to the newborn modern age, which creates as its subject a nostalgia for a non-existent past, a point of view that is nothing more than a by-product of the modern era. Consequently, Takamure’s antimodernism
然而,对于高群所谓的反现代主义,仍有重新审视的空间。自 1920 年她以诗集《日月之上》出道以来,高群将自己塑造成城市化和资本主义恶行的敌人,自然与乡村田园的守护者。顺便提一下,现代主义话语的历史表明,“乡村理想”本身是一种反动意识形态,源于对新生现代时代的反对,它制造出对一个不存在的过去的怀旧,这种观点不过是现代时代的副产品。因此,高群的反现代主义

(anti-industrialisation and anti-urbanisation) is an ideal that, like maternalism, made its appearance in the second stage of modern feminism.
(反工业化和反城市化)是一种理想,像母性主义一样,出现在现代女权主义的第二阶段。
Within a structure of Orientalism in which the West represents the modern, this reactionary idealism towards the modern had a character extremely well suited to Japanese nationalism. In addition, Takamure’s own attempts to skilfully use the emperor system discourse to legitimise her own position bore fruit in her voluminous work Bokeisei no kenkyū (A study of matriarchy) (1938, 1986).
在一个西方代表现代的东方主义结构中,这种对现代的反动理想主义具有非常适合日本民族主义的特征。此外,高群逸枝巧妙利用天皇制话语来合法化自身立场的尝试,在她大量著作《母系性の研究》(《母系性研究》)(1938 年,1986 年)中结出了成果。
In 1931, Takamure entered her legendary life of scholarship at the Mori no Ie (House in the Woods) in Setagaya, Tokyo, where it is said that she put up a notice saying ‘Never leaving the house; refuse all visitors’, and adopted a regime of ten hours study a day over a ten year period. A Takamure Itsue Support Group was formed with the intention of supporting Takamure’s life centering on her research over this period. However, it is not the case that all the names on the membership list, which included Ichikawa Fusae and Hiratsuka Raichō, necessarily got along well with each other. Nishikawa Yūko suggests that the motivation for supporting Takamure among a group of the leading feminists was their fervent desire for theoretical legitimation of wartime collaboration. These women regarded Takamure as a theorist who could provide them with this. Takamure regarded the ancient family as a matriarchal family in which the husband joined his wife’s household. She thereby challenged the pre-war patriarchal view of history. At the same time, however, in treating the ancient emperor system as the period when women’s status was at its highest, she tied women’s history to the imperial view of history, and through the logic of ‘marital harmony’ legitimated the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Bloc (Dai tōa kyōei ken) (Kōno et al.,1979; Nishikawa Yūko, 1997; Kurihara, 1997; Ueno, 1996). This is why Takamure was able to publish A Study of Matriarchy during the wartime period and continue her serial essays in Nihon Fujin (Japanese women), the bulletin of the Greater Japan Women’s Association, which embraced a membership of 20 million.
1931 年,高群逸枝开始了她在东京世田谷“森之家”的传奇学术生活,据说她贴出告示写着“绝不出门,谢绝一切访客”,并实行每天十小时学习、持续十年的制度。在此期间,成立了高群逸枝支援会,旨在支持她以研究为中心的生活。然而,会员名单上的所有人,包括市川房枝和平塚雷鸟,并不一定彼此相处融洽。西川祐子指出,一群领先的女权主义者支持高群逸枝的动机,是她们热切希望为战时合作提供理论上的合法性。这些女性认为高群逸枝是能够为她们提供这种理论支持的理论家。高群逸枝认为古代家庭是母系家庭,丈夫加入妻子的家族,从而挑战了战前的父权制历史观。 然而,同时,在将古代天皇制度视为女性地位最高的时期时,她将女性历史与帝国史观联系起来,并通过“夫妻和谐”的逻辑为大东亚共荣圈(Dai tōa kyōei ken)的理想提供了合法性(河野等,1979;西川优子,1997;栗原,1997;上野,1996)。这就是为什么高群逸枝能够在战时发表《母系制研究》,并继续在拥有 2000 万会员的大日本妇人会会刊《日本妇人》上连载她的随笔。
Takamure’s statements praising the war have been carefully deleted from The Collected Works of Takamure Itsue published between 1966-1970 (Rironsha Publications). Judging by this, at the very least the editor, her husband Hashimoto Kenzō, considered Takamure’s past a 'blemish. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} I
高群赞美战争的言论被小心翼翼地从 1966-1970 年间出版的《高群逸枝全集》(理论社出版)中删除。由此判断,至少编辑——她的丈夫桥本健三——认为高群的过去是一个“污点”。

would like to cite one section of a piece that appeared in the January, 1944 edition of Japanese Women entitled Taoya-me (Graceful, delicate ladies) but was not included in Takamure’s Collected Works.
我想引用一段出现在 1944 年 1 月号《日本妇人》上的文章《多様女》(优雅、纤细的女士们)中的内容,但该文未被收入高群的全集。
The graceful, delicate ladies of this country make the family the centre of their existence, and have an unquenchable longing for the whole world to become one large family. Thus, as our holy war has been launched against that which obstructs this, it can be said most positively that this is a war for women. Women’s unfaltering purpose should be to encourage our children, our husbands, our older brothers, our younger brothers, and never to yield. In this great war we are not taking a stand ‘even though we are women’ but ‘precisely because we are women’. (Kōno et al., 1979:262).
这个国家优雅、纤细的女士们以家庭为生活的中心,怀有让整个世界成为一个大家庭的强烈渴望。因此,既然我们已经对阻碍这一目标的事物发动了神圣的战争,可以非常肯定地说,这是一场为女性而战的战争。女性坚定不移的目标应当是鼓励我们的孩子、丈夫、哥哥、弟弟,永不退缩。在这场伟大的战争中,我们不是“尽管我们是女性”而站出来,而是“正因为我们是女性”而站出来。(河野等,1979:262)
There are many scholars studying Takamure, but few go back to and examine the primary sources that she used in her women’s history. It would take a huge effort to verify the more than ten thousand ancient genealogical records that Takamure is said to have written out on cards in preparing the original text of works such as Shinsenshōjiroku (Newly Compiled Genealogical Records). Kurihara Hiroshi spent more than ten years himself doing this and, on the basis of case-studies of 500 families from the midHeian era that Takamure had made an object of study, claims that she ‘falsified, and deliberately fabricated, historical documents’ (Kurihara H., 1994). Kurihara’s conclusion of Takamure’s fictitious reporting of women’s history caused shock waves among Takamure scholars. For all this, Kurihara has not simply criticised Takamure, but also offers us an understanding of the concealed intentions of Takamure’s women’s history that is sympathetic but intellectually sound. According to Kurihara, ‘Takamure’s ultimate motive’ was to ‘realise women’s liberation within written history’ and to ‘dispel the gloom of Japanese women since the dawn of history’ (Kurihara H., 1994:244). 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} As far as Takamure is concerned, if we take it that her women’s history itself was an ‘illocutionary speech act’ 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} done for the purpose of the liberation of women then she continued - regardless of direction - to encourage women through her discursive practice even during the war.
研究高群有许多学者,但很少有人回溯并审视她在女性史研究中所使用的原始资料。据说高群在准备《新编姓氏录》等著作的原始文本时,曾将一万多份古代家谱记录抄写在卡片上,验证这些资料需要极大的努力。栗原浩本人花费十余年时间,基于高群选取的平安中期 500 个家族的案例研究,声称她“伪造并故意捏造了历史文献”(栗原浩,1994)。栗原关于高群虚构女性史报道的结论在高群研究者中引起了震动。尽管如此,栗原并非单纯批评高群,而是为我们提供了对高群女性史隐含意图的理解,这种理解既同情又具有理性依据。栗原认为,“高群的最终动机”是“在书面历史中实现女性解放”,并“驱散自历史伊始以来日本女性的阴霾”(栗原浩,1994:244)。 就高群而言,如果我们认为她的女性历史本身是一种“言内行为”,其目的是为了女性的解放,那么她即使在战争期间,也通过她的话语实践不断地——无论方向如何——鼓励女性。

Female Socialist or Socialist Feminist? The Case of Yamakawa Kikue
女性社会主义者还是社会主义女权主义者?山川菊枝的案例

I would like to touch upon another leading actor in the motherhood protection debate, the only socialist, Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1970). Whether pre-war socialists should be counted as feminists is itself a topic of debate. The Bluestocking group consciously used the term ‘feminism’, but among socialists their movement was dismissed as ‘bourgeois feminism’. In the eyes of those taking a class perspective, the first wave feminism that was sweeping the world at that time was nothing more than another version of bourgeois liberalism, and there is no evidence that women in the socialist camp identified with it. If we distance ourselves from the self-definitions of the persons concerned, here again, in terms of world history the socialist women’s liberation movement formed one current of feminism, but further study is needed to decide whether an individual woman activist was a socialist feminist or merely a female socialist.
我想谈谈母性保护论争中的另一位主要人物,唯一的社会主义者山川菊枝(1890-1970)。战前的社会主义者是否应被视为女权主义者本身就是一个争论的话题。青鸟社有意识地使用“女权主义”一词,但在社会主义者中,他们的运动被视为“资产阶级女权主义”。从阶级视角来看,当时席卷全球的第一波女权主义不过是资产阶级自由主义的另一种形式,没有证据表明社会主义阵营中的女性认同这一点。如果我们撇开当事人的自我定义,从世界历史的角度来看,社会主义女性解放运动确实构成了女权主义的一个流派,但是否某个女性活动家是社会主义女权主义者还是仅仅是女性社会主义者,还需要进一步研究。
Of course, what we call feminism varies depending on the perspective that we take. If I can offer a provisional definition here, for a movement to be feminist the following two conditions are necessary. First, it has to be an autonomous women’s movement. Second, gender, or femininity defined in the given context, must be problematized. The first of these two conditions is necessary, but it is not the case that all movements where women are the torch-bearers are, simply for that reason, instances of feminism. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} If we make a judgement on the basis of these two criteria, firstly the socialist movement, as a male-dominated movement, lacks the condition of being an autonomous women’s movement. Secondly, the socialist camp does not recognise women’s demands for independence and, moreover, dislikes it when women create an separate movement, calling it ‘factionalism’. For socialists, women’s liberation is dependent on the liberation of the working
当然,我们所称的女权主义会根据我们所采取的视角而有所不同。如果我在这里能给出一个暂时的定义,要成为一个女权主义运动,必须具备以下两个条件。首先,它必须是一个自主的女性运动。其次,性别,或者在特定语境中定义的女性气质,必须被问题化。这两个条件中的第一个是必要的,但并非所有由女性担任先锋的运动,仅仅因为这一点就可以被视为女权主义运动。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 如果我们根据这两个标准来判断,首先,作为一个男性主导的运动,社会主义运动缺乏作为一个自主女性运动的条件。其次,社会主义阵营不承认女性对独立的诉求,而且当女性创建独立运动时,还会反感,称之为“派系主义”。对于社会主义者来说,女性解放依赖于工人阶级的解放。

class, and is something that is expected to be accomplished automatically along with the socialist revolution. Consequently, women should join the class struggle in order to bring about working class liberation, and an independent fight by women is regarded not just as meaningless, but as a hindrance to working class solidarity. Furthermore, the women to be liberated are those who belong to the working class, and a feminist movement seeking to ‘demonstrate the talents concealed within one’s self’ (Hiratsuka 1911; Horiba, 1991:18) can only be called a bourgeois diversion.
阶级,这是预期随着社会主义革命自动实现的事情。因此,女性应当加入阶级斗争,以实现无产阶级的解放,而女性的独立斗争不仅被视为毫无意义,反而被认为是阻碍无产阶级团结的因素。此外,待解放的女性是属于无产阶级的女性,而寻求“展现自身潜藏才能”的女权运动(平塚 1911;堀场,1991:18)只能被称为资产阶级的转移注意力的手段。
In the confrontation between Yosano and Hiratsuka in the motherhood protection debate Yamakawa came between the two, summing up her comparison of their theoretical stances with the words 'Yosano is the Japanese Mary Wollstonecraft…Hiratsuka is the Japanese Ellen Key (Yamakawa 1918; Kouchi, 1984:137). By the tender age of 28, Yamakawa had established a reputation for herself as a theorist. From her perspective as a socialist, ‘Yosano’s social criticism started with the bourgeois and ended with it’(Yamakawa, 1918; Kouchi, 1984:136).Yet, Yamakawa concludes that, ‘in the end Ellen Key is nothing more than an advocate of outdated social policies’, which makes hers a ‘reactionary ideology…based on an exaggeration of sexual differences’ (Yamakawa, 1918; Kouchi, 1984:118). A brilliant young theorist, Yamakawa, argued that women have both ‘a right to work’ and a ‘right to a life (including a family life)’ and maintained that both the value of women’s paid and unpaid work should be properly evaluated. Yamakawa criticised Yosano and Hiratsuka on the following points:
在母性保护论争中,山川介入了与与谢野和平塚的对峙,她用“与谢野是日本的玛丽·沃斯通克拉夫特……平塚是日本的艾伦·基”(山川,1918;幸地,1984:137)来总结她对两人理论立场的比较。年仅 28 岁的山川,已确立了自己作为理论家的声誉。作为社会主义者,她认为“与谢野的社会批判始于资产阶级,也终于资产阶级”(山川,1918;幸地,1984:136)。然而,山川得出结论,“艾伦·基终究不过是过时社会政策的倡导者”,这使得她的思想成为“基于性别差异夸大的反动意识形态”(山川,1918;幸地,1984:118)。这位才华横溢的年轻理论家山川主张,女性既有“工作的权利”,也有“生活的权利(包括家庭生活)”,并坚持应当正确评价女性有偿和无偿劳动的价值。山川对与谢野和平塚提出了以下批评:
Along with refusing women the right to work, conventional society also denies them the right to a life. That being so, it was the conventional women’s rights movement that emerged stressing the former by shouting for equal opportunities from start to finish and as a proposed amendment to this are the mother’s rights campaigners who have risen up as advocates of the latter. The fault of the former is that in demanding all out for the right to work they forgot to demand the right to a life. While a shortcoming of the latter is that they did not advocate the right of all people equally to a life, but tamely limited their demands to mothers (Yamakawa, 1918; Kouchi, 1984:146).
除了剥夺女性的工作权利,传统社会还剥夺了她们的生活权利。正因为如此,最初出现的传统女性权利运动强调的是前者,从头到尾高喊争取平等机会,而作为对此的补充,母亲权利运动者则崛起,成为后者的倡导者。前者的缺陷在于,他们在全力争取工作权利时,忘记了争取生活权利。而后者的不足则在于,他们没有主张所有人平等享有生活权利,而是温顺地将诉求局限于母亲群体(山川,1918;幸地,1984:146)。
Yamakawa’s own policy solution was ‘a higher, more thorough-going conclusion’, namely ‘taking an axe to the evil foundations of current economic relations’ (Yamakawa, 1918; Kouchi, 1984:146). Given the times, only an ambiguous style of writing would have been permissible, but it would have been clear to everybody from the context that ‘a change in
山川本人提出的政策解决方案是“一个更高、更彻底的结论”,即“用斧头砍断当前经济关系的恶劣基础”(山川,1918;幸地,1984:146)。鉴于当时的时代背景,只能采用含糊其辞的写作方式,但从上下文中每个人都能明白,“一种变革”

contemporary economic relations’ meant a socialist revolution. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} In addition, Yamakawa believed that women’s liberation was dependent on the liberation of the working class and would come about automatically when that was achieved.
“当代经济关系”意味着社会主义革命。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 此外,山川认为,女性的解放依赖于工人阶级的解放,并且当工人阶级解放实现时,女性解放也会自动到来。
Be that as it may, Yamakawa was the most aware of the unique demands specific to women among the socialists. In 1925, with the formation of the Communist Party, she requested the party headquarters insert a demand for equal rights for men and women into the manifesto. This comprised the following six items:
尽管如此,山川是社会主义者中最清楚女性特有需求的人。1925 年,随着共产党成立,她请求党总部在宣言中加入男女平等权利的要求。内容包括以下六项:
1 Abolish the patriarchal household system. Abolish all laws that enforce inequality between men and women.
1 废除父权制家庭制度。废除所有执行男女不平等的法律。

2 Equal opportunities in education and employment.
2 教育和就业机会平等。

3 Abolish the system of licensed prostitution.
3 废除有执照的卖淫制度。

4 Guarantee an equal minimum wage, regardless of sex or ethnicity.
4 保证无论性别或种族,均享有平等的最低工资。

5 Equal pay for equal work.
5 同工同酬。

6 Protection of motherhood. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
6 保护母性。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}

According to Yamakawa’s post-war memoirs, the deliberations of the Communist Party leadership resulted in the third proposal (to abolish the system of licensed prostitution) being left undecided; the leadership being split fifty-fifty. The ‘remainder were rejected because they were regarded as anti-Marxist’ (Yamakawa, 1979:66). On the basis of Yamakawa’s own perceptions, ‘these items were fundamental demands of the women’s liberation movement; unexceptional, commonsense items, acknowledged world-wide and accepted without dissent by the Second and Third International and the International Labour Organisation (ILO); and opposition to them cannot have been anything other than conservative reactionism’ (Yamakawa, 1996:66).
根据山川战后的回忆录,共产党领导层的讨论导致第三项提案(废除有执照的卖淫制度)未能决定;领导层意见分成五五开。“其余提案被拒绝是因为被视为反马克思主义”(山川,1979:66)。根据山川本人的看法,“这些条款是妇女解放运动的基本诉求;是无可非议的常识性条款,得到全世界的认可,并被第二国际、第三国际及国际劳工组织(ILO)无异议地接受;反对这些条款只能是保守反动主义”(山川,1996:66)。
However, such was the character at that time of the male-dominated Communist Party. Nor did the female party members, as comrades, question this male control. Yamakawa reports that in response to her demands, ‘the same reply came from the female executive officers’(Yamakawa, 1979:66). Should we then call the female party members ‘socialist feminists’ or simply ‘female communists’? 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} At the very least, it is certain that the women did not attempt to overturn male domination in the
然而,当时的共产党是男性主导的。女性党员作为同志,也没有质疑这种男性控制。山川报告说,针对她的要求,“女性执行官也给出了同样的答复”(山川,1979:66)。那么,我们应该称女性党员为“社会主义女权主义者”还是仅仅称为“女性共产主义者”呢? 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} 至少可以确定的是,这些女性并没有试图推翻共产党的男性统治。
Communist Party. On the contrary, within the outlawed movement, the women’s role as ‘housekeepers’ ended up being exploited 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}.
相反,在被取缔的运动中,女性作为“家庭主妇”的角色最终被利用了 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
In the same year, 1925, the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law (Danshi Futsū Senkyo Hō) came into effect, but curiously women’s suffrage was not specifically included in Yamakawa’s six-point demand. She held a cynical view of the women’s suffrage movement.
同年,1925 年,《普遍男子选举法》(Danshi Futsū Senkyo Hō)生效,但奇怪的是,女性选举权并未被山川的六点要求中特别提及。她对女性选举权运动持愤世嫉俗的看法。
There was such wariness of the granting of universal male suffrage…that it was feared that it would ‘undermine the national polity’…Conservative forces considered the problem of women’s suffrage to be something akin to a child wanting somebody else’s toy, and it was not feared in the way that male suffrage had been…This was probably because, as a result of its baptism overseas, women’s suffrage, unlike the extension of the male franchise, was not regarded as something unusual or likely to bring sudden change, but was seen rather as something that would have many benefits for the conservative forces. There were no politicians nervous enough to oppose it because they foresaw changes in the national polity.
对于赋予普遍男性选举权存在极大的警惕……人们担心这会“破坏国家体制”……保守势力将女性选举权问题视为孩子想要别人的玩具,因而并不像对男性选举权那样感到恐惧……这大概是因为,经过海外的洗礼,女性选举权不同于男性选举权的扩展,不被视为异常或可能带来突变的事物,而是被看作对保守势力有诸多好处的东西。没有政治家因为预见到国家体制的变化而紧张反对它。
I was extremely fearful that the end result of simply wanting the right to vote without deciding the purpose of this or the kind of society that we wanted to create, would not be women’s liberation but the use of women as weapons of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Because already at the time there were numerous government-controlled women’s groups, such as the Young Girls Association (Shojokai) and the Women’s Patriotic Association, and working-class women and women from farming communities were being mobilized in the same way and were under their influence…In the past, women’s activists in the West have suggested that wars would be prevented if women had the vote, but history speaks clearly and most painfully of the fact that this alone will not prevent war (Yamakawa, 1979:73).
我非常担心,如果仅仅是想要投票权,而不去决定投票的目的或我们想要创造的社会类型,最终的结果不会是女性解放,而是女性被用作军官僚独裁的武器。因为当时已经有许多政府控制的妇女团体,比如少女会和妇女爱国会,工人阶级妇女和农民妇女也以同样的方式被动员,并且受到她们的影响……过去,西方的女性活动家曾提出,如果女性拥有投票权,战争将会被阻止,但历史清楚而痛苦地表明,仅凭这一点并不能阻止战争(山川,1979:73)。
It has to be said that, even allowing for the fact that this was written after the war, Yamakawa’s observations were penetrating. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
必须说,即使考虑到这是战后写的,山川的观察仍然非常深刻。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
During the war, the socialist movement was made illegal and it was forced into silence. Yamakawa’s husband, Hitoshi, a Communist Party leader, was also imprisoned. Yamakawa experienced all kinds of hardships. In order to support her husband in prison and make a living, she tried raising quails in the place she was evacuated to [during the height of the war]. Nevertheless, according to recent research by Beth Katzoff (1977), far from keeping silent, Yamakawa was a prolific writer during the war. Those around her did their best to ensure that she could earn money from her writings, works such as Buke no josei (Women from Samurai Families) (1943), which she wrote at the request of Yanagita Kunio, and she derived most of her income from her writings. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
战争期间,社会主义运动被宣布为非法,遭到压制。山川的丈夫仁,是共产党领导人,也被监禁。山川经历了各种艰难困苦。为了支持身陷囹圄的丈夫并谋生,她尝试在战时被疏散到的地方养鹌鹑。然而,根据贝丝·卡茨奥夫(1977 年)的最新研究,山川非但没有保持沉默,反而在战争期间写作颇丰。她身边的人尽力确保她能通过写作赚钱,她应柳田国男的请求写作的《武家の女性》(武士家庭的女性)(1943 年)等作品,她的大部分收入都来自写作。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
As the war situation deteriorated, the opportunistic tendencies in Yamawaka’s work became stronger (Katzoff, 1997). Yamakawa had always backed women’s labour participation and thought long and hard about the protection of women in the work place, but in her writing at least, she ceased to ask whether or not this labour was being used to pursue a war of aggression. For a brief period after the war, during the period that the socialists were in power under the Katayama Tetsu cabinet, Yamakawa was asked to serve as the first head of the Women and Minors Bureau within the Ministry of Labour. For Yamakawa, who took great pains over women’s protection in the workplace, there was a consistency throughout her life in her aspirations.
随着战争形势恶化,山川作品中的机会主义倾向变得更为明显(Katzoff,1997)。山川一直支持女性参与劳动,并且对保护职场女性进行了深入思考,但至少在她的著作中,她不再质疑这种劳动是否被用来推动侵略战争。在战后短暂的一段时间内,即片山哲内阁执政期间,山川被任命为劳动省妇女与未成年人局的首任局长。对于一直致力于职场女性保护的山川来说,她一生的志向始终保持着一致性。

The War Responsibility of Ordinary Women
普通女性的战争责任

Another outcome of the reflexive school of women’s history has been the pursuit of the ‘war responsibility’ not only of the elite leadership class, but also of ordinary women. From works that dig into the history of ordinary women, such as Kanō Mikiyo’s Jūgo shi (The history of the home front), it is clear that the female masses did not necessarily take a negative view of the war. Women’s participation in the public sphere, made possible by war, was both exhilarating and brought with it a new identity for women, and this is remembered as a feeling of spiritual uplift.
女性史反思学派的另一个成果是追究不仅是精英领导阶层的“战争责任”,也包括普通女性的责任。从深入研究普通女性历史的作品中,如加纳美纪代的《十五史》(《后方史》),可以清楚地看到,广大女性群众并不一定对战争持负面看法。战争使女性得以参与公共领域,这既令人振奋,也赋予女性一种新的身份,这种经历被记忆为一种精神上的振奋感。
Among women’s historians, it was Murakami Nobuhiko (1978) who first pointed out the liberating aspect of the war, and Kano also comments that ‘women being on the “home front” was one form of women’s liberation’ (Kanō, 1987, 1995d:84). Kanō cited the section from Ichikawa Fusae’s autobiography (Jiden) where she comments on the appearance of women at the gathering for the inauguration of the Women’s Defence Association, who seemed both embarrassed and delighted’, that ‘for the female masses from agricultural and mountain villages who previously had no time of their own, just being able to leave the home for half a day and listen to a lecture was women’s liberation’ (Ichikawa, 1974; Kanō 1987; 1995d:84). According to Kanō, 'there were many women who as executive officers of the Women’s Defence Association worked day after day forgetting food and sleep, and are [now] left with passionate memories in their minds of this period as ‘the best days of our lives’ (Kanō, 1987; 1995d:96).
在女性历史学家中,村上信彦(1978 年)最早指出战争具有解放性,狩野也评论说“女性处于‘后方’是一种女性解放的形式”(狩野,1987,1995d:84)。狩野引用了市川房枝自传(自传)中的一段,市川评论了妇女防卫协会成立大会上女性的出现,她们看起来既尴尬又高兴,“对于那些来自农业和山区村庄、以前没有属于自己时间的广大女性群众来说,能够离开家半天听讲座就是女性解放”(市川,1974;狩野,1987;1995d:84)。据狩野说,“作为妇女防卫协会的执行官,有许多女性日复一日地工作,忘记了吃饭和睡觉,现在她们脑海中留下了对这段时期充满热情的回忆,称之为‘我们一生中最美好的日子’”(狩野,1987;1995d:96)。
In addition to this, we should not overlook the unearthing of documents concerning oral history practices such as life-histories and personal autobiographies conducted by the efforts of Local Women’s History. Among memories reconstructed as the recalled past (the past reconstructed in the
除此之外,我们也不应忽视通过地方女性历史的努力发掘的有关口述历史实践的文献资料,如生活史和个人自传。在作为回忆过去(重构的过去)中重建的记忆当中,

present), there are few examples of women who have an awareness of themselves as perpetrators. Even the personal accounts of returnees from Manchuria focus on their own hardships, with little awareness of themselves as invaders protected by military strength. Indeed, there was a tendency to disregard the rape of Chinese women or the sufferings of the comfort women on the grounds that ‘we all suffered’ or that ‘these things were only to be expected given the times’.
目前,很少有女性意识到自己是加害者。即使是从满洲归来的个人叙述,也多聚焦于自身的苦难,几乎没有意识到自己作为受军事力量保护的侵略者的身份。事实上,人们倾向于忽视对中国女性的强奸或慰安妇的痛苦,理由是“我们大家都受苦”或“这些事情在那个时代是理所当然的”。
In her valuable work listening to and recording the experiences of Japanese women who had gone as colonists to Korea, Tabata Kaya (1995) discovered that their recollected past of these Korean experiences was that of a privileged class, filled with nostalgia, and there was absolutely no interest among these women in questioning the injustices that brought about this privilege.
在她宝贵的著作中,田畑加耶(1995)倾听并记录了作为殖民者前往朝鲜的日本女性的经历,发现她们回忆中的朝鲜经历是特权阶级的记忆,充满了怀旧情绪,而这些女性对导致这种特权的不公现象毫无质疑的兴趣。
The feminist paradigm change, within which women emerged as subjects rather than objects of history, also brought about awareness that women are not simply the victims of war, but also active perpetrators in prosecuting it. Now, from what kind of perspective is the judgement of wrong doing made? Here, once again, we must confront the question, on what grounds and with regard to what should we reflect?
女性主义范式的转变,使女性成为历史的主体而非客体,同时也带来了这样一种认识:女性不仅仅是战争的受害者,也是积极参与战争实施的行为者。那么,现在从什么样的视角来判断错误行为呢?在这里,我们再次必须面对这样一个问题:我们应当基于什么理由、针对什么内容进行反思?
As we have seen, most feminists in some way or other welcomed the plan for the nationalisation of women through modern, total war. The same can be said of other women’s activists, including Yamataka Shigeri, Yoshioka Yayoi and Oku Mumeo.
正如我们所见,大多数女性主义者在某种程度上都欢迎通过现代全面战争实现女性的国家化计划。其他女性活动家,包括山高茂理、吉冈弥生和奥姆目尾,也持相同态度。
It should not be forgotten that for women’s activists the nationalisation of women project was not in any way considered a reverse course or action, but was received as an innovation. Women received this new system that both demanded and made possible women’s activity in the public sphere with excitement and something resembling a sense of mission.
不应忘记,对于女性活动家来说,女性的国家化项目绝非某种倒退或逆转,而被视为一种创新。女性以兴奋和类似使命感的心情接受了这一既要求又使女性能够在公共领域活动的新制度。
In 1937, at the start of the Sino-Japanese War, Hiratsuka Akiko (Raichō), attending a meeting held by the magazine Bungei Shunjū under the title Round Table Discussion on the Problem of Women during Wartime, 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48} made the following comments:
1937 年,在中日战争爆发之际,平塚明子(雷鸟)参加了由杂志《文艺春秋》举办的题为“战时妇女问题圆桌讨论会”的会议, 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48} 发表了以下评论:
At any rate, I feel that there has been a massive change in the lives of women given that the female masses have been mobilized, that they are having to work for society and the state outside the home, and that husbands are having to accept their wives leaving the home to do
无论如何,我觉得女性的生活发生了巨大变化,因为广大女性被动员起来,她们不得不在家庭之外为社会和国家工作,而丈夫们也不得不接受妻子离开家庭去做

this kind of work…In a variety of senses, I think that the habits that the ordinary housewife will form during these troubled days, and, in addition, the experience of cooperating in group projects can only leave behind a positive legacy. For example, they will come to understand the intimate relationship between the family and society/the state, and will be able to look at their own households through new eyes and will probably come to free themselves from their hitherto selfish focus on the home (Maruoka, 1976:647).
这种工作的现实……从多方面来看,我认为普通家庭主妇在这些动荡日子里形成的习惯,以及参与集体项目的经验,只会留下积极的遗产。例如,她们会理解家庭与社会/国家之间的密切关系,能够用新的眼光看待自己的家庭,可能会摆脱以往那种自私地只关注家庭的状态(丸岡,1976:647)。
Here Hiratsuka treats society and the state as virtual synonyms.
这里平塚将社会和国家视为几乎同义的概念。

In the course of the same roundtable discussion, Yamakawa Kikue had the following question put to her by the journalist who was chairing it: ‘Is not the most remarkable thing about the ideological trend brought about by the [China] Incident…that the conflict between men and women has disappeared and women have begun to think about things from the standpoint of women as members of the nation?’ Yamakawa replied that ‘within the women’s movement both these points are evident’ and went on to point out that:
在同一场圆桌讨论中,主持记者向山川菊枝提出了以下问题:“[中国]事件所带来的意识形态潮流中,最显著的现象难道不是男女之间的冲突消失了,女性开始从作为国家成员的女性立场来思考问题吗?”山川回答说:“在女性运动中,这两点都很明显”,并进一步指出:
Ordinary women who until now lacked awareness are as a result of the Incident acting like mobilized persons for the first time…They have been mobilized as members of the state and in the process have been found to have a special function as women and are receiving new training relating to this (Maruoka, 1976:653).
普通女性直到现在都缺乏意识,但由于这次事件,她们第一次像被动员的人一样行动……她们作为国家成员被动员,在这个过程中被发现作为女性具有特殊的功能,并正在接受与此相关的新训练(丸岡,1976:653)。
During the roundtable discussion, the journalist in the Chair suggested that ‘state compulsion’ since the Incident 'appears to me to be in accordance with the movement for women’s liberation. In their replies to this, the women’s activists were, if anything, unable to conceal their irritation at the incompleteness and half-heartedness of the reform of the government’s women’s policy. Hiratsuka argued that, ‘the Central League for Spiritual Mobilisation should demand even greater participation from women and should work to mobilize all women’s groups’ (Maruoka, 1976:648).
在圆桌讨论中,主持记者提出,自事件发生以来,“国家强制”在我看来似乎符合妇女解放运动。对此,女性活动家们的回应中,反而难掩对政府妇女政策改革不彻底和半心半意的恼怒。平塚提出,“中央精神动员联盟应要求妇女更大程度的参与,并应致力于动员所有妇女团体”(丸冈,1976:648)。
As a way of promoting ‘women’s cooperation during the current situation’, Ichikawa Fusae advocated a ‘unification of women’s organisations’ that would overcome the opposition between the Women’s Patriotic Association and the Women’s Association for National Defence (Kokubō Fujinkai). 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49} She then pointed to the lack of a ‘women’s section’ in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) inaugurated the same year, making the following criticisms:
作为促进“当前形势下妇女合作”的一种方式,市川房枝主张“妇女组织的统一”,以克服妇女爱国会与国防妇人会(国防妇人会)之间的对立。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49} 随后,她指出同年成立的帝国统治协助会(大政翼赞会)缺乏“妇女部门”,并提出了以下批评:

Abstract  摘要

To us, the fact that the Assistance Association ignores women or puts them on the back burner is the result of the way in which women have always been thought about, the fact that they are devalued…As a result, I demand that…the Assistance Association quickly…establishes a women’s section… I would like to offer the following warning, that if the authorities within the Imperial Rule Assistance Association…leave the old system as it is, without considering women, they will definitely not be able to establish a new system and the strong defence of the state will collapse at its foundations (Ichikawa, 1940; Suzuki, 1986:124-5).
对我们来说,协助会忽视女性或将她们置于次要地位,是因为女性一直以来被这样看待,她们被贬低的事实……因此,我要求……协助会迅速……设立妇女部门……我想提出以下警告,如果帝国统治协助会的当权者……不考虑女性,保持旧制度不变,他们绝对无法建立新制度,国家的坚强防御将从根基上崩溃(市川,1940;铃木,1986:124-125)。

When it came to the female draft, Ichikawa was more enthusiastic than the government. She made the following criticisms in response to incumbent Prime Minister Tōjō’s statement that ‘due to the fact that the female draft would cause the collapse of the Japanese family system we shall not institute it at the present time’ made to the Diet [the Japanese Parliament] in October 1943:
谈到女性征兵,市川比政府更为热衷。她对时任首相东条在 1943 年 10 月向国会(日本议会)发表的“由于女性征兵会导致日本家庭制度的崩溃,我们目前不会实行女性征兵”的声明提出了以下批评:
I do not think there is any need to hold back if women’s labour is indispensable to the state in order to increase productive capacity… When it comes to female labour, I would like the government itself to have a much clearer view of women’s work…I am deeply vexed that, even having reached this current stage, the way that almost all men, at all levels of society from the government down, think about women has not advanced a single step from the feudal age (Ichikawa, 1943a:6; Suzuki, 1986:132-133.
我认为,如果女性劳动力对国家提高生产能力是不可或缺的,就没有必要有所保留……谈到女性劳动力时,我希望政府本身能对女性的工作有一个更加清晰的认识……我深感恼火的是,即使到了现在这个阶段,几乎所有男人,从政府到社会各阶层,对女性的看法仍然没有从封建时代前进一步(市川,1943a:6;铃木,1986:132-133)。
Ichikawa’s comrade in the women’s suffrage movement, Yamataka Shigeri, took an even harder line. At the July 1943 assembly of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association’s 4th Central Support Conference (Chūō Kyōryoku Kaigi) she stated: 'I would like to request that the draft of single women is carried out without hesitation. She also stated her ‘earnest desire’ that ‘the state show its might’ and ‘make the establishment of motherhood protection facilities in all factories compulsory’ (Yamataka, 1943; Suzuki, 1986:154-7).
市川在妇女选举权运动中的同志山高茂则持更强硬的立场。在 1943 年 7 月帝国统治协助会第四次中央支援会议(中央协力会议)上,她表示:“我希望毫不犹豫地征召单身女性。”她还表达了“真诚的愿望”,即“国家展现其威力”,“强制在所有工厂设立母亲保护设施”(山高,1943;铃木,1986:154-7)。
Ichikawa Fusae argued that ‘the female draft is not at odds with the family system’. Rather, the compatibility of work and motherhood, and the establishment of a policy of motherhood protection in the workplace had been goals of the women’s movement for a long time. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
市川房枝认为,“女性征兵制并不与家庭制度相冲突”。相反,工作与母亲身份的兼容,以及在职场建立母亲保护政策,一直是妇女运动长期以来的目标。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
At the very least, the general mobilisation system as seen through the eyes of women’s activists was an innovation that solved at a stroke the obvious women’s problems to date, including women’s participation in the labour force and the protection of motherhood on the one hand, and women’s public activities and the raising of women’s legal and political status on the other. These women berated the authorities’ lack of thoroughness and
至少,从女性活动家的视角来看,一般动员制度是一项创新,它一举解决了迄今为止显而易见的女性问题,包括女性参与劳动力市场和母亲身份的保护,以及女性的公共活动和女性法律与政治地位的提升。这些女性批评当局态度不够彻底和消极,

weak attitude, and made it their mission to ‘compensate for the insufficiencies and inadequacies of the government’s women’s policy’ (Suzuki, 1986:157).
并将“弥补政府妇女政策的不足和缺陷”作为她们的使命(铃木,1986:157)。

‘Conservatism in thought and innovation in action - isn’t that what fascism was?’ writes Kanō (Kanō, 1987; 1995). However, fascism was definitely not a conservative ideology. Even the ideology of the national polity (Kokutai) was not presented to the people as another name for a partially realised, incomplete state project. Deceived by the rhetorical flourish of ascribing tradition to the polity, subsequent generations of historians have called this conservative ideology.
“思想上的保守与行动上的创新——这不正是法西斯主义吗?”加纳(Kanō,1987;1995)写道。然而,法西斯主义绝对不是一种保守的意识形态。即使是国体(Kokutai)的意识形态,也没有被呈现为一个部分实现的、不完整的国家项目的另一种说法。由于将传统归于国体的修辞手法所迷惑,后来的历史学家们称其为保守的意识形态。

The Dilemma of the Nation-State's Gender Strategy
民族国家性别策略的困境

At a time of total war, with its unprecedented and inflated expectations of the public sphere, there were two options for the reorganisation of gender. One was to aim at the nationalisation of the private sphere while maintaining the gender role assignment, and the other was to dismantle the gender role assignment itself. The former, we can refer to as the ‘gender segregation model’ (hereafter segregation model) and the latter, the ‘integration model’. These two gender strategy options, perceived as two paths to women’s liberation, have long been debated in feminist discourses as a confrontation over the question of ‘equality versus difference’.
在全面战争时期,公众领域被赋予了前所未有且被夸大的期望,性别重组有两种选择。一种是旨在实现私人领域的国家化,同时维持性别角色分配,另一种是拆解性别角色分配本身。前者我们可以称之为“性别隔离模式”(以下简称隔离模式),后者则称为“整合模式”。这两种性别策略选项被视为女性解放的两条路径,长期以来在女性主义话语中围绕“平等与差异”的问题展开激烈辩论。
Japan, Germany and Italy, the fascist states of the Axis Alliance, all opted for the strategy of segregation. The Nazis publicly declared their partiality for ‘manly men, and womanly women’, and placed limits on the public activities of women. It is curious that in all three countries maternalism was very prominent and the rhetoric of ‘different but equal’ dominated the ideology of the women’s liberation movement. Of course, a spectrum of ideas from segregation to integration can be seen everywhere in modern feminist ideology. However, from within this variation in the internal line of feminism we can see a process of adjustment in the liberationist rhetoric in an effort to conform, as it were, to the discourse of those in power.
日本、德国和意大利,作为轴心国的法西斯国家,都选择了隔离策略。纳粹公开宣称他们偏爱“男子汉气概的男人和女性化的女人”,并限制女性的公共活动。有趣的是,在这三个国家中,母性主义非常突出,“不同但平等”的言辞主导了女性解放运动的意识形态。当然,在现代女权主义意识形态中,从隔离到融合的各种观点随处可见。然而,在女权主义内部路线的这种变化中,我们可以看到解放主义言辞的一种调整过程,试图在某种程度上顺应掌权者的话语。
In Kindai Doitsu no boseishugi feminizumu (Modern Germany’s maternalist feminism)(1993), Himeoka Toshiko outlines the process by which the dominant strategy of integration during the Weimar Republic gave way to a separatist or segregationist model, in short, maternalism, under Nazism. This was a kind of survival strategy for feminism and, speaking from the perspective of activist tactics, it was a ‘persuasion technique’ that appealed to dominant cultural categories. The reason that I
在《近代德国的母性主义女权主义》(1993)一书中,姬冈敏子概述了魏玛共和国时期主流的融合策略如何让位于纳粹时期的分离主义或隔离主义模式,简言之,即母性主义。这是一种女权主义的生存策略,从行动者战术的角度来看,它是一种诉诸主流文化范畴的“说服技巧”。我之所以...

say that feminism is cultureboundis because feminism too has profoundly yielded its vocabulary to cultural categories.
说女权主义是文化限定的,是因为女权主义也深刻地将其词汇让渡给了文化范畴。
Based on the gender strategy of segregation, what the state expected of women on the home front was that they would play the roles of ‘reproductive soldiers’ and of ‘warriors in the economic war’. These were, to use technical terminology, the roles of ‘reproducers’ (procreation) and ‘producers’ (labour), in other words the promotion of fecundity and the mobilisation of labour. We can add to this the role of consumer, or put another way ‘lifestyle reform’ (the name for frugality and contribution). In the words of Kanō:
基于性别隔离的策略,国家对后方女性的期望是她们扮演“生育士兵”和“经济战争中的战士”这两个角色。用专业术语来说,这就是“生育者”(生育)和“生产者”(劳动)的角色,换句话说,就是促进生育率和动员劳动力。我们还可以补充一个角色——消费者,或者换句话说,“生活方式改革”(节俭和贡献的代名词)。用加纳的说法:
Men to the front line overseas and women to the home front…In a situation of a total war that was also a war of aggression, norms concerning the existing gendered division of labour that made a distinction between the ‘inside’ (the home) and the ‘outside’ were, at a stroke, expanded to the whole of the state’ (Kanō, 1987, 1995:67).
男性被派往海外前线,女性则留守后方……在这场既是全面战争又是侵略战争的情况下,关于现有性别分工的规范——即区分“内”(家庭)与“外”的规范——一举扩展到了整个国家。(叶野, 1987, 1995:67)
There are already a number of studies concerned with population control policies during the war (Nagahara, 1985; Kondō, 1995). The Mother Child Protection Law (Boshi Hogo Hō) came into effect in 1938 after the China Incident. In the same year, the Ministry of Welfare was established in order to plan population policy and bring about an improvement in the physique of the nation. In 1940 the National Eugenics Law (Kokumin Yūsei Hō) was passed and along with this, Eugenics Marriage Counselling Centres were established in every area. In November of the same year, the Ministry of Health and Welfare held the first round of awards for Excellent Families with Many Children (ten or more). In 1941, just before the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, the Outline for the Establishment of a Policy on Population (Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō) was approved by the cabinet. This proposed that a population of 73 million in 1940 should 'increase by approximately 27 million over the next twenty years, reaching 100 million by 1960 51 1960 51 1960^('51)1960{ }^{\prime 51} (Kondō, 1995:492).
关于战争期间的人口控制政策,已有许多研究(Nagahara, 1985;Kondō, 1995)。《母子保护法》(Boshi Hogo Hō)于 1938 年中国事变后生效。同年,设立了厚生省,负责规划人口政策并促进国民体质的改善。1940 年通过了《国民优生法》(Kokumin Yūsei Hō),并在各地设立了优生婚姻咨询中心。同年 11 月,厚生省举办了首届“多子优秀家庭”(十子及以上)表彰大会。1941 年,在日美战争爆发前夕,内阁批准了《人口政策制定纲要》(Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō)。该纲要提出,1940 年人口为 7300 万,应在未来二十年内“增加约 2700 万,到 1960 51 1960 51 1960^('51)1960{ }^{\prime 51} 年达到 1 亿”(Kondō, 1995:492)。
Among the measures recommended to bring about population growth were an increase in births, encouragement of marriage, support for a wholesome family system, the fostering of motherhood, a ban on contraception and abortion, and the eradication of venereal disease. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
为实现人口增长所推荐的措施包括增加出生率、鼓励结婚、支持健康的家庭制度、促进母性、禁止避孕和堕胎,以及根除性病。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
Ichikawa Fusae welcomed the government’s Outline for the Establishment of a Policy on Population in the following terms:
市川房枝对政府发布的人口政策纲要表示欢迎,内容如下:
Through this piece of national policy women have reached the point at which, for the first time, their status as the mothers of the Japanese race is recognised, and their consciousness and cooperation are sought by the state…The fact that giving birth and bringing up children are treated [in this plan] not as a private matter of concern to the mother alone or to the family, but as a public matter of concern to the state and the nation, brings the greatest pride and joy to those who are able to give birth (Ichikawa, 1943b; Suzuki 1986:128).
通过这项国家政策,女性首次被承认为日本民族的母亲,她们的意识和合作被国家所重视……在该计划中,生育和养育子女不再被视为仅母亲或家庭的私事,而是作为国家和民族的公共事务,这使得能够生育的人感到无比的自豪和喜悦(市川,1943b;铃木,1986:128)。
It has also been pointed out that population policy was never a matter solely of managing the quantity of the population but also concerned itself with quality, and that behind the policy of increasing the population lay a eugenics policy. It has also been pointed out that eugenic ideas circulated among Japanese feminist thinkers concerned with principles of selection for motherhood: who was qualified for motherhood and who was not? (Furukubo, 1991; Suzuki, 1989b). Furukubo Sakura uses the following statement by Hiratsuka to point out her ‘intimacy with eugenics’:
有人指出,人口政策从来不仅仅是管理人口数量的问题,还涉及人口质量的问题,而增加人口的政策背后隐藏着优生学政策。还有人指出,优生学思想在关注母性选择原则的日本女性主义思想家中流传:谁有资格成为母亲,谁没有?(Furukubo, 1991;Suzuki, 1989b)。古久保樱利用平塚的以下陈述指出她与“优生学的亲密关系”:
The new task of motherhood is a matter not simply of bearing and raising children, but of bearing sound children and raising them well. In other words, the great mission towards humankind that women who eternally pass on that most holy flame, life, are charged with is to contribute to, above and beyond the mere preservation and continuation of the human race, its evolution and improvement. (Hiratsuka 1920: 165; Furukubo, 1991:78).
母亲的新任务不仅仅是生育和抚养孩子,而是生育健康的孩子并将他们养育好。换句话说,永远传递那最神圣火焰——生命的女性所承担的对人类的伟大使命,是在仅仅维持和延续人类种族之上,为其进化和改善做出贡献。(平塚 1920:165;古久保,1991:78)
In Hinin no kahi o ronzu (On the rights and wrongs of contraception), Hiratsuka takes her argument a step further:
在《避孕的对与错》(Hinin no kahi o ronzu)中,平塚将她的论点更进一步:
From a eugenic point of view, it is desirable that in this country too, and as soon as possible, certain individuals should be forbidden by law to marry and a sterilisation law should be put into force. (Hiratuska, 1917; Furukubo 1991:78).
从优生学的角度来看,在我国也应尽快通过法律禁止某些人结婚,并实施绝育法。(平塚,1917;古久保,1991:78)
If we consider the context, there is no doubt that Hiratsuka was aware of the Nazi sterilisation laws. For many years she had been petitioning for a law circumscribing the marriage of men with venereal disease, and had also been advocating that men and women about to marry should be tested for sexually transmitted diseases. Hiratsuka was concerned that syphilis would be transmitted from husband to wife, and that children would be born with congenital syphilis. She believed that a man with a sexually transmitted disease (regarded as evidence of relations with a prostitute) was not qualified
如果考虑背景,毫无疑问平塚知道纳粹的绝育法。多年来,她一直在请愿制定限制患有性病的男性结婚的法律,并主张结婚男女应接受性传播疾病检测。平塚担心梅毒会从丈夫传染给妻子,孩子会患先天性梅毒。她认为患有性传播疾病的男性(被视为与妓女有染的证据)不具备成为父亲的资格。

to become a father. Hiratsuka welcomed control of reproduction by the state.
平塚欢迎国家对生育的控制。
Women’s activists like Yamataka Shigeri and Oku Mumeo enthusiastically involved themselves with ‘life-style improvement’ campaigns for housewives. For some time these women had been involved with campaigns summed up in such slogans as ‘simplification of rite-ofpassage ceremonies’, ‘elimination of waste and frugality’, and ‘rationalisation of life-style. These ideas were passed on unchanged to the post-war Housewives’ Federation (Shufu Rengōkai) and to consumer movements. After the war, Oku Mumeo was appointed Chairperson of the Housewives’ Federation, and in this respect there was no discontinuity for her between the wartime and the post-war period. Narita Ryüichi (1995) has shown, through an analysis of Oku Mumeo’s autobiography, that she carried out her mission and demonstrated her capacity as a women’s activist mobilising the masses with complete consistency both during and after the war. There is not the slightest indication of a ‘conversion’.
像山高茂理和奥梅芽这样的女性活动家热情参与了针对家庭主妇的“生活方式改善”运动。这些女性曾一度参与以“简化成年礼仪式”、“消除浪费与节俭”以及“生活方式合理化”等口号为核心的运动。这些理念被毫无改变地传递给战后主妇联合会(Shufu Rengōkai)及消费者运动。战后,奥梅芽被任命为主妇联合会主席,在这方面,她在战时与战后之间没有任何断层。成田龙一(1995)通过分析奥梅芽的自传表明,她在战时及战后始终如一地完成了她的使命,展现了作为女性活动家动员群众的能力,丝毫没有“转变”的迹象。
Women’s roles as reproducers and consumers fall within the framework, in everyday terms, of ‘wife’ and ‘mother’. What Wakakuwa calls the ‘nationalisation of the family’ (Wakakuwa, 1995) can also be said to be state control of the roles of wife and mother.
女性作为生育者和消费者的角色,在日常语境中属于“妻子”和“母亲”的范畴。若川所称的“家庭的国家化”(Wakakuwa, 1995)也可以说是国家对妻子和母亲角色的控制。
Incidentally, there is a blind spot in the population policy that is euphemistically referred to as ‘the family system’. In addition to raising the marriage rate and the rate of childbirth within marriage to increase the population, there is also the option of increasing the incidence of childbirth outside marriage, or extramarital childbearing. Here, the state is faced with the final choice of whether it should, ultimately, dismantle the private sphere of the family.
顺便提一下,人口政策中存在一个被委婉称为“家族制度”的盲点。除了提高结婚率和婚内生育率以增加人口外,还有提高婚外生育率或婚外生育的选项。在这里,国家面临的最终选择是,是否应当最终解构家庭的私领域。
In the final stages of the Second World War, Nazi concern that women of the ‘Aryan race’ were having difficulty in finding husbands (because of a gender imbalance among men and women of marriageable age), led them to propose ‘the encouragement of single motherhood’ in order to increase the population. This included ‘encouragement of illicit relations’ between members of Nazi elites, such as the SS, and unmarried women. However, this proposal was cold-shouldered by conservative women’s groups, who rallied to the chorus of ‘defend marriage and the family’, and was inevitably
在第二次世界大战的最后阶段,纳粹担心“雅利安种族”的女性因适婚年龄男女比例失衡而难以找到丈夫,因而提出“鼓励单亲母亲”以增加人口。这包括鼓励纳粹精英成员(如党卫军)与未婚女性之间的“非法关系”。然而,这一提议遭到了保守女性团体的冷遇,她们高呼“捍卫婚姻和家庭”,这一提议最终不可避免地

withdrawn (Yonemoto, 1989; Koonz, 1987, 1990). The Nazis built ‘death factories’ to exterminate ‘inferior races’, but their eugenic ideology, as a logical corollary, made it possible to imagine ‘reproduction factories’ employing birth quality control (QC). 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
被撤回(Yonemoto,1989;Koonz,1987,1990)。纳粹建造了“死亡工厂”来消灭“劣等种族”,但他们的优生学意识形态作为一个逻辑推论,使得设想采用出生质量控制(QC)的“生育工厂”成为可能。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
Although it was not openly discussed, another aspect of the defence of the home front was the control of wives’ chastity. One of the duties prescribed for the Women’s Association for National Defence was to support the ‘childbirth soldiers’ left alone at home and to care for the families of soldiers who had been wounded or killed at the front with the same level of concern as if they were their own mothers and sisters. Kanō does not forget to point out that one part of these duties was the role of preserving the ‘morals of Japanese women which are second to none in the world’ and of giving ‘protective guidance’ to ensure that the ‘problem of loose conduct’ did not arise:
虽然没有公开讨论,但保卫后方的另一个方面是对妻子贞洁的控制。国家防卫妇女协会规定的职责之一是支持那些独自留在家的“生育士兵”,并以对待自己母亲和姐妹同样的关怀照顾在前线受伤或阵亡士兵的家属。加纳不忘指出,这些职责的一部分是维护“世界无双的日本女性道德”,并给予“保护性指导”,以确保“不良行为问题”不发生:
In 1938, as a result of a request from the military, the Kobe Women’s Association for National Defence issued a directive to all its chapters concerning ‘protective guidance’ to the families of soldiers who had been killed and, more particularly, the wives of soldiers serving at the front. This directive ordered them to implement, under a cloak of secrecy, effective and appropriate measures to ensure that the moral conduct of the wives of soldiers in the Imperial Army should not give rise to the slightest suspicion. As a result, in Hyogo prefecture a Wives of Heroes Society (Yūshi tsuma no kai) and Mothers on the Home Front Society (Jūgo haha no kai) were inaugurated. These bodies gave ‘protective guidance’ to the young wives of soldiers at the front, or assigned officials to individual wives of soldiers away on active service with instructions to establish close relationships with them and keep a watch on them, so as to ensure that their chastity was not compromised. It is recorded with pride in the History of the Head-quarters of the Kobe District of the Greater Japan Women’s Association for National Defence (Dai-Nippon Kokubō Fujin Kai Kōbe Chihō Honbu Shi) that as the real aim was kept totally secret from the wives, ‘there was nothing to trigger any kind of negative reaction, and the successful prevention of the problem of lewd conduct that we had been concerned about was an accomplishment beyond measure’ (Kanō, 1987; 1995d:73).
1938 年,应军方的请求,神户国防妇女协会向其所有分会发布了一项关于对阵亡士兵家属,尤其是前线士兵妻子的“保护指导”指令。该指令要求他们在保密的掩护下,采取有效且适当的措施,确保帝国陆军士兵妻子的道德行为不引起丝毫怀疑。结果,在兵库县成立了“英雄妻子会”(Yūshi tsuma no kai)和“后方母亲会”(Jūgo haha no kai)。这些组织对前线士兵的年轻妻子进行“保护指导”,或指派官员与服役中的士兵妻子建立密切联系并进行监视,以确保她们的贞洁不受侵犯。 在《大日本国防妇人会神户地区总部史》(Dai-Nippon Kokubō Fujin Kai Kōbe Chihō Honbu Shi)中自豪地记载着,由于真正的目的对妻子们完全保密,“没有引发任何负面反应,我们成功防止了我们所担忧的猥亵行为问题,这是一项无可估量的成就”(Kanō, 1987; 1995d:73)。
The sacredness of Japanese women as wives and mothers had to be maintained using any and every method available. Calling the population policy ‘protection of the family system’ had already gone beyond mere euphemism. This was because the family itself was the stronghold where the masculinity of the soldiers of the Imperial Army was defined. In its shadow were the military comfort women who were forced to carry the burden of ‘whorishness’ as opposed to motherhood, the dark side of the sexual double standard.
必须用一切可用的方法来维护日本妇女作为妻子和母亲的神圣性。将人口政策称为“保护家庭制度”已经不仅仅是委婉说法。这是因为家庭本身就是定义帝国陆军士兵男子气概的堡垒。在其阴影下,是被迫承担“荡妇”负担的军慰安妇,她们作为母性对立面的存在,体现了性别双重标准的黑暗面。

The Paradox of this Gender Strategy
这一性别策略的悖论

Under the total mobilisation system, the strategy of gender segregation began to show cracks. It was fine while the role of the ‘warriors in the economic war’ was limited to consumer activities within the household, but once women’s labour was demanded in the domain of production (due to a shortage of male labour) a conflict between this and motherhood emerged. Women’s policy under the total mobilisation system showed plainly the difficulties of this gender strategy. For example, in order to encourage early marriage and childbearing the Outline for the Establishment of a Policy on Population adopted a policy of placing considerable restrictions on the employment of women workers aged 20 and over, while at the same time took measures to relax or improve employment or working conditions likely to be an obstacle to marriage. Again, as already indicated, women leaders such as Yamataka were critical of the indecision shown by the government over drafting women, and urged it to institute a female draft without hesitation. Even in Yamataka’s case, however, the target for the draft was to be limited to unmarried women to ensure that it was not incompatible with population policy. Social history research, concerned with women’s labour during wartime, tells us that even the severe shortage of labour did not lead to a dismantling of the system of gender segregation in the labour market. Between 1930 and 1945 the female workforce increased fivefold, but the increase in married women in the labour force was not as great and the scope of women’s work was limited. Even under the total mobilisation system, gender segregation was maintained. The integrationist ideal that promoted the female draft was fitted within the gender strategy of segregation. This was because those who promoted the integrationist ideal were, at the same time, wedded to the belief that women’s productive labour should not conflict with motherhood. At the same time, those promoting the gender strategy of segregation were least likely to take the plunge when it
在全面动员体制下,性别隔离的策略开始显现出裂痕。当“经济战争中的战士”角色仅限于家庭内的消费活动时,这种策略尚可行,但一旦由于男性劳动力短缺而需要女性参与生产领域,便出现了与母职之间的冲突。全面动员体制下的女性政策清楚地展示了这一性别策略的困难。例如,为了鼓励早婚早育,《人口政策纲要》采取了对 20 岁及以上女性劳动者的就业施加相当限制的政策,同时采取措施放宽或改善可能成为婚姻障碍的就业或工作条件。同样,如前所述,女性领导人如山高批评政府在征召女性问题上的犹豫不决,敦促政府毫不犹豫地实行女性征兵。然而,即使在山高的情况下,征召对象也被限制为未婚女性,以确保这一政策与人口政策不冲突。 社会历史研究关注战争期间女性劳动力,告诉我们即使劳动力严重短缺,也未导致劳动市场性别隔离制度的瓦解。1930 年至 1945 年间,女性劳动力增加了五倍,但已婚女性劳动力的增加幅度不大,女性工作的范围也受到限制。即使在全面动员体制下,性别隔离依然得以维持。推动女性征兵的融合主义理想被纳入了性别隔离的策略之中。这是因为推动融合主义理想的人同时坚信女性的生产性劳动不应与母职发生冲突。与此同时,推动性别隔离策略的人在女性征兵问题上最不可能冒险。

came to the issue of the female draft. Women’s participation in combat would have dismantled crucial gender boundaries that served to define the national subject and, as a result, would have undermined the self-definition of soldiers as masculine.
女性参与战斗将打破定义国家主体的重要性别界限,结果会削弱士兵作为男性的自我认同。
I indicated that the allied nations of Britain and the United States followed an integrationist gender strategy that was accompanied by female enlistment. However, overemphasising the differences between the segregationist and integrationist gender strategies may invite misunderstanding. The difference between these two strategies is only one of degree. They are rooted in the same configuration of gender within the nation-state. In both Britain and the United States, female service personnel were an exceptional minority and their role was limited to rearguard support. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
我指出,英美两国作为盟国,采取了融合主义的性别策略,并伴随着女性入伍。然而,过分强调隔离主义和融合主义性别策略之间的差异可能会引发误解。这两种策略的差异仅在于程度不同。它们都根植于民族国家内部相同的性别结构。在英国和美国,女性军人都是少数的例外,她们的角色仅限于后方支援。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
Even in the campaign urging women to engage in productive labour, the issue throughout was how to avoid damaging women’s femininity while they participated in the labour force. Anna Davin, a British writer on women’s history, describes persuasively in her classic work Imperialism and Motherhood how motherhood emerged as a keyword during the period of imperialist aggression in Britain and other imperialist nations right through to the 19th century. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
即使在鼓励女性参与生产劳动的运动中,始终关注的问题是如何在女性参与劳动力的同时避免损害她们的女性气质。英国女性史作家安娜·达文在其经典著作《帝国主义与母性》中有力地描述了母性如何在英国及其他帝国主义国家的帝国主义侵略时期,一直到 19 世纪,成为一个关键词。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
Among the Allied countries, France is renowned for its pronatalist policy of openly encouraging childbearing. The population policies of the fascist states came to be treated as taboo after defeat. Nevertheless, in France, which was on the winning side, wartime population policies continued into the post-war period. As a matter of fact, defeat in the war against Germany was put down to defeat in the population war. A policy of promoting population growth was adopted immediately after the war, and has continued to this day. It is also noteworthy that the decrease in the birth rate that has affected all the advanced industrialized countries occurred first and progressed more rapidly in France than in other country. In Germany, too, the birth rate had started to decline even during the Nazi period and Nazi population policy achieved no great results despite all the rhetoric.
在盟国中,法国以其公开鼓励生育的亲生育政策而闻名。法西斯国家的人口政策在战败后被视为禁忌。然而,在作为胜利方的法国,战时的人口政策延续到了战后。事实上,对德国战争的失败被归结为人口战争的失败。战后立即采取了促进人口增长的政策,并一直持续至今。同样值得注意的是,影响所有先进工业国家的出生率下降,最早且进展最快的国家是法国。在德国,出生率甚至在纳粹时期就开始下降,尽管纳粹人口政策言辞激烈,但并未取得显著成效。
In this sense, an integrationist gender strategy that included the drafting of women as combat personnel, a move that would ultimately dismantle the gender boundaries of the nation-state, was not adopted in any nation-state,
从这个意义上说,包括征召女性为战斗人员这一最终将打破民族国家性别界限的举措在内的整合性别策略,在任何民族国家都未被采纳,

and neither was it advocated even by proponents of women’s liberation. The ultimate goal of ‘one-nation gender equality’ (ikkoku danjyo byōdō) premised on the existence of the nation-state, 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} has to be equality between men and women in the military. Yet, when the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was in the process of being debated in the United States in the 1970s, those opposed to it mounted a pernicious campaign to prevent the passing of the ERA, suggesting that if men and women were equal, then women would also have to shoulder the burden of military service. At the time, a young soldier just about to be despatched to the frontline in Vietnam was asked in a television interview how he would feel if the fellow-soldier standing next to him was a woman. His answer revealed his dilemma:
这也不是女性解放的支持者所倡导的。“一国男女平等”(ikkoku danjyo byōdō)的最终目标,是以民族国家的存在为前提, 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} 必须是在军队中实现男女平等。然而,当 1970 年代美国正在讨论《平等权利修正案》(ERA)时,反对者发起了一场恶毒的运动,试图阻止该修正案的通过,声称如果男女平等,那么女性也必须承担服兵役的负担。当时,一名即将被派往越南前线的年轻士兵在电视采访中被问及,如果站在他身边的战友是女性,他会有何感受。他的回答揭示了他的困境:
We’ve been taught that we’re fighting to protect our wives and sweethearts at home, but if the wives and sweethearts we were protecting turned up on the front line I wouldn’t know what we were fighting for (Ueno, 1991).
“我们被教导说,我们是在为保护家中的妻子和心上人而战,但如果我们要保护的妻子和心上人出现在前线,我就不知道我们到底在为什么而战了。”(上野,1991)
Without a doubt, the success of the anti-ERA campaign was that it attacked the secret yet decisive alliance between ‘the nation’ and ‘masculinity’.
毫无疑问,反对 ERA 运动的成功在于它攻击了“国家”与“男性气概”之间那种隐秘却决定性的联盟。
At the end of the Vietnam War in 1973, conscription was abolished in the United States and participation in the armed forces became voluntary. Along with this, the number of female service personnel increased and their participation in combat emerged as an issue. Eventually, at the time of the Gulf War in 1991, (a war the majority of American citizens enthusiastically supported as ‘good war’ fought to check Saddam Hussein’s ‘madness’) the National Organisation for Women (NOW), the largest women’s organisation in the country, sought the removal of the ban on women’s participation in combat in the name of equality. Yet, should we view this as women’s liberation or as the ultimate nationalisation of women?
1973 年越南战争结束时,美国废除了征兵制,参军变为自愿。与此同时,女性军人数量增加,她们参与战斗的问题也开始浮现。最终,在 1991 年海湾战争期间(这场战争被大多数美国公民热情支持,视为遏制萨达姆·侯赛因“疯狂”的“正义战争”),全国妇女组织(NOW),该国最大的女性组织,以平等名义寻求取消女性参战禁令。然而,我们应将此视为女性解放,还是女性的最终国家化?

Women and the Issue of Conversion
女性与转变问题

In emphasising the historical agency of feminists, the reflexive school of women’s history also emphasizes that the wartime support of these women, whether active or passive, was based on ‘free will’. As a result, the question that presents itself is; did these women in fact undergo a ‘conversion’?
在强调女权主义者的历史能动性时,女性历史的反思学派也强调,这些女性在战争期间的支持,无论是积极还是消极,都是基于“自由意志”。因此,问题出现了:这些女性是否实际上经历了一次“转变”?
Here the word conversion incorporates two meanings. The first is a conversion from the principles of first wave feminism to supporting the goals of the war. The second is the conversion from supporting the war to promoting post-war peace and democracy.
这里“转变”一词包含两层含义。第一层是从第一波女权主义的原则转变为支持战争目标。第二层是从支持战争转变为推动战后和平与民主。
Scholars of the reflexive school of women’s history deny the first conversion. Here, war support was not something forced upon feminists. What, then, about the second conversion? It is pointed out that Ichikawa, Hiratsuka and Takamure were all quick to adapt to changing circumstances after the war. For these women, it was as though the statements they had made during the war had never been and there is no sense of reflection or discontinuity.
反思派女性史学者否认第一种转变。在这里,支持战争并非强加于女权主义者。那么,第二种转变又如何呢?有人指出,市川、平塚和高群都是在战后迅速适应变化的环境。对这些女性来说,仿佛她们在战争期间所发表的言论从未存在过,既没有反思也没有断裂感。
After defeat, Ichikawa wasted no time in resuming her suffragist activities. Indeed, she welcomed female suffrage brought about by the occupation authorities. For a period after the war, Ichikawa was purged from public office by the occupation forces, but after a comeback she stood successfully in the elections for the House of Councillors (Sangiin). 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} Ichikawa’s support of and cooperation in the war was evident to everybody. It was regarded as a blemish on her career, but that too has been legitimised as an unavoidable choice made to protect the women’s suffrage movement. Until the close of her long life in 1981 at the age of 87. Ichikawa, as a female Diet member who served five terms over a period of 25 years, filled the role of the figure who symbolized post-war women’s liberation. It can be said that only with her death did any real criticism of her become possible. 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58}
战败后,市川毫不犹豫地恢复了她的妇女参政权活动。事实上,她欢迎由占领当局带来的女性选举权。战后的一段时间内,市川被占领军从公职中清除,但复出后,她成功当选为参议院(参议院)议员。 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} 市川对战争的支持与合作是众所周知的。这被视为她职业生涯中的污点,但这也被合法化为为了保护妇女参政权运动而做出的不可避免的选择。直到 1981 年她 87 岁高龄去世之前,作为一名在 25 年间担任五届议员的女性国会议员,市川扮演了象征战后女性解放的角色。可以说,只有在她去世后,才有可能对她进行真正的批评。 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58}

Suzuki Yūko cites the following from Ichikawa's post-war recollections:
铃木裕子引用了市川战后回忆录中的以下内容:

Since I was a national subject living under the conditions of that time, although I wouldn’t go as far as saying that it was only natural, I don’t feel any sense of shame. I wonder if I am wrong? (Ichikawa, 1979; Suzuki, 1989b:103).
由于我是那个时代条件下的国民,虽然我不会说这是理所当然的,但我并不感到羞愧。我是不是错了?(市川,1979;铃木,1989b:103)。
In her quotation of this section, Suzuki underlines the words ‘Seeing that I was a national subject’, and indicates that this ‘is a key point when we consider the issue of her nationalism based on the emperor system’ (Suzuki, 1989b:65). The conclusion that arises from this is that Ichikawa did not go through a conversion after the war, and consequently did not reflect on what she had done either, which serves to convict her still further.
在引用本节内容时,铃木强调了“既然我是国家的臣民”这句话,并指出“这是我们考虑她基于天皇制的民族主义问题时的关键点”(铃木,1989b:65)。由此得出的结论是,市川战后并未经历信仰转变,因此也没有反思自己所做的事情,这反而使她的罪责更加明显。
Hiratsuka also participated enthusiastically in peace campaigning after the war. When there was a resumption of nuclear arms testing after the war, along with Yukawa Hideki, a Nobel Physics Prize winner, and Shimonaka Yasaburō, she became a member of the Seven-Person Committee Appealing for World Peace (Sekai Heiwa Apiru Shichinin Iinkai), and sent a protest letter to the President of the United States. She also became a director of the World Federation Establishment Alliance (Sekai Renpō Kensetsu Dōmei) and acted as a leader in the post-war peace movement. To Hiratsuka, the ideal of pacifism, linked to the conquest of overcoming the egoism of the human race, was something that she had adhered to consistently from the beginning. She felt that the conviction that she had held all along had only deepened post-war, and it cannot be said that she was conscious of a need to convert. 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59}
平塚也积极参与了战后的和平运动。当战后核武器试验恢复时,她与诺贝尔物理学奖得主汤川秀树以及下中弥三郎一起,成为“呼吁世界和平七人委员会”(世界和平アピール七人委員会)的成员,并向美国总统递交了抗议信。她还成为“世界联合建立联盟”(世界連邦建設同盟)的理事,成为战后和平运动的领导者。对平塚来说,和平主义的理想,与克服人类自我主义的征服紧密相连,是她从一开始就始终坚持的信念。她觉得自己一直持有的信念在战后更加坚定,不能说她意识到需要改变信仰。 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59}
In the case of ultra-nationalist Takamure Itsue, it appears rather difficult to defend her defection. Takamure wrote the following in her diary on the day after hearing the imperial declaration of surrender:
对于极端民族主义者高群逸枝来说,为她的叛变辩护似乎相当困难。高群在听到天皇宣布投降的第二天,在日记中写道:
I felt a deep pain that cut right through to my heart and all I could do was weep and moan. Prostrating myself, all I could do was weep and moan. At night I slept fitfully, and could only weep and moan. In the morning too, all I could do was weep. For a long time my tears did not cease. Tears of profound suffering. Tears of grief. What did this pain mean? We still had not found words to express our feelings. Yet, we suffered. The pain went on and on (cited in Kano and Horiba, 1977).
我感到一种深深的痛楚,直刺心扉,我所能做的只有哭泣和哀号。俯伏在地,我只能哭泣和哀号。夜里我辗转难眠,只能哭泣和哀号。早晨也是,我所能做的只有哭泣。很长一段时间,我的泪水没有停止。那是深沉的痛苦之泪,是悲伤的泪水。这痛楚意味着什么?我们仍未找到表达感情的言辞。然而,我们在受苦。痛楚一再持续(引自加野和堀场,1977 年)。
After this, Takamure showed herself quick to adapt to the changed circumstances in a manner that can only be called opportunist. She revised
此后,高群秀敏表现出迅速适应变化环境的能力,这种适应只能称之为机会主义。她修订了

sections of Dai-Nippon Joseishi (The history of the women of greater Japan) that had been serialised in the magazine Nihon Fujin (Japanese women) during the war to remove the emperor-centred nationalistic view of history. This was published it in 1948, at the same time as the classic cannon of women’s history, Inoue Kiyoshi’s Nihon Joseishi (The history of Japanese women). 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
在战争期间于杂志《日本妇人》中连载的《大日本女史》(大日本妇女史)部分章节,去除了以天皇为中心的民族主义历史观。该书于 1948 年出版,与女性历史经典著作井上清的《日本女史》同时问世。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
Kanō Mikiyo, who criticised Takamure for being ‘the state shamaness’, comments that, along with the ‘high priest’ Emperor’s renunciation of his divine status, Itsue the ‘child of god’ was reborn as Itsue the ‘human child’:
狩野美纪代批评高群逸枝是“国家的巫女”,并评论说,随着“最高祭司”天皇放弃其神圣地位,作为“神之子”的逸枝重生为“人类之子”逸枝:
It is difficult to say that Takamure’s comeback as the ‘human child’ was fair play. Just as in the case of the Emperor’s renunciation of his divine status…(Kanō, 1979:175).
很难说高群逸枝作为“人类之子”的回归是公平的。正如天皇放弃其神圣地位的情况一样……(狩野,1979:175)。
Should we call this Takamure’s ‘conversion’? According to Nishikawa Yūko, Takamure’s position of ‘being with the female masses’ was at least consistent. In that sense, it is perhaps fair to say that Takamure was opportunistic to the same degree as the ‘female masses’, and that she underwent a ‘conversion’ to the same degree. However if, as Kurihara Hiroshi (1997) suggests, Takamure achieved the liberation of women within her historical writing, her position as an independent scholar of women’s history was consistent and in this sense there was no conversion. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
我们应该称之为高群逸枝的“皈依”吗?根据西川裕子的说法,高群逸枝“与女性大众同在”的立场至少是一贯的。从这个意义上说,也许可以公平地说,高群逸枝和“女性大众”一样具有机会主义,她的“皈依”程度也相同。然而,如果如栗原宏(1997)所建议的那样,高群逸枝在其历史著作中实现了女性的解放,那么她作为女性历史独立学者的立场是一贯的,从这个意义上说并不存在皈依。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
Incidentally, the perspective that raises the issue of conversion, rooted as it is in the continuity school of history, reveals a strange twist. If there was continuity in the modernisation project between pre- and post-war, why was it necessary for a conversion to take place? From the viewpoint of the continuity school, it would be correct to say that there was no conversion. Now what does the reflexive school of women’s history rescue from a rereading of the texts? Just as we would expect, they find the consistency and agency of pre-war feminists thinkers.
顺便提一下,提出转变问题的视角,根植于历史连续性学派,展现出一种奇特的转折。如果战前与战后现代化项目之间存在连续性,为什么还需要发生转变?从连续性学派的观点来看,说没有转变是正确的。那么,女性历史的反思学派从重新解读文本中挽救了什么?正如我们所预期的,他们发现了战前女权思想家的连贯性和能动性。
Accepting that this is the case, just who was it that made a mistake? To condemn women’s support for the war as a mistake, two conditions are necessary. It is necessary, first, to judge the war itself a mistake and, second, as a consequence of this, to point out the ignorance and historical limitations that prevented these women from seeing that the war was a mistake. A perspective that points to this variety of mistake must always be both retrospective and transcendental. For example, Suzuki criticises
既然如此,究竟是谁犯了错误?要谴责女性对战争的支持是错误,必须满足两个条件。首先,必须判断战争本身是错误的;其次,作为这一判断的结果,指出这些女性因无知和历史局限性而未能看出战争是错误的。指出这种错误的视角必须始终既是回顾性的,也是先验的。例如,铃木批评道
Ichikawa for the limitation of not foreseeing the trap of nationalisation, and Hiratsuka for the ignorance of idealising the Emperor. This is an absolutist viewpoint in which nationalisation and the emperor system are judged wrong in their aftermath, in other words, this is given as a post-war perspective.
市川因未能预见国有化的陷阱而受到限制,平塚因理想化天皇而被批评。这是一种绝对主义观点,认为国有化和天皇制度在其后果上是错误的,换句话说,这是战后视角。
Suzuki is included in among the ‘post-war faction whose departure point is the self-evident premise that the fifteen-year war was equal to an aggressive war, which in turn equals a bad war’ (Kanō, 1987; 1995:166). But here again, the self-evident nature of this premise is something formed by history 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}. As the limits of the state and the evil of the emperor system have only been pronounced retrospectively, is it not unfair, as a historian, to convict an individual living in the midst of it for not being able to overcome historical limitations? The reason why Suzuki’s women’s history (while recognised as having raised many excellent questions and as making an important contribution to women’s history) is often called the prosecution school of history, is simply that it adopts these transcendental standards of judgement resting on this ‘vacuum zone’ of history.
铃木被归入“以十五年战争等同于侵略战争,进而等同于一场坏战争这一不言自明的前提为出发点的战后派”(加纳,1987;1995:166)。但这里同样,这一前提的不言自明性是由历史形成的 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} 。由于国家的局限性和天皇制度的罪恶只是事后才被宣告,作为历史学家,难道不应该公平地看待生活在其中的个体未能超越历史局限吗?铃木的女性史(虽然被认为提出了许多优秀的问题并对女性史做出了重要贡献)常被称为历史的起诉派,原因仅在于它采用了基于这一“历史真空区”的超验判断标准。

Ideas Capable of Transcending the 'State'
能够超越“国家”的思想

In his essay about the war generation Wadatsumi sedai, Yasukawa Junosuke raised the question ‘what footholds would have made it possible for anyone to get through the period?’ His answer was that to ‘live through the period without being swept away by the times, fate or conditions, demands that one holds a particularly dependable tenet or principle’ (Yasakawa, 1996:104).
在他关于战争世代“海神世代”的文章中,安川寿之助提出了一个问题:“有什么立足点能让人们挺过那个时期?”他的回答是,“要在那个时期不被时代、命运或环境所左右地活下来,必须持有一个特别可靠的信条或原则”(安川,1996:104)。
By offering examples of individuals living in the same era who did not make the mistake of supporting the war, Suzuki emphasizes the ‘responsibility’ of those who made a mistake that might have been avoided. As examples, she includes communist, anarchist, Christian and pacifist women. Just what were the grounds upon which these women were able transcend the state?
铃木通过举例说明同一时代中没有犯支持战争错误的个人,强调了那些可能本可避免错误者的“责任”。她举出的例子包括共产主义者、无政府主义者、基督徒和和平主义女性。这些女性究竟凭借什么理由能够超越国家?
Communist women were able to transcend the nation-state by relying on the internationalism of the Comintern, 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} but their idealism was betrayed by the actual socialist state. The state egoism of the Soviet Union under the rule of Stalin meant that internationalism was hastily cast off for national interests, and the state did not even decline to enter a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. And this was not all. Communist women were prevented by their prioritising of the class struggle above all else from problematising the oppression they themselves experienced as women. These women may have transcended the nation-state, but they were not able to transcend gender. This was due, moreover, to their loyalty to a socialist internationalism that had been tailored by men.
共产主义女性能够依靠共产国际的国际主义超越民族国家, 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} 但她们的理想主义被实际的社会主义国家所背叛。斯大林统治下的苏联国家自我主义意味着国际主义被匆忙抛弃以追求国家利益,国家甚至不惜与纳粹德国签订互不侵犯条约。这还不是全部。共产主义女性由于将阶级斗争置于一切之上,未能对她们自身作为女性所经历的压迫进行问题化。这些女性或许超越了民族国家,但她们无法超越性别。此外,这还归因于她们对由男性塑造的社会主义国际主义的忠诚。
What about religion? It is a well-known fact that not only Japanese Buddhist groups but other religious groups, including Christian ones, became involved in the imperial rule assistance system.
宗教呢?众所周知,不仅是日本佛教团体,其他宗教团体,包括基督教团体,也参与了帝国统治协助体系。
Claudia Koonz offers the example of the resistance of Christian women’s groups under Nazism (Koonz, 1987). What is extremely interesting is that
克劳迪娅·库恩茨举出了纳粹统治下基督教女性团体抵抗的例子(Koonz, 1987)。极其有趣的是

she points out that Protestants, who emphasize internal ethics, were easily caught up in Nazism, while Catholic women demonstrated greater powers of resistance to it. Now, what was it that Catholic women had that enabled them to transcend the National Socialist regime? It was simply the fact that another source of authority, a ‘state within a state’, the Vatican, existed as a concrete presence. Ought we not applaud the historical irony that this obedience to another authority, an authority that was itself extremely discriminatory towards women, was in the end what enabled these women to resist Nazism, which had been declared evil.
她指出,强调内在伦理的基督新教徒容易被纳粹主义所裹挟,而天主教女性则表现出更强的抵抗力。那么,天主教女性具备什么,使她们能够超越国家社会主义政权呢?这仅仅是因为另一个权威来源——一个“国中之国”,即梵蒂冈,作为一个具体存在而存在。我们难道不应该为这一历史讽刺鼓掌吗?正是对另一个权威的服从——这个权威本身对女性极为歧视——最终使这些女性能够抵抗被宣布为邪恶的纳粹主义。
Suzuki introduces the example of Hasegawa Teru who could be called a traitor for carrying through her anti-war intentions. As an Esperantist, Hasegawa took an absolute anti-war position. She went to China and turned on her own homeland, taking charge of anti-war broadcasting aimed at Japan. Since hers has been acknowledged as an inspiring career, there are two questions that I cannot repress asking. Firstly, was Hasegawa against all wars without making a distinction between good and bad ones? This is closely tied in with the question of whether an imperialist war of aggression is automatically bad, while a war fought for national liberation (or to support it) is good. This is in turn is tied in with the confrontation between ‘good nukes’ and ‘bad nukes’ that divided the post-war anti-nuclear campaign. Secondly, what if the broadcasts to Japan that Hasegawa was engaged in had not been for China, but from another country? What about the case of Okada Yoshiko, who was similarly engaged in broadcasting work targeting Japan, but this time from Moscow? Okada’s cooperation is regarded as having been forced. But while Okada, who cooperated with Stalin’s regime, a regime already judged to be bad, is said to have been used, Hasegawa, who assisted the Chinese people in their fight against Japan, in other words in a ‘just war’, is regarded as a hero.
铃木举了长谷川照的例子,她因坚持反战立场而可被称为叛徒。作为一名世界语者,长谷川采取了绝对的反战立场。她去了中国,转而反对自己的祖国,负责针对日本的反战广播。由于她的经历被认为是鼓舞人心的,有两个问题我无法抑制地想要提出。首先,长谷川是否反对所有战争,而不区分好坏战争?这与一个问题密切相关:帝国主义侵略战争是否自动被视为坏战争,而为民族解放(或支持民族解放)而战的战争则是好战争?这又与战后反核运动中“好核武器”和“坏核武器”之争有关。其次,如果长谷川所从事的对日本的广播不是为了中国,而是来自另一个国家,会怎样?再比如冈田良子,她同样从事针对日本的广播工作,但这次是在莫斯科?冈田的合作被认为是被迫的。 但是,虽然与斯大林政权合作的冈田被认为是被利用的,而斯大林政权本身已经被判定为恶劣政权,但协助中国人民抗击日本,也就是参与“正义战争”的长谷川,却被视为英雄。
What about anarchists like Kaneko Fumiko and Itō Noe who were killed by the authorities? It is hard to guess what these women would have done had they not died before the Sino-Japanese war began. If the task of examining the pasts of feminists closely were carried out painstakingly, it is most likely that the majority of feminist leaders would fall from their seats of honour and the only ones left at the end would be those who had the good fortune to die before the war, thus leaving their reputations unsullied.
那么像金子文子和伊藤野枝这样被当局杀害的无政府主义者呢?很难猜测如果她们没有在中日战争开始前去世,会做出什么样的选择。如果对女权主义者的过去进行细致的审视,极有可能大多数女权运动领袖都会从她们的荣誉宝座上跌落,最终留下的只有那些有幸在战争前去世、因此名誉未被玷污的人。
It was not only women, but also ethnic minorities and downtrodden groups who were dragged into the nationalisation project of total mobilisation. Kim Chonmi has fully exposed the process by which, in Japan, the National Levellers’ Society (Zenkoku Suiheisha), the forerunner of the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei), and its leader Matsumoto Jiichirō enthusiastically supported the nationalisation project and cooperated with the war of aggression (Kim, 1994). Tomiyama Ichirō asked the same question in relation to Okinawa, delving into the trap that caught the people of Okinawa; their expectation of nationalisation leading them to fight in the battle of Okinawa (Tomiyama, 1990).
不仅是女性,少数民族和被压迫群体也被卷入了全面动员的民族国家化项目。金贞美充分揭示了在日本,全国水平社(Zenkoku Suiheisha,部落解放同盟 Buraku Kaihō Dōmei 的前身)及其领导人松本治一郎热情支持民族国家化项目并配合侵略战争的过程(金,1994)。富山一郎针对冲绳提出了同样的问题,深入探讨了困住冲绳人民的陷阱;他们对民族国家化的期待使他们参与了冲绳战役(富山,1990)。
It is widely known that even in the United States, the victor nation, black and ethnic-Asian soldiers welcomed ‘equality within the military’ and enthusiastically went to the front. The nationalisation project created Anderson’s (1985) ‘imagined community’, and certainly in the course of historicising this it is a difficult task for anyone to criticise this from a transcendental, extra-historical perspective.
众所周知,即使在战胜国美国,黑人和亚裔士兵也欢迎“军队内部的平等”,并热情奔赴前线。民族国家化项目创造了安德森(1985)所说的“想象的共同体”,而且在历史化这一过程时,任何人都很难从超越历史的视角对其进行批判。

A Critique of the Reflexive School of Women's History
女性史反思学派的批判

Total war required the nationalisation of women (josei no kokuminka) and so advanced the process. As we have already seen, many women’s activists welcomed this new regime, and indeed energetically promoted it. Study of modern total war demonstrates that irrespective of whether we look at the situation in the countries of the Allied Powers or those of the Axis Alliance the ‘nationalisation of women’ was similarly advanced. There must have been female leaders in the victor countries of the United States and Britain Wakakuwa Midori calls them ‘war cheerleaders’ - but as theirs was an antifascist war for ‘freedom and democracy’, does that mean that the nationalisation of women in this ‘legitimate’ cause is excusable?
全面战争要求女性的国家化(josei no kokuminka),从而推动了这一进程。正如我们已经看到的,许多女性活动家欢迎这一新政权,甚至积极推动它。对现代全面战争的研究表明,无论我们观察的是盟军国家还是轴心国联盟国家,“女性的国家化”都同样得到了推进。在美国和英国这些胜利国中一定有女性领导者,若川绿称她们为“战争啦啦队员”——但由于她们参与的是一场反法西斯的“自由与民主”战争,这是否意味着在这一“正当”事业中女性的国家化是可以被原谅的?
When the reflexive school of women’s history raises the question of the perpetrator responsibility of women, just what is it reflecting on? Just by asking what the scope of the object of reflection is, we also ask whether the reflexive school of women’s history can transcend the boundaries of national history. This question brings with it three secondary areas of inquiry.
当女性历史的反思学派提出女性作为加害者责任的问题时,它究竟在反思什么?仅仅通过询问反思对象的范围,我们也在质疑女性历史的反思学派是否能够超越民族历史的界限。这个问题带来了三个次要的探究领域。
Firstly, when the reflexive school of women’s history raises the question of what war responsibility women bear because of their support for ‘that war of aggression’, does this mean that the object of its reflection extends to war in general? While war is the largest project that a nation-state undertakes and modern wars share the characteristic of being total wars that demand total mobilisation of all citizens of all classes, is it the case that the same act of war support requires women who belong to fascist states to reflect, while there is no such necessity for women who are citizens of the Allied Powers? If this is the case, it means that wars can be divided into good wars and bad wars, and the culpability of Japanese women lies in the fact that they did not have the foresight to realise that they were supporting a bad war. When it
首先,当女性历史的反思学派提出女性因支持“那场侵略战争”而应承担何种战争责任的问题时,这是否意味着其反思的对象扩展到了战争本身?战争是民族国家承担的最大项目,现代战争具有全面战争的特征,要求动员所有阶层的所有公民,那么是否同样的战争支持行为要求属于法西斯国家的女性进行反思,而作为同盟国公民的女性则没有这种必要?如果是这样的话,这意味着战争可以分为正义战争和非正义战争,而日本女性的罪责在于她们没有预见到自己支持的是一场非正义战争。当它

comes to distinguishing between good and bad wars, how is this to be done, if not after the event?
涉及区分正义战争和非正义战争时,如果不是事后进行,这该如何判断?
Secondly, is it the case that the reflexive school of women’s history supports the nationalisation of women, but rejects war as an undertaking of the nation state? This way of thinking fits well with the one-nation pacifism embodied in Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, which declares that the Japanese people do not recognise the right of belligerency of the state and forever renounce the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. At the same time, it brings in its wake all the limitations that accompany one-nation pacifism. For all that, how are we to evaluate the fact that the modern nation-state was established on the basis of the disarming of its citizens and the monopolisation of violence by the state?
其次,女性历史的反思学派是否支持女性的国家化,但又拒绝将战争视为民族国家的事业?这种思维方式与日本宪法第九条所体现的一国和平主义非常契合,该条款宣称日本人民不承认国家的交战权,永远放弃以武力威胁或使用武力作为解决国际争端的手段。与此同时,这也带来了伴随一国和平主义的所有局限性。尽管如此,我们又该如何评价现代民族国家是在公民解除武装和国家垄断暴力的基础上建立起来的这一事实呢?
In the modern era, the nation-state is the sole legal entity for which the use of violence has been legalised. Furthermore, how should we view the fact that military service is the basis of citizenship? In contrast, if the nationalisation of women is to be the object of criticism regardless of the circumstances, then the question that arises is, on what basis can or indeed must women transcend the state? Does the perpetrator historical viewpoint of the reflexive school of women’s history include this question within its range of fire?
在现代,民族国家是唯一合法化使用暴力的法律实体。此外,我们应如何看待军事服役作为公民身份基础的事实?相反,如果无论何种情况都应批判女性的国家化,那么随之而来的问题是,女性基于何种理由能够或必须超越国家?女性历史反思学派的加害者视角是否将这一问题纳入其关注范围?
Thirdly, while there are versions of the nationalisation of women between the integration and segregation models (whether as a result of historical accident or historical necessity, the countries of the Allied Powers correspond to the integration model and those of the Axis Alliance to the segregation model), can it be said that the segregation model is more oppressive for women and the integration model more liberating? In addition, is it possible to criticise the women of the fascist states who, having accepted the gender boundaries of the segregation model, meekly accepted cooperation with the system in the role of second-class citizens, as backward beings who submitted to the patriarchal state? 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} However, the integration model strategy of gender equality leads to female soldiers as the inexorable conclusion of the nationalisation of women. Moreover, it cannot even be said that the achievement of the kind of gender equality aimed at by integrationists would necessarily be liberating for women. This is because the model of a human being is based on a male standard and as such
第三,虽然女性国家化存在介于融合模式和隔离模式之间的版本(无论是历史偶然还是历史必然,盟军国家对应融合模式,轴心国对应隔离模式),但是否可以说隔离模式对女性更具压迫性,而融合模式更具解放性?此外,是否可以批评法西斯国家的女性,她们接受了隔离模式的性别界限,顺从地接受作为二等公民与体制合作,是屈从于父权国家的落后存在? 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} 然而,融合模式的性别平等策略最终不可避免地导致女性士兵的出现,成为女性国家化的必然结论。而且,甚至不能说融合主义者所追求的那种性别平等的实现必然会解放女性。这是因为人类的模型是基于男性标准的,因此

women’s reproductive function can only be a handicap. While the segregation model confines women to a female domain, the integration model forces women to deny their own femaleness. What is more, even if the integration model is fully realised, women end up being treated as a second-class fighting force. In the Gulf War, American service women made the nightmare scenario of soldiers getting pregnant and giving birth and soldiers going on maternity leave come true before our eyes. Besides this, we can also expect to see female prisoners of war subjected to sexual degradation to ‘humiliate the bitches’.
女性的生殖功能只能成为一种负担。隔离模式将女性限制在女性领域,而融合模式则迫使女性否认自己的女性特质。更重要的是,即使融合模式得以完全实现,女性最终仍被视为二等战斗力量。在海湾战争中,美国女兵让士兵怀孕、生育以及士兵休产假的噩梦场景在我们眼前成为现实。除此之外,我们还可以预见女战俘将遭受性侮辱,以“羞辱这些母狗”。
The differences between the integration and segregation models reflect the dilemma of the modern age’s designation of an allotted domain for women, yet we can say that both are versions of the nationalisation of women. In the Soviet Bloc countries, which in a sense maintained in peacetime the state-regulated economy of the war years, the integration model was realised in terms of women’s labour. The capitalist economies of the Allied countries, on the other hand, returned to the segregation model in peacetime. If we look at the position of women in the communist countries we see that there is no guarantee that the integration model is more liberating than the segregation model. The generous maternal protection policies of the communist countries were implemented with the aim of relieving women of the additional burdens of maternity by having the state shoulder them but, if anything, they preserved traditional ways of thinking concerning the family and gender roles. It should be noted that the socialisation of childcare was originally a labour policy aimed at mobilising women’s labour, and was not established as a part of some generous policy on gender equality and even less as a child welfare policy aimed at securing children’s right to be cared for (Ueno, Tanaka, and Mae 1994).
融合模式与隔离模式之间的差异反映了现代社会为女性划定特定领域的困境,但我们可以说,两者都是女性国家化的不同版本。在某种意义上维持了战时国家调控经济的苏联集团国家,融合模式在女性劳动方面得以实现。另一方面,盟国的资本主义经济在和平时期则回归了隔离模式。如果我们观察共产主义国家中女性的地位,会发现融合模式并不一定比隔离模式更具解放性。共产主义国家实施的慷慨母性保护政策,旨在通过国家承担育儿负担来减轻女性的额外负担,但实际上,这些政策反而保留了关于家庭和性别角色的传统观念。 应当注意,育儿社会化最初是一项旨在动员女性劳动力的劳动政策,并非作为某种慷慨的性别平等政策而建立,更不是作为保障儿童被照顾权利的儿童福利政策(上野、田中、前 1994)。
As it happens, the problem of the nationalisation of women carries within itself the possibility of its own solution. Just as the emperor system was relativised as a target to be overthrown by the very fact that the term emperor system established it as a thesis, so too the term nationalisation of women highlights at a stroke the ludicrous inconsistency of the categories nation and women. Firstly, from the very beginning the nation was defined, through the exclusion of women, in masculine terms. Secondly, women were only later discovered as a single community through the category
恰恰如此,女性国族化的问题本身就蕴含着其自身解决的可能性。正如天皇制因“天皇制”这一术语的确立而被相对化为一个应被推翻的对象一样,女性国族化这一术语一举揭示了“国家”和“女性”这两个范畴的荒谬不一致。首先,从一开始,国家就是通过排除女性而以男性视角定义的。其次,女性作为一个单一群体,是后来才通过该范畴被发现的。

gender. To rephrase this, both ‘nation’ and ‘women’ were denaturalised as a result of the deconstruction of these categories. Furthermore, what the paradigm nationalisation of women, obtained by gendering the nation made clear was, firstly, the all too obvious fact that women were not citizens and, secondly, the acuteness of the dilemma that the state faced in order for the nationalisation of women to occur; should gender boundaries be maintained or transcended?
性别。换句话说,随着这些范畴的解构,“国家”和“女性”都被去自然化了。此外,通过将国家性别化而实现的女性国家化范式首先明确指出了一个显而易见的事实:女性并非公民;其次,也凸显了国家为实现女性国家化所面临的尖锐困境——性别界限应当被维持还是超越?
Post-colonial analysis has persistently exposed the way in which a category, by creating an imagined community, in turn becomes something oppressive. In this sense the category ‘women’ is no exception. Oppression inevitably surfaces because each category involves an exclusiveness; if you are not this, you are that. Now the category nation is nothing more than one type of exclusive category. War makes this exclusiveness even more visible. The nation demands that one belong exclusively to just one state. People with dual nationality or indeterminate beings who are neither enemy nor ally, are not recognised. The post-colonialist’s response to this is not to reject categories, but to multiply them; let’s have more categories! Only a multiplication of categories to match the complexity of the individual can check the absorption of an individual into the community of a single category. The reason why the nation is oppressive is that it demands an exclusive jurisdiction that recognises no higher category. Setting up another transcendental category in order to overcome this would mean that even if individuals fled from the state they would be gathered up into another community. The lesson learned from the tumultuous international history of the 1980s was that the state has lost its transcendency, and that the state does not have a transcendency sufficient to ‘lay down ones life’ for it. In other words, the state had been relativised.
后殖民分析持续揭示了这样一种现象:某一类别通过创造一个想象的共同体,反过来成为一种压迫力量。在这方面,“女性”这一类别也不例外。压迫不可避免地出现,因为每个类别都包含排他性;如果你不是这个,你就是那个。现在,国家这一类别不过是排他性类别中的一种。战争使这种排他性更加明显。国家要求人们只能专属于一个国家。拥有双重国籍或处于既非敌人也非盟友的模糊身份的人不被承认。后殖民主义者对此的回应不是拒绝类别,而是增加类别;让我们拥有更多的类别!只有类别的增多,才能匹配个体的复杂性,从而阻止个体被吸纳进单一类别的共同体中。国家之所以具有压迫性,是因为它要求一种不承认更高类别的专属管辖权。为了克服这一点而设立另一个超越性的类别,意味着即使个体逃离国家,也会被纳入另一个共同体。 从 1980 年代动荡的国际历史中得到的教训是,国家已经失去了其超越性,国家不再具有足以让人“为之献出生命”的超越性。换句话说,国家已经被相对化了。

Going Beyond the 'Nationalisation of Women' Paradigm
超越“女性国家化”范式

Having considered the above, it is possible to place the various versions of the nationalisation of women in a more general frame.
考虑到上述内容,有可能将女性国家化的各种版本置于一个更为普遍的框架中。
There are two strategies for the nationalisation of women, that of gender segregation (the segregation model) and that of disregarding gender (the integration model). As a dilemma of ‘difference versus equality’, these two roads have been all too familiar to feminism since the beginning. If we go along with gender segregation we must adhere to norms of femininity, but as the converse of this we are able to acquire an autonomous domain inside a women’s ghetto. At first sight, equality appears to be achieved by the strategy of disregarding gender. However, for as long as the public sphere is defined in terms of masculinity, women who become producers or soldiers have to resign themselves to being second-class workers or soldiers. Otherwise, all that awaits them is a choice between denying their femaleness and seeking to become male clones. This means taking on a double burden and doing their best to maintain their womanly role while being reduced to an auxiliary labour force. Both paths are all too familiar traps within modern feminism.
女性的国家化有两种策略,一种是性别隔离(隔离模式),另一种是忽视性别(融合模式)。作为“差异与平等”的两难困境,这两条道路自女性主义兴起以来就非常熟悉。如果我们选择性别隔离,就必须遵守女性气质的规范,但作为其反面,我们能够在女性的“贫民区”内获得一个自主领域。乍一看,忽视性别的策略似乎实现了平等。然而,只要公共领域被定义为男性化,成为生产者或士兵的女性就不得不接受作为二等工人或士兵的命运。否则,她们面临的只有否认女性身份或努力成为男性克隆人的选择。这意味着承担双重负担,尽力维持女性角色,同时被降格为辅助劳动力。这两条道路都是现代女性主义中极为熟悉的陷阱。
This dilemma persists today as an unresolved problem. On the one hand, military base prostitution, Peace Keeping Forces (PKF) prostitution, and rape in wartime are as much problems now as ever. While on the other, feminists are calling for debate concerning the problem of female soldiers participating as combatants in the Gulf War.
这一困境至今仍未得到解决。一方面,军事基地的卖淫、维和部队(PKF)的卖淫以及战争时期的强奸问题依然存在且严重。另一方面,女权主义者正在呼吁就女性士兵作为战斗人员参与海湾战争的问题展开讨论。
When I posed the question, can feminism transcend the state?, I came face-to-face with a much simpler and more fundamental question: Why must feminism transcend the state? Although I think that feminism must
当我提出“女权主义能否超越国家?”这一问题时,我直面了一个更简单、更根本的问题:为什么女权主义必须超越国家?虽然我认为女权主义必须且能够超越国家,但这一点的原因直到现在才变得清晰。

and can transcend the state, the reasons for this have only now become clear to me. Feminist analysis of the nation-state has made clear that gender equality is impossible in principle within a framework of modernity, patriarchy and the nation-state. Ehara Yumiko, a contemporary feminist theorist, has pointed out that among the complex questions that surround feminism and modernity the opposition between ‘equality’ and ‘difference’ is a ‘false problem’ forced on women by modernity itself (Ehara, 1988).
对民族国家的女权主义分析表明,在现代性、父权制和民族国家的框架内,性别平等原则上是不可能实现的。现代女权理论家江原由美子指出,在围绕女权主义与现代性的复杂问题中,“平等”与“差异”之间的对立是现代性本身强加给女性的“伪问题”(江原,1988)。
The post-structuralist gender historian Joan Scott, looking back at the history of French feminism in her book Only Paradoxes to Offer (Scott, 1996), questions the fact that the individual born of modernity was gendered. The fact that the individual was created in the mould of man has lead women to face the dilemma of equality versus difference. Yet, whichever one they choose, it is a trap for women. Feminism is nothing more than modernity’s demon child, there simply to embody this paradox. Scott’s intention is precisely to deconstruct the fact that modernity has forced upon women a false problem.
后结构主义性别历史学家琼·斯科特在她的著作《只有悖论可供选择》(Scott,1996)中回顾法国女权主义的历史,质疑现代性所诞生的个体为何被赋予性别。个体被塑造成男性的模样,使女性面临平等与差异的两难境地。然而,无论她们选择哪一条路,对女性来说都是一个陷阱。女权主义不过是现代性的魔鬼之子,存在的唯一意义就是体现这一悖论。斯科特的意图正是解构现代性强加给女性的这一虚假问题。
The modernisation project was itself the cause of the rise of the ‘woman question’, and feminism demonstrates that within this historical analysis there can be no solution to the woman question within the framework of the modern. In this sense, while feminism is a product of modernity, it has in its sights the possibility of being able to transcend the modern. What feminist analysis of the nationalisation of women has shown is the fact that feminist studies, which began with the private sphere, has ultimately extended itself to an examination of the state and the public sphere. As a result, the state and the public sphere have been deprived of their outward appearance of gender neutrality. Having pursued research into the nationalisation of women I can say that the nation-state is gendered. The nationalisation of women embodies the paradox that was imposed on women by the modern nation-state, and the total mobilisation system, in displaying this paradox in an extremely grotesque form, proved conversely that women’s liberation was impossible within the framework of the modern nation-state. As a result, we can point to the basis for women to transcend the state.
现代化项目本身就是“女性问题”兴起的原因,而女权主义表明,在这一历史分析中,女性问题在现代框架内无法得到解决。从这个意义上说,虽然女权主义是现代性的产物,但它瞄准的是超越现代的可能性。对女性国家化的女权主义分析表明,女权研究最初从私人领域开始,最终扩展到了对国家和公共领域的考察。因此,国家和公共领域失去了其表面上的性别中立性。在研究女性国家化的过程中,我可以说民族国家是有性别属性的。女性国家化体现了现代民族国家及其全面动员体系强加给女性的矛盾,这种矛盾以极其荒诞的形式展现出来,反而证明了在现代民族国家框架内女性解放是不可能的。因此,我们可以指出女性超越国家的基础。
Nevertheless, is it not possible to say that the reverse is true? That the category ‘women’ is itself the creation of modernity, just as civil society and the nation-state? The nationalisation of women, their participation as
然而,是否可以说相反的情况也成立?“女性”这一类别本身就是现代性的产物,就像市民社会和民族国家一样?女性的民族化,她们的参与作为

women in the nation-state, whether in accordance with the segregation or the integration model, means nothing other than women share a common fate with the nation-state while still burdened with the paradox that ‘woman’ does not equal ‘citizen’. For men who equal citizens, this situation is probably a trap that is even harder to escape.
国家中的女性,无论是按照隔离模式还是融合模式,都意味着女性与国家共享共同的命运,同时仍背负着“女性”不等同于“公民”的悖论。对于等同于公民的男性来说,这种状况可能是一个更难逃脱的陷阱。
Dismantling the category women is the same thing as dismantling the category men as a gender category. If feminism is a product of modernity then the end of the modern should also bring an end to feminism. Yet, feminism was the demon child that was paradoxically born out of the innate contradiction of the modern period. The discovery by feminism of the gender category had the dismantling of this as its ultimate end.
解构“女性”这一类别,实际上就是解构“男性”作为性别类别。如果女权主义是现代性的产物,那么现代性的终结也应带来女权主义的终结。然而,女权主义却是现代时期内在矛盾中矛盾地诞生的“魔鬼之子”。女权主义对性别类别的发现,其最终目标就是解构这一类别。

Part II The Military Comfort Women Issue
第二部分 军慰安妇问题

A Triple Crime  三重罪行

Back in the 1990s, there was no more fundamental line of inquiry challenging us in the debate concerning nationalism and gender than that of the military comfort women issue 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}. This same issue has forced upon us fundamental questions regarding historical methodology in the construction of public memory.
回到 1990 年代,在关于民族主义与性别的辩论中,没有比军慰安妇问题更根本的探究线索了 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 。同样的问题也迫使我们面对在公共记忆构建中历史方法论的根本性问题。
The conclusive problematising of the military comfort women within Japan occurred in December 1991 when Kim Hak-sun 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} and two other former Korean comfort women filed suits against the Japanese government at the Tokyo District Court demanding a formal apology and individual compensation. Even though the fact of the military comfort women was on occasion raised as an issue after the war, this never went beyond regarding the women as wretched or pitiful, and was naturalised as the kind of cruelty or ‘going too far’ that accompanies war, or even as a sacrifice to male lust (Senda, 1973; Kim I., 1976; Yoshida, 1977). The courageous testimony of these three female victims contained the power to shift in a single stroke the paradigm surrounding the military comfort women. From the immediate period after surrender through to the present day, military pensions, annuities for bereaved families and wartime postal savings have all emerged as issues in the debate surrounding the post-war compensation of nationals from former colonies, yet the military comfort women have never emerged as targets for compensation, and the historical fact that it took half a century for their suffering to be problematised is shocking.
日本对军慰安妇问题的最终质疑发生在 1991 年 12 月,当时金学顺 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 和另外两名韩国前慰安妇在东京地方法院对日本政府提起诉讼,要求正式道歉和个人赔偿。尽管战后军慰安妇问题偶尔被提及,但从未超出将这些女性视为可怜或悲惨的范畴,并被自然化为战争伴随的残酷或“过火”行为,甚至被视为男性欲望的牺牲品(千田,1973;金一,1976;吉田,1977)。这三位女性受害者的勇敢证词具有一举改变军慰安妇相关范式的力量。 从战败投降后的直接时期直到今天,军人养老金、遗属年金以及战时邮政储蓄等问题一直是围绕前殖民地国民战后赔偿辩论中的议题,然而军中慰安妇从未成为赔偿的对象,而她们的苦难被问题化竟然花费了半个世纪,这一历史事实令人震惊。
The historical fact of the comfort women was known. Moreover, without the slightest hint of any sense of shame concerning their experiences, many soldiers left behind written testimony in diaries and memoirs. Nevertheless, the comfort women system was not problematised as a crime by anybody until very recently. The facts were there, but they were indiscernible. In
慰安妇的历史事实是为人所知的。此外,许多士兵毫无羞耻感地在日记和回忆录中留下了书面证词。然而,直到最近,慰安妇制度才被任何人作为犯罪问题来讨论。事实摆在那里,但却难以察觉。

short, as far as history was concerned it was as though they did not exist. There are as many as 30,000 war diaries and memoirs, some official and others unofficial, of former soldiers collected in The National Diet Library, including some that were published privately. At last a rereading of these is taking place.
简言之,就历史而言,仿佛她们根本不存在。国会图书馆收藏了多达 3 万份前士兵的战争日记和回忆录,其中包括一些官方和非官方的,有些是私人出版的。如今,这些文献终于开始被重新解读。
The ramifications of criminalizing the military comfort women system go well beyond a redefinition of the past. In reply to those who ask, why after half a century has passed should we talk about this now?, I would like to say that this is not a problem of the past but a present day one; a crime that we are continuing to play some part in. The double crime surrounding the military comfort women is firstly the crime of rape during wartime and secondly the crime of silencing the victims for half a century after the war. In terms of the second crime, as a result of failing to acknowledge the suffering of the victims on a day-to-day and on-going basis and letting half a century pass, we can say that this is a contemporary problem. Added to this, we can call the repudiation of the victims’ testimony by conservative factions today a third crime. What we have here amounts to considerably more than the suffering that these women underwent in the past, as there is the long silence forced upon them concerning their experiences and accusations of ‘telling lies for money’ when their silence was eventually broken. If these do not amount to a second and third crime, what are they?
将军慰安妇制度定为犯罪的影响远远超出了对过去的重新定义。对于那些问道“为什么半个世纪过去了我们现在还要谈论这个问题?”的人,我想说这不是一个过去的问题,而是一个当今的问题;这是一个我们仍在某种程度上参与其中的犯罪。围绕军队慰安妇的双重犯罪,首先是战争期间的强奸罪,其次是战后半个世纪对受害者的沉默罪。就第二个罪行而言,由于未能在日常和持续的基础上承认受害者的痛苦,让半个世纪过去,我们可以说这是一个当代问题。除此之外,我们还可以称当今保守派对受害者证词的否定为第三种罪行。这里所涉及的远远超过这些女性过去所经历的痛苦,因为她们被迫长期保持沉默,最终打破沉默时却被指控“为钱撒谎”。如果这些不构成第二和第三种罪行,那又是什么呢?
When considering the background to the paradigm shift that led to the military comfort women problem emerging as a sexual crime, the influence of the women’s movement in Korea since the 1980s should not be forgotten. Prior to Kim Hak-Sun’s lawsuit, and for the first time since the war ended, Korean women’s groups issued a statement to coincide with the former Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s visit to Japan in May 1990 demanding a resolution to the Teishintai (Women Volunteer Corps) problem. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
在考虑导致军事慰安妇问题作为性犯罪出现的范式转变背景时,不应忘记自 1980 年代以来韩国妇女运动的影响。在金学顺提起诉讼之前,也是自战争结束以来的第一次,韩国妇女团体发表声明,配合时任韩国总统卢泰愚 1990 年 5 月访日,要求解决挺身队(妇女义勇队)问题。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
In June 1990, responding to questions in the National Diet, the Japanese government issued a statement denying government involvement stating that the comfort women system was something that was organised by private entrepreneurs. In response to this reply, 37 Korean women’s groups sent letters of public protest to the Japanese government. In November of the same year, the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereafter Korean Council) was established at the centre of
1990 年 6 月,针对国会的质询,日本政府发表声明否认政府参与,称慰安妇制度是由私人企业家组织的。对此答复,37 个韩国妇女团体向日本政府发出公开抗议信。同年 11 月,韩国被日本强征为军事性奴隶妇女问题解决全国协调会(以下简称韩国协调会)在中心地带成立,...

these women’s groups. In August the following year, Kim came forward in a response to an appeal made by the Korean Council. The way had already been paved for a paradigm shift to ‘the one’s who ought to feel shame are not the former comfort women’ due to the efforts of Korean Council representative Yun Jong-ok and others. Over a 10 -year period prior to the establishment of the Korean Council, they recorded the testimony of former comfort women (Yun, 1992; Kim and Yang Ching-ja, 1995).
这些妇女团体。次年八月,金女士响应韩国议会的呼吁站了出来。由于韩国议会代表尹钟玉等人的努力,已经为“应该感到羞耻的不是前慰安妇”这一范式转变铺平了道路。在韩国议会成立之前的十年间,他们记录了前慰安妇的证词(尹,1992;金和杨清子,1995)。
What is shocking about the testimony of former comfort women is firstly the cruel historical fact itself and second the fact that the victims were forced to remain silent for a period of 50 years. Until very recently, most former comfort women treated their experiences as their personal shame and buried them in the depths of their memories. They had put a lid on their past, not even revealing it to their closest family members. Many were not able to return to their native towns and villages. It was this past that these women made public and redefined as assault. Here we had a drastic change in historical understanding and a paradigm shift.
前慰安妇证词令人震惊的,首先是残酷的历史事实本身,其次是受害者被迫沉默了 50 年之久。直到最近,大多数前慰安妇都将自己的经历视为个人的耻辱,深埋在记忆深处。她们将过去封存起来,甚至不向最亲近的家人透露。许多人无法返回故乡。这段过去被这些妇女公开,并重新定义为侵害。在这里,我们看到了历史理解的巨大变化和范式的转变。
It was the Korean democratic movement and women’s movements in the 1980s that brought about this shift. To put it another way, the background to the Korean women’s movement was the rise of a worldwide feminist movement. In 1991, when Kim Hak-sun first came forward as a victim we felt deep shock. As background, two things prepared the way for her testimony. Firstly, there was the testimony in the 1980s of a victim of sexual torture under the military dictatorship. Kwon In-suk, an activist in the student movement, was subjected to sexual torture while in a prison cell and came forward for the first time, openly declaring herself a victim. As a result of this, the ground was laid for a shift in the paradigm surrounding rape from the ‘shame of the victim’ to the ‘crime of the perpetrator’. Kwon In-suk’s testimony became possible for the first time when she received the support of women around her. Secondly, at the time the former comfort women came forward, the testimony of many victims had already been collected and the appeal by Yun Jongok, representing the Korean Council, had already occurred. It was precisely because the paradigm had already shifted that, in response to this, witnesses materialised before our eyes. The testimony of the comfort women would not have been possible without the existence of the women in the support group.
正是 1980 年代的韩国民主运动和女性运动带来了这一转变。换句话说,韩国女性运动的背景是全球女权运动的兴起。1991 年,当金学顺首次作为受害者站出来时,我们感到深深的震惊。作为背景,有两件事为她的证词铺平了道路。首先,是 1980 年代一位在军政府独裁下遭受性酷刑的受害者的证词。学生运动的活动家权仁淑在监狱牢房中遭受性酷刑,首次公开承认自己是受害者。正因为此,关于强奸的范式从“受害者的耻辱”转变为“施害者的罪行”。权仁淑的证词之所以能够首次出现,是因为她得到了周围女性的支持。其次,在前慰安妇站出来的时候,许多受害者的证词已经被收集,代表韩国议会的尹钟玉的呼吁也已发生。 正是因为范式已经发生了转变,作为回应,证人们才出现在我们眼前。没有支援团体中女性的存在,慰安妇的证言是不可能出现的。
According to ‘Ianfu’ mondai Q&A (The comfort women issue; Q&As) edited by the Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Centre, the ‘first time post-war that the issue [of the comfort women] was raised in Japanese society was in the 1970s when Korean women criticised Kisaeng tourism.’ 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} They protested that ‘during the war Japanese men used their military strength to rope in fellow country women as female Volunteer Corps, and without reflecting on this, are now using their economic power to play about with Kisaeng women’ (Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Centre, 1997:24). 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} It is easy to understand how, based on a direct association of ideas, Kisaeng tourism can be taken as a form of sexual invasion by the Japanese. This view is not limited to Korea. Another example of where an analogy has been drawn between the sex tours for Japanese men and the military comfort women can be seen in the Philippines (Go, 1993). 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} Nevertheless, this criticism of Japanese sex tourism does not go hand-in-hand with criticism of prostitute discrimination or the general atmosphere of tolerance of prostitution within Korea. We can understand this criticism of sex tourism within a framework of nationalism. What has been violated here is national pride and the indignation in response to this is not necessarily linked with respect for the human rights of the Kisaeng women.
根据亚洲-日本妇女资源中心编辑的《“慰安妇”问题问答》(慰安妇问题;问答集),战后日本社会首次提出慰安妇问题是在 1970 年代,当时韩国女性批评妓生旅游。她们抗议说:“战争期间,日本男性利用其军事力量强迫本国女性成为妇女义勇队,而现在却不反思这一点,反而利用其经济实力玩弄妓生女性。”(亚洲-日本妇女资源中心,1997:24)基于直接的联想,很容易理解妓生旅游如何被视为日本人的一种性侵略。这种观点并不限于韩国。在菲律宾也可以看到将日本男性的性旅游与军中慰安妇相类比的例子(Go,1993)。然而,对日本性旅游的批评并未与对妓女歧视或韩国社会对卖淫普遍容忍的氛围相伴随。我们可以在民族主义的框架内理解对性旅游的这种批评。 这里被侵犯的是民族自尊心,而对此的愤慨不一定与对妓生女性人权的尊重相关联。
It is appropriate to position criticism of Kisaeng tourism within the prehistory of the comfort women problem, but this is because from the beginning the comfort women problem included as components both national/ethnic discrimination (minzoku sabetsu) and sex discrimination. Nevertheless, it was only possible to tie in a criticism of Kisaeng tourism with an indictment of sex discrimination in the 1980s through the medium of a paradigm shift concerning the victims of sex crimes.
将对妓生旅游的批评置于慰安妇问题的前史中是恰当的,但这是因为慰安妇问题从一开始就包含了民族/种族歧视(minzoku sabetsu)和性别歧视两个组成部分。然而,直到 1980 年代,通过关于性犯罪受害者的范式转变,才有可能将对妓生旅游的批评与对性别歧视的指控联系起来。

The Patriarchal Paradigm of National Shame
国家耻辱的父权范式

The paradigm used for discussing the military comfort women issue has changed rapidly in a very short time. The first to appear was the patriarchal paradigm of the ‘nation’s shame’. The patriarchal paradigm denies women’s agency, and reduces the infringement of women’s sexual human rights to a dispute over property rights between fellow men within the patriarchal system. What is more, here lies the exact cause of the second crime; that of silence being forced on the victims.
用于讨论军队慰安妇问题的范式在极短时间内迅速变化。最早出现的是“国家耻辱”的父权范式。父权范式否认女性的能动性,将对女性性人权的侵犯简化为父权体系内男性之间的财产权争议。更重要的是,这正是第二种罪行的根源;即强迫受害者保持沉默。
Initially a truly patriarchal voice of suppression arose in reaction to the testimony of the women’s suffering both in Korea and Japan. ‘Don’t expose our nation’s shame’ was the catch cry (Yamashita Y., 1996; Ehara, 1992). Firstly, this reaction can be explained in terms of Confucian ethic, which turns the fact of having suffered sexual abuse into the woman’s shame. Secondly, the women’s testimony exposed to the public gaze the cowardice of Korean men, who had not been able to protect the chastity of their country women. Thirdly, there is the ‘loss of face’ associated with not being able to suppress indictments of this nature by women that put men to shame. Here chastity emerges as a form of male property, with the focus of discussion the interests of the patriarchal systems of Japan and Korea regarding the infringement of these property rights, and the dignity of the women totally ignored. Even after the movement for compensation had begun, ‘there was widespread sympathy for the opinions of those opposing the seeking of compensation from Japan on the basis that it would injure the pride of the [Korean] people’ (Yamashita Y, 1996:43). Haga Tōru, a conservative Japanese male intellectual made the following comment:
最初,针对韩国和日本女性所遭受的痛苦证词,真正的父权制压制声音随之出现。“不要揭露我们国家的耻辱”成为口号(山下洋,1996;江原,1992)。首先,这种反应可以用儒家伦理来解释,儒家伦理将遭受性虐待的事实转化为女性的耻辱。其次,女性的证词向公众揭露了韩国男性的懦弱,他们未能保护本国女性的贞洁。第三,无法压制女性提出的这类指控而使男性蒙羞,带来了“丢脸”的问题。在这里,贞洁被视为男性的财产,讨论的焦点是日本和韩国父权制系统关于侵犯这些财产权利的利益,而女性的尊严则被完全忽视。即使在赔偿运动开始后,“仍有广泛的同情反对向日本寻求赔偿的意见,理由是这会伤害[韩国]民族的自尊”(山下洋,1996:43)。 保守派日本男性知识分子羽贺彻(Haga Tōru)发表了如下评论:
and even pressing for hundreds of millions of yen in compensation…Will this not add to their shame? (cited in Ehara, 1992:39). 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
甚至还要求数亿日元的赔偿……这难道不会增加她们的羞耻感吗?(引自江原由美子,1992:39)。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
While drawing attention to statements like the one above by Haga Töru, Ehara Yumiko points out the similarities in the thinking of Japanese and Korean men. These include, ‘the sense that it is natural for women who have been sexually violated by force to feel shame, and the sense that it is natural for men to feel shame if their women have been taken by other men’. Ehara speculates on the implications of this:
江原由美子在关注羽贺彻上述言论的同时,指出了日本男性和韩国男性思维的相似之处。这些相似之处包括:“认为被强暴的女性感到羞耻是理所当然的,以及认为如果自己的女性被其他男性夺走,男性感到羞耻也是理所当然的。”江原推测其含义:
Supposing that both Japanese and Korean men assume that the women of a nation belong to the men of that nation and that rape of a country woman by those of another nation stains male honour, would this not create sufficient pressure for them to force the victims of the military comfort women problem to keep their mouths shut? (Ehara, 1992:30).
假设日本男性和韩国男性都认为一个国家的女性属于该国的男性,而被其他国家的男性强奸则玷污了男性的荣誉,这难道不会产生足够的压力,迫使军慰安妇问题的受害者保持沉默吗?(江原,1992:30)。
She goes on to argue that: ‘attempting to suppress the testimony of the victims of sexual violence because it will bring shame upon themselves can of itself be considered a form of sexual violence, and is inexcusable’ (Ehara, 1992:40). Here too, Ehara is pointing to the double sexual violence of patriarchy.
她接着论证说:“试图压制性暴力受害者的证词,因为这会给她们自己带来耻辱,本身就可以被视为一种性暴力,是不可原谅的”(Ehara,1992:40)。在这里,Ehara 同样指出了父权制的双重性暴力。
We have a history rich in examples of rape being used as a symbol in disputes between two patriarchal regimes. In 19th century India the rape of local women by British colonists was similarly used as a symbol to arouse nationalist fervour and encourage mobilisation. An Indian historian, Aparna Basu writes:
我们有丰富的历史例子,显示强奸被用作两个父权制政权之间争端的象征。在 19 世纪的印度,英国殖民者对当地妇女的强奸同样被用作激发民族主义热情和鼓励动员的象征。一位印度历史学家 Aparna Basu 写道:
In the late nineteenth century rape and racism were inter-twined, with rape used as a weapon by nationalists to oppose British law. The cry of we will protect our women from the British soldiers…rose furiously. Rather than view rape as violence against women, they viewed it as an infringement of national honour (Basu, 1993; 1995:75).
19 世纪末,强奸和种族主义交织在一起,强奸被民族主义者用作反对英国法律的武器。保护我们的妇女免受英国士兵侵害的呼声愤怒地高涨。他们并不将强奸视为对妇女的暴力,而是视为对国家荣誉的侵犯(Basu,1993;1995:75)。
Here we have a patriarchal logic that dictates that women’s sexuality is the most fundamental right and property of men, and any infringement of this is not only an insult to the woman herself, but ends up being the most supreme insult to the male group to which she belongs. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
这里存在一种父权制逻辑,规定女性的性权利是男性最根本的权利和财产,任何侵犯不仅是对女性本人的侮辱,最终也成为对她所属男性群体的最高侮辱。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
Rape in China by Japanese soldiers was a frequent occurrence even before the Nanking Massacre in 1937, which acted as a direct catalyst for the comfort women system. It is also referred to as the Rape of Nanking due to the large number rapes that took place. It is reported that the rape of
日本士兵在中国的强奸行为在 1937 年南京大屠杀之前就已频繁发生,而南京大屠杀则成为慰安妇制度的直接催化剂。由于发生了大量强奸事件,这一事件也被称为“南京大屠杀强奸案”。据报道,
Chinese women by Japanese soldiers triggered ‘powerful anti-Japanese sentiment beyond all expectation’ among Chinese men (Kim and Yang Ching-ja, 1995:92). As intended, they naturally took these rapes to be a supreme insult to their masculinity. Even after the comfort stations were established, rape by Japanese soldiers in the occupied territories did not cease, manifesting the patriarchal logic that women are the ‘spoils of war’.
日本士兵对中国女性的强奸激起了中国男性“超出预期的强烈反日情绪”(Kim 和 Yang Ching-ja,1995:92)。正如预期的那样,他们自然将这些强奸视为对其男子气概的最高侮辱。即使在慰安所建立之后,日本士兵在占领区的强奸行为也未停止,体现了女性是“战争战利品”的父权制逻辑。
Self-acknowledgement of sexual suffering in a sense means that a woman establishes an identity of herself as sexually self-determined. It brings with it an awareness of agency to the extent that it is recognised that the right to make decisions in relation to one’s sexuality - put bluntly, in relation to one’s body - belongs to oneself and not to the patriarchal authority of a father or husband. In terms of the comfort women lawsuits, the Japanese government has continued to insist that the matter of post-war compensation was settled with the 1965 Korea-Japan Treaty, however, the logic of individual claims cuts through the patriarchal logic embedded within this stance. Yamazaki Hiromi, a member of a comfort women’s support group, asks:
对性痛苦的自我承认在某种意义上意味着女性确立了作为性自主个体的身份。它带来了行动能力的意识,即认识到关于自身性行为的决策权——坦率地说,就是关于自己身体的决策权——属于自己,而不属于父权制下的父亲或丈夫的权威。就慰安妇诉讼而言,日本政府一直坚持认为战后赔偿问题已通过 1965 年日韩条约解决,然而,个人索赔的逻辑突破了这一立场中根深蒂固的父权逻辑。慰安妇支援团体成员山崎弘美问道:
Suppose that a woman was raped today and the rapist informed you that the matter had been settled on the basis of a mutual agreement between the husband or the father, would you accept this? No you would not (Yamazaki H., 1995).
假设今天有一名女性被强奸,而强奸犯告诉你此事已基于丈夫或父亲之间的相互协议而解决,你会接受吗?你不会接受的(山崎弘美,1995)。
If we replace the word ‘husband’ or ‘father’ with ‘state’, it is easy to understand the situation with the former comfort women. By refusing to recognise the right to make individual claims and by supporting the views of the Japanese government, the Korean government has reduced the individual to something belonging to the state. On the basis that the state does not represent the (interests of the) individual, the logic of the right to make an individual petition contains the clue for transcending the state. As a consequence, the opponents that the female victims and their supporters must take on are simultaneously the patriarchal regimes of Japan and Korea.
如果我们将“丈夫”或“父亲”一词替换为“国家”,就很容易理解前慰安妇的处境。韩国政府拒绝承认个人提出索赔的权利,并支持日本政府的观点,将个人简化为属于国家的东西。基于国家不代表个人(利益)的前提,个人提出请愿权的逻辑包含了超越国家的线索。因此,女性受害者及其支持者必须面对的对手,同时是日本和韩国的父权制政权。

The 'Purity' of Korean Women
韩国女性的“纯洁性”

In the early 1970s reports on the military comfort women were published in rapid succession. Two of these were Senda Kakō’s Jyūgun ianfu (Military comfort women) original and sequel ( 1973 , 1984 ) ( 1973 , 1984 ) (1973,1984)(1973,1984) and Kim Il-myon’s Tennō no guntai to chōsenjin ianfu (The Imperial Army and Korean comfort women) (1976). Senda’s writing overflows with compassion for the military comfort women and their ‘pitiful existence’. However even prior to this, we had the memoirs of a soldier who took the position that he and his colleagues had acted cruelly towards the comfort women. He wondered what had happened to the women. As for Senda, he did not see the comfort women system in a way that would have constructed it as a crime and there were no victims who we should apologise to and compensate.
20 世纪 70 年代初,有关军中慰安妇的报道接连发表。其中两部作品是千田夏光的《军中慰安妇》(原著及续集) ( 1973 , 1984 ) ( 1973 , 1984 ) (1973,1984)(1973,1984) 和金一勉的《天皇的军队与朝鲜慰安妇》(1976 年)。千田的著作充满了对军中慰安妇及其“可怜存在”的同情。然而,早在此之前,我们已有一位士兵的回忆录,他认为自己和同僚对慰安妇的行为是残酷的,并且他曾想知道那些女性后来怎么样了。至于千田,他并未将慰安妇制度视为一种犯罪,也没有认为存在需要道歉和赔偿的受害者。
Fourteen years after his last publication and responding to a request from Ronza [a monthly magazine from Asahi Newspaper Company], Senda wrote Jyūgun ianfu’ no shinjitsu (The truth of the military comfort women).
在最后一次出版物发表十四年后,响应《论座》(朝日新闻社的月刊杂志)的请求,千田撰写了《军中慰安妇的真相》。
It was 1973 when I published the book entitled The Military Comfort Women (original and sequel) with Futabasha publishers. The original and sequel combined sold in excess of 500,000 copies, but the only place to print a bona fide book review was the [Communist newspaper] Akahata (Red flag). It did not gain much social attention either. When someone investigated the matter for me, they found that the readers were largely former soldiers who had been sent to the front line in China or South East Asia and had bought [comfort] women themselves. Apparently upon finishing the book, these readers gave a deep sigh, put it away at the back of their bookshelves and there it ended without them speaking a word about it to anybody… Sadly, the book did not seem to grab the interest of historians of modern and contemporary history either.
1973 年,我与双叶社出版社合作出版了《军慰安妇》(原著及续集)一书。原著和续集合计销量超过 50 万册,但唯一刊登正规书评的地方是《赤旗》(共产党报纸)。该书也未引起太多社会关注。当有人帮我调查时,发现读者大多是曾被派往中国或东南亚前线的退伍军人,他们自己也曾买过慰安妇。显然,这些读者读完书后深深叹息,将书放回书架深处,之后便不再对任何人提起……遗憾的是,这本书似乎也未能引起现代和当代历史学家的兴趣。
In 1984, Kodansha Bunko republished the book in the form of paperback but the situation was no different…From the standpoint of it not becoming a social issue, the situation in Korea was no different. Soon after being published by Futabasha in 1973, The Military Comfort Women was translated into Korean. One newspaper critic wrote that; ‘for a Japanese, this is well researched and well written’, but that was about it (Senda, 1997:52-54)
1984 年,讲谈社文库以平装本形式重新出版了这本书,但情况并无不同……从不成为社会问题的角度来看,韩国的情况也没有不同。1973 年双叶社出版后不久,《军中慰安妇》被翻译成韩文。一位报纸评论家写道:“对于日本人来说,这本书研究充分,写得很好”,但也仅此而已(千田,1997:52-54)
Senda notes that; ‘It was in December 1991 after the former “comfort women” had filed their lawsuits that the situations in Japan and Korea were transformed’. None of us can reproach Senda for his historical limitations. There were many people in Japan and Korea who were aware of the existence of the comfort women but chose to do nothing especially in the face of the silence of the former comfort women. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
千田指出:“直到 1991 年 12 月,前‘慰安妇’提起诉讼后,日本和韩国的局势才发生了变化”。我们谁也不能责怪千田的历史局限性。在日本和韩国,有许多人知道慰安妇的存在,但选择无动于衷,尤其是在前慰安妇保持沉默的情况下。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
Senda further wrote: ‘It is rather curious…but the response of women was also close to zero’ (Senda, 1997:53). He suggests that the only exception was Takahashi Kikue from the Japanese Christian Women’s Association Against Prostitution (Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai). 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
千田进一步写道:“这倒是相当奇怪……女性的反应几乎为零”(千田,1997:53)。他认为唯一的例外是来自日本基督教妇女反卖淫协会(日本基督教妇人教扶会)的高桥菊枝。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
Senda does not refer to it, but there is another exception. This is Maruyama Yukiko, a freelance woman writer. In her writing, Maruyama pursues the cause of the ‘uncomfortable feeling’ she was left with after reading the reports of Senda and Kim (Maruyama, Y., 1977, 1995). While evaluating Korean writer Kim Il-myon’s The Imperial Army and Korean Comfort Women, which she describes as ‘the product of considerable labour which should also be called a crystal of anger and revulsion’, Maruyama does not overlook the male logic within this anger. She notes the more Kim ‘emphasised the purity and chastity of Korean women’ the more she ‘felt that something was not right.’ Maruyama argued that:
千田没有提及这一点,但还有另一个例外。那就是自由撰稿人丸山幸子。在她的著作中,丸山追寻着自己在阅读千田和金的报道后所留下的“难以言说的不适感”(丸山幸子,1977,1995)。在评价韩国作家金一明的《帝国军队与韩国慰安妇》时,丸山称其为“经过大量劳动的成果,也应被称为愤怒与厌恶的结晶”,但她并未忽视这份愤怒中所蕴含的男性逻辑。她指出,金“一再强调韩国女性的纯洁与贞洁”,反而让她“感觉有些不对劲”。丸山认为:
A society that relentlessly demands ‘purity’ from women is certainly not a happy society for women, and it cannot be said that simply because women have been obedient to the male demands of such a society that the women of that nation possess outstanding qualities as human beings (Maruyama, Y., 1977, 1995:194).
一个无情地要求女性‘纯洁’的社会,绝对不是一个让女性幸福的社会,不能因为女性顺从了这样一个社会对男性的要求,就说该国的女性作为人类具有卓越的品质(丸山幸子,1977,1995:194)。
She then offers a rebuttal to Kim, who compares Japanese women who, he suggests, went overseas as prostitutes by choice and Korean women who, he argues, were pulled into it as a result of the violence of the soldiers of the Imperial Army’. Referring here to the tradition of karayukisan [Japanese women sent overseas as indentured prostitutes], Maruyama’s counter to this comparison is as follows:
她随后对金的观点进行了反驳。金将日本女性(他认为这些女性是自愿作为妓女出国的)与韩国女性(他认为这些女性是被帝国军队士兵的暴力强迫卷入其中的)进行了比较。这里提到的是“唐行妓”传统(被派往海外的日本契约妓女),丸山对这种比较的反驳如下:
where she could speak openly about having earned her living doing ‘women’s work’ or prostitution (Maruyama Y., 1977, 1995:194).
她可以坦率地谈论自己靠“女性工作”或卖淫谋生的经历(丸山洋子,1977,1995:194)。
Although her wording over exaggerates the situation to some extent, what I believe Maruyama is intending to say here is that from the standpoint of the oppression surrounding women’s sexuality, patriarchy within Korea stands just as guilty as that of Japan.
虽然她的措辞在某种程度上夸大了情况,但我认为丸山想表达的是,从女性性压迫的角度来看,韩国的父权制与日本的父权制同样有罪。
It is not difficult to point out the limitations of Maruyama’s arguments from the perspective of today. Firstly, Maruyama considers military comfort women simply to be prostitutes. She asks, 'what exactly were the military comfort women?, and then answers that, ‘they were women who accompanied the Japanese military into all parts of Asia and worked in their brothels there’ (Maruyama Y., 1977, 1995:187). Secondly, it was originally Kim Il-myon himself who compared the Korean comfort women to karayukisan, but this comparison was way off target because the historical contexts of both cases were too different to compare. Nevertheless, we can also point to the nationalist bias of Maruyama in her strong rebuttal of this unfair comparison. Her line of argument here is that both societies are Confucianist and male-centred, but at least Japan is more generous to prostitutes. Thirdly, while showing compassion for the Japanese comfort women, Maruyama does not consider the possibility that they may have faced the same fate when they returned home. If we are going to compare what happened to the Korean comfort women afterwards, surely the comparison should be with the Japanese comfort women rather than the karayukisan. Were the Japanese comfort women accepted when they went back to their native villages and towns? Could they speak about their past when they got back to their home towns and villages? Alternatively, did they become local legends proud of the way they offered themselves for the nation? Through to today, there has been a heavy silence from the Japanese comfort women.
从今天的角度来看,指出丸山论点的局限性并不难。首先,丸山将军妓简单地视为妓女。她问道:“军妓到底是什么?”,然后回答说,“她们是随日本军队进入亚洲各地,在军妓所工作的女性”(丸山洋,1977,1995:187)。其次,最初是金一冕本人将韩国军妓比作唐行妓,但这种比较完全不合适,因为两者的历史背景差异太大,无法相提并论。尽管如此,我们也可以指出丸山在强烈反驳这一不公平比较时所表现出的民族主义偏见。她的论点是,两种社会都是儒家思想和以男性为中心的,但至少日本对妓女更为宽容。第三,虽然对日本军妓表示同情,丸山却没有考虑到她们回国后可能面临同样命运的可能性。 如果我们要比较朝鲜慰安妇之后的遭遇,比较的对象肯定应该是日本慰安妇,而不是唐行妇。日本慰安妇回到故乡村镇时被接受了吗?她们回到家乡村镇后能谈论自己的过去吗?或者,她们是否成为了当地的传奇,为自己为国家奉献的方式感到自豪?直到今天,日本慰安妇仍然保持着沉重的沉默。
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of problematising the stigma that women who have been prostitutes receive in a patriarchal society regardless of whether force was used or not, Marayama’s perspective took her right to [the reason for] the silence of the former comfort women. It was not until the 1980s as a result of feminism that there was finally a shift in paradigm from prostitution being a woman’s problem to it becoming a man’s problem.
然而,从问题化在父权社会中无论是否使用暴力,卖淫女性所受到的污名的角度来看,丸山的观点直接触及了前慰安妇沉默的原因。直到 1980 年代,随着女权主义的发展,才终于出现了范式转变——从将卖淫视为女性问题转变为成为男性问题。
Nevertheless, Maruyama came very close to a paradigm shift on the basis of her own insight and language.
然而,丸山凭借她自身的洞察力和语言,已经非常接近范式转变。

The Military Rape Paradigm
军事强奸范式

The military rape paradigm is a variation of the patriarchal paradigm. Of course, rape of non-combatants as an act of assault is not only a contravention of international law, but also a breach of military regulations. Military rape is sufficiently common for it to be pardoned, along with the slaughter of civilians, as a fact of war; a ‘going too far’ that accompanies this kind of emergency situation.
军事强奸范式是父权制范式的一种变体。当然,作为攻击行为的非战斗人员强奸不仅违反国际法,也违反军事法规。军事强奸足够普遍,以至于与屠杀平民一道被视为战争的事实而被宽恕;这是一种伴随此类紧急情况的“过火”行为。
The view that rape is something that inevitably accompanies war, something that occurs in all countries in wartime, further exempts the assailants from responsibility. Until very recently, this form of rape was explained in terms of the lust of soldiers living for long periods in an all male society separated from women. However, since it has become clear that a male assailant does not move from sexual desire to rape, little by little we are being released from the peacetime rape myth 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} and a new understanding of rape in wartime is also in the process of being established from the perspective of Men’s Studies. Hikosaka Tai, a male social critic, criticises the myth that men cannot control themselves, arguing that men rape in order to display their hold on power. He makes clear that, above all else, rape in wartime is distinctive for its multiplicity (gang rape) and it is a ritual that establishes group solidarity through the assault of a more vulnerable person (Hikosaka, 1991). It is now realised that in reality rape in wartime frequently occurs in places where there is an audience.
认为强奸是战争不可避免的伴随现象,是所有国家在战时都会发生的事情,这种观点进一步免除了施暴者的责任。直到最近,这种形式的强奸被解释为长期生活在全男性社会、与女性隔离的士兵的欲望。然而,随着越来越清楚地认识到男性施暴者并非从性欲直接转向强奸,我们逐渐摆脱了和平时期强奸的神话 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} ,并且从男性研究的视角出发,关于战时强奸的新理解也正在形成。男性社会评论家彦坂泰批判了“男性无法自控”的神话,认为男性强奸是为了展示他们对权力的掌控。他明确指出,战时强奸最显著的特点是多重性(群体强奸),这是一种通过攻击更脆弱者来建立群体团结的仪式(彦坂,1991)。现在人们意识到,实际上战时强奸常常发生在有观众的场合。
On its own, the above is an insufficient explanation of wartime rape. This assault by soldiers is directed above all else at the sexuality of women, because the assailants know that it is a display of their own power, symbolically acting as the ultimate insult to the men on the enemy side. It is exactly for this reason that rape stirs up such vehement rage in the men of the enemy country.
仅凭上述内容,无法充分解释战争期间的强奸行为。士兵们的这种攻击首先针对的是女性的性,因袭击者知道这是一种展示自身权力的行为,象征性地对敌方男性施加了极大的侮辱。正是出于这个原因,强奸会激起敌国男性极为强烈的愤怒。
Historian Hirota Masaki ( 1995 , 1996 ) ( 1995 , 1996 ) (1995,1996)(1995,1996) has attempted to make sense of the comfort women by extending the paradigm of wartime rape. Hirota holds up as one distinctive feature and cause of wartime rape, ‘the inability [of those involved] to understand each other’; 'in other words there is from the beginning the presence of two different cultures and no way to establish communication. However, this is not applicable to the case of the Korean comfort women. Under the assimilation policy of turning Koreans into Imperial subjects, former comfort women would have been given official Japanese names and made to wear yukata (cotton kimono) and take on the appearance of Japanese women. Korean comfort women were welcomed by the soldiers exactly because they could act like Japanese women. Among Japanese soldiers there are those who speak nostalgically of their communication with comfort women, and there were comfort women who committed double suicide with Japanese soldiers. Of course, among the latter, there be those who were forced to commit suicide in this way.
历史学家广田正树尝试通过扩展战时强奸的范式来理解慰安妇问题。广田认为,战时强奸的一个显著特征和原因是“当事人之间无法相互理解”;“换句话说,从一开始就存在两种不同的文化,且无法建立沟通。”然而,这一点并不适用于韩国慰安妇的情况。在将韩国人同化为帝国臣民的同化政策下,前慰安妇会被赋予官方的日本名字,穿上浴衣(棉质和服),并呈现出日本女性的形象。韩国慰安妇正是因为能够表现得像日本女性,才受到士兵们的欢迎。在日本士兵中,有些人怀念与慰安妇的交流,也有慰安妇与日本士兵双双自杀的情况。当然,在后者中,也有被迫以这种方式自杀的人。
Even if we look at this from the perspective of historical reality, it is impossible to make sense of the comfort women using the paradigm of military rape. This is because the comfort women system went beyond casual, unorganised wartime rape. Of course, there were many victims who were first victims of wartime rape who then ended up being abducted, gang raped, systematically and under continuous supervision [as comfort women]. In the occupied territories in the south such as Philippines and Indonesia, this was likely the case.
即使从历史现实的角度来看,也无法用军事强奸的范式来理解慰安妇问题。这是因为慰安妇制度超越了偶发的、无组织的战争强奸。当然,有许多受害者最初是战争强奸的受害者,随后被绑架、轮奸,并在系统性和持续监督下成为慰安妇。在菲律宾、印度尼西亚等南方被占领地区,这种情况很可能存在。
In reality it is difficult to draw a line between wartime rape and the organised comfort women system. However, simply reducing the comfort women to a case of wartime rape leaves hidden within the comfort women system itself problems that are difficult to solve.
实际上,很难划清战争强奸与有组织的慰安妇制度之间的界限。然而,单纯将慰安妇归结为战争强奸案件,会使慰安妇制度本身隐藏的问题难以解决。

The Prostitution Paradigm
卖淫范式

The prostitution paradigm is frequently mobilised to legitimise the comfort women system. In Japan, this is the argument used by conservative female critic Kamisaka Fuyuko, and more recently Tokyo University professor of pedagogy, Fujioka Nobukatsu and comic writer Kobayashi Yoshinori of the Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai (The Japanese Group for Orthodox History Education, hereafter Orthodox History Group). On the basis of ‘the involvement of business agents’ and ‘the giving and receiving of money’, this viewpoint presumes the voluntariness of the women concerned. Undoubtedly among former comfort women there were those who came along on the basis of honeyed words that they would be able to make a good living, and there are also cases where the families, rather than the woman herself, received compensation. There are also stories of women carrying home close to their bodies the military scrip they had saved up until the time of their withdrawal from the front. It is necessary here to separate the issue of whether recruitment was voluntary or not, from the question of receiving money. Of the 19 Korean women who gave testimony there were 12 cases of ‘employment by deception’ (Korean Council, 1993). As the agents doing the recruiting told them that there was a ‘job vacancy’ or that there was ‘a job for women providing board and meals’, the women did not imagine that what they were being led into was forced prostitution. It is also possible for money to be received on the basis of coercion. If payment is forced on a woman after rape it does not mean that the crime of rape is erased. In a similar vein, according to the testimony of the 19 former comfort women, three received payment (Korean Council, 1993). Even here they were paid military scrip issued by the Japanese army and after the war it was as good as rubbish paper.
卖淫范式经常被用来为慰安妇制度辩护。在日本,这一论点被保守派女性评论家上坂冬子采用,最近则由东京大学教育学教授藤冈信胜和漫画作家小林义典(隶属于“新历史教科书制作会”,以下简称正统历史团体)提出。基于“中介商的介入”和“金钱的给付与接受”,这一观点假定相关女性是自愿的。毫无疑问,在前慰安妇中确实有些人是被甜言蜜语诱骗,认为能够过上好日子而前往的,也有家庭而非女性本人获得赔偿的情况。还有女性将军用代金券紧贴身体带回家的故事,直到她们从前线撤退为止。在这里,有必要将招募是否自愿的问题与是否收受金钱的问题区分开来。 在 19 名作证的韩国女性中,有 12 例属于“欺骗性雇佣”(韩国议会,1993 年)。由于招募的中介告诉她们有“职位空缺”或“为女性提供食宿的工作”,这些女性并未想到自己被引入的是强迫卖淫的境地。基于胁迫而收取金钱也是可能的。如果在强奸后强迫女性支付费用,并不意味着强奸罪被抹消。同样,根据 19 名前慰安妇的证词,有三人收到了报酬(韩国议会,1993 年)。即使在这里,她们得到的也是日本军队发行的军票,战后几乎一文不值。
Hikosaka Tai writes the following on the basis of testimony concerning Korean comfort women at Luzon Island in the Philippines in the final stages of the war:
彦坂泰根据关于菲律宾吕宋岛上韩国慰安妇在战争末期的证词写道:
Ultimately, the money that they so carefully took with them was earned and saved as a result of coerced and relentless labour, regardless of their own will. In spite of this, even at the time [they were taking the money back home so carefully] the money had already become absolutely worthless bits of paper (Hikosaka, 1991:70).
归根结底,她们小心翼翼带走的钱,是通过被强迫且不懈的劳动挣得和积攒下来的,无论她们本人意愿如何。尽管如此,即使在当时[她们如此小心地带回钱],这些钱已经完全变成毫无价值的纸片了(彦坂,1991:70)。
If the comfort women system was a variety of compulsory recruitment and sexual labour, this ‘offering oneself for one’s country’ would have ended with the women applying for compensation for the no-longer valid military scrip after the war was over, but the comfort women were most definitely not treated as though they were a part of the general forced labour compensation problem. The reason for this is ‘prostitute discrimination’ in that prostitution was regarded as ‘shameful occupation’ or ‘dirty work’, and if this involved ‘free will’ then the degraded ones were the women themselves.
如果慰安妇制度是一种强制征募和性劳动的变体,那么这种“为国献身”本应在战争结束后,女性申请赔偿已失效的军用代金券时结束,但慰安妇绝对没有被视为一般强制劳动赔偿问题的一部分。其原因在于“妓女歧视”,即卖淫被视为“可耻职业”或“肮脏工作”,如果这涉及“自由意志”,那么被贬低的就是女性本人。
On this point, one of the victims, Moon Ok-chu’s, ‘Military Postal Saving’s Lawsuit’ is deeply significant. In this lawsuit that superficially appears to be a demand for compensation for sexual services, the case is phrased in terms of Moon not wanting to leave with her assailants, the Japanese government, money that she had torn herself into shreds over in order to receive. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} However, based on the same logic as in other postal savings suits, the case has been beaten down by the position of the Japanese government which says, ‘the matter was settled with the Japanese Korean Economic Cooperation and the Right to Claim Agreement.’ In October 1996 Moon passed away with the case still unsettled.
在这一点上,受害者之一文玉珠的“军邮储蓄诉讼”具有深远的意义。在这起表面上看似要求性服务赔偿的诉讼中,案件的表述是文玉珠不愿将自己拼命挣来的钱留给她的加害者——日本政府。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 然而,基于与其他邮储诉讼相同的逻辑,日本政府以“此事已通过日韩经济合作及债权协议解决”为由驳回了此案。1996 年 10 月,文玉珠在案件尚未解决的情况下去世。
I have a number of reservations concerning this prostitution paradigm. Firstly, in terms of the question of whether the comfort women were recruited by force or not, it was not admitted publicly that forced recruitment carried out by the Japanese government included sexual labour. Secondly, it is doubtful whether forced recruitment was ‘work for pay’. The reason for this is that, whether sexual or other forms of labour, forced recruitment in the majority of cases only involved nominal wages and it was usual for those recruited to be made to work under slave conditions.
我对这一卖淫范式有诸多保留。首先,关于慰安妇是否被强迫招募的问题,日本政府并未公开承认其强迫招募中包含性劳动。其次,强迫招募是否属于“有偿工作”也值得怀疑。原因在于,无论是性劳动还是其他形式的劳动,绝大多数情况下强迫招募仅涉及名义上的工资,且被招募者通常被迫在奴隶般的条件下工作。
I would like to indicate one more fundamental misunderstanding that is an inevitable part of the prostitution paradigm. Whether it was forced or voluntary, prostitution is not ‘sex in exchange for money’ between a woman and a man. Prostitution, as a part of the sex industry, is an exchange between the seller (agent or manager who is frequently male) and the (male) buyer. Here the woman is not the agent or central player in this exchange but simply and nothing more than an object, a commodity. As a commodity, the prostitute does not have the right to choose her customers. Those who made a living at the comfort stations were not the individual women but the operators. No doubt while military scrip was still of value there were agents who became successful men (and sometimes women) by taking away with them fortunes that had been amassed. However, there must have been those who harboured within themselves a sense of shame at exploiting these women who were comfort women.
我想指出另一个根本性的误解,这是卖淫范式中不可避免的一部分。无论是被迫还是自愿,卖淫并不是女性与男性之间的“以性换钱”。作为性产业的一部分,卖淫是卖方(经纪人或经理,通常是男性)与(男性)买方之间的交换。在这里,女性不是代理人或交换的核心参与者,而仅仅是一个物品,一种商品。作为商品,妓女没有权利选择她的客户。在慰安所谋生的不是个别女性,而是经营者。毫无疑问,在军票仍有价值的时候,有些经纪人通过带走积累的财富成为了成功人士(有时甚至是女性)。然而,肯定也有人内心怀有羞耻感,因为他们剥削了这些慰安妇。
The prostitution paradigm contains within itself a viewpoint that exempts men from responsibility by implying that women have agency. Women who ‘sell sex’, by this very act, are stigmatised. Those women themselves who work in this ‘shameful occupation’ are considered to be unclean. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} In terms of making into an issue the volition of the woman herself, at a glance the prostitute paradigm appears to recognise the woman’s right to self-determination but, given that it is supported by a sexual double standard that draws a line between prostitutes and all other women, in reality it can be said to be another version of the patriarchal code. The discrimination within the prostitution paradigm has deprived many former Japanese comfort women of their voice. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
卖淫范式本身包含一种观点,通过暗示女性具有自主权,从而免除男性的责任。那些“卖淫”的女性,仅凭这一行为就被污名化。那些从事这一“可耻职业”的女性本身被视为不洁净的。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 就将女性自身的意愿作为问题来看,乍一看卖淫范式似乎承认女性的自决权,但鉴于它依赖于将妓女与其他所有女性区分开的性别双重标准,实际上可以说它是父权制规范的另一种表现形式。卖淫范式中的歧视剥夺了许多前日本慰安妇的发声权。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
It has become clear that there are a number of deceits within the prostitution paradigm. Firstly, there is the clear involvement of the military in the comfort stations. There were three versions of comfort station: comfort stations that the military directly managed, comfort stations assigned for exclusive military use, and local comfort stations used by the military. All three versions were placed under military control. Secondly, in contrast to the appearance of prostitution, there is the point that what we are actually talking about is forced labour under conditions of confinement. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} Soldiers had to pay military scrip each time they used a comfort woman. However, to avoid misunderstanding it is important to stress that it was the
在卖淫范式中存在许多欺骗之处已变得清晰。首先,军方明显参与了慰安所的管理。慰安所分为三种类型:军方直接管理的慰安所、专供军方使用的慰安所,以及军方使用的地方慰安所。这三种慰安所均置于军方控制之下。其次,与卖淫的表象相反,实际上我们讨论的是在被限制自由的条件下的强迫劳动。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 士兵每次使用慰安妇服务时都必须支付军用代币。然而,为避免误解,必须强调的是……

agent that received this military scrip and that there was no direct exchange relationship between the soldier and the comfort woman. Thirdly, far from the procurement of the comfort women involving free will, visible and invisible pressures accompanied procurement with women violently taken by force or abduction. Many were lured by the lies of the agents and/or they were victims of human trafficking.
代理人接收了这张军用票据,士兵与慰安妇之间并不存在直接的交换关系。第三,慰安妇的征集远非出于自由意志,征集过程中伴随着有形和无形的压力,许多女性被暴力强征或绑架。许多人被代理人的谎言诱骗,或者成为人口贩卖的受害者。
The transformation of existing ‘pleasure quarters’ into those for exclusive military use, those for use by the military or comfort stations, the trick of setting up payment for each time of use, and the use of a euphemisms like comfort station and comfort women by the military meant that the reality of confinement and coercion was concealed. Further, the military was able to give the impression that this was a business activity. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} In fact, within Japan in Okinawa where there were Korean comfort women, a request was received from the military to turn into an exclusive comfort station a pleasure quarters of high standing from a long time ago known as Tsuji, but this request was turned down with great pride. The continuity between the conventional pleasure quarters and the comfort stations was categorically constructed. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
将现有的“娱乐场所”改造成专供军队使用的场所,即军队使用的慰安所,通过设定每次使用付费的方式,以及军方使用“慰安所”和“慰安妇”等委婉语,掩盖了被拘禁和强迫的现实。此外,军方还能够给人一种这是商业活动的印象。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 事实上,在日本冲绳有朝鲜慰安妇的地方,军方曾请求将一个历史悠久、地位很高的娱乐场所——辻,改为专属慰安所,但这一请求被以极大的自尊心拒绝了。传统娱乐场所与慰安所之间的连续性被明确构建起来。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
When it comes to the Korean comfort women in Okinawa, we need to consider the issue of discrimination of the Okinawans by the soldiers from mainland Japan. In response to the complaints from local women’s groups that establishing a comfort station would corrupt public morals, the military employed the logic that it would protect the chastity of women from good families and on the basis of this, women’s groups accepted a comfort station (Kawada, 1987). Here, because of the likelihood of rape by soldiers of the Imperial Army, the chastity of the women of Okinawa was ‘defended’ at the sacrifice of Korean women. The fact that for women of Okinawa the soldiers of the Imperial Army were potential assailants suggests the possibility that Okinawa was being treated as a quasi-occupied territory.
谈到冲绳的韩国慰安妇问题时,我们需要考虑来自日本本土士兵对冲绳人的歧视问题。针对当地妇女团体关于设立慰安所会败坏社会风气的抗议,军方采用了这样一种逻辑:慰安所能够保护良家妇女的贞洁,基于这一点,妇女团体接受了慰安所的设立(川田,1987)。在这里,由于帝国陆军士兵可能实施强奸,冲绳妇女的贞洁被“保护”是以牺牲韩国妇女为代价的。对于冲绳妇女来说,帝国陆军的士兵是潜在的袭击者,这一事实暗示冲绳可能被视为一个准被占领地区。
Moreover, the fact that the military was systematically involved in the military comfort stations was something that was shameful to them. While it was recognised that the military comfort women system was a ‘necessary evil’, it was also regarded as a source of embarrassment for the Imperial Army. The transportation of comfort women was carried out on military ships and the military even transferred the women to the front line. As
此外,军方系统性地参与军中慰安所的事实令他们感到羞耻。虽然军中慰安妇制度被认为是“必要的恶”,但它也被视为帝国陆军的一个尴尬来源。慰安妇的运输是由军舰执行的,军方甚至将这些妇女转运到前线。由于

civilians were prohibited from riding on military ships, the women were treated as freight (military goods) and as a result no passenger lists for them remain. Of course it can be said that this reveals the extent to which these women were deprived of their character, but at the same time, in hindsight, we can see that there was also concern not to make public the transportation by the military of ‘goods’ for the purpose of sexual comfort.
平民被禁止乘坐军舰,这些妇女被当作货物(军用物资)对待,因此没有她们的乘客名单。当然,这可以说明这些妇女被剥夺人格的程度,但同时,事后看来,我们也能理解军方不愿公开以性慰藉为目的运输“货物”的顾虑。
At the end of the war, documents concerned with the comfort women were scrapped along with most other military documents. However, there is no indication here that this was because the military feared that the comfort women problem might be judged as a particular war crime. In reality, it was the abuse of prisoners of war and the slaughter of civilians that emerged as problems, and at the Tokyo Trials (The International Military Tribunal for the Far East) the Occupation Forces did not pass judgement on the comfort women issue. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} One reason for this is that the Tokyo Tribunal Court did not invite Korea on the side of those issuing indictments against Japan. At that point in time, the problem of Korea as a colony was regarded as an internal affair with Korean people continuing to have Japanese nationality for the time being. The Tokyo Trials were trials of the war crimes of the defeated Japan brought by the Allied Nations. The many Asian nations that were the victims of Japan’s aggression - China, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines among others - were not central players in the indictment process. In the bilateral agreement between Japan and Korea concerning post-war compensation, Korea did not raise the matter of the victimisation of the comfort women. These conditions have opened the way for right-wing popular comic writer Kobayashi’s kind of faultfinding, which have continued over a long period of time. His argument has been that if it was such an important issue why did the Korean government keep quiet about it for so long. As Senda Kakō testifies, we had to wait for the paradigm shift that occurred in December 1991 as a result of the victims ‘coming out’.
战争结束时,与慰安妇相关的文件与大多数其他军事文件一起被销毁。然而,这里没有迹象表明这是因为军方担心慰安妇问题可能被判定为特定的战争罪行。实际上,战俘虐待和屠杀平民才成为突出的问题,在东京审判(远东国际军事法庭)中,驻日占领军并未对慰安妇问题作出判决。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 其中一个原因是东京审判法庭没有邀请韩国作为对日本提起指控的一方。当时,韩国作为殖民地的问题被视为内部事务,韩国人暂时仍具有日本国籍。东京审判是由同盟国对战败的日本进行的战争罪行审判。许多作为日本侵略受害者的亚洲国家——中国、韩国、台湾、印度尼西亚、菲律宾等——并未成为起诉过程中的核心参与者。 在日本与韩国关于战后赔偿的双边协议中,韩国并未提出慰安妇受害问题。这些条件为右翼通俗漫画作家小林那种挑剔的言论打开了方便之门,这种言论持续了很长一段时间。他的论点是,如果这是一个如此重要的问题,为什么韩国政府会保持沉默这么久。正如千田夏光所证实的那样,我们不得不等待 1991 年 12 月因受害者“出面”而发生的范式转变。

The Sexual Violence Paradigm
性暴力范式

The military sexual slavery paradigm clearly denies the voluntarism of the prostitution paradigm. This paradigm has become firmly established since the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June 1993. The United Nations decided to create a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women within the Human Rights Commission, and chose Radhika Coomaraswamy from Sri Lanka. She energetically carried out an investigation that included listening to the testimony of victims, and submitted the Coomaraswamy Report in April 1996 . 19 1996 . 19 1996.^(19)1996 .{ }^{19} The Human Rights Commission adopted the report unanimously. In addition to positioning the military comfort women system as a form of sexual slavery, details of the Coomaraswamy Report’s proposal, recommending that the Japanese government offer an apology and compensation, are widely known. However, the official position of the Japanese government to-date is, firstly, that the comfort women system cannot accurately be described as a system of sexual slavery, and, secondly, that it is not the job of the Human Rights Commission to retrospectively pursue questions of past responsibility.
军事性奴隶制范式明确否认了卖淫范式中的自愿性。自 1993 年 6 月在维也纳举行的联合国世界人权大会以来,这一范式已被牢固确立。联合国决定在人权委员会内设立针对暴力侵害妇女问题的特别报告员,并选择了来自斯里兰卡的拉迪卡·库马拉斯瓦米。她积极开展调查,包括听取受害者的证词,并于 4 月提交了库马拉斯瓦米报告。人权委员会一致通过了该报告。除了将军慰安妇制度定位为一种性奴隶制外,库马拉斯瓦米报告中建议日本政府道歉和赔偿的具体内容也广为人知。然而,日本政府迄今的官方立场首先是,慰安妇制度不能准确地被描述为性奴隶制,其次是,人权委员会无权追究过去责任的历史问题。
At the time, news of the rape camps in the former Yugoslavia after the collapse of the Communist Bloc had shocked the world. We were shocked by the fact that these were not simply casual, unregulated rapes triggered by war, but systematic sexual crimes by the military. Another shocking aspect was the racial genocide type strategy of ethnic cleansing that was carried out. This involved the restraint of women who had become pregnant as a result of rape until abortion was no longer a possibility. The sexual slavery paradigm was applied to the comfort women from an analogy of current issues, and not the other way round. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} Forming a background to this were the arguments of human rights politics and feminism problematising ‘violence against women in armed conflict’.
当时,前南斯拉夫在共产主义集团解体后发生的强奸营新闻震惊了全世界。令我们震惊的是,这些不仅仅是战争引发的随意、无序的强奸行为,而是军方系统性的性犯罪。另一个令人震惊的方面是实施的种族灭绝式的族群清洗策略。这包括对因强奸而怀孕的女性进行限制,直到堕胎不再可能。性奴隶制的范式是从当前问题的类比中应用于慰安妇的,而不是相反。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 作为背景的是人权政治和女权主义对“武装冲突中的针对女性的暴力”问题的讨论。
The reason that the comfort women issue has not ended with the scars from the past of a group of already elderly women, but gained considerable sympathy from the international solidarity of the women’s movement, is that there is recognition that the issue is deeply connected to current problems of violence against women. This connection is not limited to the kind of blatant war crimes that occurred in the rape camps of Bosnia. Neither is it simply the problem of ‘violence against women in armed conflict’ highlighted by the United Nations (UN). Instead, it is understood that the comfort women issue is tied in with the considerable suffering caused by what is regarded as the infringement of women’s sexual self-determination, such as ordinarily occurring rapes and sex crimes, domestic violence and child abuse. For many women, the pain is shared as if ‘the violence was inflicted on my own body’. In addition, based on the same sexual domination, prostitution is understood as an outcome of structural violence against women. At the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, the comfort women issue was one of the principal focuses of the NonGovernment Organisation (NGO) forum, and brought together activists opposed to sexual harassment, domestic violence and military-base prostitution.
慰安妇问题之所以没有随着一群已年迈女性过去的伤痕而结束,反而获得了国际妇女运动团结的广泛同情,是因为人们认识到这一问题与当前针对女性的暴力问题有着深刻的联系。这种联系不仅限于波斯尼亚强奸营中发生的那种公然的战争罪行,也不仅仅是联合国所强调的“武装冲突中的针对女性的暴力”问题。相反,人们理解慰安妇问题与被视为侵犯女性性自主权的诸多痛苦密切相关,比如日常发生的强奸和性犯罪、家庭暴力以及虐待儿童。对许多女性来说,这种痛苦仿佛“暴力施加在我自己的身体上”。此外,基于同样的性支配,卖淫被理解为针对女性的结构性暴力的结果。 1995 年在北京举行的联合国第四次世界妇女大会上,慰安妇问题成为非政府组织(NGO)论坛的主要关注点之一,汇聚了反对性骚扰、家庭暴力和军事基地卖淫的活动家。
Key concepts in the sexual violence paradigm are women’s human rights and sexual self-determination. However, this paradigm itself is also loaded with problems. Firstly, human rights is not a supra-historical, universalistic concept. The content of human rights has not only changed historically, but socially it has been limited by categories such as gender, class and race. In addition, the human rights concept is burdened by the boundaries of the historical period, in other words the modern era. A concept of women and human rights is one of the achievements of feminism and, moreover, made possible the switch to the sexual violence paradigm. Yet, at the same time, it has exposed the concepts of human rights and self-determination to a fresh examination today (Scott, 1996; Tateiwa, 1997).
性暴力范式中的关键概念是女性的人权和性自决权。然而,这一范式本身也存在问题。首先,人权并非一个超历史的、普遍主义的概念。人权的内容不仅在历史上发生了变化,而且在社会上受到性别、阶级和种族等范畴的限制。此外,人权概念还受制于历史时期的界限,也就是现代时代。女性与人权的概念是女权主义的成果,更使得转向性暴力范式成为可能。然而,与此同时,这也使得人权和自决权的概念在当今面临新的审视(Scott, 1996;Tateiwa, 1997)。
Secondly, as the term human rights diplomacy suggests, there is the issue of human rights being UN focused. Under the post-Cold War system with the United States as the central axis, it is impossible to naïvely evaluate the role carried out by the UN as simply that of international police. While the United States has used human rights as a diplomatic trump card on the one
其次,正如“人权外交”一词所暗示的那样,存在人权以联合国为中心的问题。在以美国为核心轴心的后冷战体系下,天真地将联合国的角色简单地评估为国际警察是不可能的。虽然美国一方面将人权作为外交王牌使用,

hand, it has shut its eyes to its own war crimes and military invasions, on the other. The UN is not a synonym for justice.
另一方面却对自身的战争罪行和军事入侵视而不见。联合国并不等同于正义。
Thirdly, the concept of sexual self-determination is likely once again to draw us back into a debate over the presence or absence of voluntarism surrounding sex work.
第三,性自主的概念很可能再次将我们拉回到关于性工作中自愿性存在与否的辩论中。
Military sexual slaves does indeed seem to be appropriate terminology for understanding the comfort women given the systematic and continuous rape of the women under conditions of forced capture and confinement. Nevertheless, by overemphasising its opposition to the prostitution paradigm, the military sexual slavery paradigm falls into exactly the same kind of dilemma as that of rape trials where the agency of the victims has to be assiduously denied. For example, the purity of the victim’s sexual past, whether there was any resistance or not, and the denial of any economic motivation are all symbolically utilised, with the image of the model victim. For instance, it is easier to accept as a victim the image of a young woman who was a virgin at the time that she was taken away, and either completely duped or captured by force. In this kind of story, the woman would have planned to escape or commit suicide, but she was prevented from doing so and somehow survived. Needless to say, for the victims who speak out in public about these kinds of dreadful experiences, the application of a concept of model victim, which is a manipulative category, is truly discourteous. The problem lies not with the narrator but the listener who only hears what he or she wants to hear. Moreover, the political effect of this paradigm is that it makes it difficult for anybody who deviates from the model victim to come forward. It is much harder to gain acceptance in a case where at the time of being rounded up the victim had an experience of prostitution; or due to poverty the victim went for economic reasons although vaguely aware of what was going to happen; or alternatively that the victim had been hoarding military scrip, even if these were survival strategies from among limited choices by the women to avoid certain death. Stated more clearly, this paradigm functions to place a boundary between the ‘pure’ and the ‘impure’ victim. Furthermore, as a result of creating the image of the ‘immaculate victim’, it is capable of becoming the unintended accomplice of the patriarchal paradigm, which demands women’s purity.
“军事性奴隶”确实似乎是理解慰安妇的恰当术语,因为她们在被强行捕获和囚禁的条件下遭受了系统性和持续性的强奸。然而,通过过分强调与卖淫范式的对立,军事性奴隶范式陷入了与强奸审判中相同的困境,即必须刻意否认受害者的能动性。例如,受害者性过去的纯洁性、是否有抵抗以及否认任何经济动机,都是象征性地被利用,形成模范受害者的形象。例如,更容易被接受为受害者的是那种在被带走时还是处女、要么完全被欺骗要么被强行捕获的年轻女性形象。在这种叙述中,女性本打算逃跑或自杀,但被阻止了,并且不知何故幸存下来。不用说,对于那些公开讲述这些可怕经历的受害者来说,应用模范受害者这一操控性的范畴,实在是极不尊重的。 问题不在于叙述者,而在于听者,他们只听自己想听的内容。此外,这一范式的政治效果在于,使得任何偏离典型受害者模式的人都难以站出来。在被抓捕时,如果受害者曾有过卖淫经历;或者因贫困而出于经济原因被迫参与,虽然模糊地意识到将要发生的事情;又或者受害者曾囤积军用代金券,即使这些都是女性在有限选择中为避免必死无疑而采取的生存策略,那么要获得认可就更加困难。更明确地说,这一范式的功能是划定“纯洁”与“不纯洁”受害者之间的界限。此外,由于塑造了“无瑕受害者”的形象,它有可能成为父权范式的无意帮凶,而父权范式要求女性保持纯洁。
Historian Kurahashi Masanao divides the comfort stations into two types, the civilian-run model (prostitution model) and the military comfort women model (sexual slavery model), but if this is the case then once again a distinction has been drawn between the victims (Kurahashi, 1989, 1994). 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
历史学家仓桥正直将慰安所分为两种类型,即民间经营模式(卖淫模式)和军队慰安妇模式(性奴隶模式),但如果是这样的话,那么受害者之间又一次被划分开来了(仓桥,1989,1994)。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
Another political consequence of a military sexual slavery paradigm that distinguishes itself from the prostitution paradigm is that it creates a division between Japanese comfort women and non-Japanese comfort women. The sexual slavery paradigm refers to systematic sexual crimes carried out against the women of enemy or occupied countries. Consequently, it functions to exclude from this victimisation those comfort women who were fellow nationals or military-base prostitution of allied countries. For example, there has been a tendency to pardon as economic activity based on free will the military-base prostitution of Korean soldiers who participated in the Vietnam War and American military-base prostitution within Japan. Yet, surely the rape of a 12 year-old girl in 1995 by three American soldiers that so enraged the residents of Okinawa prefecture is contiguous to military-base prostitution and everyday structural violence against women? 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
军事性奴隶制范式区别于卖淫范式的另一个政治后果是,它在日本慰安妇和非日本慰安妇之间制造了分裂。性奴隶制范式指的是针对敌国或被占领国家妇女实施的系统性性犯罪。因此,它起到了将同胞慰安妇或盟国军队基地卖淫排除在受害者之外的作用。例如,曾有一种倾向,将参与越南战争的韩国士兵的军营卖淫以及日本境内的美军基地卖淫视为基于自由意志的经济活动而予以宽恕。然而,1995 年三名美军士兵强奸一名 12 岁女孩,激怒了冲绳县居民,这难道不与军营卖淫和对妇女的日常结构性暴力相连吗? 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
Yamashita Yeong-ae, a feminist activist, points out the prostitute discrimination within the logic of the Korean Council:
女权活动家山下英爱指出了韩国议会逻辑中的卖淫者歧视:
Within the logic of the counter-argument of the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery, that the comfort women were not prostitutes and were very definitely not state licensed prostitutes, there is the danger of reinforcing the view that the comfort women were forced, while for prostitutes it was free-will (Yamashita, 1994:45).
在韩国征召妇女为军事性奴隶问题委员会的反驳逻辑中,慰安妇不是妓女,且绝对不是国家许可的妓女,这种说法存在强化慰安妇是被强迫的观点的危险,而妓女则是出于自由意志(山下,1994:45)。
On the other hand, in an effort to transcend this kind of division, Suzuki Yūko has developed the logic that the pre-war system of licensed prostitution was also sexual slavery (Suzuki, 1996b). Given that a concept of sexual slavery has been applied to the traffic of women, including the ‘whiteslave’ trade, then the system of licensed prostitution as an act that violated women’s human rights was certainly such a system. By 1925 Japan was already a signatory to The International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1904), The International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1910), and The International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Adult Women and Girls (1921), and in 1932 Japan ratified the International Labour Organisation Treaty No. 29 (the
另一方面,为了超越这种划分,铃木裕子提出了战前许可妓院制度也是性奴隶制的逻辑(铃木,1996b)。鉴于性奴隶的概念已被应用于包括“白奴”贸易在内的妇女贩卖,那么作为侵犯妇女人权行为的许可妓院制度无疑也是这种制度。到 1925 年,日本已签署了《国际禁止白奴贩运协定》(1904 年)、《国际禁止白奴贩运公约》(1910 年)和《国际禁止贩运成年妇女和少女公约》(1921 年),并于 1932 年批准了国际劳工组织第 29 号条约(即
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour). While the comfort women system was an even bigger infringement, the system of licensed prostitution was already in violation of these conventions. While on paper it looked as though the women had entered into a contract of their own free will, it was an open secret that binding debt and working under surveillance meant that actual conditions were those of slavery.
《强迫或义务劳动公约》。虽然慰安妇制度的侵犯更为严重,但有执照的卖淫制度已经违反了这些公约。表面上看,女性似乎是自愿签订合同,但众所周知,债务束缚和监视下的工作意味着实际状况就是奴役。
Conservative historian Hata Ikuhiko, in a discussion of the ‘contested points and blind spots in the Four Major Affairs’ (yondai jiken), meaning the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Nanking Massacre, Unit 731 and the comfort women, raises the following three questions in relation to the comfort women issue. First, was there a system of forced recruitment by the authorities? Second, were living conditions harsher than for licensed prostitutes during peacetime? Third, why have no Japanese comfort women come forward? In response to the first two question, Hata gives the answer ‘no’ (Hata, 1997:39). Of course, Hata’s argument is cleverly devised. For example, in his first question he asks whether there was a system of forced recruitment and not whether forced recruitment occurred. Would the answer still have been ‘no’ if he had phrased the question in this way: did systematic, forced recruitment on the instructions of the military occur? If not, would it be a case of there is no substantive proof that the military participated systematically? In terms of the second question, the implication is that if the comfort women were given an equally miserable lifestyle as licensed prostitutes, at least it meant that their treatment was the same as the Japanese. This inter-connects with question three; if this was the case, why have no Japanese comfort women come forward? Although Hata takes what appears to be great pride in indicating that this question is one of the ‘blind spots’ in the debate, of course he refrains from pointing out that this is also a contested point. It is exactly Hata’s type of conservative discourse that provided the reason for the existence of the comfort women, and the reason for their continued silence until today. Turning this around the other way, this problem is surely evidence of the powerlessness of Japanese feminism.
保守派历史学家秦郁彦在讨论“四大事件”(即卢沟桥事变、南京大屠杀、731 部队和慰安妇)中的“争议点与盲点”时,针对慰安妇问题提出了以下三个问题。第一,当局是否存在强制征募的制度?第二,慰安妇的生活条件是否比和平时期的有执照妓女更为恶劣?第三,为什么没有日本慰安妇站出来?对于前两个问题,秦的回答是否定的(秦,1997:39)。当然,秦的论点设计得很巧妙。例如,他在第一个问题中问的是是否存在强制征募的制度,而不是强制征募是否发生过。如果他这样提问:是否存在军方指示下的系统性强制征募?答案还会是“否”吗?如果不是,那是否意味着没有实质性证据表明军方系统性参与了此事? 关于第二个问题,其含义是,如果慰安妇的生活状况和有执照的妓女一样悲惨,至少意味着她们受到的待遇与日本人相同。这与第三个问题相互关联;如果情况确实如此,为什么没有日本慰安妇站出来?尽管秦(Hata)似乎非常自豪地指出这个问题是辩论中的“盲点”之一,但他当然避免指出这也是一个有争议的点。正是秦那种保守的论述为慰安妇的存在提供了理由,也为她们至今保持沉默提供了原因。反过来说,这个问题无疑证明了日本女性主义的无力。

The Nationalist Discourse
民族主义话语

The shift in our understanding of the comfort women issue from national shame to gender discrimination and national discrimination was one of the achievements of the Korean women’s movement. Nevertheless, from the very beginning the tendency was to construct these within a nationalist discourse.
我们对慰安妇问题的理解从国家耻辱转向性别歧视和民族歧视,这是韩国妇女运动的一个成就。然而,从一开始,倾向于将这些问题构建在民族主义话语之中。
Activist and brilliant theorist Yamashita Yeong-ae, while close to the Korean Council, has provided an extremely perceptive critique of the nationalism embedded within the movement. She has not only criticised the gender discrimination embedded in the Korean nationalist discourse, but has also shown how discourses surrounding the comfort women have been constructed on the basis of their exposure to this national discourse and suggests that these too ‘may be tinged with gender discrimination’ (Yamashita Y., 1996:42).
活动家兼杰出理论家山下英爱,虽然与韩国议会关系密切,但对运动中所嵌入的民族主义提供了极为敏锐的批判。她不仅批评了韩国民族主义话语中根深蒂固的性别歧视,还展示了慰安妇相关话语是如何基于她们对这一民族话语的暴露而构建的,并指出这些话语“也可能带有性别歧视的色彩”(山下英爱,1996:42)。
The first thing here, as already discussed, is the distinction between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’, and which itself is based on prostitute discrimination. As we have seen in the example of the model victim, as a result of stressing force the chastity of Korean women is also being emphasised. Secondly, the distinction between forced and voluntary is equivalent to matching Korean comfort women against Japanese comfort women, with the result that a division is brought into play on the basis of nationality.
这里首先要讨论的,如前所述,是“强迫”与“自愿”的区分,而这本身是基于对妓女的歧视。正如我们在模范受害者的例子中所见,由于强调了强迫,韩国女性的贞洁也被强调了。其次,强迫与自愿的区分相当于将韩国慰安妇与日本慰安妇进行对比,结果是在国籍基础上引入了分裂。
Yamashita cites a section from the Korean Council’s Nihon seifu no kyōsei jyūngun ianfu mondai dainiji shinsō chōsa happyō ni taisuru wareware no tachiba (Our position in relation to the Japanese government’s second truth-finding survey into the forced military comfort women problem) published in August 1993:
山下引用了韩国议会于 1993 年 8 月发表的《我们对日本政府第二次强制军慰安妇问题真相调查发表的立场》(Nihon seifu no kyōsei jyūngun ianfu mondai dainiji shinsō chōsa happyō ni taisuru wareware no tachiba)中的一段:
The character of sexual slavery of the forced [Korean] military comfort women was clearly different than that of the Japanese women. Japanese comfort women were prostitutes within the existing state-regulated system of prostitution, and they received money, had a contract, and when the contract came to an end they could quit their life as a comfort woman…The [Korean] comfort women were different from the Japanese female prostitutes under the state licensed system of prostitution existing at that time. They were sexual slaves forced by the state and public authority to give sexual comfort to the military (Yamashita Y., 1996:44). 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
被强制征召的[韩国]军慰安妇的性奴隶性质明显不同于日本女性。日本慰安妇是在现有国家监管的卖淫制度内的妓女,她们获得报酬,有合同,合同期满后可以结束慰安妇的生活……[韩国]慰安妇不同于当时国家许可的卖淫制度下的日本女性妓女。她们是被国家和公共权力强迫为军队提供性慰藉的性奴隶(山下洋,1996:44)。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
Here, the military sexual slavery paradigm was mobilised for the purpose of anti-Japanese Korean nationalism. National confrontation has been emphasised within the Korean Council with one theory even locating the comfort women system as a policy of ethnic genocide.
在这里,军事性奴隶制范式被动员用于反日的韩国民族主义目的。韩国议会内部强调民族对抗,有一种理论甚至将慰安妇制度定位为一种种族灭绝政策。
Yamashita states emphatically that the nationalistic discourse concerning the comfort women issue is ethnocentric and erects a wall between Korean victims and those from other ethnic groups and from other regions, thus bringing a division between them. Yamashita considers the nationalist tendency within the Korean women’s movement to be ‘a survival strategy aimed at having the women’s movement acknowledged within the national democratising movement’. However, she also takes the view that ‘compared to its enthusiastic reception as a women’s issue within the international solidarity movement, the comfort women issue’s influence on the domestic women’s movement and human rights movement has been extremely small…The reason for this is that…to begin with it was approached largely as a nationalist issue within Korea. On top of that, there was little effort made to overturn the nationalist discourse’ (Yamashita Y., 1996:51).
山下明确指出,关于慰安妇问题的民族主义话语具有种族中心主义,筑起了韩国受害者与其他族群及其他地区受害者之间的墙,从而造成了他们之间的分裂。山下认为,韩国妇女运动中的民族主义倾向是“一种旨在使妇女运动在民族民主化运动中获得认可的生存策略”。然而,她也认为,“与慰安妇问题在国际团结运动中作为妇女问题受到热烈欢迎相比,慰安妇问题对国内妇女运动和人权运动的影响极其有限……其原因在于……首先,在韩国国内它主要被视为一个民族主义问题。除此之外,几乎没有努力去推翻民族主义话语”(山下洋,1996:51)。

According to Korean feminist Kim Eun-shil, who Yamashita introduces:
根据山下介绍的韩国女权主义者金恩实:

By conferring greater symbolic meaning to the signifier sexual violation, the nationalist discourse denies the specificity of the women’s experiences and universalises it into a national issue. To rephrase this, it was not the women but the Korean nation that was sexually violated by the rapist Japan. Due to the fact that it was the nation itself that was of issue here, the crime of rape was not endowed with any meaning until perpetrated by the Japanese Empire (Kim, 1994:41; cited in Yamashita Y., 1996:44).
通过赋予“性侵犯”这一符号更大的象征意义,民族主义话语否认了女性经历的特殊性,并将其普遍化为一个国家问题。换句话说,被强奸的不是女性,而是被日本强奸的韩国民族。由于这里的问题是民族本身,强奸罪行直到由日本帝国实施才被赋予任何意义(Kim, 1994:41;引自山下 Y., 1996:44)。
By subsuming women within the ‘national subject’, or more precisely through the unification of women’s interests with men’s (in reality they are subordinate), the nationalist discourse could be used to mobilize nationalism. It is also a cliché among the right wing in Japan to use the rape metaphor to express a violation by another nation, however, this does not
通过将女性纳入“民族主体”,或者更准确地说,通过将女性利益与男性利益统一(实际上女性处于从属地位),民族主义话语可以被用来动员民族主义。在日本右翼中,使用强奸隐喻来表达另一个国家的侵犯也是一种陈词滥调,然而,这并不

mean that they necessarily respect women’s human rights. Far from it, there is a tendency to criticise the assertion of women’s rights as an act that serves the enemy by bringing about divisions. Seen from this perspective, the nationalist discourse can be considered a variant of the patriarchal paradigm. We can understand this within the context of the nationalisation of women as discussed in Part One. The patriarchal paradigm by objectifying women understands rape as the infringement of male property rights, while the nationalist discourse, by turning women into national subjects, understands rape as the violation of the nation. In both instances the norm for the nation is based on the male subject and there is an identification of female interests with male interests. From this standpoint, there is little difference between them.
这并不意味着他们必然尊重女性的人权。恰恰相反,往往会批评女性权利的主张,认为这是为敌人服务、制造分裂的行为。从这个角度看,民族主义话语可以被视为父权制范式的一种变体。我们可以在第一部分讨论的女性国家化背景下理解这一点。父权制范式通过将女性客体化,将强奸视为对男性财产权的侵犯,而民族主义话语则通过将女性转变为国家主体,将强奸视为对国家的侵犯。在这两种情况下,国家的规范都是基于男性主体,并且女性利益与男性利益被等同起来。从这个立场来看,两者几乎没有区别。

The Grey Zone of Collaboration with Japan
与日本合作的灰色地带

It is necessary to point out that behind the nationalist discourse and concealed by it is another latent issue, that of Korean collaboration with Japan. Currently nationalism within Korea is suppressing the surfacing of the issue, but the problem of collaboration with Japan under imperial rule is a deeply rooted and smouldering one, in the same way as the issue of the Vichy government’s collaboration with the Germans is in France.
有必要指出,在民族主义话语的背后并被其掩盖着另一个潜在的问题,那就是韩国与日本的合作问题。目前,韩国国内的民族主义正在压制这一问题的浮现,但在帝国统治下与日本合作的问题根深蒂固,隐隐作痛,就如同法国维希政府与德国合作的问题一样。
For example, on June 23 rd 1997 23 rd  1997 23^("rd ")199723^{\text {rd }} 1997 a memorial service was held by the Cornerstone of Peace Memorial to mark the 52 nd 52 nd  52^("nd ")52^{\text {nd }} anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa. The Cornerstone of Peace Memorial was the former Governor of Okinawa, Ōta Masahide’s, cherished project. Completion was planned for the 50th anniversary of the end of the war with an inscription of the names of all the war dead from the Battle of Okinawa, military and civilian, regardless of nationality. Included among these were Korean wardead who had been taken to Okinawa by force. The job of tracing back and identifying the original Korean names of those who had been recorded under the Japanese names imposed on them as a result of the renaming policy was an extremely difficult one, but it was given to On Jon-biru, a leading figure in Okinawan history in Korea and a Professor at Korea’s Myongji University. Professor On’s investigations revealed 50 names. Of these, seven of the bereaved families refused the inscription on the Cornerstone of Peace Memorial. The same day, June 23 rd 23 rd  23^("rd ")23^{\text {rd }}, the Ry u ¯ k y u ¯ u ¯ k y u ¯ bar(u)ky bar(u)\bar{u} k y \bar{u} Shinpō newspaper covered an interview with Professor On:
例如,在 6 月 23 rd 1997 23 rd  1997 23^("rd ")199723^{\text {rd }} 1997 日,和平基石纪念馆举行了纪念冲绳战役结束 52 nd 52 nd  52^("nd ")52^{\text {nd }} 周年的追悼会。和平基石纪念馆是冲绳前知事大田昌秀珍视的项目。该项目计划在战争结束 50 周年时完工,碑上刻有冲绳战役中所有战死者的名字,包括军人和平民,不论国籍。其中包括被强行带到冲绳的韩国战亡者。追溯并确认那些因改名政策而被记录为日本名字的韩国原名是一项极其艰难的工作,但这项任务交给了韩国明知大学教授、冲绳历史领域的领军人物温俊弼。温教授的调查揭示了 50 个名字。其中,七个丧属家庭拒绝在和平基石纪念馆上刻名。同一天,6 月 23 rd 23 rd  23^("rd ")23^{\text {rd }} 日,Ry u ¯ k y u ¯ u ¯ k y u ¯ bar(u)ky bar(u)\bar{u} k y \bar{u} 新报刊登了对温教授的采访:
This article shocked me. If the compulsory draft was equivalent to collaboration with Imperial Japan, then following the same logic it was possible that the comfort women would also be dealt with in this way. The name of not even a single comfort woman was inscribed on the Cornerstone of Peace Memorial. As pointed out by Kawada, ‘the real names’ of these women ‘to say nothing of their numbers or whether they are alive or dead, are unknown’ (Sensō giseisha o kokoro ni kizamukai, 1997:162). However, even if names were known, would the bereaved families give their consent for the inscription to be carried out? Even if they are able to rid themselves of the dishonour of being prostitutes and come to be regarded as victims of war, treated as equivalent to Korean civilians attached to the military, next they will probably be viewed as collaborators with Japan.
这篇文章让我震惊。如果强制征兵等同于与日本帝国合作,那么按照同样的逻辑,慰安妇也可能会被以这种方式对待。和平纪念碑上甚至没有刻上一个慰安妇的名字。正如川田所指出的,这些女性的“真实姓名,更不用说她们的数量或生死情况,都是未知的”(《将战争牺牲者铭刻于心》,1997:162)。然而,即使知道了名字,遇难者家属会同意刻上名字吗?即使她们能够摆脱作为妓女的耻辱,被视为战争受害者,与附属于军队的韩国平民同等对待,接下来她们很可能会被视为与日本合作的人。
On the basis that the Volunteer Corps were ‘offering themselves for the country’, it could be taken that they were serving the Imperial Army rather than volunteering under coercion. At the scene of fierce battle these women served as nurses, and it is said that when an enemy prisoner of war was to be executed they would stand in line wearing their Women’s Association for National Defence sashes.
基于志愿军“为国家自愿服务”的立场,可以认为她们是在为帝国陆军服务,而非在强迫下自愿参军。在激烈的战斗现场,这些女性担任护士,据说当敌方战俘被处决时,她们会佩戴国防妇女协会的绶带排成一列。
At the trials of class B and C war crimes, Korean and Taiwanese military and civilian personnel were tried as Japanese. Needless to say, Korean agents who profited from the procurement of comfort women or from operating comfort stations were subject to disdain as collaborators with Imperial Japan, but under colonial rule it is difficult to draw a line between what is coercion and what is free will. The movement questioning the perpetrator responsibility of the comfort women crime has demanded legal action be taken against the criminals, however, by exposing the issue of collaboration with Japan within Korea it will probably function to intensify anti-Japanese nationalism still further.
在 B 级和 C 级战争罪审判中,朝鲜和台湾的军民人员被作为日本人审判。不用说,因招募慰安妇或经营慰安所而获利的朝鲜代理人被视为与日本帝国合作的卖国者,但在殖民统治下,很难划清强迫与自由意志的界限。质疑慰安妇犯罪加害者责任的运动要求对罪犯采取法律行动,然而,通过揭露朝鲜国内与日本合作的问题,可能会进一步激化反日民族主义。

A Uniquely Japanese or Universal Phenomenon?
是日本独有现象还是普遍现象?

Historian Hirota Masaki introduces the historical research of Kurahashi Masao, Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Suzuki Yūko, commenting that from the standpoint that ‘all three overemphasise the uniqueness of Japan’, such as ‘the uniqueness of the military of the emperor system’, ‘the uniqueness of the modern system of regulated prostitution’, and ‘the uniqueness of Japanese patriarchy’, one is left with a feeling that something is wrong (Hirota, 1995). Hirota suggests that we should refrain from ‘narratives of the comfort women issue that are confined to the unique problems of the battlefield or the unique problems of Japan’. While I agree totally with this suggestion, even so what narrative should we use in its place? The danger lurking for those who seek to escape a thesis of uniqueness is that they will once again revert to universalism.
历史学家广田正树介绍了仓桥正夫、吉见义明和铃木裕子的历史研究,并评论说,从“他们三人都过分强调日本的独特性”的立场来看,比如“天皇制军队的独特性”、“现代管制妓院制度的独特性”以及“日本父权制的独特性”,让人感觉哪里不对劲(广田,1995)。广田建议我们应避免“将慰安妇问题局限于战场的独特问题或日本的独特问题”的叙述。虽然我完全同意这一建议,但问题是,我们应当用什么样的叙述来取代它呢?那些试图摆脱独特性论调的人所面临的危险是,他们可能会再次回归到普遍主义。
The paradigm that reduces the comfort women issue to the uniqueness of the Imperial Army (in contrast let us call it the unique emperor system paradigm), possesses a character well-suited to the theory of Japan’s cultural uniqueness. According to this theory, an oppressively dominating regime unprecedented in the world was created due to the ‘limping along’ of modernisation, and this in turn gave birth to the comfort women system, a cruel and sexually abusive system considered to have no historical parallel. The uniqueness of the Japanese military is emphasised with the suggestion that, although there are examples of prostitutes accompanying the military, there is no other example of the military organising prostitution itself. Ironically, those theorists most likely to strongly insist on the uniqueness of the emperor system as a target that must be opposed are those who are against the emperor system, and they tend to overestimate its importance.
将慰安妇问题简化为帝国陆军的独特性(我们姑且称之为独特天皇制范式)的观点,具有与日本文化独特性理论相契合的特征。根据该理论,由于现代化的“跛行”,创造了一个世界上前所未有的压迫性统治政权,而这反过来又催生了慰安妇制度——一个被认为在历史上无可比拟的残酷且性虐待性质的制度。日本军队的独特性被强调,指出虽然有军队伴随妓女的例子,但没有其他军队亲自组织卖淫的例子。具有讽刺意味的是,那些最有可能强烈坚持天皇制独特性必须被反对的理论家,恰恰是反对天皇制的人,他们往往高估了天皇制的重要性。
This argument immediately calls to mind the German Historikerstreit or historians’ dispute. If the Holocaust is made into an act of cruelty unprecedented in history, the end result is that the German people cannot escape this ‘original sin’. Historical revisionist Nolte provoked an angry counter-response from Habermas when he argued that the Holocaust was an ordinary war crime. Given that we already have the rhetoric that the comfort women system was Imperial Japan’s policy of extermination of the Korean people, it would not be so unimaginable to draw an analogy with the Holocaust.
这一论点立刻让人联想到德国的历史学家争论(Historikerstreit)。如果将大屠杀视为历史上前所未有的残酷行为,最终的结果就是德国人民无法摆脱这一“原罪”。历史修正主义者诺尔特(Nolte)曾主张大屠杀只是普通的战争罪行,因而激起了哈贝马斯(Habermas)的强烈反驳。鉴于我们已经有了“慰安妇制度是日本帝国灭绝朝鲜人民的政策”这一说法,那么将其与大屠杀作类比也就不足为奇了。
Historian Tanaka Toshiyuki, while undertaking a comparative study of military controlled systems of prostitution during Second World War in a number of countries, including the United States, Britain, Germany and Australia, and also on the basis of what happened in the First World War, was able to demonstrate that control of sexually transmitted disease among soldiers was a priority task for the military. It was not simply a case of having prostitutes attached to the military, but of the military managing prostitution with the aim of preventing sexually transmitted disease that was regarded as a necessity. Tanaka then posed the question: ‘Why did the American military ignore the issue of the comfort women at the Tokyo Trials?’ (Tanaka T., 1996) He then went on to give the following reply:
历史学家田中敏幸在对包括美国、英国、德国和澳大利亚在内的多个国家二战期间军方控制的卖淫制度进行比较研究,并结合第一次世界大战的情况后,证明了控制士兵性传播疾病是军方的优先任务。这不仅仅是军队配备妓女的问题,而是军方管理卖淫,目的是防止性传播疾病,这被视为一种必要性。田中随后提出了一个问题:“为什么美国军方在东京审判中忽视了慰安妇问题?”(田中敏幸,1996)他接着给出了以下回答:
From the very beginning among the American military, who during the war and in the early days of post-war Occupation took military controlled prostitution for granted, there was a complete lack of any awareness or discernment that the military comfort women problem, one of the serious war crimes committed by Japan and from the stand point of history one example of the most grave of all Crimes against Humanity, actually was a crime (Tanaka, T.,1996, Part II).
从一开始,在战争期间及战后初期占领时期的美国军队中,军方对军队控制的卖淫行为视为理所当然,完全缺乏任何意识或辨别能力,未能认识到军队慰安妇问题——这是日本犯下的严重战争罪行之一,从历史角度看,是最严重的人类罪行的一个典型例子——实际上是一种犯罪(田中, T., 1996, 第二部分)。
In 1993, at the Australian National University where an international Japanese Studies Conference was being held, Tanaka argued for the universality of military prostitution, saying that he would probably have gone to such a place himself, invoking a furious response from a Korean participant who by chance was in the audience. In addition, by exposing rape by Australian servicemen during the Second World War, he also received protests from the Australian Veterans’ Association. Tanaka’s argument that it was not only the Japanese who did it takes us towards a universal theory, and as a consequence allows for the recovery of a logic that
1993 年,在澳大利亚国立大学举办的一次国际日本研究会议上,田中主张军队卖淫的普遍性,称自己可能也会去那样的地方,这引发了一位偶然在场的韩国参与者的激烈反应。此外,他揭露了二战期间澳大利亚军人实施的强奸行为,也遭到了澳大利亚退伍军人协会的抗议。田中认为不仅仅是日本人犯下此类行为,这一论点引导我们走向一种普遍理论,因此也使我们能够恢复一种逻辑,即

exempts Japan from responsibility for the crimes that it has committed. However, it should not be forgotten that Tanaka pointed out not only the commonalities of the military and sex, but also the differences in the comfort women system. ‘It is clearly a mistake to regard as absolutely the same the military comfort women issue and managed prostitution carried out first by the United States and then by the militaries of other Allied countries’ (Tanaka T., 1996 Part II:277). This is because there is a crucial difference concerning criminality, but here again Tanaka reduces this difference to the presence or absence of voluntariness (the difference between prostitution based on free will and forced prostitution). A division is brought between comfort women and prostitutes. Those who he calls ‘commercial prostitutes’ suffer discrimination as their very existence is such that, due to the exchange of money, they are not expected to complain regardless of the extent to which they suffer human rights violations. Will this logic not be appropriated by a similar logic that in reality the comfort women were prostitutes? In addition, will this logic not end up condoning military base prostitution by allied nations?
这并不免除日本对其所犯下罪行的责任。然而,不应忘记田中不仅指出了军队与性之间的共性,还指出了慰安妇制度的差异。“将军队慰安妇问题与最初由美国随后由其他盟军军队实施的管理性卖淫完全等同起来,显然是错误的”(田中 T.,1996 年第二部分:277 页)。这是因为在犯罪性质上存在关键差异,但田中又将这种差异简化为是否自愿(基于自由意志的卖淫与强迫卖淫之间的区别)。慰安妇与妓女之间被划分开来。他所称的“商业妓女”因其存在本身,即因金钱交换而被期望无论遭受多大的人权侵犯都不应抱怨,从而遭受歧视。这种逻辑难道不会被类似的逻辑所利用,实际上认为慰安妇就是妓女吗? 此外,这种逻辑难道不会最终纵容盟国的军事基地卖淫吗?
On the one hand there is the argument that reduces the uniqueness of the comfort women problem to the uniqueness of the Japanese culture and society or the uniqueness of the domination of the emperor system, and on the other, an argument that universalises it as a general problem of the ‘military and sex’. It is not a matter of which one of these is correct. What we need is to locate this issue within its specific historical context in comparative history and then, as a result of this, to be able to understand it and surmount it.
一方面,有一种论点将慰安妇问题的独特性归结为日本文化和社会的独特性,或天皇制统治的独特性;另一方面,则有一种论点将其普遍化为“军事与性”的普遍问题。问题不在于哪一种论点是正确的。我们需要的是将这一问题置于其特定的历史语境中进行比较历史研究,进而理解并超越它。

Gender, Class and the Nation
性别、阶级与民族

In Sei no rekishi gaku (Japanese history of sexuality), which describes one point of arrival for women’s history in the 1990s, Fujime Yuki places at the beginning a section entitled ‘Introduction, Perspectives and Methodology’. Here she writes:
在《性之历史学》(Sei no rekishi gaku,日本性史)一书中,描述了 1990 年代女性史研究的一个重要成果,藤目由纪在开篇设有一节,题为“导言、视角与方法论”。她在这里写道:
In the study of women’s history within second wave feminism, any methodology that fails to take into account class and nation (race) and attempts to only make an issue of sex (gender) is regarded as invalid. Interest is focused on finding a unified understanding of these and a new methodology (Fujime, 196:17). 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
在第二波女权主义中对女性历史的研究中,任何未能考虑阶级和民族(种族),仅试图将问题归结为性别(性别差异)的方法论都被视为无效。研究重点在于寻找对这些因素的统一理解以及一种新的方法论(Fujime, 196:17)。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
The military comfort women issue also requires a unified understanding that includes sex, class and nation. However, in order to achieve this it is necessary to transcend the type of theories that we have seen to date, such as a male-centred historical view point, the national-centric, one-country historical view point, and the reverse side of these, universalism.
军慰安妇问题同样需要包含性别、阶级和民族的统一理解。然而,为了实现这一点,有必要超越迄今为止所见的理论类型,如以男性为中心的历史观点、以国家为中心的单一国家历史观点,以及这些观点的反面——普遍主义。
If we try and unravel the comfort women issue using these three categories as an axis, in line with the historical context of the times, we can categorise six social groups: Japanese men, Japanese women, men from the colonies, women from the colonies, and then men in the occupied territories and women in the occupied territories. It is also necessary to add to this, discrimination towards prostitutes from the lower classes. Due to the sexual double standard, the category of ‘woman’ can be further divided into wife/mother (this includes virgin girls who are eligible to become wives and mothers) and ‘prostitute’. People from the occupied territories are, regardless of sex, the ‘enemy’ therefore they are targets for slaughter if they are male and rape if they are female. The problem then is the treatment of people from the colonised territories. During the war, Korea was treated as one part of the territory of Japan, with the Korean people made into imperial subjects. With total war, men from the colonised territories were forced to
如果我们试图以这三个类别为轴线,结合当时的历史背景来解开慰安妇问题,可以将社会群体分为六类:日本男性、日本女性、殖民地男性、殖民地女性,以及被占领地区的男性和被占领地区的女性。同时,还需要补充对下层阶级妓女的歧视。由于性别双重标准,“女性”这一类别可以进一步细分为妻子/母亲(包括适龄成为妻子和母亲的处女少女)和“妓女”。被占领地区的人们,无论性别,都是“敌人”,因此男性成为屠杀的对象,女性则成为强奸的对象。问题的关键在于对殖民地人民的待遇。战争期间,朝鲜被视为日本领土的一部分,朝鲜人民被纳为帝国臣民。随着全面战争的推进,殖民地的男性被迫……

bear the burden of unwelcome duties such as the military draft and the draft for war work. Women from the colonies were also required to ‘offer their bodies for the nation’ but, already subject to discrimination even as secondclass citizens, they were allotted duties appropriate to their lower status. In Korea, the term teishintai (volunteer corps) is often used as a synonym for the comfort women. That comfort women were recruited using roundabout methods under the name Joshi Teishintai (women’s volunteer corps), which literally means ‘women offering themselves for the nation’, reveals an aggressor’s logic. For the Imperial Army sexual service amounted to just one more way of 'offering oneself for the nation 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}.
承担诸如军事征兵和战争劳役等不受欢迎的义务。殖民地的女性也被要求“为国家献出身体”,但由于她们即使作为二等公民也受到歧视,因此被分配了符合其较低地位的职责。在韩国,teishintai(志愿队)一词常被用作慰安妇的代名词。慰安妇是以女子志愿队(Joshi Teishintai,字面意思是“为国家献身的女性”)的名义,通过迂回手段招募的,这揭示了侵略者的逻辑。对帝国陆军来说,性服务不过是“为国家献身”的另一种方式。
In terms of the category itself, there was no difference between Japanese and Korean military comfort women. Although Japanese and Korean comfort women were allocated on the basis of the class of the soldier Japanese women were assigned to commissioned officers and Korean women to the regular troops - and there was a disparity in the treatment they received, they both shared the fate of the military and when necessary were assigned to carry ammunition or nurse the wounded. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
就这一类别本身而言,日本和韩国的军慰安妇并无区别。虽然日本和韩国的慰安妇是根据士兵的阶级分配的——日本女性被分配给军官,韩国女性则分配给普通士兵——且她们所受到的待遇存在差异,但她们都共同承担着军队的命运,必要时还被派去搬运弹药或护理伤员。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
That this was the case can be confirmed by the fact that, despite finally abandoning the women on the battlefield, when the Japanese army took flight from all areas of South East Asia they took the comfort women along with them until the very last moment. Of course we could view this as the Japanese military not abandoning ‘carnal lust’ even in the face of death. At the same time, these women did not necessarily treat the Allied Forces as a ‘liberating army’ having been told by Japanese soldiers that if they became prisoners of war then rape by the ‘enemy’ awaited them and, perhaps because of this, they threw their fate in with the soldiers and under pressure committed suicide, due to an anticipation frequently found to be the case in reality. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
这一事实可以通过以下事实得到证实:尽管最终在战场上抛弃了女性,但当日本军队从东南亚各地撤退时,他们一直带着慰安妇直到最后一刻。当然,我们可以将此视为日本军队即使面临死亡也不放弃“肉欲”。与此同时,这些女性并不一定将盟军视为“解放军”,因为日本士兵告诉她们,如果成为战俘,就会遭到“敌人”的强奸,或许正因为如此,她们选择与士兵共命运,在压力下自杀,这种预期在现实中经常被证实。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
Then, above all else, is the historical fact that the Tokyo Trials did not bring judgement on the comfort women issue. It was not simply that a perspective that would have understood the military comfort women as a crime was lacking on the side of the Allied countries. The Japanese government that welcomed the Occupation Forces immediately established comfort stations for the Occupation Forces, and here again the state faced with the unprecedented national crisis of defeat and occupation demanded
首先,最重要的是历史事实:东京审判并未对慰安妇问题作出裁决。问题不仅仅在于盟国方面缺乏将军队慰安妇视为犯罪的视角。日本政府在欢迎占领军的同时,立即为占领军设立了慰安所,在这里,面对前所未有的战败和占领的国家危机,国家要求

that Japanese women ‘offer themselves for the nation’ (Yamada, 1991, 1992). On this point, the patriarchal logic of the Japanese government did not change in the least between pre- and post-war.
日本女性“为国家献身”(山田,1991,1992)。在这一点上,日本政府的父权逻辑在战前和战后丝毫未变。
Nevertheless, in contrast to the Japanese women who from the beginning were recruited from among prostitutes, Korean women were made to shoulder the burden of sexual duties befitting of women who were second-class citizens. In keeping with the sexual double standard of the ‘wife/mother’ and the ‘prostitute’, it was expected that Japanese and Korean women would offer themselves for the nation corresponding to their respective sexual duties. Stated more clearly, Korean women, who were reduced to ‘public lavatories’ and ‘Ps’ (Chinese slang referring to female genitals), were even stripped of the romanticising symbolism associated with the prostitute. On the one hand, this was the practice of designating sex segregated public and private spheres. Yet on the other, through the creation of a sexual double standard, it was also a harsh means of solving the dilemma of patriarchy that had broken its own rules. While the sacredness of the home and motherhood was something that should not be violated, a ‘sexual sanctuary’ was required for men and the creation of such areas was not something to be brought out into the open. Then, because this ‘shame’ was something that was collectively shared in Japan, Korea and on the side of the Allied countries, the comfort women system was not problematised by any of the patriarchal states.
然而,与一开始就从妓女中招募的日本女性不同,朝鲜女性被迫承担起符合二等公民身份的女性应尽的性义务。按照“妻子/母亲”与“妓女”的性别双重标准,期望日本和朝鲜女性根据各自的性义务为国家奉献自己。更明确地说,朝鲜女性被贬为“公共厕所”和“Ps”(中文俚语,指女性生殖器),甚至被剥夺了与妓女相关的浪漫象征意义。一方面,这是划分性别隔离的公共与私人领域的做法;但另一方面,通过制造性别双重标准,这也是解决父权制自身规则被打破困境的一种严厉手段。虽然家庭和母性的神圣性不容侵犯,但男性需要一个“性圣地”,而这种区域的设立不应被公开讨论。 然后,因为这种“耻辱”是日本、韩国以及盟国共同分享的,所以慰安妇制度并未被任何父权国家视为问题。
In addition, assigned to be the ‘mothers of the god of war’ or ‘sacred mothers’, it was Japanese women who internalised patriarchy’s prostitute discrimination due to their heightened expectations concerning nationalisation. This prostitute discrimination has remained unchanged post-war, continuing to find expression in the discriminatory views directed towards Japanese comfort women, including those who served the Occupation Forces, and in the spirit of the Anti-Prostitution Law. The contemporary perpetrator responsibility of Japanese women depicted within this reality is that at no time have we been able to problematise the Japanese comfort women, including those who served the Occupation Forces.
此外,被赋予“战神之母”或“圣母”的身份,正是日本女性因对国家化的高度期待而内化了父权制对妓女的歧视。这种妓女歧视在战后依然未变,继续体现在对日本慰安妇(包括为占领军服务的慰安妇)的歧视性看法中,以及反卖淫法的精神中。在这一现实中所描绘的日本女性当代加害者责任是,我们从未能够对包括为占领军服务的日本慰安妇在内的慰安妇问题进行反思。
The class factor is also tied into this prostitute discrimination. Women who dared to enter this ‘shameful calling’, assuming they were paid, were considered to have existed as a breakwater to protect the chastity of women
阶级因素也与这种妓女歧视相关。那些敢于进入这一“可耻职业”的女性,假设她们是有报酬的,被视为作为一道防波堤,保护女性的贞洁。

from good homes. Whatever treatment they received was regarded as part and parcel of their role. If the Korean nationalist discourse is tied in with indignation that women who were not originally in this lowly position (the chaste Korea argument) were made into prostitutes, then we can conclude that this amounts to prostitute discrimination. But what if we accept, as Tanaka Toshiyuki suggests, that the comfort women system is a variant of military controlled prostitution that can be seen in any modern military? Treating it as a slight deviation from what usually happens in war zones similarly leaves the way open for it to be viewed as something that no-one has any business complaining about. The reason that I am persistently dwelling on the distinction between ‘forced prostitution’ and ‘voluntary prostitution’ based on the presence or absence of self-determination, and the division of women based on this, is because the prostitute discrimination contained within this view has a direct impact on the modern oppressive sexual double standard. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
出身良好的家庭。无论她们受到何种待遇,都被视为她们角色的一部分。如果朝鲜民族主义话语与愤慨联系在一起,认为原本不处于这种卑微地位的女性(贞洁的朝鲜论)被迫沦为妓女,那么我们可以得出结论,这等同于对妓女的歧视。但如果我们接受田中敏之的观点,认为慰安妇制度是军方控制的卖淫的一种变体,在任何现代军队中都可以看到类似现象呢?将其视为战争地区通常发生情况的轻微偏差,同样为其被视为无人有权抱怨的事情打开了方便之门。我之所以坚持探讨基于有无自我决定权的“强迫卖淫”与“自愿卖淫”的区别,以及基于此对女性的划分,是因为这种观点中包含的妓女歧视直接影响了现代压迫性的性别双重标准。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
Sitting in the background of the comfort women issue is the nation-state and imperialism; colonial rule and racism; patriarchy and discrimination against women; and furthermore, the oppression that continues day-to-day concerning the division and control among women brought by the sexual double standard. Our struggle is not over questions that belong to the past, but over questions concerning contemporary oppression, which belong to the present.
慰安妇问题的背景中坐落着民族国家与帝国主义;殖民统治与种族主义;父权制与对女性的歧视;更进一步,还有因性别双重标准带来的女性间分裂与控制的日常持续压迫。我们的斗争不是针对属于过去的问题,而是针对属于当下的、关于当代压迫的问题。

'Truth' Amidst Multiple Histories
“真相”与多重历史

If the interpretive paradigms regarding the comfort women contain this much plurality and complexity, what is the truth of the comfort women issue? With such a gap between interpretative paradigms it appears as though nobody knows the truth. However, in reality this way of posing the question is a trick. This is because it is premised upon the idea that truth is something singular that nobody would deny; something that looks the same to everyone. What actually exists are multiple realities experienced by the parties involved, and these are constructed into multiple histories.
如果关于慰安妇的解释范式包含如此多的多样性和复杂性,那么慰安妇问题的真相是什么?在解释范式之间存在如此大的差距,似乎没有人知道真相。然而,实际上这样提出问题是一种诡计。这是因为它以真相是单一且无人会否认的东西为前提;是对所有人看起来都相同的东西。实际上存在的是当事人所经历的多重现实,这些现实被构建成多重历史。
There is a gap difficult to bridge between the reality of former Japanese soldiers who speak with an apparent sense of nostalgia of their ‘communication’ with comfort women and the reality of the female victims who speak of their experiences as comfort women as ones of suffering and oppression. When there is such a gap between one set of involved parties compared to the other, can it really be said that both parties share one experience? However, if we think this way does it mean that this struggle concerning the truth is a Weberian type ‘divine struggle’, one that carries on to eternity without a conclusion?
前日本士兵们以明显的怀旧情绪谈论他们与慰安妇的“交流”这一现实,与女性受害者们将作为慰安妇的经历描述为痛苦和压迫的现实之间存在着难以弥合的鸿沟。当双方当事人之间存在这样的差距时,真的能说双方共享同一段经历吗?然而,如果我们这样思考,是否意味着这场关于真相的斗争是一种韦伯式的“神圣斗争”,一种永无结局、永远持续下去的斗争?
Acknowledging multiple histories does not mean that we choose one truth from among these different interpretative paradigms. It is acknowledging the possibility that history can take on an appearance completely different from that which we have seen with our own eyes. It is accepting that history can simultaneously be more than one thing. There is always the possibility of history being compositive and pluralistic. Here, the idea of an ‘official history’ has to be abandoned. From within history it is possible to write ‘another history’ of minorities, the weak and the oppressed, even if it amounts to only one person.
承认多重历史并不意味着我们要从这些不同的解释范式中选择一个真理。它是承认历史可能呈现出与我们亲眼所见完全不同的面貌。它是接受历史可以同时具有多重属性。历史总有可能是综合的、多元的。在这里,必须摒弃“官方历史”的观念。从历史内部出发,有可能书写少数群体、弱者和被压迫者的“另一种历史”,即使这仅仅是一个人的历史。
The comfort women issue confronted us with another history not known within the official history. Official history was shaken by the testimony of the former comfort women and in a single stroke was relativised. What is even more important is the discursive practice of creating the history for these women who were formerly comfort women. This was a past that had been silenced and sealed. They have attempted to recover their past as a part of their own lives and tell the story of it again. This was a past that if spoken about in the dominant language of patriarchy was thoroughly stained with humiliation. The impact of their speaking out was another revision of history. When witnessing the present that history is re-making, it is not only the victims who were former comfort women who must carry out the task of questioning what kind of narrative we should formulate and proceed with from here.
慰安妇问题让我们面对了官方历史中未曾知晓的另一段历史。官方历史因前慰安妇的证词而动摇,一下子被相对化了。更重要的是,为这些曾经的慰安妇创造历史的话语实践。这是一段被沉默和封存的过去。她们试图将这段过去作为自己生命的一部分加以恢复,并重新讲述这段故事。这是一段如果用父权制的主导语言来讲述,就会彻底被羞辱玷污的过去。她们发声的影响是对历史的又一次修正。在见证这段历史正在重塑的当下,不仅仅是曾经的慰安妇受害者必须承担起质疑我们应当从这里制定和推进何种叙事的任务。

Part III  第三部分

The Politics of Memory
记忆的政治

The Japanese Version of Historical Revisionism
日本版的历史修正主义

In December 1996, the Japanese Group for Orthodox History Education (Atarashii Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai; hereafter, the Orthodox History Group) was launched with those calling themselves the Liberal View of History Group (Jiyū Shugi Shikan Kenkyūkai) at its centre. The Orthodox History Group demanded that all descriptions of the comfort women be removed from the 1997 edition of Japanese history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, in turn performing the role of the Japanese version of historical revisionism in a dispute very similar to its German counterpart. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
1996 年 12 月,日本正统历史教育团体(Atarashii Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai,以下简称正统历史团体)成立,其核心成员自称为自由主义史观研究会(Jiyū Shugi Shikan Kenkyūkai)。正统历史团体要求将所有关于慰安妇的描述从 1997 年教育部批准的日本历史教科书中删除,扮演了日本版历史修正主义的角色,这场争议与德国的类似事件非常相似。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
There is a revealing line-up of names among those who put out the initial ‘appeal’ to start the group and their supporters. Of course there are names like Nishio Kanji and Etō Jun from the old right, but also younger generation conservative male intellectuals like Kawakatsu Heita and Ōtsuki Takahiro, and anti-feminist women such as Kimura Harumi and Hayashi Mariko. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} Another anti-feminist I would have expected to have seen on the list, Nakano Midori, is not included, but through another media she wrote, 'I support the objectives of the appeal. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} While discovering other surprising names on the list, I could not help think that this issue of the removal of descriptions of the comfort women in history textbooks splits public opinion in two, and that it has come to be a kind of loyalty test that separates Japanese commentators into two camps.
在发起该团体及其支持者的最初“呼吁”中,出现了一批耐人寻味的名字。当然,有来自旧右翼的西尾幹二和江藤淳这样的名字,也有年轻一代的保守派男性知识分子如川胜平太和大月隆寛,以及反女权主义女性如木村晴美和林真理子。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 另一位我本以为会出现在名单上的反女权主义者中野翠却未被列入,但她通过另一种媒体写道:“我支持该呼吁的目标。” 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 在发现名单上其他令人惊讶的名字时,我不禁想到,教科书中删除慰安妇描述的问题将公众舆论一分为二,已经成为一种忠诚度测试,将日本评论家分成两个阵营。
In the background here are the nationalism and the superpower consciousness of the Orthodox History Group and their supporters. Their logic is syllogistic: (1) Western powers were equally bad; (2) Western powers have not apologised; (3) therefore, how can it be wrong for Japan, an empire
其背后是正统历史学派及其支持者的民族主义和超级大国意识。他们的逻辑是三段论:(1)西方列强同样恶劣;(2)西方列强尚未道歉;(3)因此,日本作为一个帝国,怎么可能错呢?

standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the Western powers, to act in the same way?
与西方列强肩并肩站立,以同样的方式行动?
Four key points in the arguments of the Orthodox History Group can be identified. The first point is their assertion that there is no substantive proof of forced recruitment of comfort women. At a glance, this would appear to be the orthodox position of positivist history, which privileges documentary evidence. However, this stance is no different from that of the Neo-Nazis. (The Neo-Nazis claim that the Holocaust did not happen on the grounds that there are no documents signed by Hitler ordering the extermination of the Jews.) The danger of privileging documentary sources with regard to such problems should be plain to anyone. The reason for this is that it is clear that a defeated nation will destroy any documents unfavourable to itself ahead of any post-war requisition of such documents. It is necessary to consider what kind of trap you will fall into by adopting the apparent scientific methodology of positivist history.
正统历史派论点中可以识别出四个关键点。第一个观点是他们断言没有强制征召慰安妇的实质性证据。乍一看,这似乎是实证主义历史的正统立场,强调文献证据的重要性。然而,这种立场与新纳粹分子并无二致。(新纳粹分子声称大屠杀并未发生,理由是没有希特勒签署的灭绝犹太人的命令文件。)对于此类问题,强调文献资料的危险性应当显而易见。原因在于,战败国显然会在战后文献征用之前销毁任何对自己不利的文件。必须考虑采用表面上科学的实证主义历史方法会陷入怎样的陷阱。
The second point is that, as a result of positivist history’s privileging of documentary sources, there are doubts about the trustworthiness of victims’ testimony. A particular feature of the comfort women issue is that it came to have the appearance of a ‘victimless’ crime due to the silence of the victims, despite everyone being aware of its existence. Similarly, in the case of the Holocaust, because not one person who was sent to the gas chambers and survived spoke out when they returned home, there were no witnesses of what happened inside the gas chambers even if there were witnesses to what happened in the vicinity. If witnesses can be liquidated or completely silenced, the crime can be erased. In the case of the comfort women issue, women who experienced being comfort women were successfully silenced. When these victims finally opened up their sealed lips and testified about their experiences, the suffering itself was denied on the grounds that oral testimony is untrustworthy as historical evidence.
第二点是,由于实证主义历史学偏重于文献资料,因此对受害者证词的可信度存在怀疑。慰安妇问题的一个特殊之处在于,尽管人人都知道其存在,但由于受害者的沉默,这一问题呈现出“无受害者”犯罪的表象。同样,在大屠杀的案例中,因为没有一个被送进毒气室后幸存并回家发声的人,尽管有人目击了毒气室附近发生的事情,但对毒气室内发生的情况没有目击者。如果目击者被消灭或完全噤声,犯罪行为就可以被抹去。在慰安妇问题中,经历过慰安妇生活的女性被成功地噤声。当这些受害者最终打破封闭的沉默,讲述她们的经历时,她们的痛苦本身却被否认,理由是口述证词作为历史证据不可信。
The Group’s third claim is that it is inappropriate to teach junior high school students about the darker side of sexuality. Yet, when the media the children learn from about the various forms of sexuality in reality, is it the student or the teacher who ends up feeling embarrassed? This argument is nothing more than adults projecting their own feelings of embarrassment and unease on to children, a feeble attempt to avoid reality. But I suppose
该团体的第三个主张是,向初中生教授性行为的阴暗面是不合适的。然而,当孩子们从媒体中了解现实中各种形式的性时,最终感到尴尬的是学生还是老师?这个论点不过是成年人将自己尴尬和不安的情绪投射到孩子身上,是一种逃避现实的软弱尝试。但我想

that many teachers, who are doubtless struggling to deal with their own sexuality, sympathise with the Group’s position as a result of this shared feeling of ‘discomfort’. In addition, this argument presumes the sexual innocence of Japanese junior high school students. It is an awful hypocrisy to assume children’s innocence when we are all inundated with sexual information from the media.
许多教师无疑也在努力应对自己的性问题,因此出于这种共同的“尴尬”感,他们会同情该团体的立场。此外,这个论点假设日本初中生在性方面是纯洁无辜的。在我们都被媒体充斥着性信息的情况下,假设孩子们纯洁无辜是一种可怕的虚伪。
There is one more assumption being made here and that is the underlying premise that sex has to be something good. In reality, sex can take the form of something good or evil. Sex, as just one kind of relationship that can be established between human beings, can take a variety of forms. Sex can be an expression of the joy of life, but unfortunately it can also be used to violate another person. As one type of human evil there is murder, but it makes absolutely no sense when we are teaching about the darker side of human history in terms of wars and massacres in history textbooks, not to be able to teach about the darker aspects of sex. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
这里还有一个假设,那就是性必须是美好的东西。实际上,性既可以是美好的,也可以是邪恶的。性,作为人类之间可以建立的一种关系,可以有多种形式。性可以是生命喜悦的表达,但不幸的是,它也可以被用来侵犯他人。作为一种人类的邪恶形式,谋杀存在,但当我们在历史教科书中讲述战争和大屠杀等人类历史的黑暗面时,却不能讲述性的黑暗面,这完全没有道理。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
In actual fact, the age of junior high school students who would be taught about sex is not so different than the average age of prewar licensed prostitutes or contemporary prostitutes in Southeast Asia. It is said that sixteen was the peak age for prostitutes making a living for themselves in the licensed quarters in the Edo period. The majority of prostitutes in Southeast Asia are young women in their teens. Moreover, female junior high and high school students are exposed and sexually accessible through telephone dating clubs (terekura) and ‘compensated dating’ (enjo kōsai). Just what is the educational efficacy of averting the eyes of Japanese children from this reality? What we must re-examine here is the modern myth of youth that confines the teen years to being ones of childhood innocence and fashions the bodies of young people in such a way that ‘use is prohibited’ (Ōtsuka, 1989; Ueno, 1998a).
实际上,初中生被教授性知识的年龄,与战前的官方妓女或当代东南亚妓女的平均年龄并无太大差别。据说,江户时代,十六岁是官方妓院中妓女自谋生路的黄金年龄。东南亚的大多数妓女都是十几岁的年轻女性。此外,初中和高中女生通过电话约会俱乐部(terekura)和“陪伴约会”(enjo kōsai)暴露于性接触的环境中。让日本儿童对这一现实视而不见的教育效果究竟何在?我们必须重新审视的是现代关于青少年的神话,这种神话将青少年时期限定为童年纯真的阶段,并以“禁止使用”的方式塑造年轻人的身体(大塚,1989;上野,1998a)。
The fourth point, and for the Orthodox History Group the most crucial, concerns the task of recovering national pride. They argue that it is high time that we rid ourselves of this ‘self-hating, masochistic view of history’ (jiko akugyaku shikan) and restore an official history that gives us pride in our country. But just whose official history is this and what purpose does it serve? By creating one legitimate national history, an official history serves to cover and conceal the diversity and conflicts within a nation.
第四点,对于正统历史集团来说是最关键的,涉及恢复民族自豪感的任务。他们认为,现在是时候摆脱这种“自我憎恨、受虐倾向的历史观”(jiko akugyaku shikan),恢复一种能让我们为国家感到自豪的官方历史了。但这究竟是谁的官方历史,它服务于什么目的?通过创造一种合法的民族历史,官方历史旨在掩盖和隐藏一个国家内部的多样性和冲突。
Posing as ‘patriotic’ in the game of who is the most patriotic, they open the way for all kinds of arbitrary purges by drawing a border between those on the side of the the nation and the unpatriotic. The compulsion and temptation of identifying with this ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1985, 1987) we call the ‘nation’ - that can be defined in any way the speaker likes is a trap that we must avoid. Given that many on the side of the rival forces have similarly posed as ‘patriotically minded’ surely signals the recovery of nationalism.
在“谁最爱国”的游戏中伪装成“爱国者”,他们通过划分国家一方与不爱国者之间的界限,为各种任意的清洗打开了大门。认同这个我们称之为“民族”的“想象的共同体”(Anderson, 1985, 1987)——这个共同体可以由说话者以任何方式定义——的强迫性和诱惑性是一个我们必须避免的陷阱。鉴于许多对立势力一方的人同样伪装成“爱国者”,这无疑标志着民族主义的复苏。

The Challenge to Gender History
对性别历史的挑战

Historians such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Suzuki Yūko, who have vigorously problematised the comfort women issue, have for some time now been developing counter-arguments to the violent discourse of the Orthodox History Group (Yoshimi Y., 1997; Suzuki, 1997a). Furthermore, it is not only historians, but a large number of people in various positions have entered this discursive battlefield, turning it into something akin to a ‘civil war over memory’ (Impakushon, No 102). In addition, it has the aspect of a media war with specific media appointing commentators from each of the various positions.
像吉见义明和铃木裕子这样积极质疑慰安妇问题的历史学家,已经有一段时间在针对正统历史派的激烈话语展开反驳(吉见义明,1997;铃木,1997a)。此外,不仅仅是历史学家,许多处于不同立场的人也加入了这场话语战,将其变成类似于“记忆的内战”(Impakushon,第 102 期)。另外,这场争论还具有媒体战争的特征,特定媒体从各个立场中挑选评论员参与其中。
The key issue for me personally is the significant challenge made to the accumulated achievements of feminist scholarship and gender history over the past quarter century by the Japanese version of historical revisionism. In addition, there appears to be few from among us who have offered counterarguments to the Orthodox History Group that actually take this position. Indeed, due to the way in which counter-arguments have been formed, there is a danger that the line of reasoning may well undermine the foundations of gender history to an equal degree as that of their opposition.
对我个人而言,关键问题在于日本版历史修正主义对过去二十五年来女性主义学术和性别史积累成果的重大挑战。此外,我们当中似乎很少有人针对正统历史派提出真正立足于这一立场的反驳。事实上,由于反驳论述的形成方式,存在一种危险,即其论证路线可能会在同等程度上动摇性别史的基础,正如其对立面所做的那样。
From the perspective of gender history, the comfort women issue is tied up with a fundamental questioning of what is historical fact and is thus concerned with historical methodology. There is no other case that reveals this more intensely than the comfort women issue. If it is simply a matter of fact, well everyone was aware of the existence of the comfort women even before it emerged as an issue. What has changed is the way in which this fact is viewed. Put more precisely, it can be said that the fact itself changed from being one of prostitution to that of rape. It required half a century for the paradigm shift from ‘the shame of the victims’ to ‘the crime of the perpetrators’ to occur.
从性别史的角度来看,慰安妇问题与对历史事实的根本质疑紧密相连,因此涉及历史方法论。没有其他案例比慰安妇问题更能强烈地揭示这一点。如果这仅仅是一个事实问题,那么在它成为问题之前,大家早已知道慰安妇的存在。变化的是人们看待这一事实的方式。更准确地说,可以说这一事实本身从“卖淫”变成了“强奸”。从“受害者的耻辱”到“加害者的罪行”的范式转变,花费了半个世纪的时间。
The comfort women issue itself confronts gender history with some serious challenges. Hand in hand with this, those who are trying to deny this can no longer simply ignore the challenge that has been thrown out by the issue. Next, I would like to discuss methodological questions raised by gender history concerning the comfort women issue. Firstly, there is the myth of objectivity and neutrality in positivist history and scholarship. Secondly, there is the issue of the relationship between gender history and national history, or put another way, the relationship between feminism and nationalism. Pertaining to the second point, I will also discuss reflexive women’s history. Finally, I would like to discuss the seductive and dangerous trap of identification with the national subject (kokumin shutai).
慰安妇问题本身给性别史带来了一些严峻的挑战。与此密切相关的是,那些试图否认这一问题的人也无法再简单地忽视这一问题所提出的挑战。接下来,我想讨论性别史在慰安妇问题上提出的方法论问题。首先,是实证主义历史和学术中关于客观性和中立性的神话。其次,是性别史与民族史之间的关系,或者换句话说,是女权主义与民族主义之间的关系。关于第二点,我还将讨论反思性的女性史。最后,我想讨论认同国家主体(kokumin shutai)这一诱人且危险的陷阱。

The Positivist Myth of Objective and Neutral History
实证主义的客观和中立历史神话

The cut and thrust of the present debate over the comfort women appears to be primarily a dispute over standards of proof concerning whether forced recruitment occurred or not, and whether official documents demonstrating the involvement of the Japanese military exist or not. Of course we can dismiss as being out of hand the logic of those calling for a liberal view of history, being ‘absolutely ridiculous academically’ (Ienaga Saburō, cited in Kasahara, et al., 1997:225). In fact, while one group of conscientious historians has developed counter-arguments, most historians (including historians of modern history) have avoided getting caught up in the dispute and have maintained silence. The reason for this is that most of them do not share the same fundamental stance on historical scholarship, that of being in awe of the truth. It is easy to reject the Liberal View of History Group by calling them demigods, propagandists, and inadequate adversaries. However, if the myth of objective and neutral scholarship servicing the truth, which forms the background to this perspective, is going to be preserved untouched, then the dangers of this need to be pointed out. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
当前关于慰安妇问题的激烈争论,主要集中在强制征募是否发生过以及是否存在证明日本军方参与的官方文件的证据标准上。当然,我们可以断然否定那些主张自由主义历史观的人的逻辑,正如家永三郎所言,这种观点“在学术上绝对荒谬”(引自笠原等,1997:225)。事实上,虽然一部分良心派历史学家提出了反驳论点,但大多数历史学家(包括现代史学家)避免卷入争论,保持沉默。原因在于他们大多数人并不持有同样的历史学根本立场,即对真理的敬畏。通过称自由主义历史观群体为半神、宣传者和不称职的对手,拒绝他们是很容易的。然而,如果要保持作为这一观点背景的客观中立、服务于真理的学术神话不受触动,那么必须指出其中的危险。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
It is not my intention here to enter into a debate with the Liberal View of History Group. I do not think it is even possible to argue on the same wavelength as them. However, the dispute is open to more contemporaneous audiences with much wider horizons than theirs. If the Japanese version of the historical revisionism debate begins and ends with standards of proof surrounding facts, then one of the fundamental questions thrust upon us by the comfort women issue [concerning the nature of the historical project] will be overlooked. Up until this point, the oppositional discourse from conscientious historians in response to the Liberal View of History Group has been to chant, ‘do not distort historical truth’ and ‘do not
我在此并无意与自由史观派展开辩论。我甚至认为,想与他们在同一频率上争论都是不可能的。然而,这场争论面向的是视野远比他们开阔得多的当代观众。如果日本版的历史修正主义辩论始终围绕事实的证据标准展开并终结,那么慰安妇问题所带来的一个根本性问题——关于历史研究性质的思考——将被忽视。迄今为止,良心派历史学家针对自由史观派的反对话语一直是高呼“不要歪曲历史真相”和“不要

allow historical falsification’ (Suzuki, 1996a; 1996b). Here we have view of history that appears to consider historical fact to be something that takes absolutely the same appearance regardless of who is looking at it, and it is perceived as an objective reality.
允许历史伪造”(铃木,1996a;1996b)。这里的历史观似乎认为历史事实无论被谁观看,其表现形式都完全相同,并被视为一种客观现实。
The forms of evidence that positivist history accepts as historical fact are documentary historical sources, archaeological (material) sources, and oral historical sources. Among documentary historical sources, official documents are valued more highly than private ones. Even among those who emphasise the importance of oral historical sources, oral tradition and testimony begins to have credibility only when they are backed up by other forms of proof, such as material evidence or documentary sources, and its value is considered secondary and supplementary to documentary historical sources. Positivist history is centred on documentary historical sources, and views the researcher as an objective outsider. In the guise of positivist history, the Liberal View of History Group have made into an issue the lack of official documentary sources to prove forced recruitment of the comfort women. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} In this respect, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, the historian who has contributed more energetically than anybody else to the excavation of historical materials relating to the comfort women issue, was driven into a corner by popular comic writer Kobayashi Yoshinori on the TV Asahi show Asa made nama terebi (Live TV discussion through 'til the morning) during a special feature on the military comfort women aired on January 21 st 21 st  21^("st ")21^{\text {st }}, 1997). Yoshimi was forced to admit that documents that he himself had discovered in the Self-Defence Agency’s National Institute for Defence Studies Library, that led directly to the Japanese government issuing a formal statement of apology in 1992, while offering collateral evidence of forced recruitment, did not back-up the fact of forced recruitment itself.
实证主义历史接受作为历史事实的证据形式包括文献历史资料、考古(物质)资料和口述历史资料。在文献历史资料中,官方文件比私人文件更受重视。即使是在强调口述历史资料重要性的人群中,口述传统和证词只有在得到其他形式的证据支持时,如物质证据或文献资料,才开始具有可信度,其价值被视为次要且补充于文献历史资料。实证主义历史以文献历史资料为中心,将研究者视为客观的外部观察者。在实证主义历史的幌子下,自由历史观团体将缺乏官方文献资料以证明慰安妇被强制征募的问题提出为争议。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 在这方面,历史学家吉见义明是对慰安妇问题相关历史资料挖掘贡献最大的人,但在 1997 年 1 月 21 st 21 st  21^("st ")21^{\text {st }} 日朝日电视台节目《朝まで生テレビ》(直播讨论至早晨)关于军队慰安妇的特别节目中,被流行漫画作家小林义典逼入了困境。吉见被迫承认,他本人在自卫队国防研究所图书馆发现的那些文件,促使日本政府于 1992 年发表正式道歉声明,虽然提供了强制征募的间接证据,但并未直接证明强制征募的事实。
Of course, Yoshimi is not some naïve positivist historian. Behind his untiring inquiry lies an intense sense of mission concerning the question of Japan’s war responsibility. Yet even here, it was not until after the former comfort women’s testimony in 1991 that Yoshimi himself rediscovered the value of the said historical documents referred to as ‘Yoshimi’s discovery’ 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}. It was the paradigm shift that led to these documents (documents that would otherwise have probably gone unheeded) being suddenly reappraised as
当然,吉见并不是某个天真的实证主义历史学家。在他不懈的探究背后,蕴藏着对日本战争责任问题的强烈使命感。然而,即便如此,直到 1991 年前慰安妇的证词出现后,吉见本人才重新发现了被称为“吉见发现”的那些历史文献的价值 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 。正是这一范式转变,使得这些文献(否则很可能被忽视的文献)突然被重新评估为

something valuable. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} Had they been discovered 10 years earlier, they would probably not have been noticed or been thrown into the spotlight.
有价值的东西 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 。如果这些文献早十年被发现,可能不会被注意到,或者不会被推到聚光灯下。
Although her name does not appear in the line-up of the Orthodox History Group, TV reporter Sakurai Yoshiko constructed the following logic concerning the comfort women: there is no proof to back-up the idea of forced recruitment, therefore the fact of forced recruitment itself cannot be verified, and it is not appropriate to include unverified matters in school textbooks (Sakurai, 1997). Many people appear to be persuaded when faced with what, at first sight, appears to be objectively constructed, positivistic logic. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
虽然她的名字没有出现在正统历史派的阵容中,电视记者樱井良子却构建了以下关于慰安妇的逻辑:没有证据支持强制征募的说法,因此强制征募的事实本身无法被证实,也不适合将未经证实的事项纳入教科书(樱井,1997)。许多人在面对乍看之下似乎是客观构建的实证主义逻辑时,似乎都被说服了 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
What we refer to as official documents, are in fact sources that indicate the way in which bureaucracy has managed affairs. In this questioning of their presence or absence, to take the position that facts cannot be verified without official documents is nothing less than identifying with those in power.
我们所称的官方文件,实际上是表明官僚机构如何处理事务的资料。在质疑这些文件的存在与否时,认为没有官方文件就无法验证事实,无异于认同掌权者的立场。
It is known that most documents concerning the execution of the war were destroyed towards the end of the war. Documents concerning the comfort women were included among these. Yet there is nothing to suggest that in the disposal of documents concerning the comfort women that the military took the comfort women system to be an especially serious war crime. Rather, documents relating to the comfort women system were disposed of in the same way as other military documents. In 1991, in response to the Korean Council’s demand for an ‘investigation of the truth’, then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Katō Kōichi, remarked when attending a news conference that: ‘We cannot find any documents indicating that government institutions were involved’, and to prove that officials had not cut corners added defiantly: ‘If they can be found, I would like you to find them’. Depending on how you view this, his statement could be taken to mean that Katō is entirely confident that the Japanese army effectively destroyed all evidence. In such a case, what function does the privileging of documentary sources serve with regards to the victims?
众所周知,大多数与战争执行有关的文件在战争末期被销毁。有关慰安妇的文件也包括在其中。然而,没有任何迹象表明,在处理慰安妇相关文件时,军方将慰安妇制度视为特别严重的战争罪行。相反,关于慰安妇制度的文件是以与其他军事文件相同的方式被处理的。1991 年,针对韩国议会要求“调查真相”,时任内阁官房长官加藤公一在出席新闻发布会时表示:“我们找不到任何表明政府机构参与的文件”,并为了证明官员们没有偷工减料,强硬地补充道:“如果能找到,我希望你们找到它们”。根据不同的看法,他的这番话可以被理解为加藤完全有信心日本军队有效地销毁了所有证据。在这种情况下,优先考虑文献资料对于受害者来说有什么作用呢?
The greatest problem with the privileging of documentary sources is that the evidence potential of verbal testimony is denied, or at best it is regarded as having some value as a secondary source. Those who privilege documentary sources dismiss verbal testimony not backed up by documents
将文献资料置于优先地位的最大问题在于,口头证词的证据潜力被否认,或者充其量被视为具有某种作为二手资料的价值。那些优先考虑文献资料的人会忽视没有文献支持的口头证词。

on the basis that it has insufficient evidence potential. The testimony of Yoshida Seiji, about the only person on the side of the perpetrators to give testimony under his real name, was deemed to have weak credibility and was not accepted by either camp. What is much worse, is that testimony from the victims’ side failed to be accepted on the grounds that evidence to back it up was lacking. This amounts to nothing less than the worst possible challenge to the reality of the victims. Half a century after the war, when those who experienced being comfort women gave testimony as victims, their ‘lost past’ was for the first time recovered as ‘another reality’. We can say that history was rewritten at that moment. This revision of history only became possible for the first time 50 years after the end of the war. Separated from the reality of these central actors is the arrogance of positivist historians who think that they can judge certain historical facts just as they are from a third-person standpoint.
基于证据潜力不足的理由。吉田清治的证词,是加害者一方唯一以真名作证的人,但其可信度被认为较弱,双方阵营均未采纳。更糟糕的是,受害者一方的证词因缺乏支持证据而未被接受。这无异于对受害者现实的最大挑战。战争结束半个世纪后,当那些曾作为慰安妇的经历者以受害者身份作证时,她们“失落的过去”首次被恢复为“另一种现实”。我们可以说,历史在那一刻被改写了。这种历史修正仅在战争结束 50 年后首次成为可能。与这些核心参与者的现实相隔绝的是实证主义历史学家的傲慢,他们认为自己可以从第三者的立场判断某些历史事实的真相。
When the victims testified to the fact of their suffering by stating that: ‘I was forced to have sex’ and ‘I was raped’, they were challenged to bear the burden of proof and provide material evidence as well. To the positivist, sources such as the private notes, diaries, memoirs or the oral history of the persons concerned are only acknowledged to have value as secondary sources complimenting documentary historical sources due to their vagueness, subjectivity and because of lapses of memory. However, here the term ‘documentary historical sources’ is just another name for sources that have been legitimated by authority; the sources of the dominant power. In a case where the dominant power is motivated to conceal or legitimise its own crimes, then surely we must question the credibility of such documentation.
当受害者通过陈述“我被强迫发生性关系”和“我被强奸”来证明自己所遭受的痛苦时,她们被要求承担举证责任,并提供物证。对于实证主义者来说,诸如当事人的私人笔记、日记、回忆录或口述历史等资料,仅因其模糊性、主观性以及记忆的疏漏,而被视为对文献历史资料的补充性二手资料。然而,这里所说的“文献历史资料”不过是被权威合法化的资料的另一种称呼;即统治权力的资料。在统治权力有动机隐瞒或为自身罪行辩护的情况下,我们理应质疑此类文献的可信度。
There is also a problem concerning who should bear the burden of proof in relation to a crime. By way of an example, Japan’s Anti-Pollution Law sets a precedent internationally by taking a progressive stance towards the extending of aid to the vulnerable by shifting the burden of proof concerning the fact of damage from the victims to the offending company, which has to provide evidence that will disprove any accusations of wrongdoing. Normally, in a case where the perpetrator is an institution like the military or a corporation, the victim ends up utterly powerless in social terms compared to the accused. In Japan’s Anti-Pollution Law, legal doctrine is overturned with the accused having to bear the burden of providing
还有一个问题是关于谁应承担犯罪的举证责任。以日本的《反污染法》为例,该法在国际上树立了先例,采取了进步的立场,通过将损害事实的举证责任从受害者转移到被指控的公司,来扩大对弱势群体的援助。被指控的公司必须提供证据,以驳斥任何不当行为的指控。通常,在加害者是军队或企业等机构的案件中,受害者在社会地位上相较于被告完全处于无力状态。在日本的《反污染法》中,法律原则被颠覆,被告必须承担提供证据的责任。

evidence to the contrary rather than the powerless having to prove their own suffering.
相反的证据,而不是无权者必须证明他们自己的痛苦。
The same can be said of court cases where there is an indictment of sexual damage. I believe that legal logic should be recomposed so that it is not the victim who has to provide proof of sexual harassment, but the person who stands accused of harassment who should bear the burden of providing counter-evidence. The reason for this is that from the outset with sexual harassment a difference in power exists between the parties involved, and it is a crime committed by the strong against the weak. This being the case, it should be quite clear which party benefits in a court battle when both the strong and weak are treated as though they are on an equal footing. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
同样的话也适用于涉及性侵害指控的法庭案件。我认为法律逻辑应当重新构建,不应由受害者来提供性骚扰的证据,而应由被指控骚扰的人承担提供反证的责任。原因在于,从一开始性骚扰双方就存在权力差异,这是一种强者对弱者的犯罪行为。既然如此,当强者和弱者在法庭上被视为地位平等时,哪一方受益应该是显而易见的。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}

Historicization versus an Ahistorical Approach
历史化与非历史化方法的对立

The idea that history is a constant revision of the past in the present is tied in with the question: is it possible to somehow judge the past from the present? In response to this question, there are two positions: one is that judging it within its historical context (historicization 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} ) and the other is to take an ahistorical, universal standpoint. Whichever route you take, they are both fraught with problems.
历史是对过去在当下不断修正的观点,与一个问题相关联:是否有可能从现在的角度去评判过去?对此问题,有两种立场:一种是在其历史语境中进行评判(历史化 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} ),另一种是采取非历史的、普遍性的立场。无论选择哪条路,都会存在诸多问题。
The argument for historicization is that you must understand the events of a time in terms of the historical context of that time. This argument, which is honest and well-intentioned, has been distorted in the context of the comfort women issue in the following way. It is stated that at the time state-licensed prostitution was legal in Japan. Alternatively, we are told that, although state-licensed prostitution was based on a contract system, in reality there were many wretched cases where the women were victims of human trafficking and coercion. Following on from this, it is argued that from the perspective of this historical background, although the situation of the comfort women was pitiful, their wretchedness was no worse than that of Japanese licensed prostitutes and that we must understand their plight against this historical backdrop.
历史化论点认为,必须根据当时的历史背景来理解那个时代的事件。这个论点本身诚实且出于善意,但在慰安妇问题的语境中被曲解为以下方式。有人指出,当时日本的官方许可卖淫是合法的。或者,我们被告知,虽然官方许可卖淫是基于合同制度,但实际上存在许多妇女成为人口贩卖和强迫的受害者的悲惨案例。基于此,有人主张,从这一历史背景的角度来看,虽然慰安妇的处境令人同情,但她们的悲惨程度并不比日本的官方许可妓女更严重,我们必须在这一历史背景下理解她们的困境。
There is an agreed framework that is common to both sides in arguments surrounding the historicization of the comfort women system, namely that the military comfort women system was established precisely because state-licensed prostitution already existed. Understandably, today when state-regulated prostitution is no longer legal, we have not seen the appearance of arguments legitimating this system. Nevertheless, we have seen the entry of narrative that end up legitimating it just the same. We are told that, considering the context of poverty and hunger, there were plenty
关于慰安妇制度历史化的争论双方都有一个共识框架,即军队慰安妇制度的建立正是因为国家许可的卖淫已经存在。可以理解的是,现今国家监管的卖淫已不合法,我们也未见到为该制度辩护的论调出现。然而,我们确实看到了一些叙述最终使该制度得以合理化。人们告诉我们,考虑到贫困和饥饿的背景,日本当时有许多处境可怜的年轻女性,且因时代所限,这种情况无可避免。

of young women in Japan in pitiful circumstances and because of the times such things could not be helped.
在日本有许多处境可怜的年轻女性,且因时代所限,这种情况无可避免。
Against these arguments that, at first sight, seem entirely plausible, there was suddenly a counter-argument. For example, Maeda Akira, a specialist on the international law, indicates that by 1925 Japan had already signed up to the International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic, the International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic and the International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, and that in 1932 it became a signatory to the Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (International Labour Organisation Treaty No. 29). Consequently, the logic framed by Maeda is that, even in line with international treaties of the time, the comfort women system was a treaty violation.
针对这些乍看之下似乎完全合理的论点,突然出现了反驳。例如,国际法专家前田明指出,到 1925 年,日本已经签署了《国际禁止白奴贩运协定》、《国际禁止白奴贩运公约》和《国际禁止妇女儿童贩运公约》,并且在 1932 年成为《强迫或强制劳动公约》(国际劳工组织第 29 号条约)的签署国。因此,前田所构建的逻辑是,即使按照当时的国际条约,慰安妇制度也是一种条约违约。
The argument that contemporary human rights theory denies the comfort women system invites misunderstanding. The human rights theory of the time also denied the comfort women system. This was a minimum normative premise (Maeda, 1997a:12).
认为当代人权理论否认慰安妇制度的论点容易引起误解。当时的人权理论同样否认慰安妇制度。这是一个最低限度的规范前提(前田,1997a:12)。
This historicization has as an exact reverse argument in the thesis of Suzuki Yūko who asserts that the comfort women’ system is nothing less than prewar state-regulated prostitution and forced labour. Furthermore, she notes that pre-war state-regulated prostitution has also been condemned by current standards of human rights. From the standpoint that the military comfort women system was an even crueller form of slave labour than prewar state-regulated prostitution, Suzuki has constructed a super-historical continuity between human rights violations against women and the victims, yet the background to this is a universal value, human rights.
这种历史化论述在铃木优子的论点中得到了完全相反的体现,她断言慰安妇制度无非是战前国家监管的卖淫和强迫劳动。此外,她指出,战前国家监管的卖淫制度也已被现行的人权标准所谴责。从军事慰安妇制度比战前国家监管的卖淫更为残酷的奴役形式这一立场出发,铃木构建了女性及其受害者遭受人权侵犯的超历史连续性,而其背后的基础则是普世价值——人权。
In a passage written as a counter-argument to those opposed to the comfort women campaign, Suzuki locates this confrontation as ‘a bitter battle over an awareness of history and an awareness of human rights’ (Suzuki, 1997a:4). For Suzuki, an awareness of history means questioning whether a single truth is acknowledged or not, and it is something that is generated by reality. There is no perspective of history as something that is constantly being reconstructed. Likewise, for Suzuki an awareness of human rights equals a super-historical questioning of whether human rights, as a form of ‘universal justice’, is acknowledged or not. Yet, a concept of human
在一段作为反驳反对慰安妇运动者的论述中,铃木将这场对抗定位为“关于历史意识和人权意识的激烈斗争”(铃木,1997a:4)。对铃木来说,历史意识意味着质疑是否承认某一单一真相,这是一种由现实产生的意识。历史并不存在一种不断被重构的视角。同样地,对铃木而言,人权意识等同于一种超越历史的质问,即是否承认人权作为“普遍正义”的形式。然而,人权的概念

rights is not a super-historical given. The content of human rights has changed along with history and when adopting a concept of human rights we must also take on, at the same time, the historical limitations that it carries with it.
权利并非超越历史的既定事实。人权的内容随着历史而变化,当我们采纳人权这一概念时,也必须同时承担其所带有的历史局限性。
Should we use the human rights doctrine of the time to judge the history of that time, or should our present day human rights doctrine be used to judge the history of a past time? As outlined in Part One, the act of judging the past from the present can only ever amount to historical hindsight. This being the case, what happens if we follow Maeda’s advice and consider things on the basis of the human rights standards of the time? 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
我们应该用当时的人权学说来评判那个时代的历史,还是应该用我们现今的人权学说来评判过去的历史?如第一部分所述,从现在的角度去评判过去,只能算是历史的事后诸葛亮。既然如此,如果我们按照前田的建议,基于当时的人权标准来考虑问题,会发生什么呢? 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
It is a fundamental principle that questions concerning responsibility should not be applied retroactively to a time before a law or treaty was established. There are those who take the line that ex post facto there is no statute of limitations in international law. In a court battle, there is no option other than to construct legal principles based on laws and treaties. A human rights lawyer or a specialist in international law will no doubt construct an argument based on legal principles within the parameters of their specialism, which is exactly why they are specialists.
一个基本原则是,责任问题不应追溯适用于法律或条约尚未确立的时期。有人主张,事后追溯在国际法中不存在时效限制。在法庭争斗中,别无选择,只能基于法律和条约构建法律原则。人权律师或国际法专家无疑会在其专业范围内,基于法律原则构建论点,这正是他们成为专家的原因。
A legal dispute has to be constructed on the basis of legal principles. I do not want to deny the significance of court battles, however, it is important to remember the following points. Firstly, a legal battle is an extremely limited dispute. Secondly, if legal principles are created for the convenience of policy makers then, before it even starts, a court battle is the locus of a dispute where one is disadvantaged by being forced to play on the opponents home turf. Thirdly, it is always possible to change legal principles, which are the rules of battle, if those in power are so inclined even in the midst of the dispute. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
法律纠纷必须建立在法律原则的基础上。我并不想否认法庭争斗的重要性,然而,重要的是要记住以下几点。首先,法律争斗是一个极其有限的争端。其次,如果法律原则是为了政策制定者的便利而制定的,那么在争斗开始之前,法庭争斗就是一个让一方处于劣势、被迫在对方主场作战的争端场所。第三,如果掌权者有意愿,即使在争斗过程中,也总有可能改变作为战斗规则的法律原则。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
Supposing, as Maeda suggests, our argument should be premised on treaties and international law, then trafficking in women and forced labour that took place before the conclusion of any treaties would not be illegal. It is common knowledge that international law is the product of give and take in power politics between the great powers of that era. Arguments that are dependent on international law have no option but to construct their logic taking the existing international order as a given standard of judgement. As we have to fight according to the logic of the people in power, we have to
假设如前田所建议,我们的论点应以条约和国际法为前提,那么在任何条约缔结之前发生的贩卖妇女和强迫劳动就不构成非法。众所周知,国际法是那个时代大国之间权力政治博弈的产物。依赖国际法的论点别无选择,只能以现有的国际秩序作为既定的判断标准来构建其逻辑。既然我们必须按照掌权者的逻辑进行斗争,我们就必须

accept their logic, however temporarily, and are forced to employ it in the art of persuasion. As a result, there is a tendency for the realism of those who specialise in international law and international politics to end up falling into a conservatism that confirms the status quo.
暂时接受他们的逻辑,并被迫在说服的艺术中加以运用。结果,专门研究国际法和国际政治的现实主义者往往会陷入确认现状的保守主义。
Behind legal principles are the legal ideals that established them. My interest is not in this game-playing within the framework of a limited legal principle. Rather, my interest is in changes in the historical, ideological paradigms that recreate the legal principles themselves.
法律原则背后是确立这些原则的法律理想。我的兴趣不在于有限法律原则框架内的这种游戏玩法。相反,我关注的是重新创造法律原则本身的历史和意识形态范式的变革。
For example, in the age of Imperialism there was no international law prohibiting colonial invasion by the colonial powers. In the United States in the slavery era there was not a single law banning slavery. However, American history of the slavery era was re-written for the first time in histories post-dating this era due to a change in awareness concerning the extent to which slavery is a crime against humanity. Slavery and the massacre of the native population have emerged as stains on American history that cannot be erased. Within the Smithsonian Museum group in Washington DC there is the American History Museum. Here, the exhibits have changed with each revision of history. A reality that from the perspective of indigenous peoples amounted to nothing less than massacre, was until very recently accepted as an honourable conquest among AngloSaxon Americans. With the challenge of a counter-reality from the side of minority groups, for the first time American history could be re-written from a pluralistic perspective. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
例如,在帝国主义时代,没有国际法禁止殖民列强进行殖民侵略。在美国奴隶制时代,没有一条法律禁止奴隶制。然而,由于对奴隶制作为反人类罪行的认识发生了变化,美国奴隶制时代的历史首次在该时代之后的历史著作中被重新书写。奴隶制和对原住民的大屠杀成为美国历史上无法抹去的污点。在华盛顿特区的史密森学会博物馆群中,有美国历史博物馆。这里的展览随着历史的每次修订而改变。从原住民的角度看,这种现实无异于大屠杀,而直到最近,这在盎格鲁-撒克逊美国人中仍被视为光荣的征服。随着少数群体提出的反现实挑战,美国历史首次能够从多元视角重新书写。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
The same can be said of the history of the compulsory internment of Japanese-Americans. One corner of the American History Museum has been allotted to this, and on display is this inexcusable injustice carried out by the American government against its own citizens simply because they were of Japanese ancestry. However, it is doubtful whether such a display would have been realised if Japanese-Americans had not over many years demanded reparation. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} Of course, what was on display here was the legitimisation of national (citizens’) history. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} However, a history museum is not a repository of dead things. It is a living contemporary site where each revision of history brings about a change of exhibits and the re-telling of history.
同样的话也适用于日裔美国人被强制拘留的历史。美国历史博物馆的一个角落被划分给了这一部分,展出了美国政府对其自身公民实施的这一不可原谅的不公正行为,仅仅因为他们有日本血统。然而,如果不是日裔美国人多年来不断要求赔偿,这样的展览是否能够实现,还是值得怀疑的。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 当然,这里展出的内容是国家(公民)历史的合法化。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 然而,历史博物馆并不是死物的仓库。它是一个活生生的当代场所,每一次历史的修订都会带来展品的更换和历史的重新叙述。
It is we who are living today who are re-writing history. In the case of Japan, we can offer as an example the New Ainu legislation. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} It is we who are living today who re-write acts that formerly were regarded as honourable conquest as being those of barbaric plundering.
正是我们这些生活在当下的人在重写历史。以日本为例,我们可以举出新的阿伊努立法。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 正是我们这些生活在当下的人,将过去被视为光荣征服的行为重新定义为野蛮掠夺的行为。

Oral History and Testimony
口述历史与证言

Within the endeavour of women’s history there has been a massive shift in methodology over the past two to three decades. Historical awareness and methodology is being tied to practical requirements. It is not necessary to pit scholarship and methodology against practice. For feminism theory is another important form of practice, with discourse the site of battle.
在女性历史研究的努力中,过去二三十年间方法论发生了巨大转变。历史意识和方法论正与实际需求相结合。学术研究和方法论不必与实践对立。因为女性主义理论是另一种重要的实践形式,话语是其战场。
Women’s history has as its departure point a criticism of the privileging of documentary sources. The reason for this is that women’s history had to start from a point of complete and utter absence in written history. In The History of Women in the West Vol. 3 (Duby and Perrot eds, 1995) Michelle Perrot, who is a medieval French historian, laments the absence of source materials to use in the study of women in the middle ages. Of course, documents and icons about women remain. However, these are nothing more than images of women created by men. What facts about women are we given in these images of women created by men? From today’s standards of historical research, a naïve view of history that mixes image with fact is no longer viable. While we might equally ask what facts about women are not told in these images of women created by men, these images do speak volumes concerning male ideas, what they think about women and the illusions they have about them. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} Finally shared among those doing historical research (particularly in the study of imagery) is an awareness that discourses about women, produced by men, are male fantasies of women rather than depicting the reality of women.
女性史的出发点是对文献资料优先权的批判。原因在于女性史必须从书面历史中完全缺席的状态开始。在《西方女性史》第三卷(Duby 和 Perrot 主编,1995 年)中,作为一位中世纪法国历史学家的米歇尔·佩罗特哀叹中世纪女性研究中缺乏可用的资料。当然,关于女性的文献和图像依然存在。然而,这些不过是男性创造的女性形象。我们从这些男性创造的女性形象中得到了哪些关于女性的事实?以当今历史研究的标准来看,将形象与事实混为一谈的天真历史观已不再可行。我们同样可以问,这些男性创造的女性形象中有哪些关于女性的事实未被讲述,但这些形象确实充分反映了男性的观念,即他们对女性的看法以及他们对女性的幻想。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 最终,在从事历史研究(尤其是图像研究)的人们中普遍达成的共识是,男性所产生的关于女性的话语,是男性对女性的幻想,而非女性的真实写照。
The greatest challenge facing women’s history is finding ways to allow silenced voices to speak. This is why women’s history turned to oral history (history told by spoken words, writing down what is heard, and interviewing). For women’s history, oral testimony is extremely valuable. To be sure, in oral history there are a number of problems concerning the value
女性历史面临的最大挑战是找到让被沉默的声音得以发声的方法。这就是为什么女性历史转向口述历史(通过口头讲述历史,记录所听到的内容,以及进行访谈)。对于女性历史来说,口述证词极为宝贵。当然,口述历史在价值方面存在许多问题

of oral sources. Firstly, there is the problem of lapses of memory and misremembering of events. Secondly, there is the problem of inconsistency. With spoken words there is frequently an inconsistency between earlier and later accounts. The third problem is selective memory. Some events are remembered while other events are forgotten, either intentionally or unintentionally. The fourth problem is that recollections are always memories of the past in the present. We assign meaning from the present to our recollections, including self-legitimating ones. For example, whereas those leading a happy life have a tendency to positively reconstruct their past, others who feel their life is miserable will probably look back and seek the cause of their wretchedness. It is because oral testimony has these four special features that those who privilege documentary sources take the position that oral testimony is untrustworthy.
口述资料存在几个问题。首先是记忆的疏漏和事件的误记。其次是前后叙述的不一致。口头表达中,早期和后期的叙述常常存在矛盾。第三是选择性记忆。有些事件被记住,而另一些事件则被遗忘,这种遗忘可能是有意的,也可能是无意的。第四,回忆总是当下对过去的记忆。我们会从现在的视角赋予回忆意义,包括自我合理化的意义。例如,过着幸福生活的人倾向于积极地重构过去,而感到生活痛苦的人则可能回顾过去,寻找自己悲惨境遇的原因。正因为口述证词具有这四个特殊特点,那些重视文献资料的人才会认为口述证词不可靠。
Nevertheless, feminist historians present the counter-argument to this, saying, that it is precisely because of this that there is reality in oral testimony. Turning the criticism of unreliability and ideological products on its head, they throw back the question: just what is written history? Who are the authors of written history? For example, whom is official history written for, and who is entitled to write it? Is it not the case that a historian who writes about a past that he or she was not alive to see must reconstruct this past selectively? When official history is regarded as public memory, who is included in this public ‘we’, and who is excluded? In a single stroke, the feminist counter-response has raised to the surface a whole range of questions concerning written history.
然而,女性主义历史学家提出了相反的观点,认为正是因为如此,口述证词才具有真实性。她们将对口述证词不可靠和意识形态产物的批评颠倒过来,反问道:究竟什么是书面历史?书面历史的作者是谁?例如,官方历史是为谁而写的,谁有权撰写它?一个历史学家在书写自己未曾亲历的过去时,难道不必有选择地重构这段历史吗?当官方历史被视为公共记忆时,这个公共的“我们”包括谁,又排除了谁?女性主义的反驳一举将关于书面历史的一系列问题揭示了出来。
Problems inherent in oral history are also present in official history legitimated by authority. Firstly, let us take lapses of memory and mistakes. There are many official histories that treat things that happened as if they did not, as in claims that there was no Nanking Massacre. More things are forgotten than remembered in written history. In addition, it is also necessary to ask questions about the censorship that documentary sources go through before being left for us to access or read today. We can only see before our eyes today those documents that have been allowed by history.
口述历史中固有的问题同样存在于由权威合法化的官方历史中。首先,让我们来看记忆的疏漏和错误。许多官方历史对发生过的事情视而不见,比如声称不存在南京大屠杀。书面历史中被遗忘的事情远多于被记住的事情。此外,还必须对文献资料在留给我们查阅或阅读之前所经历的审查提出质疑。我们今天眼前所见的文献,都是被历史所允许的。
Secondly, there is the issue of inconsistency. There are inconsistencies in written history, too. Conversely, it is equally possible to pose the question, ‘what is consistent history’? For many years, the study of history for the
其次,是不一致性的问题。书面历史中也存在不一致的情况。反过来,同样可以提出这样一个问题:“什么是连贯的历史?”多年来,历史研究一直在

purpose of finding the laws of historical change called for scientific history, namely historical materialism. Events of the past were located within a coherent linkage of cause and effect, and the mission of history was thought to be predicting the future on the basis of an extension of this. As a result, a deterministic variable was mobilised as, what Louis Althusser referred to as the ‘ultimate class’ (dernière instance), with every event reduced to this. However, the principles of cause and effect (that is scientific history’s materialist conception of history), have lost their powers of persuasion. Today, when historical predictions have been disproved, have we not come to look upon this kind of ‘consistent history’ with scepticism? Is it not too consistent? What is more, this criticism is not limited to the materialist view of history. History that has been written so that it appears consistent has been written in accordance with certain teleological constructions and to give the impression that there is only one scenario in history. From the standpoint that any alternative interpretations are not tolerated, consistent history is extremely dangerous.
寻找历史变革规律的目的要求科学的历史,即历史唯物主义。过去的事件被置于因果关系的连贯链条中,历史的使命被认为是基于此推断未来。因此,一个决定论变量被动员起来,正如路易·阿尔都塞所称的“最终阶级”(dernière instance),每一个事件都被归结于此。然而,因果原则(即科学历史的唯物史观)已失去其说服力。如今,当历史预测被证伪时,我们难道不对这种“连贯的历史”持怀疑态度吗?它是否过于连贯?更重要的是,这种批评并不限于唯物史观。为了使历史显得连贯,历史被按照某些目的论构建来书写,给人一种历史只有一种情景的印象。从不容许任何替代解释的立场来看,连贯的历史极其危险。
The third issue is selective memory. Again, selective remembering in written history is also plentiful. Why are only the acts of the powerful selected and the experiences of those whom they oppress ignored? Why are political events conferred with privileged status while changes in daily life are deemed unworthy of consideration? Why is it that among documentary sources, the highest value is placed on official sources? Is it not the case that social history, popular history and women’s history emerged as forms of protest to this kind of selectivity? The issue of what is given priority within documentary sources is nothing more than the selection of a perspective. The important task that Yoshimi Yoshiaki undertook to search for documentary sources relating to the comfort women is something that occurred after the comfort women issue was problematised, and not the other way round. Yoshimi took the testimony of the former comfort women as a challenge to history, and responded to this with integrity.
第三个问题是选择性记忆。同样,书面历史中也充满了选择性记忆。为什么只有强者的行为被选取,而他们所压迫者的经历却被忽视?为什么政治事件被赋予特权地位,而日常生活的变迁却被视为不值得考虑?为什么在文献资料中,官方资料被赋予最高价值?社会史、大众史和女性史不正是作为对这种选择性的抗议形式而出现的吗?在文献资料中优先考虑什么的问题无非是视角的选择。吉见义明所承担的重要任务是寻找与慰安妇相关的文献资料,这一任务是在慰安妇问题被提出后才发生的,而不是相反。吉见将前慰安妇的证词视为对历史的挑战,并以诚实的态度回应了这一挑战。
Finally, written history, like oral history, can only ever be recollections of the past in the present. It is not the case that once definitive versions of the history of the French Revolution or the Meiji Restoration were written that we stopped there. As the era and interpretations change, these histories are
最后,书面历史,像口述历史一样,只能是对过去在当下的回忆。并不是说一旦法国大革命或明治维新的权威版本被写成,我们就此止步。随着时代和解读的变化,这些历史

forever placed in a position where they are being re-written from the perspective of the present. History is a continuous revision.
永远处于从当下视角被重新书写的位置。历史是一个不断修订的过程。
Gender history has come under fire from mainstream historians for being too political and ideological, and the reply of feminists in response to this is, that is exactly right, all history is political, then throwing back at them the question: ‘Is there any history that is not political?’ Joan Scott, the author of Gender and the Politics of History, when discussing the importance of gender analysis in history states, ‘I am aware of the necessarily partial results such an approach will produce’ (Scott, 1988, 1999:10). This acknowledgement that gender history is also ‘partial’, is an act akin to throwing down the gauntlet, and pronounces that all history that has been presumed to be official history is nothing more than male history and reveals the partiality of this.
性别史因过于政治化和意识形态化而受到主流历史学家的批评,女性主义者对此的回应是,正是如此,所有历史都是政治的,然后反问他们:“有哪种历史不是政治的吗?”《性别与历史政治》的作者琼·斯科特在讨论性别分析在历史中的重要性时指出,“我意识到这种方法必然会产生片面的结果”(Scott, 1988, 1999:10)。这种承认性别史也是“片面”的行为,类似于抛出挑战书,宣告所有被视为官方历史的东西不过是男性历史,揭示了其片面性。
Such an admission of partiality, it seems to me, does not acknowledge defeat in the search for universal explanation: rather it suggests that universal explanation is not, and never has been, possible (Scott, 1998, 1999:10).
在我看来,这种对片面的承认并不意味着在寻找普遍解释的过程中认输:相反,它表明普遍解释是不可能的,也从未可能过(Scott, 1998, 1999:10)。
This is a bold challenge to totalising history and nomothetical scientific history. Positivist history is not an exception here. Despite calling for objectivity and neutrality in the name of empiricism, a questioning of what is available to us as empirical sources and the political significance of privileging these historical sources has not taken place.
这是对整体化历史和法则性科学历史的大胆挑战。实证主义历史在这里也不例外。尽管以经验主义的名义呼吁客观性和中立性,但对我们所拥有的经验资料的质疑以及对赋予这些历史资料特权的政治意义并未发生。
By arguing that all history is partial, including gender history, Scott’s position is not tied to a fruitless ideological thesis or indicative of a nihilistic attitude towards scholarship. Scott announces that, just as we have been unable to position a single historical truth, reality is composed of multiple categories and that the mission of social scientists, including historians, is to become more sensitive to this multiplicity and these differences.
通过主张所有历史都是片面的,包括性别历史,斯科特的立场并不依附于无果的意识形态论断,也不表明对学术持虚无主义态度。斯科特宣告,正如我们无法定位单一的历史真相一样,现实由多重范畴构成,社会科学家(包括历史学家)的使命是对这种多样性和差异性变得更加敏感。

Narrating History  叙述历史

If, rather than viewing history as an objective restoring of the past, we see it as a reconstruction in the present, then the issue of historical narrative arises.
如果我们不将历史视为对过去的客观还原,而是视为当下的重构,那么历史叙述的问题便随之而来。
The testimony of the former comfort women was shocking not only because of the fact of what happened, but also because 50 years after the war the way in which the story was narrated changed. Until very recently, most former comfort women perceived their past experiences as their personal shame, and allowed them to sink to the depths of their memories. These women put a lid on their past, not even revealing it to their closest family members. Yet through their testimony, they made their victimization public and redefined it. Here we had a drastic change in historical awareness and a shift in paradigm.
前慰安妇的证词令人震惊,不仅因为所发生的事实本身,还因为战争结束 50 年后,叙述故事的方式发生了变化。直到最近,大多数前慰安妇将她们的过去经历视为个人的耻辱,将其深埋于记忆深处。这些女性对过去守口如瓶,甚至不向最亲近的家人透露。然而,通过她们的证词,她们将自己的受害经历公之于众,并重新定义了这一经历。在这里,我们看到了历史意识的剧烈变化和范式的转变。
It was the Korean democracy and women’s movements that brought about this shift. Furthermore, the background to the Korean women’s movement was the growing impact of the grass roots women’s movement internationally. It was precisely because this paradigm shift had already occurred that a narrative responding to this appeared before our eyes (see Part Two). The testimony of the comfort women would not have been possible without the existence of the women’s movement. Even if the court battles have only symbolic significance, the testimony of the comfort women has had profound meaning for the women themselves. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} A tremendous change occurred in that the women themselves were able to recover this blank past and their suppressed memories. However painful these memories may be, it can be said that by positioning their past as something with meaning, they recovered their integrity in life. Numerous victims have testified how much their past tormented them. If we accept that the women who were former comfort women have dignity, then it was in the very act of
正是韩国的民主运动和妇女运动带来了这一转变。此外,韩国妇女运动的背景是国际基层妇女运动影响力的日益增强。正因为这一范式转变已经发生,回应这一转变的叙述才得以呈现在我们眼前(见第二部分)。慰安妇的证言若无妇女运动的存在是不可能的。即使法庭上的斗争仅具象征意义,慰安妇的证言对她们自身却具有深远的意义。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 一个巨大的变化在于,妇女们能够重新找回这段空白的过去和被压抑的记忆。无论这些记忆多么痛苦,可以说,通过将她们的过去定位为有意义的东西,她们恢复了生活的完整性。众多受害者作证说明她们的过去给她们带来了多大的折磨。如果我们承认曾经的慰安妇拥有尊严,那么正是在这一行为中

giving testimony that they acquired this dignity. The act of denying this testimony is what tramples on the dignity of these women.
作证表明她们获得了这种尊严。否认这一证词的行为正是践踏这些女性尊严的行为。
If we ask the question, what kept these women silent for half a century, the answer is that the crime continued in the present tense for the whole of this time. In response to those who ask - why are you covering old ground, isn’t the comfort women problem something that happened in the past? my reply is that it is not a crime of the past, but something being perpetrated today. When you think that there are undoubtedly still many women who have not come forward, this is nothing less than the damage continuing to live on in the present. Among those who have not spoken out, the silence of the Japanese comfort women bears heavily on us as our crime. It hardly needs to be said, that the biggest perpetrators here are the patriarchal societies of Japan and Korea.
如果我们问,是什么让这些女性沉默了半个世纪,答案是这场罪行在这整个时间里一直以现在时态持续发生。对于那些问——为什么还要翻旧账,慰安妇问题不是过去的事情吗?——我的回答是,这不是过去的罪行,而是今天仍在进行的事情。当你想到无疑还有许多女性未曾站出来时,这无异于伤害仍在当下延续。在那些未发声的人中,日本慰安妇的沉默沉重地压在我们身上,成为我们的罪行。不言而喻,这里最大的加害者是日本和韩国的父权社会。
We can see some interesting parallels with the history of the Holocaust. The Holocaust victims did not exist objectively as victims for everyone to see. There were many post-war twists and turns before the history of the Holocaust took its present form. The greatest change occurred in 1961 with the Eichmann Trial that took place in Israel, when survivors were called up into the witness stand and, for the first time, opened their sealed lips about their experiences; experiences moreover that almost defy expression. Up until then, victims and survivors of the Holocaust were generally regarded as cowardly, even within Israel, for having simply followed orders and going meekly to the gas chambers without so much as a rebellion or an uprising. A view held implicitly among the Israeli people was that they were powerless Jews idling their time away in Europe until they were led away like lambs going to slaughter. As a result of words spoken up in the witness stand at the Eichmann Trial, a past that it had not even been possible to talk about, memories that could not be put into words, surfaced as a huge shock. The recollections of the victims, which were painful for them to even think about, surfaced as reality for the first time through narratives and the existence of those willing to listen to these. Thus, even in the case of the Holocaust it is clear that we are not talking about undisputable facts suddenly surfacing unchanged.
我们可以看到与大屠杀历史的一些有趣的相似之处。大屠杀的受害者并非客观上为所有人所见的受害者。在大屠杀历史形成现有形态之前,经历了许多战后曲折。最大的变化发生在 1961 年以色列举行的艾希曼审判,当时幸存者被传唤上证人席,首次打破沉默,讲述他们的经历;这些经历几乎难以用言语表达。在此之前,大屠杀的受害者和幸存者通常被视为懦弱者,即使在以色列内部也是如此,因为他们只是服从命令,顺从地走进毒气室,甚至没有反抗或起义。以色列人民中隐含的观点是,他们是无力的犹太人,在欧洲虚度光阴,直到被像羔羊一样带去屠宰。正是由于艾希曼审判证人席上的陈述,那些过去甚至无法谈论的、无法用言语表达的记忆,才浮现出来,成为巨大的震撼。 受害者的回忆,即使对他们来说回想起来都很痛苦,通过叙述和那些愿意倾听者的存在,首次作为现实浮现出来。因此,即使是在大屠杀的情况下,也很明显我们谈论的并不是突然浮现且未被质疑的事实。
The assumption that I make is that when a victim finally takes the plunge and speaks out, this itself is nothing less than a departure from that
我所假设的是,当受害者最终鼓起勇气发声时,这本身就是一种脱离。

victim’s oppressive reality. What I am calling reality here is not the same as fact. When there is such a gap between the reality of the assailants and the victims of rape, can we really say that there is a single fact? Instead, what we have here is the existence of two totally different realities, with not even one shared reality between the parties involved. The reason I use the term comfort women with hesitation, despite accepting the historical fact of the existence of the comfort women, is to indicate the reverse side of the fact. If rather than a single reality we think in terms of the existence of multiple ‘realities’, then two realities co-exist here: the reality of the comfort women system according to the military and the reality of rape for the victims. When there is such a tremendous gap between the reality of former Japanese soldiers (who still today speak nostalgically of their interaction with comfort women) and the reality of the comfort women themselves, the soldiers, who took for granted the shared nature of their experiences, must have been thrown into confusion when suddenly a quite different and unimagined aspect of this experience was thrust before them.
受害者所处的压迫现实。我这里所说的现实,并不等同于事实。当施暴者和强奸受害者的现实之间存在如此巨大的差距时,我们真的能说只有一个事实吗?相反,我们面对的是两种完全不同的现实,双方之间甚至没有一个共同的现实。我之所以在接受慰安妇存在这一历史事实的同时,对“慰安妇”这一称呼持谨慎态度,是为了指出事实的另一面。如果我们不把现实看作单一的,而是认为存在多重“现实”,那么这里就共存着两种现实:军方所认知的慰安妇制度的现实,以及受害者所经历的强奸现实。当前日本老兵(至今仍怀念与慰安妇的交往)所认知的现实与慰安妇自身的现实之间存在如此巨大的差距时,那些理所当然认为彼此经历是共享的士兵们,必然在突然面对这一截然不同且难以想象的经历时感到困惑。
Even though there is such a huge gap between two realities, this does not mean that one is correct and the other is mistaken. However, where power relations are asymmetrical the reality of the powerful becomes the dominant reality and this is forced on the minority party as a definition of the situation. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} In contrast to this, the act of bringing forth another reality that overturns the dominant reality is for the weak the battle itself; it is the practice of reclaiming a part of oneself that has been denied by the dominant reality.
尽管这两种现实之间存在如此巨大的差距,但这并不意味着其中一种是正确的,另一种是错误的。然而,当权力关系不对称时,强者的现实就成为主导现实,并被强加给少数群体,作为对情境的定义。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 与此相反,提出另一种颠覆主导现实的现实,对于弱者来说就是战斗本身;这是一种重新夺回被主导现实剥夺的自我部分的实践。
If the weak do this, then the next issue to emerge is how has the reality of the victims been created. The reality of the victims is constructed for the first time through the process of narration. Put the other way around, we can say that it is through the process of narration that the narrator’s subject formation as a victim takes place. The term victim may not be appropriate in this context. On the basis of what we have learned from other cases of sexual violence, it may be better to speak of them as survivors. This is because these women are not simply victims, but as survivors (ikinobita mono 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} ) of great suffering they are weaving narratives as part of the work of confirming their continued existence today.
如果弱者这样做,那么接下来出现的问题就是受害者的现实是如何被构建的。受害者的现实首次通过叙述的过程被建构出来。换句话说,我们可以说正是通过叙述的过程,叙述者作为受害者的主体形成得以实现。在这个语境中,“受害者”一词可能并不合适。基于我们从其他性暴力案例中学到的经验,称她们为幸存者可能更为恰当。这是因为这些女性不仅仅是受害者,作为经历巨大痛苦的幸存者(ikinobita mono 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} ),她们正在编织叙述,作为确认她们今日继续存在的工作的一部分。
The question of narration has a dual aspect. There is the issue of the narrator, Who narrates? But there is also that of the addressee, To whom is it narrated? Who will hear the testimony of the victims? If there is no one to hear the story, then nobody is going to narrate. When raising the question of to whom is it narrated, it is clear that a narrative is the joint production of the narrator and the audience. The narrator is not a ‘talking book’ producing the same narrative again and again like a tape recorder. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
叙述的问题具有双重方面。一方面是叙述者的问题,谁来叙述?另一方面是受众的问题,叙述给谁听?谁会听受害者的证词?如果没有人听故事,那么就不会有人去叙述。当提出叙述给谁听的问题时,很明显叙述是叙述者与观众的共同创作。叙述者并不是像录音机一样反复播放同一叙述的“会说话的书”。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
On the contrary, as oral history research to date has made clear, people placed in a position of weakness tend to tell the story that the audience (as the more powerful party) wants to hear. The site of producing narratives is a clinical site for the exercise of power. The narrative of the weak is multivocal and intertwined with complexity. Frequently, a narrative that back-ups or compliments the dominant narrative is produced, and the audience takes for granted that reality is a monolith. This other reality comes out in fragmentary bits and pieces from within the midst of ambivalences, contradictions and inconsistencies. For women’s history, it is precisely because of oral history’s inconsistencies that it is a decisive factor in indicating cracks in the dominant reality. Moreover, this is exactly why sensitivity is required of a listener at the site of producing complex narratives. If the narrative is sewn up into a consistent story, then again the listener ends up cooperating at this clinical site.
相反,正如迄今为止的口述历史研究所表明的那样,处于弱势地位的人往往会讲述观众(作为更有权力的一方)想听的故事。叙事的产生场所是权力行使的临床场所。弱者的叙事是多声部的,交织着复杂性。通常,会产生一种支持或补充主导叙事的叙述,而观众则理所当然地认为现实是单一的。这种另一种现实从矛盾、冲突和不一致的混杂中零星地显现出来。对于女性历史来说,正是因为口述历史的不一致性,它才成为揭示主导现实裂缝的决定性因素。此外,这也正是为什么在产生复杂叙事的场所,听者需要具备敏感性的原因。如果叙事被缝合成一个连贯的故事,那么听者最终又会在这个临床场所中起到配合的作用。
At such a clinical site of producing narrative there is even the creation of a model victim. The story of the model victim, told as the audience wants to hear it, could look like this: One day a naïve and innocent maiden, without warning, is suddenly forcefully abducted, kidnapped, or deceptively recruited, whisked away, gang raped and then made to labour as a comfort woman. Although she tried to escape her plans were obstructed and she managed to survive this living hell. While this is the story of the model victim, in fact there are a diverse variety of scenarios of how women became comfort women. It is difficult to generalise, but for example, by a contract entered into due to poverty or through parents; forced by a local authorities; or by the seduction of pimps and their fraudulent modes of operation. The ‘bona fide authority’ of the support groups has the tendency of inventing an image of the ‘immaculate victim’ by emphasising the innocence of the victims. We need to view with suspicion this way of forming the narrative, as
在这样一个叙事生产的临床场所,甚至创造出了一个模范受害者的形象。模范受害者的故事,按照观众想听的方式讲述,可能是这样的:某天,一个天真无邪的少女,毫无预警地被强行绑架、诱骗或欺骗性招募,匆匆带走,遭到轮奸,随后被迫作为慰安妇劳作。尽管她试图逃脱,但计划被阻挠,她设法在这地狱般的生活中幸存下来。虽然这是模范受害者的故事,但实际上女性成为慰安妇的情形多种多样。很难一概而论,例如,有的是因贫困或通过父母签订合同;有的是被地方当局强迫;还有的是被皮条客的诱惑和欺诈手段所骗。支持团体的“善意权威”倾向于通过强调受害者的纯洁无辜,来塑造“无瑕受害者”的形象。我们需要对这种叙事形成方式保持怀疑,正如

it is quite possible that the unintentional result will be an effective silencing of those who fall even slightly outside the formulation of the narrative. This is very similar to discourses that emphasise the purity of victims of sexual violence, with the unintentional effect that they reinforce patriarchy.
很有可能,无意中导致的结果是有效地使那些稍微偏离叙事框架的人被沉默。这与强调性暴力受害者纯洁性的论述非常相似,其无意中强化了父权制。
Let me offer a typical example here. Korean-American documentary filmmaker Dai Sil Kim-Gibson visited Nanumu House 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} and made a documentary showing the daily lives of the ‘harmony’ women. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} KimGibson noticed that after hearing the stories of the women many times, the narrative formula changed depending on the occasion. The details that one woman gave in her first testimony about how she became a comfort woman told of an unhappy marriage forced on her by her parents, being abused by her husband and then, in order to escape this abuse, being taken in by the sweet words of a pimp and running away from married life. In an interview by, and public testimony for, the Japanese media this changed with no mention of her married life. It is likely that Kim-Gibson’s example will be instantly seized on and misused by opposition factions. This example could be used to support those who devalue oral testimony on the basis that it shows how unreliable it is. However, we can look at the same affair from a completely different angle. The audience, in other words the Japanese media and well-intentioned interviewers, exercise their power to transform the narrative formula at the very site where they are engaging in the practice of listening in order to extract the story that they themselves want to hear. In response to the question, in what way is the reality of the victim created by and a consequence of the narrative?, both positivist historians, who at first sight appear neutral, and even well-intentioned support groups may conspire with the perpetrators without even noticing it.
让我在这里举一个典型的例子。韩裔美国纪录片导演 Dai Sil Kim-Gibson 访问了 Nanumu House 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} ,并拍摄了一部展示“和谐”女性日常生活的纪录片。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} Kim-Gibson 注意到,在多次听取这些女性的故事后,叙述的模式会根据场合而变化。一位女性在第一次作证时讲述了她如何成为慰安妇的细节,内容包括父母强迫她进入一段不幸福的婚姻,遭受丈夫的虐待,然后为了逃避这种虐待,被皮条客的甜言蜜语所诱骗,最终逃离了婚姻生活。而在接受日本媒体采访和公开作证时,这些内容发生了变化,完全没有提及她的婚姻生活。Kim-Gibson 的这个例子很可能会被反对派立即抓住并加以曲解。这个例子可能被用来支持那些贬低口述证词的人,认为它显示了口述证词的不可靠性。然而,我们也可以从完全不同的角度来看待同一件事。 换句话说,观众,也就是日本媒体和善意的采访者,在倾听的过程中行使他们的权力,改变叙事公式,以提取他们自己想听的故事。对于“受害者的现实是如何被叙事所创造并成为叙事的结果”的问题,表面上看似中立的实证主义历史学家,甚至善意的支持团体,可能在不自觉中与加害者合谋。
Even today, power relations come into play at each site of narration. This is a familiar experience for those who are knowledgeable about the narratives of the victims of sexual violence or court testimony. Court testimony forces people to speak at the most overpowering and authoritarian of sites. Narratives of the weaker party will certainly not be told in a situation where the narrator lacks a sense of security and trust that the audience will empathise with his or her story. This is something that we should have learned from studying women’s history.
即使在今天,权力关系仍在每一个叙述现场发挥作用。对于熟悉性暴力受害者叙事或法庭证词的人来说,这是一种熟悉的体验。法庭证词迫使人们在最强势、最专制的场所发声。在叙述者缺乏安全感和对观众会同情其故事的信任的情况下,弱势一方的叙述肯定无法被讲述。这是我们从研究女性历史中应该学到的东西。

Reflexive Women's History
反思性的女性历史

So far I have made a distinction between the terms gender history and women’s history. Due to the seeming neutrality of the concept of gender, there is a tendency for it to be used by those who dislike the terms feminism and women’s studies because of their exclusivity and challenging nature. However, an understanding of the concept of gender as described by Scott makes abundantly clear the political and challenging nature of this term as well. The idea that gender is more moderate and neutral than feminism is quite simply a mistake or a misunderstanding.
到目前为止,我已经区分了“性别历史”和“女性历史”这两个术语。由于“性别”这一概念看似中立,因而那些不喜欢“女权主义”和“女性研究”这两个术语的排他性和挑战性的人,往往倾向于使用“性别”一词。然而,正如斯科特所描述的对“性别”概念的理解,充分表明了这一术语同样具有政治性和挑战性。认为“性别”比“女权主义”更温和、中立的观点,简直就是错误或误解。
There are two reasons for my adoption of the term gender history. Firstly, before the establishment of gender history in Japan there was a long tradition of women’s history. Secondly, in contrast to women’s history, which is restricted by name to the study of the female arena, gender history brings with it the possibility of using the gender as an analytical category in all domains regardless of sex.
我采用“性别历史”这一术语有两个原因。首先,在日本“性别历史”建立之前,已有悠久的“女性历史”传统。其次,与仅限于研究女性领域的“女性历史”不同,“性别历史”则带来了在所有领域中,无论性别如何,都可以将性别作为分析范畴的可能性。
If we speak in terms of the first point, women’s history in Japan has had a somewhat contorted relationship with feminism. This is because it was established before the emergence of second wave feminism under the influence of historical materialism and already had a long accumulation of results. The reaction of many women historians to the appearance of women’s liberation was a barely concealed bewilderment and animosity (Ueno, 1995a). In addition, amidst the rise of the women’s liberation movement in the 1970s and 1980s, women’s history in Japan accumulated many important results. For example restoring grass roots local women’s history. Yet this occurred without a baptism in the various feminist theories developed contemporaneously and, moreover, in an interdisciplinary manner (Ogino, 1993). 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} To make it clear, when I refer to women’s history in
如果从第一个角度来说,日本的女性史与女权主义之间的关系有些曲折。这是因为女性史是在第二波女权主义出现之前,在历史唯物主义的影响下建立起来的,并且已经积累了较长时间的研究成果。许多女性历史学家对女性解放运动的出现反应出几乎掩饰不住的困惑和敌意(上野千鹤子,1995a)。此外,在 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代女性解放运动兴起的背景下,日本的女性史积累了许多重要成果,例如恢复了基层地方女性的历史。然而,这些成果的形成并未经历当时同时期发展起来的各种女权主义理论的洗礼,更没有以跨学科的方式进行(荻野,1993)。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 为了说明清楚,当我在本书中提到女性史时,指的是在引入性别作为分析范畴之前的女性史。

this book I am speaking of women’s history as it was before a concept of gender was introduced as an analytical category.
本书中所说的女性史,是指在引入性别作为分析范畴之前的女性史。
With regards to the second point, when women’s history was established, scholars in the field thought of it as specialising in research into the female domain, and an area passed over by orthodox history. As a result, it can be called a supplementary history to orthodox history; ‘picking up the scraps’ of history. Before long, scholars of women’s history realised that by simply saying ‘women were also there’ their effect on orthodox (men’s) history was negligible, and they grew increasingly more irritated. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} In contrast to the sexual division of labour within historical research where women’s history deals with the gendered private sphere and orthodox history with the ‘gender-indifferent’ public sphere, there is gender history which announces that gender is also operating in the public sphere and engenders the very concept of gender neutrality (or what is regarded as gender neutrality). Orthodox history is also engendered as ‘men’s history’. For example, if female actors are absent from the political and economic domains, we must explain from a gender perspective the phenomenon of women’s absence. Therefore, theoretically there is not a domain that gender history cannot intervene in. This is because if we look at the gender effect of constructing a domain so that it appears gender neutral it is clear that hidden behind the appearance of gender neutrality is a male-centeredness. From this kind of analysis, for example, we can see that the soldier and the citizen are constructed in a male mould. By another name, the reality of gender neutrality is male exclusivity and female exclusion.
关于第二点,当女性历史学科建立时,该领域的学者认为它专注于研究女性领域,是正统历史所忽视的一个领域。因此,它可以被称为正统历史的补充历史;“捡拾历史的残余”。不久之后,女性历史学者意识到,仅仅说“女性也在那里”对正统(男性)历史的影响微乎其微,他们变得越来越恼火。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 与历史研究中性别分工不同,女性历史处理性别化的私人领域,而正统历史处理“性别无关”的公共领域,性别历史则宣称性别也在公共领域中起作用,并产生了性别中立(或被视为性别中立)这一概念。正统历史同样被视为“男性历史”。例如,如果女性在政治和经济领域缺席,我们必须从性别视角解释女性缺席的现象。 因此,理论上没有哪个领域是性别史无法介入的。这是因为如果我们观察构建某一领域时的性别效应,使其看起来性别中立,就会清楚地发现,在性别中立的表象背后隐藏着以男性为中心的倾向。通过这种分析,例如,我们可以看到士兵和公民是按照男性模式构建的。换句话说,性别中立的现实是男性的排他性和女性的排斥。
The paradigm shift in gender history occurred as a result of the move to restore women’s agency in history. This occurred in conjunction with the move in feminism generally to restore women’s agency, however the restoration of women’s agency in history was inevitably accompanied by a questioning of women’s responsibility with regards to history. The view that women are not simply passive victims of history, but subjects actively creating history, is tied in with a questioning of the responsibility of women as perpetrators in relation to history. Ironically, this has resulted in feminist historians casting a much harsher eye at women in history than they did in previous times. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
性别史的范式转变是由于恢复女性在历史中的能动性的运动而发生的。这与女权主义整体上恢复女性能动性的运动同时进行,然而,历史中女性能动性的恢复不可避免地伴随着对女性在历史中责任的质疑。认为女性不仅仅是历史的被动受害者,而是积极创造历史的主体,这与对女性作为历史加害者责任的质疑紧密相关。具有讽刺意味的是,这导致女权主义历史学家对历史中的女性比以往更加严厉地审视。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
Where gender history points to the kind of self-referential and selfreflexive approach common to the cross-currents of post-structuralism, I have attached the name reflexive history. The meaning of reflexive (hansei) here is used in the sense of self-reflexive while simultaneously selfreferential, and self-critical. For this reason, the connotations are the same as for reflexive sociology and reflexive philosophy. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
性别史所指向的是一种自我指涉和自我反思的方法,这种方法在后结构主义的交汇流派中很常见,我将其命名为反思史。这里“反思”(hansei)的含义是指自我反思,同时具备自我指涉和自我批判的特性。因此,其内涵与反思社会学和反思哲学相同。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
Rooted in the impact of feminism, reflexive women’s history was established as a result of the shift in historical viewpoint where women moved from their conventional position as passive victims of history to being perceived as active agents in the historical process. Then, this reflexive re-examination of modern and contemporary women’s history in Japan led directly to a questioning of women’s subject complicity and role as perpetrators in the imperialistic aggression in the perpetrator view of history (kagaisha shikan).
反思女性史根植于女权主义的影响,是历史视角转变的结果——女性从传统上作为历史的被动受害者,转变为被视为历史进程中的积极主体。随后,这种对日本现代和当代女性史的反思性重新审视,直接引发了对女性作为加害者视角(kagaisha shikan)中帝国主义侵略中女性主体共谋性和角色的质疑。
However, when we talk about reflexivity we are faced with three questions: who should be reflexive; what qualifies them for this role; and what is the object of this reflexivity? Japan is an idiosyncratic state, so perhaps it is in terms of the unprecedented damage that it caused that should be the object of our reflexivity? Alternatively, perhaps it is for war crimes unpardonable in international law or from a humanitarian standpoint that we should be reflexive? Going hand-in hand with this, should we be reflexive about the evil character of what is called that ‘war of aggression’?
然而,当我们谈论反思性时,会面临三个问题:谁应该具备反思性;他们具备什么资格担此角色;反思性的对象是什么?日本是一个特立独行的国家,那么或许应以其所造成的前所未有的破坏作为我们反思的对象?或者,或许应以其在国际法或人道主义立场上不可原谅的战争罪行为反思对象?与此密切相关的,我们是否应对所谓“侵略战争”的邪恶本质进行反思?
It is not only Japan where reflexive women’s history has emerged and moved towards an indictment of women’s wartime collaboration. A similar process born of similar circumstances can also be seen in Germany and Italy. All three countries share the distinction of being former fascist states. However, the trend towards reflexive women’s history in Japan and Germany differ remarkably. In Japan, home produced historians are taking the lead in reflexive women’s history, while in Germany the task of problematising women’s collaboration with the Nazi’s has been taken up by American historian Claudia Koonz (1987). German scholars of women’s history showed bewilderment and anger at this sudden attack from outside. The reason for the difference in the trend in reflexive women’s history is that, even prior to this, there was a huge contrast between Germany and Japan in
不仅仅是在日本,反思性的女性历史也在其他地方出现,并逐渐转向对女性战时合作的谴责。类似的过程在德国和意大利也能看到,这些过程都源于相似的环境。三国都有一个共同点,那就是它们曾是法西斯国家。然而,日本和德国在反思性女性历史的发展趋势上却有显著不同。在日本,本土历史学家主导了反思性女性历史的研究,而在德国,揭示女性与纳粹合作问题的任务则由美国历史学家克劳迪娅·库恩茨(Claudia Koonz,1987 年)承担。德国的女性历史学者对这一来自外部的突然批评表现出困惑和愤怒。反思性女性历史趋势差异的原因在于,即使在此之前,德国和日本之间就存在巨大差异,具体表现在

the national recognitions surrounding war responsibility. In Japan, a national identity was established as victims of war, regardless of gender, and as symbolised in the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was into this that scholars of reflexive women’s history ‘smuggled’ the new perspective of women as perpetrators. In contrast, Germany’s national identity was formed on the basis of being perpetrators of a crime with no room for vindication, the Holocaust, and again this paid no attention to gender. It is for this reason that Germany, if anything, repressed the engendering of the perpetrators of war crimes. Koonz, who brought a gender perspective to this, reconstructed German women’s collaboration with the Nazis as collaboration as women.
围绕战争责任的国家认同。在日本,国家认同被确立为战争受害者,无论性别如何,并以广岛和长崎的悲剧为象征。正是在这一背景下,反思性女性历史的学者“偷偷引入”了女性作为加害者的新视角。相比之下,德国的国家认同则建立在作为无可辩解罪行——大屠杀的加害者的基础上,同样没有考虑性别因素。正因如此,德国在某种程度上压制了对战争罪行加害者性别特征的揭示。库恩茨(Koonz)引入了性别视角,重构了德国女性作为女性身份与纳粹合作的历史。
On the other hand, in post-cold war reunited Germany, a gender perspective has been brought to the problematization of rape of German women by the ‘liberation forces’ during the occupation (Sander u. Johr, 1992). From the backlash to the Koonz-type perspective, the taboo image of German women as sufferers was constructed. The rape of German women in the Russian occupied zone was something that had already been discussed. Against the background of the post-Cold War era and the women’s movement, this rape, which had been taken as a symbol of German national suffering, was reconstructed as a sexual crime of violence against women by men. Behind this, however, sits a racist discourse that has crept in with stealth purveying the idea that the rapes represented civilization being overrun by Russian barbarism. In addition, the construction of German women as victims also conceals hidden desires concerning national identity (Grossmann, 1995).
另一方面,在冷战后重新统一的德国,性别视角被引入对“解放军”占领期间强奸德国妇女问题的探讨中(Sander u. Johr,1992)。作为对 Koonz 式观点的反弹,德国妇女作为受害者的禁忌形象被构建起来。俄罗斯占领区对德国妇女的强奸问题已经被讨论过。在冷战后时代和妇女运动的背景下,这种被视为德国民族苦难象征的强奸事件被重新解读为男性对女性的性暴力犯罪。然而,在这背后潜藏着一种种族主义话语,悄然传播着强奸事件代表文明被俄罗斯野蛮侵袭的观念。此外,将德国妇女构建为受害者也掩盖了关于民族认同的隐秘欲望(Grossmann,1995)。
In the cases of both Japan and Germany, it would appear that there is no lack of subject matter to be reflexive about. In both cases, however, as long as gender history stays within the framework of national history it will not produce a composition in terms of the ‘crimes of the state’ that women played a part in. From beginning to end, women are subdominant to the state. Then, in the words of Maruyama Masao, women as ‘second-class citizens’ are as war criminals only ‘second-class criminals’.
在日本和德国的案例中,似乎都不缺乏可以反思的主题。然而,在这两种情况下,只要性别历史仍然局限于民族历史的框架内,就不会形成关于女性所参与的“国家罪行”的叙述。从头到尾,女性都处于国家的次要地位。正如丸山真男所言,作为“二等公民”的女性,作为战犯也只是“二等罪犯”。
Wakakuwa Midori states that during the war, Japanese women played a role of ‘war cheerleaders’. Accepting this description, does that mean that women in the Allied countries of the United States and Britain, who similarly functioned as cheerleaders, have no need to be reflexive about their
若川翠指出,在战争期间,日本女性扮演了“战争啦啦队员”的角色。接受这一描述,是否意味着在同样作为啦啦队员的美国和英国等盟国的女性,无需对她们的行为进行反思?

wartime cooperation? Whichever country you look at, the process of nationalising women was surprisingly similar. As long as reflexive history fails to transcend national history, the war responsibility of the victor countries and the cooperation of women in relation to this will not be problematised. So why should it be the case that the fascist states must reflect on their war responsibility while such reflection is not required of the Alliance countries that fought a ‘just war’ for democracy? While the war crimes of the defeated countries have been adjudicated, is it the case that the war crimes of the victor nations will neither be judged or emerge as targets of reflection?
战时合作?无论观察哪个国家,女性的国家化过程都出奇地相似。只要反思性的历史未能超越民族历史,胜利国的战争责任及女性在其中的合作就不会被问题化。那么,为什么法西斯国家必须反思其战争责任,而为民主而战的“正义战争”的盟国却不需要进行这样的反思呢?虽然战败国的战争罪行已被审判,但胜利国的战争罪行是否既不会被审判,也不会成为反思的对象呢?
The United States, as a victor country, used freedom and democracy as tools of world domination in Pax Americana; exempted the Emperor, a key person responsible for the war, from all responsibility for the purpose of its Occupation policy; took exclusive possession of the results of the experiments carried out by Unit 731 on living bodies; and legitimised Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By bringing cross-sectional variables from the gender domain, reflexive history makes comparative history possible. Yet, unless we can question the war responsibility of the victor nations, then reflexive history ends up nothing more than a masochistic exercise. Without such a questioning, women citizens subdominant in the nation will probably end up lining up behind the men of the other side cheering them on - ‘you all fought hard for your home countries’ - whitewashing the past in a similar way to French President Mitterand and German Chancellor Kohl at the 50th Anniversary of the Normandy Landing operation.
作为战胜国,美国在美利坚和平时期将自由和民主作为世界统治的工具;为了其占领政策的目的,免除了作为战争关键责任人的天皇的所有责任;独占了 731 部队在活体上进行实验的成果;并为广岛和长崎的原子弹轰炸合法化。通过引入性别领域的横断变量,反思性历史使比较历史成为可能。然而,除非我们能够质疑战胜国的战争责任,否则反思性历史最终不过是一种受虐式的练习。如果没有这样的质疑,作为国家中处于次要地位的女性公民很可能最终会站在对方男性一边为他们加油——“你们都为自己的祖国奋战过”——以类似于法国总统密特朗和德国总理科尔在诺曼底登陆行动 50 周年纪念时的方式美化过去。
By defining the scope of the subjects who need to be reflexive and the targets of reflection, we are also deciding the limits of reflexive history. The purpose of establishing gender as an analytical category in reflexive history is to allow us to transcend national history.
通过界定需要进行反思的主体范围以及反思的对象,我们也在决定反思性历史的界限。将性别作为反思性历史中的分析范畴,其目的是使我们能够超越民族历史。

Going Beyond the Nation-State
超越民族国家

I would like to add to our discussion of methodology questions surrounding the subject. In this narrative we call history there are a number of questions we must address. Who narrates and to whom is it addressed? Who is the I I II or we that a narrator speaks of? When history brings with it responsibility, who should bear this responsibility?
我想在关于主体的方法论问题的讨论中补充一点。在我们称之为历史的叙述中,有许多问题必须加以解决。谁在叙述,叙述的对象是谁?叙述者所说的“我”或“我们”是谁?当历史伴随着责任时,谁应当承担这份责任?
One of the arguments of the Orthodox History Group is that national pride must be restored. They demand a history that we can take pride in. This desire to seek an official history is equivalent to wanting to frame a collective identity for the people. Here, the identification of oneself with the nation-state both involves seduction and coercion to become an I I II or a we who is a national subject. This can include an identity as an I I II who is a person from an aggressor nation. However, this too is based on an identification of oneself with a nation-state. This identification of the individual with the nation-state is called nationalism.
正统历史学派的一个论点是必须恢复民族自豪感。他们要求有一部我们可以引以为傲的历史。这种寻求官方历史的愿望等同于想为人民构建一个集体身份。在这里,将自我认同与民族国家联系起来,既包含诱惑也包含强制,目的是成为一个 I I II 或一个作为国家主体的“我们”。这可以包括作为侵略国人民的 I I II 身份。然而,这同样基于将自我认同与民族国家联系起来。个人与民族国家的这种认同被称为民族主义。
The etymology of the word nation is the Latin nati, meaning ‘to be born’. The English word nationalism can be translated as either minzoku shugi [in the sense of patriotism] or kokka shugi [in the sense of statism] in Japanese. While there is one more possible translation, kokumin shugi [literally, nationalism], minzoku shugi and kokka shugi are fairly similar, at least within the political system of the nation state where sovereignty rests with the people. Nationalism before a state is established can be translated as minzoku shugi, whereas nationalism once a state has been formed is kokka shugi. Yet, in European languages there is just the one word to describe these two forms of nationalism.
“nation”一词的词源是拉丁语 nati,意为“出生”。英语单词“nationalism”在日语中可以翻译为“民族主義”(minzoku shugi,意指爱国主义)或“国家主義”(kokka shugi,意指国家主义)。虽然还有一种可能的翻译是“国民主義”(kokumin shugi,字面意思为民族主义),但“民族主義”和“国家主義”在国家主权属于人民的民族国家政治体系内相当相似。国家尚未建立时的民族主义可以翻译为“民族主義”,而国家形成后的民族主义则是“国家主義”。然而,在欧洲语言中,这两种民族主义形式只有一个词来描述。
The word patriotism, which is often identified with nationalism, has mistakenly been translated as aikokushin or aikoku shugi in Japanese [both meaning to love one’s country] even though the word originally did not
“爱国主义”一词常被认为与民族主义相同,但在日语中被错误地翻译为“愛国心”或“愛国主義”(均意为爱国),尽管该词最初并非如此。

convey the sense of a love of one’s nation (kokumin shugi). Originally patri referred to one’s native province or birth place, with the term patriotism simply referring to a love of one’s homeland. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} To look upon the love of the state as an extension of the love of one’s birth place, in the manner of a concentric circle, is simply the product of a desire (put more bluntly, a conspiracy) to force a link between a person’s birth place and the state. There is a discontinuity between the artificially created state (all states are artificially created) and the native province or homeland. For example, the patriotism of an Italian is a complete and utter love for his or her region, and bears no relationship to [the Japanese translation] aikoku shugi (love of one’s country). Indeed, it is questionable whether Italian people even share a national identity. This is exactly why the state has been so eager to mobilise any means to create a circuit link running from patriotism to nationalism.
传达对国家(kokumin shugi)的热爱之情。最初,patri 指的是一个人的故乡或出生地,爱国主义一词仅仅指对故土的热爱。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 将对国家的热爱视为对出生地热爱的延伸,如同同心圆的方式,只是出于一种欲望(更直白地说,是一种阴谋)强行将个人的出生地与国家联系起来的产物。人为创造的国家(所有国家都是人为创造的)与故乡或出生地之间存在断裂。例如,意大利人的爱国主义是对其所在地区的完全且彻底的热爱,与[日文翻译]aikoku shugi(爱国主义)毫无关系。事实上,意大利人是否拥有共同的国家认同本身就是一个值得怀疑的问题。正因如此,国家才如此热衷于动用各种手段,创造从爱国主义到民族主义的循环联系。
Even within this notion of nationalism, is it the case that minzoku shugi or patriotism is right, whereas kokka shugi or statism is wrong? Or then again, maybe it is only minzoku shugi that we find acceptable? Is it possible to say that the nationalism of the oppressor is bad, while nationalism of the oppressed is legitimate? Is it the case that the nationalism of an imperialist state is oppressive, but the struggle of the colonised people seeking independence is justified? Is nationalism liberating during the period of nation building, but then turns to something oppressive after the state has been founded? Up until what point is nationalism ‘wholesome’, and at what point does it change to something bad?
即使在民族主义这一概念之内,是否可以说民族主义(minzoku shugi)或爱国主义是正确的,而国家主义(kokka shugi)或国家主义是错误的?或者说,也许只有民族主义是我们可以接受的?是否可以说压迫者的民族主义是坏的,而被压迫者的民族主义是合法的?是否帝国主义国家的民族主义是压迫性的,但被殖民人民争取独立的斗争是正当的?民族主义在国家建设时期是解放性的,但国家建立后却变成了某种压迫性的东西?民族主义“健康”的界限在哪里,到什么程度它会变成坏的?
When East and West Germany were reunified, cries of ‘we are a single people’ (Wir sind ein Volk) performed a powerful role as a banner of national reunification. It is difficult to make a distinction between ‘a people’ (of the same ethnos) and ‘the people’ of a nation. Indeed, as Anderson makes clear, the nation-state itself depends on the imagined community of ‘the people’ (Anderson, 1985).
当东西德统一时,“我们是一体的人民”(Wir sind ein Volk)的呼声作为民族统一的旗帜发挥了强大的作用。很难区分“一个民族”(同一族群)和一个国家的“人民”。正如安德森所明确指出的,民族国家本身依赖于“人民”的想象共同体(Anderson, 1985)。
One nation-state is very similar to another. The reason for this is that a nation-state in the process of being constructed as a nation-state models itself on other contemporaneous nation-states (Nishikawa, 1995). This being the case, then within the nationalism of the oppressed there is a concealed desire to take on the nation-state form of the oppressor. In other words,
一个民族国家与另一个民族国家非常相似。其原因在于,作为民族国家构建过程中的民族国家,会以其他同时代的民族国家为榜样(Nishikawa,1995)。既然如此,那么在被压迫者的民族主义中,隐藏着一种想要采用压迫者的民族国家形式的愿望。换句话说,

there is a desire for a collective identity in the form of the people equal national subjects.
存在着一种以人民为平等民族主体的集体身份的渴望。
The problem here is the same as that debated by Katō Norihiro, a literary and social critic and Takahashi Tetsuya, a Tokyo University philosopher, in the so-called historical subject dispute. In Haisengo-ron (On the post-war era) 1977, Katō has taken pains not to identify the individual subject with the national subject. He has struggled to build a bridge between the collective subject and the individual subject in the form of the public. Yet, when he carelessly uses the pronoun we I cannot suppress the question who is this we that he is referring to? Likewise, when borrowing from psychologist Kishida Shū’s popularised Freudian influenced Nihonjinron, (theories about the Japanese), Katō speaks of ‘the character fragmentation of we the post-war Japanese’ (Katō, 1997:60). The questions that arises in response to this are, since when did the Japanese have a collective identity based on a single character, who is able to make such an assumption and on what basis? 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
这里的问题与文学社会评论家加藤典洋和东京大学哲学家高桥哲也在所谓的历史主体争论中讨论的问题相同。在《战后论》(1977 年)中,加藤极力避免将个体主体等同于民族主体。他努力在集体主体与个体主体之间搭建一座以公共性为形式的桥梁。然而,当他不经意地使用代词“我们”时,我无法抑制心中的疑问:他所指的“我们”究竟是谁?同样地,当借用心理学家岸田秀受弗洛伊德影响而普及的日本人论时,加藤谈到了“我们这些战后日本人的性格分裂”(加藤,1997:60)。由此产生的问题是,日本人自何时起拥有基于单一性格的集体认同?谁有资格做出这样的假设?又基于什么依据? 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
Compared to the complexity of Katō’s arguments, civil society theorist sociologist Hashizume Daisaburō’s style of writing for the purpose of enlightenment is clear to a degree in that it is too easy to understand. He turns the problem of war responsibility into an issue of continuity between the wartime, imperialist Japan and post-war Japan. Without question, there is a continuity in the legal subject as the current Japanese constitution took the form of a revision of the constitution of Imperial Japan. Similar to the situation of a merger between two companies where any debts must be carried over, debts from Imperial Japan and the occupation after its colonies were relinquished and transferred to post-war Japan. In terms of legal principle, it is correct for Japan to take responsibility for crimes committed by Imperial Japan. Resulting from this legal or logical assumption is the conclusion that it is correct for citizens who have sovereignty to take responsibility as citizens.
与加藤的论点复杂性相比,作为公民社会理论家的社会学家桥爪大三郎为了启蒙目的而写作的风格则显得过于浅显易懂。他将战争责任的问题转化为战时帝国主义日本与战后日本之间的连续性问题。毫无疑问,作为法律主体存在连续性,因为现行日本宪法是对帝国日本宪法的修订。类似于两家公司合并时必须承担所有债务的情况,帝国日本及其放弃并转交给战后日本的殖民地所产生的债务也必须继承。从法律原则上讲,日本对帝国日本所犯下的罪行承担责任是正确的。基于这一法律或逻辑假设,得出的结论是拥有主权的公民作为公民承担责任是正确的。
However, when he draws the following conclusion from the same argument, I cannot follow what he calls his ‘logic’:
然而,当他从同一论点得出以下结论时,我无法理解他所谓的“逻辑”:
the constitution. Given that this is the case, then being called up and proceeding to the front is entirely correct (Takeda, Kobayashi, and Hashizume, 1997:281).
鉴于情况如此,被征召并前往前线是完全正确的(武田、小林、桥爪,1997:281)。
If Katōs condolences for the 3 million Japanese killed in action is based on a warped sympathy with the agency of the soldiers who went to the war front despite acknowledging that it was a meaningless war, then Hashizume’s civil society thesis has the clarity of game of logic. Here, any doubts about the fact that the nation-state has an exclusivity and transcendence so great that it can demand the death of its citizens - the coercive force of this kind of collective identity - are neatly and tidily swept away. Takahashi Tetsuya states that we must ‘take responsibility’ as ‘Japanese’ (Takahashi, 1995). If Takahashi’s meaning here is that the Japanese have responsibility as members of a political community that we call the nation-state, then his position ends up being not very much different from that of civil society theorist Hashizume. However, Takahashi conceptualises from the standpoint of a much more transcendental logic than Hashizume. Even though, a crime is a crime even if no apparent victim exists (or no accusation has been made). What he has made into an issue here is the ‘original sin’ of the imperialist state. From this standpoint, Takahashi is making a distinction between the nationalism of imperialists and the nationalism of oppressed peoples, declaring his allegiance with the latter.
如果加藤对三百万阵亡日本士兵的哀悼是基于对那些明知战争毫无意义却仍然前往战场的士兵行为的扭曲同情,那么桥爪的大众社会论就具有逻辑游戏般的清晰。在这里,关于民族国家拥有如此排他性和超越性,以至于能够要求其公民为国捐躯——这种集体身份的强制力量——的任何疑问,都被干净利落地扫除。高桥哲也指出,我们必须作为“日本人”承担“责任”(高桥,1995)。如果高桥此处的意思是,日本人作为我们称之为民族国家的政治共同体成员,负有责任,那么他的立场最终与大众社会理论家桥爪的观点并无太大区别。然而,高桥的概念立场比桥爪更具超越性的逻辑。即使没有明显的受害者(或没有提出指控),犯罪依然是犯罪。他在这里提出的问题是帝国主义国家的“原罪”。 从这个角度来看,高桥区分了帝国主义者的民族主义和被压迫民族的民族主义,表明他支持后者。
I cannot bring myself to say that the nationalism of oppressed ethnic groups is righteous. For example, counter-institutional and unorganised heroic terrorism in independence movements has been made the target of feminist criticism due to the structure of sexual discrimination inherent within them. Likewise, Mahatma Gandhi, whose non-violent, civil disobedience movement has generally been regarded as a model among national-liberation movements, has emerged as a target of criticism in postcolonial analysis for his sexual discrimination in cleverly deploying femininity as a resource (Basu, 1993). Within nationalism we create an u s u s usu s and a them by identifying ourselves with an ethnic group, but this collective identification awaits us as trap in both the nationalisms of the oppressor and the oppressed. If a concept of the people - the same can be said for culture and tradition - includes the oppression of women and other minorities, than I cannot accept it. This is not a matter of which movement gets priority in terms of the tactics of activists. If this were the issue, have we not already
我无法说被压迫民族的民族主义是正义的。例如,独立运动中反体制且无组织的英雄式恐怖主义,因其内在的性别歧视结构而成为女权主义批评的对象。同样,甘地的非暴力公民抗命运动通常被视为民族解放运动的典范,但在后殖民分析中,他因巧妙地将女性气质作为资源加以利用而被批评存在性别歧视(Basu,1993)。在民族主义中,我们通过认同某一民族来划分“我们”和“他们”,但这种集体认同在压迫者和被压迫者的民族主义中都成为陷阱。如果“人民”的概念——文化和传统亦是如此——包含了对女性和其他少数群体的压迫,那么我无法接受它。这并非是关于哪一运动在行动策略上优先的问题。如果是这样的话,我们难道还没有……

been thoroughly exploited by the logic of the socialist women’s liberation movement where the liberation of the working classes was given priority over women’s liberation? If in reply to this it is countered that this is because class was subsumed by the nation and the ethnic group, then I would like to know what difference this makes? 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
是否被社会主义妇女解放运动的逻辑彻底利用了,在那里工人阶级的解放被置于妇女解放之上?如果对此的回应是因为阶级被国家和民族所取代,那么我想知道这有什么区别? 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
Now I would like to turn again to the comfort women issue. Kim-Gibson visited Nanumu House and experienced a strong emotional identification as a Korean-American with the harmony (grandma) women there. According to Kim-Gibson, it is not possible to make an objective and neutral documentary, and by extension neither is it possible to have an objective and neutral history. Indeed she sat on a panel at a history conference not as a bona fide historian, but because she wanted to declare that she intended to stop using a historical type narrative in her work. During her panel speech, Kim-Gibson spoke with emotion about how she got angry and cried along with the harmony women. Kim-Gibson remarked that it was as though it was a violence inflicted on her own flesh. Nevertheless, the we she constructed in this speech was as a Korean and rooted in a privileging of ethnicity. A Korean-American is American and not Korean. Despite this, it was as a Korean that she identified with the harmony women. Faced with Kim-Gibson’s narrative, how am I to respond as a Japanese woman belonging to the perpetrator nation? Am I forbidden from speaking the words, I was angry, I cried? What about the case of a woman who is neither Korean nor Japanese, let us say an American woman, what happens then? In any event, surely the reason that the comfort women issue has resonated so widely internationally is that, transcending nationality, large numbers of women have shared the pain as if the violence had been inflicted on their own flesh. The issue here is how this collective identity we has been constructed.
现在我想再次谈谈慰安妇问题。金-吉布森访问了南无屋,并作为一名韩裔美国人与那里的和解(奶奶)妇女产生了强烈的情感认同。金-吉布森认为,不可能制作出客观中立的纪录片,进而也不可能拥有客观中立的历史。事实上,她曾作为一个非正式的历史学家参加过一个历史会议的小组讨论,因为她想宣告自己打算停止在作品中使用历史类型的叙述。在小组发言中,金-吉布森情绪激动地讲述了她如何与和解妇女一同愤怒和哭泣。金-吉布森说,这仿佛是对她自身肉体施加的暴力。然而,她在这次发言中构建的“我们”是作为韩国人,并根植于对族裔的优先考虑。韩裔美国人是美国人,而非韩国人。尽管如此,她还是以韩国人的身份认同了和解妇女。面对金-吉布森的叙述,作为属于加害者国家的日本女性,我该如何回应?我是否被禁止说出“我很愤怒,我哭了”这句话? 那么,如果是既非韩国人也非日本人的女性,比如说一位美国女性,会发生什么呢?无论如何,慰安妇问题之所以在国际上引起如此广泛的共鸣,肯定是因为超越了国籍,许多女性都分享了那种仿佛暴力发生在自己身上的痛苦。这里的问题在于,这种集体身份“我们”是如何被构建起来的。
In December 1996 at the Department of Education, the University of Tokyo (where Fujioka Nobukatsu is affiliated), an event was organised largely by the students to hear the testimony of the former comfort women. A report of the meeting was put together in a pamphlet entitled Nanumu no Ie kara Wakamono tachi e - Kankoku moto ‘ianfu’ no ima (From Nanumu House to young people: former Korean comfort women today). Within this, the following sentiments were expressed by a woman in her twenties:
1996 年 12 月,在东京大学教育学部(藤冈信胜所属单位)举办了一场主要由学生组织的活动,聆听前慰安妇的证词。会议报告被整理成一本小册子,题为《从 Nanumu 之家到年轻人——韩国前“慰安妇”的现状》。其中,一位二十多岁的女性表达了以下感想:
Until now I personally had run away from the issues, clinging to Professor Ueno Chizuko’s words ‘you must not confuse the individual and the state; the individual and the Japanese government’. Professor Ueno said that ‘it is a frightening nationalism when the Japanese government suddenly starts apologising over the comfort women and its young people take on the government’s burden and weep and start apologising, too’. In other words, this means that we must admit and be aware of what the Japanese government did, but take care not to confuse the individual and the state…On the basis of this, I thought ‘yeah, that is right, there is no point taking on a grovelling stance’…and that was the end of it. I did not want to get involved. In fact, that was just running away, wasn’t it? I have become keenly aware that it is necessary to study history and start acting on your own.
直到现在,我个人一直逃避这些问题,紧抓着上野千鹤子的那句话:“你不能混淆个人和国家;个人和日本政府。”上野教授说,“当日本政府突然开始为慰安妇道歉,而年轻人承担起政府的责任,哭泣并开始道歉时,那是一种可怕的民族主义。”换句话说,这意味着我们必须承认并意识到日本政府所做的事情,但要注意不要混淆个人和国家……基于此,我想“是啊,没错,采取卑躬屈膝的态度没有意义”……事情就这样结束了。我不想参与其中。事实上,那不过是逃避,不是吗?我深刻意识到有必要学习历史并开始自主行动。
Encountering this kind of sentiment, it is possible that some people may think that my argument that individuals should not identify themselves with the state can be taken as proof that the citizens of an aggressor nation can be exonerated of any responsibility.
遇到这种情绪,有些人可能会认为我主张个人不应与国家认同的论点,可以被视为侵略国公民可以免除任何责任的证明。
Let me explain the instance the woman in her twenties refers to in the above statement. A group of young people went on a visit to Korea and as part of their schedule, an event was arranged for them to listen to the stories of men who had been forcibly recruited and women who had been made to become comfort women during the war. I saw the event broadcast on television, but at the venue a sturdily built young man stood up and suddenly started weeping saying ‘I didn’t know such things happened. Please forgive us’. This ‘moving episode’ surrounding this young person’s naïve reaction, which undoubtedly came from innocent intentions, instilled in me a terror that in his naivety this young man could so easily identify himself with the state. We need to find a way, other than identification with the state, to express the pain that this young man no doubt felt.
让我解释一下这位二十多岁女性在上述陈述中提到的那个例子。一群年轻人去韩国参观,作为行程的一部分,安排了一个活动,让他们听那些在战争期间被强行征召的男性和被迫成为慰安妇的女性讲述她们的故事。我在电视上看到了这个活动的转播,但在现场,一位体格健壮的年轻男子站起来,突然开始哭泣,说:“我不知道发生过这样的事情。请原谅我们。”围绕这位年轻人天真反应的“感人插曲”,无疑出于纯真的意图,却让我感到恐惧,因为他天真地如此轻易地将自己与国家认同。我们需要找到一种方式,除了与国家认同之外,来表达这位年轻人无疑感受到的痛苦。
I would like to introduce one more episode. When a social studies teacher at a high school raised the comfort women issue in a class discussion he turned to a girl student, a Korean permanent resident in Japan (zainichi Kankokujin), and demanded of the rest of the class, ‘all of you, apologise to her.’ The Korean student herself reported that this was a bewildering experience. Her matter-of-fact reaction was, ‘I don’t think that was a proper thing to do’. Undoubtedly this was a ‘conscientious teacher’. This demonstrates the trap of the individual identifying with the nation-state, for both right and left.
我想再介绍一个插曲。当一位高中社会科老师在课堂讨论中提出慰安妇问题时,他转向一名女学生——一位在日本的韩国永久居民(在日韩国人),并对全班同学说:“你们所有人,都要向她道歉。”这位韩国学生自己报告说,这是一次令人困惑的经历。她理所当然的反应是:“我觉得那样做不合适。”毫无疑问,这是一位“有良知的老师”。这显示了个体认同民族国家的陷阱,无论是右翼还是左翼。

Can Feminism Transcend Nationalism?
女性主义能超越民族主义吗?

In the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (hereafter, Beijing Conference) Kim Pu-ja, a Korean resident in Japan, and myself organised a workshop on the comfort women issue. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} Starting out with reservations that the comfort women issue might be used as a bargaining tool over the national interests of both Korea and Japan, I stated that both Korean and Japanese feminism must transcend national boundaries, incurring as a result the most ferocious rebuttal. I will cite from Kim’s writing:
在 1995 年于北京举行的第四届世界妇女大会(以下简称北京大会)上,居住在日本的韩国人金富子和我共同组织了一个关于慰安妇问题的研讨会。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 起初我对慰安妇问题可能被用作韩日两国国家利益谈判的筹码持保留态度,我声明韩国和日本的女性主义必须超越国界,因此遭到了最激烈的反驳。我将引用金富子的著作:
Concerning the question of whether feminism can transcend nationalism [spoken about in Ueno’s speech]…a Korean-American offered the following counter-argument. 'My country’s borders were invaded by soldiers from your country. You should not be so quick to say that we should forget national borders. Stating that feminism has nothing to do with nationalism is surely no different from the ethnocentric thinking of Western feminism…Nationalism is a an extremely important issue for feminism in Asia (Kim P 1996:285).
关于女性主义是否能够超越民族主义的问题[在上野的演讲中提到]……一位韩裔美国人提出了以下反驳观点。“我的国家边界曾被你们国家的士兵入侵。你们不应该那么轻易地说我们应该忘记国界。声称女性主义与民族主义无关,无疑与西方女性主义的以自我为中心的思维没有区别……民族主义对于亚洲的女性主义来说是一个极其重要的问题”(Kim P 1996:285)。
Kim’s argument here is that a Japanese feminist demanding that feminism transcend the state from women, including those from countries invaded by Japan, may end up nullifying aggression of Japan and the Japanese people. As I argued in Part One of this book, Japanese feminism does not have a history of transcending the state, but is this the same as saying that as a logical consequence feminism cannot transcend the state? This is precisely the question I have raised and pursued in this book. The argument I have developed in this book concerns the trap of nationalisation even when trying to mobilise ‘second-class’ and ‘third-class’ citizens, and the difficulty of escaping this trap. However, just as with the case of gender, the fact that escaping the trap of nationalisation is difficult is not the same as saying that it is fate.
金的论点是,日本女权主义者要求女权主义超越国家,包括那些来自被日本侵略国家的女性,最终可能会使日本及日本人民的侵略行为无效。正如我在本书第一部分所论述的,日本女权主义并没有超越国家的历史,但这是否等同于说,作为逻辑结果,女权主义无法超越国家?这正是我在本书中提出并探讨的问题。我在本书中展开的论点涉及即使试图动员“二等”和“三等”公民,也会陷入国家化的陷阱,以及逃脱这一陷阱的困难。然而,就像性别问题一样,逃脱国家化陷阱的困难并不等同于这是命中注定的。
If feminism is a product of the modern era, then it will not be able to transcend the range of the modern and, as a consequence, has to throw its fate in with it. In the language of nation-state theory, feminism was moulded within the framework of the nation-state, and at most this amounts to little more than an idea demanding a gender-indifferent ‘distribution justice’ within the nation-state (one-state feminism). In the tone of this retrospective debate about modern feminism, feminism itself is reduced to nothing more than bourgeois liberal feminism in civil society and with the historical limits of this being made clear, it has the appearance of something akin to wara ningyō tataki (attacking a straw or caricaturalised figure of the enemy). However, what I have attempted to demonstrate in this book is the paradox of modern feminism, namely that feminism is a contradiction created by modernity itself and inevitably, as a result, the only way it can survive is by breaking through modernity itself.
如果女权主义是现代时代的产物,那么它就无法超越现代的范围,因此不得不与现代命运相连。用民族国家理论的话来说,女权主义是在民族国家框架内形成的,充其量不过是要求在民族国家内实现性别无差别“分配正义”的一种思想(一国女权主义)。在关于现代女权主义的回顾性辩论中,女权主义本身被简化为资产阶级自由主义女权主义,局限于市民社会,其历史界限被明确指出,因而看起来像是在攻击稻草人或敌人的漫画化形象。然而,我在本书中试图展示的是现代女权主义的悖论,即女权主义是现代性本身创造的矛盾,因此,女权主义唯一能够生存的方式,必然是突破现代性本身。
If based on feminism’s history of not being able to transcend the state we pass judgement that it cannot transcend the state, we once again end up being divided by our various nationalities. While it is no longer possible for anybody to erect the kind of optimistic universalism of Sisterhood is Global (Morgan, 1984), the reason for bringing the gender category to history is surely not to use this as a basis to conceal differences of class, race, ethnicity and nationality, but to add one more difference; a difference, moreover, that has been naturalized to such an extent that it is not even recognised as a difference, in other words, it is the ultimate and definitive difference. It is said that under post-modern feminism such categories as class and race have been added to that of gender, but if anything feminism should lay the charge that the categories of class and race have until now concealed the gender category. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} It is not that the categories of class and race have been newly discovered, but that the gender category was the trigger for them to be rediscovered as multiple categories.
如果基于女性主义历史上未能超越国家的事实,我们断定它无法超越国家,那么我们又一次陷入了各自国籍的分裂之中。虽然如今已不可能再有人树立《姐妹情谊是全球性的》(Morgan,1984)那样的乐观普遍主义,但将性别范畴引入历史的理由,绝不是为了以此为基础掩盖阶级、种族、民族和国籍的差异,而是为了增加一种差异;而且这种差异已被自然化到甚至不被视为差异,换句话说,它是最终且决定性的差异。据说在后现代女性主义中,阶级和种族等范畴被加入了性别范畴,但如果说有什么话,女性主义应当指责的是,阶级和种族范畴直到现在都掩盖了性别范畴。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 并非阶级和种族范畴是新近被发现的,而是性别范畴成为了它们被重新发现为多重范畴的触发点。
The objective of feminism is not to replace one exclusive category with another. The objective is not to construct an essentialist community called women. Just as I cannot be reduced to the category ‘woman’, do not reduce me to the category ‘national subject’. The intention is to relativise these categories.
女权主义的目标不是用一个排他性的类别取代另一个。目标也不是构建一个被称为“女性”的本质主义共同体。正如我不能被简化为“女性”这一类别,也不要将我简化为“民族主体”这一类别。意图是使这些类别相对化。
Terms such as global citizen, the individual and human being invoked to transcend the exclusivity of group identities such as national subject are abstract and universalistic principles. Yet, a concept of the cosmopolitan, universal global citizen who transcends all nationalities is itself fraught with dangerous attractions. It carries with it the illusion of individuals freed from all burdens and constraints, encouraging people to act as though any historical debt did not exist. The I I II is neither national subject nor mere cosmopolitan. What constitutes the I I II is the aggregate of a variety of relationships such as gender, nationality, occupation, social status, race, culture, ethnicity and sexuality. This I cannot escape from any one of these, but neither can it be reduced to any one of them. This I I II denies the privileging or essentialising of unitary categories. For this unique I I II - who is definitely not an individual who can be reduced to universalities something that is absolutely impossible to accept is the logic of representation which equals being spoken for by proxy.
诸如全球公民、个体和人类等术语被用来超越诸如国家主体等群体身份的排他性,这些都是抽象且普遍主义的原则。然而,超越所有国籍的世界主义、普遍的全球公民这一概念本身却充满了危险的诱惑。它带有一种错觉,认为个体摆脱了所有负担和限制,鼓励人们表现得仿佛不存在任何历史债务。 I I II 既不是国家主体,也不仅仅是单纯的世界主义者。构成 I I II 的是性别、国籍、职业、社会地位、种族、文化、族裔和性取向等多种关系的总和。我无法逃避其中任何一种,但也不能将其简化为其中任何一种。这个 I I II 否认了对单一类别的特权化或本质化。对于这个独特的 I I II ——绝对不是可以被简化为普遍性的个体——这是绝对无法接受的,是代表逻辑,即被代理发声的逻辑。
In the way that feminism attempts to transcend boundaries undoubtedly, as Kim Pu-ja fears, we may see the imposition of universalism in the form of imperialist feminism. While this merits due caution, it is also true that feminism cannot remain within national borders. Feminism should cross national borders, and indeed it needs to do so.
正如金富子所担忧的那样,女权主义试图超越界限的方式无疑可能表现为帝国主义女权主义形式的普遍主义强加。虽然这值得我们保持警惕,但女权主义也确实无法局限于国家边界之内。女权主义应当跨越国界,实际上它必须这样做。
The logic of individual claims within the comfort women lawsuits has significance for this transcending of boarders. Standing up to the government’s line that the matter of post-war compensation was settled with the bilateral treaty, the fact of taking on the state as an individual and questioning its responsibility is significant as it announces that m y m y mym y interests are not represented by the state, m y m y mym y body does not belong to and my rights do not reside with the state. The fight of the former comfort women - the idea that I I II want my dignity restored - has the character of not only a stand against the Japanese state, but a rejection of the Korean state’s approach where representation of m y m y mym y human rights equals being spoken for by proxy.
慰安妇诉讼中个体诉求的逻辑对于这种跨越边界具有重要意义。面对政府声称战后赔偿问题已通过双边条约解决的立场,作为个体挑战国家并质疑其责任的事实具有重要意义,因为这表明 m y m y mym y 的利益未被国家代表, m y m y mym y 的身体不属于国家,我的权利也不依附于国家。前慰安妇的斗争——即 I I II 希望恢复我的尊严——不仅是对日本国家的抗争,也是否定韩国国家将 m y m y mym y 人权代表权等同于代理发声的做法。
What if it is the intention of the state to violate me? Then I I II have the right and qualifications to reject this. What if the state intends to violate you? Then I I II have the right and qualifications to reject this. My responsibility is derived from this standing up to and relativisation of the state. This is different from accepting responsibility as a national subject.
如果国家的意图是侵犯我呢?那么 I I II 有权利和资格拒绝这种侵犯。如果国家的意图是侵犯你呢?那么 I I II 有权利和资格拒绝这种侵犯。我的责任正是源于这种对国家的抗争和对国家的相对化。这不同于作为国家主体接受责任。
My body does not belong to the state and neither do my rights reside with the state. So women (and men) can speak out. If the comfort women issue can be constructed discursively as a human rights violation, then it is also possible to argue that being made to become a murderer for the state as a soldier is a human rights violation for men. Is this within the scope of human rights theory? The question that the comfort women issue has thrust upon us is not simply that of war crimes. War itself is the crime.
我的身体不属于国家,我的权利也不属于国家。因此,女性(和男性)可以发声。如果慰安妇问题可以被话语构建为一种人权侵犯,那么同样可以论证,被迫作为士兵为国家成为杀人犯对男性来说也是一种人权侵犯。这是否属于人权理论的范畴?慰安妇问题抛给我们的不只是战争罪的问题。战争本身就是罪。
Ideas that transcend the nation-state lead us by logical necessity to this conclusion. The position of women, in indicating the logical paradox of a female citizen, exposes the cracks in the nation-state. Yet, does that mean we need to accept the essentialist premise that woman equals pacifist. The arrival point for a gender history that has deconstructed an engendering of the nation-state is this denaturalization and de-essentialization of the category nation-state as well as that of women.
超越民族国家的思想逻辑上必然引导我们得出这个结论。女性的地位,通过揭示女性公民的逻辑悖论,暴露了民族国家的裂痕。然而,这是否意味着我们必须接受女性等同于和平主义者的本质主义前提?对性别史的终点,是对民族国家这一范畴以及女性这一范畴的去自然化和去本质化,这一性别史已经解构了民族国家的性别化。

Part IV  第四部分

Hiroshima from a Feminist Perspective: Between War Crimes and the Crime of War
从女性主义视角看广岛:介于战争罪行与战争之罪之间

Feminism, Peace Studies and Military Studies
女性主义、和平研究与军事研究

Until recently, peace studies had no relationship with feminism, and feminism only a remote relationship with peace studies. Now the flip side of peace studies is military research/military studies, and the same can be said about the relationship (or apparent lack of it) between feminism and military studies. Given this background, the theme I have been handed for today’s talk, Hiroshima from a feminist perspective, 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} is an incredibly difficult and challenging one as the Hiroshima experience has seldom been gendered.
直到最近,和平研究与女权主义之间几乎没有关系,而女权主义与和平研究的关系也非常疏远。现在,和平研究的另一面是军事研究/军事学,同样可以说女权主义与军事研究之间的关系(或表面上的缺乏关系)也是如此。鉴于这一背景,我今天演讲的主题——从女权主义视角看广岛——是一个极其困难且具有挑战性的课题,因为广岛的经历很少被赋予性别视角。
I took up this challenge mainly because this was a task handed to me by Kanō Mikiyo, 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} an independent scholar of women’s history, who herself is a survivor of the atomic bombing. It was Kanō who came up with the phrase ‘history of the home front’ 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} at a time when no such term existed and women’s history was centred on the victim school of history. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} She has spent the last 30 years digging away at the issue of women’s war responsibility and has organized grass roots study groups to explore women’s history. She has recognised the complex multiplicity of women’s responses to the military regime, not only as victims. She was a real pioneer in this field, founding the history of women on the ‘home front’, the domain where women were mobilized during the Asia-Pacific War, long before the feminist approach restored women’s agency to history. Ever since I first met Kanō when I was in my 20s, I have continued to respect Kanō Mikiyo’s work over the past 30 years. When Kanō throws a ball at me, I have no choice but to catch it, whatever direction it goes.
我接受这个挑战,主要是因为这是加纳美纪代交给我的任务。加纳美纪代是一位独立的女性历史学者,她本人也是原子弹爆炸的幸存者。正是加纳提出了“后方史”的说法,那时还没有这样的术语,女性历史主要集中在受害者史学派。她过去 30 年一直致力于挖掘女性的战争责任问题,并组织基层学习小组探讨女性历史。她认识到女性对军事政权的反应是复杂多样的,不仅仅是作为受害者。她是这一领域的真正先驱,创立了“后方”女性史,即在亚太战争期间女性被动员的领域,远在女性主义方法恢复女性历史主体性之前。自从我二十多岁时第一次见到加纳以来,过去 30 年我一直尊重加纳美纪代的工作。每当加纳向我抛球时,无论球飞向何方,我都只能接住。
How am I to respond to this difficult task today; a task few feminists have approached before? In this final Part, I would like to try to construct a
我今天该如何应对这个艰难的任务;这是一个很少有女权主义者曾经涉足的问题?在最后这一部分,我想尝试构建一个

theoretical framework for looking at this issue from the perspectives of feminist theory and gender studies. By so doing I would like to take arguments outlined in Nationalism and Gender a step further.
从女权主义理论和性别研究的视角来审视这一问题的理论框架。通过这样做,我希望将《民族主义与性别》中提出的论点更进一步。

Hiroshima as a Symbol
广岛作为象征

The construction of post-war Japan as a victim
战后日本作为受害者的建构

What I mean by the phrase Hiroshima as a symbol is of course, Hiroshima as a symbol of war defeat. While to speak about Hiroshima as a symbol may leave some people feeling uncomfortable, especially those who view Hiroshima as a unique experience. But let us ask ourselves, is there anything comparable that serves as a symbol of defeat in Germany? By comparison, the differences between Japan and Germany emerge with a sharp contrast. Without a doubt, the symbol of defeat in Germany is Auschwitz. As a result, post-war Germany’s only departure point was as a perpetrator, whereas Japan, in contrast, was able to take as its departure point Hiroshima as a symbol of its suffering and in so doing construct itself as a victim rather than a perpetrator.
我所说的“广岛作为象征”当然是指广岛作为战争失败的象征。虽然谈论广岛作为象征可能会让一些人感到不适,尤其是那些将广岛视为独特经历的人。但让我们问自己,德国有没有什么可以作为失败象征的东西?相比之下,日本和德国之间的差异显得格外鲜明。毫无疑问,德国的失败象征是奥斯维辛。因此,战后德国唯一的出发点是作为加害者,而日本则相反,能够以广岛作为其受难的象征为出发点,从而将自己构建为受害者而非加害者。

Ichioku sōzange (the collective repentance of one hundred million people): a system with no accountability
一亿总罪过(亿万人集体忏悔):一个没有责任归属的体系

Behind this self-construction of the Japanese nation as a victim is an unaccountable system symbolised by the phrase ichioku sōzange 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} (the collective repentance of 100 million people, or the entire population of the time). Of course, when speaking of war responsibility, there is no reason to treat as the same the war responsibility of the Emperor and that of the common people; the war responsibility of A , B A , B A,B\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B} and C class war criminals and the lowest ranked soldiers; or the war responsibility of women, who were denied the right to vote before the war, and that of men. For citizens, suffrage is ‘the right of rights’, in other words, the right to rights. In short, it is the right to determine one’s own fate. Taking this to the extreme, it could
在将日本民族自我构建为受害者的背后,是一个无法追责的体系,这一体系以“一亿总罪过”(ichioku sōzange,意为一亿人的集体忏悔,或当时的全部人口)这一短语为象征。当然,在谈论战争责任时,没有理由将天皇的战争责任与普通民众的战争责任相提并论;将甲级战犯与丙级战犯及最低级士兵的战争责任相混淆;或将战前被剥夺投票权的女性的战争责任与男性的战争责任等同起来。对于公民来说,选举权是“权利中的权利”,换句话说,是获得权利的权利。简而言之,它是决定自己命运的权利。将这一点推向极端,可能会...

be argued that women, having not enjoyed this right, bear no responsibility for the war. While this may be the case, post-war Japan took as its departure point ‘the collective repentance of 100 million people’. The fact that everybody has to repent can also mean that nobody has to take responsibility. In a manner of speaking, we can say that, starting with the Emperor, all the people were exonerated of any war responsibility and that the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal gave the rubber stamp to this approach. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
可以说,女性由于没有享有这一权利,因此不承担战争责任。虽然情况可能如此,但战后日本以“亿万人民的集体忏悔”为出发点。人人都必须忏悔这一事实,也可能意味着无人需要承担责任。从某种意义上说,可以说从天皇开始,所有人都被免除了战争责任,而东京战争罪行法庭为这一做法盖了章。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}

The shock of a 'new type of bomb'
“新型炸弹”的震惊

It is historically absurd to insist that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima stopped the war. In the final stages of the war, both the Emperor and the military authorities were fully aware of the fact that a new type of bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima with its disastrous effect. As to the shock that this new type of bomb gave to the Imperial Headquarters, one thing is clear, neither the Emperor nor the Imperial Headquarters made the decision to end the war based on it. Even after another bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, no decision was made to end the war. As historical fact, it is clear that the Emperor and the Imperial Headquarters only accepted unconditional surrender after the Soviet Union entered the war. Therefore, historically speaking it is a mistake to say that the Emperor made the decision to end the war due to this new type of bomb.
坚持认为广岛原子弹轰炸结束了战争是历史上的荒谬。在战争的最后阶段,天皇和军事当局都完全清楚一种新型炸弹已在广岛投下并造成了灾难性的后果。至于这种新型炸弹给帝国总部带来的震惊,有一点是明确的:无论是天皇还是帝国总部,都没有基于此做出结束战争的决定。即使在长崎又投下一颗炸弹后,也没有做出结束战争的决定。作为历史事实,很明显天皇和帝国总部是在苏联参战后才接受无条件投降的。因此,从历史角度来看,说天皇因这种新型炸弹而决定结束战争是错误的。

Justification for the aerial bombing
空中轰炸的正当性

While the cruelty of this ‘new type of bomb’, in other words the A-Bomb, is frequently spoken of, one might ask what about the aerial bombardment of Tokyo? Tokyo residents may feel that it is all very well talking about Hiroshima all the time, but what about the victims of the Tokyo air raids? In terms of civilian casualties, the Okinawa ground battle 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} resulted in a total of 200,000 victims including soldiers. There were initially 100,000 casualties as a result of the bomb being dropped on Hiroshima plus another 100,000 that emerged later, making a total of over 200,000. It is said that the Tokyo air raids produced over 100,000 casualties, thus somewhat more than the 100,000 initial victims of the bomb being dropped on Hiroshima. Carpet-
虽然人们经常谈论这种“新型炸弹”,换句话说,即原子弹的残酷性,但有人可能会问,东京的空袭又如何呢?东京的居民可能会觉得,总是谈论广岛固然重要,但东京空袭的受害者又该怎么办?就平民伤亡而言,冲绳地面战役 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 共造成包括士兵在内的 20 万人伤亡。广岛投弹初期造成 10 万人伤亡,后来又增加了 10 万人,总计超过 20 万人。据说东京空袭造成了超过 10 万的伤亡,略多于广岛投弹初期的 10 万受害者。地毯式——

bombing, unlike the so-called pinpoint bombing employed in the Gulf War 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}, does more than simply destroy military installations. It is undeniably a direct attack on civilians aimed at destroying the lifelines and livelihood of citizens. In emphasising the casualties of this new-type bomb, there has been a tendency to overlook the barbarity of non-nuclear aerial attacks. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
轰炸,不同于海湾战争中所谓的精确轰炸,不仅仅是摧毁军事设施。它无疑是对平民的直接攻击,旨在摧毁公民的生命线和生计。在强调这种新型炸弹造成的伤亡时,人们往往忽视了非核空袭的野蛮性。
I might add here that political dynamics are at work in these figures of 100,000 or 200,000 casualties. For example, the writer Iris Chang (1997) claims that there were 300,000 casualties in the ‘Rape of Nanking’ 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} (the Nanking massacre). Iris Chang has good reason for standing by this figure as it surpasses the figure of 200,000 for Hiroshima. Thus, the Nanking Massacre emerges here is a tragedy that surpasses Hiroshima. This competition over suffering can be called a ‘pyramid of victimhood’, and Iris Chang’s intent here is to knock Hiroshima from the top of the apex.
我想补充一点,这些十万或二十万伤亡数字背后存在政治动态。例如,作家张纯如(1997 年)声称“南京大屠杀”中有 30 万人伤亡。张纯如坚持这一数字是有充分理由的,因为它超过了广岛的 20 万人伤亡数字。因此,南京大屠杀在这里被呈现为一场超过广岛的悲剧。这种对苦难的竞争可以称为“受害者金字塔”,张纯如的意图是将广岛从金字塔顶端击落。
Attacking non-combatants was a war crime under international law even at that time. While it is said by opposition voices that an atomic bomb cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, can it really be said that an attack aimed at non-combatants is unjust? The problem we encounter here is that modern wars are total wars accompanied by a total mobilisation regime. Civilians are responsible for cooperating with the execution of war, the largest undertaking of a nation-state. As a result, there is every reason to attack non-combatants during periods of total war.
即使在当时,攻击非战斗人员也是国际法下的战争罪。虽然反对声音认为原子弹无法区分战斗人员和非战斗人员,但真的可以说针对非战斗人员的攻击是不公正的吗?我们在这里遇到的问题是,现代战争是伴随着全面动员体制的全面战争。平民有责任配合执行战争,这是民族国家最大的事业。因此,在全面战争期间攻击非战斗人员是有充分理由的。

Hiroshima as seen from an American Perspective
从美国视角看广岛

With Hiroshima being the post-war point of departure for Japan, it is all too evident that even 50 years after the war there is a huge chasm that cannot be bridged between Japan’s perspective of Hiroshima as a symbol of its victimhood and the way in which Hiroshima is perceived in the United States. Nothing demonstrates this more than the Smithsonian dispute of the mid-1990s. There was a major controversy over plans by the Smithsonian Museum group to display the Enola Gay, the warplane that dropped the nuclear bomb, in its Air and Space Museum. In the end, the liberal side [which wanted to see artefacts from aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima put on display, and thus show something of the human suffering] was defeated.
作为战后日本的出发点,广岛的形象在日本作为受害象征的视角与美国对广岛的看法之间,至今仍存在着难以逾越的巨大鸿沟,哪怕战争已经过去了 50 年。没有什么比 1990 年代中期史密森争议更能说明这一点。史密森博物馆集团计划在其航空航天博物馆展出投下核弹的战机“恩诺拉·盖伊号”,引发了重大争议。最终,主张展示广岛爆炸后遗物以展现人类苦难的自由派一方败北。
It is said that Truman’s ‘decision’ 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the end of the war, and that by dropping the bombs a ground war was avoided, which helped to reduce the number of American casualties. Nevertheless, this so-called decision is not fact but a myth fabricated after the event to legitimise dropping the bombs. As already stated above, it was not the dropping of the two atomic bombs that led to the Japanese military authorities and the Emperor accepting defeat, but the Soviet Union’s entry into the war. Furthermore, it is said that the reason that two bombs were dropped rather than just one (which would have been enough to fulfil any intention towards experimentation), was that Truman had within his sight a post-war strategy aimed at the Soviet Union.
据说杜鲁门“决定”投下原子弹轰炸广岛和长崎,加速了战争的结束,通过投下原子弹避免了地面战争,从而减少了美军的伤亡。然而,这个所谓的决定并非事实,而是事后为了合法化投弹行为而编造的神话。如上所述,促使日本军方和天皇接受失败的并非两颗原子弹的投下,而是苏联参战。此外,据说投下两颗原子弹而非一颗(本来一颗就足以满足任何实验意图)的原因,是因为杜鲁门心中有针对苏联的战后战略。

The Smithsonian controversy
史密森争议

I personally visited the Enola Gay exhibition in the American Air and Space Museum. A 14 -minute spooled videotape of an interview with the captain of the Enola Gay was playing on a huge screen. I listened to this very carefully. The captain was saying that:
我亲自参观了美国航空航天博物馆的“埃诺拉·盖伊”展览。一个 14 分钟的录像带采访了“埃诺拉·盖伊”机长,播放在一个巨大的屏幕上。我非常仔细地听着。机长说:
We dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Even then Japan did not accept unconditional surrender. As a result, we had no choice but to drop another bomb on Nagasaki. Even after this, Japan did not accept unconditional surrender. We feel that dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the right thing to do.
我们在广岛投下了一颗原子弹。即便如此,日本仍未接受无条件投降。结果,我们不得不在长崎投下另一颗炸弹。即使在这之后,日本仍未接受无条件投降。我们认为投下广岛和长崎的原子弹是正确的做法。
After the captain says this, a picture of the 14 crew appears on the screen. The narration that accompanies this is, ‘Look, they are patriots’. Young American men and women and other tourists watched this intently. For me, it was truly a sickening experience.
船长说完这句话后,屏幕上出现了 14 名机组人员的照片。伴随的旁白是:“看,他们是爱国者。”年轻的美国男女和其他游客都专注地观看着。对我来说,这真是一种令人作呕的经历。
The initial scenario for the Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian - a scenario that was fiercely opposed by the American Veterans’ Association and quashed, one that even brought about the resignation of the curator included a plan to borrow and display relics from the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. It was this plan that got shot down. At the time, when I heard that America was going to borrow relics from Hiroshima for the Enola Gay exhibition my first reaction was ‘what arrogance!’ and I felt extremely angry. I argued that not a single item should be moved from Hiroshima to the U.S. Around the same time, Ōe Kenzaburō 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} argued in favour of these relics being lent out. Looking back on this from where I am today, I realise that I was being completely narrow-minded. It was my visit to the Smithsonian that led to this change in my thinking.
史密森学会“恩诺拉·盖伊”展览的最初方案——一个被美国退伍军人协会强烈反对并被叫停的方案,甚至导致策展人辞职——包括借用并展示广岛和平纪念博物馆的遗物。正是这个方案被否决了。当时,我听说美国要借用广岛的遗物来做“恩诺拉·盖伊”展览时,我的第一反应是“真是傲慢!”我感到非常愤怒。我主张广岛的任何物品都不应该被运往美国。大约在同一时间,大江健三郎 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 则支持借出这些遗物。回顾现在的立场,我意识到当时自己非常狭隘。正是我访问史密森学会的经历促使了我思想的转变。
What appeared on the screen at the Smithsonian were images viewed from the same angle as the pinpoint bombing that took place during the Gulf War. Hiroshima seen from above, the mushroom cloud seen from afar, but with almost no information covering the experiences of people who had been living down below or the devastation that occurred. In other words, the perspective was extremely one-sided. My own thinking changed and I realised that for people to understand what happened below that mushroom cloud it was necessary to display the personal effects of the bomb victims. Fortunately the current Hiroshima City mayor, Akiba Tadatoshi, 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} is an advocate of friendly relations between Japan and the U.S. So, if in return for the Dogwood trees given by America, he made a gift of some personal
史密森学会屏幕上出现的影像,是从海湾战争期间精确轰炸的同一角度拍摄的。广岛从上方俯视,蘑菇云从远处望去,但几乎没有任何信息涉及生活在下面的人们的经历或发生的毁灭。换句话说,视角极其片面。我的想法发生了变化,我意识到为了让人们理解蘑菇云下发生的事情,有必要展示原子弹受害者的个人物品。幸运的是,现任广岛市长秋叶忠俊 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 是日本与美国友好关系的倡导者。因此,如果作为对美国赠送的山茱萸树的回礼,他赠送了一些个人物品

effects of the survivors, even in replica, and had the Smithsonian create a special display room, then I think this would have an extremely positive effect on the two countries relations.
即使是复制品,对幸存者的影响也会存在,并且让史密森学会创建一个特别的展示室,我认为这将对两国关系产生极其积极的影响。

Just wars and unjust wars
正义战争与非正义战争

This one-sided perspective of America towards Hiroshima has continued largely unchallenged for over half a century. A rhetoric justifying the dropping of the atomic bombs is predominant even today. Behind it is the belief that it was a war to defend freedom and democracy against fascism, and that it was a ‘just war’. Even now, few Americans question the use of military force if it is in the name of justice. They believe that there are two types of wars, just wars and unjust wars.
美国对广岛的这种片面看法在半个多世纪以来基本未受到挑战。至今,支持投掷原子弹的论调依然占主导地位。其背后是这样一种信念:这场战争是为了捍卫自由和民主,抵抗法西斯主义,是一场“正义战争”。即使在现在,很少有美国人质疑以正义名义使用军事力量的行为。他们认为战争分为两种:正义战争和非正义战争。
This begs the question, what exactly is a just war and how does it differ from an unjust war? With the subjugation of the native-American Indians during the era of nation-building made into an exception, there is only one blemish on U.S. history where it waged an unjust war and that was the Vietnam War. Yet, I am unable to suppress the thought, what if America had won the Vietnam War? In other words, there is a correspondence here with outcome, in that a war goes down as a just war in history if it was won, and as an unjust war if it was lost. Testimony of this is not only the complete lack of any reflection by the Americans on their unilateral invasions of Nicaragua 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} and Grenada 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}, but also the fact that the U.S. did not emerge as a target of United Nations sanctions either. In a similar vein, the Tokyo Trials are widely said to have been a trial of the losers by the winners.
这就引出了一个问题,什么才是真正的正义战争,它与非正义战争有何不同?在国家建设时期对美洲原住民印第安人的征服被视为例外,美国历史上只有一次污点,那就是越南战争,这是一场非正义战争。然而,我无法抑制这样的想法:如果美国赢得了越南战争会怎样?换句话说,这里存在一种与结果相关的对应关系:一场战争如果赢了,就会被历史记为正义战争;如果输了,则被视为非正义战争。对此的证明不仅是美国人对其单方面入侵尼加拉瓜 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 和格林纳达 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 完全缺乏反思,还在于美国并未成为联合国制裁的对象。同样,东京审判也被广泛认为是胜利者对失败者的审判。

The Hague International Court of Justice and the De-Criminalization of Nuclear Weapons
海牙国际法院与核武器的非刑事化

The diplomatic stance of the Japanese government
日本政府的外交立场

America is not entirely to blame for generating this gap between the U.S. and Japan concerning the dropping of the atomic bombs. The post-war Japanese government has supported and reinforced this. You will perhaps remember the response of the Japanese government as recently as the 1990s when an inquiry was held into inhumane weapons at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The delegate sent by the Foreign Ministry testified that ‘it cannot be said that the atomic bomb is an inhumane weapon’. At the same venue, the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave testimonies that were in direct contradiction to that of the Foreign Ministry. Biological and chemical weapons and poisonous gas munitions all come within the category ‘inhumane weapons’. Yet despite the fact that biological and chemical weapons and poisonous gas munitions have been designated inhumane weapons by the International Court of Justice, it is the official position of the Japanese government that nuclear bombs cannot be called an inhumane weapon. It is the citizens of this country, myself included, who have supported this kind of government and it is my feeling that we should all feel ashamed of this. Japanese diplomacy has continually nestled up to the United States and given unwavering support to American attempts to legitimate the dropping of the atomic bombs.
美国并非完全应为美日之间关于投掷原子弹这一分歧负责。战后日本政府对此予以支持并加以强化。你或许还记得,1990 年代日本政府在海牙国际法院就非人道武器进行调查时的回应。日本外务省派出的代表作证称“不能说原子弹是非人道武器”。在同一场合,广岛市长和长崎市长的证词则与外务省的立场直接相悖。生物武器、化学武器和毒气弹均被归类为“非人道武器”。然而,尽管国际法院已将生物武器、化学武器和毒气弹定性为非人道武器,日本政府的官方立场却是核弹不能被称为非人道武器。正是这个国家的公民,包括我自己,支持了这样的政府,我觉得我们所有人都应该为此感到羞愧。 日本外交一直依附于美国,并坚定支持美国为投掷原子弹辩护的努力。

Conspiracy and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
阴谋与《核不扩散条约》(NPT)

Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} came into being under American leadership, it is quite clear that it was a conspiracy of international politics. The NPT does not allow countries other than those superpowers that have already become major nuclear powers to possess nuclear weapons and so obviously protects vested interests. Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been opposition from late-comers with the ambition of becoming the next nuclear powers. Among the superpowers, France in particular has behaved with extreme arrogance. Under President Chirac, France carried out a series of nuclear tests. These were carried out in the Mururoa Atoll, a colony which, as yet, France has refused to give up, and one feels like saying that ‘if you are going to do it, you can at least do it in France!’ In reaction to this, India and Pakistan carried out nuclear testing in succession in a kind of violent outrage, yet the nuclear superpowers are hardly in a position to berate such acts.
尽管《核不扩散条约》(NPT)是在美国领导下诞生的,但很明显这是一场国际政治的阴谋。NPT 不允许除已经成为主要核大国的超级大国外的国家拥有核武器,因此显然是在保护既得利益。因此,来自那些有志成为下一个核大国的后来者的反对也就不足为奇了。在超级大国中,尤其是法国表现得极为傲慢。在希拉克总统执政期间,法国进行了一系列核试验。这些试验是在穆鲁罗阿环礁进行的,该地是法国尚未放弃的殖民地,让人不禁想说“既然要做,至少也应该在法国本土做吧!”对此,印度和巴基斯坦接连进行了核试验,作为一种激烈的愤怒反应,但核超级大国几乎无权谴责这种行为。

The Split in the Peace Movement
和平运动的分裂

International politics during the Cold War
冷战时期的国际政治

In contrast, in Japan the anti-nuclear movement has continued unwavering throughout the post-war years. A moving illustration of this is a housewife in Suginami Ward in Tokyo who started an anti-nuclear petition in the 1950s at the time of the Lucky Dragon the Fifth Incident 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} and collected one million signatures. Although the peace movement has been supported by this kind of grass roots anti-nuclear sentiment, it also has a history 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} of division on the basis of party interests among the leftists under the pressure of Cold War international politics. Recently, after almost forty years since the peace movement against nuclear bomb testing was split, we are at last seeing a shift towards patching up this divide. What has happened here is a small domestic version of what has been happening in international politics; the splintering of reformist groups during the Cold War era and their regrouping in the post-Cold War era. When the Soviet Union and China began conducting nuclear testing under the Cold War regime, peace activists fell into a dispute over ‘good nukes and bad nukes’ between those referred to as the Soviet-Chinese faction and those against them. People from Hiroshima might wonder how there can be good and bad nuclear weapons, nevertheless, it was the grotesque logic that there could be good and bad nukes that brought a political split in the Japanese peace movement. The Japanese peace movement got caught up in the polarised Cold War confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union with the end result being the birth of the logic that, the communist countries have good nukes as they are there to stop the capitalist international strategy.
相比之下,日本的反核运动在战后多年里一直坚定不移地持续着。一个感人的例子是东京杉并区的一位家庭主妇,她在 1950 年代“第五幸运龙号事件”发生时发起了一项反核请愿,收集了 100 万签名。尽管和平运动得到了这种草根反核情绪的支持,但在冷战国际政治压力下,左翼内部也曾因党派利益而出现分裂的历史。最近,在反对核试验的和平运动分裂近四十年后,我们终于看到修补这一分歧的转变。这里发生的事情是国际政治中正在发生的事情的一个小型国内版本;即冷战时期改革派团体的分裂及后冷战时代的重新整合。当苏联和中国在冷战体制下开始进行核试验时,和平活动家们在所谓的苏中派系与反对派之间就“好核武器与坏核武器”问题陷入了争论。 来自广岛的人们可能会想,核武器怎么会有好坏之分,然而,正是这种“核武器有好坏之分”的荒谬逻辑导致了日本和平运动的政治分裂。日本和平运动陷入了美苏冷战对峙的极化局面,最终形成了这样一种逻辑:共产国家的核武器是好的,因为它们用来阻止资本主义的国际战略。

Has there been a national consensus formed around the elimination of nuclear weapons?
是否已经形成了关于消除核武器的全国共识?

When it comes to the question of whether a national consensus has truly been formed in post-war Japan on the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons, in actual fact, through to today, no such consensus has been formed. This is evident from the split in the peace movement. Clearly, looking at the Japanese government’s nuclear power program, the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes has been promoted as a national policy and even the so-called ‘allergy’ of the Japanese people to anything nuclear has in reality been undermined. The fact that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} which may have been created as a result of the earnest wishes of post-war Japan (even by a conservative Liberal Democratic Party) government, lost any substance a long time ago is something that we have sadly been aware of for some time.
关于战后日本是否真正形成了消除核武器问题的国家共识,实际上直到今天都没有形成这样的共识。这一点从和平运动的分裂中可以明显看出。显然,观察日本政府的核能计划,利用核能进行和平用途已被作为国家政策推动,甚至日本人对任何核事物的所谓“过敏”实际上也被削弱了。三原则(即三不核原则), 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 可能是战后日本(即使是保守的自由民主党政府)出于真诚愿望制定的,但早已失去了实质内容,这一点我们遗憾地已经意识到有一段时间了。

The undermining of the three non-nuclear principles
三不核原则的削弱

It is hardly necessary to remind the people of Hiroshima that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles are the daring three principles that Japan, will not possess, produce or bring nuclear weapons into the country, regardless of national capability or technical expertise. Before its reversion to Japanese administration in 1972, Okinawa was an exception to the application of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as it was not a part of Japanese territory. However, when Japan regained sovereignty over Okinawa, attention focused on whether the Principles should apply there or not. The Satō government in power at the time officially said that the Three Principles would apply, but in reality behind-the-scenes bargaining with the U.S. took place. This has recently been exposed with the release of documents from the time. Concerning the question of whether or not Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration nuclear-free, in reality it did not. It is also common knowledge that since then we have not seen Okinawa falling into line with mainland Japan, but the reverse. According to the agreement between the two countries, whenever an American nuclear submarine enters a Japanese port, the U.S. government is responsible to answer questions concerning
几乎无需提醒广岛人民,三原则是日本大胆提出的三项原则,即无论国家能力或技术专长如何,日本都不会拥有、制造或将核武器带入国内。在 1972 年归还日本管辖之前,冲绳并不适用三原则,因为它不属于日本领土。然而,当日本重新获得对冲绳的主权时,关注点集中在三原则是否应适用于冲绳。时任佐藤政府正式表示三原则将适用,但实际上与美国进行了幕后谈判。最近随着当时文件的公开,这一事实被揭露。关于冲绳归还日本管辖时是否无核,实际上并非如此。众所周知,自那时以来,冲绳并未与日本本土保持一致,反而相反。 根据两国之间的协议,每当一艘美国核潜艇进入日本港口时,美国政府有责任回答有关的问题

whether it is equipped with nuclear warheads or not, yet never once has there been an on-board inspection. With Japan taking America at its word as a matter of principle, the ‘Okinawa-ization’ of mainland Japan has long been underway. This again is a matter of fact. Furthermore, it is us who have continued to give our support to this shameful government.
无论是否配备核弹头,却从未进行过一次机载检查。日本原则上一直信任美国的话,所谓的“冲绳化”大陆日本早已在进行中。这同样是事实。此外,正是我们一直支持着这个可耻的政府。

The De-Criminalization of State Violence
国家暴力的非刑事化

The disarmament and the criminalization of murder and violence in civil society
裁军与民间社会中谋杀和暴力的刑事化

When we make an issue out of the premise that citizens are disarmed, and that murder and violence are criminal acts, then we come up with the following questions: What actually is this military power that states employ and what is the basis for justifying state violence, in other words the use of military power? Here I would like to respond to these questions.
当我们把公民被解除武装,以及谋杀和暴力是犯罪行为这一前提作为问题时,我们会提出以下问题:国家所使用的军事力量究竟是什么?以及国家暴力的正当性基础是什么,换句话说,军事力量的使用依据是什么?在这里,我想对这些问题作出回应。
It can be said that the basis of military power is the decriminalization of state violence. After all, an act of violence committed under any other circumstances is a criminal act. In civil society it is a crime to hit somebody on the street. In civil society murder and violence are also criminal acts, yet these same acts are not regarded as criminal when carried out by the state. How can we make sense of this? Following this line of thought confronts us with the issue of the formation of the modern civil society and the nationstate, and the distribution of violence within these. Inside civil society citizens are disarmed, and murder and violence are established as crimes. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} If this is the case, then we can only conclude that the state does not constitute a part of civil society.
可以说,军事力量的基础是国家暴力的非犯罪化。毕竟,在任何其他情况下实施的暴力行为都是犯罪行为。在市民社会中,在街上打人是犯罪。在市民社会中,谋杀和暴力也是犯罪行为,然而当这些行为由国家实施时,却不被视为犯罪。我们如何理解这一点?沿着这条思路,我们会面临现代市民社会和民族国家的形成问题,以及暴力在其中的分配。在市民社会内部,公民被解除武装,谋杀和暴力被确立为犯罪行为。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 如果情况如此,那么我们只能得出结论:国家并不构成市民社会的一部分。

Civil society and beyond: the state and the private sphere
公民社会及其延伸:国家与私人领域

In actual fact, there is another sphere that does not constitute a part of civil society. This is what is referred to as the private sphere. At the time that civil society was established it produced two spheres external to it; the state sphere and the private sphere. It is not simply a surprising coincidence that two types of violence that do not belong to civil society - violence carried
实际上,还有另一个领域不属于市民社会。这就是所谓的私人领域。在市民社会建立之时,它产生了两个外部领域:国家领域和私人领域。两种不属于市民社会的暴力类型——暴力行为——的存在,并非简单的巧合。

out by the state on the one hand, which we can call public violence, and violence that occurs in the private sphere, which we can call private violence or more recently domestic violence, on the other - have quite evidently not been criminalized. It has long been realised among civil society theorists that society is differentiated from the state. In other words, civil society is different from the public sphere and, in addition, the family, or the private sphere, is set aside from the rest of society, where civic rules do not apply.
一方面是国家实施的暴力,我们可以称之为公共暴力;另一方面是在私人领域发生的暴力,我们可以称之为私人暴力,或更近称为家庭暴力——显然,这些暴力并未被刑事定罪。公民社会理论家早已认识到,社会与国家是有区别的。换句话说,公民社会不同于公共领域,此外,家庭或私人领域被划分为与社会其他部分分离的空间,在那里公民规则不适用。

The criminalization of public and private violence
公共和私人暴力的刑事化

It was through the work of Linda Kerber (1998) an American scholar of women’s history, that I came to realise that the decriminalization of public and private violence occurred simultaneously with the criminalization of violence in civil society. Instead of asking general theoretical questions such as ‘Is violence a crime or not?’ or ‘Is the state inherently violent?’, I would like to re-frame these questions and ask, ‘Under what conditions does violence become a crime and under what conditions does it not emerge as a crime?’ By so doing, we find that to systematically commit murder or acts of violence as a member of a national army can turn you into a hero, whereas punching someone in a bar can brand you as a criminal. By re-framing the question in this way, we can inquire further by asking, ‘What is the difference here?’
正是通过美国女性历史学者琳达·科伯(Linda Kerber,1998 年)的研究,我才意识到,公共和私人暴力的非刑事化与民间社会暴力的刑事化是同时发生的。我不想再问诸如“暴力是否构成犯罪?”或“国家本质上是否暴力?”这样的一般理论问题,而是想重新构建这些问题,问“在什么条件下暴力成为犯罪,而在什么条件下则不被视为犯罪?”通过这样做,我们发现,作为国家军队成员系统性地实施谋杀或暴力行为可以使你成为英雄,而在酒吧里打人则会让你被贴上罪犯的标签。通过这种方式重新构建问题,我们可以进一步探究,“这里的区别是什么?”
Kerber, as a scholar of American history, has conducted empirical research into the reciprocal relationship between military service and civil rights in the U.S. since the War of Independence (1775-1783). Her work was so inspiring to me that I would like to take her findings a step further by asking the question, What might we learn if we treat violence in the public and private spheres and civil society as paired? Asking such a question has led me to the following development.
作为一位美国历史学者,Kerber 对自独立战争(1775-1783)以来军事服役与民权之间的相互关系进行了实证研究。她的研究对我启发很大,因此我想在她的发现基础上更进一步,提出这样一个问题:如果我们将公共领域和私人领域的暴力以及公民社会视为一对,能学到什么?提出这样的问题促使我进行了以下的探讨。

Two Lawless Zones  两个无法无天的区域

Civil society comes under the law. Yet it has become clear that there are quite evidently two lawless zones external to civil society. One of these lawless zones is international society. Nation-states are constituent members of international society. This international society is in a lawless zone. Gradually rules in the form of international law have been introduced into this lawless zone. Rules have been created such as: ‘If we are going to have a war, let’s do it in a gentlemanly fashion’; ‘Let’s not use inhumane weapons’; It’s okay to have a war, but let’s go about it in a fair way’; or 'Let’s have a war without committing any war crimes. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} These rules are totally unrealistic and send a shiver down my spine just to repeat them. However, international law serves to justify the use of armed force as a means of settling disputes between nations.
公民社会受法律约束。然而,显然存在两个位于公民社会之外的无政府区。其中一个无政府区是国际社会。民族国家是国际社会的组成成员。这个国际社会处于一个无政府区。国际法形式的规则逐渐被引入这个无政府区。制定了诸如:“如果我们要开战,就以绅士的方式进行”;“不要使用不人道的武器”;“开战可以,但要公平进行”;或者“开战时不要犯战争罪”等规则。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 这些规则完全不切实际,仅仅重复它们就让人不寒而栗。然而,国际法的作用是为使用武装力量解决国家间争端提供正当理由。

The rhetoric of peace-keeping operations
维和行动的言辞

Now we have what are called the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO), yet there is a clear through-line between peacekeeping operations and military operations. The word operation comes from a military term. Let us explore the etymology of the word peace. The word peace has its origins in the verb to pacify. From the verb peace we also derive the noun pacification. Pacification is the suppression of an inferior force by a superior force. It was Hasegawa Michiko, 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} a female new-right intellectual, who imparted the wisdom to me. Hasegawa is a real smart old fox and, while she may be an adversary, I have something to learn from her. She obviously came out with this to emphasise the violent character of peace-keeping, but according to Hasegawa peace-keeping without recourse to violence is not possible. She hit the nail well and truly on the head when she said that a
现在我们有了所谓的联合国维和行动(PKO),但维和行动与军事行动之间有着明显的内在联系。operation 这个词源自军事术语。让我们来探究一下 peace 这个词的词源。peace 一词起源于动词 to pacify(使平静)。从动词 peace 我们还派生出了名词 pacification(平定)。平定是指强者对弱者的镇压。是新右翼女性知识分子长谷川美智子 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 向我传授了这一智慧。长谷川是个非常聪明的老狐狸,虽然她可能是对手,但我能从她身上学到东西。她显然提出这一观点是为了强调维和的暴力性质,但据长谷川所说,没有诉诸暴力的维和是不可能的。她说得非常准确,切中了要害,认为……

peace-keeping operation is the act of suppressing the use of force locally by a superior, overwhelming military force. Consequently, it is clear that peacekeeping operations are, above all else, military action and are being continually carried out in the name of human rights in order to justify military intervention. The aerial bombardment of Kosovo 23 Kosovo 23 Kosovo^(23)\mathrm{Kosovo}^{23} is one example.
维持和平行动是指由一支优势明显、军力压倒性的部队在当地压制武力使用的行为。因此,很明显,维持和平行动首先是一种军事行动,并且为了证明军事干预的正当性,这种行动不断以人权的名义进行。对 Kosovo 23 Kosovo 23 Kosovo^(23)\mathrm{Kosovo}^{23} 的空中轰炸就是一个例子。
The site where decision-making of this nature takes place is where the United Nations (UN) convenes. That the bi-polar domination of the U.S. and Soviet Union has in the post-Cold War era given way to the monocratic domination of the U.S. is also common-knowledge in international politics. America holds on to the international hegemony within the UN. If it was necessary for UN forces to intervene in Kosovo in the name of human rights diplomacy, then why has it not intervened in the Palestinian conflict? 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} Prior to this, when the U.S. carried out military interventions unilaterally during the invasion of Grenada, the UN took absolutely no action at all. Likewise, in the current Palestinian conflict the UN has made no attempt to intervene. This is because Israel is America’s Achilles heel. America’s opportunism is all too apparent. When a country other than the U.S. breaks the rules of international society the UN intervenes in the name of ‘justice’, but when America itself breaks the rules it is a case of ‘you can do whatever you like’. This is the reality of the US, which plays the role of the world’s policeman with no request from anyone else. The reason that I say that international society is a lawless zone is because the logic of ‘might is right’ still operates within it. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
进行此类决策的场所正是联合国(UN)召开的地方。冷战后,美苏两极主导地位让位于美国的单极主导地位,这在国际政治中也是众所周知的事实。美国在联合国内保持着国际霸权。如果联合国部队以人权外交的名义必须干预科索沃,那么为什么不干预巴勒斯坦冲突呢? 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 早在此之前,当美国在入侵格林纳达时单方面进行军事干预,联合国完全没有采取任何行动。同样,在当前的巴勒斯坦冲突中,联合国也没有尝试干预。这是因为以色列是美国的阿喀琉斯之踵。美国的机会主义显而易见。当除美国以外的国家违反国际社会规则时,联合国以“正义”的名义进行干预,但当美国自己违反规则时,则是“你想做什么就做什么”。这就是美国的现实,它扮演着世界警察的角色,而没有任何人请求它这样做。 我之所以说国际社会是一个无法无天的区域,是因为“强权即公理”的逻辑仍然在其中运作。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
On the other hand, in the private sphere domestic violence (DV) in the name of patriarchy is rampant. Given that this is the case, then the question that arises is whether there is any logical consistency or thread between these two lawless zones in civil society.
另一方面,在私人领域,以父权制名义的家庭暴力(DV)猖獗。既然如此,那么问题就在于这两个公民社会中无法无天的区域之间是否存在任何逻辑上的一致性或联系。

Who is a Citizen?
谁是公民?

The right to be a first-class citizen and the obligation of military conscription
作为一等公民的权利与服兵役的义务

When we ask ourselves, who has the right to exercise violence?, the answer is citizens. But let us consider here whom we are talking about when we use the word citizen. We are talking about those people who are first-class citizens. Historically this meant male heads-of-household who were married, owned private property, had an obligation to pay taxes, and were eligible for military service. Those who fit into this category have come to be referred to as first-class citizens. If first-class citizens engage in systematic violence in the name of the state it is de-criminalized. Likewise, within the scope of private property rights - and a wife falls within the range of being private property - if one of these first-class citizens is violent towards his wife, this too is de-criminalized. For example, when you consider that the legal principle upon which the crime of adultery 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} is founded is the right to claim compensation for a violation of propriety rights, it becomes clear that a wife is regarded as one part of a husband’s private property. While before the war, this right was one-sided and now the obligation is bilateral, the legal principle that a spouse has exclusive rights of ownership on the (sexual) use of the partner’s body has been preserved even if this is now reciprocal.
当我们问自己,谁有权行使暴力时?答案是公民。但在这里让我们考虑一下,当我们使用“公民”这个词时,我们指的是谁。我们指的是那些一等公民。从历史上看,这意味着已婚的男性户主,拥有私有财产,有纳税义务,并有服兵役的资格。符合这一类别的人被称为一等公民。如果一等公民以国家名义进行系统性的暴力行为,这种行为就被非刑事化。同样,在私有财产权的范围内——妻子属于私有财产的范畴——如果这些一等公民中的某人对妻子施暴,这也被非刑事化。例如,当你考虑通奸罪 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 所依据的法律原则是对违反财产权利的赔偿请求权时,就清楚地表明妻子被视为丈夫私有财产的一部分。 虽然战前这一权利是单方面的,而现在义务是双向的,但配偶对伴侣身体(性使用)的专有权这一法律原则即使在现已互惠的情况下仍被保留。
These two forms of violence - public and private - are two poles, and when an individual citizen, meaning first-class citizen, uses violence, civil society de-criminalises it on both sides. In contrast, it is only violence between more than two citizens that ends up being criminalized. From this perspective we are able to see this surprising sleight of hand.
这两种暴力形式——公共的和私人的——是两个极端,当一个个体公民,即一等公民,使用暴力时,公民社会在双方都将其非刑事化。相反,只有两个以上公民之间的暴力才最终被定为犯罪。从这个角度我们能够看到这一令人惊讶的巧妙手法。

The theory of the war origins of the welfare state
福利国家的战争起源理论

Here I would like us to consider the inseparable relationship between firstclass citizens and military conscription since the early stage of the founding of the nation-state. Recently, welfare-state theory has been all the rage, and it has become clear from historical research that the welfare state has its origins in war.
在这里,我想让大家思考自民族国家建立初期以来,一等公民与军事征兵之间不可分割的关系。近年来,福利国家理论风靡一时,历史研究已经明确显示福利国家起源于战争。
According to Linda Kerber (1998), the welfare system in America was first established as the privilege of soldiers who were injured or became sick during the War of Independence. It was then extended as a perk enjoyed by retired servicemen. In concrete terms, this meant being able to enjoy civic privileges throughout one’s life as result of military service, including priority recruitment for civil service jobs, lifelong pension rights, and priority enrolment into public universities.
根据琳达·科伯(Linda Kerber,1998 年)的说法,美国的福利制度最初是作为独立战争期间受伤或生病士兵的特权而建立的。随后,这一福利被扩展为退役军人的一种待遇。具体来说,这意味着因服兵役而终身享有公民特权,包括公务员职位的优先录用、终身养老金权利以及公立大学的优先入学资格。

Public Violence and Gender
公共暴力与性别

Military (meaning state) violence as a male monopoly
军事(即国家)暴力作为男性的专属领域

As military conscription was an obligation that only males fulfilled it resulted in structural gender bias in the allocation of these lifelong civic privileges. Women in the mainstream feminist organisation such as National Organisation for Women (NOW) 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} in the U.S. spoke out saying that this was unfair. During the period of the Vietnam War, NOW actually filed lawsuits again and again to have women included in military conscription and for women to be able to register for the draft. It would appear then that the goal of feminism at that time was equality as first-class citizens and, sitting behind this, gender equality in military service.
由于军事征兵是只有男性履行的义务,这导致了这些终身公民特权分配上的结构性性别偏见。美国主流女权组织如全国妇女组织(NOW) 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 的女性发声称这不公平。在越南战争期间,NOW 实际上一再提起诉讼,要求将女性纳入军事征兵范围,并允许女性登记入伍。由此看来,当时女权主义的目标是作为一等公民的平等,而其背后则是军事服役中的性别平等。

Should women also have the right to become 'spirits of dead war heroes'?
女性是否也应有权成为“死去战争英雄的灵魂”?

What happens if we introduce the category gender into an analysis of public violence? The military represents the systematisation of state violence, and as such the demand for gender equality in the military comes down to the assertion that, it is outrageous for men to have a monopoly over violence, give women a slice, too! I once wrote an essay, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, entitled Should Women also be Given the Right to become 'Spirits of Dead War Heroes, (‘Eirei’ ni naru kenri o onna nimo?) (Ueno, 1999a). A ‘spirit of the war dead’ (eirei) refers to someone who has made the noble self-sacrifice of giving one’s life for the state. Nevertheless, the other side of this is a much cruder reality. ‘Dying for one’s country’ in fact also means ‘killing for one’s country’, in other words exercising the right to kill in the name of the state.
如果我们在分析公共暴力时引入性别这一范畴,会发生什么?军队代表了国家暴力的系统化,因此对军队中性别平等的要求归结为这样一种主张:男性垄断暴力是荒谬的,也应该让女性分一杯羹!我曾经写过一篇带有些许玩笑意味的文章,题为《女性是否也应被赋予成为“战死英灵”的权利?》(‘Eirei’ ni naru kenri o onna nimo?)(上野,1999a)。“战死英灵”(eirei)指的是为国家做出高尚自我牺牲、献出生命的人。然而,另一方面的现实则粗糙得多。“为国捐躯”实际上也意味着“为国杀戮”,换句话说,就是以国家名义行使杀戮的权利。
The military is a place where people are trained to kill efficiently. Is feminism really seeking gender equality in terms of this kind of right, too?
军队是一个训练人们高效杀戮的地方。女权主义真的也在追求这种权利上的性别平等吗?

Do women seek an equal right to commit acts of folly?
女性是否也在寻求平等的权利去犯傻?

No matter which way you look at it, it is a whole lot better not to kill than to kill, and among all the various deeds that human beings engage in, it must surely be called the ‘folly of follies’. A male scholar of ethics, Katō Hisatake 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} presents the simplistic notion that if feminism demands equality between men and women in every sphere, then it should also demand equal rights to commit acts of folly. This kind of cheap understanding of feminism or macho misconception of feminism, which advocates that ‘if men commit acts of folly we want a go too’ or ‘we want equal rights to commit acts of folly’, is currently in circulation. Such a misunderstanding of feminism demonstrates nothing less than the ‘poverty’ of imagination of male intellectuals. That such men can only conceive of gender equality by taking themselves as a standard reveals their limitations.
无论从哪个角度来看,不杀人总比杀人好得多,在人类所从事的各种行为中,这无疑应被称为“愚行中的愚行”。一位男性伦理学者加藤久武 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 提出了一个简单的观点:如果女权主义要求男女在各个领域平等,那么它也应该要求拥有同等的愚行权利。这种对女权主义的肤浅理解,或者说对女权主义的男子气概误解,主张“如果男人可以犯愚行,我们也想试试”或“我们想要犯愚行的平等权利”,目前正在流传。这种对女权主义的误解无疑暴露了男性知识分子“想象力的贫乏”。这些男性只能以自己为标准来设想性别平等,显示了他们的局限性。

The symbolism of the Pieta
圣母哀悼像的象征意义

If we look at history, the path that led to women supporting the war effort during the last World War was not through female military service, that is to say participation in the military. The self-sacrifice of women that was meant to rival that of being a spirit of a dead war hero was that of being the mother of the military hero who becomes a war god, or a guardian spirit of the state after his death. For women this meant offering to the state their most valuable, most precious possession. This was the life of their sons. This ties in with the symbolism of the Pieta. The Pieta is the image of Christ and his lamenting mother. Wakakuwa Midori (1995) 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} indicates in Sensō ga tsukuru josei zō (Images of Women Created by War) that the symbolism of the spirit of the dead war hero and his mother appeared repeatedly in wartime propaganda. During total war it was thought that despite the fact that women could not themselves become spirits of dead war heroes, they could contribute to the state in a way to rival that of men simply by becoming the mothers of war gods or the mothers of spirits of dead war heroes.
如果我们回顾历史,导致女性在上一次世界大战中支持战争努力的路径,并不是通过女性参军,也就是说参与军事行动。女性的自我牺牲,旨在与作为死去战争英雄灵魂的精神相抗衡,是成为军事英雄的母亲,这位英雄死后成为战争之神或国家的守护神。对女性来说,这意味着向国家献出她们最宝贵、最珍贵的财产——她们儿子的生命。这与圣母哀悼基督的象征意义相联系。若川翠(1995)在《战争创造的女性形象》中指出,死去战争英雄的灵魂及其母亲的象征在战时宣传中反复出现。在全面战争期间,尽管女性自身不能成为死去战争英雄的灵魂,但人们认为她们可以通过成为战争之神的母亲或死去战争英雄灵魂的母亲,以一种可与男性相抗衡的方式为国家做出贡献。

Motherhood and pacifism - A de-essentialised relationship
母性与和平主义——一种去本质化的关系

If we look at the history of motherhood being mobilised for military purposes, then we find that the essentialist idea of women as pacifists being contradicted. Motherhood may have become a symbol of peace in peacetime, but during the war it was mobilised as a symbol in the execution of the war. Here we can discard the question, Is motherhood pacifistic? This is because it is the same as asking: 'Is motherhood essentially pacifistic? and within feminist theory terms like essential and natural no longer make sense. This was the theoretical point of arrival for feminism in the 1990s. In its place we are able to re-frame the question as follows: Under what conditions is motherhood mobilized for the purposes of peace, and under what conditions is it mobilized for military purposes? It is clear from history that motherhood can be mobilized for different purposes depending on the context.
如果我们回顾母性被动员用于军事目的的历史,就会发现将女性视为和平主义者的本质主义观点是被矛盾的。母性在和平时期可能成为和平的象征,但在战争期间,它被动员成为执行战争的象征。在这里,我们可以摒弃“母性是和平主义的吗?”这个问题。因为这等同于问:“母性本质上是和平主义的吗?”而在女性主义理论中,诸如本质和自然之类的术语已不再有意义。这是 1990 年代女性主义理论的一个理论终点。取而代之的是,我们能够将问题重新表述为:在什么条件下母性被动员用于和平目的,而在什么条件下被动员用于军事目的?历史清楚地表明,母性可以根据不同的情境被动员用于不同的目的。
This shift in the way that the question is framed is one of the theoretical achievements of feminism. For example, we can re-frame the question: Is motherhood a handicap for women? to now read: Under what conditions does motherhood become a handicap for women and under what conditions is it not a handicap? In so doing, it becomes evident that it was industrialisation in modern society that made motherhood a handicap for women. Motherhood does not emerge as a handicap in agricultural societies, and neither is it a handicap among elite women, in fact the reverse is the case. As another example, let us consider the question: Is sex, labour? This is rather an odious question as I am sure no-one would want to think of an act of love in terms of labour. The problem here is that the question has been framed in the wrong way. Discarding the question, What in essence is sex?, we can ask in its place the following question: Under what kind of conditions does sex become a form of labour and under what kind of conditions does it not? By contextualizing the question in this way, we sever the essentialist relationship between motherhood and pacifism.
这种问题表述方式的转变是女性主义的理论成果之一。例如,我们可以将问题重新表述为:母亲身份是女性的障碍吗?改为:在什么条件下母亲身份成为女性的障碍,在哪些条件下则不是障碍?这样一来,就显而易见,正是现代社会的工业化使得母亲身份成为女性的障碍。母亲身份在农业社会中并不构成障碍,精英女性中也不是障碍,实际上情况恰恰相反。再举一个例子,我们来考虑这样一个问题:性是劳动吗?这个问题相当令人反感,因为我相信没有人愿意将爱的行为视为劳动。这里的问题在于,问题的表述方式是错误的。抛开“性本质上是什么?”这个问题,我们可以改问:在什么样的条件下性成为一种劳动形式,在哪些条件下则不是?通过这样将问题置于具体语境中,我们切断了母亲身份与和平主义之间的本质主义联系。

Women's Participation in the Military
女性参军

The feminisation of the military or the militarization of women?
军事的女性化还是女性的军事化?

The assumption that participation of women in the military is unnatural is no longer sustainable. Women’s participation in the military in the name of equal participation of men and women in all fields and the enhancement of women’s professionalism and access to employment is entirely feasible. But what is likely to happen as a result of this? Will it lead to the feminisation of the military? Or would it cause the militarization of women? Which of these will occur first?
认为女性参军是不自然的假设已不再站得住脚。以男女在各领域平等参与、提升女性专业能力和就业机会为名,女性参军完全可行。但这可能带来什么后果?会导致军事的女性化吗?还是会引发女性的军事化?这两者中哪一个会先发生?
The answer is already there for us to see in the historical experience of the U.S… Based on the fact that women have already entered the military in America, we can give the following answers to a number of questions. Can women kill? The answer is yes. Can women undergo training to kill at the same level of efficiency as men? The answer is yes. Do women have the physical abilities necessary to handle combat duty? The answer is yes. Have women been accepted into the front line platoons and the marines? The answer is yes 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}. These are the answers that have been brought forth from the militarization of women in the U.S…
答案已经可以从美国的历史经验中看到……基于女性已经进入美国军队这一事实,我们可以对几个问题给出如下回答。女性能杀人吗?答案是肯定的。女性能接受与男性同等效率的杀人训练吗?答案是肯定的。女性具备执行战斗任务所需的体能吗?答案是肯定的。女性被接纳进入前线排和海军陆战队了吗?答案是肯定的 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 。这些都是美国女性军事化带来的答案……

The Nationalisation of Women
女性的国家化

Assimilation and the completion of the nation-state
同化与民族国家的完成

Let us consider here once again what we mean by the idea of women becoming first-class citizens or first-class national subjects. The end result of women arguing that they too can be fully-fledged members of society just like men is that the nationalisation of women becomes the goal. Within nation-state theory we have seen an increase in research concerned with the nationalisation of women. This has been aided by the new theory of what is referred to as post-colonialism. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
让我们在这里再次思考一下,女性成为一等公民或一等国家主体的概念究竟意味着什么。女性主张自己也能像男性一样成为社会的完全成员,其最终结果就是女性的国家化成为目标。在民族国家理论中,我们已经看到越来越多的研究关注女性的国家化。这一趋势得到了所谓后殖民主义新理论的推动。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
Let us consider, for example, assimilation policy as a part of colonial rule. Assimilation policy aims at complete national unification, including colonial subjects. This year [2000] Arakawa Akira, 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} an intellectual who opposed the return of Okinawa to mainland Japan in 1972, had his book Okinawa - tōgō to hangyaku (Okinawa: integration and resistance) published by Chikuma Shobō. Arakawa states that this year’s Okinawa Summit and the printing of the 2,000 yen note with a picture of Shurenomon Gate are a 'symbol of the final completion of the national integration of Okinawa. The path of resisting national integration is tied in with the rejection of assimilation.
让我们以同化政策作为殖民统治的一部分为例。同化政策旨在实现包括殖民地臣民在内的完全民族统一。今年(2000 年),反对 1972 年冲绳回归日本本土的知识分子荒川晃的著作《冲绳——统一与反抗》由筑摩书房出版。荒川指出,今年的冲绳峰会以及印有守礼门图案的 2000 日元纸币的发行,是“冲绳民族统一最终完成的象征”。抵制民族统一的道路与拒绝同化紧密相连。

The gendered nature of the model of the national subject
民族主体模型的性别特征

The act of rejecting assimilation amounts to a questioning of who is a national subject and who is a first-class national subject at the time that nationalisation takes place. When the model of the first-class national subject has already been cast in a male mould, then we must say no to this and refuse to assimilate, as to be like men or to resemble men is not a
拒绝同化的行为等同于在民族国家形成之时质疑谁是民族主体,谁是一流的民族主体。当一流民族主体的模型已经被塑造成男性形象时,我们必须对此说不,拒绝同化,因为成为像男人或类似男人并不是一个…

feminist goal. Within post-structuralist 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} gender theory, Christine Delphy formulated the idea that gender does not consist of two items, but is the practice of differentiation to create two asymmetrical arenas. She says the following about the significance of gender:
女权主义目标。在后结构主义 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 性别理论中,克里斯汀·德尔菲提出了性别并非由两个项目组成的观点,而是通过区分的实践来创造两个不对称的领域。她这样谈论性别的重要性:
To become like men is to become the ruler, but to be the ruler requires somebody to be ruled…For this reason it is not possible to conceive of a society where everybody is a ruler (1989). 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}
成为像男人一样就是成为统治者,但成为统治者就需要有人被统治……因此,不可能设想一个人人都是统治者的社会(1989)。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}
In other words, as it is not possible in either theoretical or practical terms for women to be treated the same as men or for women to be like men, it is clear that the goal of gender equality can only be to dismantle these gender differences themselves.
换句话说,无论在理论上还是实践上,女性都不可能被视为与男性相同,或成为像男性一样的人,因此性别平等的目标显然只能是拆除这些性别差异本身。

Citizens, individuals and human beings
公民、个体和人类

Post-colonialist intellectuals theorize in a very similar way in relation to assimilation policies. In an essay by Nomura Kōya (1997), an Okinawan scholar, I came upon a passage arguing the following, and was surprised at how closely it tallies with gender theory. He states that for Okinawans ‘to resemble the Japanese is for them to become an oppressor. To become an oppressor will not bring liberation to the Okinawan people’ (Nomura, 1997).
后殖民主义知识分子在论述同化政策时,理论方式非常相似。在冲绳学者野村幸也(1997 年)的一篇文章中,我看到这样一段论述,令我惊讶的是它与性别理论的高度契合。他指出,对于冲绳人来说,“像日本人一样就是成为压迫者。成为压迫者不会给冲绳人民带来解放”(野村,1997)。
Women, Okinawans and colonized people are all second-class national subjects, and Nomura describes exactly the trap of national integration that awaits second and third-class citizens who attempt to be nationalised as first-class citizens. Looking at this from the perspective of where nationstate theory, gender theory and post-colonialism are at the moment, it is clear that we are now in an era where questions are being asked about what exactly we mean when we use terms such as citizen or the individual. This process demands that we also question the gender, ethnic and class bias of these concepts.
女性、冲绳人和被殖民者都是二等国民,野村准确描述了那些试图被国族化为一等公民的二等、三等公民所面临的国族整合陷阱。从国家理论、性别理论和后殖民主义当前的发展视角来看,显然我们正处于一个质疑“公民”或“个体”等术语具体含义的时代。这个过程也要求我们质疑这些概念中的性别、族群和阶级偏见。

Gender justice and distribution justice
性别正义与分配正义

What exactly is this gender justice that feminism is demanding? One way of understanding this is that it means demanding justice in the distribution of
女性主义所要求的性别正义到底是什么?一种理解方式是,它意味着要求在民间社会中所有资源的分配上实现正义。

all resources in civil society. It means justice in the distribution of all rights and obligations that reside in civil society. Yet, is this kind of distribution justice the goal of feminism? Among the various rights enjoyed by national subjects is the right to become a spirit of a dead war hero, meaning distribution justice in the execution of the state’s violence, or the right to kill. Consequently, it includes distribution justice in the right to commit acts of folly. This being the case, the question that we are forced to confront is whether this really is the goal of feminism?
这意味着在民间社会中所有权利和义务的分配上实现正义。然而,这种分配正义真的是女性主义的目标吗?作为国家主体所享有的各种权利中,有成为已故战争英雄灵魂的权利,也就是说,在国家暴力的执行中实现分配正义,或者说拥有杀戮的权利。因此,它还包括在犯愚蠢行为的权利上的分配正义。既然如此,我们不得不面对的问题是,这真的是女性主义的目标吗?

The trap of seeking equality on a par with men
追求与男性平等的陷阱

If we think of gender justice as justice in the distribution of various clustered groups of rights and obligations that take men as their model, then we find that there is a history of the expansion of women’s rights being achieved within the confines of a specific group and with specific limitations. For example, among middle-class whites in the U.S. the gender wage gap has been significantly reduced over the past 20 years. Some women would probably say that this is the same as an elimination of discrimination against women. However, others are paying the price of this elsewhere. During the same period, the wage gap between whites and other ethnic groups actually widened. In other words, a structure has been created where white middleclass women can hire childminders from other ethnic groups, for example Hispanic, and carve out their own careers.
如果我们将性别正义视为以男性为模型的各种权利和义务群体的分配正义,那么我们会发现,女性权利的扩展历史是在特定群体的范围内并带有特定限制地实现的。例如,在美国中产阶级白人中,过去 20 年性别工资差距显著缩小。一些女性可能会认为这等同于消除了对女性的歧视。然而,其他群体却为此付出了代价。在同一时期,白人与其他族裔群体之间的工资差距实际上扩大了。换句话说,形成了一种结构,使得白人中产阶级女性可以雇佣来自其他族裔群体(例如西班牙裔)的保姆,从而开辟自己的职业生涯。

Is state feminism possible?
国家女权主义可能吗?

This kind of equality within the confines of a group and with specific limitations I call a ‘members-only club’. As long as you become a part of this members-only club you can attain a specific level of equality within it, and without a doubt some women have obtained the fruits of this. This again is a fact. If we take it that one-state feminism is possible, then it is probably possible to establish it within specific boundaries. In the countries of Northern Europe we have even seen the birth of a concept of state feminism. However, we are still left with the question of whether this is our goal. If women are nationalised in this way it means that women must play a role in
我称这种在群体内部且带有特定限制的平等为“会员专属俱乐部”。只要你成为这个会员专属俱乐部的一员,你就可以在其中获得某种程度的平等,毫无疑问,一些女性确实获得了这种成果。这同样是一个事实。如果我们认为单一国家的女权主义是可能的,那么它很可能是在特定界限内建立的。在北欧国家,我们甚至见证了国家女权主义概念的诞生。然而,我们仍然面临一个问题:这是否是我们的目标。如果女性以这种方式被国家化,这意味着女性必须在

total war, the largest project that a state undertakes, but should women support or take part in the execution of public violence carried out by the state? Mainstream American feminists, for example NOW, would probably answer yes to this question. I wonder what Japanese feminist might answer in response to this question.
全面战争中发挥作用,而全面战争是国家承担的最大项目,但女性是否应该支持或参与国家执行的公共暴力?例如,美国主流女权主义者,如全国妇女组织(NOW),可能会对此问题回答“是”。我想知道日本女权主义者会如何回答这个问题。

Between War Crimes and the Crime of War
战争罪与战争罪行之间

Women's history of defeated nations and women's history of victor nations
战败国女性的历史与胜利国女性的历史

Taking a rather roundabout route, I would like to consider the next question: ‘What is a war crime?’ If we consider the difference between victor nations and loser nations, although this may sound a little odd, it becomes clear that within women’s history we also find that there is a women’s history of victor nations and women’s history of loser nations. Since the 1980s, there has been a trend in women’s history towards reflexive history, but this has only taken hold in Japan, Germany and Italy. This is something more than coincidence. The women’s history of Japan, Germany and Italy is also the women’s history of the former Axis countries. At the same time, it is also the women’s history of the former fascist nations and, moreover, the women’s history of the countries defeated in the war. If we look at this on a world scale we need to ask the following: Has a movement towards reflexive women’s history also materialised in the women’s history of the former Allied nations, or the victor nations? The answer is no. Within British women’s history and American women’s history there has been a trend to reflect on colonial rule and the oppression of indigenous peoples in the form of Imperialist feminism. However, in the women’s history of the Allied countries, in other words those on the winning side, there has been little reflection on either the First or Second World Wars; ‘wars of freedom and democracy’ against 20th century fascism. A reflexive history concerning World War II has arisen in France, but it is self-critical of the Vichy government, in other words co-operation with Nazi Germany, whereas the fight against fascism is consistently defended. It is reasonable to say that a
绕了一个比较迂回的路子,我想考虑下一个问题:“什么是战争罪?”如果我们考虑胜利国和失败国之间的差异,虽然这听起来有些奇怪,但很明显,在女性史中我们也能发现胜利国的女性史和失败国的女性史。自 20 世纪 80 年代以来,女性史出现了一种反思性历史的趋势,但这只在日本、德国和意大利得以确立。这绝非巧合。日本、德国和意大利的女性史也是前轴心国的女性史。同时,这也是前法西斯国家的女性史,更是战败国的女性史。如果我们从全球范围来看,我们需要问:反思性女性史的运动是否也出现在前盟国或胜利国的女性史中?答案是否定的。 在英国女性史和美国女性史中,存在一种反思殖民统治和对土著人民压迫的趋势,这种趋势表现为帝国主义女性主义。然而,在盟国的女性史中,换句话说,在胜利一方的国家中,几乎没有对第一次或第二次世界大战的反思;这些战争被视为对 20 世纪法西斯主义的“自由与民主之战”。关于第二次世界大战的反思性历史在法国出现过,但它主要是对维希政府的自我批判,也就是说对纳粹德国的合作,而对反法西斯斗争则始终予以辩护。可以合理地说,

movement similar to the kind of reflexive history as seen in Japan is hardly present in France, with few exceptions.
在法国,类似于日本所见的那种反思性历史运动几乎不存在,只有少数例外。

Those women of the victor nations who do not question state violence
那些胜利国的女性并不质疑国家暴力

In Images of Women Created by War, Wakakuwa comes out with the wonderful expression: ‘As one would expect, women did not go to the front line, however they fulfilled the role of war cheerleaders’ (Wakakuwa, 1995). In their role as cheerleaders, did women of all the nation-states contribute in the same way to their respective countries? American women must have taken on the role of cheerleaders, and so too must have German women. Why do you think it is that despite having fulfilled the same cheerleader role, women from the defeated nations must reflect on this whereas those from the victor nations can get away without any reflection?
在《战争创造的女性形象》中,若川提出了一个精彩的表达:“正如预期的那样,女性没有上前线,但她们履行了战争啦啦队员的角色”(若川,1995)。作为啦啦队员的角色,所有民族国家的女性是否以相同的方式为各自的国家做出了贡献?美国女性肯定承担了啦啦队员的角色,德国女性也必然如此。你认为为什么尽管履行了相同的啦啦队员角色,战败国的女性必须对此进行反思,而胜利国的女性却可以不加反思地过去?
It is because women in the victor nations do not question the execution of public violence in the name of justice. This is still the case today. American women support the use of military force if it is in the name of the United Nations, such as PKO and PKF 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} activities, or in the name of ‘freedom and democracy’ even without U.N. agreement. We are even seeing a movement among German women to support the participation of German troops in a PKF in the name of NATO. Given this, the move to avoid military force in Japan is extremely exceptional when we look at the international situation, which we can interpret to mean that what is commonsense for Japan would be viewed as nonsensical by the rest of the world. But truly, which of the two is nonsensical? The Japanese Constitution, though imposed by the Occupation Forces led by the U.S., prohibits Japan to use the military power to solve any kind of international conflicts, and the majority of citizens have given their earnest support to this decision reflecting sincere regret and the painful memory of the war. We are facing the cost of neglecting to make the Japanese view of state violence the commonsense view of the world over the last 50 years.
这是因为胜利国的女性并不质疑以正义之名执行的公共暴力。时至今日,情况依然如此。美国女性支持以联合国名义进行的军事行动,如维和行动(PKO)和维和部队(PKF) 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} ,甚至在没有联合国同意的情况下,也支持以“自由与民主”名义使用军事力量。我们甚至看到德国女性中出现了支持德国军队以北约名义参与维和部队的运动。鉴于此,从国际形势来看,日本避免使用军事力量的做法极为特殊,我们可以解读为对日本来说是常识的事情,在世界其他地方却被视为荒谬。但究竟哪一方才是真正的荒谬呢?尽管日本宪法是由以美国为首的占领军强加的,但它禁止日本利用军事力量解决任何国际冲突,大多数国民也真诚支持这一决定,反映出对战争的深切遗憾和痛苦记忆。 我们正面临着过去 50 年未能使日本人对国家暴力的看法成为世界常识的代价。

The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal and a definition of war crimes
国际妇女战争罪行法庭与战争罪行的定义

In December 2000, the landmark Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal was held under the leadership of Japanese women and with Matsui Yayori 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} playing a pivotal role.
2000 年 12 月,在日本女性的领导下,具有里程碑意义的国际妇女战争罪行法庭召开,松井弥与里在其中发挥了关键作用。
Behind the act of judging war crimes lies, what in reality, are some truly frightful questions. The flip side of defining what is a war crime is the simultaneous act of defining what is not a war crime. This is because in criminalizing some kinds of violence you are also excusing all forms of violence that fall outside these parameters. This being the case, feminism must provide an answer to the question: What kind of violence is excusable and under what kind of circumstances? I was very keen to see how far the organisers of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal were ready to go to give an answer to this question. In reality, the Tribunal adopted the principle of judging war crimes of that time according to the international law of that time, and did not delve into defining what is a war crime. Clearly, this demonstrates the limits of the Tribunal. Yet within these limits, the organisers exerted themselves to the utmost, and out of this we saw the restoration of justice to the victims, which was an enormous achievement.
在审判战争罪行的背后,实际上隐藏着一些真正令人恐惧的问题。界定什么是战争罪的另一面,是同时界定什么不是战争罪。这是因为在将某些类型的暴力定为犯罪的同时,也是在为所有不在这些界定范围内的暴力行为开脱。既然如此,女权主义必须回答这样一个问题:什么样的暴力是可以被原谅的,在什么样的情况下?我非常想了解国际妇女战争罪行法庭的组织者们准备走多远来回答这个问题。实际上,法庭采用了当时国际法对战争罪的判定原则,并未深入探讨什么是战争罪。显然,这显示了法庭的局限性。然而,在这些局限之内,组织者们尽了最大努力,由此我们看到了对受害者正义的恢复,这是一项巨大的成就。
That fact that defining what is a war crime simultaneously involves legitimating non-criminalized acts of war is a real problem for me. I feel that it is akin to being caught in a trap to discuss war crimes without asking whether or not war itself is a crime.
定义什么是战争罪的事实,同时涉及对未被定为犯罪的战争行为的合法化,这对我来说是一个真正的问题。我觉得这就像陷入了一个陷阱,讨论战争罪却不问战争本身是否是犯罪。

Is violence excusable?  暴力可以被原谅吗?

The question: What kind of violence is excusable and under what kind of circumstances? is tied in with the answer to the question, Is there such a thing as justified violence? There is only one answer feminism can give to this question and that is to say that there is no justified form of violence, which leads to the criminalization of all forms of violence.
问题是:什么样的暴力可以被原谅,在什么样的情况下?这个问题与“是否存在正当暴力”这一问题的答案紧密相关。女性主义对此问题只有一个答案,那就是没有正当的暴力形式,这导致所有形式的暴力都应被定为犯罪。
Here I am fully aware that women can also exercise violence. American feminists have carried out a campaign to ‘fight back the night’, as a response
在这里,我完全意识到女性也可能施加暴力。美国女性主义者发起了一场“反击黑夜”的运动,作为回应

to the ever-present dangers of rape and muggings in their society. Some feminists have urged women to take courses in self-defense training. Other women insist that it leaves women in a less defensive position if they partake in state violence. Yet I would ask: is feminism an idea that seeks to catch up with men on all terms; socially, mentally, physically, and so on?’ Some women may be able to ‘catch up’, but we should not forget that others cannot. Suppose you are aged or handicapped and incapable of fighting back, what happens then? Even the exercise of violence in the name of selfdefense is a right that can be enjoyed by only those who are capable of it, those who are equal to this task. Victims of DV who do not dare to run away, demonstrate the lesson that you risk being beaten up even more severely if you try to fight back. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} You can also think of the case of prisoners in concentration camps. Are any of us in the position to ask: Why do you not stand up and fight back? The case of DV tells us that the private sphere functions no better than a concentration camp for victims. If feminism does not stand for the weak, by which I mean those who are incapable of counterattack, it has no meaning for me.
面对社会中无处不在的强奸和抢劫危险,一些女权主义者鼓励女性参加自卫训练课程。另一些女性则坚持认为,如果女性参与国家暴力,反而会使她们处于更不利的防御位置。然而我想问:女权主义是否是一种试图在所有方面——社会上、心理上、身体上等——与男性平起平坐的理念?有些女性或许能够“赶上”,但我们不应忘记其他人无法做到。假设你年老或有残疾,无法反击,那会怎样?即使以自卫名义行使暴力的权利,也只能由那些有能力、能够胜任这项任务的人享有。那些不敢逃离家庭暴力的受害者,证明了一个教训:如果你试图反击,可能会遭受更严重的殴打。你也可以想到集中营中的囚犯。我们中有谁有资格问:“你为什么不站起来反抗?”家庭暴力的案例告诉我们,私人领域对受害者来说,功能不亚于集中营。 如果女权主义不代表弱者,我指的是那些无法反击的人,那么对我来说它毫无意义。

The contribution of feminism equals the criminalizing of war
女权主义的贡献等同于将战争定为犯罪。

The criminalization of all forms of violence is the only answer that feminism can give. Yet if we answer in this way we will almost certainly be faced immediately with protests of ‘but that is not realistic’. I can easily imagine the barrage of questions. Who will protect you from violence? Will you refuse police control as well? Would you not retaliate when a dictator like Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait? Would you just sit by and watch when a 17 year-old youth hijacks a bus? 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
将所有形式的暴力定为犯罪是女权主义唯一能给出的答案。然而,如果我们这样回答,几乎肯定会立即面临“但那不现实”的抗议。我可以轻易想象接踵而至的问题。谁来保护你免受暴力?你会拒绝警方的控制吗?当像萨达姆·侯赛因这样的独裁者入侵科威特时,你不会反击吗?当一个 17 岁的青年劫持公交车时,你会袖手旁观吗? 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
When the police use violence in the name of justice employed for the good of the community, the concept is then extended to the use of military force employed by the state for self-defence. However, here again, history shows us that societal violence employed by the community or state in the name of justice ends up being exercised only on behalf of its own citizens rather than for those perceived as enemies. The lesson we must learn from history is this: it is almost impossible to prevent the abuse of violence, once the use of violence is justified. No military dictatorship can be maintained
当警察以正义的名义、为了社区的利益而使用暴力时,这一概念便被延伸到国家为自卫而使用的军事力量。然而,历史再次告诉我们,以正义之名由社区或国家施加的社会暴力,最终只会针对其自身公民,而非那些被视为敌人的人。我们必须从历史中吸取的教训是:一旦暴力的使用被合理化,几乎不可能防止暴力的滥用。没有任何军事独裁政权能够仅靠武力和暴力维持下去,

simply with the use of force and violence, as it also needs to establish authority, namely the agreement of the ruled. Might without authority will not last long. Here then, my proposal is simple, though difficult: to never authorise the exercise of any form of violence.
因为它还需要建立权威,即被统治者的同意。没有权威的武力不会持续太久。因此,我的建议很简单,虽然很难做到:永远不要授权使用任何形式的暴力。
To say no to all forms of violence includes the criminalization of both public and private forms of violence. Recently, domestic violence has at last been problematised. It was feminism that pushed forward to criminalize violence in the private sphere, which traditionally has been de-criminalized. We are now at the stage of criminalizing acts of violence in the private sphere. If feminism has even the slightest hope of preventing men from engaging in acts of violence in the private sphere, of building relationships with men who have no intention of using violence against women, and of raising sons to be this kind of non-violent male, then instead of using essentialist language such as masculinity is violent by nature, we must say that masculinity is also constructed and as a result it can be transformed.
拒绝一切形式的暴力,包括将公共和私人形式的暴力都定为犯罪。近年来,家庭暴力终于被问题化。正是女权主义推动了将传统上被非刑事化的私人领域暴力定为犯罪。我们现在正处于将私人领域的暴力行为定为犯罪的阶段。如果女权主义甚至有一丝希望能够阻止男性在私人领域实施暴力行为,建立与那些无意对女性施暴的男性的关系,并培养儿子成为这种非暴力的男性,那么我们必须摒弃诸如“男性气质本质上具有暴力性”这样的本质主义语言,而应当说男性气质也是被建构的,因此可以被改变。

A minority idea  少数派观点

In my understanding, feminism is not an idea about distribution justice, of being on a par with men concerning rights and obligations. While feminism is frequently received this way, it is not an idea advocating that whatever men can do, women can do too.
在我看来,女权主义并不是关于分配正义的理念,也不是关于在权利和义务上与男性平起平坐的理念。虽然女权主义常常被这样理解,但它并不是主张无论男性能做什么,女性也能做什么的理念。
In my view, feminism is from first to last an idea of, for and by the minority. By minority, I mean those people who are oppressed, handicapped and/or discriminated against, and those who are weak and vulnerable. Feminism is not an idea that advocates that women should become powerful on a par with men, an idea I call a ‘catching-up strategy’, but should be an idea that respects the dignity of minorities just as they are. I may be no match for a man in terms of muscular strength. I may not be able to make it through life single-handedly. But why simply because of this, should I be forced to obey somebody else? It is feminism that has argued for this kind of respect for the weak. This being so, my answer is that there is only one possible solution for feminism and that is to aim in the direction of criminalizing all kinds of violence, regardless of whether it is public or
在我看来,女权主义从始至终都是一个关于少数群体、为少数群体、由少数群体提出的理念。这里所说的少数群体,是指那些被压迫、残障和/或受到歧视的人,以及那些弱小和脆弱的人。女权主义并不是主张女性应该变得和男性一样强大,这种观点我称之为“追赶策略”,而应当是一种尊重少数群体本来面貌尊严的理念。我在肌肉力量上可能无法与男性匹敌。我可能无法独自一人撑起生活。但仅仅因为这些,我为什么就必须服从别人呢?正是女权主义为这种对弱者的尊重进行了辩护。既然如此,我的答案是,女权主义唯一可能的解决方案,就是以将各种暴力行为刑事化为目标,无论这些暴力是公开的还是

private. It goes without saying, that this also includes the criminalization of war.
私下的。这一点不言而喻,也包括将战争刑事化。

Epilogue  尾声

A quick glance at this book may give the impression that it is only concerned with events that happened in the past. Be that as it may, my intention has been to discuss current issues. My reasoning here is that firstly, the construction of the past is always a current project and secondly, there has never been a period when the revision of history has been more controversial than today in this post-Cold War era.
快速浏览这本书,可能会给人一种它只关注过去发生的事件的印象。尽管如此,我的意图是讨论当前的问题。我的理由是,首先,过去的构建始终是一个当下的工程;其次,在这个后冷战时代,历史的修订从未像今天这样充满争议。
While I feel I have done my best to fully express myself concerning the arguments in this book, even so I would like to respond here to criticisms and questions that I expect will be thrown at me. These I predict will be from the standpoint of how in reality we should respond to questions put by those who have survived being comfort women and who demand an apology and compensation. Indeed, they may extend to the question of how we should respond to the unresolved problem of post-war compensation generally. Yet, this book was not written to discuss ideas about activism. At the same time, there is a strong resistance on the activist side to the reality of the comfort women becoming a target of academic speculation concerning what may or may not have happened, or the comfort women issue being made into a tool for interpreting history. Moreover, due to the creation of the Asian Women’s Fund by the Japanese government in 1995, the movement to compensate the victims is currently in deadlock and a more effective policy solution to replace this has yet to be found. Given this situation, it is perhaps necessary for me to express my own position here.
虽然我觉得自己已经尽力充分表达了对本书论点的看法,但我仍想在此回应一些我预料中会被提出的批评和质疑。我预测这些质疑将基于现实中我们应如何回应那些幸存的慰安妇提出的问题,她们要求道歉和赔偿。事实上,这些质疑可能还会延伸到我们应如何应对战后赔偿这一未解决问题的整体态度。然而,本书并非为讨论激进主义理念而写。同时,激进主义一方强烈抵制慰安妇成为学术推测的对象,质疑慰安妇问题是否被用作解释历史的工具。此外,由于日本政府于 1995 年设立了亚洲女性基金,赔偿受害者的运动目前陷入僵局,尚未找到更有效的政策解决方案来取代该基金。鉴于这种情况,我或许有必要在此表达我自己的立场。
Firstly, as a member of the nation-state that exists in reality as Japan, I feel that in political terms a piece of special legislation on post-war compensation is required. Transcending various political interpretations and the constraints of the Bilateral Treaty between Japan and Korea, it is possible to seek a transformation of the rules through special legislation by reflecting
首先,作为现实中存在的日本这个民族国家的一员,我认为在政治层面上需要一项关于战后赔偿的特别立法。超越各种政治解读以及日韩双边条约的限制,通过特别立法反映现实,有可能寻求规则的变革。

on the passing of half a century where post-war compensation has been consistently disregarded. It goes without saying, that the logic of individual claims must be incorporated within this. Even if the current reality is that this kind of standpoint is politically a minority view, the setting of such a goal is of itself significant. Moreover, while it is the case that two-thirds of those with Japanese nationality were born after the war, this fact actually accounts for the increase in those who are of the opinion that Japan must apologise and offer compensation. The task for post-war generations changes from one of passing down personal memories and experiences, to that of questioning how we should reconstruct the past. Our discursive battle is taking place in order to get more people to sympathise with this point of view [that individual claims should be recognised]. It is noteworthy that many of those who have been responsible for bringing about an actual paradigm change surrounding the comfort women are Japanese and Koreans born after the war.
在半个世纪过去后,战后赔偿问题一直被持续忽视。这其中,个人索赔的逻辑必须被纳入考量,这是不言而喻的。即使目前这种立场在政治上属于少数观点,设定这样的目标本身就具有重要意义。此外,虽然三分之二拥有日本国籍的人是在战后出生的,但这一事实实际上促使了更多人认为日本必须道歉并提供赔偿。战后世代的任务,从传承个人记忆和经历,转变为质疑我们应如何重构过去。我们的论辩正是为了让更多人同情这一观点——即应承认个人索赔。值得注意的是,推动慰安妇问题实际范式转变的许多人,都是战后出生的日本人和韩国人。
As indicated by Hashizume Daizaburō, 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} the post-war Japanese constitution was legally formulated on the basis of a revision of the constitution of the Japanese Empire. It is not the case that we are living under a revolutionary government that denied and overturned the former administration. Given this situation, it is self-evident that we must accept that the nation-state has the status of a legal entity meaning that the postwar Japanese state must take over the debts and liabilities of the state of the Japanese Empire. On this point, I am in agreement with the opinion of modern rationalist Hashizume.
正如桥爪大三郎所指出的, 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 战后日本宪法是在对大日本帝国宪法进行修订的基础上依法制定的。我们并非生活在一个否定并推翻前政权的革命政府之下。在这种情况下,不言而喻,我们必须接受民族国家具有法律主体地位的事实,这意味着战后日本国家必须继承大日本帝国国家的债务和负债。在这一点上,我同意现代理性主义者桥爪的观点。
Nevertheless, can we say that under a democratic system of political representation that this kind of political choice requires only that we exercise our rights as a citizen by voting in elections for individuals or parties whose policies we support? Clearly this is not the case, as the issue does not end there.
然而,我们能否说,在民主政治代表制度下,这种政治选择仅仅要求我们通过投票选举支持其政策的个人或政党来行使公民权利?显然情况并非如此,问题并未止步于此。
Secondly, we have a responsibility as citizens. Just as the state and the people are not the same, the government and citizens are not one. On the premise that the nation equals the voters, can we say that the matter is settled just because the government entrusts the tasks of making a state apology and paying compensation to policy-makers? Here in the world of representative democracy we see the logic that representation equals being
其次,作为公民我们有责任。正如国家与人民不同,政府与公民也不是一体的。在以民族等同于选民为前提的情况下,仅仅因为政府将国家道歉和赔偿的任务委托给政策制定者,就能说事情已经解决了吗?在代议制民主的世界里,我们看到的逻辑是代表即是被代表。

spoken for by proxy. Standing in opposition to this is the logic of participatory democracy and individual activism that we see in NonGovernment Organisations (NGOs). NGOs do not speak for the government and neither do they allow the government to speak for them. For example, even if you have a government that supports nuclear testing, an NGO can carry out action that is against this. Moreover, citizens have a responsibility to be involved in the kind of activities carried out by NGOs. In terms of the comfort women issue, the groups that immediately formed to support the law suit and the meetings held in many local areas by nongovernment, civic groups to hear the testimony of former comfort women and to consider the issue of post-war compensation represent the kind of direct action I am referring to here. In contrast, when every prefectural assembly and every city, town and village assembly took the decision to call for the deletion of all descriptions of the comfort women from history textbooks, the activities of citizens can also attempt to confront this backlash.
由代理人代为发声。与此相对立的是我们在非政府组织(NGO)中看到的参与式民主和个人行动主义的逻辑。非政府组织既不代表政府发声,也不允许政府代表他们发声。例如,即使政府支持核试验,非政府组织也可以采取反对的行动。此外,公民有责任参与非政府组织所开展的各类活动。就慰安妇问题而言,立即成立支持诉讼的团体,以及许多地方非政府公民团体举办的听取前慰安妇证词和讨论战后赔偿问题的会议,正是我这里所指的那种直接行动。相反,当每个县议会以及每个市、镇、村议会决定要求从历史教科书中删除所有关于慰安妇的描述时,公民的活动也可以试图应对这种反弹。
However, the logic of representation inherent in policy-making and court trials has its limits, as both must proceed according to pre-existing political and legal procedure. Although I do not deny the significance of court battles, at the same it is necessary to acknowledge their limitations as well.
然而,政策制定和法庭审判中固有的代表性逻辑是有其局限性的,因为两者都必须按照既定的政治和法律程序进行。虽然我不否认法庭斗争的重要性,但同时也必须承认其局限性。
It is then possible to make a case for raising funds to support the lives of survivors from within the above kind of citizens’ activism. At the same time, it goes without saying that the Asian Women’s Fund is a distortion that will do little to unravel the comfort women issue. It was established by the government and, as the Japanese name reveals, despite its private guise it is a national (kokumin) fund (kikin). 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} On the one hand the Japanese government repeats insistently that it cannot compensate individuals, yet on the other ‘atonement money’ is paid out in the name of the government, which has employed a double logic to suit itself. This inconsistency has already been widely criticised. Firstly, as the public character of the Asian Women’s Fund is ambiguous the issue of who is taking responsibility is also unclear. Secondly, and as a direct consequence of this, there is real concern that the Asian Women’s Fund is being used to cover up the fact that the state is not paying out any compensation. Thirdly, with the turn of phrase that all
因此,有理由通过上述公民行动筹集资金,以支持幸存者的生活。与此同时,不言而喻,亚洲妇女基金是一个扭曲的存在,几乎无法解决慰安妇问题。该基金由政府设立,正如其日文名称所示,尽管表面上是私人性质,但实际上是一个国家(kokumin)基金(kikin)。一方面,日本政府一再坚持不能向个人赔偿,另一方面却以政府名义支付“赔偿金”,采用了自我适应的双重逻辑。这种矛盾已被广泛批评。首先,由于亚洲妇女基金的公共性质模糊,责任归属问题也不明确。其次,作为直接后果,人们真正担心亚洲妇女基金被用来掩盖国家不支付任何赔偿的事实。第三,随着措辞的转变,所有…

the people should take responsibility we are once again reproducing a system that has no accountability in the manner seen in ‘the collective repentance of 100 million people’ ichioku sōzange ). 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} More importantly, the Asian Women’s Fund was established by riding roughshod over the opposition of the survivors and their support groups. Despite many survivors expressing the view that they would not accept such an ‘illogical payment of money’ or that this was 'not the kind of money that they had been seeking, the fund was created without their consent (Yun 1997, Yi et al., 1995). Furthermore, once the Asian Women’s Fund was up and running the concerns of the people involved quickly became reality. For a start, it gave the anti-comfort women lobby a pretext to campaign that the women were only after money. Another, is that it brought a division among the survivors and among the support groups on the question whether they should accept the money or not. The Fund has served as a testing ground (fumi-e) and the divisions that this has brought have caused deep trauma and undermined relationships among survivors and support groups.
人民应该承担责任,我们再次复制了一个没有问责制的体系,就像“亿万人集体忏悔”(ichioku sōzange)中所见的那样。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 更重要的是,亚洲妇女基金是在无视幸存者及其支持团体反对的情况下建立的。尽管许多幸存者表示他们不会接受这种“无理的金钱支付”或认为这“不是她们所寻求的那种钱”,该基金仍在未征得她们同意的情况下成立(Yun 1997,Yi 等,1995)。此外,一旦亚洲妇女基金开始运作,相关人员的担忧很快变成了现实。首先,它为反对慰安妇的游说团体提供了借口,声称这些妇女只是为了钱。其次,它在幸存者及支持团体之间就是否应接受这笔钱的问题引发了分裂。该基金成为了一个试金石(fumi-e),这种分裂带来了深刻的创伤,破坏了幸存者和支持团体之间的关系。
In the spring of 1997, only seven women had accepted any atonement money from the Asian Women’s Fund. After that it was reported that by early 1998, 50 women had accepted the money. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Payment is carried out in secret, and even those who appealed for the setting up of the Asian Women’s Fund and its board members have expressed concern that it has brought with it a rift among survivors and their support groups. Nevertheless, it was the side for the Asian Women’s Fund that created the situation of 'the buttons being put in the wrong button hole. Two-and-half years have passed since the Asian Women’s Fund was set up. Even though the Fund may have been created with good intentions - if the policy is assessed not on the basis of the logic of intentions but by the logic of results - those who appealed for the Fund to be established and its board members are responsible for the political stalemate and the escalation of mistrust in the Japanese government. Miki Mutsuko, political leader and the widow of late Liberal Democratic Party prime minister Miki Takeo, although previously among those who appealed for the Fund to be established, later resigned her position expressing criticism of it. It would not be that strange if we saw board members resigning in order to take responsibility for the political
1997 年春季,只有七名女性接受了亚洲女性基金的任何赔偿金。此后,据报道,到 1998 年初,已有 50 名女性接受了赔偿金。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 赔偿是在秘密中进行的,甚至那些呼吁设立亚洲女性基金及其董事会成员的人也表达了担忧,认为这导致了幸存者及其支持团体之间的分裂。尽管如此,正是支持亚洲女性基金的一方造成了“扣子扣错了扣眼”的局面。亚洲女性基金设立至今已过去两年半。即使该基金的设立初衷良好——如果不以初衷的逻辑评估政策,而是以结果的逻辑评估——呼吁设立该基金及其董事会成员应对政治僵局和对日本政府信任度的恶化负责。 三木睦子,政治领袖,已故自由民主党首相三木武夫的遗孀,虽然曾是呼吁设立该基金的人之一,但后来辞去了职务,表达了对该基金的批评。如果我们看到董事会成员辞职以承担政治责任,也不会感到奇怪。

turmoil caused today by the Asian Women’s Fund; a turmoil that nobody predicted when it was first established.
由亚洲妇女基金会引发的动荡;这是当初成立时无人预料到的动荡。
What is incomprehensible is that post-war liberal intellectuals are among the names of those who have enthusiastically supported the Asian Women’s Fund. Behind their motivation to support the Fund lie two factors. Firstly, they shared the political realism that given current political conditions, the chance of individual compensation being paid out is close to zero. Secondly, they also share feelings of sympathy and goodwill, presumably genuine, towards the survivors. One often hears the rhetorical question: What is wrong with the Fund?’ However, instead of complying with the appeal made by the government, why do they not start NGO fund raising-activities in the name of citizens?
令人费解的是,战后自由派知识分子中竟有许多人热情支持亚洲女性基金会。他们支持该基金的动机背后有两个因素。首先,他们认同一种政治现实主义,即鉴于当前的政治状况,个人赔偿几乎没有可能发放。其次,他们也怀有对幸存者的同情和善意,这种感情大概是真诚的。人们常听到这样一个修辞性的问题:“这个基金有什么不对吗?”然而,与其顺从政府的呼吁,为什么他们不以公民的名义发起非政府组织的募捐活动呢?
In fact, it is my opinion that there is nothing wrong with fund-raising itself. The problem here is that it is not being carried out by an NGO, but by the government. A few years before the Asian Women’s Fund was set up, my colleagues in feminist activism and I conceived an idea to carry out fund raising in an organised way through an NGO to support survivors in their every day life, and made preparations in secret. Due to numerous difficulties and obstacles, ultimately this idea never came to be realised. But because preparations for the fund-raising coincided time-wise with the announcement about the Asian Women’s Fund, some feminist activists made the distorted interpretation that we were fulfilling the will of the government.
事实上,我认为筹款本身没有什么问题。问题在于这不是由非政府组织来进行,而是由政府来操作。在亚洲女性基金成立的几年前,我和从事女权运动的同事们曾构思过通过非政府组织以有组织的方式筹款,支持幸存者的日常生活,并秘密进行了准备。由于种种困难和障碍,这一想法最终未能实现。但由于筹款准备的时间恰逢亚洲女性基金的宣布,一些女权活动家曲解了我们的意图,认为我们是在履行政府的意愿。
Nevertheless, the idea of fund-raising activity existed from early on within the support group movement. Even today, there is the NGO Sengo Hoshō Jitsugen Shimin Kikin (The citizens fund for realising post-war compensation) represented by Kawada Fumiko, which is opposed to the Asian Women’s Fund. Inside Korea, the Korean Council carried out independent fund-raising activities, which was later taken over by the Korean government paying out livelihood support to the survivors. Perhaps one reason that fund-raising has not emerged as a core task for activists [in Japan] is that it was feared that a fund raising campaign would serve to atone and pardon through money those citizens who responded to it. There has been a tendency for fund-raising to be a ‘prohibited strategy’ within movements due to a concern that it would further promote a climate in
尽管如此,筹款活动的理念从一开始就在支援团体运动中存在。即使在今天,也有由川田文子代表的非政府组织“战后补偿实现市民基金”,该组织反对亚洲妇女基金。在韩国国内,韩国议会进行了独立的筹款活动,后来由韩国政府接手,向幸存者支付生活补助。也许筹款未能成为[日本]活动家的核心任务的一个原因是,人们担心筹款活动会通过金钱赎罪和宽恕那些响应筹款的市民。由于担心筹款会进一步助长一种氛围,筹款在运动中往往被视为一种“禁止的策略”。
Japan where money can buy anything and, moreover, that it would cast a damper on the demand for the state to pay compensation. On the Korean side, support groups have gone as far as to express the notion that the provision of livelihood support should be ‘with our own hands’. So instead, a demand for state compensation has been the core strategy within support movements to the last.
在日本,金钱可以买到一切,而且这还会抑制对国家支付赔偿的要求。在韩国方面,支持团体甚至提出了“要靠我们自己的双手”来提供生活保障的观点。因此,要求国家赔偿一直是支持运动的核心策略,直到最后。
NGO fund-raising is for livelihood support, and does not take the form of an apology or compensation. This is because citizens cannot emerge as subjects responsible for offering an apology nor providing compensation for crimes committed by the state. The responsibilities of the state can only be fulfilled by the state. Nevertheless, we feel that citizens as citizens have their own way of showing solidarity and sympathy. It is fine to object to the Asian Women’s Fund, nevertheless, our inability to effectively organise a civil movement as an alternative to this is regretful evidence of our own incapability. I feel in my bones that there is widespread sentiment among the Japanese people who feel that they would like to do something for the victims, but we cannot find the way ahead, and that the Asian Women’s Fund has plugged up the entrance point for people who think this way.
非政府组织的募捐是为了生活支持,而不是以道歉或赔偿的形式进行。这是因为公民无法作为承担国家所犯下罪行的道歉或赔偿责任的主体出现。国家的责任只能由国家来履行。尽管如此,我们认为作为公民,公民有自己表达团结和同情的方式。反对亚洲妇女基金是可以的,然而,我们未能有效组织起一个作为替代方案的公民运动,这恰恰是我们自身无能的遗憾证据。我深切感受到,日本人民中普遍存在一种情感,大家都希望为受害者做些什么,但我们找不到前进的道路,而亚洲妇女基金堵塞了那些有此想法的人的入口。
In outlining my own position on the comfort women issue, a key point is the responsibility of the contextualised I. Personally for me, gender studies is both a profession and a vocation. The comfort women issue has tested my own gender theory and become the site of the most fervent struggle. Put another way, I took the questioning of the existence of the former comfort women as a questioning of my own positionality. A feminist friend who is a Korean resident in Japan stated the following: ‘The comfort women problem is a Japanese problem so let the Japanese think about it’. I completely agree with her. In 1991, when Kim Hak-sun made her testimony I was staying in Germany. Seven years have passed since I was confronted with important questions surrounding differences in the way that Germany and Japan have atoned for the atrocities of the last war. This book is the result of my attempt to respond to these questions to the best of my limited ability.
在阐述我自己关于慰安妇问题的立场时,一个关键点是“情境化的自我”的责任。对我个人而言,性别研究既是一种职业,也是一种使命。慰安妇问题考验了我自己的性别理论,并成为最激烈斗争的场所。换句话说,我将对前慰安妇存在的质疑视为对我自身立场的质疑。一位在日本居住的韩国女权主义朋友曾说:“慰安妇问题是日本的问题,就让日本人来思考吧。”我完全同意她的看法。1991 年,当金学顺作证时,我正待在德国。自那时起,七年过去了,我一直在面对德国和日本对上次战争暴行赎罪方式差异的重要问题。这本书是我尽我有限能力回应这些问题的成果。
Parts I and II of this book are based on revised versions of a paper given at the Second International Symposium of the Japan Society for the Promotion
本书的第一部分和第二部分基于我在日本促进学会第二届国际研讨会上发表论文的修订版本。

of Science, Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research General Project on ‘Wartime Mobilisation and Structural Change’ (representative Yamanouchi Yasushi). The theme of the second symposium was ‘Women and the Wartime Mobilisation System’ and held on July 9 th 9 th  9^("th ")9^{\text {th }} 1997, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. I am extremely grateful to Yamanouchi Yasushi, Narita Ryüichi and Nakano Toshio for organising the symposium that day. In addition to myself, Ute Frevert also presented a paper that day, and Nishikawa Yūko and Himeoka Toshiko were kind enough to act as commentators.
科学研究费补助金一般项目“战时动员与结构变迁”(代表:山内康)。第二次研讨会的主题是“女性与战时动员体制”,于 1997 年 7 月 9 th 9 th  9^("th ")9^{\text {th }} 日在东京外国语大学举行。非常感谢山内康、成田龙一和中野敏夫当天组织了这次研讨会。除了我本人,乌特·弗雷弗特当天也发表了论文,西川优子和姬冈敏子则亲切地担任了评论员。
Part III is based on a revision of a lecture sponsored by the Ajia Josei Kaigi Nettowāku (Asian women’s conference network) for the panel ‘Contemporary Japan Seen from a Gender Perspective’ on April 29 th 1997 29 th  1997 29^("th ")199729{ }^{\text {th }} 1997 at the Bunkyōku Josei Sentā (Women’s Centre in Bunkyoku, Tokyo). I am grateful to Funabashi Kuniko and Tachi Kaoru for providing me with the opportunity to make such an important presentation just after I had returned from a year’s leave in the United States and Mexico. Kim Pu-ja and Han Myong-suk were on the same panel. The symposium ‘Nationalism and the Comfort Women Issue’ sponsored by The Centre for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility (September 28 th 28 th  28^("th ")28{ }^{\text {th }} 1997, Surugadai Kaikan, Tokyo) gave me opportunity to explore these arguments further. I greatly appreciate the effort made by the Yoshimura Mariko from the executive office. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Soh Kyong-shik and Takahashi Tetsuya were on the same panel, and Kim Pu-ja and Nishino Rumiko kindly took on the job of coordinators.
第三部分基于我为亚洲女性会议网络(Ajia Josei Kaigi Nettowāku)主办的专题讨论会“从性别视角看当代日本”所做讲座的修订稿,该讲座于 29 th 1997 29 th  1997 29^("th ")199729{ }^{\text {th }} 1997 年 4 月在东京文京区女性中心(Bunkyōku Josei Sentā)举行。非常感谢船橋邦子和立薰为我提供了这样一个重要的发言机会,正值我刚从美国和墨西哥一年的休假归来。金富子和韩明淑也参加了同一小组讨论。由日本战争责任研究与资料中心主办的研讨会“民族主义与慰安妇问题”(1997 年 28 th 28 th  28^("th ")28{ }^{\text {th }} 月,东京骏河台会馆)让我有机会进一步探讨这些论点。我非常感谢执行办公室的吉村真理子所做的努力。吉见义明、苏京植和高桥哲也也参加了同一小组讨论,金富子和西野留美子则热心地担任了协调员。
At a symposium sponsored by the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Tokyo (1 October 1997), I acted as commentator for reports given by Wada Haruki, Korean studies specialist, and one of the executive committee members of the Asian Women’s Fund, and Ilse Lenz, a German scholar of women’s studies. Ōsawa Mari, a feminist scholar in social policy, was kind enough to take on the job of co-ordinator.
在东京大学社会科学研究所主办的一个研讨会上(1997 年 10 月 1 日),我担任了关于和田春树(韩国研究专家,亚洲妇女基金执行委员会成员之一)和伊尔泽·伦茨(德国女性研究学者)报告的评论员。社会政策领域的女性主义学者大泽真理也好心地担任了协调员的工作。
The questions I raised concerning historical methodology were taken up, and led me to a number of dialogues with historians. At the symposium ‘How should History be Narrated?’ sponsored by The International Institute of Language and Cultural Studies, Ritsumeikan University (July 5 th 5 th  5^("th ")5{ }^{\text {th }} 1997, Ritsudai Matsukawa Kaikan, Kyoto), I was one of the speakers along with
我提出的关于历史方法论的问题被采纳,并促使我与历史学家进行了多次对话。在立命馆大学国际语言文化研究所主办的“历史应如何叙述?”研讨会上(1997 年 7 月,立命馆松川会馆,京都),我与其他几位发言人一起参加了此次会议。
Narita Ryūichi and Sasada Kyōji, with Iwasaki Minoru and Watanabe Kōzō taking on the role of co-ordinators. I am extremely grateful to Nishikawa Nagao for organising the symposium. The Sōgō Joseishi Kenkyūkai (Association of Integrated Women’s History) held a seminar on ‘The Methodology of Women’s History’ with myself as a speaker (November 29 th 29 th  29^("th ")29{ }^{\text {th }} 1997, Kyodai Kaikan). Nishikawa Yūko who had been involved in the planning of the seminar acted as Chair that day. Wakita Haruko, Nakatani Ayami, Furukubo Sakura offered stimulating feedback as commentators.
成田龙一与笹田恭司,岩崎稔和渡边浩三担任协调员。我非常感谢西川长夫组织了此次研讨会。综合女性史研究会举办了题为“女性史的方法论”的研讨会,我作为演讲者出席(1997 年 11 月,京大会馆)。当日担任主持的是参与研讨会策划的西川优子。若田春子、中谷绫美、古久保樱作为评论员,提供了富有启发性的反馈。
On March 14 th 14 th  14^("th ")14{ }^{\text {th }} 1997, I was able to have my own panel on ‘Nationalism and Women’ at the Association of Asian Studies annual conference in Chicago, and had an opportunity to discover the reaction of American researchers. Ikeda Keiko co-ordinated the panel with me, and also chaired it on the day. Nishikawa Yüko, Ogino Miho, and Beth Katzoff travelled all the way from Japan especially to take part in the presentations. Claudia Koonz played the part of an extremely stimulating discussant. The incumbent President of the Association of Asian Studies, Carol Gluck, worked as an intermediary to welcome Claudia Koonz as the discussant and exerted considerable energy behind the scenes to ensure her participation in the Asian Studies Conference though she was not a member of the association nor a regional specialist.
1997 年 3 月 14 th 14 th  14^("th ")14{ }^{\text {th }} 日,我有幸在芝加哥举行的亚洲研究协会年会上举办了题为“民族主义与女性”的专场,并借此机会了解了美国研究者的反应。池田惠子与我共同协调了该专场,并在当天担任主持。西川裕子、小木野美穗和贝丝·卡佐夫特地从日本远道而来参加了演讲。克劳迪娅·库恩茨担任了极具启发性的讨论者。时任亚洲研究协会主席的卡罗尔·格拉克作为中间人,欢迎克劳迪娅·库恩茨担任讨论者,并在幕后付出了大量努力,确保她能参加亚洲研究会议,尽管她既不是协会成员,也不是该地区的专家。
In the same year, on 24 March, the same speakers were welcomed at a symposium that was held by the Department of East Asian Studies, Columbia University. As would be expected, Atina Grossmann developed a stimulating discussion.
同年 3 月 24 日,哥伦比亚大学东亚研究系举办的研讨会上,同样的发言人受到了欢迎。正如预期,阿蒂娜·格罗斯曼引发了一场激动人心的讨论。
Next, I am extremely grateful to the following people who provided me with opportunities to present my ideas on related themes in the form of public lectures, and, moreover, to those writers who involved me in discussions: Miyoshi Masao, Fujitani Takashi, Yoneyama Lisa, Soon-Suk Moon, Richard Okada, Don Roden, Dorothy Koh, Bonnie Smith, and Choi Kyon-Hi (all titles omitted).
接下来,我非常感谢以下人士,他们为我提供了以公开讲座形式展示相关主题思想的机会,更感谢那些与我共同参与讨论的作家:三好正雄、藤谷隆、米山丽莎、文顺淑、理查德·冈田、唐·罗登、多萝西·科、邦妮·史密斯,以及崔健熙(所有职称省略)。
I would like to express my thanks to Ikegami Yoshihiko from the editorial department of Gendai Shisō (contemporary ideas) and Fukada Taku from the editorial department of Impaction for providing me with an opportunity to present my arguments for the first time in their publications.
我想感谢《现代思想》编辑部的池上义彦和《Impaction》编辑部的深田拓,感谢他们首次在各自的刊物中给予我发表论点的机会。
In particular, the editor of Gendai Shisō took the decisive step of publishing in one go, all 140 pages of my original manuscript.
特别是《现代思想》的编辑果断采取了将我原稿全部 140 页一次性刊登的决定性步骤。
After the first article was published, I received feedback from a variety of people both for and against, and my response to this is incorporated into this book. In this process I owe much to discussions with the following people: all those who enrolled in the class I taught on ‘Japanese Feminist Thought’ at Barnard College, Colombia University in the autumn term of 1996; all those who took the ‘Ueno Seminars’ in the Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, University of Tokyo, in particular the special seminar course on ‘Nationalism and Women’ in the academic year 19971998.
第一篇文章发表后,我收到了来自各方的支持与反对意见,我对这些反馈的回应也融入了本书。在这个过程中,我非常感谢以下人士的讨论:1996 年秋季学期在哥伦比亚大学巴纳德学院我所教授的“日本女性主义思想”课程的所有学生;以及东京大学人文社会系研究生院参加“上野研讨会”的所有同学,特别是 1997-1998 学年关于“民族主义与女性”的专题研讨课程。
Part IV has been added to this English version as an update of the original Japanese edition, as I wished to include further developments in my thinking. I am extremely grateful to my translator, Beverley Yamamoto, and my publisher, Yoshio Sugimoto, who supported me in this idea. I cannot find words to express my gratitude to both of them, for discovering some importance in sharing my ideas with English-speaking academic communities, and who took painstaking trouble and patience throughout the entire process. I am also grateful for the financial support of the Japanese Council for the Promotion of Social Sciences, without which this project would not have been realized.
第四部分作为对原日文版的更新被加入到本英文版中,因为我希望包含我思想的进一步发展。我非常感谢我的译者贝弗利·山本和我的出版人杉本义雄,他们支持了我的这个想法。我无法用言语表达对他们的感激之情,感谢他们发现了与讲英语的学术界分享我的思想的重要性,并在整个过程中付出了艰辛的努力和耐心。我也感谢日本社会科学振兴会的财政支持,没有这笔支持,这个项目无法实现。
Ueno Chizuko  上野千鹤子
24 November 2003  2003 年 11 月 24 日

Postscript  后记

As an up-date, I would like to add the latest information regarding the Asia Women’s Fund. The Fund, set up in 1995, completed its brief this year. Over the eight years since it was established, the Fund has delivered atonement
作为最新情况补充,我想提供关于亚洲妇女基金的最新信息。该基金成立于 1995 年,今年已完成其使命。在成立的八年间,基金一直致力于赎罪工作。

money accompanied by a formal letter of apology from the current Prime Minister of Japan to up to 285 women survivors from Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In addition 79 Dutch women received government money for health care. In total, 364 survivors have been recipients of money from the Asian Women’s Fund. The distribution in numbers of recipients by country is not available. This is because the Fund has tried to keep from public view the number of Korean recipients due to concern that those receiving funds may be stigmatised. At the very least, it can be said that more than half of the recognised survivors in Korea refused to accept the money. The historical evaluation of the Fund as ‘better than nothing’ is still open to question.
日本现任首相向来自韩国、台湾和菲律宾的多达 285 名女性幸存者致以正式的道歉信,并附上了金钱赔偿。此外,79 名荷兰女性也获得了政府的医疗补助金。总计共有 364 名幸存者从亚洲女性基金会获得了资金。按国家划分的受助人数数据尚不可得。这是因为该基金会试图避免公开韩国受助者的数量,担心接受资金者可能会受到污名化。至少可以说,韩国被认可的幸存者中有超过一半拒绝接受这笔钱。对该基金会的历史评价为“总比没有好”仍然存在争议。
1890
  • Enactment of the Public Meetings and Political Association Act (Shūkai oyobi Seisha Hō). This law banned women from public meetings and political associations.
    《集会及政治协会法》(Shūkai oyobi Seisha Hō)的颁布。该法律禁止女性参加公开集会和政治协会。
1900
  • Enactment of the Police Security Law (Chian Keisatsu Hō) banning women’s political activity.
    颁布禁止女性政治活动的警察保安法(治安警察法)。
1925
  • Enactment of the Universal (Manhood) Suffrage Law (Futsū Senkyohō).
    《普通(男子)选举权法》(Futsū Senkyohō)的颁布。
1927
  • October 10: Inauguration of the Greater Japan Federation of Young Women’s Associations (Dai-Nippon Rengō Joshi Seinen Dan).
    10 月 10 日:大日本联合女子青年团(大日本联合女子青年团)成立。
1928
  • May 13: The establishment of Mother’s Day.
    5 月 13 日:母亲节设立。
  • July 1: Enlargement nationwide of the Special Higher Police Force (‘Thought Police’) (Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu, abbreviated to Tokkō).
    7 月 1 日:全国范围内扩大特别高等警察部队(“思想警察”)(Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu,简称 Tokkō)。
1930
  • May 10: Passing of the Women’s Civil Rights Act (Fujin Kōminken Hō) in the House of Representatives. Ran out of time in the House of Peers.
    5 月 10 日:众议院通过《妇女民权法》(Fujin Kōminken Hō)。在贵族院时间耗尽未能通过。
  • February 28: Passing of the Women’s Civil Rights Act (Fujin Kōminken Hō) in the House of Representatives. Rejected in the House of Peers.
    2 月 28 日:众议院通过《妇女民权法》(Fujin Kōminken Hō)。在贵族院被否决。
  • March 6: Founding of the Greater Japan Federated Women’s Association (Dai-Nippon Rengō Fujinkai). Celebration of the Empresse’s Birthday (the Empress’s birthday becomes Mother’s Day).
    3 月 6 日:成立大日本联合妇女会(Dai-Nippon Rengō Fujinkai)。庆祝皇后生日(皇后生日成为母亲节)。
  • September 18: The Manchurian Incident.
    9 月 18 日:满洲事变。

1932

  • January 28: The Shanghai Incident.
    1 月 28 日:上海事变。
  • March 1: Founding of the puppet state of Manchuria (Manshūkoku).
    3 月 1 日:伪满洲国(满洲国)成立。
  • March 18: Inauguration of the Osaka Women’s Association for National Defence (Ōsaka Kokubō Fujinkai)
    3 月 18 日:大阪国防妇人会(大阪国防妇人会)成立。
  • October 24: Inauguration of the Greater Japan Women’s Association for National Defence (Dai-Nippon Kokubō Fujinkai). In the ten years after its inauguration the Greater Japan Women’s Association for National Defence has a membership of 10 million.
    10 月 24 日:大日本国防妇人会(Dai-Nippon Kokubō Fujinkai)成立。成立后的十年内,大日本国防妇人会的会员人数达到一千万。

1933

  • March 27: Japan withdraws from the League of Nations.
    3 月 27 日:日本退出国际联盟。

1934

  • November 20: Discovery of a plot for a planned coup by commissioned officers from the Imperial Way faction.
    11 月 20 日:发现由皇道派军官策划的政变阴谋。

1935

  • Two prominent socialist women writers, Chūjo Yuriko and Kubokawa Ineko, are arrested.
    两位著名的社会主义女性作家,中条百合子和久保川伊根子被逮捕。

1937

  • July 7: The Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Beginning of the Sino-Japanese War.
    7 月 7 日:卢沟桥事变。中日战争开始。
  • August 24: Publication of the Outline for the Implementation of National Spiritual Mobilisation (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Yōkō).
    8 月 24 日:《国民精神动员纲要》发布。
  • September 28: Founding of the Japanese Federation of Women’s Groups (Nihon Fujin Dantai Renmei).
    9 月 28 日:日本妇女团体联合会(Nihon Fujin Dantai Renmei)成立。
  • October 12: Founding of the Central League for National Spiritual Mobilisation (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chūō Renmei). Councillors include Yoshioka Yayoi, President of the Greater Japan Federation of Young Women’s Groups, and Sanjonishi Nobuko, President of the Greater Japan Federated Women’s Association.
    10 月 12 日:中央国民精神动员联盟(Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chūō Renmei)成立。理事包括大日本青年妇女团体联合会会长吉冈弥生和大日本妇女联合会会长三条西信子。
  • November 20: Establishment of the Imperial Headquarters.
    11 月 20 日:设立帝国总部。
  • December 13: The occupation of Nanking. The massacre starts. Following the massacre, comfort stations are established systematically throughout China.
    12 月 13 日:占领南京。大屠杀开始。大屠杀之后,慰安所系统地在中国各地设立。

1938

  • January 1: The Mother and Child Protection Law (Boshi Hogo Hō) comes into effect.
    1 月 1 日:《母子保护法》(Boshi Hogo Hō)生效。
  • January 11: The Ministry of Welfare is established to promote population policy and improvement of physique.
    1 月 11 日:设立福利部,推动人口政策和体质改善。
1939
  • February 18: Founding of the Research Centre for Contemporary Women’s Issues (Fujin Jikyoku Kenkyūkai ) with Ichikawa Fusae as president.
    2 月 18 日:成立当代女性问题研究中心(Fujin Jikyoku Kenkyūkai),市川房枝任会长。
  • May 12: The Nomonhan Incident
    5 月 12 日:诺门罕事件
  • December 26: Korean’s forced to use Japanese family names.
    12 月 26 日:朝鲜人被强制使用日本姓氏。

1940

  • May 1: Enactment of the National Eugenics Law (Kokumin Yūsei Hō). Establishment of Eugenic Marriage Counselling Centres (Yūsei Kekkon Sōdansho).
    5 月 1 日:颁布国民优生法(Kokumin Yūsei Hō)。设立优生婚姻咨询中心(Yūsei Kekkon Sōdansho)。
  • July 10: Women’s groups mobilised to purge the use of unnecessary luxuries.
    7 月 10 日:妇女团体动员起来清除不必要的奢侈品使用。
  • July 19: Establishment of the Institute for Population Problems (Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūsho). An Outline on Population Policy (Jinkō Seisaku Taikō) is agreed on.
    7 月 19 日:成立人口问题研究所(Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūsho)。通过了《人口政策纲要》(Jinkō Seisaku Taikō)。
  • September 12: Dissolution of the Women’s Suffrage League (Fujin Sanseiken Dōmei).
    9 月 12 日:解散妇女选举权联盟(Fujin Sanseiken Dōmei)。
  • September 21: Dissolution of the League for the Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage) (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei), which is integrated into the Research Centre for Contemporary Women’s Issues.
    9 月 21 日:解散妇女选举权取得联盟(Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei),并并入当代妇女问题研究中心。
  • October 12: Inauguration of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai).
    10 月 12 日:大政翼赞会成立。
  • November 3: Ministry of Welfare chooses families with ten children or more for the Rewarding of Excellent Families with Many Children (Yüryō Tashi Katei no Hyōshō) awards.
    11 月 3 日:厚生省选定十个子女及以上的家庭,授予多子优秀家庭奖。

1941

  • January 22: The Outline for Establishing Population Growth (Jinkō seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō) is agreed on.
    1 月 22 日:通过《人口增长纲要》(Jinkō seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō)。
  • November 22: Issuing of the National Labour Patriotic Cooperation Ordinance (Kokumin Kinrō Hōkoku Kyōryoku Rei).
    11 月 22 日:发布《国民劳动爱国合作条例》(Kokumin Kinrō Hōkoku Kyōryoku Rei)。
  • December 8: Attack on Pearl Harbour. War between Japan and the United States begins. The name the ‘Great East Asian War’ (Dai-tōa sensō ) agreed on at a cabinet meeting to describe the war against the United States and Britain.
    12 月 8 日:珍珠港袭击。日本与美国之间的战争开始。在内阁会议上确定将对美英战争称为“大东亚战争”(Dai-tōa sensō)。

1942

  • February 2: Founding of the Greater Japan Women’s Association (DaiNippon Fujinkai) combining The Women’s Association for National Defence (Kokubō Fujinkai), membership nine million, The Women’s Patriotic Association (Aikoku Fujinkai), member-ship one million, and The Greater Japan Federated Women’s Association (Dai-Nippon Rengō Fujinkai).
    2 月 2 日:成立大日本妇人会(DaiNippon Fujinkai),合并了国防妇人会(Kokubō Fujinkai),会员九百万,爱国妇人会(Aikoku Fujinkai),会员一百万,以及大日本联合妇人会(Dai-Nippon Rengō Fujinkai)。
  • February 15: The Japanese army occupies Singapore.
    2 月 15 日:日本军队占领新加坡。
  • April 18: The first air raid attack on the Japanese mainland by U.S. jetfighters.
    4 月 18 日:美国喷气式战斗机首次对日本本土进行空袭。
  • November 5: Maternity passbooks start to be issued.
    11 月 5 日:开始发放产妇手册。
  • February 1: Japanese army retreat from Guadalcanal (more than 25 thousand die in battle or from starvation).
    2 月 1 日:日本军队从瓜达尔卡纳尔撤退(超过 2.5 万人在战斗或饥饿中死亡)。
  • June 25: Outline for the Establishment of a Wartime System of Student Mobilisation (Gakuto Senji Dōin Taisei Kakuritsu yōkō) is agreed on.
    6 月 25 日:通过《学生战时动员体制建立纲要》(学徒战时动员体制确立要纲)。
  • July 12: Women’s Total Action Central Rally (Fujin Sōkekki Taikai).
    7 月 12 日:妇女总行动中央集会(妇人总决起大会)。
  • September 22: Decision made to move ahead with the mobilisation of women.
    9 月 22 日:决定推进动员妇女。

1944

  • January 19: 143 Women’s Volunteer Corps enter Harima Shipbuilding Company.
    1 月 19 日:143 名妇女志愿队进入播磨造船厂。
  • March 8: The Imphal strategy is put into action (30,000 dead and 45,000 war wounded or sick).
    3 月 8 日:英帕尔战略付诸实施(3 万人死亡,4.5 万人战伤或患病)。
  • July 7: Total defeat in the Battle of Saipan followed by U.S. air raids of the Japanese mainland.
    7 月 7 日:塞班岛战役全军覆没,随后美国对日本本土进行空袭。
  • August 23: Student Mobilisation Ordinance (Gakuto Kinrō rei). Women’s Voluntary Labour Ordinance (Joshi Teishin Kinrō rei).
    8 月 23 日:学生动员条例(Gakuto Kinrō rei)。妇女志愿劳动条例(Joshi Teishin Kinrō rei)。

1945

  • February 1: Recruitment of women for aircraft maintenance work.
    2 月 1 日:招募女性从事飞机维护工作。
  • March: The Air Force recruits 600 female medical orderlies.
    3 月:空军招募 600 名女性医务勤务兵。
  • March 6: National Labour Mobilization Ordinance (Kokumin Kinrō Dōin Rei).
    3 月 6 日:国民劳动动员条例(Kokumin Kinrō Dōin Rei)。
  • March 10: Air raids on Tokyo.
    3 月 10 日:东京遭受空袭。
  • March 18: Outline on Educational Measures for the Final Battle (Kessen Kyōiku Sochi Yōkō) decided on (With the exception of elementary level, all school classes cancelled, and general mobilisation for production of munitions and food).
    3 月 18 日:决定《决战教育措施纲要》(决战教育措置要綱)(除小学阶段外,所有学校课程取消,全面动员生产军火和粮食)。
  • March 25: Organised evacuation of pregnant women and infants.
    3 月 25 日:有组织地疏散孕妇和婴儿。
  • April 1: Training of female medical orderlies.
    4 月 1 日:培训女性医务兵。
  • April 7: Sinking of the battleship Yamato by the U.S. in air attack in the waters off the coast of Kyushu ( 24,988 crew died). The Yamato was on route to Okinawa.
    4 月 7 日:美国在九州海岸附近水域的空袭中击沉战列舰“大和号”(24,988 名船员遇难)。大和号正前往冲绳途中。
  • June 13: The Greater Japan Women’s Association is dissolved in order to form the National Volunteer Combat Corps (Kokumin Giyū Sentōtai).
    6 月 13 日:为组建国民义勇战斗队(Kokumin Giyū Sentōtai),大日本妇女协会被解散。
  • June 23: Voluntary Military Service Law (Giyū Heiyeki Hō) (men aged 15 to 60 years, women aged 17 to 40 years organised as National Volunteer Combat Corps). Annihilation of the Okinawa defence force (190,000 dead).
    6 月 23 日:颁布《义勇兵役法》(Giyū Heiyeki Hō)(15 至 60 岁男性,17 至 40 岁女性组成国民义勇战斗队)。冲绳防卫部队全军覆没(19 万人死亡)。
  • August 6: Dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima.
    8 月 6 日:广岛原子弹爆炸。
  • August 9: Dropping of the atom bomb on Nagasaki.
    8 月 9 日:对长崎投下原子弹。
  • August 15: Japan accepts unconditional surrender with the Potsdam Declaration. War defeat.
    8 月 15 日:日本接受波茨坦公告的无条件投降。战争失败。
  • August 18: The Home Ministry gives instructions for the establishment of sexual comfort stations for the occupation forces.
    8 月 18 日:内务省下达指示,设立供占领军使用的性慰安所。
  • August 25: Ichikawa Fusae recommences the Women’s Suffrage League.
    8 月 25 日:市川房枝重新启动妇女选举权联盟。
  • August 26: Recreation and Amusement Associations (RAA) (Tokushu Ian Shisetsu Kyōkai) established.
    8 月 26 日:成立娱乐与游乐协会(RAA)(特殊院设施协会)。
  • December 17: Revision of the voting law (granting of women’s suffrage).
    12 月 17 日:修订选举法(赋予妇女选举权)。
1946
  • January 19: International Military Tribunal for the Far East Ordinance.
    1 月 19 日:远东国际军事法庭条例。
1946-1948
  • Trials of medical and military personnel held throughout Asia Pacific region (trials for B - and C -class war criminals).
    在亚太地区各地对医务人员和军事人员进行审判(B 级和 C 级战犯审判)。
1948
  • The Batavia Trial (trying those accused of involvement in the use of 35 Dutch women as comfort women).
    巴达维亚审判(审判被控参与使用 35 名荷兰妇女作为慰安妇者)。
1951
  • San Francisco Peace Treaty.
    旧金山和平条约。
1956
  • Authorisation of Japan’s admission to the United Nations.
    日本加入联合国的授权。
  • Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The Korean government gives up the right to further compensation in return for economic aid from Japan.
    《日韩基本关系条约》。韩国政府放弃进一步索赔权,以换取日本的经济援助。
1973
  • Restoration of Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.
    恢复日本对冲绳的主权。
  • Korean women’s campaign against sex tourism by Japanese men in Korea.
    韩国女性反对日本男性在韩国的性旅游运动。
1988
  • Korean women’s groups carry out an investigation of comfort stations established by the Japanese military.
    韩国女性团体对日本军队设立的慰安所进行调查。
1990
  • May-June: Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s visits Japan. A demand made in the Diet for an investigation of the comfort women issue. The Japanese government denies the state’s involvement, stating that civilian operators ran comfort stations.
    五月至六月:韩国总统卢泰愚访问日本。国会提出对慰安妇问题进行调查的要求。日本政府否认国家参与,称慰安所由民间经营者运营。
  • October 17: The Federation of Korean Women’s Groups sends an open letter to the Japanese government demanding an apology and an investigation.
    10 月 17 日:韩国妇女团体联合会向日本政府发送公开信,要求道歉并进行调查。
  • November: Formation of The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery.
    11 月:成立“被征召为军事性奴隶的韩国妇女委员会”。
1991
  • August: Kim Hak-Sun (aged 68) is first former comfort woman to come forward as a victim.
    8 月:金学顺(68 岁)成为首位公开作为受害者身份站出来的前慰安妇。
  • November 26: The inauguration in Tokyo of the Yuri Yoson Network on the Comfort Women Issue.
    11 月 26 日:慰安妇问题“百合洋松网络”在东京成立。
  • December 6: Thirty-two former soldiers, civilian personnel and surviving families, including Kim Hak Sun and two other former comfort women, file suit in the Tokyo District Court (Asia-Pacific Korean victims’ demand for compensation suit).
    12 月 6 日:包括金学顺及另外两名前慰安妇在内的 32 名前士兵、文职人员及幸存家属,在东京地方法院提起诉讼(亚太地区韩国受害者赔偿诉讼)。
  • January 13: Japanese government acknowledges for the first time its involvement in the establishment of comfort stations.
    1 月 13 日:日本政府首次承认其参与设立慰安所。
  • February: Comfort women issue is taken up by the UN Commission on Human Rights.
    2 月:慰安妇问题被联合国人权委员会提上议程。
  • July: Publication of documents by the Japanese government showing official military involvement in the comfort stations.
    7 月:日本政府公布文件,显示官方军方参与慰安所的事实。
1993
  • The comfort women issue presented to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The comfort women issue re-presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The comfort women issue presented to the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery.
    慰安妇问题提交给联合国防止歧视和保护少数民族小组委员会。慰安妇问题再次提交给联合国人权委员会。慰安妇问题提交给当代奴隶制工作组。
  • May: The Japanese government repeats that all claims were settled with the bi-lateral treaty between Japan and Korea, and that it has no legal obligation concerning individual compensation.
    五月:日本政府重申,所有索赔已通过日韩双边条约解决,且对个人赔偿不负法律义务。
  • August 4: The Japanese government acknowledges and apologises for the forced recruitment of comfort women.
    八月四日:日本政府承认并为强制征募慰安妇道歉。
1995
  • August 15: The Japanese government inaugurates the Asian Women’s Fund (Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin).
    8 月 15 日:日本政府成立亚洲妇女基金(女性のためのアジア平和国民基金)。
  • September: The comfort women is one area of focus during the NGO forum at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.
    九月:慰安妇问题成为联合国第四次世界妇女大会非政府组织论坛的一个关注点。

1996

  • April 19: The UN adopts Coomaraswamy’s Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime.
    四月十九日:联合国通过了库马拉斯瓦米关于对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、大韩民国和日本进行军事性奴役问题考察的报告。
  • August: The Asian Women’s Fund moves ahead with paying out ‘atonement money’, which 50 Filipino women accept but other women reject.
    八月:亚洲妇女基金会推进支付“赔偿金”,其中 50 名菲律宾女性接受,但其他女性拒绝。
  • December: The inauguration of the Japanese Group for Orthodox History Education (Atarashii Kyōkasyo o Tsukuru Kai). The group demands that
    十二月:日本正统历史教育团体(Atarashii Kyōkasyo o Tsukuru Kai)成立。该团体要求

    references to the comfort women be deleted from school history books authorised for use in the academic year 1997-1998 by the Ministry of Education.
    对 1997-1998 学年教育部批准使用的学校历史教科书中关于慰安妇的提及被删除。
1997
  • January 1: Seven Korean women receive payments of atonement money from the Asian Women’s Fund.
    1 月 1 日:七名韩国女性从亚洲妇女基金会获得赔偿金。
  • December 6: A report by the Asian Women’s Fund is featured in Korean newspapers. The Korean government states that this is ‘undesirable’.
    12 月 6 日:亚洲妇女基金会的一份报告在韩国报纸上刊登。韩国政府表示这是“不受欢迎的”。
  • December 16: Kim Hak-Sun dies aged 73.
    12 月 16 日:金学顺去世,享年 73 岁。
1998
  • January 1: Announcement by the Asian Women’s Fund that more than 50 women have received atonement money, which serves to create conflict among the survivors.
    1 月 1 日:亚洲妇女基金会宣布已有超过 50 名女性领取了赔偿金,这引发了幸存者之间的矛盾。
  • August 14: Opening of the memorial museum on the comfort women attached to the House of Sharing (Nanumu).
    8 月 14 日:慰安妇纪念馆在“共享之家”(Nanumu)开幕。
2000
  • December 7-12: Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery held in Tokyo as a citizens tribunal by the Violence Against Women in War Network International (VAWW-NET International).
    12 月 7 日至 12 日:由国际战争中针对妇女暴力网络(VAWW-NET International)作为公民法庭在东京举办的 2000 年国际妇女战争罪行法庭,审理日本军队性奴役案件。
2001
  • December 4: A final judgement is issued by the judges of the Women’s Tribunal. This finds the late Emperor Hirohito guilty for the practice of military sexual slavery.
    12 月 4 日:妇女法庭的法官发布最终判决,认定已故的裕仁天皇对军队性奴役行为负有罪责。
2002
  • September: The Asian Women’s Fund finishes its project and announces that a total of 364 women of 4 nationalities have received atonement money to date.
    九月:亚洲妇女基金会完成其项目,并宣布迄今已有来自 4 个国家的共计 364 名女性获得了赔偿金。

Notes  注释

Translator's Introduction
译者介绍

1 The term World War II is Euro-centric and fails to take account of the fact that Japan’s military expansionism started with the Manchuria Incident in 1931 and continued through until surrender in 1945. Japan moved into a phase of total war with China in 1937, following the China Incident, and continued to push further into Asia until the Pacific War began with the invasion of Pearl Harbour in 1941, bringing the United States into the conflict. John Dower notes that ‘At the peak of its expansion in 1942, Japan bestrode Asia like a colossus, one foot planted in the mid-Pacific, the other deep in the interior of China, its ambitious grasp reaching north to the Aleutian Islands and south to the Western colonial enclaves of Southeast Asia’ (Dower, 1999:21). Some writers speak in terms of the Fifteen-year War, but I prefer the geographical explicitness of the term Asia-Pacific War.
1 “第二次世界大战”这一术语具有欧洲中心主义色彩,未能考虑到日本的军事扩张始于 1931 年的“满洲事变”,并持续到 1945 年投降。日本于 1937 年“七七事变”后进入对华全面战争阶段,并持续向亚洲其他地区推进,直到 1941 年珍珠港事件引发太平洋战争,美国由此加入冲突。约翰·道尔指出:“1942 年日本扩张达到顶峰时,宛如一尊巨像横跨亚洲,一脚踏在中太平洋,另一脚深入中国内陆,其野心伸展至北方的阿留申群岛和南方的东南亚西方殖民地”(Dower, 1999:21)。有些作者称之为十五年战争,但我更倾向于使用地理上更明确的“亚太战争”一词。

2 Yoshimi Yoshiaki is Professor of History at Chūō University in Tokyo. He is a founding member of the Centre for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility (Nihon no sensō sekinin shiryō sentaa), and has been actively involved in unearthing documents and coordinating scholarly research concerning Japanese war crimes. It was the publication of documents discovered by Yoshimi in the Japanese Self-defence Agency archives that led to the government finally admitting military involvement in the operation of the comfort women system and offering an apology to the survivors. His book the Comfort Women (both Japanese and English editions) is considered essential reading on the subject. In his Pulitizer Prize winning book Embracing Defeat, John Dower notes that ‘exceptional research and analysis’ on war crimes has been carried out by Yoshimi Yoshiaki and acknowledges that he is indebted to his scholarship (Dower, 2000:17).
2 吉见义明是东京中央大学的历史教授。他是日本战争责任研究与资料中心(Nihon no sensō sekinin shiryō sentaa)的创始成员之一,积极参与发掘文件并协调有关日本战争罪行的学术研究。正是吉见在日本自卫队档案中发现的文件的发表,促使政府最终承认军方参与慰安妇制度的运作,并向幸存者道歉。他的著作《慰安妇》(日文版和英文版)被视为该主题的必读书目。在普利策奖获奖作品《拥抱失败》中,约翰·道尔指出吉见义明在战争罪行方面进行了“卓越的研究和分析”,并承认自己受益于他的学术成果(Dower, 2000:17)。

3 After the war the comfort women issue was raised as a war crime in the case of the comfort stations that had been set up in Semarang on the island of Java. Those involved in operation of the comfort stations were tried for war crimes in a case brought to the Dutch military court in Batavia in 1948. There were 13 defendants of which 11 were found guilty (seven officers and four civilian comfort station operators). Sentences ranged from 2 years penal servitude to the death penalty. What is notable about this trial is that the Dutch Government excluded all cases where the women acknowledged that they had more or less ‘volunteered’ to work in the comfort stations (see Yoshimi, 1995: 171-175).
3 战后,慰安妇问题作为战争罪行被提出,涉及在爪哇岛三宝垄设立的慰安所。参与慰安所运营的人士于 1948 年在巴达维亚的荷兰军事法庭受审。共有 13 名被告,其中 11 人被判有罪(包括 7 名军官和 4 名民间慰安所经营者)。判决刑期从 2 年劳役到死刑不等。此案值得注意的是,荷兰政府排除了所有女性承认自己或多或少“自愿”在慰安所工作的案件(参见 Yoshimi,1995:171-175)。

4 At the Tokyo Trials, ‘Crimes against Humanity’ were defined as ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed before, or during the war, or persecution on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the
4 在东京审判中,“反人类罪”被定义为“在战争前或战争期间实施的谋杀、灭绝、奴役、驱逐及其他不人道行为,或基于政治或种族理由的迫害,这些行为是在本法庭管辖范围内的任何罪行的执行或相关过程中实施的,无论是否违反实施国的国内法。参与的领导者、组织者、煽动者及共犯,均被追究责任。”

formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such a plan’ (Dower, 2000,456; emphasis added). Clearly, there was ample room within this definition for the comfort women system to have been treated as a Crime against Humanity at the Tokyo Trials.
“制定或执行共同计划或阴谋以实施上述任何犯罪的人,应对执行该计划的任何人的所有行为负责”(Dower,2000,456;加重强调)。显然,在这一定义范围内,慰安妇制度完全可以被视为东京审判中的反人类罪。

5 It is interesting to note that initially the group had called themselves the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Service. The fact that today they only use the phrase ‘sexual slavery’ is indicative of the paradigm shift that occurred in how the comfort women issue has been understood. I am grateful to one of my post-graduate dissertation students, Elisabeth Frischknecht Kind, for this insight.
5 有趣的是,最初该团体自称为“被征召为军事性服务的韩国妇女委员会”。如今他们仅使用“性奴役”一词,反映了慰安妇问题理解方式发生的范式转变。我感谢我的一位研究生论文学生 Elisabeth Frischknecht Kind 提供的这一见解。

6 In fact, the content of this TV debate and the content of what Yoshimi ‘admitted’ to has been the focus of a heated debate between Yoshimi and Ueno. Yoshimi has reacted strongly to Ueno’s accusation of ‘privileging of documentary sources’. For a record of this debate see Yoshimi, 2003 and Ueno, 2003).
6 实际上,这场电视辩论的内容以及吉见“承认”的内容一直是吉见与上野之间激烈辩论的焦点。吉见对上野指责其“偏重文献资料”反应强烈。有关这场辩论的记录,请参见吉见,2003 年和上野,2003 年。

7 In keeping with recent trends, it was re-named the Kitakyushu Municipal Gender Equality Centre MOVE in 2002.
7 顺应近期趋势,该机构于 2002 年更名为北九州市性别平等中心 MOVE。

Introduction to the English Edition
英文版导言

1 [Translator’s note] The historikersteit refers to the near explosion of historical debate in Germany in the mid-1980s fought out in professional journals as well as the media concerning how World War II should be remembered.
1【译者注】“历史学家之争”(historikerstreit)指的是 20 世纪 80 年代中期德国围绕如何纪念第二次世界大战,在专业期刊和媒体中爆发的激烈历史辩论。

Part I: Engendering the Nation
第一部分:赋予国家性别属性

1 In response to claims made by German historian Ernst Nolte in the 1980s, German intellectuals including Jūrgen Habermas and Jūrgen Kocka have been engaged in an explosive debate over how to understand Nazi war crimes. Should they be viewed as typical of the kind of atrocities carried out by totalitarian regimes and therefore ranked alongside crimes committed in Russia under Stalin’s dictatorship or in Indochina under the Pol Pot regime? Alternatively, does what happened in Germany have no parallel in history? A review of this debate can be found in Habermas et al., 1987.
1 针对德国历史学家恩斯特·诺尔特在 1980 年代提出的主张,包括尤尔根·哈贝马斯和尤尔根·科克在内的德国知识分子展开了激烈辩论,讨论如何理解纳粹战争罪行。应否将这些罪行视为极权政权所犯暴行的典型,因此与斯大林独裁下的俄罗斯或波尔布特政权下的印度支那所犯的罪行并列?或者,德国所发生的事情在历史上无可比拟?关于这场辩论的综述可见哈贝马斯等人,1987 年。
2 Through structuralism to the current trend of thought known as post-structuralism, the development of linguistics (semiotics) since Saussure has led to a broad area of shared epistemological ground. A change in epistemological paradigm occurred with the realisation that things and meanings do not exist as givens to which linguistic signs are conferred, but instead the sign is the preceding factor and constructs meaning and content. A central core of postmodernism is that the subject is completely self-referencing, nothing more than the effect of linguistic practices.
2 从结构主义到被称为后结构主义的当前思潮,自索绪尔以来语言学(符号学)的发展促成了一个广泛的共同认识论基础。认识论范式的转变发生在意识到事物和意义并非作为既定存在而被赋予语言符号,而是符号是先行因素,构建了意义和内容。后现代主义的核心之一是主体完全是自我指涉的,仅仅是语言实践的效果。

3 [Translator’s note] Michel Foucault (1926-1984) has been a controversial figure in the social sciences since the 1970s. A French post-structuralist philosopher, Foucault is best known for his four studies: Madness and Civilization (1961), The Birth of the Clinic (1963), Discipline and Punishment (1975) and The History of Sexuality (vol. 1 1976). Through these case studies of madness, medicine, prisons and sexuality, Foucault was able to demonstrate that across time and space major shifts have occurred in the discursive formations (structures of knowledge) used to order our knowledge of the world. Such shifts force a change in the systems we use to categorize knowledge, which impacts our everyday beliefs and practices. Foucault argued that discursive formations have the power to both shape and exert power over social objects, from large institutions to individual human bodies. Thus, structures of knowledge are inherently political structures.
3【译者注】米歇尔·福柯(1926-1984)自 20 世纪 70 年代以来一直是社会科学领域的争议人物。作为一位法国后结构主义哲学家,福柯最著名的四部著作是:《疯狂与文明》(1961)、《诊所的诞生》(1963)、《规训与惩罚》(1975)和《性史》(第一卷,1976)。通过对疯狂、医学、监狱和性这四个案例的研究,福柯展示了在不同时间和空间中,用于组织我们对世界认知的话语结构(知识结构)发生了重大转变。这些转变迫使我们改变用于分类知识的系统,从而影响我们的日常信念和实践。福柯认为,话语结构不仅能够塑造社会对象,还能对其施加权力,这些社会对象既包括大型机构,也包括个体人体。因此,知识结构本质上就是政治结构。

4 Both of these phrases were cited in the prefaces of Suzuki 1996a and 1996b.
4 这两个短语均出现在铃木 1996a 和 1996b 的前言中。

5 [Translator’s note] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant is considered to be one of the greatest of all modern philosophers. He attempted to synthesize the dominant rival epistemological traditions of his day: empiricism and rationalism. Kant rejected the central doctrine of empiricism that substantive human knowledge is limited to that which can be tested by empirical observation. Yet, he also rejected the rationalist claim that knowledge comes from reason alone. Kant argued that there are forms of human knowledge that are not mere tautologies despite being based on reason rather than derived from experience. Yet knowledge gained from an understanding of ‘things-inthemselves’ could only be legitimately applied within the realm of experience. As such, he tried to resolve the tension between acknowledging a world beyond what is immediately observable, and accepting what he considered to be the bogus claims to knowledge of theology and metaphysics based on faith, intuition of ‘pure reason’.
5【译者注】伊曼努尔·康德(1724-1804)。康德被认为是所有现代哲学家中最伟大的人物之一。他试图综合当时占主导地位的两大对立认识论传统:经验主义和理性主义。康德否定了经验主义的核心教义,即实质性的人类知识仅限于通过经验观察可验证的内容。然而,他也拒绝了理性主义声称知识仅来源于理性的观点。康德认为,存在基于理性而非经验推导的非同义反复的人类知识形式。然而,从“物自身”的理解中获得的知识只能合法地应用于经验领域。因此,他试图解决承认超出直接可观察世界的存在与接受他认为基于信仰、对“纯理性”的直觉而产生的神学和形而上学虚假知识主张之间的矛盾。

6 For example, in the case of problems that people are reluctant to discuss in public such as domestic violence and child sex abuse, even if those involved do come forward and testify, it is frequently the case that their testimony is denied on the basis that it is not ‘fact’. In extreme cases the testimony is thought to be false memory or a lie and the victim is deemed to be in need of medical treatment.
例如,对于人们不愿在公开场合讨论的问题,如家庭暴力和儿童性虐待,即使相关人员站出来作证,他们的证词也常常被否定,理由是这不属于“事实”。在极端情况下,证词被认为是虚假记忆或谎言,受害者则被认为需要接受医疗治疗。
7 [Translator’s note] In the original Japanese the author used the equivalent of quotation marks around the phrase comfort women throughout to emphasise the fact that it is a highly contentious term. In the English translation, while acknowledging the contentious nature of the phrase, I will omit the quotations marks hereafter in the interests of the publisher’s house style, where a minimalist approach is taken to punctuation. I will follow the same approach with other contentious terms, inserting quotation marks only on the first occasion that they appear.
7【译者注】在原日文中,作者在“慰安妇”一词周围使用了相当于引号的标记,以强调该词是一个高度有争议的术语。在英文翻译中,虽然承认该词的争议性,但为了符合出版社的风格,即对标点采取极简主义方法,今后将省略引号。对于其他有争议的术语,我也将采取同样的做法,仅在首次出现时加引号。

8 In Part II there is an in-depth discussion of the comfort women issue.
8 第二部分对慰安妇问题进行了深入讨论。

9 [Translator’s note] Recent scholarship, particularly within the field of post-colonial studies, has pointed to the created rather than inherently authentic nature of much of what we call tradition. The invention of tradition is considered to be a key part of the process of nation building; a tool employed for creating and unifying national identity.
9【译者注】近年来的学术研究,特别是在后殖民研究领域,指出我们所称的许多传统是被创造出来的,而非固有真实的。传统的发明被认为是国家建设过程中的关键部分;是一种用于创造和统一民族认同的工具。

10 Speaking from the perspective of post-colonial analysis, Oguma’s argument is incomplete. By accepting the concepts of ‘people’ and ‘nation’ as givens, he is led into the trap of taking the heterogeneous or multicultural nation for granted (see Tomiyama, 1997).
10 从后殖民分析的角度来看,小熊的论点是不完整的。通过接受“人民”和“国家”这两个概念为既定事实,他陷入了理所当然地认为国家是异质的或多元文化的陷阱(参见富山,1997 年)。

11 [Translator’s note] The Kojiki (The record of ancient matters) was compiled in 712 and is Japan’s earliest surviving ‘historical’ narrative. It covers the period from the mythical creation of Japan to the reign of Emperor Suiko (AD544-628). The Nihon Shoki (The chronicles of Japan) was compiled in 720 and is a mythological narrative of the founding of the Japanese state focusing on the Imperial Household line. It traces the imperial line from the descent from heaven of the descendants of the gods’ (tenson kōrin) to the reign of the Jito Emperor (690-697).
11 【译者注】《古事记》成书于 712 年,是日本现存最早的“历史”叙事作品。它涵盖了从日本神话创世到推古天皇(公元 544-628 年)统治时期的历史。《日本书纪》成书于 720 年,是一部关于日本建国的神话叙事,重点讲述皇室世系。它追溯了从“天孙降临”(天孙降临)到持统天皇(690-697 年)统治时期的皇室血脉。

12 Yamanouchi suggests that Mitani Taichirō’s Shinpan Taishō Demokurashi-(New edition Taishō democracy), published by University of Tokyo Press in 1995, and Mitani Taichirō’s Taishō Demokurashi- (Taishō democracy), published by Iwanami Shoten in 1974 and then again in 1994, are representative of accepted theory here.
12 山内指出,三谷太一郎于 1995 年由东京大学出版会出版的《新版大正民主主义》和 1974 年及 1994 年由岩波书店出版的《大正民主主义》是此处被接受理论的代表作。

13 For example, we can find the classical argument in this area within the field of family history. The discontinuity view of history’s overestimation of post-war democratisation contributes to the creation of the phantom of the pre-war family system as a ‘relic of the feudal system’. As a result, the ‘modern’ characteristics of the pre-war family and the oppressive characteristics of the post-war family end up being disregarded by the official paradigm even in much of the empirical research. In contrast, the continuity school of history underscores the commonalities between the pre- and post-war family in terms of structure and character, but offers two versions of this. One viewpoint emphasises the discontinuities between the pre-modern and modern family, the other stresses anew the continuities. The former viewpoint can be seen in the importance placed on modern family characteristics of the Japanese ie (household) in Ueno 1994a, which later produced the ‘Modern Family Controversy’ (Tabata, Ueno and Fukutō, 1997). From the latter viewpoint, the modern characteristics of the family (characteristics that fit in with the modernisation project) are traced back to the pre-modern era to verify there immanence and spontaneity, and in so doing the continuity and superiority of Japanese cultural identity ends up being emphasized (Hirayama, 1995; Yamazaki 1990). Proponents of the latter viewpoint, who can only be described as the ultracontinuity school of history, clear the way for a new cultural nationalism and frequently end up contributing to the theory of Japan’s uniqueness.
13 例如,我们可以在家族史领域中找到这一领域的经典论点。历史断裂论高估了战后民主化,助长了将战前家族制度视为“封建制度遗迹”的幻象。因此,即使在许多实证研究中,官方范式也最终忽视了战前家族的“现代”特征和战后家族的压迫性特征。相比之下,历史连续论强调战前与战后家族在结构和特征上的共性,但对此有两种版本。一种观点强调前现代家族与现代家族之间的断裂,另一种则重新强调其连续性。前者观点可以在上野千鹤子的《日本家》(ie,户)现代家族特征的重要性中看到(上野 1994a),这后来引发了“现代家族争论”(田畑、上野、福藤,1997)。 从后者的观点来看,家庭的现代特征(符合现代化项目的特征)被追溯到前现代时代,以验证其内在性和自发性,在此过程中,日本文化身份的连续性和优越性最终被强调(平山,1995;山崎,1990)。持后者观点的人只能被称为极端连续性历史学派,他们为新的文化民族主义铺平了道路,并经常最终促成了日本独特性理论的发展。

14 Narita Ryūichi coined the name ‘neo-continuity theory’ (Yamanouchi, Narita, Ōuchi, 1996b:10).
14 成田龙一创造了“新连续性理论”这一名称(山内、成田、大内,1996b:10)。

15 Yamanouchi’s argument contains one more innovation, namely the total mobilisation system. He embraces Systems Theory here to argue that with the introduction of total mobilisation the modern nation-state entered a new stage of being a so-called ‘system society’. I do not hold with this part of Yamanouchi’s thesis for three reasons. First, a ‘system’ as Systems Theory terminology is
15 山内的论点还包含另一个创新,即全面动员体制。他在这里采用系统理论,认为随着全面动员的引入,现代民族国家进入了所谓“系统社会”的新阶段。我不认同山内这一部分论断,原因有三。首先,作为系统理论术语的“系统”是

a generic concept that is open to being applied to any system. The fact that any social system can be described as a ‘system society’ renders it a virtually indefinable concept. Second, the implication of the system society is that, as a system of interdependence lacking a centre, it is an irresponsible system with no subject, which is one of the clichés of the post-war Nihonjinron. As such, it cannot be said that this is a unique concept that requires the creation of new terminology. Third, if the ‘system society’ implies that there is a bureaucratic leadership model of an irresponsible system with no centre, it is because through the attribution of personified agency to the system it has become linked with political conservatism that supports the status quo. Yamanouchi’s idea of a system society needs greater theoretical elaboration and until the implications of it are clarified I would like to reserve judgement on this part of his thesis. Here I think that with the nation-state as a key concept the term nationalisation is more than adequate. On this point, I am greatly indebted to Nishikawa Nagao, 1994.
这是一个通用概念,可以应用于任何系统。任何社会系统都可以被描述为“系统社会”,这使得该概念几乎无法定义。其次,系统社会的含义是,作为一个缺乏中心的相互依赖系统,它是一个没有主体的不负责任的系统,这也是战后日本人论中的陈词滥调之一。因此,不能说这是一个需要创造新术语的独特概念。第三,如果“系统社会”意味着存在一个没有中心的不负责任系统的官僚领导模式,那是因为通过赋予系统以拟人化的能动性,它与支持现状的政治保守主义联系在一起。山内的系统社会思想需要更深入的理论阐述,在其含义明确之前,我愿意对他论点的这一部分保留判断。在这里,我认为以民族国家为关键概念,“民族化”一词已经足够。对此,我非常感谢西川长夫,1994 年。

16 See Ueno 1995b for a discussion of the concept gender. There is a misunderstanding that gender studies takes a more neutral and objective position than feminism or women’s studies (so this fits in with calls for the current governmental policy of a gender-equal society!) and there are those who, based on this misunderstanding, are repelled by or critical of the concept. However, I can only say that both positions are mistaken. The aforementioned study considers the political and militantly critical nature of the concept gender. Moreover, as will become clear later, a concept of gender works to demolish the myth of gender neutrality.
16 参见上野 1995b 对“性别”概念的讨论。有人误解性别研究比女权主义或女性研究采取更中立和客观的立场(因此这与当前政府推动性别平等社会的呼声相符!),基于这种误解,有些人对该概念感到排斥或持批评态度。然而,我只能说这两种立场都是错误的。上述研究认为“性别”概念具有政治性和激进批判性。此外,正如后文将会明确指出的,性别概念有助于打破性别中立的神话。

17 In retrospect, I must confess that a hidden motive behind my underestimation of the state was my reluctance to enlarge the role of the state. When Capitalism and Domestic Labour (1985) was published by Kaimeisha, which formed the basis for Patriarchy and Capitalism (1990), I was criticised by Takenaka Emiko, a leading feminist economist, and various reviewers for underestimating the welfare state model as a solution in my analysis of unpaid labour. While this criticism was absolutely appropriate, prior to this I had already regarded the welfare state as a version of the control state, and indicated my scepticism about its role. According to recent news reports (Asahi Shinbun, 26 August 1997), it has become clear that between 1935 and 1976 the Swedish government carried out compulsory sterilisations on 60,000 people under the Sterilisation Law, including those deemed to be ‘inferior persons’, single women who had borne many children, ‘abnormal persons’ and ‘gypsies’. The reason for this was an economic one (if the people become healthier there would be fewer people needing social security) and can be said to demonstrate more clearly than anything else that a welfare state is a reproductive control state. While the Sterilisation Law was abolished in 1976, Sweden’s generous maternal protection policies and family policies in the 1970s were triggered directly by a decrease in the birth rate (the reproduction rate fell below population replacement level) and can be considered a continuation of population policy. It is not difficult to imagine that a state that adopts generous pronatalist policies in response to a decline in the birth rate will implement population control policies in the case of overpopulation. For those who regarded the Swedish model of the welfare state as ideal, the above reports must have come as a shock. Yet, for somebody who views the welfare state as a version of the control state it came as no surprise.
17 回顾过去,我必须承认,我低估国家的一个隐藏动机是我不愿扩大国家的角色。《资本主义与家庭劳动》(1985 年)由开明社出版,成为《父权制与资本主义》(1990 年)的基础,我因此在无偿劳动分析中低估福利国家模式作为解决方案,受到了著名女性主义经济学家竹中惠美子及多位评论家的批评。虽然这种批评完全合理,但在此之前,我已经将福利国家视为一种控制国家的变体,并表达了对其作用的怀疑。根据最近的新闻报道(《朝日新闻》,1997 年 8 月 26 日),已明确瑞典政府在 1935 年至 1976 年间,根据《绝育法》对 6 万人进行了强制绝育,其中包括被认为是“劣等人”、生育过多的单身女性、“异常人”和“吉普赛人”。 原因是经济方面的(如果人民变得更健康,需要社会保障的人数就会减少),这比任何其他事情都更清楚地表明福利国家是一个生育控制国家。虽然《绝育法》于 1976 年被废除,但瑞典在 1970 年代实施的慷慨的母亲保护政策和家庭政策,正是由出生率下降(生育率低于人口更替水平)直接引发的,可以视为人口政策的延续。不难想象,一个在出生率下降时采取慷慨鼓励生育政策的国家,在人口过剩时也会实施人口控制政策。对于那些将瑞典福利国家模式视为理想的人来说,上述报道无疑是一个震惊。然而,对于将福利国家视为控制国家版本的人来说,这并不令人惊讶。

18 The word citoyen (citizen) comes from the Latin word civitas, and ‘human rights’ actually mean ‘civil rights’. These civilized citizens then go on to create civilisation. Along with the universal idea that anybody who has been civilized or enlightened can become a citizen, the notion of human rights that came out of the French Revolution also brought with it the imperialist logic of exclusion and hierarchy (see Nishikawa, 1992).
18 “citoyen”(公民)一词来源于拉丁语 civitas,“人权”实际上意味着“公民权利”。这些文明的公民随后创造了文明。伴随着任何被文明或启蒙的人都可以成为公民的普遍观念,法国大革命中产生的人权概念也带来了排斥和等级的帝国主义逻辑(参见西川,1992)。

19 A classic example of this was the women’s suffrage movement that grew up after the American Civil War. After slavery was abolished women in the movement argued over who should get the vote
19 一个经典的例子是美国内战后兴起的妇女选举权运动。奴隶制废除后,运动中的妇女们争论谁应该首先获得投票权,

next, the freed black man or the white woman.
是刚获得自由的黑人男性,还是白人女性。

20 Even after formal education was made compulsory many parents were unenthusiastic about their children attending school as it meant having precious labour power snatched away from them. The Conscription Ordinance, which snatched up able-bodied young men, also met with considerable resistance. Wild rumours circulated that one’s life blood was taken away if one went into the army, and opposition movements sprang up in areas where military service was referred to as ‘blood tax’ (tax paid in blood). While it is said that school and the military are two great agencies for disciplining the nation, it is not the case that these two systems were established without any objections.
20 即使在义务教育被强制推行之后,许多家长仍对孩子上学不感兴趣,因为这意味着他们宝贵的劳动力被夺走了。征兵条例也遭到了相当大的抵制,该条例征召健壮的年轻男子入伍。流传着各种谣言,说参军会被夺走生命之血,反对运动在将兵役称为“血税”(以血偿税)的地区兴起。虽然有人说学校和军队是训练国家的两大机构,但这两套制度的建立并非没有任何反对声音。

21 Tachi notes: ‘In terms of a legal understanding, as both countries were Japanese colonies at the time, males from Korea and Taiwan were also included in the category ‘male Japanese imperial subjects’ and were among those who possessed Japanese nationality…What is more, as it was made a principal that voters had to be resident in mainland Japan, the voting rights of Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese living in the colonies went wholly unrecognised’ (Tachi, 1994:126).
21 Tachi 指出:“从法律理解的角度来看,由于当时两个国家都是日本的殖民地,来自朝鲜和台湾的男性也被归入‘日本帝国男性臣民’的范畴,属于拥有日本国籍的人……更重要的是,由于选民必须居住在日本本土成为原则,居住在殖民地的日本人、朝鲜人和台湾人的投票权完全未被承认”(Tachi,1994:126)。

22 With regards to the paradigm change in women’s history, see Ueno, 1995a.
22 关于女性历史范式的转变,参见上野,1995a。

23 The 23 June 1945, the day that the Volunteer Military Service Law was promulgated was ‘ironically also the day that the Okinawa garrison was completely wiped out’ (Katō, 1996:257).
23 1945 年 6 月 23 日,即《志愿兵役法》颁布之日,“讽刺的是,这一天也是冲绳守备部队被彻底消灭的日子”(加藤,1996:257)。

24 For a discussion of Germany see Koonz, 1987 and Himeoka, 1993. At a symposium where I gave a paper that formed the basis of this book, Ute Frevert, a German scholar of women’s history, suggested that in Germany the mobilisation system was the integration model, but I suspect there is room for debate on this point.
24 关于德国的讨论,参见库恩茨,1987 年和姫冈,1993 年。在一次我发表了构成本书基础的论文的研讨会上,德国女性历史学者乌特·弗雷弗特提出,在德国动员体系是整合模式,但我认为这一点还有讨论的余地。

25 Katō Yōko points out that, ‘there is doubt about whether the National Volunteer Corps actually functioned in real terms because they were not formed until after Japan had been defeated’ (Katō, 1996:258).
25 加藤洋子指出,“关于国民义勇队是否真正发挥了作用存在疑问,因为它们是在日本战败之后才组建的”(加藤,1996:258)。

26 The contribution made by military nurses was forgotten for a long time after the war. It was not until the 1960s, and as a result of demands made by the Japan Nursing Association, that the government agreed to pay military nurses and the family of the deceased compensation equivalent to a military pension. Those who died on active service came to be enshrined together at the Yasukuni shrine. This indicates the extent to which the war was considered a man’s war, and even the existence of those women who served at the front was ignored.
战争结束后,军队护士的贡献长期被遗忘。直到 1960 年代,在日本护理协会的要求下,政府才同意向军队护士及其去世者家属支付相当于军人养老金的补偿。那些在服役期间牺牲的人被一同安奉在靖国神社。这表明战争被视为男人的战争,甚至那些在前线服役的女性的存在也被忽视了。

27 [Translator’s note] The pre-war motherhood protection debate (bosei hogo ronsō) referred to here took place between 1915 and 1919. The main protagonists in the debate were Hiratuska Raichō, Yosano Akiko, Yamakawa Kikue and Yamada Waka. It can be analysed in terms of the classic equality versus difference conundrum that has dogged feminism over the years. Thus, while Yosano Akiko, for example, argued for women’s economic independence from men and the state through paid employment, Hiratsuka Raichō took the position that it was impossible to properly care for the house and any children while holding a job, and demanded state protection of motherhood in the form of paid maternity.
27【译者注】此处提到的战前母性保护论争(bosei hogo ronsō)发生于 1915 年至 1919 年间。论争的主要参与者有平塚雷鸟、与谢野晶子、山川菊枝和山田若。该论争可从长期困扰女权主义的经典“平等与差异”难题来分析。例如,与谢野晶子主张女性通过有偿就业实现经济独立于男性和国家,而平塚雷鸟则认为一边工作一边妥善照顾家庭和子女是不可能的,主张国家应通过有薪产假形式保护母性。

28 Suzuki frequently claims that the individual characteristics of these women activists - their ‘elitism’ and/or ‘a burning sense of mission’ - account for their support and participation in the war. She confesses a kind of idealism along the lines that if the division between the leader and the follower was eliminated and everybody became ‘autonomous individuals’, we would be able to avoid making such a mistake. However, surely we should not reduce causes to the individual characteristics of these women, but seek them in their social positioning?
铃木经常声称,这些女性活动家的个人特质——她们的“精英主义”和/或“强烈的使命感”——是她们支持和参与战争的原因。她承认一种理想主义,认为如果消除了领导者与追随者之间的分化,每个人都成为“自主的个体”,我们就能避免犯下这样的错误。然而,我们当然不应将原因归结于这些女性的个人特质,而应从她们的社会定位中寻找原因。

29 While studying at university, Hiratsuka took up meditation and in 1906 was given permission to take the special Zen Buddhist name Ekun by Shaku Sōkatsu, a senior Buddhist priest supervising
29 在大学学习期间,平塚开始修习冥想,1906 年获得了资深佛教僧侣释宗活的许可,得以使用特别的禅宗法号“恵薫”

her at the Ryōbō - a temple in Nippori. Again in 1907, she was given another special Zen name, Zenmei, by Nakahara Zenchū a senior priest at the Kaiseiji temple in Nishinomiya city. For further details, see Ueno 1997b.
她在日暮里的两坊寺。1907 年,她又被西宫市海清寺的资深僧侣中原善忠赐予另一个特别的禅号——禅明。更多详情见上野 1997b。

30 This was a debate that took place between Yosano Akiko, Hiratsuka Raichō, Yamada Waka and Yamakawa Kikue, among others. See Kōuchi 1984.
30 这是一个由与谢野晶子、平塚雷鸟、山田若和山川菊枝等人之间进行的辩论。参见 Kōuchi 1984。

31 [Translator’s Note] Ellen Karolina Maria Key (1849-1926) was a Swedish thinker and writer who, like Hiratuska Raichō, viewed women’s role in the home, especially their role as mothers, as something akin to a sacred mission. The importance of this mission meant that it was necessary for women to sacrifice the outside world in favour of focusing their creativity on producing the next generation. As with many maternalists, this fervour for motherhood incorporated eugenic ideas about improving the physical qualities of the ‘race’ through reformed practices of parenthood. Her ideas became popular in Japan around the same time that Ibsen’s theatrical work generated attention with the staging of A A AA Doll’s House by many university drama circles in 1911-12. Again, like Hiratsuka, Key was a commentator on Ibsen’s work. Hiratuska acquired an English copy of Key’s Love and Marriage (1911) and translated sections for two editions of Bluestocking.
31【译者注】艾伦·卡罗琳娜·玛丽亚·基(Ellen Karolina Maria Key,1849-1926)是瑞典思想家和作家,她与平塚雷鸟一样,将女性在家庭中的角色,尤其是作为母亲的角色,视为一种类似神圣使命的存在。由于这一使命的重要性,女性有必要牺牲外部世界,将创造力专注于孕育下一代。与许多母性主义者一样,这种对母性的热忱融合了通过改革育儿方式来改善“种族”身体素质的优生学思想。她的观点在日本流行起来,正值易卜生的戏剧作品因 1911-12 年许多大学戏剧社团上演《玩偶之家》而引起关注之时。同样,像平塚一样,基也是易卜生作品的评论者。平塚获得了基的《爱情与婚姻》(1911 年)英文版,并为《蓝袜子》杂志的两个版本翻译了部分内容。

32 Jang Jing’s (1995) Kindai Chūgoku to ‘Ren’ai’ no Hakken (Modern China and the discovery of ‘love’) splendidly illustrates the argument that translation is the selective reception of culture. Jang discusses from the perspective of comparative literature the circumstances on the Chinese side that dictated what would be adopted or rejected when modern China imported a concept of ‘love’ via Japan.
32 张静(1995 年)的《近代中国与“恋爱”的发现》精彩地阐释了翻译是文化选择性接受的论点。张静从比较文学的角度讨论了中国方面的情况,这些情况决定了当现代中国通过日本引入“恋爱”这一概念时,哪些内容会被采纳或拒绝。

33 [Translator’s Note] Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935) was a prolific American writer of fiction, social commentary and feminist criticism, although much of her work is not widely known or accessible. Among feminists, Gilman is best remembered for Herland, originally published in 1915. In Herland Gilman creates a feminist utopian society made up entirely of women with its own distinct social and cultural arrangement, and its own political system. The roots of radical feminism are often traced back to this amusingly satirical book.
33 【译者注】夏洛特·珀金斯·吉尔曼(1860-1935)是一位多产的美国小说家、社会评论家和女性主义批评家,尽管她的大部分作品并不广为人知或易于获取。在女性主义者中,吉尔曼最为人所知的是她于 1915 年首次出版的《她的土地》。在《她的土地》中,吉尔曼创造了一个完全由女性组成的女性主义乌托邦社会,拥有其独特的社会文化安排和政治体系。激进女性主义的根源常被追溯到这本带有幽默讽刺色彩的书。

34 [Translator’s Note] Olive Schreiner (1855-1920) was born in South Africa where she spent her childhood. Her English mother and German fathers, strict Calvinists, had been sponsored by the London Missionary Society to do missionary work in South Africa. Her father’s financial insolvency resulted in Olive Schreiner being separated from her parents at the age of 12. In 1881, Schreiner paid her own passage to England having worked as a governess for 11 years. The publication of her novel The Story of an African Farm in 1883 brought her acceptance as a novelist and social activist. In her writing and activism, Schreiner was anti-imperialist and a stalwart pacifist. Her political activism included participation in the women’s suffrage movement in England.
34【译者注】奥利弗·施赖纳(Olive Schreiner,1855-1920)出生于南非,在那里度过了童年。她的母亲是英国人,父亲是德国人,二人都是严格的加尔文主义者,受伦敦传教会资助在南非从事传教工作。由于父亲经济破产,施赖纳 12 岁时被迫与父母分离。1881 年,施赖纳在做了 11 年家庭教师后,自费前往英国。她于 1883 年出版的小说《非洲农场的故事》使她获得了作为小说家和社会活动家的认可。在她的写作和社会活动中,施赖纳反对帝国主义,是坚定的和平主义者。她的政治活动还包括参与英国的妇女选举权运动。

35 Miyake’s thesis rode upon the current of new women’s history in the 1980s, and was written with the intention of raising the question of the war responsibility of Japanese feminism. In her summary of the ‘motherhood protection debate’, Miyake argues that the maternalistic tendency within Japanese feminism, from Hiratsuka to Takamure, encouraged war participation. In other words, the cause of wartime cooperation was the incompleteness of individualism within Japanese feminism. However, the problem of individualism in Japanese feminism should be dealt with separately. The reason for saying this is that the view that feminism equals the women’s version of modern individualism is itself a reflection of a modern bourgeois liberal feminist viewpoint, and the limits of modern individualism have already been made clear.
35 宫崎的论点顺应了 1980 年代新女性史的潮流,写作目的在于提出日本女性主义的战争责任问题。在她对“母性保护论争”的总结中,宫崎认为,从平塚到高群,日本女性主义中的母性主义倾向助长了战争参与。换句话说,战时合作的原因在于日本女性主义中个人主义的不完整性。然而,日本女性主义中个人主义的问题应当另行处理。之所以这样说,是因为将女性主义等同于女性版现代个人主义的观点本身反映了现代资产阶级自由女性主义的视角,而现代个人主义的局限性已经被明确揭示。

36 Furthermore, in the same debate Hiratsuka stated that the reason that Yosano was opposed to the idea of motherhood protection was that she was shackled to the old fashioned view that one’s child
36 此外,在同一论争中,平塚曾指出,与母性保护理念相对立的与谢野之所以反对,是因为她被旧式观念束缚,认为自己的孩子…

is one’s own private property and that the job of motherhood is a private activity. However, the view that motherhood is a private activity is definitely not an old fashioned idea, but rather the product of the birth of the private sphere as a result of modernisation, namely the privatisation of reproduction. What is more, Yosano did not even view motherhood as a private activity.
是个人的私有财产,母亲的职责是一种私人活动。然而,将母亲身份视为私人活动的观点绝不是过时的想法,而是现代化带来私有领域诞生的产物,即生育的私有化。更重要的是,与此相反,与谢野并不认为母亲身份是一种私人活动。

37 On this point, we cannot ignore the different backgrounds of the two women: Hiratsuka the daughter of a bureaucrat in the new capital Tokyo and Yosano born into the world of a merchant family in a local city.
37 在这一点上,我们不能忽视这两位女性不同的背景:平塚是新首都东京一位官僚的女儿,而与谢野则出生于一个地方城市的商人家庭。

38 For publications that supplement the deleted text in Takamure Itsue’s Collected Works see Kōno, 1997 and Akiyama, 1973.
38 关于补充高群逸枝全集中被删节文本的出版物,请参见河野,1997 年和秋山,1973 年。

39 For two consecutive years, 1994 and 1995, the Society of Comparative Family History decided upon the theme The Current Situation of and Themes in Women’s History and Women’s Studies as its focus, and in the second year, 1995, held a symposium on Transcending the State and Motherhood: What Can we Learn from Takamure’s Women’s History? The speakers were Ishimure Michiko, Kurihara Hiroshi and Nishikawa Yūko, with Ueno Chizuko as the chair. A record of the content of the reports and discussion can be found in Jendà to josei (Women and gender), edited by Tabata, Ueno and Fukutō 1997.
39 1994 年和 1995 年连续两年,比较家族史学会决定以“女性史与女性研究的现状与课题”为主题,1995 年第二年举办了题为“超越国家与母性:我们能从高群逸枝的女性史中学到什么?”的研讨会。发言者有石牟道子、栗原裕、以及西川优子,会议由上野千鹤子主持。报告内容和讨论记录见于田畑、上野和福藤编辑的《ジェンダーと女性》(女性与性别,1997 年)。

40 [Translator’s note] John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960). The ‘illocutionary speech act’, or ‘performative speech act’ as it is generally described today, is a key term in Austin’s speech act theory introduced in How Do Things Work with Words published by Oxford University Press in 1962. Austin distinguishes between ‘performatives’ which through their utterance linguistically perform the act to which they are referring and ‘constatives’ which are concerned with the truth or falsity of a statement (see Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz eds 2000). In the case of the former, for a person performing a marriage ceremony, saying the words ‘I now pronounce you man and wife’ is itself the act of marrying two people. So what Ueno appears to be suggesting is that for Takamure to state that women had played a more significant and active role in history than had previously thought was a ‘performative speech act’ in that the words themselves contributed to the liberation or encouragement of women by providing a vision to aspire to, even if the sources themselves had been falsified (I am grateful to Graham Healey, University of Sheffield, for his input on the above point).
40【译者注】约翰·兰肖·奥斯汀(1911-1960)。“言内行为”(illocutionary speech act),或如今通常所称的“施为性言语行为”(performative speech act),是奥斯汀在 1962 年由牛津大学出版社出版的《语言如何运作》(How Do Things Work with Words)中提出的言语行为理论中的一个关键术语。奥斯汀区分了“施为性言语”(performatives),即通过其发声在语言上完成其所指行为的言语,以及“陈述性言语”(constatives),即关注陈述的真伪(参见 Andermahr、Lovell 和 Wolkowitz 编,2000 年)。以前者为例,对于主持婚礼的人来说,说出“我现在宣布你们成为夫妻”这句话本身就是将两人结为夫妻的行为。因此,上野似乎在暗示,高群谊(Takamure)声称女性在历史上扮演了比以往认为的更重要和积极的角色,这是一种“施为性言语行为”,因为这些话语本身通过提供一个值得追求的愿景,促进了女性的解放或鼓励,即使相关史料本身可能被伪造(感谢谢菲尔德大学的格雷厄姆·希利对上述观点的贡献)。

41 These criteria are relevant to the debate over how to evaluate the women’s movements of the 1950s within feminism, such as the peace movement Haha-oya Taikai (Mother’s Convention) and the campaigning of Shufuren (National Housewives Organisation).
41 这些标准与如何在女权主义内部评价 20 世纪 50 年代的女性运动有关,例如和平运动“母亲大会”(Haha-oya Taikai)和主妇联盟(Shufuren,国家主妇组织)的活动。

42 In [Japanese] society at that time, the economic independence advocated by Yosano could only be achieved by women like Yosano who had a privileged work situation. Yet the protection of motherhood advocated by Hiratsuka was not something that the state aspired to in its social policy at that time. On these points, both arguments have been criticised as unrealistic. However, forced to make a choice between workers’ rights or the right to an existence, Yamakawa’s argument should have been to sublate workers rights and the right to live, but instead she offered as the only possibility transforming contemporary economic relations. In other words, a socialist revolution, a policy which at the time looked exceedingly unlikely. On this point, Yamakawa’s argument was also unrealistic.
42 在当时的[日本]社会中,与谢野倡导的经济独立只能由像与谢野这样拥有特权工作环境的女性实现。然而,平塚倡导的母性保护并非当时国家社会政策所追求的目标。在这些方面,两种观点都被批评为不切实际。然而,在工人权利与生存权之间被迫做出选择时,山川的论点本应是扬弃工人权利和生存权,但她却将变革当时的经济关系作为唯一可能。换句话说,就是社会主义革命,而这一政策在当时看起来极不可能实现。在这一点上,山川的论点同样不切实际。

43 Taken and abridged from Yamakawa’s memoirs (Yamakawa, 1979:66).
43 摘自山川的回忆录并加以删节(山川,1979:66)。

44 Yamakawa was also scathing of women’s activists stating that, ‘It was business as usual, these women displayed the virtues of Japanese women and changed direction in accordance with male demands…’ (Yamakawa, 1979:81).
44 山川也严厉批评女性活动家,称“这照旧是老一套,这些女性展现了日本女性的美德,并根据男性的要求改变了方向……”(山川,1979:81)。
45 During the period when the communist party was illegal, [male] activists and female supporters lived in the guise of married couples, and the term ‘housekeeping’ refers to the housework services, and in some cases these included sexual services, that the former received from the latter. Although it was legitimised as ‘for the party’, it emerged as an issue after the war (Yamashita C., 1985).
45 在共产党被取缔的时期,[男性]活动家和女性支持者以已婚夫妇的身份生活,“家务”一词指的是家务服务,有时包括性服务,前者从后者那里获得。虽然被合法化为“为了党”,但战后这一问题浮出水面(山下 C.,1985)。

46 The conclusion reached in studies of women’s voting behaviour since they gained the right to vote after the war is that women’s suffrage did not change Japanese politics. On the contrary, it functioned to support the long period of one-party conservative rule. It was not until 1989 that there were indications of a trend towards women’s voting behaviour becoming independent of the household vote.
46 战后女性获得投票权以来,对女性投票行为的研究得出的结论是,女性选举权并未改变日本政治。相反,它起到了支持长期一党保守统治的作用。直到 1989 年,才出现女性投票行为开始独立于家庭投票的趋势迹象。

47 This does not only apply to Yamakawa. Even Takamure, who was supposed to be confined to the house in the aloof lifestyle of a scholar, wrote numerous essays and other manuscripts. Unable to get by living off their gardens at their places of evacuation or through farming, these female intellectuals felt that any road to making a living other than through writing would be a difficult one. Through the benevolence of those around them they were supplied with opportunities to write, and the end result is that during the war these women left behind an unexpectedly large amount documentation giving their opinion.
47 这不仅适用于山川。即使是本应过着学者清高生活、被限制在家中的高群,也写了大量的随笔和其他手稿。无法靠避难地的菜园或耕作维生,这些女性知识分子觉得除了写作之外,谋生的道路都很艰难。通过周围人的善意,她们得到了写作的机会,结果是在战争期间,这些女性留下了出乎意料的大量表达她们观点的文献。

48 There were seven participants at this meeting. In alphabetical order: Hiratsuka Akiko [Raichō], Katayama Tetsu, Okuda Yoshiko, Tatewaki Sadayo, Tatsuno Takashi and Yamakawa Kikue.
48 这次会议共有七名参与者。按字母顺序排列:平塚明子[雷鸟]、片山哲、奥田良子、立脇定代、辰野隆和山川菊枝。

49 The interpretation that the dissolution of Ichikawa’s Association for the Promotion of Women’s Suffrage was an unavoidable choice made in order to protect the women’s suffrage movement is denied by this self-managed dissolution.
49 对于市川妇女参政权促进会解散是为了保护妇女参政权运动而不得不做出的选择的解释,被这次自主管理的解散所否定。

50 Working conditions and the reality of motherhood protection at the places where women were drafted were even cruder than in peacetime. In reality, even the Women’s Volunteer Labour Association (Joshi Teishin Kinrōkai) in 1944 while demanding the mobilisation of women aged 12 to 40 , set as a condition the exemption of persons who are pivotal in the home. It is clear that the government did not view work and motherhood as compatible.
50 女性被征召工作的场所的工作条件和母亲保护的现实甚至比和平时期更为恶劣。实际上,即使是 1944 年的妇女志愿劳动协会(Joshi Teishin Kinrōkai)在要求动员 12 至 40 岁女性的同时,也以家庭中关键人物的免除为条件。显然,政府并不认为工作与母亲身份是兼容的。

51 Ironically, targets set during the war were actually achieved post-war despite a change by the government to a policy of suppressing population growth.
51 具有讽刺意味的是,尽管政府在战后改变了抑制人口增长的政策,但战争期间设定的目标实际上在战后得以实现。

52 The term venereal disease, karyūbyō, literally ‘red light district disease’ in Japanese, refers to sexually transmitted diseases. In Japanese it is called karyūbyō because it was in the red light districts, karyūkai, that these diseases spread.
52 性病一词,日语为 karyūbyō,字面意思是“红灯区疾病”,指的是性传播疾病。之所以称为 karyūbyō,是因为这些疾病是在红灯区(karyūkai)传播开来的。

53 In fact, when an Aryan race child was discovered in an occupied territory as a result of the Cranium Measurement Law they were abducted and brought up [by the Nazis] (Yonemoto, 1989).
53 事实上,根据颅骨测量法,在被占领区发现雅利安人种的儿童时,他们会被绑架并由纳粹抚养长大(Yonemoto,1989)。

54 The participation of female soldiers in combat did not arise as an issue until after the American invasion of Panama in 1989.
54 女性士兵参与战斗直到 1989 年美国入侵巴拿马后才成为一个问题。

55 Davin’s pioneering results teach us two things about the relationship between imperialistic aggression and motherhood: 1) it is not something limited to the Axis powers, but something shared with the Allies; 2) it is not limited to the exceptional times of total war, but accompanies the forming of the modern imperialist states.
55 Davin 的开创性成果告诉我们关于帝国主义侵略与母性之间关系的两点:1)这不仅限于轴心国,而是盟军也共有的现象;2)这不仅限于全面战争的特殊时期,而是伴随着现代帝国主义国家的形成。

56 In Sweden policy makers use the term state feminism openly, and there are feminists in Japan who take the Swedish form as a model. However, as seen in the sterilisation of people with disabilities, even in the Swedish Welfare State, only suitably qualified citizens share the benefits of equality.
56 在瑞典,政策制定者公开使用“国家女权主义”一词,日本也有女权主义者以瑞典的形式为榜样。然而,正如对残障人士进行绝育所显示的那样,即使在瑞典福利国家,只有符合条件的公民才能享有平等的利益。

57 After being released from the purge from public office, Ichikawa ran for a seat in the 1953 elections for the House of Counsellors as a candidate for the Tokyo constituency, and was duly elected. Following this, she continued as a Diet member for 18 years until she was defeated in the 1971 elections. In 1974, she once again stood as a candidate for the national constituency in the House
57 在被解除公职清洗后,市川作为东京选区的候选人参加了 1953 年参议院选举,并顺利当选。此后,她继续担任国会议员长达 18 年,直到 1971 年选举中落败。1974 年,她再次作为全国选区的候选人参选众议院。

of Counsellors elections, and after being elected in first place went on to hold office for another seven years until she passed away in 1981 at the age of 81.
在顾问选举中,她获得第一名当选,随后又继续任职七年,直到 1981 年去世,享年 81 岁。

58 According to persons concerned, there are still a considerable number of documents in safekeeping at the Ichikawa Fusae Memorial Hall that have not yet been sorted or released to the public, and it is felt that if they were all made public it would have a considerable impact on the study of Ichikawa.
58 据相关人士称,市川房枝纪念馆内仍有相当数量的文件尚未整理或公开,人们认为如果全部公开,将对市川研究产生相当大的影响。

59 In a recent study Hiratsuka Raichō no hikari to kage (The light and shade of Hiratsuka Raichō) (1977), Ömori Kahoru wrote the following. ‘It is precisely because Raichō had deep in her heart the bitter experience of the wartime regime while she was young that she strove single-mindedly for world peace after the war, became a symbol of the movement and, despite her delicate constitution, continued to be involved in a large number of campaigns’ Ōmori, 1997:222). However, there is no speculation about expressions that might suggest that Hiratsuka underwent a post-war conversion. Moreover, there is presumption of discontinuity between preand post-war.
59 在最近的一项研究《平塚雷鸟的光与影》(1977 年)中,大森薫写道:“正是因为雷鸟年轻时心中深藏着战时政权的痛苦经历,战后她才一心一意地为世界和平而努力,成为运动的象征,尽管体质虚弱,仍持续参与大量运动”(大森,1997:222)。然而,文中并未推测平塚是否经历了战后转变。此外,文中还假设战前与战后之间存在断裂。

60 Inoue Kiyoshi’s The History of Japanese Women was published in 1948. Along with Takamure’s The History of the Women of Greater Japan, it is ranked as one of the classics in post-war women’s history. Although their historical viewpoints are different, these two classics share in common their understanding of surrender and occupation as women’s liberation. Following this, in the revised editions of 1953 and 1962 Inoue does an about turn and criticises his own mistaken view that occupation policies represented liberation (see Ueno, 1995a).
60 井上清的《日本女性史》于 1948 年出版。与高群逸枝的《大日本妇女史》一起,被誉为战后女性史的经典著作。尽管两者的历史观点不同,但这两部经典作品共同认为投降和占领是女性解放。随后,在 1953 年和 1962 年的修订版中,井上彻底转变立场,批评自己曾错误地认为占领政策代表解放的观点(参见上野,1995a)。

61 As already outlined, the person who deleted wartime statements from Takamure’s Collected Works was her husband, Hashimoto Kenzō. At the very least, this shows that for Hishimoto, Takamure’s wartime activities were a ‘blemish’ on her career, but in her autobiographical recollections written after the war Hi no kuni no onna no nikki (A Diary of a women from the country of fire) there are no passages suggestive of self-criticism.
61 如前所述,删除高群逸枝战时言论的是她的丈夫桥本健三。至少,这表明对桥本来说,高群逸枝的战时活动是她事业上的“污点”,但在战后她所写的自传体回忆录《火之国的女人日记》中,并无任何自我批评的内容。

62 Moreover, it cannot really be said that the self-apparent nature of this historical perspective is shared by the majority of citizens through to today.
62 此外,不能说这种历史视角的自明性至今为大多数公民所共有。

63 [Translator’s Notes] Comintern is an abbreviation of Communist International. The Comintern was created in 1920 and consisted of a single (Russian centred) communist party with braches in countries around the world, rather than a series of national communist parties, as had previously been the case.
63【译者注】Comintern 是共产国际的缩写。共产国际成立于 1920 年,由一个以俄罗斯为中心的共产党组成,在世界各国设有分支机构,而非像以前那样由一系列国家共产党组成。

64 Mizuta Tamae in her recent book Nihon ni okeru Feminizumu shisō no juyō (The acceptance of feminist ideas in Japan) developed the argument that maternalism is the characteristic acceptance of feminism in ‘backward countries’ like Japan. She argued that in Japan as well as in Germany it induced women’s wartime cooperation (Mizuta, 1997). In addition to having doubts about whether this book, as suggested by the title, amounts to anything more than the acceptance of Western feminism by modern Japanese feminism, it is problematic to have positioned Japan as a ‘backward’ country. As with Miyake’s (1994) thesis, the result of making ‘weak individualism’ a characteristic of Japanese feminism is, firstly, that it is impossible to escape the drawbacks of the existing modernisation theory that takes the West as its model. Secondly, as a result of this, it constructs the West into a monolithic model. Thirdly, in idealising individualism, the roles that individualism has created within modernity are beyond criticism. If we demand from capitalism or the nation-state the integration of women ‘as men’ within an individualism based on the logic of equal opportunity, then female soldiers are also being endorsed. I wonder what Mizuta’s response would be to this.
64 水田珠江在她最近的著作《日本におけるフェミニズム思想の受容》(《日本对女性主义思想的接受》)中提出,母性主义是像日本这样的“落后国家”接受女性主义的典型特征。她认为,在日本和德国,母性主义促使了女性在战争时期的合作(Mizuta, 1997)。除了对这本书是否如标题所示,仅仅是现代日本女性主义对西方女性主义的接受表示怀疑之外,将日本定位为“落后”国家也是有问题的。与宫崎(1994)的论点类似,将“弱个体主义”作为日本女性主义的特征,首先使得无法摆脱以西方为模型的现有现代化理论的弊端。其次,由此构建了一个单一的西方模型。第三,在理想化个体主义的过程中,个体主义在现代性中所创造的角色也变得不容批评。 如果我们要求资本主义或民族国家按照基于机会均等逻辑的个人主义,将女性“作为男性”纳入其中,那么女性士兵也将被认可。我想知道水田对此会有什么反应。

Part II: The Military Comfort Women Issue
第二部分:军中慰安妇问题

1 Numerous claims have already been made concerning the terminology jyūgun ianfu (military comfort women). There is the view that the term jyūgun (going with the military) brings to mind the voluntariness of war correspondents or military nurses and, as a result, it is more appropriate to use terms such as ‘Imperial Army comfort women’, ‘Japanese army comfort women’ or ‘army comfort women’. Another argument is that the term ianfu (comfort women) is an army euphemism and the reality was that the women were nothing less than sexual slaves, therefore we should not adopt the language of the oppressors. It is further argued that, while it may have been comfort for the soldiers, for the victims it amounted to nothing less than rape and, as a result, the term comfort women serves to conceal reality. We have even seen the appearance of a book entitled Watashi wa ‘ianfu’ dewanai (I am not a comfort woman) by the Sensō Giseisha o Kokoro ni Kizamukai (The Association to Take the Victims of War into One’s Heart) (1977). We have also had the appearance of the so-called Liberal School of History’s argument that the term jyügun refers to civilians and conclude from this that the term jyūgun ianfu is not a historical term. If jyūgun ianfu is not a historical term, they continue, then there was no such historical reality. However, the argument that because no such terminology existed the historical reality similarly did not exist is plainly a leap in logic. Fujioka Nobukatsu claims that Senda Kakō coined the term. However, the word ianfu appeared in the Kōjien Dictionary before Senda’s book Jyūgun ianfu (military comfort women) was published (Senda, 1973). The term jyūgun means nothing more and nothing less than following the army to the war front (Senda, 1977). The question of what terminology is used is itself political. Here I will use the term ianfu (comfort women) as a historical term. Now there are various ways of referring to comfort women from the Korean peninsula such as Chōsenjin ianfu (Korean comfort women) and Chōsen/Kankokujin Ianfu (North Korean and South Korean comfort women), but todate little is known about comfort women from North Korea. The data I have is largely limited to the activities of women with South Korean nationality, so I will adopt the term South Korean here. This convention does not hold when I am citing the work of another person.
1 关于术语“従軍慰安婦”(军中慰安妇)已经有许多不同的说法。有一种观点认为,“従軍”(随军)一词让人联想到战地记者或军医护士的自愿性,因此更适合使用“帝国陆军慰安妇”、“日本陆军慰安妇”或“陆军慰安妇”等术语。另一种观点认为,“慰安妇”是军方的委婉说法,实际上这些女性无异于性奴隶,因此不应采用压迫者的语言。还有人认为,虽然这对士兵来说可能是慰藉,但对受害者而言无异于强奸,因此“慰安妇”一词掩盖了事实真相。我们甚至见过一本名为《私は「慰安婦」ではない》(我不是慰安妇)的书,由“将战争受害者铭记于心协会”(Sensō Giseisha o Kokoro ni Kizamukai,1977 年)出版。 我们还遇到了所谓自由派历史学派的论点,即“jyūgun”一词指的是平民,并据此得出“jyūgun ianfu”一词不是历史术语的结论。他们继续说,如果“jyūgun ianfu”不是历史术语,那么就不存在这样的历史现实。然而,认为因为没有这样的术语,历史现实也不存在,这显然是逻辑上的跳跃。藤冈信胜声称该词是千田夏光创造的。然而,“ianfu”一词早在千田的著作《军慰安妇》(1973 年)出版之前就已出现在《广辞苑》词典中。术语“jyūgun”仅仅意味着随军前往战场(千田,1977 年)。使用何种术语本身就是一个政治问题。在这里,我将使用“ianfu”(慰安妇)作为历史术语。现在,有多种称呼朝鲜半岛慰安妇的方式,如“朝鲜人慰安妇”和“朝鲜/韩国人慰安妇”(指北朝鲜和南朝鲜慰安妇),但迄今为止,关于北朝鲜慰安妇的资料知之甚少。 我掌握的数据主要限于具有韩国国籍的女性活动,因此这里我将采用“韩国”一词。但在引用他人作品时,此惯例不适用。

2 Kim Hak-sun passed away 16 December, 1997 aged 73. She died six years after filing the suit without hearing the conclusion of the court hearing and without receiving a response suggesting sincere intentions from the Japanese government. Nevertheless, after coming forward she, among other things, gave evidence at the United Nations Human Rights Committee and her influence internationally was profound.
2 金学顺于 1997 年 12 月 16 日去世,享年 73 岁。她在提起诉讼六年后去世,未能听到法院审理的结论,也未收到日本政府表现出诚意的回应。尽管如此,她挺身而出,在联合国人权委员会作证,她在国际上的影响深远。

3 Recruitment was carried out for female Volunteer Corps on the Korean peninsular just as it was in mainland Japan, but because some women who signed up for the Volunteer Corps were forced to become military comfort women the term Teishintai (volunteer corps) has come to be linked with comfort women in the minds of many inside Korea.
3 在朝鲜半岛,女性志愿军的招募与日本本土一样进行,但由于部分报名参加志愿军的女性被迫成为军慰安妇,“挺身队”(志愿军)一词在许多韩国人心中已与慰安妇联系在一起。

4 The comfort women issue had already been problematised within the women’s liberation movement in the early 1970s, and it has been pointed out that Japanese women were torn between whether they should view themselves as the oppressed and the oppressors (Ueno, 1994a: 9-10; Inoue et al., 1994:89). This is one of the earliest examples of the problematising of the comfort women in post-war Japanese society, but the women’s liberation and feminist movements that followed did not pursue this question.
4 早在 1970 年代初,慰安妇问题就在女性解放运动中被提出并加以讨论,有观点指出日本女性在是否应将自己视为被压迫者还是压迫者之间陷入了矛盾(上野,1994a:9-10;井上等,1994:89)。这是战后日本社会中最早对慰安妇问题进行反思的例子之一,但随后出现的女性解放和女权运动并未继续深入探讨这一问题。

5 This was a reply to the question: Why is it that the comfort women issue has surfaced 50 years after the war ended? The writer responsible for this item was Matsui Yayori. Yet, she does not touch
5 这是对一个问题的回答:为什么慰安妇问题会在战争结束 50 年后才浮出水面?这篇文章的作者是松井弥代里。然而,她并未涉及

upon sexual torture within the democratising movement or Kwon In-suk’s indictment.
关于民主化运动中的性虐待或权仁淑的控诉。

6 Liza Go, a Filipino woman who has campaigned energetically for the Japayukisan (women bound for Japan in search of work) argues that sex tours to Asian countries by Japanese men and the sex discrimination directed at Asian women within Japan have the same roots as the comfort women problem under the emperor system. She was the first person to problematise Filipinos resident in Japan as a problem of long-term foreign residents in Japan. Go has indicated the racism in Japanese feminism and has appealed for minority feminism.
6 利萨·戈,一位积极为 Japayukisan(前往日本寻找工作的菲律宾女性)奔走呼吁的菲律宾女性,认为日本男性对亚洲国家的性旅游以及日本国内针对亚洲女性的性别歧视,与天皇制下慰安妇问题有着相同的根源。她是首位将居住在日本的菲律宾人问题视为日本长期外国居民问题的人。戈指出了日本女性主义中的种族主义,并呼吁关注少数群体女性主义。

7 Haga Tōru, ‘Bunka Kaigi’ (Culture Conference), 1992:10. I have simply re-quoted Ehara who notes that: 'However this is taken from Nishio Kanji ‘Kutsujoku to zōo no kankei o ippen saseru ‘nikkanhishoku’ no susume’ (Advice for a ‘no-touch Japan-Korea’ that will change in a single stroke the relationship of humiliation and hatred). (SAPIO, 12 November 1992). Both Haga Tōru and Nishio Kanji are connected with the Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai [literally, the society for the making of new history textbooks, but the official English name is The Japanese Institute for Orthodox History Education; hereafter Orthodox History Group] formed at the end of 1996. The Orthodox History Group demanded the erasure of all references to the comfort women from textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education [now Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology] for use in schools from April 1997.
7 羽賀徹,《文化会議》,1992 年 10 月。我只是简单地引用了江原的观点,他指出:“不过这摘自西尾幹二的《屈辱与憎恶关系一笔勾销的‘日韩非接触’建议》(SAPIO,1992 年 11 月 12 日)。”羽贺徹和西尾幹二都与 1996 年底成立的新历史教科书制作会(直译为“制作新历史教科书的协会”,官方英文名为日本正统历史教育研究所,以下简称正统历史团体)有关。正统历史团体要求从 1997 年 4 月起,教育部(现为文部科学省)批准用于学校的教科书中删除所有关于慰安妇的内容。

8 Likewise, in the pre-war period the crime of adultery was constructed on the patriarchal logic of ‘an infringement of the husband’s property rights’. The wife’s sexuality belonged to the husband but, as the husband’s did not belong to the wife, there was no reciprocity in the crime of adultery. In the post war Civil Code the obligation of chastity between husband and wife is now reciprocal. However, the fact that the wife of a husband who has been unfaithful can demand compensation from her husband’s lover amplifies the logic of an infringement of property rights.
8 同样,在战前时期,通奸罪是基于父权制逻辑构建的,即“对丈夫财产权的侵犯”。妻子的性属于丈夫,但丈夫的性不属于妻子,因此通奸罪中不存在互惠关系。在战后民法典中,夫妻之间的贞洁义务变成了相互的。然而,丈夫不忠时,妻子可以向丈夫的情人索赔,这一事实加剧了财产权被侵犯的逻辑。

9 Senda explains this situation as follows: ‘The society being a male-centred society still tied to the vestiges of feudalistic ideals, means that the Korean people have a strong sense of discrimination towards women. I was told by social critics who talked about the situation during this period that it would not have mattered how the circumstances arose, as women who had once been comfort women and, moreover, as raped women there would have been only one way of looking at them. It did not emerge as a problem because the women’s themselves were aware of this attitude and so they hid themselves in obscurity in one corner of society’ (Senda, 1997:54). Here the ‘one way of looking at them’ that Senda refers to is with a patriarchal consciousness rooted in sexual discrimination.
9 仙田这样解释这种情况:“社会是一个以男性为中心的社会,仍然与封建主义理想的残余紧密相连,这意味着韩国人对女性有强烈的歧视感。我从谈论那个时期情况的社会批评家那里听说,无论情况如何产生,作为曾经的慰安妇,更何况是被强奸的女性,人们对她们的看法只有一种。这个问题没有浮现出来,是因为女性们自己意识到了这种态度,所以她们隐藏在社会的某个角落里默默无闻”(仙田,1997:54)。这里仙田所说的“对她们的唯一看法”是根植于性别歧视的父权意识。

10 ‘She (Takahashi Kikue) said to me that: “I think that the leaders of the military when they thought up a system like the military comfort women used the system of licensed prostitution within Japan as a basis”’ (Senda, 1997:53).
10 “她(高桥喜久江)对我说:‘我认为军方领导人在设计军慰安妇制度时,是以日本国内的有照妓院制度为基础的’”(仙田,1997:53)。

11 For more about the dismantling of the rape myth see Ogura Chikako (1988) Sekkusu shinwa kaitai shinsho (The dismantling of the sex myth) and Beneke, Timothy (1982) Men on Rape.
11 关于拆解强奸神话的更多内容,请参见小倉千加子(1988)《性神话拆解新书》和本尼克,蒂莫西(1982)《强奸中的男性》。

12 Moon’s postal savings were not paid as compensation for sexual services. It was money that she had saved in her own name from casual income such as tips from soldiers. She states that she received no wages from the operators of the comfort stations. On the contrary, even if she were to have won the lawsuit, these savings amounted to only a nominal sum of money, pointing to the inappropriateness of saying that she became a comfort woman for the money or that the law suit was only taken up for money. For Moon, the case was of symbolic significance; a demand for justice.
12 月的邮政储蓄并非作为性服务的报酬支付。这是她以自己名义从士兵的小费等零散收入中积攒下来的钱。她表示没有从慰安所的经营者那里领取过工资。相反,即使她赢得了诉讼,这些储蓄也只是象征性的一小笔钱,说明说她成为慰安妇是为了钱,或者诉讼只是为了钱,是不恰当的。对月来说,这个案件具有象征意义;是一种对正义的诉求。

13 According to Sone Hiromi (1998) who has studied prostitution in the Edo period, the etymology of the word for prostitution baita [now baishunfu] was originally the act of ‘selling women’ (onna o
13 根据研究江户时期卖淫的园江弘美(1998 年),卖淫一词 baita(现为 baishunfu)的词源最初是指“卖女人”的行为(onna o)

uru). After this it shifted to indicate ‘women selling spring’ (baishun). According to another study by Sone (1990), there were five actors involved in prostitution: 1) the prostitute, 2) her family, 3) the agent 4) the customer 5) and the government. With the exception of the first, the prostitute, the remaining four actors were all central players profiting from prostitution as part of the sex industry.
uru)。之后,它转而表示“卖春的女人”(baishun)。根据 Sone(1990 年)另一项研究,卖淫涉及五个角色:1)妓女,2)她的家庭,3)中介,4)顾客,5)政府。除妓女本人外,其余四个角色都是作为性产业一部分从卖淫中获利的核心参与者。

14 Recent research on women’s history points to the prostitution discrimination inherent in the principle of the Anti-prostitution Law and the views of the women Diet members who promoted this piece of legislation.
14 近期关于女性历史的研究指出,反卖淫法原则中固有的对卖淫者的歧视,以及推动该立法的女性国会议员的观点。

15 Those in the Orthodox History Group narrowly limit the meaning of ‘forced’ to ‘forcibly taken away’. In terms of continued forced labour under conditions of confinement, the forced nature of the comfort women system is quiet clear. Even if recruitment occurred on the basis of free will, a system of forced labour contravening the free will of the woman concerned was established in the comfort stations.
15 正统历史派将“强迫”的含义狭义地限定为“被强行带走”。就被拘禁条件下持续的强迫劳动而言,慰安妇制度的强迫性质非常明确。即使招募是基于自由意志,慰安所内建立的强迫劳动制度仍然违背了相关女性的自由意志。

16 In actual fact, when the comfort women issue was first introduced overseas, the term ‘ianjo’ (comfort station) was translated as ‘military brothel’ and ‘ianfu’ (comfort women) as ‘prostitutes’.
16 实际上,当慰安妇问题首次在海外被提出时,“慰安所”(ianjo)一词被翻译为“军妓院”,“慰安妇”(ianfu)被翻译为“妓女”。

17 Separate from the standpoint of the continuity of categories, a sharp distinction has frequently been made between the privately run brothels and the military run comfort stations. On the grounds of protection and prevention, not only were military personnel strictly prohibited from entering privately run prostitution facilities, but also private citizens had only restricted entry to the military controlled comfort stations. However, in pointing to the continuity between categories, many theorists (Suzuki, 1997b; Fujime, 1997) have suggested that the military comfort stations were an extension of the system of licensed prostitution. Needless to say, this does not mean that either the system of regulated prostitution or the comfort women system are being pardoned.
17 除了从类别连续性的角度来看,私营妓院和军方经营的慰安所之间经常被严格区分开来。出于保护和预防的理由,不仅军人被严格禁止进入私营的卖淫场所,普通民众进入军方控制的慰安所也受到限制。然而,许多理论家(铃木,1997b;藤目,1997)指出,这两类之间存在连续性,认为军方慰安所是有执照卖淫制度的延伸。毋庸置疑,这并不意味着对有执照卖淫制度或慰安妇制度的任何宽恕。

18 However, in 1948 in Batavia in Indonesia at a class B and C war crimes trial, a total of 11 members of the military and civilians employed by the military were found guilty of forcing 35 Dutch women to become comfort women, with sentencing including the death penalty.
18 然而,1948 年在印度尼西亚巴达维亚举行的 B 级和 C 级战争罪审判中,共有 11 名军人及军方雇佣的平民被判强迫 35 名荷兰妇女成为慰安妇,其中包括死刑判决。

19 [Translator’s note] See Coomaraswamy, Radhika 1996.
19 【译者注】参见库马拉斯瓦米,拉迪卡 1996 年。

20 The United Nations Human Rights Committee established a Human Rights Sub-Committee and within this a working group was set up on Contemporary Sexual Slavery. This working group has dealt with the comfort women issue. The problem-setting of issues, such as international trafficking for the contemporary sex industry, violence against women both inside and outside the family, violence against women (including sexual violence) during armed conflict, was unified through the sexual slavery paradigm.
20 联合国人权委员会设立了一个人权小组委员会,并在其中成立了一个关于当代性奴隶制的工作组。该工作组处理了慰安妇问题。诸如当代性产业的国际贩运、家庭内外对妇女的暴力、武装冲突期间对妇女的暴力(包括性暴力)等问题的界定,均通过性奴隶制范式得以统一。

21 In addition to clearly acknowledging the involvement of the army in the military comfort women model, Kurahashi in an article written in 1989 judged that the treatment of the women in these comfort stations would have been better than in the ‘civilian-run’ types. The basis for this was firstly, that the comfort women as ‘weapons’ would have been treated with care, and secondly, due to the standardisation of the military as a bureaucratic system they ‘should have received the same handling and treatment’ (Kurahashi, 1989:81-2). For a historian, neither of these grounds amount to anything more than inappropriate conjecture. Considering that it was published in 1989, it is possible to appreciate this essay as an early scholarly achievement concerned with the comfort women issue. However, both the grounds outlined by Kurahashi are refuted by the testimony of the former comfort women. Kurahashi raises the question: ‘out of these two situations, which was really the better for these women?’ He then concludes that: ‘in both cases there was no saving these women’.
21 除了明确承认军队参与了军事慰安妇模式外,仓桥在 1989 年撰写的一篇文章中判断,这些慰安所中的妇女待遇可能比“民间经营”类型要好。其依据首先是,作为“武器”的慰安妇会被小心对待;其次,由于军队作为官僚体系的标准化,她们“应该会得到同样的管理和待遇”(仓桥,1989:81-82)。对于历史学家来说,这两个理由不过是不恰当的推测。考虑到该文发表于 1989 年,可以将其视为早期关注慰安妇问题的学术成果。然而,仓桥提出的这两个理由均被前慰安妇的证词所驳斥。仓桥提出问题:“在这两种情况下,哪一种对这些妇女来说真的更好?”他随后得出结论:“无论哪种情况,这些妇女都无法得救。”
22 Prior to the rape of the 12 -year old girl in Okinawa, the rapes of two other women, one 22 years old and the other 19 years old, were reported. However, the anger of local citizens rallied around the symbolic innocence of the 12 -year old victim. In the cases of the two adult women, where there could be slightest doubt about consent, these reports did not trigger the same level of outrage. However, the power that created the climax of the campaign, a mass meeting of 100,000 local citizens in October of the same year, was a contingent of the Okinawa Movement on Women who had just arrived back from the Fourth World Women’s Conference in Beijing. The group’s leader, Takasato Suzuyo, is an activist who has been grappling with the problem of military-base prostitution for a long time. Within the women’s movement in Okinawa, rape and military-base prostitution are contiguous as both are forms of violence against women.
22 在冲绳发生 12 岁女孩被强奸事件之前,还有两名女性被强奸的报告,一名 22 岁,另一名 19 岁。然而,当地民众的愤怒集中在象征纯洁无辜的 12 岁受害者身上。对于这两名成年女性的案件,由于对同意与否存在丝毫疑问,这些报道并未引发同样程度的愤慨。然而,促成这场运动高潮的力量,是同年 10 月由 10 万名当地市民参加的大型集会,而这场集会的主力正是刚从北京第四届世界妇女大会归来的冲绳妇女运动团体。该团体的领导者高里铃代是一位长期致力于解决军事基地卖淫问题的活动家。在冲绳的妇女运动中,强奸和军事基地卖淫是相连的,因为两者都是对女性的暴力形式。

23 Yamashita states in note 6 of this article: ‘As I, along with a number of other people, have pointed to the problematic nature of this section, it was announced that it would be cut in the Japanese edition’ (Yamashita, Y., 1996:55). The significance of this kind of high quality piece of work is coming out of the Korean women’s movement should not be underestimated. When the Japanese government’s answer in relation to Korea was quite clearly ethnocentric, we have to respect and value the self-critical stance taken towards the ethno-centrism that has arisen in response to this on their own side.
23 山下在本文的注释 6 中指出:“正如我和其他一些人所指出的,这一部分存在问题,因此宣布将在日文版中删减”(山下,Y.,1996:55)。来自韩国女性运动的这类高质量作品的重要性不容小觑。当日本政府对韩国的回应明显带有种族中心主义时,我们必须尊重并重视他们自身对由此产生的种族中心主义所采取的自我批判立场。

24 Originally, gender history was established through the process of confronting the monotheoretical, materialist historical viewpoint of class domination and by emphasising the independence of gender (sex) as a variable. If we turn Fujime’s expression on its head, gender history criticised hitherto views of history that simply put the priority on class by neglecting a gender perspective. It can be said that criticism from gender history has done a full circuit in that the importance of variables such as class, nation and ethnicity has once again surfaced. In my own words, contemporary gender studies has reached a point where ‘a problem cannot be analysed solely by gender, but there is not a problem that can be analysed without gender’ (Ueno, 1995b).
24 最初,性别史是通过与单一理论的、唯物主义的阶级统治历史观点对抗的过程建立起来的,并强调性别(性)作为一个独立变量的存在。如果反过来理解 Fujime 的表达,性别史批判了迄今为止仅仅将阶级置于优先地位而忽视性别视角的历史观。可以说,性别史的批判已经完成了一个完整的循环,阶级、民族和族裔等变量的重要性再次浮现。用我自己的话说,当代性别研究已经达到这样一个阶段:“问题不能仅仅通过性别来分析,但没有性别就没有问题可以被分析”(上野,1995b)。

25 That Taiwanese women were not sent to the front line in China is not unrelated to the fact that one of the aims of the comfort women system was the prevention of espionage. There were fears that troop movement and other military information would be leaked to the enemy via the comfort women. Taiwanese women could understand Chinese. On this point, Korean women were ideal targets as they could understand Japanese, but could not speak Chinese.
25 台湾女性没有被派往中国前线,这与慰安妇制度的一个目的——防止间谍活动——密切相关。人们担心通过慰安妇,部队调动等军事情报会泄露给敌人。台湾女性能听懂中文。在这方面,韩国女性是理想的对象,因为她们能听懂日语,但不会说中文。

26 Kurahashi Masanao introduces documents from 1933 after the establishment of Manchuria as the prehistory of the military comfort women. ‘The ‘jōshi gun’ (Amazonian troops, namely troops made of maidens) were definitely not prostitutes (inbai). When fighting suddenly broke out they would lay down their lives to dodge artillery fire to carry army provisions to the troops. Therefore, to the injured soldiers they were like wives and nurses. In what way were they prostitutes, I am forced to exclaim. Rather than selfishly indulge in meaningless sexual play like the modern girl and modern boy, they accompanied the troops and were truly Amazonian troops. Why do those modern girls not serve the army with their sexual service?’ Nakayama Tadanao Tōyō, November, 1993:419; Kurahashi, 1989:143). It is indicated that within this ‘sexual comfort’ was one way of offering oneself for the nation.
26 蔵橋正直介绍了 1933 年满洲国成立后作为军队慰安妇前史的文件。“‘女子军’(亚马逊部队,即由少女组成的部队)绝对不是妓女(inbai)。当战斗突然爆发时,她们会冒着炮火生命危险为部队运送军需品。因此,对于受伤的士兵来说,她们就像妻子和护士。我不得不惊呼,她们怎么会是妓女呢?她们不像现代男女那样自私地沉溺于无意义的性游戏,而是随军作战,是真正的亚马逊部队。为什么那些现代女孩不以性服务来服役军队呢?”(中山忠直《东洋》,1993 年 11 月:419;蔵桥,1989 年:143)。这表明,在这种“性慰藉”中,是为国家奉献自我的一种方式。

27 The work of historian Tanaka Toshiyuki (1993) and a film maker, Sekiguchi Noriko with the film Senjo no Mura (The village battleground) have revealed that after the victory of the Allied Forces, comfort stations in the southern battlefields were then used as comfort stations by the soldiers of the Allied Forces and that the women become targets of rape by these soldiers.
27 历史学家田中敏幸(1993 年)和电影制片人关口纪子通过电影《战场之村》揭示,盟军胜利后,南方战场的慰安所被盟军士兵使用,这些女性成为这些士兵强奸的对象。

28 Kawabata Tomoko (1995) develops a precise argument concerning the sexual double standard and prostitute discrimination. According to Kawabata, the ‘prostitute label’ is nothing more than an
28 川端智子(1995)提出了一个关于性别双重标准和对妓女歧视的精确论点。根据川端的观点,“妓女标签”不过是一个

expression of social sanction towards women who deviate from the role patriarchy expects of them.
对偏离父权制期望角色的女性施加社会制裁的表现。

Part III: the Politics of Memory
第三部分:记忆的政治

1 In October of the same year at a symposium on Japanese Modern History held at the University of Colombia in New York, Narita Ryüichi predicted that in the Japanese version of revisionism the comfort woman issue would probably perform the role that the Holocaust has in German Revisionism, and his prediction has turned out to be true. Moreover, this prediction became reality at a faster pace than we had expected.
1 同年十月,在纽约哥伦比亚大学举办的日本现代史研讨会上,成田龙一预测,在日本版的修正主义中,慰安妇问题很可能会扮演类似德国修正主义中大屠杀问题的角色,而他的预测已被证明是正确的。此外,这一预测的实现速度比我们预期的还要快。

2 It is revealing that popular women writer and essayist, Hayashi Mariko and Agawa Sawako, who appear on the list of names of those who made the appeal to start the Group, have maintained a continuous silence, not even appearing once at a news conferences and turning down all requests for a meeting (Tsukurukai sandōin intabyū [An interview with supporters of the Orthodox History Group], Ronza, May 1997, Asahi Shinbun Company).
2 值得注意的是,出现在发起该团体呼吁名单上的著名女性作家和散文家林真理子与阿川佐和子一直保持沉默,甚至一次新闻发布会都未曾出席,且拒绝了所有会面请求(《正统历史团体支持者访谈》,《论座》,1997 年 5 月,朝日新闻社)。

3 Nakano wrote ‘I decline putting my name to anything that functions to use my notoriety as a writer as a means of influence’. She also commented that she did not want to make statements as an expert, and stated that ‘with this in mind I declined giving my signature, but…perhaps you would call this is rather a negligent stance…I do not have much confidence in my judgement’. If she is unaware of the very fact that her writing was published in the print media supported by her notoriety then her irresponsibility and cowardice cannot be covered up. Nakano Midori ‘Rensai essei 14,2 Mangetsu Zakkichō’ (Serialised essay, 14,2 Fullmoon Essays), Sundē Mainichi Shinbun, 15 December, 1996.
3 中野写道:“我拒绝在任何利用我作为作家的名声来施加影响的事情上签名。”她还评论说,她不想以专家身份发表声明,并表示:“考虑到这一点,我拒绝签名,但……也许你会说这是一种相当疏忽的态度……我对自己的判断没有太大信心。”如果她没有意识到她的文章正是凭借她的名声被印刷媒体发表,那么她的这种不负责任和懦弱是无法掩盖的。中野绿《连载随笔 14,2 满月杂记》(连载随笔,14,2 满月随笔),《星期日日刊新闻》,1996 年 12 月 15 日。

4 A similar inconsistency is evident in the fact that most of the Japanese media voluntarily refrain from using the word rape. The official reason is that it is ‘too offensive’, but at the same time the term murder is used quite indifferently. Yet surely it is clear what is concealed when terms like teasing (itazura) and assault are used instead, and who benefits from this (Ueno, 1996).
4 类似的不一致还体现在大多数日本媒体自愿避免使用“强奸”一词。官方理由是该词“过于冒犯”,但同时“谋杀”一词却被相当冷漠地使用。然而,显然当使用“戏弄(いたずら)”和“袭击”等词时,隐藏了什么,以及谁从中受益,这一点是清楚的(上野,1996)。

5 The study of Japanese post-war history cannot necessarily be reduced to naïve positivist history. Both scientific history based on a materialist interpretation of history and the perspective of total history are heavy with ideological overtones. It seems to be only with this issue that, rather than being a debate over historical paradigms, it is a dispute at a level of true or false questions concerning facts? If validity is being adopted as popular persuasion technique, then this is, firstly, extending the life of naïve positivist history by placing off-limits questions from a historical perspective and, secondly, it is underestimating the audience (Ueno, 1996).
5 日本战后历史的研究不一定能简化为幼稚的实证主义历史。基于唯物主义历史解释的科学历史和整体历史的视角都带有浓厚的意识形态色彩。似乎只有在这个问题上,不是历史范式的争论,而是真伪问题的事实层面的争议?如果有效性被作为流行的说服技巧采用,那么首先,这是通过从历史视角将某些问题划为禁区来延续幼稚实证主义历史的生命;其次,这是低估了受众(上野,1996)。

6 In response to this, historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki and non-fiction writer and activist, Nishino Rumiko have already voiced criticism that the presence or absence of coercion has been sneakily switched to a problem falling within the scope of [the women] being intentionally hauled away. However, the parameters of the problematizing here, no matter how they are set up, leave unchanged the fact that everything has to be fought out on the basis of positivism.
6 针对此,历史学家吉见义明和非虚构作家及活动家西野留美子已经批评说,是否存在强制行为的问题被偷偷地转变为[女性]是否被故意带走的问题。然而,无论这里的问题参数如何设定,都没有改变必须基于实证主义来进行一切斗争的事实。

7 [Translator’s note] Yoshimi had first come across the relevant documents before a two-year sabbatical to the US in the later 1980s, but had not made them public. As Ueno points out, they only became significant after the paradigm shift occurred (see Yoshimi, 1995:35).
7【译者注】吉见早苗最初是在 1980 年代后期赴美两年休假期间接触到相关文件的,但当时并未公开。如上野所指出,这些文件只有在范式转变发生后才变得重要(参见吉见,1995:35)。

8 Yoshimi himself testifies to this situation: ‘In August 1991 in Korea, Kim Hak-sun came forward for the first time under her real name. In December 1991, Kim Hak-sun along with two other former comfort women, and former soldiers and civilians attached to the military and/or the bereaved families filed a lawsuit at the Tokyo District Court seeking an apology and compensation from the Japanese government. At this point the Japanese government was denying any involvement and no
8 吉见本人也证实了这种情况:“1991 年 8 月,在韩国,金学顺首次以真名站出来。1991 年 12 月,金学顺与另外两名前慰安妇,以及曾隶属于军队的前士兵和平民和遗属一起,在东京地方法院提起诉讼,要求日本政府道歉和赔偿。此时,日本政府仍然否认任何牵连,且没有任何...

attempt had been made to seek out any documentation. As it happened, I was aware of the existence of relevant data and, as a result, set about investigating the matter anew with the results of this published in the Asahi Shinbun newspaper in January 1992. Unable to reject these findings, the government was forced to admit involvement’ (Kasahara et al., 1997:154).
曾试图寻找任何相关的文件。恰巧我知道相关数据的存在,因此重新着手调查此事,并于 1992 年 1 月在《朝日新闻》上发表了调查结果。政府无法否认这些发现,被迫承认了其“参与”(Kasahara 等,1997:154)。

9 Two young scholars of folklore studies, Ōtsuki Takahiro and Akasaka Norio (1997) together declared that they agreed with Sakurai Yoshiko. Irokawa Daikichi, a modern historian and militant anti-imperialist, severely criticised them suggesting that surely this amounted to a denial of Folklore Studies: ‘Ōtsuki Takahiro is involved in the Orthodox History Group, but where he is pitiable is that while a scholar of folklore studies he forgot that the departure point for folklore studies was a distrust of documents created by the state or the authorities. Is it not the case that folklore studies came about from listening to the stories of ordinary people and creating oral history?’ (Irokawa, 1997).
9 两位年轻的民俗学者大月孝宏和赤坂纪夫(1997 年)共同声明他们同意樱井良子。现代历史学家兼激进反帝国主义者色川大吉严厉批评他们,认为这无疑是否定了民俗学:“大月孝宏参与了正统历史派,但令人遗憾的是,作为一名民俗学者,他忘记了民俗学的出发点是对国家或当局制作的文献的不信任。民俗学不正是通过倾听普通人的故事,创造口述历史而产生的吗?”(色川,1997 年)。

10 Wakakuwa Midori (1997) similarly argues that in court cases involving sexual crimes the burden of proof should shift from the victim to the perpetrator. In the first ruling of the Akita sexual harassment case (January 28th, 1997) the judge passed judgement on a suspected interaction between the man and woman concerned that took place behind closed doors without witnesses, and after having ‘impartially’ examined the statements of both sides, declared that the reliability of the woman’s case was weaker. The reason given for this was that the speech and behaviour of the woman at the scene of sexual harassment, being contrary to the Judge’s own common-sense, was deemed unnatural. Again, in the famous sexual harassment dispute between Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas in the United States, the end result of Congress making what was said to be as impartial judgement on the reliability of the testimony was Hill’s defeat. Once again, those bringing judgement did not question their own so-called neutrality and objectivity.
10 若川绿(1997)同样主张,在涉及性犯罪的法庭案件中,举证责任应从受害者转移到加害者身上。在秋田性骚扰案的第一次判决(1997 年 1 月 28 日)中,法官对男女当事人在无证人在场的闭门情况下的疑似互动作出判决,并在“公正”审查双方陈述后,宣称女性的证词可信度较弱。给出的理由是,女性在性骚扰现场的言行与法官自身的常识相悖,被认为是不自然的。同样,在美国著名的安妮塔·希尔与克拉伦斯·托马斯之间的性骚扰争议中,国会对证词可信度所作的所谓公正判决的最终结果是希尔的失败。再次证明,作出判决的人并未质疑他们自称的中立性和客观性。

11 [Translator’s Note] The term historicization refers to the practice of placing the object of study within its own particular historical context.
11 【译者注】“历史化”一词指的是将研究对象置于其特定历史背景中的做法。

12 I was criticised by Maeda concerning an article that I wrote (Ueno, 1997a). The following points are partially a response to Maeda’s criticisms (Maeda, 1997b).
12 我因一篇自己写的文章(上野,1997a)受到前田的批评。以下几点部分是对前田批评的回应(前田,1997b)。

13 Nothing demonstrates this more blatantly (and with less shame) than the enactment of the Okinawa Special Measures Law (Okinawa Tokubetsu Sochi Hō) in April 1997. In the middle of a dispute following legal principles over the rejection of a request for an extension of land-lease rights for the American military base in Okinawa by the land owners and as a result of a change in the legal principles themselves, a new law was created to legalise use of the land by the American military without the consent of the landlords. What is more, under a system of a ruling-party coalition government, the Okinawa Special Measures Law was enacted with 90 percent of Diet members voting in favour. As indicated by many people, this is akin to changing the rules in the middle of a game and is an unreasonable intervention.
13 没有什么比 1997 年 4 月颁布的《冲绳特别措施法》(Okinawa Tokubetsu Sochi Hō)更明显(且更无耻)地证明这一点了。在围绕冲绳美军基地土地租赁权延长请求被地主拒绝的法律原则争议中,随着法律原则本身的改变,制定了一部新法律,允许美军在未获得地主同意的情况下使用土地。更重要的是,在执政党联盟政府体制下,《冲绳特别措施法》以 90%的国会议员赞成票通过。正如许多人所指出的,这无异于在比赛中途更改规则,是一种不合理的干预。

14 A current point of contention is the bronze statue of Jefferson in front of the Natural History Museum in New York. It is truly a colonialist symbol with Jefferson on horseback with a black man and a Native American in tow at his feet. Groups representing Native Americans have continued to protest against this statue. Some time in the future this statue of Jefferson will probably be preserved as historical material of the stain of its history of conquest or usurpation and at the same time as an explanation of it.
14 目前一个争议点是纽约自然历史博物馆前的杰斐逊青铜雕像。它确实是一个殖民主义象征,雕像中杰斐逊骑在马上,脚下跟着一名黑人和一名美洲原住民。代表美洲原住民的团体一直在抗议这座雕像。未来某个时候,这座杰斐逊雕像可能会被作为其征服或篡夺历史污点的历史资料加以保存,同时也作为对此历史的解释。

15 The claim for compensation for Japanese-Americans subject to compulsory internment was finally realised in 1988.
15 对于被强制拘留的日裔美国人提出的赔偿要求最终在 1988 年得以实现。

16 Here the framework of national history has not been transcended. Japanese-Americans were ‘loyal Americans’ just like other citizens, with Japanese-American GIs the symbol of this ‘loyalty to
16 在这里,国家历史的框架尚未被超越。日裔美国人和其他公民一样是“忠诚的美国人”,日裔美国士兵则成为这种“忠诚”的象征。

country’. Moreover, it was this loyalty that was placed on display along with an exhibition of life in the compulsory internment camps. To the end, the rhetoric of the America’s National History Museum is that this was a crime (racial discrimination) committed by the state against its own citizens who are loyal to the state’.
国家”。此外,正是这种忠诚与强制性拘留营中的生活展览一同被展示出来。直到最后,美国国家历史博物馆的言辞都是,这是一种国家对忠于国家的公民所犯下的罪行(种族歧视)。

17 [Translator’s Note] The New Ainu Law (Ainu Shinpō) was passed in May 1997. The New Law nullified the Ainu Protection Act, which had been enacted in 1899 and revised in 1968, which had essentially institutionalised ideas of Ainu inferiority by representing these indigenous people of Northern Japan as a ‘dying race’ in need of state protection (Siddle, R., ‘Ainu: Japan’s Indigenous People’ in Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity edited by Michael Weiner (1997). In contrast to the Protection Act, the New Law is committed not to the assimilation of the Ainu people, but the preservation of their indigenous culture. It is this shift in official representations of the Ainu people that Ueno is alluding to here.
17【译者注】《新爱努法》(Ainu Shinpō)于 1997 年 5 月通过。该新法废除了 1899 年颁布、1968 年修订的《爱努保护法》,后者通过将日本北部的原住民爱努人描绘为需要国家保护的“濒危种族”,实质上制度化了爱努人的劣等观念(参见 Siddle, R.,《爱努:日本的原住民》,收录于 Michael Weiner 主编的《日本的少数民族:同质性的幻象》(1997)中)。与《保护法》不同,新法致力于保护爱努人的原住民文化,而非同化他们。上野在此所指的,正是官方对爱努人表述的这一转变。

18 What is more, as far as Perrot is concerned, the main producers of discourses on women in the middle ages were Christian ecclesiastics, in other words, by definition men who were prohibited from having contact with women. This means, ironically, that we are being made to read illusions about women created by men who knew nothing of women.
18 更重要的是,就佩罗(Perrot)而言,中世纪关于女性话语的主要生产者是基督教教士,换言之,按定义是被禁止与女性接触的男性。这具有讽刺意味,即我们被迫阅读的是由对女性一无所知的男性所创造的关于女性的幻象。

19 It is taboo for members of the support groups to acknowledge that the chances of winning a court case are slim. To admit this would be considered defeatism. The logic of the support groups is only natural; if you are going to fight, then you have to develop a battle strategy where you have a winning chance, and if you do not envision winning then you will not be visited with victory. However, repeatedly since the end of the war, in cases where post-war compensation has been sought for individuals the claimant has been ‘turned down at the door’ on the grounds that the claim does not fit domestic law. Where laws are created for the convenience of policy makers, court battles can neither be objective nor neutral. Indeed, with the rules of legal principle forced upon them, the individual must fight from a position of disadvantage on the ‘home turf’ of his or her adversary. If one daringly takes a case to court fully aware of these disadvantages, it is less for the sake of winning and more due to an expectation of the symbolic impact that a discursive battle in the court will have in a public space.
19 对支持团体成员来说,承认赢得官司的机会渺茫是禁忌。承认这一点会被视为失败主义。支持团体的逻辑是很自然的;如果你要战斗,就必须制定一个有胜算的战斗策略,如果你不设想胜利,那么胜利就不会降临。然而,自战后以来,在为个人寻求战后赔偿的案件中,原告多次被以不符合国内法律为由“门口拒之”。当法律是为政策制定者的便利而制定时,法庭上的争斗既不可能客观也不可能中立。事实上,个体在被强加的法律原则规则下,必须在对手的“主场”处于劣势地位进行斗争。如果有人敢于带着充分意识到这些劣势的案件上法庭,这更多不是为了赢得胜利,而是期待法庭上的话语斗争在公共空间产生象征性的影响。

20 Let me cite a familiar example of this; divorce among middle-aged couples. The reason that it so frequently comes as a shocking ‘bolt out of the blue’ for a middle-aged husband broached with the subject of divorce is because these men fail to question whether their wife shares the dominant reality that they themselves had defined. Looking at statistical data, among couples aged sixty or over who were asked the question, Is a married couple ‘one heart, one mind’ (isshindōtai), 60 percent of husbands answered ‘yes’, whereas less than 30 percent of wives did so. There are cases of couples living together with one party continually thinking of divorce, and where this serious discommunication continues over many years. The dominant party’s power of imagination is not sufficient to conceive such a huge gap in the two realities. What if we could imagine that the reality we experience in our lives has a very different aspect from the perspective of another party? Acknowledging multiple histories is accepting that there is not a single reality and that for another person a completely different reality exists.
20 让我举一个大家熟悉的例子:中年夫妻离婚。中年丈夫在被提及离婚话题时,之所以常常感到震惊,仿佛晴天霹雳,是因为这些男人没有去质疑妻子是否认同他们自己所定义的主导现实。根据统计数据,在被问及“夫妻是否‘一心一意’(isshindōtai)”的六十岁及以上的夫妻中,60%的丈夫回答“是”,而妻子中不到 30%这样回答。有些夫妻一方不断想着离婚,却依然共同生活,这种严重的沟通障碍持续多年。主导一方的想象力不足以理解双方现实之间存在如此巨大的差距。如果我们能够想象,自己生活中所经历的现实,从另一方的视角看,可能有着截然不同的面貌呢?承认多重历史,就是接受不存在单一现实,而对另一个人来说,存在着完全不同的现实。

21 Takahashi Tetsuya uses the term ‘seikansha’ (survivors; literally those who have returned from the living hell) (Takahashi, 1995).
21 高桥哲也使用了“生还者”(seikansha)一词(字面意思是从人间地狱中归来的人)(高桥,1995)。

22 Tonkin refers to the illusion that part of a narrative is repeated unerringly in the same story the ‘talking book fallacy’ (Tonkin, 1992).
22 托金将叙述中某部分在同一故事中被无误重复的错觉称为“会说话的书谬误”(托金,1992 年)。

23 Nanumu House is an institution in the suburbs of Seoul where the former comfort women victims can live communally. A Buddhist group administrates it. The word nanumu is the Korean word for
23 Nanumu House 是位于首尔郊区的一个机构,供前慰安妇受害者集体生活。该机构由一个佛教团体管理。单词 nanumu 是韩语中“分享”的意思。

‘sharing’. Two documentaries about the life of the women have been directed by Byeon Yeong-ju The House of Nanumu I and The House of Nanumu II.
关于这些女性生活的两部纪录片由卞英珠导演,分别是《Nanumu House I》和《Nanumu House II》。

24 According to a report made at the American History Association conference, comfort women section meeting held at the Sheraton Hotel in New York, 1 January 1997.
24 根据 1997 年 1 月 1 日在纽约喜来登酒店举行的美国历史协会会议慰安妇分会的报告。

25 As a result, one side has criticised the other. Women’s history has accused women’s studies (representing feminism) of relying on the importation of Western ideas and knowing little about the situation in Japan. From the other side, women’s studies has criticised women’s history for falling behind important changes in other academic fields. For the complex relationship between women’s history and feminism in Japan, see Ueno, 1995a. For a discussion of attempts to bring the two sides closer together, see Tabata, Ueno and Fukutō, Jendā to josei 1997.
25 结果,一方批评另一方。女性历史学指责女性研究(代表女权主义)依赖于西方思想的引进,对日本的实际情况了解甚少。另一方面,女性研究则批评女性历史学落后于其他学科领域的重要变革。关于日本女性历史学与女权主义之间复杂关系,参见上野,1995a。关于试图拉近双方关系的讨论,参见田畑、上野和福藤,《性别与女性》1997 年。

26 Scott is well informed about these conditions. She remarks that, 'the discrepancy between the high quality of recent work in women’s history and its continuing marginal status is the field as a whole (as measured by textbooks, syllabi, and monographic work) points up the limits of descriptive approaches that do not address dominant disciplinary concepts, or at least that do not address these concepts in terms that can shake their power and perhaps transform them. It has not been enough for historians of women to prove either that women had a history or that women participated in the major political upheavals of Western civilization. In the case of women’s history, the response of most non-feminist historians has been acknowledgement and then separation or dismissal (women had a history separate from men’s, therefore let feminists do women’s history, which need not concern us; or women’s history is about sex and the family and should be done separately from political and economic history). In the case of women’s participation, the response has been minimal interest at best (my understanding of the French Revolution is not changed by knowing that women participated in it) (Scott, 1999:30-31).
斯科特对这些情况了解颇深。她指出:“近年来女性历史研究质量很高,但该领域整体仍处于边缘地位(从教科书、课程大纲和专著来看),这凸显了描述性方法的局限性——这些方法未能触及主导学科概念,或者至少未能以能够动摇其权力并可能转变它们的方式来探讨这些概念。女性历史学家仅仅证明女性有历史,或女性参与了西方文明的重大政治动荡,是远远不够的。在女性历史领域,大多数非女性主义历史学家的回应是承认然后分离或忽视(女性有一段与男性分开的历史,因此让女性主义者去做女性历史,这与我们无关;或者女性历史是关于性和家庭的,应当与政治和经济历史分开研究)。” 在女性参与的问题上,回应充其量也只是极少的兴趣(我对法国大革命的理解并不会因为知道女性参与其中而改变)(Scott,1999:30-31)。

27 In British women’s history a new research theme under the title Imperial Feminism has emerged investigating the attitude of bourgeois feminists of the time concerning the policies of imperialist invasion under the British Empire. For example, from a thorough re-reading of the text it has been demonstrated that female abolitionists called for the liberation of slaves either from an anti-racist position or argued for the abolition of slavery as a ‘noble duty precisely in order to establish the supremacy of the Caucasian race’ (Midgley, 1992). Ann Davin’s Imperialism and Motherhood is a pioneering achievement of this kind of reflexive women’s history (Davin, 1978).
27 在英国女性史中,出现了一个新的研究主题,名为“帝国主义女性主义”,探讨当时资产阶级女性主义者对大英帝国帝国主义侵略政策的态度。例如,通过对文本的深入再解读,已经证明女性废奴主义者呼吁解放奴隶,要么是出于反种族主义立场,要么则主张废除奴隶制是“一项高尚的责任,正是为了确立高加索人种的至高无上地位”(Midgley,1992)。Ann Davin 的《帝国主义与母性》是这类反思性女性史研究的开创性成果(Davin,1978)。

28 Ögoshi Aiko suggests that my concept of reflexive women’s history differs little from Fujioka Nobukatsu et al’s ‘self-hating masochistic view of history’ (jikoaku- gyaku shikan)? (Ōgoshi and Takahashi, 1997). However, on a number of points she conclusively reveals her ignorance and misunderstanding. Firstly, I had already used the term reflexive women’s history in 1994 in an article entitled History and Feminism. At that time, Fujioka’s term self-hating masochistic view of history had yet to make its appearance, and my concept of reflexive women’s history was established completely independently of his movement. Secondly, the term reflexive itself does not have a negative meaning. Her argument does not understand the context within post-structuralism that the term reflexive was established. Thirdly, reflexive women’s history is a movement that can be seen all over the world, regardless of nationality. It is not a Japanese trend.
28 大越爱子认为,我的反思性女性史概念与藤冈信胜等人的“自我憎恨的受虐历史观”(jikoaku-gyaku shikan)几乎没有区别(大越与高桥,1997)。然而,在多个方面,她明确暴露了自己的无知和误解。首先,我早在 1994 年就已在一篇题为《历史与女权主义》的文章中使用了反思性女性史这一术语。那时,藤冈的“自我憎恨的受虐历史观”尚未出现,而我的反思性女性史概念完全独立于他的运动而建立。其次,反思性这一术语本身并不带有负面含义。她的论点未能理解反思性这一术语在后结构主义语境中的确立。第三,反思性女性史是一场在全球范围内都能看到的运动,与国籍无关。它并非日本的一个潮流。

29 To reiterate the point, one’s native province is just another ‘imagined community’.
29 重申一点,故乡省份不过是另一个“想象的共同体”。

30 Naturally, Katō reveals considerable deliberation in his work to the extent that he writes, ‘because Japanese society is not a single person it is not possible to explain the construction of the fragmentation of Japanese society without assuming that what is being refered to here is a collective ego’ (Katō, 1997:319). Thus, while he starts out with the words ‘I understand’ and ‘I am aware’, Katō ends up retreating into a collective subject, a we with one character (Katō, 1997:75).
30 自然,胜田在其作品中表现出相当的深思熟虑,他写道:“因为日本社会不是一个单一的人,所以无法解释日本社会碎片化的构建,除非假设这里所指的是一个集体自我”(胜田,1997:319)。因此,虽然他一开始用“我理解”和“我意识到”这样的词语,但最终胜田退回到了一个集体主体,即具有统一特征的‘我们’(胜田,1997:75)。
31 Naturally, the same can be said of the category women. Categories where the group equals a we, regardless of what kind of category this is, there is a move to highlight differences with the outside and conceal internal differences. In feminism it is no longer acceptable to simply rely on one single category woman.
31 同样的话也适用于“女性”这一类别。无论是哪种类别,只要群体等同于“我们”,就会倾向于强调与外部的差异,掩盖内部的差异。在女权主义中,单纯依赖“女性”这一单一类别已不再被接受。

32 The workshop entitled ‘The Japanese Military Comfort Women: From the Perspective of Japanese Women and Women Living in Japan’ was held on 6 September, 1995 at the Beijing Conference NGO Forum and was sponsored by the Asian Women’s Conference Network (AWCN).
32 题为“日本军队慰安妇:从日本女性及居住在日本的女性视角”的研讨会于 1995 年 9 月 6 日在北京会议非政府组织论坛上举行,由亚洲妇女会议网络(AWCN)主办。

33 The identity of ethnic minority women, for example black women, is first as a black and then as a woman. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to mobilize women who identify with an ethnic group to participate in the women’s movement. At the same time, problematising the gender category within the ethnic group - which needless to say is male dominated - is viewed as a taboo if not an act that serves the interests of the enemy. The indignation that Alice Walker’s Color Purple generated in black, male society illustrates that identification with the male-centred ethnic group includes the oppression of women. We can add to this the class-centeredness of socialist women’s liberation theory that early radical feminism opposed. As here too loyalty to one’s class meant loyalty to the men of that class group.
33 例如,少数民族女性的身份首先是黑人,然后才是女性。因此,动员认同某一族群的女性参与妇女运动极为困难。与此同时,在族群内部对性别类别进行问题化——毋庸置疑该族群是男性主导的——被视为禁忌,甚至被看作是为敌人利益服务的行为。艾丽斯·沃克的《紫色姐妹花》在黑人男性社会中引发的愤慨说明,认同以男性为中心的族群意味着对女性的压迫。我们还可以补充社会主义妇女解放理论的阶级中心主义,早期激进女权主义对此持反对态度。因为在这里,对阶级的忠诚意味着对该阶级男性的忠诚。

Part IV: Hiroshima from a Feminist Perspective
第四部分:从女性主义视角看广岛

1 [Translator’s Note] In the original Japanese the word Hiroshima was written in katakana (the script generally reserved for words of non-Japanese and non-Chinese origin), rather than in kanji (ideographs) as would be expected. Ueno has done this to emphasise that the subject is not only the place Hiroshima, but also Hiroshima as an actual and symbolic event that began with the dropping of the nuclear bomb from the Enola Gay on August 6th, 1945. Other than this first occasion, I will not put any special emphasis around the word.
1【译者注】在原日文中,“广岛”一词是用片假名书写的(片假名通常用于非日语和非汉语起源的词汇),而非通常预期的汉字。上野这样做是为了强调主题不仅是地名“广岛”,更是指 1945 年 8 月 6 日“恩诺拉·盖伊”号投下核弹所引发的广岛这一实际且象征性的事件。除首次出现外,本文不会对该词做特别强调。

2 The speech was originally given as part of an event at The Hiroshima Kanō Cram School (Hiroshima Kanō Juku), the Hiroshima Women’s Studies Course (Hiroshima Joseigaku Kōza), sponsored by Kazokusha. Between April and August 2000, Kano held a lecture once a month. Approximately 35 participants attended each lecture. The theme of each session was as follows:
2 该演讲最初是在广岛叶野补习学校(广岛叶野塾)举办的广岛女性学课程(广岛女性学讲座)活动中发表的,该课程由家族社赞助。2000 年 4 月至 8 月期间,叶野每月举办一次讲座。每次讲座约有 35 名参与者。各次讲座的主题如下:

i) Feminism and Women’s History.
i) 女权主义与女性历史。

ii) War and Women: the Military Comfort Women and the Women on the Home Front.
ii) 战争与女性:军慰安妇与后方女性。

iii) Peace and Women: the Maternal Myth and Peace Campaigning.
iii) 和平与女性:母性神话与和平运动。

iv) Feminism and War: Focusing on the Issue of Female Combat Troops.
iv) 女权主义与战争:聚焦女性战斗部队问题。

v) Hiroshima and Feminism: An essay on Hiroshima Women’s Peace Studies.
v) 广岛与女权主义:关于广岛女性和平研究的论文。
Continuing into 2001, Kazokusha and the Course Planning Committee sponsored lectures on the following themes and with the following speakers:
进入 2001 年,家族社和课程规划委员会赞助了以下主题的讲座,讲者如下:

i) Hiroshima Women’s History: Its Significance and Methodology (Kanō Mikiyo).
i) 广岛女性史:其意义与方法论(狩野美纪代)。

ii) Things We Can Discover from the Approach of Local Women’s History (Okayama, Matsue, Shimane and Hiroshima Women’s History Group and Kanō Mikiyo).
ii) 从地方女性史视角可以发现的事物(冈山、松江、岛根及广岛女性史研究会与狩野美纪代)。

iii) A-Bomb Damage and Women (Seki Chieko).
iii) 原子弹伤害与女性(关千惠子)。

iv) A Reading From the Perspective of A-Bomb Literature (Esashi Akiko)
iv) 从原子弹文学视角的解读(江差明子)。

v) An Essay on The Hiroshima Women’s Peace Studies: Nukes and Feminism (Kanō Mikiyo).
v) 广岛女性和平研究论文:核武器与女权主义(狩野美纪代)。
3 The Fifteen-Year War that began in September 1931, was an aggressive war carried out by Japan with the aim of colonizing Asia. It was a total war fought on the basis of a system of gender segregation with men on the front line and women on the home front. The phrase history of the home front was applied to the history of women who supported the war with pride on the home front. In 1967, the Society for Questioning Women Today (Josei no genzai (ima) o toukai) was formed to get a clearer picture of why and in what way women supported the war. With Kanō Mikiyo playing a pivotal role, a number of independent researchers of women’s history at the grass roots level gathered together and inaugurated the Society’s own publication Jyūgo shi nōto (A Note on the History of the Home Front). Between 1977 and 1996 a total of 18 volumes were published, including the final issue.
3 1931 年 9 月开始的十五年战争,是日本为殖民亚洲而发动的侵略战争。这是一场基于性别隔离制度进行的全面战争,男性在前线作战,女性则在后方支援。 “后方史”这一说法被用来指代那些自豪地在后方支持战争的女性的历史。1967 年,成立了“质疑当代女性协会”(Josei no genzai (ima) o toukai),旨在更清楚地了解女性为何以及以何种方式支持战争。在狩野美纪代的关键推动下,一批基层女性史独立研究者聚集起来,创办了该协会的刊物《十五年史笔记》(Jyūgo shi nōto)。1977 年至 1996 年间,共出版了 18 期,包括最后一期。

4 Based on a Marxist school of history, which emphasises the establishment of a system of private property in bringing about class and the oppression of women, the victim school of history sees the history of women as one of oppression as a subordinated class. Here women are regarded as passive victims of history and it is, therefore, also a liberationist view of history, a kind of evolutionist history, seeing women as more liberated as history develops. It is the position taken by Takamure Itsue as well as Inoue Kyoshi, two great authors of bestseller textbooks on women’s history after the war, though the former did not share the historical view of the class struggle with the latter.
4 基于马克思主义历史学派,强调私有制的建立导致阶级形成和对女性的压迫,受害者历史学派将女性历史视为作为被压迫阶级的历史。在这里,女性被视为历史的被动受害者,因此这也是一种解放主义的历史观,一种进化主义的历史观,认为随着历史的发展,女性变得更加解放。这是战后两位女性历史畅销教科书著名作者高群逸枝和井上恭子的立场,尽管前者并不认同后者的阶级斗争历史观。
5 On the August 28th 1945, Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko (Commander-in-Chief of Home Defence during the war), appealed for the ‘collective repentance of 100 million people’ (ichioku sō zange) saying that it would be pitiful for the Emperor to be pursued for war responsibility.
5 1945 年 8 月 28 日,首相东久迩宫稔彦(战时国内防卫总司令)呼吁“亿万人集体忏悔”(ichioku sō zange),称追究天皇的战争责任将是可怜的。

6 The Tokyo Tribunal equals the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In accordance with the clause in the Potsdam Declaration on ‘the punishment of war criminals’, following the allied countries’ occupation of Japan, war leaders and those who had abused prisoners-of-war were arrested. Among the A-class criminal war leaders, there was Tōjō Hideki (former Prime Minister), 28 military leaders and politicians who were prosecuted, of whom seven were executed by hanging and 18 received life-sentences (commuted after independence). A-class suspects, such as Kishi Shinsuke, did not come to trial. The government accepted the judgements at the San Francisco Peace Treaty and a settlement was achieved diplomatically.
6 东京审判即远东国际军事法庭。根据《波茨坦宣言》中关于“惩治战犯”的条款,在盟国占领日本后,战时领导人及虐待战俘者被逮捕。在 A 级战犯中,有东条英机(前首相)、28 名军事领导人和政治家被起诉,其中 7 人被绞刑处死,18 人被判终身监禁(独立后减刑)。像岸信介这样的 A 级嫌疑人未被审判。政府接受了《旧金山和约》中的判决,并通过外交途径达成了和解。

7 In the closing stages of the Fifteen-year War, starting with massed air raids by 355 American military carrier-based aircraft on 23, March 1945 and 30 Japanese and American warships open firing on each other on March 24, the US Military landed in Okinawa on April 1st. This was the beginning of a fierce ground battle between Japan and America stretching over a period of 3 months. During what is referred to as the ‘Storm of Steel’, a wave of mass suicides took place in every district, beginning in the Kerama Islands. In addition, the Japanese army forced locals to commit suicide. With mass suicides, the Battle of Okinawa resulted in massive casualties. The previous year, as part of the fortification of Okinawa, the Imperial Headquarters had deployed 110,000 preparatory forces, but the US military had injected a force of 550,000 ( 183,000 went ashore). Most of the Japanese military died an ‘honourable death’ [carried out suicidal attacks], with 90 percent ended up as war dead. It is said that 100,000 local people and 100,000 military personnel and voluntary military corps were victims of the ground battle. With the annihilation of the Japanese army, organizationally the war in Okinawa ended on the June 23rd.
7 在十五年战争的最后阶段,始于 1945 年 3 月 23 日 355 架美国军用航母飞机的大规模空袭,以及 3 月 24 日 30 艘日美军舰相互开火,美国军队于 4 月 1 日登陆冲绳。这标志着日美之间为期三个月的激烈地面战斗的开始。在被称为“钢铁风暴”的期间,每个地区都发生了大规模自杀浪潮,始于庆良间群岛。此外,日本军队还强迫当地居民自杀。由于大规模自杀,冲绳战役造成了巨大的伤亡。前一年,作为冲绳防御工事的一部分,帝国总部部署了 11 万预备部队,但美军投入了 55 万兵力(其中 18.3 万人登陆)。大多数日本军人以“光荣的死亡”告终[实施自杀式攻击],90%成为战死者。据说有 10 万当地居民和 10 万军人及志愿军团成为地面战斗的牺牲者。 随着日本军队的全军覆没,冲绳战役在组织上于 6 月 23 日结束。

8 In reaction to the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 by Iraq, the UN Security Council demanded a withdrawal. A resolution was passed recognising the use of armed force if Iraq did not withdraw by January 15th 1991. Immediately after this deadline had passed, air raids on Iraq were initiated by a multinational force, but with the U.S. as the main power. With the multinational force having overwhelming supremacy, the Iraqi military withdrew at the end of February. Despite war defeat, Saddam Hussein’s regime survived, and he went on to repress the Shiite Muslims in the South and Kurd’s in the North who had risen up against him. Japan also shouldered part of the financial burden of the war.
8 1990 年 8 月伊拉克入侵科威特后,联合国安理会要求伊拉克撤军。通过了一项决议,承认如果伊拉克未在 1991 年 1 月 15 日前撤军,将使用武力。该期限一过,多国部队立即对伊拉克发动空袭,但以美国为主导。凭借多国部队的压倒性优势,伊拉克军队于 2 月底撤退。尽管战争失败,萨达姆·侯赛因政权依然存续,他随后镇压了南部的什叶派穆斯林和北部的库尔德人起义。日本也承担了部分战争的财政负担。

9 It is suspected that the Occupation regime prohibited any problematising of the Tokyo aerial bombing. Unlike the case of Hiroshima and Okinawa, it was only in the mid-1980s, when the civic memorial museum was established for the victims of Tokyo air raid, with no public financial support, that the number of victims even began to be calculated.
9 据推测,占领政权禁止对东京空袭进行任何问题化。与广岛和冲绳的情况不同,直到 1980 年代中期,东京空袭受害者的市民纪念馆成立(无公共财政支持),受害者人数才开始被统计。

10 The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of WWII. Published in America in December 1997, it became a best seller selling over 500,000 copies. It was published in China in Chinese at the same time. Iris Chang is a young journalist who is a Chinese-American.
10 《南京大屠杀:二战被遗忘的大屠杀》。1997 年 12 月在美国出版,成为畅销书,销量超过 50 万册。同期在中国以中文出版。张纯如是一位华裔美国年轻记者。

11 Harry Truman (1884-1972). Thirty-third president of the United States (1945-1953). He became Vice President in 1944, and took office as President upon the death of Roosevelt. It was Truman who took the decisions to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; to loan money to Western Europe; and to send American troops to the Korean Peninsular. In order to countermine the Communist Bloc, he promoted a policy that provided Western Europe with military and financial aid (Truman’s Doctrine).
11 哈里·杜鲁门(1884-1972)。美国第三十三任总统(1945-1953)。1944 年成为副总统,罗斯福去世后继任总统。正是杜鲁门做出了对广岛和长崎投掷原子弹的决定;向西欧提供贷款;派遣美军进入朝鲜半岛。为了遏制共产主义集团,他推动了一项向西欧提供军事和经济援助的政策(杜鲁门主义)。
12 Ōe Kenzaburō (1935-). In 1958, Ōe received the Akutagawa Prize for literature for his book Shiiku (feeding). In 1994, he won the Nobel Prize for Literature. He has been a prolific writer and his work includes critical essays such as Hiroshima Notes and Kaku jidai no sōzōryoku (The power of imagination in the nuclear age).
12 大江健三郎(1935-)。1958 年,因其作品《饲育》获得芥川奖。1994 年获得诺贝尔文学奖。他是一位多产作家,作品包括批评性散文,如《广岛笔记》和《核时代的想象力》。

13 Akiba Tadatoshi (1942-). Current Mayor of Hiroshima (1999-) and mathematician. In 1978 he launched the Akiba Project, inviting overseas news correspondents to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He has held the post of assistant professor at Hiroshima Shūdō University since 1988. Since 1990 he has been a member of the House of Representatives [the lower House of the Japanese Diet] (Third term, Social Democratic Party).
13 秋叶忠俊(1942-)。现任广岛市长(1999 年至今)及数学家。1978 年,他发起了秋叶计划,邀请海外新闻记者访问广岛和长崎。自 1988 年起,他担任广岛修道大学助理教授。自 1990 年起,他成为日本众议院(日本国会下院)议员(第三届,社会民主党)。

14 The invasion of Nicaragua. In 1979 the Samosa dictatorship was overthrown and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) set up a left-wing government. However, in 1982 civil war broke out between the Sandinista government and the American backed right-wing guerrilla faction, the Contras. In 1984, in the presidential elections, left-winger Ortega [Savedra] was elected with overwhelming support, but as a result of tough sanctions being imposed by the U.S. the country fell into economic crisis and the people started to move away from the left. In the 1990 presidential elections a centrist/right-wing coalition government was set-up under the presidency of [Violeta Barrios de] Chamorro. In 1996 the country transferred to the right-wing Aleman government.
14 尼加拉瓜入侵。1979 年,萨莫萨独裁政权被推翻,桑地诺民族解放阵线(FSLN)建立了左翼政府。然而,1982 年,桑地诺政府与美国支持的右翼游击队派别“反抗军”爆发内战。1984 年总统选举中,左翼的奥尔特加(萨韦德拉)以压倒性支持当选,但由于美国实施严厉制裁,国家陷入经济危机,民众开始远离左翼。1990 年总统选举中,建立了以中间派/右翼联盟政府,由查莫罗(维奥莱塔·巴里奥斯·德·查莫罗)担任总统。1996 年,国家转由右翼的阿莱曼政府执政。

15 The invasion of Grenada in October 1983. The island kingdom of Grenada (under the umbrella of the British Commonwealth) was invaded by armed forces made up largely of the U.S. military and backed-up by forces from Jamaica and the Organisation of East Caribbean States (OECS). The leftwing government was overthrown and a pro-U.S. government was formed. In 1979, the authoritarian government in Grenada had been overthrown and an anti-colonialist, moderate process of social reform was under way when a pro-Soviet military general seized power in a coup d’etat. It was amidst the ensuing chaos that the invasion took place.
15 1983 年 10 月入侵格林纳达。格林纳达岛屿王国(在英联邦的保护伞下)被主要由美国军队组成的武装部队入侵,并得到了牙买加和东加勒比国家组织(OECS)部队的支持。左翼政府被推翻,成立了亲美政府。1979 年,格林纳达的专制政府被推翻,反殖民主义的温和社会改革进程正在进行中,随后一位亲苏联的军事将军通过政变夺取了政权。正是在随之而来的混乱中发生了这次入侵。

16 This treaty prevents any country other than the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and China becoming nations with nuclear capability. One hundred and eight-seven countries are signatories to this treaty. India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba are non-signatories. The treaty was signed in 1968 and was published in 1970. In 1998, India and Pakistan carried out nuclear testing and, along with Israel, became in effect nuclear powers.
16 该条约禁止除美国、俄罗斯、英国、法国和中国之外的任何国家拥有核能力。共有 187 个国家是该条约的签署国。印度、巴基斯坦、以色列和古巴未签署该条约。该条约于 1968 年签署,1970 年公布。1998 年,印度和巴基斯坦进行了核试验,并与以色列一道,实际上成为了核大国。

17 On March 1st 1954, a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon the Fifth was exposed to radioactive fallout as a result of nuclear testing being carried out at the Bikini Atolls in the Marshall Islands. Although the vessel was outside the danger zone, all 23 crew came upon severe radiological hazards and the captain, Kuboyama Aikichi, died as a result. This incident served to intensify the ban-the-bomb movement throughout Japan. In 1976, a Lucky Dragon the Fifth exhibition hall was opened on Yume Island in Tokyo by the Tokyo Metropolitan government.
1954 年 3 月 1 日,一艘日本渔船“第五幸运龙号”因在马绍尔群岛比基尼环礁进行的核试验而暴露于放射性降尘中。尽管该船位于危险区之外,但 23 名船员均遭受了严重的放射性危害,船长窪山爱吉因此去世。此事件加剧了日本全国范围内的反核运动。1976 年,东京都政府在东京的梦之岛开设了“第五幸运龙号”展览馆。

18 The split in the ban-the-bomb movement. Behind the attainment of 30 million signatures supporting the banning of the bomb was the first World Convention Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima on August 6, 1955, with 5,000 delegates from 11 countries. In the same year, the Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuibaku kinshi Nihon kyōkai; abbreviated to Gensui kyō) was founded. In 1959, the conservative faction broke away from this over the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In 1961, the Democratic Socialists formed the Kakuheiki kinshi heiwa kensetsu kokumin kaigi (People’s conference on banning the bomb and constructing peace; abbreviated to Kakukin kaigi). Within the Kakukin kaigi there was a deepening of tensions between the Socialist Party of Japan and 13 groups within the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan on one side, who were against any country having nuclear weapons, and the Communist Parties and its allies on the other, who advocated the acceptance of Soviet nukes and the idea of the Soviet Union as a force of peace. In February 1965,
18 禁止核弹运动的分裂。支持禁止核弹的三千万签名背后,是 1955 年 8 月 6 日在广岛举行的第一届世界反原子弹与氢弹大会,来自 11 个国家的 5000 名代表参加。同年,日本反原子弹与氢弹协会(Gensuibaku kinshi Nihon kyōkai,简称 Gensui kyō)成立。1959 年,保守派因日美安全条约修订问题从中分裂出去。1961 年,民主社会主义者成立了核兵器禁止与和平建设国民会议(Kakuheiki kinshi heiwa kensetsu kokumin kaigi,简称 Kakukin kaigi)。在 Kakukin kaigi 内部,日本社会党与日本总工会内的 13 个团体一方,反对任何国家拥有核武器;另一方则是共产党及其盟友,主张接受苏联核武器,并认为苏联是和平力量。1965 年 2 月,

the Gensuibaku kinshi Nihon kokumin kaigi (Japanese Peoples’ Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs; abbreviated to Gensui Kin) was formed around the axis of the Socialist Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan. While the Kakukin Kaigi was short-lived, the two groups held conventions and campaigned on their own terms. In 1977, a unified convention was realised, but splintering occurred again in 1985.
原水爆禁止日本国民会议(简称原水禁)是以社会党和日本职工总评议会为轴心组建的。虽然核禁会议存在时间较短,但这两个团体各自举办大会并开展运动。1977 年,实现了统一大会,但 1985 年又再次出现分裂。

19 In December 1967 during a session of the Lower House Budget Committee, then Prime Minister Satō Eisaku from the LDP stated that not possessing, not producing and not allowing entry of nuclear weapons in to the country was government policy. In November 1971, an agreement was reached in a Lower House plenary session concerning the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryūkyū Islands and the Daitō Islands, that along with obeying the three nuclear principles not to possess, produce or bring nuclear weapons into the country, it would be necessary for the government to take steps to demonstrate that there would be no nuclear weapons in Okinawa at the time of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration. On the other hand, as a counterplea the government stated that as an interpretation of the constitution it is not prohibited to possess the minimum level of force for selfdefence and that providing it does not exceed this minimum level, it would be constitutional to have nuclear weapons, thus making it just a matter of government policy. Except that due to the NPT, Japan could not make or possess nuclear weapons.
1967 年 12 月,在众议院预算委员会的一次会议上,当时的自由民主党首相佐藤荣作表示,不拥有、不生产、不允许核武器进入国内是政府的政策。1971 年 11 月,在众议院全体会议上就《日本与美利坚合众国关于琉球群岛及大东群岛的协议》达成一致,除遵守不拥有、不生产、不携带核武器入境的三原则外,政府还需采取措施,证明在琉球群岛归还日本管辖时,冲绳不会有核武器。另一方面,作为反驳,政府表示根据宪法解释,拥有最低限度的自卫力量并不被禁止,只要不超过这一最低限度,拥有核武器是合宪的,因此这只是政府政策的问题。只是由于《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT),日本不能制造或拥有核武器。

20 [Translator’s note] When I suggested to Ueno Chizuko that citizens in American society were never completely disarmed she came back with the following reply. As a result of the only partial disarming of citizens in the United States, ‘violence among citizens has become more serious and fatal than in other societies. Yet, the government would not accept the idea of guns being bought and sold freely. Moreover, individuals are not allowed to own nuclear bombs nor jet fighters even if they could afford buy them’.
20【译者注】当我向上野千鹤子提出美国社会的公民从未被完全解除武装时,她给出了以下回答。由于美国公民只被部分解除武装,“公民之间的暴力比其他社会更为严重和致命。然而,政府不会接受枪支自由买卖的想法。此外,即使个人有能力购买,也不允许拥有核弹或喷气式战斗机。”

21 In a narrow sense, war crimes are acts that are in contravention of the rules of armed conflict (crimes committed during wartime). A broader definition includes Crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity. Crimes against Peace include wars of aggression, the act of planning or starting a war that is in violation of international conventions, agreements or covenants, and supporting a conspiracy. Crimes against Humanity are murder, massacre, enslavement, forced migration, and other inhumane acts, as well as political, racial and religious persecution. In 1998, the treaty creating a permanent International Criminal Court was adopted (not yet published).
21 狭义上,战争罪是指违反武装冲突规则的行为(战争期间犯下的罪行)。广义上则包括反和平罪和反人类罪。反和平罪包括侵略战争、策划或发动违反国际公约、协议或盟约的战争行为,以及支持阴谋。反人类罪包括谋杀、大屠杀、奴役、强制迁移及其他不人道行为,以及政治、种族和宗教迫害。1998 年,创设永久国际刑事法院的条约被通过(尚未公布)。

22 Hasegawa Michiko (1949-). Professor at Saitama University. Received the Watsuji Tetsurō Culture Prize in 1997. Her publications include, Kara gokoro (Chinese way of thinking), Seigi no sōshitsu (The loss of justice), and Anata mo konnichi kara Nihonjin (From today, you too are Japanese), which was written along with [Orthodox History Group member] Nishio Kanji.
22 长谷川道子(1949 年生)。埼玉大学教授。1997 年获得和辻哲郎文化奖。著作包括《唐心》(中国人的思维方式)、《正义的丧失》和《从今天起你也是日本人》,后者与[正统历史集团成员]西尾幹二共同撰写。

23 The aerial bombardment of Kosovo. NATO forces became involved in the conflict between Albanian’s seeking the independence of the autonomous region of Kosovo and the Serbian Republic (Kosovo Conflict). In March 1999, in the middle of the peace talks, aerial bombing was initiated. Over 78 days, more than 10,000 air raids were carried out and 1,200 civilians and 5,000 military personnel were killed. The total cost of the damage was 14.5 billion yen. The economies of the neighbouring Balkan countries also took a terrible battering. Peace was established in June, 1999 and an international force (KFOR) of 50,000, made up mainly of NATO troops, was deployed in Kosovo.
23 科索沃的空中轰炸。北约部队介入了阿尔巴尼亚人寻求科索沃自治地区独立与塞尔维亚共和国之间的冲突(科索沃冲突)。1999 年 3 月,在和平谈判进行中,开始了空中轰炸。在 78 天内,进行了超过 1 万次空袭,造成 1200 名平民和 5000 名军人死亡。总损失达 145 亿日元。邻近的巴尔干国家经济也遭受了严重打击。和平于 1999 年 6 月建立,一支由 5 万名国际部队(KFOR)组成的部队,主要是北约军队,被部署到科索沃。

24 In June 1992 the Rabin government was established. Peace talks with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) moved ahead, and a peace consensus was reached. In 1994, a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority came into being in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. In 1995, Israeli forces withdrew from cities on the West Bank of the Jordan River (with the exception of Jerusalem
24 1992 年 6 月,拉宾政府成立。与巴勒斯坦解放组织(PLO)的和平谈判取得进展,达成了和平共识。1994 年,巴勒斯坦临时自治政府在加沙地带和杰里科成立。1995 年,以色列军队从约旦河西岸的城市撤出(耶路撒冷除外)

and Hebron), however, that same year Rabin was assassinated. In May 1996, Israel was on the brink of a general election when a series of bombing incidents took place at the hands of Islamic extremists. A sharp swing in public opinion led to the opposition party, Likud, coming to power with Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister. After this, the peace process came to a halt. In 1999, a Labour Government was returned to power with Ehud Barak as prime minister. In July the peace talks held at Camp David failed. In September the Al Aqsa Intifada (a Palestinian popular uprising) broke out. In February 2001, hardliner Ariel Sharon’s government was formed. The peace process broke down completely.
然而,同年拉宾被暗杀。1996 年 5 月,以色列正处于大选边缘,期间发生了一系列由伊斯兰极端分子实施的爆炸事件。公众舆论的急剧转变使反对党利库德集团上台,本杰明·内塔尼亚胡成为总理。此后,和平进程陷入停滞。1999 年,工党政府重新执政,埃胡德·巴拉克出任总理。7 月,在戴维营举行的和平谈判失败。9 月,阿克萨起义(巴勒斯坦民众起义)爆发。2001 年 2 月,强硬派阿里尔·沙龙组建政府。和平进程彻底破裂。

25 Unfortunately enough, this has become clearer in the Iraq War after I wrote this essay.
25 不幸的是,在我写这篇文章之后,伊拉克战争使这一点变得更加明显。

26 The following were recognised under the Meiji constitution, 1) in criminal law, the crime of adultery (criminal penalty), 2) under civil law, adultery was a reason for requesting a divorce (adulterous behaviour), 3) the right to claim for damages. The above could be immediately applied in the case of the adultery of a wife, but in the case of the husband it only became a problem if the relationship was with a woman who was married and her husband sued and criminal charges were imposed. After the war, equality between men and women under the law was highlighted in the new constitution. In 1947, the crime of adultery was removed from criminal law and provision was made within civil law for adultery to act as a reason for filing for divorce and to claim for compensation for both men and women equally.
26 根据明治宪法,以下情况被认可:1)在刑法中,通奸罪(刑事处罚);2)在民法中,通奸是请求离婚的理由(通奸行为);3)有权要求赔偿。上述规定可立即适用于妻子的通奸情况,但对于丈夫而言,只有当其与已婚女性发生关系且该女性的丈夫提起诉讼并施加刑事指控时,才构成问题。战后,新宪法强调了男女在法律上的平等。1947 年,通奸罪被从刑法中删除,民法中规定通奸可作为男女双方提出离婚和索赔的理由。

27 National Organisation for Women (NOW). NOW is the largest organisation of feminist activists in the United States. It was established in 1966, with Betty Friedan as the first President, and has campaigned for complete equality between men and women, focusing particularly on legal and economic equality. Its headquarters are in Washington D.C., and there are a total of 550 chapters, embracing a membership of 500,000. The organisation wielded immense political power, but was strongly criticised for being a platform for white, middle-class women. Since the 1980s it has aimed at bringing about gender equality by fighting all types of discrimination, including racial and classbased discrimination. Recently it has expanded it campaigning to include such issues as the right to abortion, sexual and reproductive freedom, eradication of gay and lesbian discrimination, and prohibiting violence against women.
27 全国妇女组织(NOW)。NOW 是美国最大的女权主义者组织。它成立于 1966 年,第一任主席是贝蒂·弗里丹,致力于争取男女完全平等,特别关注法律和平等经济权利。总部设在华盛顿特区,拥有 550 个分会,会员总数达 50 万。该组织拥有强大的政治影响力,但因被批评为白人中产阶级女性的平台而备受争议。自 1980 年代以来,NOW 致力于通过反对各种歧视,包括种族和阶级歧视,实现性别平等。近年来,其活动范围扩大到包括堕胎权、性与生殖自由、消除同性恋歧视以及禁止针对女性的暴力等议题。

28 Katō Hisatake (1937-). President of Shimane Environmental University. Emeritus Professor at Kyoto University. Won the Yamazaki Prize for the Promotion of Philosophy and the Watsuji Tetsurō Culture Prize. His publications include, Kankyō rinrigaku no susume (An Introduction to environmental ethics), O ¯ y o ¯ O ¯ y o ¯ bar(O)y bar(o)\bar{O} y \bar{o} rinrigaku no susume (A case for applied ethics). His edited works include Chikyū kankyō dokuhon (A Reader on the global environment).
28 加藤久武(1937-)。岛根环境大学校长。京都大学名誉教授。曾获山崎哲学振兴奖和和辻哲郎文化奖。著作包括《环境伦理学的推荐》(Kankyō rinrigaku no susume)、《应用伦理学的推荐》( O ¯ y o ¯ O ¯ y o ¯ bar(O)y bar(o)\bar{O} y \bar{o} rinrigaku no susume)。主编作品有《地球环境读本》(Chikyū kankyō dokuhon)。

29 Wakakuwa Midori (1935-). Feminist art historian (Italian art history). After working at Tokyo National University of Fine Arts and Music and at Chiba University, she is now Professor in the Department of Literature teaching art history and gender studies at Kawamura Gakuen Women’s University. Her publications include, Bara no iconorojī (The iconology of the rose), Imēji o yomu (Reading the Image), Gui to shōchō no joseizō (The hidden meaning and symbolism of the female image), Shōchō toshite no joseizō (The female image as a symbol), Kōgō no Shōzō (The portrait of the Empress).
29 若桑绿(1935-)。女性主义艺术史学家(意大利艺术史)。曾任职于东京艺术大学和千叶大学,现为川村学园女子大学文学部教授,教授艺术史与性别研究。著作包括《玫瑰的图像学》(Bara no iconorojī)、《解读图像》(Imēji o yomu)、《女性形象的隐含意义与象征》(Gui to shōchō no joseizō)、《作为象征的女性形象》(Shōchō toshite no joseizō)、《皇后的肖像》(Kōgō no Shōzō)。

30 Rayner, Richard (1997), Women in the Warrior Culture, New York Times Magazine, June 22:55.
30 雷纳,理查德(1997),《战士文化中的女性》,《纽约时报杂志》,6 月 22 日,第 55 页。

31 Post-colonialism. A theoretical trend after Orientalism, which deconstructs the binary opposition between the West and the Orient. This new criticism focuses on the cultural imperialism that has continued even after political independence was achieved in former colonies. According to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 1990, post colonialism can be defined as a child born out of rape.’
31 后殖民主义。继东方主义之后的一种理论潮流,解构了西方与东方之间的二元对立。这种新批评关注的是即使在前殖民地实现政治独立后仍然持续存在的文化帝国主义。根据盖亚特里·查克拉沃蒂·斯皮瓦克 1990 年的观点,后殖民主义可以被定义为“强奸所生的孩子”。
32 Arakawa Akira (1931-). A leading intellectual in Okinawa, who pursues Okinawan independence and protested the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. His books include, Shin nantō fudo ki (A new geography of the southern islands), Hankokka no kyōku (The counter realm against the state), and Ryūkyū shobun igo (Since the disposal of the Ryūkyū).
32 荒川明(1931-)。冲绳的主要知识分子,追求冲绳独立并抗议冲绳回归日本。他的著作包括《新南岛风土记》、《反国家的境域》和《琉球处置以后》。

33 Post-structuralism A new school of thought introduced in response to the reductionist and determinist nature of structuralism. Stressing the undetermined characteristics of the structure and arbitrariness of value in language, post-structuralism opened up the path to restore linguistic agency, however limited it may be. As it is derived from and stands in reaction to structuralism, it therefore inherits the anti-essentialist constructionism stance taken since the linguistic turn. Among the most well-known post-structuralist feminists are Joan Scott and Judith Butler.
33 后结构主义 后结构主义是一种新兴的思想流派,作为对结构主义的简化主义和决定论性质的回应而提出。它强调结构的未确定性特征以及语言中价值的任意性,后结构主义为恢复语言主体性开辟了道路,尽管这种主体性可能是有限的。由于它源自结构主义并对其作出反应,因此继承了自语言转向以来所采取的反本质主义建构主义立场。最著名的后结构主义女性主义者包括琼·斯科特和朱迪思·巴特勒。

34 Delphy, Christine (1941-). Materialist feminist and activist in France. She played a leading role in MLF both in theory and in practice. She has also made an important contribution to the poststructuralist theory of gender. Author of Main Enemy, Close to Home and others. Her paper, Sexe et Genre (1989), was presented at the International Seminar on Women’s Studies, National Women’s Education Centre, Saitama, Japan.
34 德尔菲,克里斯汀(1941-) 法国的唯物主义女性主义者和活动家。她在法国女性解放运动(MLF)中无论理论还是实践方面都发挥了领导作用。她还对后结构主义的性别理论做出了重要贡献。著有《主要敌人》、《贴近家园》等。她的论文《性别与性》(1989 年)曾在日本埼玉国立妇女教育中心举办的国际妇女研究研讨会上发表。

35 [Translator’s note] PKO and PKF. United Nations Peace Keeping Operations and United Nations Peace Keeping Forces.
35 【译者注】PKO 和 PKF 联合国维和行动(Peace Keeping Operations)和联合国维和部队(Peace Keeping Forces)。

36 Matsui Yayori (1934-2003). International Journalist. Formerly a correspondent with the Asahi Newspaper. In 1977 she founded the Asian Women’s Association and in 1995 the Asian Women’s Document Centre. She was representative for the Violence Against Women and War Network (VAWW-Net Japan). Her books include: Onnatachi ga tsukuru Ajia (Asia created by women) and Gurō-baruka to josei e no bōryoku - Shijyō kara senjyō made (Violence against women under globalisation: from the market to the battle field).
36 松井弥代里(1934-2003)。国际记者。曾任朝日新闻特派员。1977 年创立亚洲妇女协会,1995 年创立亚洲妇女档案中心。她是反对暴力侵害妇女与战争网络(VAWW-Net Japan)的代表。著作包括:《女性创造的亚洲》(Onnatachi ga tsukuru Ajia)和《全球化下的女性暴力——从市场到战场》(Gurō-baruka to josei e no bōryoku - Shijyō kara senjyō made)。

37 [Translator’s note] It is also worth noting that victims of DV are in greater danger at the point that they decide to leave an abusive relationship. In other words, any sign of fighting back tends to cause an escalation of the violence.
37【译者注】同样值得注意的是,家庭暴力受害者在决定离开虐待关系的那一刻,处于更大的危险之中。换句话说,任何反抗的迹象往往会导致暴力升级。

38 The Hijack of a bus by a 17-year old youth. In May 2000, a 17-year-old youth from Saga City took over a long-distance coach bound for Fukuoka City. He killed a 68-year old female passenger. A note was found in his house and seized containing references to two other incidents involving youths of the same age in Kobe. Among other things, he mentioned that he wanted to experience killing another person. The youth was sent to a juvenile medical treatment facility for a minimum of five years.
38 一名 17 岁青少年劫持公交车。2000 年 5 月,一名来自佐贺市的 17 岁青少年劫持了一辆开往福冈市的长途客车。他杀害了一名 68 岁的女乘客。在他家中发现并查获了一张笔记,提及了神户另外两起涉及同龄青少年的事件。其中,他提到自己想体验杀人的感觉。该青少年被送往少年医疗矫治设施,至少服刑五年。

Epilogue  尾声

1 Hashizume Daizaburo (1948-). Sociologist and conservative nationalist thinker. He is the author of many books such as Bukkyō no gensetsu senryaku (Discursive strategy of Buddhism) and Tennō ron (Theories on emperorship). He justifies fighting for the nation based on the civil contract and, at the same time, supports compensation [of comfort women] by the state based on the legal continuity of the modern Japanese state.
1 橋爪大三郎(1948-)。社会学家及保守民族主义思想家。他著有多部著作,如《佛教的论述策略》(Bukkyō no gensetsu senryaku)和《天皇论》(Tennō ron)。他基于社会契约论为为国家而战辩护,同时支持国家基于现代日本国家法律连续性对“慰安妇”进行赔偿。

2 [Translator’s Note] The official name of the Asian Women’s Fund is Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin (literally, the Asian Peace National Fund for Women), although it is usually abbreviated to ‘Kokumin kikin’ (the national fund).
2【译者注】亚洲妇女基金的正式名称是“女性のためのアジア平和国民基金”(直译为“为女性的亚洲和平国民基金”),但通常简称为“国民基金”。

3 [Translator’s note] On the 28th August 945, Prime Minister Higashikunie Naruhiko, who had taken office on the 17th August, announced at a cabinet press meeting that the military, government officials and all the people must thoroughly reflect (hansei) and repent (zange) on what had happened. He stated that the ‘collective repentance of 100 million people’ (ichioku sō zange) was a necessary step in the re-building of the nation.
3【译者注】1945 年 8 月 28 日,8 月 17 日上任的首相东久迩宫稔彦在内阁记者会上宣布,军队、政府官员及全体国民必须彻底反省(反省)并忏悔(懺悔)所发生的事情。他表示,“一亿人的集体忏悔”(一億総懺悔)是国家重建的必要步骤。

4 By summer, 2002, a total of 285 women from three countries (Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines) had accepted the money. In addition, 79 Dutch women had received medical welfare.
4 到 2002 年夏季,来自三个国家(韩国、台湾和菲律宾)的共计 285 名女性接受了这笔款项。此外,还有 79 名荷兰女性接受了医疗福利。

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qquad\qquad 1996 Sei no rekishigaku (The history of sexuality), Tokyo, Fuji Shuppan.
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qquad\qquad 1997 ‘Joseishi kara mita “ianfu” mondai’ (The ‘comfort woman’ issue seen from the perspective of women’s history), Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū Vol. 18 Winter 1997, Sensō Sekinin Shiryo Center.
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Hanasaki, Kōhei 1997 ‘Aikokushin wa akutō no saigo no kakuremino’ (Patriotism is the final cloak concealing the villain), Impaction 102, April 1997, Tokyo, Impact Shuppankai.
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Hata, Ikuhiko 1997 ‘Seiji no omocha ni sareru rekishi ninshiki: Rokōkyō, Nankin, nana san ichi (731), ianfu no kyojitsu o tou’ (Historical awareness made into the toy of politics: the fabricated debate concerning the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Nanking, Unit 731 and the comfort women), Shokun September 1997, Tokyo, Bungeishunjusha.
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Hikaku Kazokushi Gakkai (supervising editor) 1997 Jendā to josei (Women and gender), Tokyo, Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu.
比较家族史学会(主编)1997 《性别与女性》,东京,早稻田大学出版部。

Hikosaka, Tei 1991 Dansei shinwa (The male myth), Tokyo, Komichi Shobō.
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Himeoka, Toshiko 1993 Kindai Doitsu no bosei shugi feminizumu (The maternalist feminism of modern Germany), Tokyo, Keisō Shobō
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qquad\qquad 1995 ‘Josei besshi to bosei raisan: Nachi no josei seisaku’ (The contempt for women, the glorification of women: Nazi women’s policy) in Kanō, Mikiyo (ed.) ‘Bosei fashizumu’ (Maternal fascism), New Feminism Review 6, Tokyo, Gakuyō Shobō
qquad\qquad 1995 《女性蔑视与女性崇拜:纳粹的女性政策》,载叶野美纪代(编)《母性法西斯主义》,新女性主义评论 6,东京,学阳书房。

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qquad\qquad 1917 ‘Hinin no kahi o ronzu’ (Arguing about the pros or cons of contraception), reprinted in 1984 Hiratsuka Raichō chosaku shū (The collected works of Hiratsuka Raichō), Vol. 2, Tokyo, Ōtsuki Shoten.
qquad\qquad 1917 《论避孕的利弊》(Hinin no kahi o ronzu),收录于 1984 年《平塚雷鸟著作集》第 2 卷,东京,大月书店。

qquad\qquad 1920 ‘Shakai kaizō ni taisuru fuijn no shimei’ (Women’s mission concerning social reform), reprinted in 1984 in Hiratsuka Raichō chosaku shū (The collected works of Hiratsuka Raichō), Vol.3, Tokyo, Ōtsuki Shoten.
qquad\qquad 1920 年 《妇女对社会改革的使命》(Shakai kaizō ni taisuru fuijn no shimei),收录于 1984 年《平塚雷鸟著作集》第 3 卷,东京,大月书店。

qquad\qquad 1984 Hiratsuka Raichō chosaku shū (The collected works of Hiratus Raichō: the complete 8 volumes), Tokyo, Ōtsuki Shoten.
qquad\qquad 1984 年 《平塚雷鸟著作集》(平塚雷鸟全集 8 卷),东京,大月书店。

Hirayama, Chōji 1995 Ie shakai to kojin shugi (The household society and individualism), Tokyo, Nihon Kezai Shinbunsha.
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Hirota, Masaki 1995 Sensō no katarare kata (Narratives of war). Paper presented at the symposium ‘Rekishi to hyōshō’ (History and representation) at the annual convention of the Japan Society of the History of Thought (Nihon Shisōshi Gakkai), October 22, 1995.
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… 1996 ‘Bunka kōryūshi no kadai to hōhō’ (Issues and methodology in the history of cultural exchange), Osaka Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 36, OsakaUniversity.
… 1996 《文化交流史的问题与方法》,《大阪大学文学部纪要》第 36 期,大阪大学。
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… 1943a ‘Shinpen zakki’ (Essays on my everyday life), Fujin Mondai kenkyūsho shohō 6, October 30 1943. Reprinted in Suzuki, Yūko 1986 Feminizumu to sensō (Feminism and war), Tokyo, Marujusha.
… 1943a 《新篇杂记》(我的日常生活随笔),《女性问题研究所小报》6 期,1943 年 10 月 30 日。收录于铃木裕子 1986 《女性主义与战争》,东京,丸寿社。
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1943b 《战时妇女读本》,载于铃木裕子 1986 年《女性主义与战争》,东京,丸善社。

qquad\qquad 1974a Ichikawa Fusae jiden: senzenhen (The memoirs of Ichikawa Fusae: pre-war edition), Tokyo, Shinjuku Shobō.
qquad\qquad 1974a 市川房枝自传:战前篇,东京,新宿书房。

qquad\qquad 1974b Ichikawa Fusae jiden: sengohen (The memoirs of Ichikawa Fusae: post-war edition), Tokyo, Shinjuku Shobō.
qquad\qquad 1974b 市川房枝自传:战后篇,东京,新宿书房。

qquad\qquad 1976 Nihon fujin mondai shiryō shūsei, Dai 2 kan, Seiji (A Collection of documentation on Japanese women’s issues, vol. 2, politics), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
qquad\qquad 1976 日本妇女问题资料集成,第 2 卷,政治,东京,Domesu 出版社。

Ichikawa Fusae to iu Hito’ Kankō Iinkai (ed.) 1982 Ichikawa Fusae to iu hito: 100 nin no kaisō (Ichikawa Fusae: the recollections of 100 people), Tokyo, Shinjuku Shobō.
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Ikezawa, Natsuki 1997 ‘Bungei jihyō: rekishi to katarikuchi’ (Monthly literary review: history and narrative) Asahi Shinbun, 26 August 1997.
池泽夏树 1997 《文艺批评:历史与叙述》 《朝日新闻》,1997 年 8 月 26 日。

Inoue, Kiyoshi 1948 Nihon joseishi (Japanese women’s history), Tokyo, San Ichi Shobō.
井上清 1948 《日本女性史》,东京,三一书房。

Inoue, Teruko, Chizuko Ueno, Yumiko Ehara and Masako Amano (eds.) 1994 Nihon no Feminizumu 1: Ribu to Feminizumu (Japanese feminisms, vol. 1, women’s liberation and feminism), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
井上照子、上野千鹤子、江原由美子、天野雅子(编)1994 《日本的女性主义 1:解放与女性主义》,东京,岩波书店。
Irokawa, Daikichi 1997 ‘Jigyaku shikan to Nihon nashionarizumu 13: Irokawa Daikichi san ni kiku’ (The masochistic view of history and Japanese nationalism 13: an interview with Irokawa Daikichi) vols. 1 and 2, Tōitsu Nippō, 12-13 September 1997.
色川大吉 1997 年《自虐史观与日本民族主义 13:访谈色川大吉》,第 1 卷和第 2 卷,《统一日报》,1997 年 9 月 12-13 日。

Jang, Jing 1995 Kindai Chūgoku to ‘ren-ai’ no hakken (Modern China and the discovery of ‘love’), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
张静 1995 年《近代中国与“恋爱”的发现》,东京,岩波书店。

Kameyama, Michiko 1984a ‘Sensō to kangofu’ (War and nurses), Rekishi Hyōron 407, 37-2, March 1984.
龟山道子 1984a《战争与护士》,《历史评论》407 期,37-2,1984 年 3 月。

qquad\qquad 1984b ‘Sensō to kango’ (War and nursing), in the series Kindai Nihon kangoshi II (Modern Japanese nursing history vol. II), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
qquad\qquad 1984b 《战争与护理》,收录于《近代日本护理史 II》,东京,Domesu 出版社。

Kankoku Teishintai Mondai Kyōgikai, Teishintai Kenkyūkai (ed.) 1993 Shōgen: kyōsei renkō sareta Chōsenjin ianfu tachi (The testimony of Korean comfort women who were forcibly recruited), Tokyo, Akashi Shoten. Translated by the Jūgun Ianfu Mondai Uriyoson Nettowaku.
韩国挺身队问题协商会、挺身队研究会(编)1993 《证言:被强制征召的朝鲜慰安妇们》,东京,明石书店。由“军慰安妇问题卖淫网络”翻译。

Kano, Masanao, and Horiba, Kiyoko 1977 Takamure Itsue, Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha.
加野正直、堀场清子 1977 《高群逸枝》,东京,朝日新闻社。

Kanō, Mikiyo 1979a ‘Takamure Itsue to kōkoku shikan’ (Takamure Itsue and the imperialist view of history), in Kawano, Nobuko et al. 1979 Takamure Itsue ronshū (The collected articles of Takamura Itsue), Tokyo, JCA Shuppan.
加纳美纪代 1979a 《高群逸枝与帝国主义的历史观》,收录于川野信子等编 1979 《高群逸枝论集》,东京,JCA 出版社。

qquad\qquad 1979b Josei to tennōsei (Women and the emperor system), Tokyo, Shisō no Kagakusha.
qquad\qquad 1979b 《女性与天皇制》,东京,思想之科学社。

qquad\qquad 1987 Onnatachi no ‘jūgo’ (Women and the ‘home front’), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobō.
qquad\qquad 1987 《女性们的“后方”》,东京,筑摩书房。

qquad\qquad (ed.) 1990 Jiga no kanata e e ee (Beyond the self), Tokyo, Shakai Hōronsha.
qquad\qquad (编)1990 《自我之外》(Jiga no kanata),东京,社会评论社。

qquad\qquad (ed.) 1995a ‘Bosei fashizumu’(Maternal fascism), New Feminism Review 6, Tokyo, Gakuyō Shobō.
qquad\qquad (编)1995a 《母性法西斯主义》(Bosei fashizumu),《新女性主义评论》第 6 期,东京,学阳书房。

qquad\qquad (ed.) 1995b Komentaru sengo gojū nen 5: Sei to kazoku (A commentary on the fifty years since the war, Vol. 5, Sex and the family), Tokyo, Shakai Hōronsha.
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qquad\qquad 1995c ‘Kindai joseishi ni totte no kuni to jiyū’ (The state and freedom in modern women’s history), Shisō no Kagaku August 1995,
qquad\qquad 1995c 《近代女性史中的国家与自由》,《思想の科学》1995 年 8 月,
Tokyo, Shiso no Kagakusha.
东京,思想之科学社。

Kasahara Tokushi, et al. 1997 Rekishi no jijitsu o dō nintei shi dō oshieru ka: Kenshō 731 butai, Nankin gyakusatsu jiken, ‘Jūgun ianfu’ (How do we authorize and teach historical facts: The verification of Unit 731, the Nanking Massacre and the ‘comfort women’), Tokyo, Kyōiku Shiryō Shuppankai.
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Kasai, Hirotaka 1996 ‘Maruyama Masao no Nihon’ (Maruyama Masao’s Japan), in Sakai, Naoki, Brett de Barry and Iyotani, Toshio (eds.), Nashonarithi no datsu kōchiku (Deconstructing nationality), Tokyo, Kashiwa Shobō.
笠井宏隆 1996 《丸山真男的日本》,收录于境直树、布雷特·德·巴里和伊与谷俊夫(编),《民族性的解构》,东京,柏书房。

Katō, Norihiro 1997 Haisengo ron (On the post-war era), Tokyo, Kōdansha.
Katō, Norihiro 1997 《战后论》,东京,讲谈社。

Katō, Yōko 1996 Chōheisei to kindai Nihon 1868-1945 (The military conscription system and modern Japan 1868-1945), Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kōbundō.
Katō, Yōko 1996 《征兵制与近代日本 1868-1945》,东京,吉川弘文馆。

Katzoff, Beth 1997 War and Feminism: Yamakawa Kikue 1931-1945. Paper presented at the panel ‘Women and Nationalism’, at the Annual Convention of the Association of Asian Studies, 14 March 1997, Chicago, U.S.A.
贝丝·卡佐夫 1997 《战争与女权主义:山川菊枝 1931-1945》。发表于 1997 年 3 月 14 日美国芝加哥亚洲研究协会年会“女性与民族主义”专题讨论会论文。
Kawada, Fumiko 1987 Akarenga no ie: Chōsen kara kita jūgun ianfu (The Redbrick house: comfort women from Korea), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobō.
川田文子 1987 《红砖屋:来自朝鲜的慰安妇》,东京,筑摩书房。

Kawahata, Tomoko 1995 ‘Seiteki doreisei kara no kaihō o motomete’ (In search of liberation from sexual slavery), in Ehara, Yumiko (ed.) Feminizumu no shuchō 2: Sei no shōhinka (Feminist advocacy 2: the commodification of sex), Tokyo, Keisō Shobō.
川畑智子 1995 《寻求从性奴役中解放》,收录于江原由美子(编)《女性主义主张 2:性的商品化》,东京,庆祥书房。

Kerber, Linda 1998 No Constitutional Rights to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship, New York, Hill and Wang.
琳达·科伯 1998 《没有宪法权利成为淑女:女性与公民义务》,纽约,希尔与王出版社。

Kim, Chonmi 1994 Suihei undōshi kenkyū: Minzoku sabetsu hihan (A study of the leveler movement: a criticism of ethnic discrimination), Tokyo, Gendai Kikakutshitsu.
金贞美 1994 《水平运动史研究:民族歧视批判》,东京,现代企划室。

Kim, Yōnghi 1998 ‘Is Forgetting a Kindness?’ Translated by Sarah Kovner, in U.S.-Japan Women’s Journal, English supplement No.14, 1998, U.S.-Japan Women’s Journal.
金永熙 1998 《遗忘是一种善意吗?》 由 Sarah Kovner 翻译,载于《美日女性杂志》英文增刊第 14 期,1998 年,美日女性杂志。

Kim-Gibson, Dai Sil 1997 Japanese Military Supplies: The Korean ‘Comfort Women’. Paper presented at the panel ‘The ‘Comfort Women’: Contexts
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以及副文本”,在美国历史学会年度大会,纽约。

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金一明 1976 《天皇的军队与朝鲜慰安妇》,东京,三一书房。金富子与杨清子等 1995 《想更多了解“慰安妇”问题:从性与民族的视角》,东京,明石书店。

Kim, Pu-ja 1996 ‘Sekai Josei Kaigi hōkoku: ‘ianfu’ mondai o chūshin ni’ (Report of the World Women’s Conference focusing on the ‘comfort women’ problem), in Ajia Keizai Kenkyūsho (ed.) Daisan sekai no hataraku josei (Working women in the third world), Tokyo, Akashi Shoten.
金富子 1996 《世界女性会议报告:以“慰安妇”问题为中心》,载于亚洲经济研究所(编)《第三世界的劳动女性》,东京,明石书店。

Kurahashi, Masanao 1989 ‘Jūgun ianfu zenshi: Nichi-Ro sensō no baai’ (The prehistory of the comfort women: the case of the Japanese-Russo War), Rekishi Hyōron 467, 42-2 March 1989.
仓桥正直 1989 《慰安妇的前史:日俄战争的案例》,《历史评论》467 期,42-2,1989 年 3 月。

Kōketsu, Atsushi 1981 Sōryokusen taisei kenkyū (A study of the total war regime), Tokyo, San Ichi Shobō.
高月敦 1981 《总力战体制研究》,东京,三一书房。

Komagome, Takeshi 1997 ‘Jiyū shugi shikan wa watashitachi o jiyū ni suru no ka?’ (Will the liberal view of history make us free?), Sekai April 1997, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
駒込健 1997 《自由主义史观会使我们自由吗?》,《世界》1997 年 4 月号,东京,岩波书店。

Kondō, Kazuko 1995 ‘Onna to sensō: bosei / kazoku / kokka’ (Women and war: motherhood, family and the state) in Okuda, Akiko (ed.) 1995 Onna to otoko no jiku: Nihon joseishi saikō V, Semegiau onna to otoko: kindai (Space and time of women and men: a reconsideration of Japanese women’s history, vol. V, Women and men in conflict: the modern period), Tokyo, Fujiwara Shoten.
近藤和子 1995 《女人与战争:母性/家庭/国家》载于奥田明子(编)1995《男女的时空:日本女性史再考Ⅴ,男女的冲突:现代篇》,东京,藤原书店。

Kōno, Nobuko et al., 1979 Takamure Itsue ronshū (The collected articles of Takamura Itsue), Tokyo, JCA Shuppan.
河野信子等编著 1979 《高群逸枝论集》,东京,JCA 出版。

Koonz, Claudia 1987 Mothers in the Fatherland, New York, St. Martin’s Press.
克劳迪娅·库恩兹 1987 《祖国的母亲》,纽约,圣马丁出版社。

Kōuchi, Nobuko (ed.) 1984 Shiryō bosei hogo ronsō (Documentation on the motherhood protection debate), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
高内信子(编)1984 《母性保护论争资料》,东京,Domesu 出版社。

Koyama, Shizuko 1991 Ryōsaikenbo to iu kihan (The norm of the good wife, wise mother), Tokyo, Keisō Shobō.
小山静子 1991 《所谓良妻贤母的规范》,东京,庆尚书房。
Kurahashi, Masanao 1994 Jūgun ianfu mondai no rekishiteki kenkyū (A historical study of the military comfort women), Tokyo, Kyōei Shobō.
仓桥正直 1994 《军妓问题的历史研究》,东京,共荣书房。

Kurihara, Hiroshi 1994 Takamure Itsue no kon-in joseishizō no kenkyū (A study of Takamure Itsue’s research of images of married women in history), Tokyo, Takashina Shoten.
栗原浩 1994 《高群逸枝的婚姻女性形象研究》,东京,高科书店。

… 1997 ‘Takamure Itsue no joseishizō’ (Tamamure Itsue’s images of women’s history), in Tabata, Yasuko, Chizuko Ueno, and Sanae Fukutō, (eds), Hikaku Kazokushi Gakkai (supervising editor) Jendà to josei (Women and gender), Tokyo, Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu.
… 1997 《高群逸枝的女性史形象》,收录于田畑康子、上野千鹤子、福藤早苗(编),比较家族史学会(总编辑)《性别与女性》,东京,早稻田大学出版部。

Kurihara, Yukio 1997 ‘Rekishi no saishin ni mukete: Watashi mo mata revijionisuto de aru’ (Toward a revision of history: I too am a revisionist!), Impaction 102 April 1997, Tokyo, Impact Shuppankai.
栗原幸雄 1997 《面向历史的新修订:我也是修正主义者!》,《Impaction》102 期,1997 年 4 月,东京,Impact 出版会。

Maeda, Akira 1997a ‘Sabetsu to jinken: kihanteki shikō’ (Discrimination and human rights: a normative approach), Impaction 102 April 1997, Tokyo, Impact Shuppankai.
前田明 1997a 《歧视与人权:规范性思考》,《Impaction》1997 年 4 月第 102 期,东京,Impact 出版社。

qquad\qquad 1997b ‘Ueno Chizuko no “Kioku chigai no seijigaku”: Nihongun “ianfu” mondai o dō miru ka?’ (Ueno Chizuko’s ‘politics of misconceived memory’: how should we view the military ‘comfort women’ issue?), Masukomi Shimin September 1997.
qquad\qquad 1997b 《上野千鹤子的〈记忆错置的政治学〉:如何看待日本军“慰安妇”问题?》,《大众传媒市民》1997 年 9 月。

… 1997c ‘Tettei tsuikyū jiyūshugi shikan Kokuren ni okeru ‘ianfu’ tōgi to Nihon seifu’ (The outright objections of the Liberal View of History group: discussions concerning the ‘comfort women’ by the United Nations and the Japanese government), Shükan Kinyōbi 25 July 1997.
… 1997c 《彻底追求自由主义视角——联合国关于“慰安妇”的讨论与日本政府》,《周刊星期五》1997 年 7 月 25 日。

Maruoka, Hideko (ed.) 1976 ‘Nihon fujin mondai shiryō shūsei, dai 8 kan’(Collected documentation on Japanese women’s issues, vol. 8) Shichō (Thoughts), No.1, Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
丸冈秀子(编) 1976 《日本妇女问题资料集成,第 8 卷》,《思想》第一期,东京,Domesu 出版社。

Maruyama, Masao 1946, ‘Chō-kokkashugi no ronri to shinri’ (The logic and psychology of ultra-nationalism), Sekai, May 1946, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten. Reprinted in 1995 Sekai shuyō ronbun sen 1946-1995 (The best selection of leading essays of the time in Sekai, 1946-1995), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
丸山真男 1946 年,《超国家主义的逻辑与心理》,《世界》,1946 年 5 月,东京,岩波书店。收录于 1995 年《世界主要论文选 1946-1995》,东京,岩波书店。

Maruyama, Yukiko 1977, 1995 ‘Dansei raita no kaita ‘jūgun ianfu’ o kiru’ (Criticising the ‘military comfort women’ written by male writers), in Kanō, Mikiyo (ed.) Komentaru sengo 50 nen, vol. 5: Sei to kazoku (A
丸山幸子 1977 年,1995 年 《批判男性作家所写的“军中慰安妇”》,收录于叶野美纪代(编)《战后 50 年评论》第 5 卷:性与家庭(A)

commentary on the 50 years since the war, vol. 5, Sex and the family), Tokyo, Shakai Hyōronsha.
战后 50 年评论,第 5 卷,性与家庭,东京,社会评论社。

McCormack, Gavan 2000 ‘The Japanese Movement to “Correct” History’, in Hein, Laura and Mark Selden (eds) Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, New York and London, M.E. Sharpe.
麦考马克,加文 2000 年 《日本“修正”历史运动》,载于海因,劳拉与马克·塞尔登(编)《审查历史:日本、德国与美国的公民身份与记忆》,纽约与伦敦,M.E. Sharpe 出版社。
McDougal, Gay 1998 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slave-like Practices During Armed Conflict, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Geneva, United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
麦克杜格尔,盖伊 1998 《当代形式的奴隶制、系统性强奸、性奴隶制及武装冲突期间的奴隶般行为》,联合国人权委员会特别报告员最终报告,日内瓦,联合国人权委员会。

Merry, Sally Engle 2001 ‘Women, Violence and the Human Rights System’, in Agosín Marjorie (ed.) Women, Gender and Human Rights, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, Rutgers University Press.
梅里,莎莉·恩格尔 2001 《女性、暴力与人权体系》,载于阿戈辛,玛乔丽(编)《女性、性别与人权》,新泽西新布伦瑞克及伦敦,罗格斯大学出版社。

Midgley, Clare 1992 Women Against Slavery: The British Campaigns, 17801870, London and New York, Routledge.
米德格利,克莱尔 1992 《反对奴隶制的女性:英国运动,1780-1870》,伦敦及纽约,劳特利奇出版社。

Miyake, Yoshiko 1994 ‘Kindai Nihon joseishi no saisōzō no tame ni: Tekisuto no yomikae’ (Towards a re-creation of modern women’s history: re-interpretation of the texts), Shakai no Hakken, Kanagawa Daigaku Hyōron Sōsho 4, Kanagawa University.
宫崎良子 1994 《为了近代日本女性史的再创造:文本的重新解读》,《社会的发现》,神奈川大学评论丛书 4,神奈川大学。

Mizuta, Tamae 1997 ‘Nihon ni okeru feminizumu shisō no juyō’ (Acceptence of feminists ideas in Japan), in Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (ed.) Kōza Sekaishi 7: ‘Kindai’ wa hito o dō kaete kita ka (A series of world history 7: How has the modern period changed people?), Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
水田珠江 1997 《日本におけるフェミニズム思想の受容》(日本对女性主义思想的接受),载于历史学研究会(编)《讲座世界史 7:“近代”是如何改变人的?》,东京,东京大学出版会。

Morgan, Robin (ed.) 1984 Sisterhood is Global, New York, Anchor Books.
摩根,罗宾(编)1984 《姐妹情谊是全球性的》,纽约,Anchor Books。

Morisaki, Kazue 1965, 1992 Daisan no sei (The third sex), Tokyo, Kawade Shobō Shinsha.
森崎和惠 1965,1992 《第三性》,东京,河出书房新社。

Murai, Atsushi 1997 ‘Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai no kyōshi tachi: Genba kyōshi e no kikitori chōsa kara’ (Concerning the teachers of the Liberal History Research Group: drawing on an interview survey of classroom teachers), Sekai April 1997, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
村井敦 1997 《自由主义史观研究会的教师们:基于对一线教师的访谈调查》,《世界》1997 年 4 月号,东京,岩波书店。

Murakami, Nobuhiko 1978 Nihon no fujin monda (Japanese women’s issues), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
村上信彦 1978 《日本的妇女问题》,东京,岩波书店。
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永原和子 1985 《女性统一与母性》,收录于脇田春子(编)《质问母性 第二卷》,京都,人文书院。
1989 ‘Josei wa naze sensō ni kyōryoku shitaka?’ (Why did women support the war?) in Fujiwara et al. (eds) Nihon kindai no kyozō to jitsuzō 3 (The fictitious and real images of modern Japan), Tokyo, Ōtsuki Shoten.
1989 《女性为何支持战争?》收录于藤原等(编)《日本近代的虚构与真实形象 3》,东京,大月书店。

Nagahara, Kazuko and Yoneda, Sayoko 1996 Zōhoban onna no Shōwa shi (An expanded edition of Shōwa women’s history), Tokyo, Yūhikaku.
永原和子、米田佐代子 1996 《昭和女性史 增订版》,东京,有斐阁。

Nakamura, Ikuo 1994 Nihon no kami to ōken (Japanese devinity and kingship), Kyoto, Hōzōkan.
中村郁雄 1994 《日本的神性与王权》,京都,法藏馆。

Narita, Ryūichi 1995 ‘Haha no kuni no onnatachi: Oku Mumeo no senji to sengo’ (The women of the mother land: Oku Mumeo preand post-war), in Yamanouchi, Yasushi, Victor Koschmann, and Ryūich Narita, (eds) Sōryokusen to gendaika (Total war and modernization), Tokyo, Kashiwa Shobō.
成田龙一 1995 《母国的女性们:奥梦芽夫的战前与战后》,收录于山内靖、维克多·科施曼、成田龙一(编)《总力战与现代化》,东京,柏书房。
Nishikawa, Nagao 1992 Kokkyō no koekata (How to transcend national boundaries), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobō.
西川永郷 1992 《国境の越え方》(如何超越国界),东京,筑摩书房。
1993 ‘Kokka ideorogi to shite no bunmei to bunka’ (Civilization and culture as state ideologies), Shisō 827, May 1993, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
1993 《作为国家意识形态的文明与文化》,《思想》827 号,1993 年 5 月,东京,岩波书店。

Nishikawa, Nagao 1995 ‘Nihongata kokumin kokka no keisei’ (The formation of the Japanese model of the nation-state), in Nishikawa, Nagao and Matsumiya Shūji (eds) Bakumatsu/Meiji ki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka henyō (The formation of the nation-state and cultural transformation at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate and in the Meiji period), Tokyo, Shin-yōsha.
西川长夫 1995 年 《日本型民族国家的形成》,收录于西川长夫、松宫修司(编)《幕末明治期的民族国家形成与文化变迁》,东京,新曜社。

Nishikawa, Yūko 1982a Mori no ie no miko (The shamaness of the house in the woods), Tokyo, Shinchōsha; reprinted in 1990 Takamure Itsue, Tokyo, Daisan Bunmeisha.
西川祐子 1982a 《森林之家的巫女》,东京,新潮社;1990 年再版,收录于高群逸枝,东京,第三文明社。

… 1982b ‘Sensō e no keisha to yokusan no fujin’ (The predisposition of women towards war and their wartime collaboration), in Joseishi Sōgō Kenkyūkai (ed.) Joseishi 5: Kindai (Japanese women’s history Vol. 5, The modern period), Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
…… 1982b 《女性对战争的倾向及其战时协作》,收录于女性史综合研究会(编)《女性史 5:近代》(日本女性史第 5 卷,近代),东京,东京大学出版会。

… 1997 ‘Takamure Itsue no kindai kazoku ron’ (Takamure Itsue’s theory on the modern family), in Tabata, Yasuko, Chizuko Ueno, and Sanae Fukutō, (eds), Hikaku Kazokushi Gakkai (supervising editor) 1997 Jendà to josei (Women and gender), Tokyo, Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu.
… 1997 《高群逸枝的现代家庭论》,收录于田畑康子、上野千鹤子、福藤早苗(编),比较家族史学会(总编辑)1997《性别与女性》,东京,早稻田大学出版部。

Nishino, Rumiko 1992 Jūgun Ianfu: Moto heishi tachi no shōgen (The testimony of former comfort women and soldiers), Tokyo, Akashi Shoten.
西野留美子 1992 《军妓:前士兵们的证言》,东京,明石书店。

Nishio, Kazumi 1990 ‘Joseishi to iu shiza’ (The perspective of women’s history), Rekishi Hyōron 479, March 1990.
西尾和美 1990 《所谓女性史的视角》,《历史评论》479 期,1990 年 3 月。

Nomura, Koya 1997 Sabetsu, doka, ‘Okinawa-jin’ (Discrimination, assimilation and the ‘Okinawans’), Bulletin of Sanyō Gakuin Junior College, Vol. 28, December 1997.
野村幸也 1997 《歧视、同化与“冲绳人”》,《三阳学院短期大学学报》,第 28 卷,1997 年 12 月。

Ogino, Miho 1993 ‘Nihon ni okeru joseishi kenkyū to feminizumu’ (Women’s studies and feminism in Japan), Nihon no Kagakusha 28(12).
荻野美穗 1993 《日本的女性史研究与女权主义》,《日本科学家》28 卷 12 期。

Ōgoshi, Aiko and Takahashi, Tetsuya 1997 ‘Taidan jendā to sensō sekinin’ (A dialogue about gender and war responsibility), Gendai Shisō 25(10) September 1997, Tokyo, Seidosha.
大越爱子、高桥哲也 1997 《对谈:性别与战争责任》,《现代思想》25 卷 10 期,1997 年 9 月,东京,成涛社。

Oguma, Eiji 1995 Tan-itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen (The origins of the myth of a homogenous nation), Tokyo, Shin-yōsha. English translation by David Askew 2002 A Genealogy of Japanese Self-images, Melbourne, Trans Pacific Press.
小熊英二 1995 《单一民族神话的起源》,东京,新曜社。大卫·阿斯库 2002 年英文译本《日本自我形象的谱系》,墨尔本,跨太平洋出版社。

Ogura, Chikako 1988 Sekkusu shinwa kaitai shinsho (A new book for dismantling the sex myth), Tokyo, Gakuyō Shobō.
小仓千加子 1988 《性神话解体新书》,东京,学阳书房。

Oku, Takenori 1995 ‘Kokumin kokka no naka no josei: Meiji ki o chūshin ni’ (Women in the nation-state: focusing on the Meiji period) in Okuda, Akiko (ed.) Onna to otoko no jiku: Nihon joseishi saiko V, Semegiau onna to otoko: Kindai (The space and time of women and men: a reconsideration of Japanese women’s history, vol. V, Women and men in conflict: modern period), Tokyo, Fujiwara Shoten.
奥武纪则 1995 《国民国家中的女性:以明治时期为中心》,收录于奥田明子(编)《男女的时空:日本女性史再考Ⅴ,冲突中的男女:近代》,东京,藤原书店。

Okuda, Akiko (ed.) 1995 Onna to otoko no jiku: Nihon joseishi saiko V, Semegiau onna to otoko: Kindai (The space and time of women and men: a reconsideration of Japanese women’s history, vol. V, Women and men in conflict: modern period), Tokyo, Fujiwara Shoten.
奥田明子(编) 1995 《男女的时空:日本女性史再考Ⅴ,冲突中的男女:近代》,东京,藤原书店。

Ōmori, Kahoru 1997 Hiratsuka Raichō no hikari to kage (The light and shade of Hiratsuka Raichō), Tokyo, Daiichi Shorin.
大森薫 1997 《平塚雷鸟的光与影》,东京,第一书林。
Ōtsuka, Eiji 1989 Shōjo minzokugaku (Folklore studies of girls), Tokyo, Kōbunsha.
大塚英司 1989 《少女民俗学》,东京,光文社。

Perrot, Michelle and Duby, George 1995 A History of Women in the West, Vol. 3, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
米歇尔·佩罗和乔治·迪比 1995 《西方女性史》第三卷,剑桥,哈佛大学出版社。

Rayner, Richard 1997 ‘Women in the Warrior Culture’, New York Times Magazine, 22 June.
理查德·雷纳 1997 《战士文化中的女性》,《纽约时报杂志》,6 月 22 日。

Ryūkyū Shinpō 1997 ‘Kokumei kyohi no izoku mo: Kankoku shusshinsha no kokumei sagyō ni kakawaru Hong shi intabyū’ (The bereaved families also reject the inscription of names: An interview with Mr. Hong involved with the engraving work) Ryūkyū Shinpōsha 23 June 1997.
《琉球新报》 1997 《连失去亲人的家属也拒绝铭刻姓名:采访参与铭刻工作的洪先生》,琉球新报社,1997 年 6 月 23 日。

… 1997 ‘Hito: Kankoku Myong Ji Dai kyōju. Hong Jong Pil san’ (People: Professor Hong Jong Phil of Korea’s Myongji University), Ryūkyū Shinpō, 23 June 1997.
…… 1997 《人物:韩国明知大学洪钟弼教授》,《琉球新报》,1997 年 6 月 23 日。

Sakai, Naoki, Brett de Barry and Toshio Iyotani (eds) 1996 Nashonarithi no datsu kōchiku (Deconstructing nationality), Tokyo, Kashiwa Shobō.
酒井直树、布雷特·德·巴里和伊与谷俊夫(编) 1996 《国籍的解构》,东京,柏书房。

Sakurai, Yoshiko 1997 ‘Mitsuyaku gaikō no daishō: ianfu mondai wa naze kojireta ka’ (Secret diplomacy for compensation: why is the comfort women problem so entangled?), Bungei Shunjū April 1997, Tokyo, Bungeishunjūsha.
樱井良子 1997 《赔偿的秘密外交:慰安妇问题为何如此纠结?》,《文艺春秋》1997 年 4 月,东京,文艺春秋社。

Sand, Jordan 1999 'Introduction to Ueno Chizuko’s “The Politics of Memory: Nation, Individual and Self”", History and Memory, 2(2).
桑德,乔丹 1999 《上野千鹤子的〈记忆的政治:国家、个体与自我〉导读》,《历史与记忆》,第 2 卷第 2 期。

Sander, Helke and Johr, Barbara 1995 Befreier und Belfreite: Krieg, Vergwaltigungen, Kinder, Munich, Antje Kemstman.
桑德, 赫尔克 和 乔尔, 芭芭拉 1995 《解放者与被解放者:战争、强奸、儿童》,慕尼黑,安特耶·肯斯特曼出版社。

Scott, Joan Wallach 1996 Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminism and the Rights of Man, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
斯科特,琼·沃拉奇 1996 《只有悖论可言:法国女性主义与人权》,剑桥,哈佛大学出版社。

… 1999 Gender and the Politics of History, New York, Columbia University Press.
…… 1999 《性别与历史政治》,纽约,哥伦比亚大学出版社。

Senda, Kakō 1973 Jūgun ianfu (The comfort women), Tokyo, Futabasha, (reprinted in 1984 by Kōdansha Bunko).
Senda, Kakō 1973 旧军慰安妇,东京,双叶社,(1984 年由讲谈社文库再版)。

… 1997 ‘Jūgun ianfu no shinjitsu’ (The truth about the ‘comfort women’), Ronza, August 1997, Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha.
… 1997 年《“慰安妇”的真相》,《论座》,1997 年 8 月,东京,朝日新闻社。

Sensō giseisha o kokoro ni kizamu kai (Official name, Taiheiyō Chiiki no sensō giseisha ni omoi o hase, kokoro ni kizamu shūkai jikkō iinkai) (ed.)
战祸受害者之心铭刻会(正式名称:太平洋地区战祸受害者怀念铭刻集会执行委员会)(编)
1997 Watashi wa ‘ianfu’ de wa nai: Nihon no shinryaku to seidorei (I am not a ‘comfort woman’: Japanese invasion and sexual slavery), Osaka, Tōhō Shuppan.
1997 年《我不是“慰安妇”:日本的侵略与性奴隶制》,大阪,东宝出版。

Sone, Hiromi 1990 ‘Baita kō: Kinsei no baishun’ (Considering prostitutes: prostitution in the early modern age), in Joseishi Sōgō Kenkyūkai (ed.) Nihon josei seikatsushi 3, Kinsei (A history of Japanese women’s lives in Japan, vol. 3, The modern period), Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.
园部裕美 1990 年《考虑妓女:近世的卖淫》,载于女性史综合研究会(编)《日本女性生活史 3,近世》(日本女性生活史第三卷,近世),东京,东京大学出版会。

… 1998 ‘Baishun gainen o megutte’ (On the concept of prostitution) Sakata, Yoshinori (ed.) Gendai no Esupuri 366, Sei no shosō (The contemporary Espirit 366, Diversity of sexuality), Tokyo, Shibundō.
… 1998 《关于卖淫概念》坂田义则(编)《现代精神 366,性的多样性》,东京,思文堂。

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1999 The Post-Colonial Critic, London and New York, Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
斯皮瓦克,盖亚特里·查克拉沃蒂 1999 《后殖民批评家》,伦敦和纽约,劳特利奇,查普曼与霍尔。

Suzuki, Yūko 1986 Feminizumu to sensō (Feminism and war), Tokyo, Marujusha.
铃木裕子 1986 《女性主义与战争》,东京,丸寿社。

… 1989a Joseishi o hiraku 1: Haha to onna (Creating women’s history 1: women and mothers), Tokyo, Miraisha.
… 1989a 《开创女性史 1:母亲与女性》,东京,未来社。

… 1989b Joseishi o hiraku 2: Yokusan to teikō (Creating women’s history 2: Collaboration and resistance), Tokyo, Miraisha.
… 1989b 《开创女性史 2:合作与抵抗》,东京,未来社。

… 1991 Chōsenjin jūgun ianfu (Korean military comfort women), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten (Iwanami Booklet).
… 1991 《朝鲜人从军慰安妇》,东京,岩波书店(岩波小册子)。

… 1993 Jūgun ianfu mondai to sei bōryoku (The comfort women issue and sexual violence), Tokyo, Miraisha.
… 1993 《従軍慰安婦问题与性暴力》,东京,未来社。

… 1996a Joseishi o hiraku 3: Onna to sengo 50 nen (Creating women’s history 3: Women and the 50 years since the end of the war), Tokyo, Miraisha.
… 1996a 《开启女性史 3:女性与战后 50 年》,东京,未来社。

… 1996b Joseishi o hiraku 4: ‘Ianfu’ mondai to sengo sekinin (Creating women’s history 4 : The ‘comfort women’ issue and post-war responsibility), Tokyo, Miraisha.
… 1996b 《开启女性史 4:“慰安妇”问题与战后责任》,东京,未来社。
1997a 'Nihongun “ianfu” (sei doreisei) mondai no shindankai to han “ianfu” kyanpen, 2 volumes (A new stage of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ (sexual slaves) problem and the anti-comfort women campaign, vols. 1 and 2), Mirai 365/ 366, February-March 1997.
1997a 《日本军“慰安妇”(性奴隶)问题的新阶段与反“慰安妇”运动》,2 卷,未来 365/366,1997 年 2-3 月。
1997b Sensō sekinin to jendā (War responsibility and gender), Tokyo, Miraisha.
1997b 《战争责任与性别》,东京,未来社。
Tabata, Kaya 1995 ‘Shokuminchi no Chōsen de kurashita Nihon josei tachi’ (Japanese women who lived in colonial Korea). Paper presented at the special session Feminism and War at the spring convention of the Women’s Studies Association of Japan.
田畑佳也 1995 《殖民地朝鲜生活的日本女性》。发表于日本女性学会春季大会特别会议“女性主义与战争”。

Tabata, Yasuko, Chizuko Ueno and Sanae Fukutō, (eds), Hikaku Kazokushi Gakkai (supervising editor) 1997 Jendà to josei (Women and gender), Tokyo, Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu.
田畑康子、上野千鹤子、福藤早苗(编),比较家族史学会(总编辑)1997 《性别与女性》,东京,早稻田大学出版部。

Tachi, Kaoru 1994 ‘Josei no sanseiken to jendā’ (Women’s right to vote and gender), in Hara, Hiroko (ed.) Raiburari Sōkan kagaku 2: Jendà (Library interdisciplinary social sciences vol. 2: gender), Tokyo, Shinseisha.
立薰 1994 《女性的参政权与性别》,载原弘子(编)《图书馆跨学科社会科学卷 2:性别》,东京,新星社。

Takahashi, Tetsuya 1995 Kioku no echika: sensō /tetsugaku/Aushuwittsu (The Ethics of Memory: War, Philosophy and Auschwitz), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
高桥哲也 1995 《记忆的伦理:战争、哲学与奥斯维辛》,东京,岩波书店。
2001 ‘Nani ga chokuzen ni kesaretaka: NHK “Towareru senji seibōryoku” kaihen o kangaeru’ (What was cut just before the broadcast?: A consideration of the alterations made to NHK’s ‘Questioning wartime sexual violence’), Sekai, 2001(5), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
2001 年 《什么内容在播出前被删减了:关于 NHK《质疑战争性暴力》改编的思考》,《世界》,2001 年第 5 期,东京,岩波书店。

Takamure, Itsue 1938, 1966 Bokeisei no kenkyū (A study of matriarchy); reprinted in Takamure Itsue zenshū 1 (The collected works of Takamure Itsue, vol. 1), Tokyo, Rironsha.
高群逸枝 1938 年,1966 年 《母系制研究》;收录于《高群逸枝全集》第 1 卷,东京,理论社。

… 1966-70 Takamure Itsue zenshū, Zen 10 kan (The collected works of Takamure Itsue, complete 10 volumes), Tokyo, Rironsha.
…… 1966-70 年 《高群逸枝全集》,全 10 卷,东京,理论社。

Takeda, Seiji, Yoshinori Kobayashi and Daizaburō Hashizume 1997 Seigi, Sensō, Kokka Ron (On justice, war and the state), Tokyo, Komichi Shobō.
武田诚司、小林义典、桥爪大三郎 1997 年 《正义、战争与国家论》,东京,小路书房。

Tanaka, Hiroshi 1993 ‘Nihon no sengo sekinin to Ajia: Sengo hoshō to rekishi ninshiki’ (Japan’s post-war responsibility and Asia: Post-war compensation and historical awareness), in Kōza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi 8: Ajia no reisen to datsu shokuminchi ka (Series modern Japan and colonialism, vol. 8, The Asian cold-war and de-colonization), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
田中浩 1993 《日本的战后责任与亚洲:战后赔偿与历史认知》,收录于《现代日本与殖民地讲座》第 8 卷《亚洲冷战与去殖民化》,东京,岩波书店。

Tanaka, Toshiyuki 1993 Shirarezaru sensō hanzai (Unknown war crimes), Tokyo, Ôtsuki Shoten.
田中敏之 1993 《未知的战争罪行》,东京,大月书店。
1996 ‘Naze Beigun wa jūgun ianfu mondai o mushi shita no ka’, 2 volumes (Why did the American army ignore the military comfort
1996 《为什么美军忽视军队慰安妇问题》,2 卷本。

women issue? Vols. 1 and 2), Sekai 627/628 November and December 1996, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
女性问题?第 1 卷和第 2 卷,1996 年 11 月和 12 月,世界 627/628 期,东京,岩波书店。

Tateiwa, Shinya 1997 Shiteki Shoyūron (Private ownership theory), Tokyo, Keisō Shobō.
立岩真也 1997 《私有论》,东京,庆应书房。

Tokyo Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kyōikugaku Kenkyūshitsu Kitsuke ‘1209 Kirokushū Sakusei Chimu’ 1997 Kirokushu Nanumu no Ie kara wakamono tachi e: Kankoku moto ‘Ianfu’ no ima (Memorial collection: From ‘Nanumu House’ to young people: former Korean ‘comfort women’ today). Tokyo, Dept. of Pedagogy, The University of Tokyo.
东京大学教育学部教育学研究室着装“1209 记录集制作组”1997 年记录集《从南雾之家到年轻人:韩国前“慰安妇”的现状》(纪念集:从“南雾之家”到年轻人:前韩国“慰安妇”今日)。东京,东京大学教育学部。

Tomiyama, Ichirō 1990 Kindai Nihon shakai to ‘Okinawajin’ (Modern Japanese society and the ‘Okinawans’), Tokyo, Nihon Hyōronsha.
富山一郎 1990 《近代日本社会与“冲绳人”》,东京,日本评论社。

… 1997 'Shohyō: Oguma Eiji cho “Tan-itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen” (Book review: ‘The Origins of myth of the homogenous society’ by Eiji Oguma), Nihonshi Kenkyū 413.
… 1997 《书评:小熊英二著〈单一民族神话的起源〉》,《日本史研究》413。

Tonkin, Elizabeth 1992 Narrating the Past: The Social Construction of Oral History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
汤金,伊丽莎白 1992 《叙述过去:口述历史的社会建构》,剑桥,剑桥大学出版社。

Tonosaki, Mitsuhiro and Okabe, Masako (eds) 1979 Yamakawa Kikue no kōseki (The tracks of Yamakawa Kikue), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
殿崎光弘、冈部正子(编)1979 《山川菊枝的足迹》,东京,Domesu 出版社。

Tsukuru Kai Sandōnin Intabyu- 1997 ‘Hiki komogomo no sandōnin jijō’ (The bittersweet circumstances of the supporters for the Orthodox History Textbook Group), Ronza May 1997, Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha.
筑琉会三道人访谈 1997 《正统历史教科书支持者的苦乐参半境况》,《论座》1997 年 5 月,东京,朝日新闻社。

Ueno, Chizuko 1985 Shihonshugi to kaji rōdō (Capitalism and domestic labour), Tokyo, Kaimeisha.
上野千鹤子 1985 《资本主义与家务劳动》,东京,开明社。

… 1990 Kafuchōsei to shihonsei (Patriarchy and capitalism), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
… 1990 《家父长制与资本主义》,东京,岩波书店。

… 199190 nendai no Adamu to Ibu (Adam and Eve of the 1990s), Tokyo, NHK Shuppan.
… 1991 《1990 年代的亚当与夏娃》,东京,NHK 出版。
1994a Kindai kazoku no seiritsu to shüen (The rise and fall of the modern family), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
1994a 《现代家庭的兴衰》,东京,岩波书店。
1994b ‘Nihon no ribu: sono shisō to haikei’ (Japanese women’s liberation movement: its ideas and background) in Inoue et al. (eds) Nihon no feminizumu 1: Ribu to feminizumu (Japanese feminism 1: women’s liberation and feminism), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
1994b 《日本的解放运动:其思想与背景》,收录于井上等编《日本的女性主义 1:解放与女性主义》,东京,岩波书店。

qquad\qquad 1995a ‘Rekishigaku to feminizumu: “joseishi” o koete’ (History and feminism: transcending women’s history), in the series Iwanami kōza Nihon tsu-shi bekkan 1: Rekishi ishiki no genzai (Iwanami lectures Japanese history special series 1: historical consciousness today), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
1995a 《历史学与女性主义:“女性史”的超越》,收录于岩波讲座日本通史别卷 1:当代历史意识,东京,岩波书店。

qquad\qquad 1995b ‘Sai no seijigaku’ (The politics of difference), in Ueno et al. (eds) Iwanami koza gendai shakaigaku 11: Jendà no shakaigaku (Series Contemporary sociology 11: sociology of gender), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
1995b 《差异的政治学》,收录于上野等编《岩波讲座现代社会学 11:性别社会学》,东京,岩波书店。

qquad\qquad (ed.) 1996 Kitto kaerareru seisabetsu go: Watashitachi no gaidorain (Sexist language that can be changed for sure: our guidelines), Tokyo, Sanseidō.
(编)1996 《一定能改变的性别歧视语言:我们的指导方针》,东京,三省堂。

qquad\qquad 1997a ‘Kioku no seijigaku: kokumin, kojin, watashi’(The Politics of memory: the nation, the individual and I), Impaction 103, June 1976, Tokyo, Impact Shuppankai.
qquad\qquad 1997a 《记忆的政治学:国家、个人与我》,《Impaction》103 期,1976 年 6 月,东京,Impact 出版社。

qquad\qquad 1997b ‘Hiratsuka Raichō’, Asahi Shinbun, 5 December 1997.
qquad\qquad 1997b 《平塚雷鸟》,《朝日新闻》,1997 年 12 月 5 日。

qquad\qquad 1997c Feminists’ Active Participation in Japan’s Ultra-nationalism. Paper presented at the panel ‘Women and Nationalism’, Annual Convention of the Association of Asian Studies, March 14, 1997, Chicago, U.S.A.
qquad\qquad 1997c 《女权主义者在日本极端民族主义中的积极参与》。发表于“女性与民族主义”专题讨论会,亚洲研究协会年会,1997 年 3 月 14 日,美国芝加哥。

qquad\qquad 1998a Hatsujō sōchi (Erotic apparatus), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobō.
qquad\qquad 1998a 《欲望装置》,东京,筑摩书房。

qquad\qquad 1998b 'Posuto reisen to ‘Nihonban rekishi shūsei shugi’ (The postcold war Japanese version of historical revisionism), Ronza March 1998, Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha.
qquad\qquad 1998b 《后冷战与“日本版历史修正主义”》,《论座》1998 年 3 月号,东京,朝日新闻社。
1998c ‘Josei heishi no kōchiku’ (The Construction of female soldiers) in Ehara Yumiko (ed.) Sei, bōryoku, neshon (Sex, violence and the nation), Tokyo, Keisō Shobō.
1998c 《女性兵士的构建》,收录于江原由美子(编)《性、暴力与国家》,东京,庆应书房。

qquad\qquad 1999 ‘Eirei ninaru kenri o josei nimo?: jendā byōdō no wana’ (Should women also be given the right to become ‘the spirits of war dead’?: the trap of gender equality), Doshisha Amerika Kenkyū, No. 25, Center for American Studies, Doshisha University.
1999 《女性也应拥有成为“英灵”的权利吗?:性别平等的陷阱》,《同志社美国研究》第 25 期,同志社大学美国研究中心。

qquad\qquad 1999b ‘The Politics of Memory: Nation, Individual and Self’, History and Memory, 2 (2). Translated and with an introduction by Jordan Sand.
1999b 《记忆的政治:国家、个体与自我》,《历史与记忆》2(2)。由乔丹·桑德翻译并附引言。

qquad\qquad 2003 ‘Jendāshi to rekishigaku no hōhō’ (Gender history and the methodology of history) in Nihon no Sensō Sekinin Shiryō Senta (ed) Nashonarizumu to ‘ianfu’ mondai (Nationalism and the ‘comfort women’ issue), Tokyo, Aoki Shoten. First edition 1998.
2003 《性别史与历史学的方法论》,收录于日本战争责任资料中心(编)《民族主义与“慰安妇”问题》,东京,青木书店。初版 1998 年。

Ueno, Chizuko, Miyuki Tanaka and Michiko Mae 1994 Doitsu no mienai kabe: onna ga toinaosu töitsu (The invisible wall in Germany: women requestioning unification), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
上野千鶴子、田中美幸、前道子 1994 《德国看不见的墙:女性重新质问统一》,东京,岩波书店。

Uesugi, Satoshi 1997 Datsu gōmanizumu sengen (The ‘anti-gōmanism’ declaration), Osaka, Tōhō Shuppan.
上杉聪 1997 《反傲慢主义宣言》,大阪,东宝出版。

Ukai, Satoshi 1997 ‘Rekishi shūsei shugi: Yōroppa to Nihon’ (Historical revisionism: Europe and Japan), Impaction 102, April 1997, Tokyo, Impact Shuppankai.
鵜飼聪 1997 《历史修正主义:欧洲与日本》,《Impaction》第 102 期,1997 年 4 月,东京,Impact 出版会。

Wakakuwa, Midori 1995 Sensō ga tsukuru joseizō: Dai 2 ji sekai taisen ka no Nihon josei do-in no shikakuteki puropaganda zō (Images of women created by war: visual propaganda used in the mobilization of Japanese women during the Second World War), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobō.
若桑绿 1995 《战争塑造的女性形象:第二次世界大战期间日本女性动员的视觉宣传》,东京,筑摩书房。

qquad\qquad 1997 “Jendā shigaku” no shiten kara rekishi shūsei shugisha o hihan suru’ (A critique of historical revisionism from the perspective of ‘gender history’), Shūkan Kinyōbi 181, 1 August 1997.
qquad\qquad 1997 年 “从‘性别史学’视角批判历史修正主义”(A critique of historical revisionism from the perspective of ‘gender history’),《周刊金曜日》181 期,1997 年 8 月 1 日。

Yamada, Meiko 1991 Ianfu tachi no Taiheiyō Sensō (The comfort women’s Pacific War), Tokyo, Kōjinsha.
山田明子 1991 年 《慰安妇们的太平洋战争》(The comfort women’s Pacific War),东京,光人社。

qquad\qquad 1992 Senryōgun Ianfu: Kokusaku baishun no onnatachi no higeki (The comfort women of the occupation forces: the tragedy of the women used in the state’s prostitution policy), Tokyo, Kōjinsha.
qquad\qquad 1992 年 《占领军慰安妇:国家卖淫政策下女性的悲剧》(The comfort women of the occupation forces: the tragedy of the women used in the state’s prostitution policy),东京,光人社。

Yamakawa, Kikue 1918 Bosei hogo to keizaiteki dokuritsu: Yosano, Hiratsuka 2 shi no ronsō (Maternal protection and economic independence: the debate between Yosano and Hiratsuka). Reprinted in Kouchi, Nobuko (ed.), 1984 Shiryō: Bosei hogo ronsō (Documentation on the motherhood protection debate), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
山川菊枝 1918 年 《母性保护与经济独立:与与野、平塚两氏的论争》(Maternal protection and economic independence: the debate between Yosano and Hiratsuka)。收录于高知信子(编),1984 年《资料:母性保护论争》(Documentation on the motherhood protection debate),东京,Domesu 出版社。

qquad\qquad 1943, 1983 Buke no josei (A Woman from a Samurai Family), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
qquad\qquad 1943,1983 《武家之女性》(A Woman from a Samurai Family),东京,岩波书店。

qquad\qquad 1974 Oboegaki, Bakumatsu no Mitohan (Notes on the Mito Domain at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate). Reprinted in 1982, Yamakawa
qquad\qquad 1974 备忘录,幕末水户藩。1982 年重印,山川
Kikue shū (The Collected Works of Yamakawa Kikue), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
《山川菊枝全集》,东京,岩波书店。
1979 ‘Watashi no undōshi’ (My personal history of activism), in Toyama, Mitsuyiro and Okabe, Masako (ed.) 1979 Yamakawa Kikue no kōseki (The tracks of Yamakawa Kikue), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
1979 《我的运动史》(My personal history of activism),收录于富山光代与冈部雅子(编)1979 《山川菊枝的足迹》(The tracks of Yamakawa Kikue),东京,Domesu 出版社。

Yamanouchi, Yasushi 1996a Sisutemu shakai no gendaiteki isō (The contemporary phase of the system society), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
山内康 1996a 《系统社会的现代阶段》,东京,岩波书店。

Yamanouchi, Yasushi, interviewed by Ryūichi Narita, and Hirokazu Ōuchi 1996b ‘Intabyu-: Sōryokusen, kokumin kokka, sisutemu shakai’ (An interview on the total war, the nation-state and the system society), Gendai Shisō 24-7 June 1996.
山内康,受成田龙一和大内浩和采访 1996b 《访谈:全面战争、民族国家与系统社会》,《现代思想》1996 年 6 月第 24 卷第 7 期。

Yamanouchi, Yasushi, Victor Koschmann, and Ryūich Narita, (eds) 1995 Sōryokusen to gendaika (Total war and modernization), Tokyo, Kashiwa Shobō.
山内康司、维克多·科施曼、成田龙一(编)1995 《总力战与现代化》,东京,柏书房。

Yamashita, Chieko 1985 Maboroshi no tō: Hausukipa Kumazawa Mitsuko no baai (The phantom tower: the case of housekeeper Kumazawa Mitsuko), Tokyo, BOC Shuppan.
山下千惠子 1985 《幻影之塔:管家熊泽美津子的案例》(The phantom tower: the case of housekeeper Kumazawa Mitsuko),东京,BOC 出版社。

Yamashita, Etsuko 1988 Takamure Itsue: ‘Haha’ no arukeoroji (Takamure Itsue: Archeology of the ‘mother’), Tokyo, Kawade Shobō Shinsha.
山下悦子 1988 《高群逸枝:“母亲”的考古学》(Takamure Itsue: Archeology of the ‘mother’),东京,河出书房新社。

Yamashita, Yong-e 1994 ‘Ianfu mondai no ninshiki o megutte’ (Concerning the awareness of the comfort women issue), Kikan Akurosu (journal of the citizen’s group Kenpō o ikasu Shimin no Kai), November 1994.
山下永枝 1994 《关于慰安妇问题的认知》,《公民团体宪法活用市民会季刊阿克罗斯》,1994 年 11 月。
1996 ‘Kankoku joseigaku to minzoku: Nihongun “ianfu” mondai o meguru “minzoku” giron o chūshin ni’ (Nationalism in Korean women’s studies: addressing the nationalist discourses surrounding the ‘comfort women’ issue), Joseigaku 4, The Japanese Society of Women’s Studies.
1996 《韩国女性学与民族:以日本军“慰安妇”问题为中心的“民族”论争》,《女性学》第 4 期,日本女性学会。

qquad\qquad 1998 Nationalism in Korean Women’s Studies: Addressing the Nationalist Discourses Surrounding the “Comfort Women” Issue’, U.S.Japan Women’s Journal, English supplement, No.15, 1998, The U.S.-Japan Women’s Center.
qquad\qquad 1998 《韩国女性学中的民族主义:围绕“慰安妇”问题的民族主义话语》,《美日女性杂志》英文增刊,第 15 期,1998 年,美日女性中心。

Yamataka, Shigeri 1943 Dai 4 kai chuo kyoryoku kaigiroku (Fourth meeting of the central cooperation committee: conference report). Reprinted in Suzuki, Yūko 1986 Feminizumu to sensō (Feminism and war), Tokyo, Marujusha.
山高茂 1943 《第四次中央协作会议记录》,载于铃木裕子编 1986《女性主义与战争》,东京,丸善社。
Yamazaki, Hiromi 1995 ‘Minkan bokin wa “jūgun ianfu” o 2 do korosu’ (The civic fundraising will kill the ‘military comfort women’ twice), Shūkan Kinyōbi 30 June 1995.
山崎浩美 1995 年 《民间募捐将使“军队慰安妇”遭受二次杀害》,《周刊星期五》,1995 年 6 月 30 日。

Yamazaki, Masakazu 1990 Nihon bunka to kojin shugi (Japanese culture and individualism), Tokyo, Chūō Kōronsha.
山崎正和 1990 《日本文化与个人主义》,东京,中公论社。

Yasukawa, Junosuke 1996 ‘Jidai o koeru koto no mutsukashisa: Sensō sekinin ron to no kakawari de’ (The difficulty of transcending the epoch: in relation to the issue of war responsibility), Gakushikai Kaihō 811 1996II.
安川淳之助 1996 《超越时代的困难:关于战争责任论的关联》,《学士会会报》811 号,1996 年第二期。
Yi, Hyo Jei, Yun Jong Ok, Chi Eun Hui and Pak Won Sun 1995 ‘Shin Tōa Sekai kyōdō kikaku Nihongun “ianfu” mondai o dou kangaeru ka? Nikkan chishikijin ōfuku shokan, henshin: yahari kikin no teian wa ukeirerarenai’ (Joint project by Shin Tōa and Sekai, Exchange letters between Japanese and Korean intellectuals: how should we understand the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ issue? Reply: Having considered the matter, we cannot accept the fund proposal.) Sekai November 1995, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
李孝宰、尹钟玉、池恩熙、朴元顺 1995 《新东亚世界共同企划日本军“慰安妇”问题如何看待?日韩知识分子往返书信,回复:经过考虑,我们无法接受资金提案》,《世界》1995 年 11 月,东京,岩波书店。

Yoneda, Sayoko 1996 ‘Hiratsuka Raichō no senso sekinin ron josetsu’ (An introduction to the debate over Hiratsuka Raichō’s war responsibility), Rekishi Hyōron April 1996.
米田佐代子 1996 《平塚雷鸟战争责任论导言》,《历史评论》1996 年 4 月。

qquad\qquad 2002 Hiratsuka Raichō: Kindai Nihon no demokurashi to jendā (Hiratsuka Raichō: Democracy and gender in modern Japan), Tokyo, Yoshikawakōbunkan.
qquad\qquad 2002 平塚雷鸟:《近代日本的民主与性别》(Hiratsuka Raichō: Democracy and gender in modern Japan),东京,吉川弘文馆。

Yonemoto, Shōhei 1989 Iden kanri shakai: Nachisu to kin mirai (Genetic management society: Nazism and the near future), Tokyo, Kōbundō.
米本正平 1989 《遗传管理社会:纳粹与不远的未来》(Iden kanri shakai: Nachisu to kin mirai),东京,弘文堂。

Yosano, Akiko, 1918a ‘Nendo Jizō’ (Self-portrait of clay: Review of women’s issues), Taiyō, 24(7), June 1918. Reprinted in Kouchi, Nobuko (ed.) 1984 Shiryō bosei hogo ronsō (Documentation on the motherhood protection debate), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
与谢野晶子 1918a 《泥塑自画像》(女性问题评论)(Nendo Jizō: Review of women’s issues),《太阳》,第 24 卷第 7 期,1918 年 6 月。收录于高地信子(编)1984《资料 母性保护论争》(Shiryō bosei hogo ronsō),东京,多姆斯出版。

qquad\qquad 1918b ‘Hiratsuka, Yamakawa, Yamada, 3 joshi ni kotau’ (In response to the three women, Ms. Hiratsuka, Ms. Yamakawa, and Ms.Yamada), Taiyō, 24(13), November 1918. Reprinted in Kouchi, Nobuko (ed.) 1984 Shiryō bosei hogo ronsō (Documentation on the motherhood protection debate), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
qquad\qquad 1918b 《回应三位女性:平塚、山川、山田》(Hiratsuka, Yamakawa, Yamada, 3 joshi ni kotau),《太阳》,第 24 卷第 13 期,1918 年 11 月。收录于高地信子(编)1984《资料 母性保护论争》(Shiryō bosei hogo ronsō),东京,多姆斯出版。
1919 ‘Gyakufu Kōseki’ (Traces against the window), Taiyō, 25(2), February 1918. Reprinted as ‘To Mr. Sakai Kosen’, in Kouchi, Nobuko (ed.) 1984 Shiryō bosei hogo ronsō (Documentation on the motherhood protection debate), Tokyo, Domesu Shuppan.
1919 年《逆覆痕迹》(窗上的痕迹),《太阳》,第 25 卷第 2 期,1918 年 2 月。收录于高知信子(编)1984 年《资料 母性保护论争》,东京,多姆斯出版社。

Yoshida, Seiji 1977 Chōsenjin ianfu to Nihonjin (The Korean comfort women and the Japanese), Tokyo, Shin Jinbutsu Öraisha.
吉田诚二 1977 年《朝鲜人慰安妇与日本人》,东京,新人物往来社。

Yoshimi, Shūko (ed.) 1977 Nihon fashizumu to josei (Japanese fascism and women), Tokyo, Gōdō Shuppan.
吉见修子(编)1977 年《日本法西斯主义与女性》,东京,合同出版社。

Yoshimi, Shunya 1996 ‘Media tennōsei no shatei’ (The scope of the media emperor system) in Riarithi Toranjitto (Reality Transit), Tokyo, Kinokuniya Shoten.
吉见俊也 1996 年《媒体天皇制的范围》,收录于《现实转变》,东京,纪伊国屋书店。

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki (ed.) 1992 Jūgun ianfu shiryōshū (A collection of documents concerning the military comfort women), Tokyo, Otsuki Shoten.
吉见义明(编)1992 《军妓资料集》,东京,大月书店。

… 1995 Jūgun ianfu (The comfort women), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten. English translation by Suzanne O’Brien 1995 Comfort Women, New York and Chichester, Columbia University Press.
…… 1995 《従軍慰安婦》,东京,岩波书店。英文译本由苏珊·奥布莱恩翻译,1995 年《Comfort Women》,纽约及奇切斯特,哥伦比亚大学出版社。

… 1996 “Jūgun ianfu” mondai no kaiketsu no tame ni’ (Towards a solution to the ‘comfort women’ issue), Sekai September 1996, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
…… 1996 “为解决‘军妓’问题”(《世界》1996 年 9 月号,东京,岩波书店)。
1997 ‘Kōsho ron ni hanron suru: Nihongun “ianfu” mondai no honshitsu to wa’ (A counter-argument to the theory of the state licensed prostitutes: what is the nature of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ problem?), special issue: ‘Rekishi shiryō o dou yomu ka?’ (How should we read historical documents?), Sekai March 1997, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
1997 “反驳官方论:日本军队‘慰安妇’问题的本质是什么?”(特刊:“我们应如何解读历史资料?”《世界》1997 年 3 月号,东京,岩波书店)。

… 2003 “Jūgun ianfu” mondai to rekishizō: Ueno Chizukoshi ni kotaeru’ (The ‘comfort women’ problem and historical awareness: a reply to Ueno Chizuko), in Nihon no sensō sekinin shiryō senta (ed) Nashonarizumu to ‘Ianfu mondai’ (Nationalism and the ‘comfort women’ issue), Tokyo, Aoki Shoten. First edition 1998.
…… 2003 “‘军妓’问题与历史意识:回应上野千鹤子的论述”,收录于日本战争责任资料中心(编)《民族主义与‘慰安妇’问题》,东京,青木书店。初版 1998 年。

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki and Hayashi, Hiroshi (eds) 1995 Kyōdō kenkyū: Nihongun ianfu (Joint research concerning the Japanese military comfort women), Tokyo, Ōtsuki Shoten.
吉见义明、林宏(编)1995《共同研究:日本军队慰安妇》,东京,大月书店。
Yun, Jong-ok 1997, ‘Kokumin kikin wa nani o rikai shite inai ka’ (What is it that the Asian Women’s Fund fails to understand?), Sekai November 1997, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
尹钟玉 1997,《国民基金未能理解的是什么?》,《世界》1997 年 11 月号,东京,岩波书店。

… 1992 Chōsenjin josei ga mita ‘ianfu mondai’ (The ‘comfort women’ issue as seen by Korean women), Tokyo, San-ichi Shobō.
…… 1992,《朝鲜女性所见的“慰安妇问题”》,东京,三一书房。

Zenkoku Josei Nyūsu 1997 ‘Rekishi no jijitsu o sunao ni mitome yo’ (Let’s accept historical facts without hesitation) Zenkoku Josei Nyūsu 20 January 1997.
全国女性新闻 1997,《让我们坦然接受历史事实》,全国女性新闻 1997 年 1 月 20 日。

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  1. The image assigned to Japanese women during the war was not a morale-boosting picture representing war itself, but the figure of motherhood holding a boy child. In other words, it fitted into the genealogy of ‘the Holy Mother and Child’ (Wakakuwa, 1995:254).
    战争期间赋予日本女性的形象,并非代表战争本身、用以振奋士气的形象,而是持有男孩的母亲形象。换句话说,这符合“圣母与圣子”的谱系(若桑若,1995:254)。
  2. One would have expected Koreans to be a people with a stronger sense of pride…Bringing out into the open a past that in truth they should also be ashamed of, publicising it to the world,
    人们本以为韩国人会有更强烈的自豪感……将他们实际上也应感到羞耻的过去公之于众,向世界宣传,
  3. In Korean society, even if a woman who has been violently abducted, taken to the front line, and then forced to become a prostitute manages to return to her homeland, having narrowly escaped death, she will not be able to tread the earth of her native village again. Compared to this, there can be no doubt that a happier life awaits a [Japanese] woman who could at least go back to her island homeland, erect a grave for herself while still alive, and live in a society
    在韩国社会,即使一个被暴力掳走、带到前线、然后被迫成为妓女的女性侥幸逃脱死亡,回到故乡,她也无法再踏上故乡的土地。相比之下,毫无疑问,一个至少能够回到自己岛屿故乡、在生前为自己立墓、并生活在社会中的[日本]女性,将迎来更幸福的生活。
  4. The general view in Korea is that those people who were led away by force supported the Japanese military during the period of the Japanese Empire…There are those who fear that the descendents of families who collaborated with the Japanese army will be labelled. Even in the villages they are looked upon as dishonourable, and this ends up having an effect on such things as marriage prospects (Ryūkyu Shinpō, 23 June, 1997).
    在韩国,普遍的看法是那些被强行带走的人在日本帝国时期支持了日本军队……有人担心与日本军队合作的家族后代会被贴上标签。即使在村庄里,他们也被视为不光彩,这最终会影响到婚姻前景等方面(琉球新报,1997 年 6 月 23 日)。
  5. Imagine that you or I are living in the period 1935 to 1945, and one day we are called up for national service. This is based on the legal procedure of the state and a duty of citizens fixed in
    想象一下你或我生活在 1935 年至 1945 年期间,有一天我们被征召参加国民服役。这是基于国家的法律程序和公民的义务。