Since the 1950s, Egypt has developed dozen new towns in the desert around Cairo. This book offers the first system exploration of these cities, analyzing t architecture and urban form, their pro and shortcomings. Intended to satisfy growing demand for housing, most of the desert towns have never been completed. Taking this condition of permanently emerging urban development at face value, the study identifies the potential of these towns through a series of design scenarios. Cairo Desert Cities underscores the value of re-engaging with modernist town planning, for wiping away the dust of past failures may uncover the contours of future opportunities. 自 20 世纪 50 年代以来，埃及在开罗周边的沙漠地带规划了十余座新城。本书首次系统考察这些城市，分析其建筑形态与城市规划的得失。这些沙漠新城本为满足住房需求而建，但多数沦为"未完成"工程。研究直面这种持续演变的城市发展状态，通过系列设计情景揭示其潜在价值。《开罗沙漠城市》重审现代主义城市规划的意义——拂去过往失败的尘埃，或能勾勒出未来的机遇轮廓。
Edited by Marc Angélil and Charlotte Malterre-Barthes with Something Fantastic in collaboration with CLUSTER Cairo 马克·安杰利尔与夏洛特·马莱特-巴尔特斯联合 Something Fantastic 团队 与开罗 CLUSTER 合作编著
ETH Zurich MAS Urban Design 苏黎世联邦理工学院城市设计硕士项目
ISBN 978-3-944074-23-8
EGYPT'S DESERT DREAMS 埃及的沙漠梦想
Development or Disaster? 发展还是灾难？
David Sims 戴维·西姆斯
Foreword by Timothy Mitchell 蒂莫西·米切尔 序言
The American University in Cairo Press Cairo New York 开罗美国大学出版社 开罗 纽约
Seoudi Sodic
6 October City 十月六日城
Giza 吉萨
0238573427－28
فاتورة بيم 保险账单
1.1) CAIRO DESERT GITIES … 24 1.1) 开罗沙漠城市…24
Charlotte Malterre-Barthes 夏洛特·马勒特-巴特斯
1.2) DEMYSTIFYING VOCABULARY … 29 1.2) 词汇解析……29
MAS Urban Design MAS 城市设计
1.3) CAIRO’S NEW TOWNS 1.3) 开罗新城
FROM ONE REVOLUTION TO ANOTHER … 34 从一场革命到另一场革命……34
Eric Denis 埃里克·德尼
2. CAIRO’S DESERT CITIES: A CHRONOLOGY 2. 开罗沙漠城市：编年史
2.1) HELWAN … 48 2.1) 赫勒万...48
2.2) HELIOPOLIS … 62 2.2) 赫利奥波利斯...62
2.3) NASR CITY … 78 2.3) 纳斯尔城...78
2.4) SIXTH OF OCTOBER … 92 2.4) 十月六日城 … 92
2.5) EL-OBOUR … 112 2.5) 奥布尔...112
2.6) FIFTEENTH OF MAY … 126 2.6) 五月十五日城 … 126
2.7) TENTH OF RAMADAN … 142 2.7) 斋月十日城 … 142
2.8) AL-BADR … 160 2.8) 巴德尔城 … 160
2.9) NEW CAIRO … 178 2.9) 新开罗 … 178
2.10) SHEIKH ZAYED … 194 2.10) 谢赫扎耶德城 … 194
2.11) MADINATY … 212 2.11) 马迪纳提…212
3. DESERT CITIES TODAY 3. 当代沙漠城市
3.1) LIVING IN DESERT CITIES … 228 3.1) 沙漠城市生活…228
Eman Farouk, Rana El Rashidy, Ahmed El Melegy, Reem El Attar, and Aly El Shafei … 2343.2) DOING BUSINESS IN THE DESERTAn Interview with Mark Elkatsha (SODIC) 伊曼·法鲁克、拉娜·拉希迪、艾哈迈德·梅莱基、里姆·阿塔尔与阿里·谢菲…2343.2) 沙漠营商之道——马克·埃尔卡察（SODIC 公司）访谈录
4. MECHANISMS OF DESERT CITIES 4. 沙漠城市的运作机制
4.1) NEW CITY MODUS OPERANDI … 242 4.1) 新城运作模式...242
Christina Lazou, Sofia Symeonidou 克里斯蒂娜·拉祖，索菲亚·西梅奥尼杜
4.2) DESERT URBANIZATION 4.2) 沙漠城市化
THE PLANNING OF NEGLECT … 248 被忽视的规划…248
Felipe Combeau, Guido Greco 费利佩·孔博，吉多·格雷科
4.3) RESIDENTIAL ARCHITECTURE OF NEW TOWNS … 254 4.3) 新城镇住宅建筑…254
Ekkachan Eiamananwattana, Jide Haidar, Shinji Terada 埃卡灿·伊亚玛纳瓦塔纳，吉德·海达尔，寺田信二
4.4) LEGISLATING THE DESERT … 260 4.4) 荒漠立法... 260
Maro Tsagka, Caterina Viguera 马洛·察卡，卡特琳娜·维格拉
4.5) MILITARY INC … 266 4.5) 军事介入...266 页
Georgios Kaldis, Olga Vougioukalaki 乔治奥斯·卡尔迪斯，奥尔加·沃吉奥卡拉基
4.6) PROGRAMMING THE CITY … 272 4.6) 城市编程… 272
Yorgos Lavantsiotis, Kasha Pankowska 约格斯·拉万西奥蒂斯，卡莎·潘科夫斯卡
5. ALTERNATIVE URBAN FUTURES 5. 另类城市未来
5.1) 7 PROJECTS FOR SIXTH OF OCTOBER … 278 5.1) 十月六日城的 7 个项目…278
5.2) UNGATED COMMUNITY … 286 5.2) 开放式社区… 286
5.3) IN PRAISE OF SHADOWS … 296 5.3) 阴翳礼赞…296
5.4) SYMBIOSIS … 308 5.4) 共生关系… 308
5.5) URBAN CONTINUUM … 318 5.5) 城市连续体… 318
5.6) DISPELLING MIRAGES … 328 5.6) 驱散幻象…328
5.7) GRAFT . … 340 5.7) 嫁接移植… 340
5.8) URBAN SYNERGY … 350 5.8) 城市协同效应…350
6. REFLECTING ON DESERT URBANIZATION IN EGYPT 6. 埃及沙漠城市化进程的反思
6.1) THE NEW TOWNS AROUND CAIRO … 366 6.1) 开罗周边的新城镇…366
David Sims 戴维·西姆斯
6.2) CLAIMING THE DESERT … 369 6.2) 沙漠开发主张…369
Charlotte Malterre-Barthes 夏洛特·马勒特-巴特斯
6.3) INFITAH: A TERRITORIAL OPENING … 375 6.3) 开放政策：领土开放…375
Marc Angélil, Cary Siress 马克·安杰利尔，卡里·西雷斯
6.4) CAIRO’S NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL … 382 6.4) 开罗新行政首都…382
Mirette Khorshed, Lawrence Vale, Khaled Tarabieh 米雷特·霍舍德、劳伦斯·韦尔、哈立德·塔拉比耶
7. AFTERWORD … 391 7. 后记…391
Mohamed Elshahed 穆罕默德·埃尔沙希德 |ши|ши|ши|шいいい_(0)200km\underset{0}{|ш и| ш и|ш и| ш い い い ~} 200 \mathrm{~km}
（1）Egypt （1）埃及
（2）Libya （2）利比亚
（3）Sudan （3）苏丹
（4）Saudi Arabia （4）沙特阿拉伯
（5）Jordan （5）约旦
（6）Israel and Palestinian Occupied Territories （6）以色列及巴勒斯坦被占领土
（7）Syria （7）叙利亚
（8）Lebanon （8）黎巴嫩
Capital Cairo 首都开罗
Total area 总面积 1010407.84sqkm^(2)1010407.84 \mathrm{sq} \mathrm{km}{ }^{2}
Population 2015 estimate 89247000 m ． 2015 年人口估计 89247000 人。
Population 2017 estimate 94,799,000m94,799,000 \mathrm{~m} ． 2017 年人口估计 94,799,000m94,799,000 \mathrm{~m}
CAIRO DESERT CITIES 开罗沙漠城市
CHARLOTTE MALTERRE－BARTHES，DIRECTOR OF STUDIES MAS 2015－16 夏洛特·马尔泰尔-巴尔特，2015-16 学年研究主任
Presented since 1950 as the solution to all urban problems， new cities have flourished in the deserts around Cairo． Colossal amounts of money and resources have been spent in the name of a modern Egypt，all of which have yet to show success．Huge tracts of land have been urbanized to produce housing that stays largely vacant，benefiting only a small portion of the population．This phenomenon is the legacy of a long history of expansionist urban policies in Egypt．New cities of the nineteenth century were driven by hygienist （Helwan，1870s）or elitist motives（Heliopolis，1920s）．The Cairo suburb of Nasr City，envisioned by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954，was intended as an urban settlement for and by the government，and it initiated a movement towards the desert that continues to this day．The creation of new cities was also a pet project of Anwar Sadat，and was consolidated into a surprisingly long－lasting policy pursued throughout the 1980s and 1990s by Hosni Mubarak－as exemplified by New Cairo， his personal project．The New Capital，announced in March 2015 by the current President Abdel Fattah el－Sisi，confirms the persistence of such planning ideas and processes even today． 自 1950 年起被奉为解决所有城市问题的良方，开罗周边沙漠地带的新城如雨后春笋般涌现。以建设现代埃及之名投入的巨额资金与资源，至今仍未显现成效。大片土地被城市化后建成的住宅区长期空置，仅使少数群体受益。这种现象是埃及长期奉行扩张主义城市政策的历史遗产。十九世纪的新城建设或出于卫生考量（如 1870 年代的赫勒万），或服务于精英阶层（如 1920 年代的赫利奥波利斯）。纳赛尔于 1954 年规划的开罗卫星城纳斯尔城，旨在打造由政府主导的行政居住区，由此开启了持续至今的沙漠城市化进程。新城建设也是萨达特钟爱的政绩工程，经穆巴拉克在 1980 至 1990 年代推行后竟演变为一项异常持久的国策——由其亲自督建的新开罗城便是明证。现任总统塞西 2015 年 3 月宣布的新行政首都计划，更印证了这类规划理念与实施流程至今仍在延续
These towns have never proved efficient nor were they ever fully realized－none of the new cities of the past decades have reached their projected populations，for example－but their expansion is unlikely to stop．In fact， domestic demand for housing is growing，as Egyptians wary of the banking system seek secure investments for their savings．Desert land，a seemingly infinite resource owned by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense，is sold—often at bargain prices－to private investors willing to develop gated communities or condominiums．Desert cities also serve as dumping grounds for government－led relocation programs， 这些城镇从未被证明高效，也从未完全实现其规划目标——例如过去几十年的新城市无一达到预期人口规模——但其扩张趋势不太可能停止。事实上，随着对银行系统缺乏信任的埃及民众寻求储蓄的安全投资渠道，国内住房需求正在持续增长。国防部拥有的沙漠土地作为近乎无限的资源，常以低廉价格出售给愿意开发封闭社区或公寓楼的私人投资者。沙漠城市还充当着政府主导搬迁计划的安置地，
Fig．1：Egypt and its neighbouring countries 图 1：埃及及其邻国
with poorer populations housed in new, remote settlements lacking services, transportation, or basic infrastructure. As multiple announcements of new cities in recent years have demonstrated, it appears that the political powers that be are still willing to pursue this form of development, even as official data from the 2017 census reveal that twelve million new housing units stand vacant throughout the country. 贫困人口被安置在缺乏服务、交通和基础配套的偏远新定居点。近年来多次宣布的新城建设计划表明，当权政治力量似乎仍执着于这种发展模式，即便 2017 年人口普查官方数据显示全国有 1200 万套新建住宅空置。
The Master of Advanced Studies in Urban Design (MAS), which focused on the urban development of the Egyptian capital for the 2015-16 year, explored the so-called informal districts of Cairo with the previous publication Housing Cairo: The Informat Response. Nonetheless, it appeared just as important to investigate the phenomenon of desert cities, particularly in relation to the role of planners and architects. The quest for an ordered urban form claiming to offer universal solutions to the perceived chaos of old or industrial cities—an idea partially inspired by modernist, rationalist models from the West-is the driving force behind this phenomenon. New towns gave modernist planners a blank canvas on which to create their vision of an ideal urban society. Architects have had a hand in the materialization of this ideology, which is why the MAS Urban Design explores these cities, their failure and relative success, and the urban conditions that have emerged as a result. Critical of these conditions, and aware of the responsibility held by architects and planners that comes with designing space, this publication offers an analytical and speculative overview of Cairo’s desert cities. 2015-16 年度以埃及首都城市发展为主题的"高级城市设计研究硕士"项目，曾通过《开罗住房：非正规应对》出版物探讨了开罗所谓的非正规住区。然而，研究沙漠城市现象——特别是规划师与建筑师在其中扮演的角色——显得同等重要。这种现象背后的驱动力，是对有序城市形态的追求：这种形态声称能为老旧工业城市的混乱提供普世解决方案，其理念部分源自西方现代主义与理性主义模式。新城为现代主义规划师提供了实现理想城市社会愿景的空白画布。建筑师们参与了这种意识形态的实体化建设，这正是本项目探索这些城市及其成败得失、以及由此产生的城市状况的原因。本出版物批判性地审视这些现状，意识到建筑师与规划师设计空间所肩负的责任，对开罗沙漠城市进行了兼具分析性与前瞻性的概述。
Urban researcher and Egypt expert Eric Denis’s indepth account (“Cairo New Towns: From One Revolution to Another”) of the genesis of desert development, the policies that facilitated its emergence, the administrative mechanism behind it, and how successive political powers have defined and used desert residential areas for different purposes, allows one to understand the intricacy inherent in this spatial 城市研究者兼埃及问题专家埃里克·德尼斯的深度报告《开罗新城：从一场革命到另一场革命》，详尽阐述了沙漠开发的起源、推动其出现的政策、背后的行政机制，以及历代政权如何为不同目的定义和利用沙漠居住区，使人们得以理解这种空间规划中固有的复杂性
expansion. A chronological overview (“Cairo’s Desert Cities: A Chronology”) presents eleven desert cities around Cairo, from Helwan to Madinatty, addressing the New Capital project with a few artefacts. The case studies are introduced systematically, with each city shown using a figure-ground plan, images, and their characteristic architectural typologies. This allows for a comparison of the characteristics of each settlement and provides an understanding of how desert development is physically expressed and architecturally translated. Interviews with young residents of the new cities (“Living in Desert Cities”) offer valuable insights into how some people live in such settlements, while Markus Elkatsha, of the real estate development firm SODIC, provides an assessment of the situation from the industry’s point of view (“Doing Business in the Desert”). A series of essays entitled the “Mechanisms of Desert Cities” attempts to untangle the complexity behind desert development-for instance from a legal perspective (“Legislating the Desert”), or by tracing the origins of such planning (“Desert Urbanization”). 扩张。按时间顺序梳理的《开罗沙漠城市编年史》呈现了从赫勒万到麦迪纳蒂等环绕开罗的十一座沙漠新城，并通过若干实物资料探讨了新行政首都项目。案例研究采用系统化呈现方式，每座城市均配以肌理平面图、实景图像及标志性建筑类型学分析，使读者能横向对比各聚居区特征，并理解沙漠开发在实体形态与建筑语言上的转化过程。来自新兴城市年轻居民的访谈《生活在沙漠城市》为这类聚居区的生活方式提供了珍贵观察，而房地产开发商 SODIC 公司的马库斯·埃尔卡察则从行业视角给出形势评估《沙漠营商指南》。题为《沙漠城市机制》的系列论文试图解析沙漠开发背后的复杂性——例如从法律角度切入的《沙漠立法》，或追溯规划渊源的《沙漠城市化溯源》。
Architects and planners have played a crucial role in designing these areas, producing questionable results. Embracing the responsibility held by the design professions, the MAS program explored design solutions, proposing provocative projects for a paradigmatic case study: the city of Sixth of October. With the intention of launching a critical conversation, the projects ask: If desert development must happen, why does it have to be unsustainable and poorly designed? Under the name “Alternative Urban Futures,” seven projects offer another take on desert development in Sixth of October. This city, in particular, is a case in which modernist urban planning, economic liberalization, and crony capitalism meet and overlap, with an unfortunate result. Tellingly, it is also considered to be one of Egypt’s more successful new towns. Implementing Trojan-horselike strategies that put design at the service of both rich 建筑师与规划师在设计这些区域时扮演了关键角色，却产生了令人质疑的成果。MAS 项目秉持设计行业应承担的责任，探索了针对典型案例——十月六日城的创新设计方案，提出了一系列具有挑战性的规划。这些方案旨在引发批判性讨论：如果沙漠开发势在必行，为何非要选择不可持续且设计拙劣的模式？以"替代性城市未来"为命题的七个项目，为十月六日城的沙漠开发提供了全新视角。这座城市的规划恰是现代主义城市规划、经济自由化与裙带资本主义交织叠加的典型案例，其结果令人扼腕。颇具讽刺意味的是，它仍被视为埃及较成功的新城之一。通过实施"特洛伊木马"式策略，这些设计既服务于权贵阶层，又巧妙植入了可持续理念——在奢华高尔夫球场中嵌入节水系统，在封闭社区内规划公共绿廊，用设计智慧消解着这片沙漠新城与生俱来的矛盾性。
and modest populations (“Symbiosis”), planning the city for pedestrians (“In Praise of Shadows”), or transplanting planning tactics from informal areas (“Graft”), the student projects investigate alternative modes of planning and urbanization, thereby questioning the situation of Sixth of October and of desert cities in general. 以及适度的人口规模（"共生"）、为行人规划城市（"阴翳礼赞"），或是移植非正规住区的规划策略（"嫁接"），这些学生作品探索了另类的规划与城市化模式，由此对十月六日城乃至所有沙漠城市的现状提出了质疑。
Featuring essays by myself and prominent experts David Sims, Marc Angélil, and Cary Siress, Mirette Khorshed (with Lawrence Vale and Khaled Tarabieh), as well as an afterword by Mohamed Elshahed, the final section, “Reflecting on Desert Urbanization in Egypt,” positions urban expansion into the desert within the larger Egyptian context, addressing topics such as political agendas, long-term land-reclamation policies, national scales, and territorial organization. The intention here is twofold: to address the somewhat unattractive topic of new towns and failed planning in terms of the ethical duty of architects and planners, on the one hand, and, on the other, to use insights into the mechanisms behind desert expansion and the resulting spatial conditions to both question the phenomenon and ameliorate its effects with more intelligent and viable urban-design solutions. 本书最后一章"反思埃及的荒漠城市化"收录了笔者与知名专家大卫·西姆斯、马克·安杰利尔、卡里·赛瑞斯，米雷特·科尔谢德（与劳伦斯·韦尔、哈立德·塔拉比合作）的专题论文，以及穆罕默德·埃尔谢赫的后记。该章节将沙漠中的城市扩张置于埃及宏观背景下进行探讨，涉及政治议程、长期土地开垦政策、国家尺度及领土规划等议题。其意图具有双重性：一方面从建筑师与规划师的伦理责任出发，探讨新城镇建设与规划失败这一并不讨喜的话题；另一方面则通过剖析荒漠扩张的内在机制及其衍生的空间形态，既对这一现象提出质疑，又试图以更智慧、更可行的城市设计方案来缓解其负面影响。
The Jargon of Desert-City Development 沙漠城市发展的专业术语
There are a multitude of terms associated with the urbanization of the desert, from simple acronyms designating administrative entities to apparent synonyms used for defining different types of urban settlements. Here is a basic glossary for navigating among actors, entities, projects, political ideologies, and events relevant to the urbanization of the Egyptian desert. 与沙漠城市化相关的术语繁多，既有表示行政实体的简单缩写词，也有用于定义不同类型城市聚落的表面同义词。以下是为理解埃及沙漠城市化进程中的参与者、实体、项目、政治意识形态和事件而整理的基础术语表。
DESERT DEVELOPMENT 沙漠开发
Desert Cities: These cities lie in the desert both east and west of Cairo. Developing the state-owned desert lands around Cairo for urban expansion can be traced back to the 1956 Cairo Master Plan. The idea was further elaborated in the subsequent 1969 Master Plan, and was finally approved in 1974. Desert cities were to be growth poles for development and opportunities for decentralizing state institutions. They were meant to divert population away from Cairo, Alexandria, and the crowded Nile Valley; create new industrial bases; and attract investments. 沙漠城市：这些城市位于开罗东西两侧的沙漠地带。将开罗周边国有沙漠土地开发用于城市扩张的构想，可追溯至 195 年的开罗总体规划。该理念在 1969 年的后续总体规划中得到进一步阐述，并最终于 1974 年获批。沙漠城市旨在成为发展增长极，为国家机构分散化提供契机。其规划目标包括：分流开罗、亚历山大及拥挤的尼罗河谷地区人口；建立新工业基地；吸引投资。
Land Reclamation: Land reclamation refers to the attempt to use the desert to create more inhabitable and cultivable land. This is technically, financially, and organizationally a challenging process, due to lack of water and land fertility. Agriculture projects often include the planning of adjacent new towns. 土地开垦：土地开垦指利用沙漠创造更多宜居可耕地的尝试。由于缺乏水源和土壤肥力，这一过程在技术、资金和组织层面都面临挑战。农业项目通常包含邻近新城镇的规划。
First-Generation New Towns: After 1977, four new towns were built: Tenth of Ramadan, Sadat City, Fifteenth of May, and Sixth of October. After the promulgation of Law 59/1979 and the creation of NUCA, six new towns were announced between 1979 and 1982: el-Amiriya el-Gadida, New Damietta, el-Obour, el-Amal, al-Badr, and Salihiya. Together, they comprise the so-called “First-Generation New Towns,” which were designed to be independent, 第一代新城镇：1977 年后，埃及兴建了四座新城镇：十月六日城、萨达特城、五月十五日城和斋月十日城。随着 1979 年第 59 号法令颁布及新城市社区管理局成立，1979 至 1982 年间又宣布建设六座新城：新阿米里亚、新杜姆亚特、奥布尔城、希望城、巴德尔城和萨利希亚城。这些统称为"第一代新城镇"，其设计理念是打造具有独立性的
self-sustaining cities, each with its own economic base and large population targets (mainly 500,000 inhabitants) 自给自足城市，每座城市都拥有自身的经济基础及宏大的人口目标（主要规划为 50 万居民）
New Towns/New Urban Communities: There are presently eight new towns that are considered part of Greater Cairo: Sixth of October, Fifteenth of May, El-Obour, elShuruq, Sheikh Zayed, New Cairo, Al-Badr, and Tenth of Ramadan. They are part of Egypt’s New Towns Program, which started in 1977 and is being implemented by the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA). 新城镇/新城市社区：目前有八个新城镇被视为大开罗地区的一部分：十月六日城、五月十五日城、奥布尔城、旭日城、谢赫扎耶德城、新开罗城、巴德尔城和斋月十日城。这些城镇属于埃及新城镇计划的一部分，该计划始于 1977 年，由新城市社区管理局（NUCA）负责实施。
New Settlements: In the mid-1980s, nine satellite cities called New Settlements were announced by the state. Each featuring a population target of 250,000 inhabitants, these settlements were conceived as pure dormitory suburbs meant to solve the overpopulation of Cairo. Only five of these settlements were realized, each one kickstarted by the construction of ten thousand public-housing units. In the 1990s, these five settlements became part of two new towns: New Cairo, to the east of the Greater Cairo Region, and Sheikh Zayed, to the west. 新定居点：20 世纪 80 年代中期，政府宣布了九个名为"新定居点"的卫星城。每个定居点规划人口目标为 25 万居民，这些定居点被设计为纯粹的卧城，旨在解决开罗人口过剩问题。最终只有五个定居点得以实现，每个定居点都以建造一万套公共住房单元为启动项目。20 世纪 90 年代，这五个定居点并入两个新城镇：位于大开罗地区东部的新开罗城和西部的谢赫扎耶德城。
Satellite Town: A satellite town is a town built in the vicinity of a large city, and is dependent to a certain extent on the parent city for population and services. A distinction is to be made between a consumer satellite (a dormitory suburb with few facilities) and a production satellite (a settlement with capacity for commercial, industrial, and other productive activities). The latter can function independently of its parent city, and can be considered similar to a new town. 卫星城：卫星城是指在大城市周边建立的城镇，在人口和服务方面一定程度上依赖于母城。需区分消费型卫星城（设施匮乏的"卧城"郊区）与生产型卫星城（具备商业、工业等生产活动能力的聚居区）。后者可独立于母城运作，其性质类似于新城。
Industrial Zone/Area: This refers to a designated zone far from residential areas, in which industrial and warehouse development are concentrated. Large industrial areas were created in the late 1950s; an example of this is the iron and steel complex in Helwan, 工业区：指远离居住区、集中发展工业与仓储业的指定区域。大型工业区始建于 1950 年代末，例如赫勒万的钢铁联合企业，
which reflected the socialist regime’s policy of rapid industrialization. Such areas have also been created in four of the eight new towns; in three of these-Sixth of October, Tenth of Ramadan, and el-Obour-investments in factories and warehouses have been very significant due to government incentives to attract private manufacturing. 这反映了当时社会主义政权快速工业化的政策。八个新城中有四个也规划了此类工业区，其中十月六日城、斋月十日城和奥布尔城三地因政府吸引私营制造业的激励政策，工厂与仓库投资规模尤为显著。
Public Housing/State-Subsidized Housing: This type of housing is fully or partly funded by the state. In Cairo, such developments initially appeared in the 1950s with the passing of Law 206/1951. Typical public housing consists of four- to five-story walkup blocks, usually with two to four units per floor. Housing blocks are arranged in geometric patterns within the site. The smaller units ( 45 to 65 square meters), called “economical” or “affordable” housing, were distributed to “limited-income” families and lower-ranking government employees. However, the 1960s saw the addition of the categories of “middle,” “above-average,” and “luxury” housing, which were intended for government officials and army officers. In all cases, nominal rents were charged. In the new towns, social-housing estates are built by NUCA or other government agencies. Since 2000, private-sector developers have also built some social housing. 公共住房/国家补贴住房：这类住房由国家全额或部分出资建设。在开罗，此类住房开发最初出现于 20 世纪 50 年代，随着 1951 年第 206 号法律的颁布而兴起。典型的公共住房为四至五层无电梯公寓楼，通常每层设有两到四个单元。住宅楼群在规划地块内呈几何图案排列。其中面积较小（45 至 65 平方米）的单元被称为"经济型"或"平价"住房，分配给"低收入"家庭和基层政府雇员。然而到了 1960 年代，新增了面向政府官员和军官的"中等"、"中上等"及"豪华"住房类别。所有类型的公共住房均收取象征性租金。在新城区，社会住宅区由新城市社区管理局（NUCA）或其他政府机构建造。自 2000 年以来，私营开发商也开始参与部分社会住房的建设。
Superblocks: Superblocks are large areas in new towns devoted to plot subdivision for individual residences. They are designed for purely car-oriented suburban living, with individual building over plots that usually range from 500 to 1,200 square meters and include ample land for open areas, parks, and circulation. 超级街区：超级街区是新城镇中专门用于划分独立住宅用地的大片区域。其设计完全以汽车出行为导向，采用郊区化生活方式，每块独立建筑用地面积通常在 500 至 1200 平方米之间，并配有充足的开放空间、公园和交通用地。
Gated Community: This is a form of residential community or housing estate containing strictly controlled entrances for pedestrians, bicycles, and automobiles, and often characterized by a closed perimeter of walls and fences. The gated community-with strong reference to the American suburban lifestyle-is a popular development model in the latest desert cities targeting upper classes with the provision of exclusive services 封闭式社区：这是一种设有严格管控的人行、自行车及机动车出入口的住宅社区形式，通常以围墙和栅栏形成封闭边界。这种借鉴美国郊区生活模式的封闭社区，在最新开发的沙漠新城中成为面向精英阶层的热门开发模式，通过提供专属服务设施（如高尔夫球场、国际学校）来吸引高端人群。
(e.g. golf courses, international schools). Export-Processing Zone: According to the International Labor Organization of the United Nations, this is an industrial zone with special incentives that is set up to attract foreign investors. In these zones, imported materials undergo some degree of processing before being exported again. 出口加工区：根据联合国国际劳工组织的定义，这是为吸引外国投资者而设立、享有特殊优惠政策的工业区。在此类区域中，进口原材料经过一定程度的加工后将被再次出口。
Free Economic Zone: This is a special designated area in which taxation is lighter or nonexistent for companies so as to encourage economic growth. Such areas can be located in Ismailia, Port Said, Alexandria, and Nasr City, among other Egyptian cities. 自由贸易区：这是特别划定的区域，区内企业可享受减税或免税政策以促进经济发展。此类区域可分布于埃及的伊斯梅利亚、塞得港、亚历山大及纳斯尔城等城市。
Informal Settlements/Housing (ashwa’iyyat): These are areas developed in absence of government planning processes, mostly on former agrarian land, emerging in desert areas too. Approximately sixty percent of the twenty million inhabitants of Cairo are living in these concrete and brick-infill constructions of up to fifteen stories at the edges of the capital. 非正规住区（ashwa'iyyat）：指未经政府规划程序开发的区域，多由农业用地转化而来，在沙漠地带亦有出现。开罗两千万居民中约 60%居住在这些由混凝土和砖块搭建、高达 15 层的建筑中，它们密集分布在首都边缘地带。
TERRITORIAL AND 领土与
ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITIES 行政实体
Greater Cairo Region: Greater Cairo is the region comprising the city of Cairo (the historic center) and the surrounding urban areas, including the new towns. The General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) defines the Greater Cairo Region as the area encompassing the contiguous urbanized area of the three governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Qalyubiya (mainly the cities of Cairo, Giza, and Shubra el-Khayma) and the eight new towns that surround it. 大开罗地区：大开罗地区由开罗市（历史中心）及周边城区组成，包括新兴城镇。埃及国土规划总局将其定义为涵盖开罗省、吉萨省和盖勒尤比耶省（主要包括开罗市、吉萨市和舒卜拉海迈市）三地连绵城区的区域，以及环绕其周边的八座新兴城镇。
Governorate: A governorate is an administrative division of a country. Egypt is divided into twenty-seven governorates. The governorates that comprise just one city are divided into districts, or kisms (urban neighborhoods)-Cairo Governorate, for example, consists of forty-one districts. 省级行政区：省级行政区是国家的一级行政划分。埃及全国共设二十七个省级行政区。单一城市构成的省级行政区会进一步划分为区级行政单位（即城市社区）——例如开罗省就包含四十一个行政区。
New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA): This authority was established by 新城市社区管理局：该机构根据
the New Communities Law (Law 59/1979) and is affiliated with the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development. It is responsible for declaring special development zones on state-owned desert lands. It has the right to develop and sell lands within these special zones and retain these revenues to finance further development. 《新社区法》（1979 年第 59 号法律）成立，隶属于住房、公共设施与城市发展部。其职责是在国有荒漠土地上划定特殊开发区，有权对这些特殊区域进行开发与土地出让，并将收益用于后续发展资金。
General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP): Established in 1973, GOPP is the public authority supervising all planning processes and projects at national level. It produces planning guidelines, development programs and monitors implementation of projects. It is under the authority of the Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development (SCPUD) chaired by the Prime Minister. 国家物理规划总局（GOPP）：成立于 1973 年，是国家层面监督所有规划流程和项目的公共管理机构。负责制定规划指南、开发计划并监督项目实施。该机构隶属于由总理担任主席的最高规划与城市发展委员会（SCPUD）。
Arab Contractors: Arab Contractors are an Egyptian construction and contracting company. Osman Ahmed Osman, an Egyptian entrepreneur who also served as Egypt’s housing minister under Anwar Sadat’s presidency established it in 1955. Close to the regime, the firm is an important actor of desert development. 阿拉伯承包商公司：这是一家埃及建筑与工程承包企业。由埃及企业家奥斯曼·艾哈迈德·奥斯曼于 1955 年创立，其本人曾在安瓦尔·萨达特总统任期内担任埃及住房部长。作为与政权关系密切的企业，该公司是沙漠开发的重要参与者。
Urabi Land Reclamation Cooperative: The Urabi (Orabi) Land Reclamation Cooperative was established in 1978 by high-ranking army officers in order to seize control of developable desert land around Cairo. 乌拉比土地开垦合作社：该合作社由高级军官于 1978 年成立，旨在控制开罗周边可开发的沙漠土地。
EVENTS AND POLICIES 重大事件与政策
Agrarian/Land Reform: Agrarian reform refers to an effort to change land-ownership practices in Egypt following the 1952 Revolution. It began with Law 178/1952, which limited individual ownership to 200 feddans, fixed rents, set tenancy duration at a minimum of three years, and established a minimum wage. Laws that followed in 1961 and 1969 further reduced the maximum land that one could own to fifty feddans. 土地改革：土地改革指 1952 年埃及革命后推行的土地所有权制度改革。1952 年颁布的第 178 号法令拉开了改革序幕，规定个人持有土地上限为 200 费丹（约 840 公顷），固定地租标准，确立至少三年的租佃期限，并制定最低工资标准。1961 年和 1969 年相继出台的法令进一步将个人土地持有上限降至 50 费丹。
The beneficiaries of this reform were to be tenants, estate workers, and the poorest villagers. Land-reform laws in Egypt, though, never had a land consolidation component. 此次改革的主要受益群体是佃农、庄园工人和最贫困的村民。但埃及的土地改革法案始终未包含土地整合的相关内容。
Egyptian Revolution of 1952: This was the political revolution that was instigated starting on July 23, 1952, by the Free Officers Movement, a group of army officers led by Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Its initial aim was to overthrow King Farouk, the reigning monarch of Egypt; however, the movement went on to abolish the constitutional monarchy altogether and establish a republic influenced by socialism and Arab nationalism. 1952 年埃及革命：这场政治革命由自由军官组织于 1952 年 7 月 23 日发起，该组织是以穆罕默德·纳吉布和加麦尔·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔为首的军官团体。革命最初旨在推翻埃及在位君主法鲁克国王，但随后发展为彻底废除君主立宪制，建立受社会主义和阿拉伯民族主义影响的共和政体。
De-Nasserization: Encouraged by the successor of Gabel Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, this process can be described as the dismantling of the Nasserist model in Egypt, which was characterized by a state-dominated economy. The Open-Door Policy (Infitah) came to be identified in the public mind with de-Nasserization. 去纳赛尔化：这一进程由贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔的继任者安瓦尔·萨达特推动，可描述为埃及纳赛尔主义模式的解体，其特点是国家主导经济。开放政策（Infitah）在公众认知中逐渐与去纳赛尔化画上等号。
Six-Day War: The Six-Day War was fought between Israel and the countries of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria from June 5 to 11, 1967. It resulted in a win for Israel, which obtained the territories of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. 六日战争：1967 年 6 月 5 日至 11 日，以色列与埃及、约旦和叙利亚三国爆发六日战争。以色列获胜后获得了西奈半岛、约旦河西岸和戈兰高地的领土控制权。
Yom Kippur War: The Yom Kippur War was fought between the coalition of Arab States, under the leadership of Egypt and Syria, and Israel from October 6 to 25, 1973. It resulted in a win for Egypt, which took back the territories lost in the Six-Day War. 赎罪日战争：1973 年 10 月 6 日至 25 日，以埃及和叙利亚为首的阿拉伯国家联盟与以色列展开赎罪日战争。埃及取得胜利，收复了在六日战争中失去的领土。
October Working Paper (Waraqat Uktubur): This document was presented by President Anwar Sadat in 1973. It described his vision of Egypt’s future and laid down a growth and redevelopment strategy for the country. 十月工作文件（Waraqat Uktubur）：该文件由总统安瓦尔·萨达特于 1973 年提交，阐述了他对埃及未来的愿景，并制定了国家经济增长与重建战略。
Open-Door Policy (Infitah): This economic policy was the most important part of the October Working Paper. It signified a departure from the socialist era of Gabel Nasser, paving the way for Egypt’s neoliberal present. The policy aimed to attract foreign investment in Egypt, encourage greater participation of the private sector in the economy, and to give more freedom to individuals to generate personal wealth. 门户开放政策（经济开放政策）：这是《十月工作文件》中最重要的经济政策，标志着埃及告别纳赛尔时代的社会主义路线，为当前的新自由主义经济模式铺平道路。该政策旨在吸引外资进入埃及，鼓励私营部门扩大经济参与度，并赋予个人创造财富的更大自由空间。
Camp David Accords: The Camp David Accords refer to the signing of two frameworks by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin in 1978, which directly led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. 戴维营协议：指 1978 年埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特与以色列总理梅纳赫姆·贝京签署的两项框架协议，该协议直接促成了《埃以和平条约》的签订。
Privatization Policy: One of the main pillars of the Economic Reform and Structural Transformation Program (ERSAP), the policy of privatization was launched in 1991 under the Mubarak regime to address dire economic conditions. As a result of this program, 382 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were fully or partially privatized. 私有化政策：作为《经济改革与结构调整计划》(ERSAP)的核心支柱之一，这项政策于 1991 年穆巴拉克执政时期启动，旨在应对严峻的经济形势。在该计划实施过程中，共有 382 家国有企业实现了全部或部分私有化改制。
Egyptian Revolution of 2011: This refers to the political and social revolution that took place between January 25 and February 11, 2011. Through demonstrations, occupations, and strikes, people from across the social and economic spectrum in Egypt demanded the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. 2011 年埃及革命：指 2011 年 1 月 25 日至 2 月 11 日期间发生的政治社会变革。埃及各阶层民众通过示威游行、占领公共场所以及罢工等形式，要求推翻胡斯尼·穆巴拉克总统政权。
Cairo 2050: Cairo 2050 is a vision for the Greater Cairo Region that was developed primarily by the GOPP and announced in 2008. Based on the slogan “Global… 开罗 2050 规划：开罗 2050 是由埃及城市规划组织（GOPP）主导制定的大开罗地区发展愿景，于 2008 年正式发布。该规划以"全球化...
Green… Connected,” it proposes creating green public spaces, improving road and transportation networks, and redistributing the population in order to lower density in overcrowded areas. Cairo 2050 also attempts to set a limit to the growth of the Greater Cairo Region by imposing a population cap of twenty-four million people. ...绿色化·互联化"为核心理念，提出通过打造绿色公共空间、完善道路交通网络、重新布局人口分布来降低过度拥挤区域的人口密度。开罗 2050 还试图通过设定两千四百万人口上限，限制大开罗地区的扩张规模。
DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TOWNS IN EGYPT 埃及新城镇人口发展演变
Region 地区
1996
2006
Variation 19962006 19962006 变体
Target Population in Year 25 25 年目标人口
Burg al-Arab al-Gadid 新阿拉伯堡
Alexandria 亚历山大
7,051
41,351
34,300
400,000
Damiette al-Gadid 新达米埃塔
Delta coast 三角洲海岸
6,520
25,944
19,424
500,000
Salihiyya al-Gadid 新萨利希亚
Delta 三角洲
8,140
18,968
10,828.
100,000
Madina al-Sadat 萨达特城
Delta 三角洲
95,191
142,032
46,841
500,000
Bani Suef al-Gadid 贝尼苏韦夫新城
Upper Egypt 上埃及
208
17,638
17,430
200,000
Fayoum al-Gadid 法尤姆新城
Upper Egypt 上埃及
0
0
0
200,000
Minya al-Gadid 明亚新城
Upper Egypt 上埃及
68
4,570
4,502
120,000
Asyout al-Gadid 艾斯尤特新城
Upper Egypt 上埃及
0
1,761
1,761
200,000
Akhmîm al-Gadid 新艾赫米姆
Upper Egypt 上埃及
0
0
0
100,000
Assouan al-Gadid 新阿斯旺
Upper Egypt 上埃及
0
0
0
200,000
Tushka al-Gadid 新图什卡
Upper Egypt 上埃及
0
2,655
2,655
500,000
al-Qahira al-Gadida New Cairo 新开罗
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
34,703
118,678
83,975
800,000
6th of October 十月六日城
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
35,354
157,135
121,781
500,000
Sheikh Zayed 谢赫·扎耶德
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
0
29,553
29,553
300,000
10th of Ramadan 10 月斋城
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
47,833
124,120
76,287
500,000
Al-Badr 巴德尔城
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
258
17,172
16,914
250,000
15th of May 5 月 15 日城
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
65,560
90,324
24,764
100,000
Shorouk 曙光城
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
0
20,983
20,983
250,000
El-Obour 奥布尔新城
Greater Cairo 大开罗地区
997
43,802
42,805
250,000
New Towns Total in Egypt 埃及新城总数
301,883
835,703
533,820
5,720,000
Greater Cairo New Towns 大开罗新城
184,705
601,767
417,062
2,950,000
Share of GCR New Towns in New Towns Total 大开罗新城占全国新城比例
61.2%
68.4%
72.7%
51,6%
Greater Cairo (3 Regions Total) 大开罗地区（共 3 个区域）
14,887,332
17,608,574
2,721 242
Metropolitan Agglomerate 大都会集聚区
11,632,794
12,969,602
1,336,808
Share of GCR New Towns in 3 Regions Total 三大区域新城镇占大开罗地区比重
From Emptiness to Emerging Urbanity Passing By 从荒芜到途经新兴城市
Exclusionary Urbanism 排他性城市化
ERIC DENIS 埃里克·德尼
It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges subsist here and there, in the deserts which are no longer those of the Empire, but our own. The desert of the real itself. 在这片荒漠中存续的并非地图上的标记，而是真实的遗迹——这里不再是帝国的疆域，而是属于我们自己的荒漠。真实本身的荒漠。
" - Jean Baudrillard, "1981^(1)\text { - Jean Baudrillard, } 1981^{1}
THE TWO-STAGE
"CONCRETE-IZATION" OF THE DESERT:
FROM A PUBLIC APPROACH TO A NEOLIBERAL ONE 沙漠"混凝土化"的双重进程：从公共导向到新自由主义模式
Amr is back home: Sixth of October City, Hay al-Muntaz, stairwell C, third floor, left door. The Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development’s bus has taken no more than an hour to reach his residential district, even though it is located 35 kilometers from the planning office from where he has been monitoring the Greater Cairo master plan for the last twenty years. 阿姆尔回到了家：十月六日城，蒙塔兹区，C 单元楼梯间，三楼左侧门。尽管距离他二十年来监控大开罗总体规划的规划办公室足有 35 公里，住房、公共设施与城市发展部的通勤巴士不到一小时就抵达了他居住的社区。
By moving to this residential district on the edge of the western desert, he has, paradoxically, become far less marginal than when he lived in the crowded middleclass apartment blocks of Giza, although the latter are much closer to the center. Once it had reached the car bridges and crossed the ring road without any major delay, his bus raced westwards above the intricate universe of illegal constructions (ashwa’iyyat) that overlay the rare surviving irrigated cultivation activities in Greater Cairo. This is one of the Housing Ministry’s nightmares: four million people live there today, where only a little more than 700,000 lived in 1970, when the ministry launched the master plan that was supposed, with its four new satellite cities, to put an end to the encroachment of agricultural land. The bus then finally reached its destination, 搬进西部沙漠边缘的这个住宅区后，他反而比住在吉萨拥挤的中产阶级公寓楼时更不边缘化——尽管后者离市中心近得多。巴士驶过立交桥，毫无阻滞地穿过环城公路，随即在错综复杂的违章建筑群（阿什瓦伊亚特）上方向西疾驰，这些建筑覆盖了大开罗地区仅存的零星灌溉农田。这里是住房部的噩梦之一：1970 年该部启动总体规划时，此地仅有 70 余万居民，如今却生活着 400 万人。当初规划的四座卫星城本应遏止农田侵占现象。巴士最终抵达了目的地，
the desert plateau of Giza, northwest of the three pyramids. 吉萨沙漠高原，三座金字塔的西北方向。
Things change rapidly. His best friend from school, Ahmed, who chose to stay downtown, commutes every day to the IBM Technology Development Center in the Smart Village, where he works on a prepaid smart electricity meter project for all of Cairo. The meters will merge with a complete, real-time geo-database, gathering information on residents. 世事瞬息万变。他学生时代最好的朋友艾哈迈德选择留在市中心，每天通勤前往智能村的 IBM 技术开发中心工作，负责整个开罗的预付费智能电表项目。这些电表将与一个完整的实时地理数据库整合，收集居民信息。
The current military regime touts the promises of rationalized urban flows and the performance surveillance attendant to smart urbanism. It prolongs, in the virtual world, the current president’s pharaonic ambition to create a new capital between Cairo and the Red Sea. 当前军政府大肆宣扬智能城市主义带来的合理化城市流动与绩效监控承诺。在虚拟世界中，延续着现任总统在开罗与红海之间建造新都城的法老式野心。
Heavy traffic jams are recurrent in the city nowadays, but in the reverse direction, as workers and engineers commute to industrial and IT parks on the desert fringes. Retail employees, too, are traveling to jobs in the malls that have more recently completed the landscape of the new towns in the desert. The Mall of Arabia, Arkan, Tagamu el Khames, or Designopolis have become central places where all of Cairo can come together to share, under freshly conditioned air, the infinite consumerist possibilities of an imagined Dubai way of life. The two worlds, the desert city and downtown with its ministries and offices, are increasingly interconnected environments of living, work, and leisure. Their networks pass over and neglect the working-class areas in the Nile Valley that are also burgeoning like never before since the mass uprising of January 2011. Increasingly, land conversions and construction in the fertile valley are also taking the form of speculative-housing. ^(2){ }^{2} 如今，城市里经常出现严重的交通堵塞，但方向却与以往相反——工人和工程师们正通勤前往沙漠边缘的工业园区和 IT 产业园。零售业员工也纷纷前往新近落成的购物中心工作，这些商场已成为沙漠新城的标志性景观。阿拉伯购物中心、阿尔坎商城、第五社区购物城以及设计之都购物中心，已然成为开罗全民聚集的核心场所。在恒温空调营造的舒适环境中，人们共享着仿效迪拜生活方式的无限消费可能。沙漠新城与遍布政府部门的市中心老城，这两个世界正日益交织成生活、工作与休闲的复合空间。它们的交通网络跨越并忽视了尼罗河谷的工薪阶层社区——自 2011 年 1 月大规模起义以来，这些区域也正以前所未有的速度扩张。在这片肥沃的河谷地带，越来越多的土地变更与建设项目也呈现出投机性住房开发的态势。 ^(2){ }^{2}
A decade ago, Amr could not have imagined moving so quickly into such a comfortable flat. He was among the first to purchase, based on plans from the Engineers Syndicate, which had been developing the building. This was thanks to his connections among the Muslim Brotherhood, which was controlling the syndicate until the crack down on the organization in the fall of 2013-after the coup against then-president Mohamed Morsi. The real estate boom of the 1990s and the early twenty-first century changed everything. He and his colleagues at the Greater Cairo Physical Planning Office did not see it coming at all. In less than fifteen years, the urbanized area of Cairo has almost tripled in size, and roadway infrastructure, as well as the supply of transport-privately run, rather than public-has finally caught up, keeping pace with the projects of developers. 十年前，阿姆尔根本不敢想象能如此迅速地搬进这般舒适的公寓。作为最早一批购房者之一，他依据工程师协会提供的建筑规划图购置了这套房产——该协会当时正负责开发这栋楼。这得益于他在穆斯林兄弟会中的人脉关系，该组织在 2013 年秋天针对时任总统穆罕默德·穆尔西的政变后遭到镇压前，一直掌控着这个协会。1990 年代至 21 世纪初的房地产热潮改变了一切。他和他在大开罗城市规划办公室的同事们完全没预料到这种剧变。不到十五年间，开罗城市化区域面积几乎增长了两倍，道路基础设施与交通供给——以私营为主而非公营——终于追上了开发商项目的步伐。
Amr’s residential district, built in 1991, had stood empty for almost a decade, an improbable juxtaposition of concrete and brick skeletons plunked down willy-nilly in the middle of the desert. For the next ten years, it remained just barely accessible and livable. It was only after 2010 that neighborhood shops started expanding their offerings and supermarkets like Carrefour opened. 阿姆鲁住宅区建于 1991 年，却在沙漠中空置了近十年——那些混凝土与砖块构筑的骨架杂乱无章地矗立在荒漠里，形成超现实的荒诞景观。此后十年间，这里始终处于勉强可居住的状态。直到 2010 年后，社区商铺才开始扩充商品种类，家乐福等大型超市相继入驻。
In the meantime, the modernist, working-class cores of these new towns, which were built by the state, gained more than 1,000 square kilometers of recreational and exclusive residential projects—gated communities, golf courses, and amusement parks, not to mention universities and private hospitals-during the 1990s. Residential complexes with evocative names such as Utopia, Gardenia, New Garden City, Qatamiya Heights, and Dreamland emerged by the dozens. As of 2016, new High-Class projects are still popping up and consuming space like never before: Park Corner, Oriana Villas, and Mivida in New Cairo, or El Patio Zahraa in Sheikh Zayed are just a few of them. 与此同时，这些由国家建造的新城镇中，现代主义风格的工薪阶层核心区在 1990 年代新增了超过 1000 平方公里的休闲娱乐及高端住宅项目：封闭式社区、高尔夫球场、游乐园，更不用说大学和私立医院了。名为"乌托邦"、"栀子花园"、"新花园城"、"卡塔米亚高地"、"梦幻乐园"等充满诗意的住宅区如雨后春笋般涌现。截至 2016 年，高端项目仍在以前所未有的速度吞噬土地：新开罗的"公园角"、"奥莉安娜别墅"、"米维达"，以及谢赫扎耶德的"埃尔帕蒂奥扎赫拉"都是典型代表。
In less than a decade, a new urban world has emerged at Cairo’s gates: 1,000 square kilometers outfitted with sewers and 不到十年光景，开罗城郊已崛起一个全新的都市世界：1000 平方公里的土地铺设了下水道系统
utilities, an immense, sparsely inhabited, recovered surface of sand and rocks partially divided into plots. This is equal to twice the size of the contemporary Cairo urban agglomeration, which took a millennium to grow and had a population of some thirteen million inhabitants in 2006-twenty times more than the 600,000 urbanites who cope with uncertainty and deficiencies of all manners in this uncompleted milieu of public housings and gated communities. ^(3){ }^{3} 基础设施，一片广袤、人烟稀少、经过整治的沙石地表，部分区域被划分成地块。其面积相当于当代开罗城市群的两倍——后者历经千年发展，在 2006 年拥有约 1300 万居民，是这片未完工的公共住宅与封闭社区中忍受各种不确定性与设施短缺的 60 万城市人口的二十倍。 ^(3){ }^{3}
Amr works in an office on the roof of the ministry, in an extra story added on top of the fifteenth floor. The walls are made of planks and the roof of corrugated steel-not very legal. He registers the plots of land sold by the state that are open to property development, and records them on a map. Ever since the appointment of minister Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman in 1993, Amr has been constantly covering his map with new areas devoted to grandiose projects that were never part of any previous planning rule. The desert fringes have become the new horizon for Cairo and for Egypt, the place to be: these days, one has to be in Palm Hills or Beverly Hills, just as in the early twentieth century one bove to Baron Empain, absolutely had to move to Baron Empain s oasis at Heliopolis, and in the 1880s, to the banks of the Nile, which were done up in the Haussmannian style. ^(4){ }^{4} These days, one has to be in Palm Hills or Beverly Hills. So many sites have been sold, most often by mutual agreement, without any public tender, that no one can figure out where the second beltway should now go. The housing ministry no longer makes plans; it just keeps records. 阿姆尔在政府大楼屋顶的办公室里工作，那是十五层之上加盖的一层。墙壁由木板搭建，屋顶是波纹钢板——并不完全合法。他负责登记政府出售用于房地产开发的地块，并将它们标注在地图上。自 1993 年穆罕默德·易卜拉欣·苏莱曼部长上任以来，阿姆尔的地图上不断新增着宏伟项目的区域，这些项目从未出现在任何先前的规划条例中。沙漠边缘已成为开罗乃至埃及的新疆界，是当下必争之地：如今人们必须入住棕榈山或比佛利山庄，就像二十世纪初人们必须搬进赫利奥波利斯的巴伦·埃姆潘绿洲，或是 1880 年代必须迁居经过奥斯曼风格改造的尼罗河畔。如今人们必须入住棕榈山或比佛利山庄。如此多的地块通过协议出让，往往未经公开招标，以至于没人能确定第二条环城公路现在该修在哪里。住房部不再制定规划，只做记录。
So many sites have been sold, most often by mutual agreement and without any public tender, that no one can figure out where the second ring road should now go. The housing ministry no longer makes plans; it just keeps records. 如此多的地块已通过私下协议售出且未经公开招标，以至于如今无人能确定第二环线究竟该往何处延伸。住房部不再制定规划，仅剩档案记录职能。
And yet the idea of crossing the desert plateaus was considered inconceivable by Amr’s father, who as a young engineer participated in the formulation of the first Greater Cairo Master Plan in 1956, right 然而穿越沙漠高原的构想曾被阿姆尔的父亲视为天方夜谭——这位年轻工程师曾参与制定 1956 年首版大开罗总体规划
after independence: “It has to limit the urban development on the west side for preserving the agricultural land whenever possible as green belt and protecting it against any further encroaching of the city…The eastern limit was determined by the Moqattam hills and the contour lines which make any development highly expensive.” ^(5){ }^{5} While the change in direction towards favoring new towns in the 1970 master plan-later reaffirmed in the 1982 plan-opened the door for today’s boom, development remained under the guidance of a progressive planning vision controlled exclusively by the state: “Massive opening of desert land to urbanization especially toward the east which is easiest to develop with the creation of new settlements along the ring road and around the satellite cities.” ^(6){ }^{6} 独立后："必须限制城市向西侧扩张，尽可能保留农业用地作为绿化带，防止城市进一步蚕食……东部边界由莫卡塔姆山和等高线决定，这些地形使得任何开发都成本高昂。" ^(5){ }^{5} 虽然 1970 年总体规划（后在 1982 年规划中重申）转向支持新城建设，为今日的繁荣打开了大门，但发展始终遵循着由国家主导的渐进式规划愿景："大规模开放东部沙漠地带用于城市化最为便利，通过沿环城路建设新居住区，围绕卫星城进行开发。" ^(6){ }^{6}
This was a continuation of the hygienist and reformist discourses of the early twentieth century in Egypt, which promoted model villages and the conquest of new lands-in order to expand agricultural land, of course, but also to bring about the advent of a modern peasantry and, with the new towns, to turn peasants into city-dwellers. ^(7){ }^{7} 这延续了二十世纪早期埃及的卫生改革话语，当时提倡建设模范村庄和开垦新土地——当然是为了扩大农业用地，但同时也为了培育现代农民阶层，并通过新城建设将农民转变为城市居民。 ^(7){ }^{7}
Starting in the early 1990s, land on the desert fringes, which is the property of the state, began to be sold without restraint or any overall plan to private developers. This transfer continues to this day, involving increasingly gigantic private projects. 自 20 世纪 90 年代初起，国家所有的沙漠边缘地带土地开始被毫无节制且缺乏整体规划地出售给私人开发商。这种土地转让行为持续至今，涉及的私人开发项目规模日益庞大。
This political about-face is grounded in the practical implementation, in 1991, of the Egyptian government’s adoption of liberal dogma, something to which it had hitherto merely paid lip service since the Camp David Accords (1978) that ended the conflict with Israel. At the Ministry of Housing and New Communities, as the housing ministry was known at the time, this manifested itself in the end of the era of the omnipotent minister Hassaballah el-Kafrawi in 1993. This champion of standardized, mass-produced public housing built on the desert fringes had been in command of the housing ministry since 1978. In el-Kafrawi’s view, 这一政策转向源于 1991 年埃及政府实际推行自由主义信条——自 1978 年《戴维营协议》结束与以色列冲突以来，该国此前仅对此作表面文章。在当时的住房与新建社区部（住房部前身），这一转变体现为 1993 年全能部长哈萨巴拉·卡夫拉维时代的终结。这位主张在沙漠边缘建设标准化、批量生产公共住房的旗手，自 1978 年起便执掌住房部。在卡夫拉维看来，
what mattered was to establish a planned alternative to counter the expansion of illegal working-class housing into the fertile land of the Nile Valley, while also creating a new urban society. With the end of his term, a halt was called to the mass production of blockat: the “Kafrawi no. 4 and 5” or “Chinese”-type buildings that dominated the landscape, urban-design compositions plunked down in the middle of the desert. ^(8){ }^{8} 关键在于建立一个有规划的替代方案，以遏制非法工人住宅向尼罗河谷肥沃土地的蔓延，同时打造一个新型城市社会。随着他任期的结束，大规模生产"布洛卡特"（即那些主宰着城市景观的"卡夫拉维 4 号和 5 号"或"中式"建筑）的浪潮被叫停——这些突兀矗立在沙漠中的城市设计作品就此画上句点。 ^(8){ }^{8}
In 1991, immediately after the First Gulf War, Egypt signed a program of reform and economic liberalization with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The agreement aimed at reducing public spending, facilitating privatization, and opening up to foreign direct investment. It was accompanied by the partial reduction of foreign debt in return for the deployment of Egyptian troops in Kuwait alongside the international coalition that had repelled the Iraqi army. 1991 年第一次海湾战争刚结束，埃及就与国际货币基金组织和世界银行签署了改革与经济自由化计划。该协议旨在削减公共支出、推动私有化进程并开放外国直接投资。作为埃及军队在科威特与国际联盟共同抵御伊拉克军队的回报，埃及部分外债得到了减免。
After this agreement, the state could no longer give priority to public housing programs. In any event, the initial program of new towns intended for the working class had entirely failed to achieve its aims. The new towns remained ghost towns, full of pitiful and soulless concrete structures. Instead of the one to two million inhabitants they could and should have housed, given the completed housing on offer, a mere 30,000 unfortunates were spending a difficult exile in them. Even when inhabited, the buildings were becoming dilapidated at an incredible rate: bearing structures and foundations would crumble after the smallest leak, and many even had to be demolished less than ten years after they were built. Reform thus provided an opportunity to put an end to a plan that had been sustained merely to support construction suppliers and reach the plan’s quotas, with surreal landscapes as a result. 协议签订后，政府再也无法将公共住房计划置于优先地位。事实上，最初为工人阶级设计的新城镇计划已彻底偏离目标。这些新城沦为鬼城，遍布着可悲而毫无生气的混凝土建筑。根据已建成的住房规模，这些城镇本可容纳一两百万居民，但实际仅有 3 万不幸者在此艰难度日，如同遭受流放。即便有人居住，建筑也以惊人速度破败：承重结构与地基在轻微渗漏后就会崩塌，许多建筑甚至在落成不到十年就被迫拆除。这场改革终于叫停了这个仅为了维持建材供应商利益、完成指标配额而存在的计划，终结了那些超现实主义的荒诞景观。
The sale of land resources was also part of a privatization program meant to refill the government’s coffers. The transfer of real estate development in the desert to the private sector signified the disengagement of the state from housing production altogether. 土地资源出售同样是充实国库的私有化计划组成部分。将沙漠房地产开发权移交私营部门，意味着政府全面退出住房生产领域。
The real-estate boom was now underway, and has maintained, ever since, a dynamic of producing new, exclusive, and restricted residential neighborhoods-private cities, even. Better still, the ministry has allocated lots in the desert to major building contractors in exchange for public infrastructure projects such as bridges, irrigation canals, and so on. 房地产热潮已然兴起，并自此持续保持着开发新型高端封闭式住宅区的势头——甚至可称之为私人城市。更妙的是，建设部门将沙漠地块划拨给大型建筑承包商，以换取桥梁、灌溉渠等公共基础设施项目。
In the mid-1990s, the cabinet did attempt to impose a moratorium so that a universal plan and regulatory instruments could be drawn up to ensure the transparency needed for transactions, but the housing ministry paid little heed. Updates to the master plan consistently endorsed the sale of building lots. New Cairo was developed on an area almost equal in the size to the existing city; on pre-1990 maps, this area had been designated as a zone to be greened and where building would be prohibited. 1990 年代中期，内阁确实试图实施暂停令，以便制定总体规划及监管工具来确保交易透明度，但住房建设部置若罔闻。总规划的历次修订始终支持地块出售。新开罗的开发面积几乎与旧城相当；而在 1990 年前的地图上，该区域曾被划定为绿化禁建区。
The dynamic was maintained by a rise in revenues, an opening to foreign capital (from the Gulf in particular), the performance of the real estate market, and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, which guaranteed ever-greater liquidity to holders of currency. These events afforded currency-holders profit margins far superior to inflation, which fueled a rise in real estate prices. Investment in land and real estate-in an apartment (sha’qa) or villa-is something all sections of Egyptian society aspire to, in order to deal with the uncertainties, devaluations, and deficiencies of the banking system. It is the only investment (along with gold) that makes it possible to stockpile acquired wealth and reduce the risks associated with the volatility and lack of transparency of the markets, as well as with devaluations. The standard housing produced by the state and the corporate syndicates in the new towns was turned over entirely to this speculative market, which explains why they never reached their working-class target. 这种动态得以维持，主要得益于收入增长、外资开放（特别是海湾地区资金涌入）、房地产市场的强劲表现以及埃及镑贬值——这些因素共同确保了货币持有者能获得越来越充裕的流动性。这些变化使货币持有者获得的利润空间远超通胀水平，进而推高了房地产价格。面对银行体系的不确定性、货币贬值和功能缺陷，埃及社会各阶层都渴望通过投资土地和房产（无论是公寓还是别墅）来实现资产保值。这是唯一（与黄金并列）能让人们囤积已得财富、降低市场波动性和不透明性以及货币贬值风险的投资方式。而政府和企业联合体在新城镇建造的标准住宅，完全被卷入了这场投机市场，这也解释了为何这些住房始终未能惠及原定的工薪阶层目标群体。
Finally, one must not forget that Egypt is still undergoing significant demographic growth. ^(9){ }^{9} This means that demand, even 最后必须指出，埃及目前仍处于显著的人口增长阶段。 ^(9){ }^{9} 这意味着即便在
if it is only partly solvent, does exist. Investment in construction and especially in land therefore entails minimum guarantees: prices will adjust to demand, but the money will not vanish like in a stock market crash. And even if the value of land were to collapse, it would still maintain a certain utility value. 如果只是部分有偿付能力，这种情况确实存在。因此，对建筑尤其是土地的投资具有最低保障：价格会根据需求调整，但资金不会像股市崩盘那样蒸发殆尽。即便土地价值暴跌，它仍会保留一定的使用价值。
This unprecedented reversal, in which the desert became the focus of all investments and all efforts toward social progress, was not simply the product of government reform in favor of the private sector. Rather, it was above all the result of the private sector gaining access to government, under the guise of an opening up to civil society. In the 1990s, having taken over the machinery of the National Democratic Party, entrepreneurs entered parliament and subsequently became part of the government. 这种沙漠成为所有投资和社会进步努力焦点的史无前例逆转，并非单纯是政府偏向私营部门改革的结果。更准确地说，这主要是私营部门以向公民社会开放为名，实际获得政府准入的产物。1990 年代，在接管国家民主党机器后，企业家们进入议会并随后成为政府组成部分。
Court cases against the collusion between land developers and the state elite had preceded the January 2011 uprising. Take the Talaat Moustafa Group and its Madinaty megaproject, for example, which was on the brink of cancellation after the group bought thirty-three million square meters of land for almost nothing in a direct sale from a government agency. Famous slogans during the uprising addressed these injustices, political racketeering, and the dilapidation of public properties. A banner deployed by one protester renamed Tahrir square as Montaga al Huriyya (the Freedom Resort), directly addressing the liberal turn and its exclusive landscape of residential and leisure compounds. ^(10){ }^{10} 针对地产开发商与国家精英勾结的法庭诉讼早在 2011 年 1 月起义前就已展开。以塔拉特·穆斯塔法集团及其"新行政首都"超级项目为例——该集团以近乎零成本从政府机构直接购得 3300 万平方米土地后，项目几近流产。起义期间的著名口号直指这些不公现象、政治敲诈以及公共财产的荒废。一位抗议者打出的横幅将解放广场更名为"自由度假村"，直接影射自由主义转向及其排他性的住宅休闲飞地景观。 ^(10){ }^{10}
Then, the sons of then-president Hosni Mubarak were notably arrested for their involvement in real estate affairs and their supervision of “Cairo 2050,” a liberal and Dubai-inspired vision for Cairo’s urban development that was projected to dispossess and displace many working-class communities; the housing minister was dismissed and brought to court along with his predecessor; several tycoons escaped abroad; and major residential projects were left on the edge of bankruptcy. 随后，时任总统穆巴拉克的两个儿子因涉足房地产业务及主导"开罗 2050"规划而锒铛入狱。这项受迪拜启发的自由主义城市发展蓝图，原计划将迫使众多工人阶级社区迁离。住房部长与其前任均遭解职并面临审判，数名商业大亨外逃，多个大型住宅项目濒临破产边缘。
Despite the voices calling for the restitution of public property, the real estate business rebounded rapidly after 2011. It has been flourishing more than ever since the army retook power on June 30, 2013, in a sort of impeachment-by-force of the first freely elected and Muslim-Brotherhood-backed president, Mohamed Morsi. It followed an unequalled mobilization of millions of citizens against the non-secular regime. 尽管要求归还公共财产的呼声不断，房地产业在 2011 年后迅速反弹。自 2013 年 6 月 30 日军队通过武力弹劾首位民选且获穆斯林兄弟会支持的总统穆罕默德·穆尔西重新掌权以来，该行业更是迎来了前所未有的繁荣。这场政变背后是数百万公民对非世俗政权的空前大规模抗议。
This unfinished sequence of historical change reveals how the tycoons of the Mubarak era, as well as the upper-class coalition which made itself rich in the land deals and the easy access to credit before the revolution, managed to survive the difficult times with their fortunes safeguarded in the land they had capitalized around Cairo. ^(11){ }^{11} 这段未完成的历史变革序列揭示了穆巴拉克时代的商业巨头们，以及那些在革命前通过土地交易和轻松信贷渠道致富的上层阶级联盟，如何凭借他们在开罗周边资本化的土地保全财富，成功度过了艰难时期。 ^(11){ }^{11}
Their land assets have withstood the revolution, with its terrible inflation (Ten to twelve percent per year) and the fall of the Egyptian pound (from 5.74 against the US dollar in January 2011 to 8.87 in September 2016) associated with the quasi collapse of the stock exchange. Land value and real estate prices, however, did not erode. The owners of such properties are today in an excellent position to refinance themselves via the bank and (re)articulate themselves within the state apparatus. The tycoons are back on the stage with even bigger projects-thanks to money from the Gulf. 他们的土地资产经受住了革命的考验，尽管伴随着可怕的通货膨胀（每年 10%到 12%）和埃及镑的贬值（从 2011 年 1 月对美元 5.74 的汇率跌至 2016 年 9 月的 8.87），以及股市近乎崩溃的局面。然而，土地价值和房地产价格并未受到侵蚀。如今，这些房产的所有者处于极佳的位置，可以通过银行进行再融资，并在国家机构中重新确立自己的地位。得益于来自海湾地区的资金，大亨们带着更宏大的项目重返舞台。
For Amr, after the uncertainty and incapacity of Tariq Wafiq, his former professor at the school of planning of Cairo University and housing minister under the Morsi administration, to show the way toward a more inclusive and just urban development, the present day is just like wearing his old and comfortable castor pajamas to go to the daily market. The routines are back. After the coup, Ibrahim Mahlab, the former president of the giant, semi-public construction company Arab Contractor, briefly became his minister, but Mahlab advanced rapidly to become prime minister in March 2014. Then, Mostafa Madbouli, Amr’s former boss at the General Organization for Physical Planning during the conception of Cairo 2050, became the new housing minister. With the support 对阿姆尔而言，在经历塔里克·瓦菲克——这位开罗大学规划学院前教授、穆尔西政府时期的住房部长——未能指明一条更具包容性与公平性的城市发展道路后，如今的日子就像穿着他那件舒适的老式棉睡衣去日常集市般平淡。熟悉的日常又回来了。政变后，半国营建筑巨头阿拉伯承包商公司前总裁易卜拉欣·马赫莱布曾短暂担任他的部长，但马赫莱布在 2014 年 3 月迅速升任总理。随后，在"开罗 2050"规划构想期间担任阿姆尔上司的物理规划总局局长穆斯塔法·马德布利成为了新任住房部长。在
of UN-Habitat, he supervised the revision of the 2050 plan. Renamed the Greater Cairo Regional Strategic Development Vision, it preserves the business friendly spirit and provisions for new towns and gigantic highend residential and commercial projects that were present in the Cairo 2050 plan. The largest change was the adoption of a new name-the ministry was now known as the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development, instead of the Ministry of Housing and New Communities. 作为联合国人居署的顾问，他负责监督 2050 年修订计划的制定工作。这份更名为《大开罗区域战略发展愿景》的规划，保留了原《开罗 2050》计划中亲商的核心精神，以及关于新城开发和大型高端住宅与商业项目的条款。最显著的变革在于采用了新名称——该部门现称为"住房、公用事业与城市发展部"，取代了原先的"住房与新社区部"的称谓。
When, in March 2015, the Egyptian president and army general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi launched the pharaonic Capital Cairo ^(12){ }^{12} project in the presence of most of the Gulf leaders as well as many representatives of Dubai and Abu Dhabi construction and real estate companies, the possibility of an inclusive city that had been opened up by the 2011 uprising was completely extinguished. Later, Chinese entrepreneurs began showing interest in investing: in September 2016, a memorandum of understanding was inked with the state-owned China Fortune Land Development company. The project will move several Egyptian ministry buildings to the New Capital and fund a trade-fair and a giant conference center following a diplomatic line of strategic investments already experimented with in several other African countries. This grandiose, dystopian plan reflects the comeback of a familiar pattern: nepotism and racketeering backed by an authoritarian state apparatus, in turn supported by foreign investments from nondemocratic states characterized by a firm association of private business expansion and national interest. The Capital Cairo project concretizes (at least on paper as a “regime of graphics” ^(13){ }^{13} ) the will to capture in a gigantic grid all the wealth of Egypt while excluding, under control, the people (al-sha^(')ab)(a l-s h a ' a b). The potential cost has been estimated somewhere between fifty and three hundred billion US dollars, which can be put in perspective when considering the eight billion US dollars of public money spent for new cities over the last thirty years. 2015 年 3 月，埃及总统兼陆军上将阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西在多数海湾国家领导人及迪拜、阿布扎比多家建筑房地产公司代表的见证下，启动了规模宏大的"新开罗首都"项目，2011 年起义所孕育的包容性城市可能性就此彻底破灭。随后中国企业开始展现投资兴趣：2016 年 9 月，埃及与国有房企华夏幸福签署了合作备忘录。该项目将使多个埃及部委迁址新行政首都，并参照在多个非洲国家实践过的战略性投资外交路线，出资建设贸易展览馆与巨型会议中心。这项宏大而反乌托邦的规划，标志着熟悉模式的回归：威权国家机器支持下的裙带关系与敲诈勒索，而这种政权又得到来自非民主国家外资的支撑——这些国家的显著特征，正是将私营企业扩张与国家利益紧密捆绑。 "新首都开罗"项目（至少在纸面上作为"图形治理体系" ^(13){ }^{13} ）具体体现了这样一种意志：用一张巨型网格囊括埃及的全部财富，同时将民众置于受控的排斥状态 (al-sha^(')ab)(a l-s h a ' a b) 。该项目预估成本在 500 亿至 3000 亿美元之间，对比过去三十年间用于新城建设的 80 亿美元公共支出，这个数字更显惊人。
PROMOTING HOUSING OUTSIDE THE “VICTORIOUS CITY”: THE FLIGHT INTO THE DESERT ^(14){ }^{14} 推动"胜利之城"之外的住房建设：向沙漠的逃亡 ^(14){ }^{14}
For exclusive housing developments of the gated-community type, the tourism angle is fundamental. The tourist resorts of the Mediterranean or the Red Sea were the frontlines for the normalization of an alternative lifestyle, taking place outside the city walls, for the wealthiest of Cairo’s residents. The summer months spent among peers, far from the maddening crowd, made it possible to conceive of an alternative to city living in spatial proximity with the rest of society. Therefore, when the first gated communities appeared in the early 1990s, they immediately found a clientele that was convinced of the benefits of this new mode of living. These luxury tourist villages west of Alexandria are also where the elites have been shoring up their contacts for several decades, and where the circles and alliances of today’s business and political figuresthose same figures now carrying out liberal reforms-were formed. 对于封闭式社区类型的专属住宅开发项目，旅游元素至关重要。地中海或红海的旅游度假区曾是开罗最富裕阶层体验城外另类生活方式的试验场。在远离尘嚣的环境中与同阶层共度夏日时光，使人们开始构想一种与社会其他群体保持空间距离的城市生活替代方案。因此当 1990 年代初首批封闭社区出现时，立即吸引了一批深信这种新型生活方式优越性的客户群。这些位于亚历山大港以西的豪华旅游度假村，也是数十年来精英阶层巩固人脉的场所——当今推行自由主义改革的商政界要员们，正是在此形成了他们的交际圈层与利益联盟。
From this point of view, the elites filled their role as pioneers perfectly, introducing, at the heart of social aspirations, a radical rupture from the felahi wa madani’ (peasant and city-dweller) model of settlement in Egypt. They literally fled the fertile river valley and disavowed a city model anchored in density, diversity, and sharing the same public space. By championing private cities on the front pages of newspapers and on television, they succeeded in promoting what had hitherto-given the poor people who had been forcibly relocated, without means or recourse, to the first working-class residential districts of the new townsseemed a terrible relegation, exposed to the threat of wild dogs and oblivion, far from the support of loved ones. The desert fringes became the territory of all success, of empowerment. 从这个角度看，精英阶层完美扮演了先驱者的角色，在社会理想的核心地带引入了一种与埃及传统的"费拉希与马迪尼"（农民与市民）聚居模式彻底决裂的新范式。他们实质上逃离了肥沃的河谷地带，摒弃了以高密度、多元化和共享公共空间为基础的城市模型。通过在报纸头版和电视上鼓吹私有化城市理念，他们成功地将那些被迫搬迁至新城镇首批工人住宅区、既无资源又无退路的贫民所经历的可怕流放境遇——暴露在野犬威胁与被人遗忘的风险中，远离亲人支持——包装成了人人向往的成功图景。沙漠边缘由此化身为所有成就与赋权的疆域。
The desire to follow the new trend has subsequently spread throughout society, even if for the majority the reality of the super dense, working-class suburbs 尽管对大多数人而言，超高密度的工人阶层郊区仍是现实，但追随这股新潮流的渴望已席卷整个社会。
surrounding Cairo remains the norm and will continue to be so. For in a context of global economic competition, it is unlikely that a stable and expanded middle class can emerge that is capable of borrowing from banks in order to gain access to housing in the new private communities in the desert. The market for these desert cities remains largely speculative, driven by the transnational demand for millionaire villas and other mansions with views over the golf courses, amusement parks, or the stretches of preserved desert that guarantee the exclusion of others. 开罗周边的沙漠化现象仍是常态，并将持续如此。因为在全球经济竞争的背景下，不太可能形成一个稳定且壮大的中产阶级群体——他们能够通过银行贷款购置沙漠新兴私人社区住宅。这些沙漠城市的房地产市场本质上仍是投机性质，主要受跨国资本对百万富翁别墅的需求驱动：那些能俯瞰高尔夫球场、游乐园或受保护荒漠地带的豪宅，恰恰确保了居住者的排他性特权。
The prices give an idea of the speculative nature of the sector. A villa on a golf course purchased for 250,000 US dollars in 1996 was worth one million US dollars in 2010. Similarly, a standard sixty square-meter apartment sells today for around 60,000 US dollars, or nineteen years of the average annual income, despite the general consensus among international housing experts that the cost of low-income housing should not exceed five years’ worth of earnings. The speculative nature of this urbanism can also be assessed against the yardstick of the number of housing units acquired but still unoccupied: the 2006 census reported vacancy rates of 63 percent in the new cities around Cairo, compared to 25 percent within the city, while ten percent is the average rate in the large cities of industrial democracies. 房价充分体现了该行业的投机性质。1996 年以 25 万美元购入的高尔夫球场别墅，到 2010 年已价值百万美元。同样，如今一套标准的 60 平方米公寓售价约为 6 万美元，相当于当地居民 19 年的平均年收入——而国际住房专家普遍认为，低收入住房成本不应超过五年收入。这种城市化进程的投机性还可通过已购但空置的住房数量来衡量：2006 年人口普查显示，开罗周边新城的住房空置率达 63%，而城区内为 25%，工业民主国家大城市的平均空置率仅为 10%。
This is in fact why, since the 1990s, the regime has initiated a policy of tolerating and often legalizing illegal working-class housing around Cairo. It can no longer offer a public housing alternative, even if, until the brutal end of the Mubarak era, it boasted a massive program of subsidized housing named after Madame Mubarak that has never reached the modest young couples it was intended for. On the periphery of Sixth of October City, Haram City, an awardwinning project by the Orascom Housing Communities, exemplifies the affordable housing programs being realized in publicprivate partnership. Designed in 2007 with support from the World Bank and the 事实上，这正是自 20 世纪 90 年代以来，埃及政府开始对开罗周边工人阶级非法住房采取容忍政策并经常予以合法化的原因。当局已无力提供公共住房替代方案——即便在穆巴拉克时代末期，政府仍大肆宣扬以穆巴拉克夫人命名的巨额补贴住房计划，但这些住房从未惠及计划中需要帮助的普通年轻夫妇。在十月六日城边缘，由奥拉斯康住宅社区开发的获奖项目"哈拉姆城"，展现了公私合营模式下经济适用房计划的实践典范。这个 2007 年在世界银行和
United Nations Development Programme, it has become the flagship of a potential socially mixed form of development for the new towns. Despite the defective construction, the burden of housing costs, and the difficulty faced by the more modest households in accessing credit lines, a real urban life is emerging there for its thirty thousand inhabitants. Its expanding Suq elSha’abi (daily market) gives a unique sense of community that constitutes an all-too-rare expression of spontaneous appropriation of space in the new cities. 联合国开发计划署支持下设计的项目，已成为新城镇潜在社会混合发展模式的标杆。尽管存在建筑缺陷、住房成本负担以及普通家庭获取信贷的困难，但这座容纳三万居民的城市正孕育出真实的都市生活。日益扩大的"人民集市"（日常市场）营造出独特的社区氛围，这种居民自发形成的空间利用方式在新城中实属罕见。
In 2016, the affordable housing concept was appropriated by the regime as a central element of the Capital Cairo plan. It promoted a 1.5 billion-dollar plan to relocate 850,000 ashwa’iyyat dwellers. Under the name “Tahya Misr” (Long Live Egypt), housing projects have already caused forced evictions of residents in illegal neighborhoods qualified as non-inhabitable, pushing them out toward the satellite cities in the desert. The Tahya Misr Fund is directly controlled by the president, lacks any transparent accounting, and is supported by tycoons that have found a convenient way to continue their businesses close to the state, pay their back taxes, and avoid court cases for their arrangements with the prerevolution regime. 2016 年，当局将保障性住房概念挪用为"新开罗计划"的核心内容，推出耗资 15 亿美元的方案，计划迁移 85 万棚户区居民。以"埃及万岁"为名的住房项目，已导致那些被认定为不宜居住的非法社区民众遭到强制驱逐，迫使他们迁往沙漠中的卫星城。"埃及万岁"基金由总统直接掌控，财务运作完全不透明，其资金支持来自一批富豪——这些人借此便利途径维持与政府的密切商业往来、补缴历史税款，并避免因与前革命时期政权勾连而面临司法诉讼。
This initiative reveals the neverending dialectic between the authoritarian reformists, on the one hand, who push for eviction and resettlement, and the social movements and alternative urbanists, on the other hand, who push for accommodating residents’ grassroots capabilities to produce their urban environment starting with their own homes. Indeed, the military regime has taken its share in the latter as well, by directly contracting with army construction companies involved in rehabilitation schemes for illegal settlements. The Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements did not last long (from July 2015 to October 2016) -a sign, among others, that the priority of the regime and the elite remains the development of new towns, as well as using construction and real 这一举措揭示了永无止境的辩证关系：一方面是主张强制搬迁与重新安置的威权改革派，另一方面则是倡导发挥居民基层能力、从自家住宅开始营造城市环境的社会运动与另类城市规划者。事实上，军政府也通过直接签约参与非正规住区改造计划的军方建筑公司，在后一领域分得了一杯羹。城市更新与非正规住区部仅存在短暂时间（2015 年 7 月至 2016 年 10 月）——这个迹象与其他现象共同表明，政权与精英阶层的优先事项始终是新城镇开发，以及将建筑和房地产
estate as a motor of growth and personal wealth accumulation. In 2016, a study conducted by the interdisciplinary research group 10 Tooba showed that, for the fiscal budget for 2015-2016, infrastructure for the new cities received an equivalent amount of public investments as the rest of the settlements, villages, and towns in the country combined, where 98 percent of the Egyptian population lives. ^(15){ }^{15} 作为经济增长与个人财富积累的引擎。2016 年，跨学科研究小组 10 Tooba 开展的研究显示，在 2015-2016 财年预算中，新城市基础设施获得的公共投资额，竟与埃及 98%人口居住的其他住区、村庄和城镇的总和相当。 ^(15){ }^{15}
NEW CITIES IN A 沙漠中的新兴城市
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE: STABILITY AND OPPORTUNITIES 区域视角：稳定与机遇
The pro-rich bias of the peripheral residential market is maintained by an Arab clientele, who are in turn powered by oil revenues. In light of the disintegration of the rest of the Middle East, Arab entrepreneurs and clients see in the stability of Egypt-not to mention the individual liberty it affords its guests-an investment environment without equal. Egypt, and Cairo in particular, is thus a place in which wealthy investors from the oil monarchies increasingly prefer to invest, now that Lebanon no longer offers any guarantees. Iraqi businesspersons seeking to invest as well as set up residence abroad also constitute a choice clientele. The new mode of housing in the deserts also came by way of the Gulf monarchies, where many Egyptian graduates go to work: it is there that they first experienced gated communities and decentralized urban forms scattered across the desert. ^(16){ }^{16} Since the 2011 revolution, Gulf countries are as present as ever in Egypt. With the exception of the Qatari sovereign fund and other Qatari construction companies, which presently lag behind after having supported the Muslim Brotherhood and the Morsi presidency, the Gulf monarchies and their businesspersons are very keen to lend money and aid to Egypt, gaining in exchange access to favored opportunities for investment. New cities and prime locations along the Nile are particularly privileged sites. Cairo Uptown, a megaproject developed by the Dubai 外围住宅市场的亲富倾向由阿拉伯客户群体维持，而这些客户的购买力又源自石油收入。鉴于中东其他地区的分崩离析，阿拉伯企业家和客户在埃及——更不用说该国赋予客人的个人自由——看到了无与伦比的投资环境。因此，埃及（尤其是开罗）正成为来自石油君主国的富裕投资者日益青睐的投资目的地，毕竟黎巴嫩已无法提供任何保障。寻求海外投资与定居的伊拉克商人也构成了重要客户群体。这种沙漠新型居住模式同样源自海湾君主国——许多埃及毕业生前往工作的目的地：正是在那里，他们首次体验到了封闭式社区和散布于沙漠中的分散化城市形态。 ^(16){ }^{16} 自 2011 年革命以来，海湾国家在埃及的存在感丝毫未减。 除卡塔尔主权基金和其他卡塔尔建筑公司外——这些机构因曾支持穆斯林兄弟会和穆尔西政权而目前处于落后状态——海湾君主国及其商界人士都热衷于向埃及提供贷款和援助，以换取优先投资机会。尼罗河沿岸的新城市和黄金地段尤其受到青睐。由迪拜
company Emaar, sets the tone: " 4.5 million sqm of luxury, indulgence, and comfort within a few minutes from Sixth of October Bridge and New Cairo via Emaar Drive." ^(17){ }^{17} 伊玛尔地产开发的"开罗新城"超级项目定下基调："450 万平方米的奢华、纵享与舒适，通过伊玛尔大道仅需数分钟即可抵达十月六日大桥和新开罗。" ^(17){ }^{17}
A second reason behind the entrepreneurial adoption of the model of private cities in the desert lies in the social and political rehabilitation, through the prism of neoliberal dogma, of the Egyptian liberal age, which is to say the whole of the early twentieth century before independence and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s accession to power. This was a golden age for real estate development, during which all of the exclusive neighborhoods in Cairo were built up. This colonial-era memory is now used as a vehicle to promote gatedcommunity projects such as New Garden City and New Heliopolis, or villas that, depending on their style, bear the name of various princes, khedives, or princesses of Egypt. 企业家选择在沙漠中建设私人城市模式的第二个原因，在于通过新自由主义教条视角对埃及自由主义时代——即独立前和贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔掌权前的整个二十世纪初期——进行社会政治层面的重塑。那是房地产开发的黄金时代，开罗所有高端社区都建于该时期。如今，这种殖民时期的记忆被用作营销工具，用以推广诸如新花园城、新赫利奥波利斯等封闭社区项目，或是根据建筑风格冠以埃及各位王子、赫迪夫或公主之名的别墅群。
The heritage-based promotion of the ancient center, as well as the restorations of the villas on the banks of the Nile, also carried out by the elites and the business community, served to legitimize exclusive projects in the desert and the development of a world of artifacts. ^(18){ }^{18} The trend went as far as to create a fake ancient souk in the middle of the desert, Khan al-Azizi. It failed. The turmoil of 2011 precipitated its bankruptcy, and now it only lives on as an abandoned structure, although other commercial programs of this sort have taken off since then. 以遗产保护为名对古城中心的推广，以及尼罗河沿岸别墅的修复工程（同样由精英阶层和商界推动），为沙漠地区的排他性项目和人造景观世界提供了合法性依据。 ^(18){ }^{18} 这种趋势甚至催生了沙漠腹地的仿古市集"汗阿齐兹"，最终以失败告终。2011 年的动荡加速了它的破产，如今只剩废弃建筑残存，尽管此后同类商业项目仍有发展。
Conversely, the socialist experiment of the Nasser years has come to be considered an absolute abomination. It is now seen as a phase of stagnation for Egyptian society during which individual or private initiative was crushed. Social, public, and collective housing, which was introduced in this period and continued long after thanks to public policies led by engineers trained under socialism and a culture of modernist architecture that supports the powerful semi-public building lobby almost to this day, became its most virulently rejected avatar. ^(19){ }^{19} In the process, the influence of the 与之形成鲜明对比的是，纳赛尔时代的社会主义实验如今被视为彻头彻尾的败笔。这段时期被看作埃及社会的停滞阶段，个人和私营企业的发展遭到压制。当时推行的社会性、公共性和集体住房政策——得益于社会主义培养的工程师主导的公共政策，以及延续至今、由强大的半公共建筑游说团体支持的现代主义建筑文化——成为了最受诟病的象征。 ^(19){ }^{19} 在此过程中，
era of Egyptian nation-building after the 1952 revolution has also been minimized, although the country had been the core of the international Non-Aligned Movement and Pan-Arabism. 1952 年革命后埃及国家建设的时代也被淡化了，尽管该国曾是国际不结盟运动和泛阿拉伯主义的核心。
THE RIVERBANK OF THE DEAD GIVEN OVER TO SKELETONS 被遗弃的河岸沦为枯骨之地
Until the authorities started using them to house several thousand homeless survivors of the 1992 earthquake as well as the daily victims of collapsing derelict buildings in the old city, the new towns of the 1980s were almost entirely deserted. 在当局开始用这些新城安置 1992 年地震的数千名无家可归幸存者以及老城区危房坍塌的日常受害者之前，1980 年代兴建的新城几乎完全无人居住。
The Egyptian press described them as “ghost towns,” and they indeed had the appearance of never-completed building sites, where no Cairo resident wanted to go. Those unfortunate enough to be displaced or forced for economic reasons to move there were constantly clamoring for basic services. The only things the authorities successfully relocated to the desert were new cemeteries. ^(20){ }^{20} 埃及媒体称其为"鬼城"，这些地方确实像是永远无法完工的建筑工地，没有开罗居民愿意前往。那些不幸因流离失所或经济原因被迫迁居至此的人们，不断呼吁要求基本生活服务。当局唯一成功迁往沙漠的只有新建的墓地。 ^(20){ }^{20}
Those unfortunate enough to be relegated to these new towns, in Qatamiya or in the “Chinese” tower blocks of Sixth of October, were issued flats without any finished work, without proper doors or windows, and without a single shop-most neighborhood plans did not stipulate any, and there was no funding for those that had been planned. Similarly, there was virtually no regular bus line to these ghost towns, and the rare modes of transport, given the distance from Cairo, were far too expensive for their residents. Meanwhile, there was running water for only a few hours a day and the brandnew sewers were already overflowing. 那些不幸被安置在这些新城镇的人们——无论是住在卡塔米亚还是十月六日城的"中国式"塔楼里——分配到的公寓都未经任何装修，没有像样的门窗，周边甚至没有一家商店。大多数社区规划中根本没有预留商铺空间，而那些规划了商铺的区域也缺乏建设资金。同样，这些鬼城几乎没有常规公交线路，由于距离开罗太远，稀少的交通工具对居民而言价格高昂得难以承受。与此同时，每天仅供应几小时自来水，崭新的下水道系统却早已污水横流。
Cemeteries and poorly finished skeletons (concrete-frame structures filled in with bricks) shared the landscape with piles of rubble and oversized (but never completed) roadways, along with a few barracks. This was the standard landscape beyond the pyramids or along the road to Port Said from the 1980s until the mid-1990s. 墓地与粗制滥造的毛坯房（砖块填充的混凝土框架结构）构成了这里的主要景观，其间散落着瓦砾堆、过度设计却从未完工的道路，以及零星的活动板房。从 1980 年代到 1990 年代中期，这种景象在金字塔景区外围或通往塞得港的道路沿线随处可见。
Being exiled to the anonymous cities of the desert was all the more unpopular because to relocate outside the Nile Valley, into the desert, signified a break with the cultural foundation of Egyptian society. The desert remains the realm of the deadas the west bank of the Nile was in the religion of the time of the pharaohs-which is why it had remained off the market until recently. The desert constitutes a place of initiation, of the experience of the void. It is also where monasteries were built. Therefore, turning the desert into a place that was not just acceptable, but attractive-even exclusive-required a major adaptation of the myths guaranteeing the territorial structures of communal life, amidst density and diversity, on either side of the Nile. Nevertheless, starting in the 2010s, people from different classes have been moving voluntarily to Sixth of October and New Cairo. Life tends to normalize, and services are expanding, including spontaneous and interstitial solutions by small merchants responding to the insufficient offerings in the formally designed areas. Moreover, the industrial areas of new towns have long attracted hundreds of factories and thousands of jobs, and thus associated activities have also emerged in the surrounding areas. With the development of tertiary activities such as universities, specialized hospitals, malls, and high-tech parks there, engineers too have started to think about a change in their job location and place of residence. ^(21){ }^{21} 被流放到沙漠中那些无名城市之所以更不受欢迎，是因为迁离尼罗河谷、进入沙漠，意味着与埃及社会文化根基的割裂。沙漠始终是亡者的国度——正如法老时代宗教观念中尼罗河西岸所象征的那样——这也是为何直到最近这片区域都未被开发。沙漠是举行启蒙仪式的场所，是体验虚无之境。这里也是修道院的建造之地。因此，要将沙漠转变为不仅可接受、更具吸引力——甚至独树一帜的居住地，就需要对保障尼罗河两岸密集多元社区生活空间结构的神话体系进行重大调整。然而自 2010 年代起，不同阶层的人们开始自愿迁往十月六日城和新开罗。生活逐渐趋于常态，服务设施不断扩展，包括小商贩为弥补规划区域供应不足而自发形成的间隙性解决方案。 此外，新城的工业区长期以来吸引了数百家工厂和数千个就业岗位，周边地区也随之衍生出相关配套活动。随着大学、专科医院、购物中心和高科技园区等第三产业在这些区域的发展，工程师们也开始考虑改变工作地点和居住地。 ^(21){ }^{21}
At the beginning, living in the desert meant to transgress a fundamental, structural interdict on settlement. The placing on the market and the real-estate conquest of a void where settlement has been forbidden (a vacuum), which traditionally assured the exclusive promotion of the river valley and the delta, implies a powerful means of leverage carried out by private developers and thus the creative destruction of a proscription. Naturally, as they are open to the world, elites are more suited to free themselves of these cultural values and to domesticate this hostile environment. 最初，在沙漠定居意味着打破一项根本性的结构性禁忌。将这片传统上禁止居住的空白地带（真空）推向房地产市场并进行不动产开发，实质上颠覆了尼罗河谷与三角洲地区独享发展资源的传统格局，这背后是私营开发商运用强大杠杆力量实现的创造性破坏。自然，作为面向世界的群体，精英阶层更易于摆脱这些文化价值观的束缚，进而驯化这片原本不宜居的环境。
Such resources are not simply material and financial. They also entail a conversion to a new myth: the neoliberal dogma offering a framework of justification for individual and private conquest, exclusively among peers-a departure, therefore, from a tradition of living and participating in social diversity. Moving to gated communities outside the city walls means subscribing to this momentum of individualistic rupture, in which a part of society chooses to abandon solidarity with those who lack the means for such mobility and adaptation to the global scale. 这些资源不仅限于物质与财力层面。它们还意味着对一种新神话的皈依：新自由主义信条为个体与私人征服提供了合法性框架，但这种征服仅在同阶层内部展开——由此背离了参与社会多样性共存的传统。迁往城墙外的封闭社区，意味着投身于这种个人主义割裂的浪潮中：社会中部分群体选择放弃与那些缺乏全球流动性适应能力者的团结互助。
Here, the devaluation of life within the inner city of Cairo, as much as the promotion of the new mode of life on the fringes, made it possible to initiate the settlement of 开罗内城生活的贬值，与郊区新生活方式的推广同样重要，使得启动这片定居成为可能
desert areas as soon as the government lifted the interdict on settlement that had held for several thousand years. 政府解除延续数千年的定居禁令后，人们立即涌入了这片荒漠地带。
DEVALUATION:
THE ABANDONMENT OF A UNIFIED URBAN SOCIETY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATIZED DEMOCRACY 贬值：放弃统一的都市社会，转向私有化民主
The departure of the elites for these vast desert expanses was accompanied by a sense of a loss of control over their environment. The devaluation of Cairo was not a natural development. Until the early 1990s, the elites were in fact very active in defending the integrity of an idealized urban society against an invasion by peasants, against a ruralization that threatened Cairo’s identity-even though migration to Cairo had been declining since the 1980s (today, little more than 10 percent of Cairo’s inhabitants are not native to the city) and this invasion was therefore somewhat of a phantasm. The issue of distinction played out among Cairo’s residents, between the rich and the poor, but it remained coded in terms of geographic origin and therefore of legitimacy as a true city dweller. Master plans attempted to represent this desire to protect the integrity of the city against invaders. The ring road was conceived as a raised rampart demarcating the boundaries 精英阶层迁往广袤荒漠的同时，也伴随着对环境失控的失落感。开罗的贬值并非自然演变的结果。直至 1990 年代初，这些精英实际上仍在积极捍卫理想化都市社会的完整性，抵御所谓"农民入侵"对开罗城市特性的威胁——尽管自 1980 年代以来迁入开罗的人口持续减少（如今非本地出生的居民仅占城市人口的 10%出头），这种"入侵"多少带有臆想成分。区分身份的问题在开罗居民之间、贫富阶层之间持续上演，但始终以地理出身作为编码标准，进而判定谁才是真正的合法都市人。城市规划方案试图体现这种守护城市完整性的诉求，环城公路的设计理念便是筑起高耸壁垒来划定边界。
of the legal city, while the new towns were intended to house the plebeian populace as separate suburbs. Anwar Sadat even considered issuing a Cairo identity card to monitor the influx of migrants. In 1996, a governor once again proposed it as a solution, but by then no one believed in it. It was too late: the city was already totally compromised, lost, and overrun. The elites no longer felt at home. They could not move around the city without being confronted, in endless traffic jams, by a noisy mob. To escape, to flee in order to establish a new city, became an attractive prospect. 合法城区之外，新建的卫星城旨在安置平民阶层。安瓦尔·萨达特甚至考虑发放开罗身份证以监控移民潮。1996 年有位省长再度提议此方案，但那时已无人相信其可行性——为时已晚：整座城市早已彻底失控、沦陷且不堪重负。精英阶层再也找不到归属感，他们在无尽堵车中穿行时，总被喧嚷的市井人群包围。逃离此地、另建新城，成了极具诱惑力的选择。
The traumas of the 1990s further allowed for real estate promoters to position desert cities as a potential Eden. The 1992 earthquake laid bare Cairo’s fragility and reinforced the notion that living in a villa would provide better protection than living in a block of flats that was often old and lacking proper maintenance. This is to say nothing of the fact that Islamist groups, in the wake of this humanitarian disaster, displayed an effectiveness that far outstripped that of the state-a sign that they had a significant presence in Cairo’s working-class areas, precisely where the state had lost its grip. This evolved into increasingly violent confrontations between the state and these organizations, which signaled a point of no return in modes of protest against the regime. ^(22){ }^{22} While Cairo remained one of the world’s safest metropolises, thus in no way justifying a flight to gated communities in line with the Californian or South African model, Islamistbased protest against the regime encouraged this kind of flight. These protests and rare popular unrests represented not so much a physical threat as a movement of structural dissent about values, which was gaining ground while imposing restrictive and orthodox moral standards on society as a whole. The gated-community model made it possible to escape this moralization of public space. The January 2011 uprising and the uncertainty that predominated until the summer of 2013 added layers of arguments for the upper-middle class to leave the inner 20 世纪 90 年代的创伤进一步促使房地产开发商将沙漠城市定位为潜在的伊甸园。1992 年地震暴露出开罗的脆弱性，强化了"住在别墅比住在年久失修的老旧公寓更安全"的观念。更不必说在这场人道主义灾难后，伊斯兰组织展现出的效率远超政府——这表明他们在开罗工人阶级社区具有重要影响力，而这些区域恰恰是政府控制力薄弱的地带。这种态势逐渐演变为政府与这些组织间日益暴力的对抗，标志着反政权抗议模式已进入不可逆转的阶段。 ^(22){ }^{22} 尽管开罗仍是全球最安全的大都市之一，远未达到需要效仿加州或南非模式逃往封闭社区的程度，但基于伊斯兰主义的反政权抗议确实助长了这种逃离倾向。 这些抗议活动和罕见的民众骚乱与其说是对人身安全的威胁，不如说是一场关于价值观的结构性异议运动——该运动在向社会整体强加限制性传统道德标准的同时，其影响力正日益扩大。封闭社区模式使人们得以逃离这种公共空间的道德化规训。2011 年 1 月的起义以及持续至 2013 年夏季的不确定性，为中产阶级上层离开内城提供了更多理由，这里曾爆发暴力骚乱，鲜明控诉着日益加剧的社会不平等。街头被草根阶层占据的景象，在"体面"家庭口中化作了负面词汇。
city, which had been the theatre of violent unrests that clearly denounced growing inequalities. The grassroots appropriation of the streets turned into negative words on the lips of the “decent” families. （注：根据翻译规则，第二段因原文不完整未作翻译，保留原文格式）
The appropriation of the environmental discourse and increased attention to pollution-not only air pollution, but all of the other blemishes that degrade the city, notably refuse and overflowing sewers reinforced the sense of an irreversible degradation of living conditions. Then, according to a logic of naturalization, the poor, intrinsically carriers of dirt, became encroaching pollutants themselves, something to be fled. The exodus to the gated communities was thus part of a quest for a lost purity, in which the desert reclaimed its status as a purifying space. It was a media-driven social construct of an “ecology of fear” that made it possible to promote a commercial alternative and sell exclusivity and security. ^(23){ }^{23} 对环境议题的挪用及污染问题日益受到关注——不仅是空气污染，还包括所有其他损害城市面貌的污点，尤其是垃圾和污水外溢——强化了生活条件不可逆转恶化的认知。随后，根据一种自然化的逻辑，穷人作为肮脏的内在载体，本身就成了蔓延的污染物，成为需要逃离的对象。因此，迁往封闭社区成为追寻失落纯净的一部分，沙漠在此过程中重获其净化空间的地位。正是这种媒体驱动的"恐惧生态学"社会建构，使得推广商业替代方案、兜售排他性与安全性成为可能。 ^(23){ }^{23}
In this regard, it is fascinating to see how promoters and buyers, as well as the government, repackage the development of villas surrounded by golf courses or artificial forests as the pursuit of the green revolution and the conquest of the deserts, or even as the creation of new natural areas for Egyptian society. This extremely exclusive and extremely costly way-particularly in terms of water resources-of turning the desert green has been legitimized as a contribution to the progress of Egyptian society as a whole. 在这方面，有趣的是看到开发商、购房者以及政府如何将高尔夫球场或人造森林环绕的别墅开发项目重新包装成对绿色革命的追求、对沙漠的征服，甚至是为埃及社会创造新的自然区域。这种极其排外且成本高昂（尤其是水资源方面）的沙漠绿化方式，已被合法化为对整个埃及社会进步的贡献。
The loss of class distinctions has to be viewed within the context of the degradation of the identity of the city. There is no longer enough open space to stage this difference. Moreover, liberalization has created a nouveau riche class, for whom it is unacceptable to find oneself alongside a butcher or a small contractor when picking up one’s son at the gates of a private school. The gated community is therefore understood as an opportunity to create a neighborhood of “people like us” who share the same values. This exclusivity is far removed from-in fact the very opposite 阶级区隔的消失必须放在城市身份认同退化的背景下来看待。这里已没有足够的开放空间来展现这种差异。此外，自由化催生了一个新贵阶层，对他们而言，在私立学校门口接孩子时与肉铺老板或小承包商比邻而居是不可接受的。因此，封闭式社区被视为创造"同类人"聚居区的机会——这些居民共享相同的价值观。这种排他性与（事实上完全背离了）
of-the reformist ambitions that drove the protagonists of Egyptian independence: they saw the new towns as instruments that would facilitate adaptation to modern life, as well as promote integration of working-class inhabitants from rural areas into the city and its practices. 推动埃及独立运动先驱者们改革雄心的愿景：他们将新城视为促进适应现代生活的工具，同时帮助来自农村地区的工人阶级居民融入城市及其生活方式。
"FOR THE DESERT OF THE CITIES IS EQUAL TO THE DESERT OF SANDS" ^(24){ }^{24} "因为城市的荒漠与沙砾的荒漠同样荒芜" ^(24){ }^{24}
The real, historical city has therefore become a desert of sorts, in which life is impossible. The buyers of villas in gated communities and other private cities see themselves as pioneers of a new society, one that erases and excludes the old society and re-creates it on the margins as a utopia more aligned with the ruling class’s own self-image. 因此，这座真实的历史之城已沦为某种意义上的荒漠，在这里生活变得难以为继。封闭社区别墅及其他私人城邦的购买者们自视为新社会的开拓者——这个社会抹除并排斥旧秩序，在边缘地带将其重塑为更符合统治阶级自我想象的乌托邦。
Drawing from the experience of the clubs left behind by the British, into which one can only gain entry through co-option and in which selection entails major stakes, the gated communities developed archipelagos of private microdemocracies. This has to be understood as an alternative to the Egyptian political system, which is completely hermetic and offers no such democratic spaces-no credible elections, no real decentralization, to say nothing of corruption: in other words, economic liberalization without political liberalization. ^(25){ }^{25} In that, too, 2011 has not been a turning point. 借鉴英国遗留俱乐部的经验——这些俱乐部只能通过内部推选进入，且入选涉及重大利益——封闭社区发展成了私人微观民主的群岛。这必须被理解为对埃及政治体系的一种替代方案，后者完全封闭且不提供任何此类民主空间：没有可信的选举，没有真正的权力下放，更不用说腐败问题——换言之，这是没有政治自由化的经济自由化。就此而言，2011 年也未能成为转折点。
In the image of the world adopted by its elites, Cairo has in its very geographic form become a constantly expanding universe, where the center of gravity, or Cairo proper, is no longer particularly relevant in the face of the lures of the outside world, of the potential for mobility expanded to a global scale, and of the flows that connect the entirety of the planet. Withdrawing to one’s villa is, first and foremost, connecting to the world-through satellite television, telephone, Internet, and so on. This represents a profound revolution in global settlement, in which the desert fringe, 在其精英阶层所接纳的世界图景中，开罗的地理形态已演变成一个不断扩张的宇宙。在这里，重心所在——即开罗城区本身——面对外部世界的诱惑、扩展到全球范围的流动可能性，以及连接整个地球的各类要素流动时，已不再具有特别重要的意义。退居别墅首先是与世界建立连接——通过卫星电视、电话、互联网等方式。这代表着全球居住模式的深刻革命，沙漠边缘地带
invested in and inhabited by these new cosmopolitan nomads, is redefining the contours and the integration of Egyptian society. 这些由新兴国际游牧阶层投资并居住的飞地，正在重塑埃及社会的边界与融合形态。
The public cores of the new towns built in the 1980s are also experiencing, thanks to the real estate boom that surrounds them, localized forms of regeneration. Transport services finally link them to the metropolis, services are multiplying along with businesses and sometimes even genuine commercial centers, like malls. More and more people are moving to these areas, in particular the middle class individuals who have their own cars. A diffusion of settlement is thus taking place that, through a new social mix, could bring nuance to the apparent exclusivity of the current appropriation of the deserts. As for the worst of the public housing projects-those plonked down there in the 1980s and 1990s to satisfy statistical demands-they are falling into ruin, stand abandoned, or have been demolished because they spoiled the view from a luxury residential project, or because developers wanted to buy the sites they occupied. 得益于周边房地产热潮的推动，建于 1980 年代的新城镇公共核心区也正经历着局部复兴。交通服务终于将它们与都市连接起来，商业设施如雨后春笋般涌现，有时甚至形成了真正的购物中心等商业综合体。越来越多人群——尤其是拥有私家车的中产阶级——正迁入这些区域。这种居住扩散现象通过新的社会融合，可能将淡化当前沙漠开发表面上的排他性。而那些最糟糕的公共住房项目（1980-90 年代为满足统计指标而仓促建造的）正逐渐坍塌、遭废弃或被拆除——或因破坏豪华住宅项目的景观视野，或因开发商觊觎其地块价值。
Regional integration is not only bringing the shining exclusionary life of compounds and malls to the new towns; it also brings the victims of forced migrations due to raging wars. Since the 2000 s, there have been a few Iraqi and Sudanese families that have found shelter in the unfinished and sometime decaying public and cooperative housing projects as sub-tenants. Today, the scale of such regional presence is changing at a tremendous pace; Syrians have taken over whole streets in new towns, opening restaurants and shops and even investing in factories-creating a “Little Damascus” behind Sixth of October University. There are no less than thirty thousand in Sixth of October alone, bringing a sense of diversity and subaltern cosmopolitanism to the new cities. Saying that is not to downplay the hard time migrants are having in Cairo, who have to face, all too often, xenophobic attitudes. 区域一体化不仅将封闭式社区与购物中心的闪亮生活带到了新城镇，同时也带来了因战乱而被迫迁徙的流离失所者。自 2000 年代以来，陆续有伊拉克和苏丹家庭以转租客身份栖身于未完工且日渐破败的公有住房与合作住宅项目中。如今这种区域移民的规模正以惊人速度扩张——叙利亚人已整条街地占领新城镇，开设餐馆商铺甚至投资建厂，在十月六日大学后方打造出"小大马士革"社区。仅十月六日城一地就聚集了至少三万人，为新城市带来了多元文化与底层世界主义的气息。此言并非要淡化移民在开罗遭遇的困境，他们仍时常需要面对排外情绪的侵扰。
1 J. Baudrillard, Simulacres et Simulation (Paris: 1 让·鲍德里亚，《拟像与仿真》（巴黎：
Galilée, 1981), 10. 伽利略出版社，1981 年），第 10 页。
2 David Sims, “Trends in Informal Areas’ Development Since 25 January 2011” (paper presented at the CEDEJ/GIZ/UN-Habitat workshop series “Egypt Urban Futures,” Cairo, March 11, 2013); Donia Tawakol, “Speculative Impacts on Greater Cairo Areas: A Case Study on ‘EI-Matareya’” (master’s thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2015). 2 大卫·西姆斯，《2011 年 1 月 25 日以来非正规区域发展趋势》（提交于 CEDEJ/GIZ/联合国人居署"埃及城市未来"系列研讨会，开罗，2013 年 3 月 11 日）；多尼亚·塔瓦科尔，《大开罗地区投机影响研究：以'马塔利亚区'为例》（硕士论文，鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学，2015 年）。
318.2 million in the metropolitan area-the total population of three governorates: Cairo, Giza, and Qaliyubiya, see: “Egypt Census, 2006,” Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics of Egypt, last accessed October 10, 2017, http:// egypt.opendataforafrica.org/EGSNS2006/egypt-census-2006; the first results from the January 2017 census showed 23.4 million inhabitants for the very same metropolitan area-an increase of 5.5 million in ten years, against 3.4 million during 5.5 minon the prees " 2017 of Population, Housing, and Establishments," Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics of Egypt, last accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.capmas.gov.eg. 大都会区人口 3182 万——包含开罗省、吉萨省和盖勒尤比耶省三大行政区总人口，参见：《2006 年埃及人口普查》，埃及中央公众动员和统计局，最后访问于 2017 年 10 月 10 日，http://egypt.opendataforafrica.org/EGSNS2006/egypt-census-2006；2017 年 1 月人口普查初步结果显示，同一大都会区人口增至 2340 万——十年间增长 550 万，而此前五年半仅增长 340 万，参见《2017 年人口、住房及机构普查》，埃及中央公众动员和统计局，最后访问于 2017 年 10 月 10 日，http://www.capmas.gov.eg。
4 Robert Ilbert, Heliopolis: 1905-1922, genèse d’une ville (Paris: CNRS, 1991); Jean-Luc Arnaud, Le Caire: Mise en place d’une ville moderne 1867-1907 (Arles: Sindbad/Actes Sud, 1998). 4 罗伯特·伊尔伯特，《赫利奥波利斯：1905-1922，一座城市的起源》（巴黎：法国国家科学研究中心，1991 年）；让-吕克·阿尔诺，《开罗：现代城市的形成 1867-1907》（阿尔勒：辛巴达/南方行动出版社，1998 年）。
5 Sadik El Sadr and the Planning Commission of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, Municipality of Cairo, eds., Master Plan of Cairo (Cairo: SOP Press, 1956), 45. 5 萨迪克·埃尔萨德尔与沙特城乡事务部规划委员会合编，《开罗总体规划》（开罗：SOP 出版社，1956 年），第 45 页。
6 Jean-Emmanuel Cornu, “Planning for Cairo’s Future Environment,” in The Expanding Metropolis: Coping with the Urban Growth of Cairo, ed. Ahmet Evin (Singapore: Concept Media/The Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1985), 191. Emphasis in original. 6 让-伊曼纽尔·科尔努，《为开罗未来环境规划》，收录于《扩张中的大都市：应对开罗城市增长》，艾哈迈德·埃文主编（新加坡：概念传媒/阿迦汗建筑奖，1985 年），第 191 页。原文强调。
7 Timothy Mitchell, “The Invention and Reinvention of the Egyptian Peasant,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 2 (May 1990): 129-150. 7 蒂莫西·米切尔，《埃及农民的发明与再发明》，《国际中东研究杂志》第 22 卷第 2 期（1990 年 5 月）：129-150 页。
8 The “Kafrawi”-style standardized structures, named after the housing minister, were assigned a number according to the number of stories and a cooperation with the Chinese government, which supplied buildings made of pre-stressed concrete that are remarkably ill-adapted to desert heat. 8 这种以住房部长命名的"卡夫拉维"式标准化建筑，根据楼层数进行编号，并与中国政府合作采用预应力混凝土建造，却极不适应沙漠高温气候。
9 Egypt gained fourteen million inhabitants between 1996 and 2006, including 2.7 million in the Greater Cairo area alone. Currently, in 2016, Egypt adds one million inhabitants every six months. 1996 至 2006 年间，埃及人口增长 1400 万，其中大开罗地区就增加了 270 万。截至 2016 年，埃及每半年新增人口达百万。
10 See Samia Mehrez, ed., Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012). 参见萨米娅·梅雷兹主编的《转译埃及革命：解放广场的语言》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2012 年）。
11 David Sims, Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster? (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2015). 11 大卫·西姆斯，《埃及的沙漠之梦：发展还是灾难？》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2015 年）。
12 The Capital Cairo official website, accessed August 8, 2017, http://thecapitalcairo.com/. 12 新行政首都官方网站，2017 年 8 月 8 日访问，http://thecapitalcairo.com/。
13 The expression was coined by Adham Selim, see: Adham Selim, “Capital Cairo: A Regime of Graphics,” Mada Masr, August 5, 2015, http:// www.madamasr.com/sections/culture/capital-cairo-regime-graphics#_ftn1. 13 该表述由阿德姆·塞利姆首创，参见：阿德姆·塞利姆，《首都开罗：图形统治》，Mada Masr，2015 年 8 月 5 日，http://www.madamasr.com/sections/culture/capital-cairo-regime-graphics#_ftn1。
14 “Victorious City” is an allusion to the title of the seminal 1971 work by Janet Abu-Lughod and to the Arabic name for Cairo, “al-Qahira,” meaning “the victorious.” 14 "胜利之城"这一表述既呼应了珍妮特·阿布-卢格霍德 1971 年的开创性著作标题，也暗指开罗的阿拉伯语名称"al-Qahira"，意为"胜利者"。
1510 Tooba, “The Built Environment Budget 2015/16: An Analysis of Spatial Justice in Egypt,” accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.10tooba.org/ en/? p=172. 1510 托巴组织，《2015/16 年度建成环境预算：埃及空间正义分析》，2017 年 8 月 8 日访问，http://www.10tooba.org/en/?p=172.
16 Yasser Elsheshtawy, ed., Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope (London: Routledge 2004); Mike Davis, Le stade Dubaï du capitalisme 17 "Ars: Les Prairies Ordinaires, 2007. 16 亚西尔·埃尔谢塔维编，《中东城市规化：都市万花筒》（伦敦：劳特利奇出版社，2004 年）；迈克·戴维斯，《资本主义的迪拜阶段》（巴黎：平凡草原出版社，2007 年）。
1 About, ptown Cairo official website, accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.uptowncairo-egypt. 1 关于，uptown Cairo 官方网站，2017 年 8 月 8 日访问，http://www.uptowncairo-egypt.
18 Galila El Kadi, “La genèse du patrimoine en Egypte : du monument au centre historique,” in Regards croisés sur le patrimoine dans le monde à l’aube du XXIè siècle, eds., Maria Gravari-Barbas and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis (Paris: Presses de 19 Omnia El Shakry, “Cairo as Capital of Socialist Revolution?” in Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East, eds., Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 18 加里拉·埃尔·卡迪，《埃及文化遗产的起源：从纪念碑到历史中心》，收录于《21 世纪前夕世界文化遗产的交叉视角》，玛丽亚·格拉瓦里-巴巴斯与西尔维·吉夏尔-安吉斯编（巴黎：19 出版社）；19 奥姆尼亚·埃尔·沙克里，《开罗作为社会主义革命之都？》，收录于《世界主义开罗：新全球化中东的政治、文化与城市空间》，黛安·辛格曼与保罗·阿马尔编（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社）
2006).
20 Fueled by joint ventures and foreign investment, industry has found highly advantageous, tax-free sites in the industrial zones of the new cities of Sixth of October and lenth of Ramadan. This areas in Egypt. Few workers took up residence these cities, however: every day, company buses ferry their employees to and from Cairo’s informal suburbs. See: Eric Denis and Leïla Vignal, “Cairo as Regional/Global Economic Capita 在合资企业和外资的推动下，工业在十月六日城和斋月十日城的新城区找到了极具优势的免税选址。这些区域位于埃及境内。然而鲜有工人选择在此定居：每天，公司班车往返于开罗的非正规郊区接送员工。参见：埃里克·德尼与莱拉·维尼亚尔，《作为区域/全球经济之都的开罗》
1 Singerman and Amar, Cairo Cosmopolitan, 99-152. Migration to the New Cities in the Greater Cairo Region: Causes and Consequences” (master’s thesis, American University in Cairo, 2011). 1 辛格曼与阿马尔，《开罗大都会》第 99-152 页。《大开罗地区新城市移民：动因与影响》（硕士论文，开罗美国大学，2011 年）
22 Patrick Haenni, L’ordre des caïds: Conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire (Paris: Karthala, 2005); Eric Denis, “La mise en scè¬ne des 'ashwaiyyât: Premier acte: Imbâba, décembre 1992,” Egypte/ Monde Arabe 20 (1994): 117-132.24; J.Baudrillard (1981), Simulacres et Simulation, 219. 22 帕特里克·海尼，《酋长秩序：化解开罗城市异见》（巴黎：卡尔塔拉出版社，2005 年）；埃里克·德尼，《阿什瓦伊亚特社区的舞台呈现：第一幕：因巴巴，1992 年 12 月》，《埃及/阿拉伯世界》第 20 期（1994 年）：117-132.24；让·鲍德里亚（1981 年），《拟像与仿真》，219 页。
24 Eberhard Kimulacres et Simulation, 219. Economic Reform in Egypt Delusion: Democracy and 2001). 24 埃伯哈德·基姆《拟像与仿真》第 219 页。《埃及经济改革幻象：民主与 2001 年》
CAIRO'S DESERT CITIES: A CHRONOLOGY 《开罗沙漠城市：编年史》
New target population … 750,000 Population 新目标人口...75 万
Census 1996 … 537,416 1996 年人口普查...537,416
Census 2006 … 649,571 2006 年人口普查...649,571
Total area … 64.97 km ^(2)^{2} 总面积…64.97 平方公里 ^(2)^{2}
Population density … 9,998.6ppl//km^(2)9,998.6 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2} 人口密度... 9,998.6ppl//km^(2)9,998.6 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2}
Built-up area … 12.25km^(2)12.25 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 建成区面积… 12.25km^(2)12.25 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
Helwan, known in ancient times as Alphocranon, is located 28 kilometers south of Cairo off the Nile. Sulfur springs were discovered there in the midnineteenth century, and in 1868 Khedive Ismail Pasha decided to build the Thermal Baths of Helwan and a grand hotel. A spa building and seventy-three villas were built, and “Helwan-Les-Bains” was born. After the liquidation of the khedive’s land in 1879 , the Ministry of Public Works commissioned the Austrian Wilhelm Reil to design a master plan. He produced a hygienist grid of 100 by 100 meters with twenty-meter-wide roads. The upper-class area (al-Izba Bahariyya) was divided in plots ranging from 1,650 square meters (a sixth of a block) to 10,000 square meters (the entire block). The plan also included areas for the working class. The street pattern followed a north-south orientation for good hygiene, ventilation, and mobility. It is still recognizable today, even if the area has densified and the heights have increased. The original villas became multi-story apartment buildings and the large plots were divided into smaller ones. In 1903, a railway line was constructed to connect the city to Cairo, which boosted the city’s development. After 1952, as part of Nasser’s plans to industrialize Egypt, Helwan became the country’s biggest industrial center, with iron, steel, textile, cement, and automobile factories. Subsidized public housing projects were built, with small units (45-65 square meters) distributed to lowincome families and government employees. Later on, informal settlements appeared. Urban migration and a rapidly expanding population exacerbated growth. Helwan was the first attempt to build on desert land in modern times. Although far from Cairo, it is well connected to it by rail and forms a successful urban development based on an urban core that developed into a functional and diverse city. 赫勒万（古称 Alphocranon）位于开罗以南 28 公里处的尼罗河畔。十九世纪中期当地发现硫磺泉后，赫迪夫伊斯梅尔帕夏于 1868 年决定在此建造赫勒万温泉浴场和豪华酒店。随着温泉疗养院及七十三栋别墅的落成，"赫勒万温泉镇"由此诞生。1879 年赫迪夫土地清算后，公共工程部委托奥地利人威廉·雷尔制定总体规划。他设计出以卫生为导向的 100×100 米网格布局，配备 20 米宽的道路。上流社区（al-Izba Bahariyya）地块面积从 1650 平方米（六分之一街区）到 10000 平方米（整个街区）不等，规划还包含工人阶层居住区。街道采用南北走向布局以确保卫生、通风和交通便利，这种格局至今仍可辨识——尽管建筑密度已显著增加，楼层高度也大幅提升，原有别墅改建为多层公寓，大型地块也被分割成更小单元。 1903 年，一条连接开罗的铁路线建成，推动了该市的发展。1952 年后，作为纳赛尔埃及工业化计划的一部分，赫勒万成为全国最大的工业中心，拥有钢铁、纺织、水泥和汽车制造厂。政府兴建了补贴性公共住房项目，将 45-65 平方米的小户型分配给低收入家庭和公职人员。后来逐渐出现非正规居住区。城市移民和人口激增加速了扩张进程。赫勒万是现代在沙漠地带进行城市建设的首次尝试。虽然远离开罗，但通过铁路紧密相连，依托城市核心区发展成功能多元的成功案例。
Initial target population qquad\qquad 初始目标人口 qquad\qquad
Census 1947 50,000 1947 年人口普查 50,000 人
Census 1960 1960 年人口普查
Census 2006 234,000 2006 年人口普查 234,000 人
Total area . 25km^(2)25 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 总面积 . 25km^(2)25 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
Population density … 9,360ppl//km^(2)9,360 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2} Built-up area 3.61km^(2)3.61 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 人口密度… 9,360ppl//km^(2)9,360 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2} 建成区 3.61km^(2)3.61 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
En route from Cairo Airport to downtown, one passes the district of Heliopolis and a peculiar sight: a solitary, Angkor-style villa. It was home to a Belgian railroad tycoon, Baron Edouard Empain, who created of the area, the second “new city” around Cairo after Helwan. Implementation took place between 1905 and 1930. Heliopolis was fundamentally a private enterprise: its vision was a personal initiative, and investment capital came from private individuals and European financial markets. Empain, via the Cairo Electric Railways and Heliopolis Oases Company, developed a resort-like district appealing to both the foreign and local bourgeoisie with leisure facilities such as the Palace Hotel (today the presidential palace), a racetrack, and an amusement park, around which the entire urban structure was organized. The eclectic architectural style was designed to suit wealthy Europeans and westernized Egyptians. Haussmann’s influence is felt through the architectural harmony and other urban-planning principles. The building heights, the number of floors, and the building coverage ratios were strictly regulated. Heliopolis was planned as an autonomous city, detached from Cairo but still connected to it by a rapid transit system. One wonders if Empain, owner of a streetcar company, created the city to sustain his business, or if the streetcar sustained his city. In any case, Heliopolis offered all of the necessary services without relying on Cairo. During the First World War, the area was turned into a British military base, and after the war the Europeans stayed, contributing to the consolidation of Heliopolis into a city. After the 1952 Revolution, the area became home to Cairo’s educated middle class. Modern residential blocks were constructed for the growing population. Heliopolis’s distinctive gardens gradually disappeared. As the capital expanded, the distance to Cairo shrunk, and the area is now an intrinsic part of the city. Today, Heliopolis is a flourishing district with 234,000 inhabitants, connected to the metro system and close to the airport. Its independence from downtown and its social and functional diversity are key elements, defining it as a successful example of a “new city.” 从开罗机场前往市区的途中，会经过赫利奥波利斯区，那里有一处独特的景观：一座孤零零的吴哥风格别墅。这里曾是比利时铁路大亨爱德华·安潘男爵的住所，他在这片区域打造了继赫勒万之后开罗周边的第二座"新城"。建设实施于 1905 至 1930 年间。赫利奥波利斯本质上是一项私营事业：其规划源于个人倡议，投资资本来自私人及欧洲金融市场。安潘通过开罗电气铁路与赫利奥波利斯绿洲公司，开发了一个度假胜地般的区域，以宫殿酒店（现总统府）、赛马场和游乐园等休闲设施吸引外国与本地资产阶级，整个城市结构都围绕这些设施布局。折衷主义的建筑风格专为富裕的欧洲人和西化的埃及人设计。奥斯曼的城市规划影响体现在建筑协调性及其他城市规划原则中。建筑高度、楼层数与容积率都受到严格管控。 赫利奥波利斯最初被规划为一座独立城市，与开罗保持距离但通过快速交通系统相连。人们不禁猜测，身为电车公司老板的恩潘建造这座城市究竟是为了维持他的生意，还是他的电车在维系这座城市。无论如何，赫利奥波利斯提供了所有必要服务设施，无需依赖开罗。第一次世界大战期间，该地区成为英军基地，战后欧洲人留居此地，促进了赫利奥波利斯向成熟城市的转型。1952 年革命后，这里逐渐成为开罗知识中产阶级的聚居地。为应对人口增长，现代住宅区拔地而起，赫利奥波利斯独具特色的花园景观逐渐消失。随着首都扩张，与开罗的距离不断缩短，如今该地区已成为城市不可分割的部分。现今的赫利奥波利斯是拥有 23.4 万人口的繁华城区，地铁通达且毗邻机场。其与市中心的独立性，以及社会功能多样性，使之成为"新城"建设的成功典范。
Fig. 5: Modern residential building, “Merryland Housing” 图 5：现代住宅建筑"欢乐城住宅区"
Fig. 6: Example of a typical neighborhood, Scale 1:1,000 图 6：典型社区示例，比例尺 1:1000
Initial target population qquad\qquad 初始目标人口 qquad\qquad
Population density qquad\qquad Population den 人口密度 qquad\qquad 人口密度
Following the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Nasser and the Free Officers pursued a revolutionary agenda, and agrarian reform and industrialization programs initiated an unprecedented period of infrastructure building and urbanization. Nasr City was once intended to be Egypt’s new capital, a modern city that would reflect the political and social ideology of the new regime. Indeed, it was labeled “City of the Revolution” and sought to establish an order for every aspect of citizens’ lives. In 1956, a team was formed to plan Nasr City. The Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Defense (the landowner), and the Governorate of Cairo established a planning commission under the Nasr City Society, which was led by Mahmoud Riad, a friend of President Nasser In 1959, a presidential decree was issued for the establishment of the new city. Five years later, the Nasr City Society was turned into a private company. Sayed Karim, who designed the city as a consulting architect, took command of the task. The major objectives of the Nasr City Society were to provide a new model for desert expansion, build new governmental headquarters, and create housing for government workers, as well as to alleviate the housing crisis in central Cairo by creating new residential areas for rental and ownership. The new city was planned for 1,200 square kilometers located east of the Abbassia district and south of Heliopolis. The initial master plan was composed of two parts, connected by the Nasr Road. The northwestern part was divided into large sectors, and housed public facilities, industrial zones, and new institutions representative of the new state. The southeastern part was made up of smaller sectors arranged in an orthogonal plan, which contained housing blocks and services organized around public gardens. This residential area was planned in 1960 to accommodate 200,000 inhabitants at full capacity, with a density of 25,000 habitants per square kilometer. Ultimately, Nasr City became a new district of Cairo, rather than an independent city, and is today a busy, dense, but pleasant area. 1952 年埃及革命后，纳赛尔与自由军官组织推行革命纲领，土地改革与工业化计划开启了一段史无前例的基础设施建设与城市化时期。纳赛尔城曾计划成为埃及的新首都，这座现代都市旨在体现新政权的政治与社会意识形态。它确实曾被冠以"革命之城"的称号，并试图为公民生活的方方面面建立秩序。1956 年，埃及组建了纳赛尔城规划团队。住房部、国防部（土地所有者）与开罗省在纳赛尔城协会下成立了规划委员会，由纳赛尔总统的朋友马哈茂德·里亚德领导。1959 年，总统令颁布建立这座新城。五年后，纳赛尔城协会改制为私营公司，担任咨询建筑师的赛义德·卡里姆接管了这项任务。 纳赛尔城协会的主要目标是为沙漠扩张提供新模式、建设新的政府总部、为政府工作人员提供住房，并通过开发新的租赁和产权住宅区来缓解开罗市中心的住房危机。这座新城规划占地 1200 平方公里，位于阿巴西耶区以东、赫利奥波利斯以南。最初的总体规划由两部分组成，通过纳赛尔路相连。西北部分划分为大型区域，设有公共设施、工业区以及代表新国家形象的机构；东南部分则由正交规划的小型区域构成，围绕公共花园布局住宅街区和服务设施。该住宅区于 1960 年规划，满负荷时可容纳 20 万居民，人口密度为每平方公里 2.5 万人。最终，纳赛尔城并未成为独立城市，而是发展为开罗的新城区，如今已成为一个繁忙密集却宜人的区域。
Fig. 1: Nasr City, surface: 59,520 feddans 图 1：纳赛尔城，占地面积：59,520 费丹
Fig. 5: Example of a typical residential neighborhood, scale 1:1,000 图 5：典型住宅区示例，比例尺 1:1000
Initial target population … 500,000 Population 初期目标人口...50 万
Census 1986… 528 1986 年人口普查...528 人
Census 1996 …35,354 1996 年人口普查...35,354 人
Census 2006…157,135 2006 年人口普查...157,135 人
Total area … 413km^(2)413 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 总面积... 413km^(2)413 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
Population density … 380.14 ppl/km² 人口密度...每平方公里 380.14 人
Driving away from downtown Cairo on the Twenty-Sixth of July highway towards the west, the informal settlements to the left and to the right are replaced by palm trees and agrarian land, in turn replaced later by yellow, sandy tracts of desert land. Soon, urban developments appear, and you see empty structures behind walls, advertised with spectacular renderings of lush gardens and pools, until you arrive at a denser, busy area of low-rise buildings from the 1970s. You have reached Sixth of October, the second oldest of the new towns, located thirty kilometers from Cairo. Established in 1980, it is named after the day that the Yom Kippur War broke out. Initially built as an industrial city, today it boasts an active commercial core revitalized by Syrian refugees, in addition to several private universities, malls, sprawling middle-class residential projects, and unreachable public-housing complexes. The city was designed by Ahmed Abdel Mohsen Wahdan, and was planned and constructed by Egyptian firms under the authority of the deputy minister of reconstruction Muhhamad Abd alAl and the General Office for Physical Planning (GOPP). Sixth of October was inaugurated in 1981 with an area of 47.88km^(2)47.88 \mathrm{~km}^{2}. The city limits were expanded in 1993 to bring the size of the city to 413 square kilometers. In the 2000 s, further extensions occurred. It is considered a successful desert city, though it has failed to generate the promised employment opportunities and reach the expected population numbers. The lack of transportation and relatively expensive housing offerings contribute to the city’s high vacancy rate, with most workers commuting from Cairo. 沿着七月二十六日高速公路从开罗市中心向西行驶，道路两侧的非正规聚居区逐渐被棕榈树和农田取代，继而又化作连绵的黄色沙地。不久后，城市开发项目开始显现——围墙后方矗立着空置的建筑群，巨幅广告牌上展示着绿意盎然的庭院与泳池效果图。当低矮的 1970 年代建筑群密集出现时，你已抵达距开罗三十公里的十月六日城——这座第二古老的新城以赎罪日战争爆发日命名。这座 1980 年建立的工业城如今焕发新生：叙利亚难民激活了商业核心区，私立大学群、购物中心、蔓延的中产阶级住宅项目与遥不可及的公共住房综合体共同构成城市图景。其规划由艾哈迈德·阿卜杜勒·穆赫辛·瓦赫丹主导，埃及企业在重建部副部长穆罕默德·阿卜杜勒与国土规划总局（GOPP）监管下实施建设。 十月六日城于 1981 年建成，占地面积为 47.88km^(2)47.88 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 。1993 年该市边界扩展后，城市面积达到 413 平方公里。进入 21 世纪后，该城又经历了进一步扩建。虽然未能实现承诺的就业机会和预期人口规模，它仍被视为成功的沙漠城市。交通不便及相对高昂的住房成本导致该城空置率居高不下，多数工作者仍从开罗通勤往返。
Fig. 3: Private apartments in Seventh District 图 3：第七区私人公寓
Fig. 4: Public housing in Sixth District 图 4：第六区公共住房
Fig. 5: Warehouse in the industrial district 图 5：工业区仓库
Fig. 6: Mixed-use building near Hosary Square 图 6：霍萨里广场附近的混合用途建筑
Fig. 7: Example of a neighborhood arranged along the central axis in the Sixth District, scale 1:1,000 图 7：第六区沿中轴线布局的社区示例，比例尺 1:1,000
Initial target population qquad\qquad 初始目标人口 qquad\qquad
New target population 新目标人口
Population 人口
Census 1986 1986 年人口普查
Census 1996 1996 年人口普查
Census 2006 2006 年人口普查
Total area 总面积
Population density 人口密度
El-Obour belongs to the first generation of new towns, and is a satellite city located thirty kilometers northeast of Cairo, near the international airport. It includes an industrial park, a wholesale produce market, and an exportprocessing zone. In 1978, the GOPP commissioned the German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to assist in the planning. A preliminary master plan was developed that included industrial zones, housing areas, and community facilities, and that supported owner-built, incremental construction on small plots. In 1982, a prime-ministerial decree designated a 42-squarekilometer site for el-Obour, with a target population of 250,000 inhabitants. But in 1983, the Ministry of Defense, superseding all other agencies, did not grant final approval for the plan and blocked implementation. Arab Contractors and the Urabi Cooperative, whose boards included army officers, subsequently engaged in land reclamation procedures, allowing its members to build “country houses.” GTZ abandoned planning in 1985. In early 1986, the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA, which is currently responsible for the development) and the Ministry of Defense agreed on a 21 -square-kilometer site for development. In late 1980s, the first public-housing neighborhoods were built, while later construction was funded by semi-governmental or private agencies within the framework of Mubarak’s privatization policy. A decade later, high-end neighborhoods appeared, eventually occupying half of the area, along with a private-developer compound called “Golf City.” Today, el-Obour is home to 43,802 inhabitants, and while it is considered by NUCA to be “the most successful new town,” it largely remains uninhabited. 奥布尔城属于第一代新城，是位于开罗东北方向三十公里处的卫星城，毗邻国际机场。该城设有工业园区、农产品批发市场及出口加工区。1978 年，埃及国家规划院委托德国技术合作署（GTZ）协助规划工作，制定了包含工业区、住宅区和社区设施的初步总体规划，支持小地块上业主自建的渐进式开发。1982 年总理令划定了 42 平方公里的奥布尔城建设用地，规划人口 25 万。但 1983 年国防部凌驾于所有机构之上，既未批准最终方案又阻挠实施。董事会由军官组成的阿拉伯承包商公司和乌拉比合作社随后启动土地复垦程序，允许其成员建造"乡间别墅"。德国技术合作署于 1985 年终止了规划工作。 1986 年初，新城市社区管理局（NUCA，现负责该地区开发）与国防部就 21 平方公里的开发用地达成协议。上世纪 80 年代末，首批公共住房社区建成，后续建设则在穆巴拉克私有化政策框架下由半政府或私营机构出资。十年后，高端社区开始出现，最终占据了该区域半壁江山，其中还包括一个名为"高尔夫城"的私营开发商综合体。如今，奥布尔城拥有 43,802 名居民，虽被 NUCA 誉为"最成功的新城"，但大部分区域仍处于空置状态。
Fig. 4: Residential public housing, “Mubarak Youth Housing” 图 4：公共住宅区，"穆巴拉克青年住房计划"
Fig. 5: Example of an individual subdivision neighborhood, scale 1:1,0001: 1,000 图 5：某独立分区社区示例，比例尺 1:1,0001: 1,000
Fig. 1: Fifteenth of May, surface: 3,500 feddans 图 1：五月十五日城，占地面积：3,500 费丹
Fifteenth of May 五月十五日
Initial target population … 180,000 规划初始人口…18 万
New target population 新目标人口
Population 人口
Census 1986 1986 年人口普查
Census 1996 1996 年人口普查
Census 2006 2006 年人口普查
Total area 总面积 9,032ppl//km^(2)9,032 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2}
… 9,032ppl//km^(2)9,032 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2}
nsity
Built-up area . 建成区
Even though President Anwar Sadat officially inaugurated the city of Fifteenth of May in 1978, it actually belongs to the three satellite towns (along with el-Obour and al-Badr) that originated in the 1956 Master Plan for Cairo and therefore predates the new-town program put in place by Sadat. Located 35 kilometers south of Cairo, it is a satellite of Helwan, on the eastern bank of the Nile, and differs in that sense from other new cities that are established in a vacuum, without linkage to existing settlements. The city is still in development, officially until 2032. This dormitory town of 1000 hectares, planned by architect Mohamed Ahmed el-Bahiy in collaboration with German engineers for the GOPP, is one of the largest industrial developments in Egypt-and features steel and concrete factories. A low-density area, Fifteenth of May is divided into six districts of 25,000 people each, with schools and green areas. Two districts form a “quarter” sharing administrative and commercial facilities. A geological survey from 2005 discovered that the area is located on a fault, and is potentially subject to earthquakes. 尽管安瓦尔·萨达特总统于 1978 年正式为五月十五日城举行落成典礼，但这座城市实际上属于 1956 年《开罗总体规划》中提出的三座卫星城（与奥布尔城、巴德尔城并列），因此其历史早于萨达特推行的新城计划。该城位于开罗以南 35 公里处，是尼罗河东岸赫勒万市的卫星城，这一特点使其与那些在空白地带新建、与现有聚居区无关联的其他新城有所不同。根据规划，这座城市将持续开发至 2032 年。这座占地 1000 公顷的卧城由建筑师穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·巴希与德国工程师团队为埃及城市规划总局共同设计，是埃及规模最大的工业开发区之一，拥有钢铁和混凝土工厂。作为低密度开发区，五月十五日城划分为六个居住区，每个区规划容纳 2.5 万人口，并配备学校和绿地。两个居住区组成一个"片区"，共享行政与商业设施。2005 年的地质勘测显示，该区域位于断层带上，存在地震风险。
Fig. 4: Middle-income housing building 图 4：中等收入住宅建筑
Fig. 5: Example of a typical public-housing neighborhood, scale 1:1,000 图 5：典型公共住宅社区示例，比例 1:1,000
Fig. 6: Example of a typical middle-income neighborhood, scale 1:1,000 图 6：典型中等收入社区示例，比例 1:1,000
Initial target population
qquad\qquad qquad\qquad
Census 1986 … 8,509 1986 年人口普查...8,509 人
Census 1996 … 47,833 1996 年人口普查...47,833 人
Census 2006 … 124,120 2006 年人口普查...124,120 人
Total area … 208km^(2)208 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 总面积... 208km^(2)208 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
Population density … 596.73ppl//km^(2)596.73 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2} 人口密度… 596.73ppl//km^(2)596.73 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2}
Built-up area\(15.1 \mathrm{~km}^{2}\)
In 1977, the inauguration of Tenth of Ramadan was broadcast on national television. A still frame from that broadcast shows military officers in front of a large billboard depicting former president Anwar Sadat with images of factories and greenery, as well as the logo of the new town. Tenth of Ramadan was indeed the first desert city built in Egypt after the publication in 1973 of President Sadat’s October Working Paper, even though, like Fifteenth of May, its site was already included in the 1956 Master Plan. Synonymous with Sixth of October, the city is named after the day of Egypt’s victory against Israel, albeit according to the Muslim calendar. Located on the Cairo-Suez Road, it was planned as a self-sustaining, industry-based city with residential areas for factory workers. Contracted by the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1974, the Swedish firm SWECO, in association with the Egyptian office Shawky-Zeitoun (later COPA), proposed a master plan based on a strict segregation of functions, low density (with sixty percent unbuilt space), and the concentration of commercial and administrative functions on a central axis. Residential districts were subdivided into smaller neighborhoods with a school, mosque, or administrative building in the center. The housing planned for factory workers ended up being sold to middle-class households, and most employees commute to Cairo every day. Nevertheless, the layout of Tenth of Ramadan generated principles that were replicated later in other desert cities. Due to its strategic position between Cairo and the Suez Canal, the city is considered a semi-success. 1977 年，斋月十日城的落成典礼通过国家电视台播出。转播画面中的定格镜头显示，军官们站在巨幅宣传板前，板上绘有前总统安瓦尔·萨达特的肖像，背景是工厂与绿地的图案，以及这座新城的标志。尽管与五月十五日城一样，其选址早在 1956 年的总体规划中就已确定，但斋月十日城确实是萨达特总统 1973 年发布《十月工作文件》后，埃及兴建的第一座沙漠城市。与十月六日城类似，该城以埃及对以色列取得胜利的日期（按伊斯兰历计算）命名。它位于开罗-苏伊士公路沿线，规划为以工业为基础的自给自足城市，设有工厂工人居住区。1974 年受重建部委托，瑞典 SWECO 公司联合埃及 Shawky-Zeitoun 事务所（后更名为 COPA）制定了总体规划方案，其核心特点是严格的功能分区、低密度开发（60%未建设空间）以及商业行政功能沿中央轴线集中布局。 住宅区被细分为更小的社区单元，每个社区中心都设有学校、清真寺或行政办公楼。原本为工厂工人规划的住宅最终出售给了中产阶级家庭，大多数雇员每天通勤往返开罗。尽管如此，十月六日城的规划布局形成了可复制的范式，后来被其他沙漠城市效仿。由于地处开罗与苏伊士运河之间的战略位置，这座城市被视为半成功案例。
Fig. 4: Residential public housing, “Mubarak Youth Housing” 图 4：住宅公共住房项目"穆巴拉克青年住房"
Cairo Desert Cities 开罗沙漠城市
Fig. 5: Example of a typical industrial area, scale 1:1,0001: 1,000 图 5：典型工业区示例，比例 1:1,0001: 1,000
Tenth of Ramadan 斋月十日城
Fig. 6: Example of a typical residential compound, scale 1:1,000 图 6：典型住宅区示例，比例 1:1000
Initial target population 初期目标人口
New target population 新目标人口 qquad\qquad
Population 人口
Census 1986 … 0 1986 年人口普查…0
Census 1996 … 248 1996 年人口普查...248 人
Census 2006 … 17,000 2006 年人口普查...17,000 人
Total area 672km^(2)672 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 总面积 672km^(2)672 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
Population density … 25 ppl/km² 人口密度...25 人/平方公里
Built-up area 建成区
Of all the desert cities of Cairo, al-Badr is the most remotely located, and is a mysteriously vacant city like most, both in character and in numbers. Al-Badr is part of the first generation of industrial new towns that aimed to create free zones for export-oriented industries, using public and private investments. Despite its strategic location-45 kilometers away from Cairo on the Cairo-Suez Desert Road-and tax incentives, the city remains 71 percent vacant. According to the original plan, the city would have been developed in five phases over a fifteen-year period. Drafted in 1982, the plan presented a heterogeneous mix of programs and divided the city in two. The western part includes the residential areas that encompass 16,000 subsidized units and 3000 housing units for the middle classes, along with commercial, governmental, and health services. The eastern side of the city consists of the industrial and warehouse area, with 129 factories of various types, including the medical, technological, food-processing, and manufacturing industries. In 1996, the city counted 248 inhabitants, versus the expected 250,000 . A second master plan by private investors and a foreign developer, Ökoplan, was launched, with high-end residential units, leisure facilities, tourist services, and elite educational centers such as the Egyptian Russian University, which was built in 2006. At present, al-Badr has reached a population of 17,000 inhabitants, but it remains a rather desolated patchwork of incomplete buildings and infrastructure. It is a favored location to resettle families displaced by Cairo’s informal-settlement clearance schemes. 在开罗所有的沙漠城市中，巴德尔地理位置最为偏远。与大多数同类城市一样，无论是从城市特质还是人口数量来看，这都是一座神秘的空城。作为第一代工业新城之一，巴德尔旨在通过公私合营投资模式，打造面向出口加工业的自由贸易区。尽管坐拥距离开罗仅 45 公里的战略要地（位于开罗-苏伊士沙漠公路沿线）并享有税收优惠政策，该城空置率仍高达 71%。根据最初规划，这座城市本应在十五年内分五期完成开发。1982 年制定的规划方案呈现多元复合功能布局，将城市划分为东西两区：西区为住宅组团，包含 1.6 万套保障性住房和 3000 套中产阶级住宅，配套商业、政府机构及医疗设施；东区为工业仓储区，分布着 129 家涵盖医疗、科技、食品加工及制造业等各类工厂。截至 1996 年，该市实际居民仅 248 人，与预期 25 万人口规模相去甚远。 由私人投资者和外国开发商Ökoplan 提出的第二份总体规划开始实施，规划包含高端住宅单元、休闲设施、旅游服务以及精英教育中心（如 2006 年建成的埃及俄罗斯大学）。目前，巴德尔城人口已达 1.7 万，但这里仍是一片由未完工建筑和基础设施拼凑而成的荒凉之地。该地区是安置开罗非正规住区清理计划中搬迁家庭的首选地点。
Fig. 4: Medium-sized residential building 图 4：中型住宅楼
Fig. 5: Example of a typical residential neighborhood, scale 1:1,000 图 5：典型住宅区示例，比例尺 1:1000
Initial target population 初期目标人口
New target population qquad\qquad 新目标人口 qquad\qquad
Population 人口
Census 2006 …118,678 2006 年人口普查…118,678 人
Total area 总面积
Population density … 338,11ppl//km^(2)338,11 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2} Built-up area … 42.7km^(2)42.7 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 人口密度… 338,11ppl//km^(2)338,11 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2} 建成区面积… 42.7km^(2)42.7 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
New Cairo is a large real estate development that was initiated by the Egyptian military under the Mubarak government. The city lies to the southeast of Cairo, 10 kilometers from Nasr City and outside of the ring road. Established in 2000 by Mubarak via presidential decree, it is considered a second-generation city, and is now one of the largest of the twenty new cities. Today, the city covers an area of 351 square kilometers, and includes residential, service, industrial, tourist, and recreational zones. New Cairo is planned to eventually be home to four million inhabitants in 69,764 units. The city’s rapid pace of development was sustained by a rise in revenues and an opening-up to foreign investment. While the development was initially planned as a mixed-use project with a varied program, the subdivided land is now exploited, in a manner counter to the original plan, by investors and developers (both domestic and foreign) as well as the military. These actors are mainly interested in residential development, and thus the industrial sector has still not been allowed to develop any land. Instead, large swaths of the city are allocated for the creation of luxury residential compounds, offering an attractive alternative to life in urban Cairoan escape from the dense crowds and pollution found in the city center. The prices for both residential units and municipal services are high. New Cairo is not associated with any affordable housing programs. The city has grown in the form of dispersed patches of exclusive luxury housing, shopping malls, educational facilities, and sports clubs with golf courses. Housing and education (as offered by the American University in Cairo and the German University in Cairo) only cater to high-income populations. Moreover, the absence of public transportation infrastructure functions as a social barrier to keep poorer populations away. New Cairo is an example of top-down, profit-driven development resulting in a segregated city based on capital and differentiation among peers-with questionable urban qualities. 新开罗是由埃及军方在穆巴拉克政府时期启动的大型房地产开发项目。该城位于开罗东南方向，距纳赛尔城 10 公里，地处环城公路外侧。2000 年穆巴拉克通过总统令建立该城，被视为第二代城市，现已成为二十座新城中规模最大的之一。如今该城占地 351 平方公里，包含住宅区、服务区、工业区、旅游区和休闲区。根据规划，新开罗最终将在 69,764 个住宅单元内容纳四百万居民。城市发展的快速推进得益于收入增长和对外资开放政策。虽然最初规划为包含多元功能的综合开发项目，但如今细分土地已被国内外投资者、开发商及军方以违背原计划的方式开发利用。这些主体主要对住宅开发感兴趣，因此工业区至今仍未获准开发任何土地。 相反，这座城市的大片区域被规划用于建造豪华住宅区，为开罗都市生活提供了诱人的替代选择——逃离市中心拥挤的人群和污染。无论是住宅单元还是市政服务，价格都居高不下。新开罗与任何经济适用房计划都毫无关联。这座城市以分散的豪华住宅区、购物中心、教育设施以及配备高尔夫球场的体育俱乐部等形式扩张。住房和教育资源（如开罗美国大学和开罗德国大学提供的服务）仅面向高收入群体。此外，公共交通基础设施的缺失形成了一道社会屏障，将贫困人口阻隔在外。新开罗是自上而下、利润驱动型开发的典型案例，最终形成了一座基于资本和阶层差异的隔离之城——其城市品质令人存疑。
Fig. 1: New Cairo, surface: 70,000 feddans 图 1：新开罗，占地面积：70,000 费丹
Fig. 2: New Cairo, 1:30,000 图 2：新开罗，比例尺 1:30,000
Fig. 3: Private villa 图 3：私人别墅
Fig. 4: Luxury apartment building 图 4：豪华公寓大楼
Fig. 5: Example of a typical villa in a gated community with golf course, scale 1:1,0001: 1,000 图 5：某高尔夫球场封闭社区内的典型别墅示例，比例尺 1:1,0001: 1,000
Initial target population qquad\qquad 初始目标人口 qquad\qquad
New target population qquad\qquad 新目标人口 qquad\qquad
Population 人口
Census 2006 … 29,553 2006 年普查... 29,553 人
Total area . 43.62km^(2)43.62 \mathrm{~km}^{2} 总面积 . 43.62km^(2)43.62 \mathrm{~km}^{2}
Population density 人口密度 qquad\qquad667.5ppl//km^(2)667.5 \mathrm{ppl} / \mathrm{km}^{2}
Sheikh Zayed is a second-generation city established in 1995, following Presidential Decree 325. Located 24 kilometers away from Cairo, it neighbors Sixth of October. It owes its name to its main financial backer, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the former president of the United Arab Emirates and cofounder of Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. There were 29,500 inhabitants in 2006. Sheikh Zayed is divided into seventeen neighborhoods, each split into four sections and featuring services, mosques, and markets. Areas are segregated according to social class, from middle income to high income. This structure can be traced back to the nature of the investors and their favored built typologies: private developers, together with investors from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, consulting firms, and local architects such as Al Bayt, Al Rabwah, and SODIC (developer of Beverly Hills and Allegria), which produce gated communities. Overall, around 73,000 units were constructed, of which 15,000 were implemented by NUCA and 58,000 by private investors. Sheikh Zayed is considered one of the most successful new towns, as it offers some work opportunities along with good living conditions, health services, the Faculty of Engineering of Cairo University, mega malls (Carrefour, Hyper One, Mall of Arabia), and local and international banks (HSBC, Piraeus Bank, CIB, Banque Misr, and National Bank of Egypt). Lacking public transportation, and thus inaccessible to residents with modest means, Sheikh Zayed is largely a city of gated communities and a privatized, segregated environment for privileged Egyptians. 谢赫扎耶德是依据 1995 年第 325 号总统令建立的第二代城市，距开罗 24 公里，毗邻十月六日城。其名称源自主要资金支持者——阿联酋前总统、阿布扎比发展基金联合创始人谢赫·扎耶德·本·苏丹·阿勒纳哈扬。2006 年该城居民数为 29,500 人。整座城市划分为 17 个社区，每个社区又分为四个片区，配备服务设施、清真寺与市场。区域按社会阶层划分，从中产阶层延伸至高收入群体。这种结构可追溯至投资者性质及其偏好的建筑类型：私营开发商联合阿联酋、沙特投资者，咨询公司以及本地建筑事务所（如 Al Bayt、Al Rabwah 和开发了比佛利山庄与阿莱格里亚的 SODIC）共同打造了封闭式社区。总计建成约 73,000 套住宅单元，其中 15,000 套由国家城市社区管理局承建，58,000 套来自私人投资者。 谢赫扎耶德城被视为最成功的新城镇之一，它提供就业机会、优质生活条件、医疗服务、开罗大学工程学院校区、大型购物中心（家乐福、Hyper One、阿拉伯商城）以及本土与国际银行（汇丰银行、比雷埃夫斯银行、埃及国际商业银行、埃及银行和埃及国家银行）。由于缺乏公共交通系统，中低收入居民难以进入，谢赫扎耶德城主要由封闭式社区构成，成为埃及特权阶层专属的私有化隔离空间。
Fig. 3: Villa with enclosed garden 图 3：带封闭花园的别墅
Fig. 4: Residential building 图 4：住宅楼
Fig. 5: Medium-sized residential building 图 5：中型住宅楼
Fig. 6: Villa with enclosed garden and pool 图 6：带封闭花园与泳池的别墅
Fig. 7: Example of a gated community with villas overlooking a golf course, scale 1:1,0001: 1,000 图 7：某封闭式社区示例，别墅群俯瞰高尔夫球场，比例尺 1:1,0001: 1,000
Initial target population
qquad\qquad
Census 2006 2006 年人口普查
Madinaty is a gated community and extension of New Cairo located in the eastern desert, 33 kilometers from downtown along the road to Suez. It is a paradigmatic case of the speculative urbanization processes that have been in force in Egypt since the 1990s. Madinaty occupies 3,360 hectares and targets a population of 600,000 inhabitants in 120,000 units by 2025 . The master plan contains all the amenities needed to attract wealthy locals and foreigners: exclusive housing units, recreational and commercial facilities, shopping malls, business hubs, luxury resorts, and sport and entertainment facilities. A hierarchy of linear and curving roads creates an ambiguous patchwork of various land uses, different densities, and segregated income classes. The architecture of Madinaty is a confusing mix of American styles and monumental orientalism, combining pitched roofs and arches-and with everything in light pastel colors. Two-story villas surrounding a golf course, seven-story housing buildings organized around pedestrian areas, and a monumental, Luxor-like gate are among the memorable components of this pretentious urbanism. The developer, TMG Holding (controlled by the Talaat Moustafa family), is entrenched in controversy. TMG Holding is also the developer for various gated communities (i.e. el-Rehab in New Cairo) as well as high-end resorts along the Red Sea. TMG hired North American designers (HHCP from Orlando, Florida; SWA from Pasadena, California; and Sasaki Associates from Watertown, Massachusetts) to develop the master plan, the architecture, and the landscape plan. In 2005, TMG acquired land for Madinaty without a public auction, thanks to connections with Mubarak’s government; for this land deal, TMG currently faces two legal suits. Additionally, less than nine years from the expected completion date, Madinaty is less than fifty percent built, remaining a deserted landscape of miscalculations. 迈迪纳蒂是一座封闭式社区，也是新开罗向东延伸的沙漠新城，距市中心 33 公里，位于通往苏伊士的公路上。作为埃及自 1990 年代以来投机性城市化进程的典型案例，该项目占地 3360 公顷，计划到 2025 年建成 12 万套住宅，容纳 60 万人口。总体规划囊括了吸引富裕阶层及外籍人士的全套设施：专属住宅区、休闲商业配套、购物中心、商务枢纽、豪华度假村以及文体娱乐场所。层级分明的直线与曲线道路网络，将不同功能分区、开发密度和收入群体割裂成模糊的拼贴画。建筑风格混杂了美式设计元素与夸张的东方主义符号——坡屋顶与拱形结构交织，整体采用浅淡的糖果色调。高尔夫球场环绕的双层别墅、步行街区布局的七层住宅群，以及仿卢克索神庙风格的巨型门楼，共同构成了这种浮夸都市主义的标志性景观。 开发商 TMG 控股（由塔拉特·穆斯塔法家族控制）深陷争议漩涡。该公司还开发了多个封闭式社区（如新开罗的 el-Rehab）以及红海沿岸的高端度假村。TMG 聘请了北美设计团队（佛罗里达州奥兰多的 HHCP、加利福尼亚州帕萨迪纳的 SWA 以及马萨诸塞州沃特敦的 Sasaki Associates）负责总体规划、建筑设计和景观规划。2005 年，凭借与穆巴拉克政府的关系，TMG 未经公开拍卖就获得了 Madinaty 项目的土地，这笔土地交易目前面临两起法律诉讼。此外，距离预计竣工日期不足九年，Madinaty 的建设进度仍不足 50%，这片误判频出的荒芜之地依旧满目萧索。
Fig. 4: Madinaty, housing units in area 1-11-1, scale 1:10,0001: 10,000 图 4：Madinaty 1-11-1 区域住宅单元，比例尺 1:10,0001: 10,000
Fig. 5: Detail of housing area with type “No. 400” buildings, scale 1:1,000 图 5：采用"400 号"建筑类型的住宅区局部详图，比例尺 1:1000
DESERT CITIES TODAY 今日沙漠城市
LIVING IN DESERT CITIES 生活在沙漠城市
Interviews with Eman Farouk, Rana El Rashidy, Ahmed El 对伊曼·法鲁克、拉娜·埃尔·拉希迪、艾哈迈德·埃尔
Melegy, Reem El Attar, and Aly El Shafei 梅莱吉、里姆·埃尔·阿塔尔和阿里·埃尔·沙菲的访谈
While many claim that the new towns in the desert around Cairo have failed to reach their population targets, these urban agglomerations are far from being really deserted. People actually do live, work, and study there. Eman, Rana, Ahmed, Reem, and Aly are inhabitants and users of New Cairo, Sixth of October, and other desert cities. 尽管许多人声称开罗周边沙漠新城未能达到人口目标，这些城市群远非真正荒芜之地。实际上人们确实在那里生活、工作和学习。伊曼、拉娜、艾哈迈德、里姆和阿里都是新开罗、十月六日城等沙漠城市的居民和使用者。
EMAN FAROUK 伊曼·法鲁克
Eman Ahmed Farouk is a twenty-two-year-old architecture student at the German 伊曼·艾哈迈德·法鲁克是一名 22 岁的建筑系学生，就读于德国
University of Cairo who lives in an apartment owned by her parents in an area called “AlNozha El-Gedida,” close to the airport. She has lived there all of her life, and considers her neighborhood very lively. She has a good relationship with her neighbors, sometimes talking to them from one balcony to another. In her apartment building, there is no bawab, the typical concierge-cum-security guard, but rather only a guard who watches over cars and the area. She has been familiar with desert cities as long as she can remember. Her family lives scattered in several locations, all in new towns around Cairo. Eman’s grandmother lives in Tenth of Ramadan, her uncle attended university in the area, and her father works there as well. Eman’s family owns two houses besides the one she is currently living in. Her mother owns an apartment in a building in Tenth of Ramadan, which was originally built by her grandfather after he bought the land and decided to build a family house with apartments for each member of the family. Her father is building another apartment in New Cairo. Her weekends are divided between spending time at her house, staying with her grandmother in Nasr City in Cairo, and sometimes staying with her other grandmother in Tenth of Ramadan. 开罗大学学生，现居父母名下位于机场附近"新诺兹哈区"的公寓。她在此地度过整个成长岁月，认为社区充满活力。与邻里关系融洽，时常隔着阳台闲话家常。所在公寓楼没有传统意义上的门房兼保安（bawab），仅设一名负责看管车辆及区域的警卫。自记事起便对沙漠新城耳熟能详——家族成员分散居住于开罗周边多个卫星城：祖母定居十月六日城，叔父曾在该区就读大学，父亲亦在此工作。除现居公寓外，家族另有两处房产：母亲名下拥有十月六日城某栋公寓楼的单元，该楼原由外祖父购地后兴建，旨在为每位家族成员打造独立居所；父亲目前正在新开罗区营建另一套公寓。 她的周末时间分配如下：有时待在自己家，有时去开罗纳斯尔城陪伴祖母，偶尔也会去十月六日城看望另一位外祖母。
Eman’s day 伊曼的日常
Living in desert cities 生活在沙漠之城
Acts of informality 非正规行为
Residential situation 居住情况
Desert-city developments 沙漠城市发展
I wake up at 6:30 a.m. and take the bus to university from 7:15 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. I spend the day there and then I go back home. That’s it. Sometimes, maybe once or twice a week, I go out with friends in the afternoon to a café in New Cairo. 我每天早晨 6:30 起床，7:15 到 8:00 乘公交去大学。白天都在学校度过，然后直接回家。每周大概有一两次例外，下午会和朋友去新开罗的咖啡馆小聚。
Generally, it is more quiet than in Cairo. It’s true that there are very few shops and grocery stores, but this is improving. But for transportation, if you don’t have a car, you can’t go anywhere. My mother takes me places. In smaller areas, like in Tenth of Ramadan, it is possible to walk a bit. 这里比开罗安静得多。虽然商店和杂货店确实很少，但情况正在改善。不过交通方面，如果没有车就寸步难行，平时都是母亲开车带我出行。在十月六日城这样的小区域，倒是可以步行活动。
I noticed that people started to build higher buildings, and in my area, since it is near to the airport, this is forbidden. 我注意到人们开始建造更高的楼房，但由于我们片区靠近机场，这种高层建筑是被明令禁止的。
We live in an apartment building that belongs to the family. My mother owns one apartment in the building. 我们住在家族所有的公寓楼里，母亲拥有其中的一套公寓。
My grandmother bought a plot in Tenth of Ramadan from the government. Because both my parents are architects, they designed the building and my father took over the construction management. 祖母当初从政府手中购买了十月六日城的地块。由于父母都是建筑师，他们亲自设计了这栋楼，并由父亲负责施工管理。
The construction process is slow, as it depends on the amount of money available. One part is constructed first, and then work is suspended until there is enough capital to resume. This happens 建造过程十分缓慢，因为这取决于可用资金的多少。通常先完成其中一部分工程，随后暂停施工直至筹集到足够资金才会继续。这种情况会反复出现
Living in Desert Cities 生活在沙漠之城
several times, so construction can take years. None of my relatives have bought a finished house. 多次，因此整个工程可能耗时数年。我的亲戚中没有一个人购买过完工的现房。
Future of 未来前景
There is high demand. Many people want to live away from new towns crowded Cairo in secured compounds, aiming for a luxurious dream and willing to buy an apartment or villa. Some do not consider Tenth of Ramadan a good residential option because there are no gated areas. 需求旺盛。许多人渴望远离拥挤的开罗新城，住进安保严密的封闭社区，追求奢华梦想，甘愿购置公寓或别墅。部分人认为斋月十日城并非理想居住选择，因为那里缺乏封闭式社区。
"None of my relatives or family bought a finished house". "我的亲戚和家人从没买过现房"。
RANA EL RASHIDY 拉娜·埃尔·拉希迪
Rana El Rashidy is a twenty-one-year-old architecture student at the German University of Cairo, who lives in an apartment owned by her parents in an area of Cairo called “Manya” together with her sister, brother, and parents. Her aunt lives with her family in the apartment above and her grandparents across the street. She has lived there since the 2000s, moving from Nasr City, where she had lived since she was seven years old. Both of her parents work at Kasr Alaini (the biggest hospital in Cairo, located in Manya). Her aunt previously lived in the Fifth Settlement, and Rana’s parents have bought a plot in Sixth of October, where they started construction on a house in 2003. It was completed around 2010, but her other grandmother did not move there until 2015. The idea of living in a desert city was exciting for Rana, even though she is attached to her family in downtown Cairo; life is more vibrant there, with several country clubs and facilities. She commutes every day to university with the campus bus. It takes her 35 minutes in the morning, and up to an hour and a half to go back home. There are microbuses from Manya to the Fifth Settlement, but she prefers not to use them. Microbuses have unreliable timetables, stops, and routes, and are not considered safe. Rana mostly spends her weekends in Sixth of October, which she considers her second home. Her sister got married and now lives there, as well as her grandmother, who moved there a year ago. On school days, she mainly goes out for leisure to the area around her university in the Fifth Settlement. 拉娜·埃尔·拉希迪是开罗德国大学 21 岁的建筑系学生，与姐姐、弟弟和父母同住在开罗"曼尼亚"区一套父母所有的公寓里。她的姑姑一家住在楼上公寓，祖父母则住在街对面。自 2000 年代从七岁起居住的纳斯尔城搬来后，她便在此定居。父母都在卡斯尔阿尼医院（开罗最大的医院，位于曼尼亚区）工作。姑姑曾住在第五定居区，而拉娜父母在十月六日城购置了地块，2003 年动工建房，约 2010 年完工，但另一位祖母直到 2015 年才搬入。尽管留恋开罗市中心与家人相伴的热闹生活——那里有众多乡村俱乐部和便利设施，但沙漠城市的生活构想仍令拉娜兴奋。她每天乘坐校车通勤上学，早晨耗时 35 分钟，返家则需一个半小时。虽然曼尼亚有开往第五定居区的小巴，但她更倾向于不乘坐。 小巴车的时间表、站点和路线都不可靠，且安全性欠佳。拉娜大部分周末都在十月六日城度过，她将那里视为第二故乡。她的姐姐婚后定居于此，祖母也于一年前搬来同住。上学期间，她主要在第五定居区大学周边区域进行休闲活动。
Rana’s family owns two additional homes: a villa with two rooftop apartments in Sixth of October, and one house in Maadi. The building in Sixth of October cost two hundred pounds per square meter, but she claims that with inflation, it ended up costing around two thousand pounds per square meter. Relationships with her neighbors are nonexistent. The neighborhood is very quiet because it is not fully occupied, with possibly a fifty to sixty percent occupancy rate. 拉娜家另有两处房产：十月六日城一栋带两套顶层公寓的别墅，以及迈阿迪的一处住宅。十月六日城的建筑当初每平方米造价两百镑，但她表示算上通货膨胀，最终成本达到每平方米约两千镑。她与邻居们毫无往来。由于入住率仅约五六成，整个社区显得异常安静。
The family hired a bawab to take care of the building starting with the beginning of construction. He is staying with his family in a two-room apartment on the ground floor, next to the parking spaces. The bawab uses the empty central lot for farming small crops such as molokhiya, cabbage, and so on. Rana’s parents bought the building both as an investment and to fulfill the family’s desire for a “dream house.” Each of the siblings will get his or her own flat. Renting the empty apartments is not an option. 这家人从施工初期就雇了位看门人负责照看整栋楼。他和家人住在一楼紧邻停车位的两居室里，利用中央空地种植锦葵、卷心菜等小作物。拉娜父母买下这栋楼既是投资，也为圆全家人的"梦想之家"——每个子女都能分到专属公寓，空置单元绝不外租。
Rana’s day 拉娜的一天
I wake up at 5:30 a.m. and take the bus at 6:30 a.m.; I reach school 我清晨 5:30 起床，6:30 乘公交，到学校
p.m., and I take the bus and arrive at home around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. I eat, work a bit, and sleep by 11:00 or 12:00 p.m. 下午，我搭乘公交约 7:30 至 8:00 到家。吃完晚饭稍作工作，11 点或午夜前入睡。
Opinion on desert cities 关于沙漠城市的看法
My city is not complete yet. All the planned areas are empty, just sand, like in most of the new cities. Compounds look a little better because houses have to be finished before selling, and so it looks more or less complete. But in general, outside of the compounds, like in my house’s case, the infrastructure is half finished, incomplete. Services don’t really reach you, not like in downtown. It feels like a huge effort will be needed before people can start moving in. There is no real connection to the city, to downtown Cairo, to Sixth of October, and so on. Maintenance of the road network is also an issue: the ring road, for instance, is not well maintained, and there are a lot of accidents. 我的城市尚未建成。所有规划区域都空荡荡的，只有黄沙，和大多数新城一样。封闭社区的情况稍好，因为房屋必须完工才能出售，所以看起来相对完整。但总体而言，在社区之外——比如我家所在区域——基础设施只完成了一半。公共服务远未到位，与市中心截然不同。感觉需要付出巨大努力才能达到宜居标准。这里与开罗市区、十月六日城等主要区域缺乏有效连接。道路维护也是问题：比如环城公路养护不善，事故频发。
"Outside the compounds—infrastructure is half finished." "社区之外——基础设施只完成了一半"
During the 2011 revolution 2011 年革命期间
Living situation 居住现状
Desert-city developments 沙漠城市发展
Future of new towns 新城的未来
We didn’t go to Sixth of October much during that time. We were worried that people would break in and squat the building-we heard of things like that happening-but the bawab was checking on our place every now and then. Some people moved during the revolution thinking desert cities would be safer. 那时候我们很少去十月六日城。总担心会有人破门而入强占房子——听说这类事时有发生——不过看门人时不时会去查看我们的房子。革命期间有些人搬去了沙漠城市，觉得那里会更安全些。
We have a villa with two apartments. My family started building it from scratch. We bought the land when the city plan was just zones. We were picking it blindly. You buy the land and the number of square meters that you can just afford. Over the years, you build brick by brick. 我们拥有一栋带两套公寓的别墅。我的家人从零开始建造它。当初购买这块地时，城市规划还只是分区图纸。我们几乎是盲选——买下力所能及面积的土地，然后年复一年地一砖一瓦慢慢建造。
This is the one thing that is going steady in Cairo. People are buying more and more. Even though there is a saturation of the housing market, people are still buying. I am not sure when it will be clear that we have enough. 这是开罗为数不多保持稳定发展的事。人们购房需求持续增长，即便住房市场已趋饱和，交易仍在进行。我不确定要到何时才能明确判断供给已足够。
I think the new generation has a different mindset. We have really urgent issues. Young couples are finding it difficult to find a home. This is something urgent that could be disruptive, socially. This kind of new-town development is not affordable for this generation. I hope people will be more open to renting, for instance. 我认为新生代有着不同的思维方式。我们面临着真正紧迫的问题——年轻夫妇难以安家，这可能引发社会层面的动荡。这类新城开发项目对这代人而言难以负担。我希望人们能更开放地接受租房等替代方案。
AHMED EL MELEGY 艾哈迈德·埃尔·梅莱吉
Ahmed El Melegy is a twenty-six-year-old architect currently working in an architectural firm and as a teaching assistant at a private university. He had been living in Fayyum with his parents and brother, but recently moved to a rented apartment in Sixth of October. His neighborhood is still deserted. A bawab is responsible for guarding the house, and tends to the public gardens. 艾哈迈德·埃尔·梅莱吉是一位 26 岁的建筑师，目前就职于一家建筑事务所，同时在一所私立大学担任助教。他原本与父母和兄弟住在法尤姆，但最近搬到了十月六日城的一间出租公寓。他所在的社区至今仍人烟稀少，由一名看门人负责看守房屋并打理公共花园。
From Sixth Of October, he mostly commutes every day to his work by car, and sometimes by minibus. Although the distance is short and can be covered on foot, the road conditions make this impossible. Ahmed has lived in desert cities since he came to Egypt to study (he was previously living in the Gulf), as most of the private universities are located in desert cities. 从十月六日城出发，他通常每天开车通勤上班，偶尔也会乘坐小巴。虽然距离很近步行即可抵达，但路况条件使得这一想法无法实现。艾哈迈德自来到埃及求学（此前他生活在海湾地区）起就一直居住在沙漠新城，因为大多数私立大学都坐落于此。
Ahmed’s parents own a new, unfinished house in Sixth of October, and another, also unfinished, in the new town of Shorouk City, which is located east of Cairo. His weekends are spent with family in Fayyum, but for hanging out during the week, he goes to Sixth of October where there are malls, cafés, and other facilities. 艾哈迈德的父母在十月六日城拥有一栋未完工的新房，在开罗东部的新城舒鲁克城还有另一处同样未竣工的房产。他的周末时光多在法尤姆与家人共度，但平日的休闲娱乐则会前往十月六日城——那里有购物中心、咖啡馆等各类设施。
Ahmed’s day I spend most of the morning on campus, and the rest of the day at work. At night I will be at home, or maybe I will meet some friends. 艾哈迈德的一天 我大部分上午时间都在校园度过，其余时间则在工作。晚上我会待在家里，或者可能去见些朋友。
Living in a new It would be very hard to live there without a car, because the town distances between residential areas, commercial zones, and religious facilities are very large. Walking, especially in the summer, is impossible. 在新城生活 没有汽车会非常困难，因为住宅区、商业区和宗教场所之间的城镇距离非常遥远。步行出行，尤其是在夏天，根本不可能实现。
During the 2011 2011 年期间
People interacted more with their neighbors. For instance, it was difficult to buy or find food, and so there was a community effort. People who went to the supermarket to buy big bags of groceries sold them to their neighbors at lower prices. 人们与邻居的互动更多。例如，当时很难购买或找到食物，因此出现了社区互助行动。去超市采购大袋食品的人会以更低的价格转卖给邻居们。
Living situation A villa composed of six apartments. 由六套公寓组成的别墅居住环境
Desert-city 沙漠之城
My family registered for the plot lottery at the neighborhood center. developments Unfortunately we didn’t win, so we had to buy a plot from someone who won it, at a higher price. We started construction, supervised by one of our relatives, who is an architect and whom we trust because he is a family member. 我家在社区中心登记参加了地块抽签。遗憾的是我们没能中签，只好以更高价格从一位中签者手中购买地块。我们开始施工时，由一位身为建筑师的亲戚负责监督，因为他是家庭成员，我们信得过他。
"I do think that there will be more people living in new towns in the future." "我确实认为未来会有更多人住进新城镇。"
Future of new towns There is definitely a trend of people moving from downtown to the desert cities in Greater Cairo. I do think that there will be more people living in new towns in the future. 新城镇的未来 人们从市中心迁往大开罗沙漠城市的趋势确实存在。我确实认为未来会有更多人居住在新城镇中。
REEM EL ATTAR 瑞姆·艾塔尔
Reem El Attar is a twenty-two-year old architecture student at the German University in Cairo. She lives in New Cairo with her family and her two grandmothers. She moved there in 2012, leaving Nasr City to be closer to her university. 瑞姆·埃尔阿塔尔是开罗德国大学 22 岁的建筑系学生。她与家人及两位祖母共同居住在新开罗。2012 年为了离大学更近，她从纳斯尔城搬到了这里。
Her neighborhood is not lively; in fact, it is rather empty, with surrounding buildings that are sold but not occupied. A bawab guards their house. There are some well-maintained public spaces in their compound, including green spaces and swimming pools for some houses. Reem commutes every day to her university by taxi, and does not use any public 她的社区并不热闹，事实上相当冷清，周围建筑虽已售出却无人入住。一名看门人守护着他们的住宅。小区内有些维护良好的公共空间，包括绿地和部分住宅配备的游泳池。瑞姆每天乘坐出租车通勤上学，不使用任何公共
transportation. It takes her ten minutes to get to school and the same amount of time to come home in the evenings. She knew about desert cities from a family friend who had bought land in New Cairo. But it was deserted back then, and didn’t seem to be very attractive. Reem’s parents bought two apartments for their children: an apartment in New Cairo, where she spends her weekends, and one in Sixth of October. Reem would live in a desert city if she had a car. 交通。她每天上学需要十分钟，晚上回家也花同样的时间。她是从一位在开罗新城购置土地的家庭朋友那里了解到沙漠城市的。但那时那里还很荒凉，看起来并不怎么吸引人。瑞姆的父母为孩子们买了两套公寓：一套在开罗新城，她周末会去那里度过；另一套在十月六日城。如果瑞姆有车的话，她会选择住在沙漠城市里。
Reem's day 瑞姆的一天
I get up, I get dressed, I go to university, and usually spend eight hours there. Sometimes, during the day, we take someone's car to go to a café. And maybe in the evening, if there's no dinner at home, we'll go out in New Cairo, to restaurants or malls. 我起床、穿衣、去大学，通常在那里待上八个小时。白天有时我们会搭别人的车去咖啡馆。晚上如果家里没准备晚餐，我们可能会去开罗新城的餐厅或商场。
Opinions about desert cities 关于沙漠新城的看法
Lack of security, big distances, not walkable. You're car-dependent all the time. It should be a recipe for success, but it's too isolated. There isn't sufficient infrastructure to connect places. If it's to be an extension of the city, it should be connected properly. 治安缺失、距离遥远、步行不便。你时刻都离不开汽车。这本该是成功的配方，但它太过孤立。缺乏足够的基础设施来连通各地。如果要作为城市的延伸，就应该建立完善的连接。
During the 2011 events 2011 年事件期间
Most of the people I knew who lived in desert cities at the time left for somewhere more central, and to be with people, instead of alone in empty settlements. 当时我认识的大多数居住在沙漠城市的人都搬去了更中心的地带，为了与人相伴，而非独守空城。
Acts of informality 非正规行为
Because of the lack of control, people started to build illegally, adding gardens to their apartments. 由于缺乏管控，人们开始违法扩建，在公寓里私自加建花园。
"We don't need to build more properties, we need to allocate them better." "我们不需要建造更多房产，而是需要更合理地分配现有资源。"
Living situation 居住现状
An apartment in a residential building. My grandfather bought it as an investment in a compound called "Dreamland" in Sixth of October, because one of my grandfather's brothers had bought a property there. He thought it was a good investment and decided to invest as well. Some compounds are ridiculously more expensive than others, but it's just more marketing, as they're identical. 这是一栋住宅楼里的公寓。我祖父当初在十月六日城一个叫"梦幻之地"的社区买下它作为投资，因为他有个兄弟在那里购置了房产。祖父觉得这是个不错的投资机会，便决定跟进。有些社区的价格比其他地方高得离谱，但其实只是营销手段不同，本质上它们毫无差别。
Future of desert cities 沙漠城市的未来
Currently, the market is still strong, both for building and selling. But I believe that it will eventually stop because nobody's living there. I think that to design and plan new cities is a big challenge, and to make sure these places function as planned is difficult. I wish we could tell the government to stop building new cities because we already have enough properties. We don't need to build more properties, we need to allocate them better. 目前无论是建设还是销售，市场依然强劲。但我认为这种繁荣终将停止，因为根本没人居住在那里。设计和规划新城市是个巨大挑战，确保这些区域按规划运转更是难上加难。真希望能告诉政府停止建造新城，我们已有足够的房产。现在需要的不是更多建筑，而是更合理的分配方案。
ALY EL SHAFEI 艾利·埃尔沙菲
Aly El Shafei is a twenty-five-year old architect who lived all his life in his parents' apartment in Mohandesseen, an upscale neighborhood in the center of Cairo. Now, he studies at the Polytecnico di Milano. His two siblings are living abroad, his sister in Qatar and his brother in Paris. His mom moved this year to Saudi Arabia. His parents were living in Haram City before, and moved for an upgrade to their current flat. 25 岁的建筑师阿里·沙菲从小生活在开罗市中心高档社区莫罕迪辛的父母公寓里，现就读于米兰理工大学。他的兄妹都在海外——姐姐在卡塔尔，哥哥在巴黎。母亲今年移居沙特阿拉伯。其父母原先住在哈拉姆城，后为改善居住条件搬至现居公寓。
Reem's day I get up, I get dressed, I go to university, and usually spend eight hours there. Sometimes, during the day, we take someone's car to go to a café. And maybe in the evening, if there's no dinner at home, we'll go out in New Cairo, to restaurants or malls.
Opinions about desert cities Lack of security, big distances, not walkable. You're car-dependent all the time. It should be a recipe for success, but it's too isolated. There isn't sufficient infrastructure to connect places. If it's to be an extension of the city, it should be connected properly.
During the 2011 events Most of the people I knew who lived in desert cities at the time left for somewhere more central, and to be with people, instead of alone in empty settlements.
Acts of informality Because of the lack of control, people started to build illegally, adding gardens to their apartments.
"We don't need to build more properties, we need to allocate them better."
Living situation An apartment in a residential building. My grandfather bought it as an investment in a compound called "Dreamland" in Sixth of October, because one of my grandfather's brothers had bought a property there. He thought it was a good investment and decided to invest as well. Some compounds are ridiculously more expensive than others, but it's just more marketing, as they're identical.
Future of desert cities Currently, the market is still strong, both for building and selling. But I believe that it will eventually stop because nobody's living there. I think that to design and plan new cities is a big challenge, and to make sure these places function as planned is difficult. I wish we could tell the government to stop building new cities because we already have enough properties. We don't need to build more properties, we need to allocate them better.
ALY EL SHAFEI
Aly El Shafei is a twenty-five-year old architect who lived all his life in his parents' apartment in Mohandesseen, an upscale neighborhood in the center of Cairo. Now, he studies at the Polytecnico di Milano. His two siblings are living abroad, his sister in Qatar and his brother in Paris. His mom moved this year to Saudi Arabia. His parents were living in Haram City before, and moved for an upgrade to their current flat.| Reem's day | I get up, I get dressed, I go to university, and usually spend eight hours there. Sometimes, during the day, we take someone's car to go to a café. And maybe in the evening, if there's no dinner at home, we'll go out in New Cairo, to restaurants or malls. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Opinions about desert cities | Lack of security, big distances, not walkable. You're car-dependent all the time. It should be a recipe for success, but it's too isolated. There isn't sufficient infrastructure to connect places. If it's to be an extension of the city, it should be connected properly. |
| During the 2011 events | Most of the people I knew who lived in desert cities at the time left for somewhere more central, and to be with people, instead of alone in empty settlements. |
| Acts of informality | Because of the lack of control, people started to build illegally, adding gardens to their apartments. |
| "We don't need to build more properties, we need to allocate them better." | |
| Living situation | An apartment in a residential building. My grandfather bought it as an investment in a compound called "Dreamland" in Sixth of October, because one of my grandfather's brothers had bought a property there. He thought it was a good investment and decided to invest as well. Some compounds are ridiculously more expensive than others, but it's just more marketing, as they're identical. |
| Future of desert cities | Currently, the market is still strong, both for building and selling. But I believe that it will eventually stop because nobody's living there. I think that to design and plan new cities is a big challenge, and to make sure these places function as planned is difficult. I wish we could tell the government to stop building new cities because we already have enough properties. We don't need to build more properties, we need to allocate them better. |
| ALY EL SHAFEI | |
| | Aly El Shafei is a twenty-five-year old architect who lived all his life in his parents' apartment in Mohandesseen, an upscale neighborhood in the center of Cairo. Now, he studies at the Polytecnico di Milano. His two siblings are living abroad, his sister in Qatar and his brother in Paris. His mom moved this year to Saudi Arabia. His parents were living in Haram City before, and moved for an upgrade to their current flat. |
In 2004, Aly’s parents also bought two apartments for their children: an apartment with 100 square meters in Nasr City for his brother, and another one with 135 square meters near Haram City for him. When they bought Aly’s apartment, the square meter price was about 1,350 pounds. It stayed stable, possibly going down to 1,200 pounds per square meter. The neighborhood is considered lively, even though the apartments are not all sold and occupied. Aly can imagine living in desert cities, since firms and offices are moving there, and the commute from home to work would be a major factor in choosing the right accommodation. 2004 年，阿里的父母也为子女购置了两套公寓：一套位于纳斯尔城、面积 100 平方米的给弟弟，另一套 135 平方米的靠近哈拉姆城的留给他。购买阿里这套时，每平米价格约为 1350 埃镑，之后保持稳定，甚至可能跌至 1200 埃镑。尽管该社区公寓尚未全部售罄入住，但仍被视为充满活力。阿里能想象自己住在沙漠新城，因为企业和办公场所正往那里迁移，而通勤距离将成为选择理想住所的关键因素。
Opinions about desert cities 关于沙漠新城的看法
Living situation 居住现状
Desert-city developments 沙漠城市发展
Future of desert cities 沙漠城市的未来
Planning desert cities 规划沙漠城市
During the 2011 events 在 2011 年事件期间
There is not enough infrastructure, like water and gas. Until recently, there was no Internet. And if you don’t own a private car, it would be impossible for you to stay there. Desert cities are very common and popular. Many people want to move there because everyone is looking for quiet and less-dense areas. There are services and standards that are higher than in downtown Cairo. If I would want to live in Cairo and get married, I think a desert city would be the best place. 这里缺乏足够的基础设施，比如水和天然气。直到最近才通网络。如果你没有私家车，根本不可能在那里生活。沙漠城市非常普遍且受欢迎。许多人想搬去那里，因为大家都在寻找安静且人口密度低的区域。那里的服务和标准甚至比开罗市中心更高。如果我想在开罗定居结婚，我认为沙漠城市会是最佳选择。
During the Revolution, people living in desert cities were terrified; the streets were dark at night, and they were in the desert. Small changes also happened, like closing balconies to add more space, adding more floors to every building, and sometimes adding new constructions between two buildings, and so on. 革命期间，沙漠城市的居民生活在恐惧中；夜晚的街道漆黑一片，四周尽是荒漠。细微的变化也在发生：封闭阳台以拓展空间，每栋建筑加盖楼层，有时甚至会在两栋楼之间插入新建物，诸如此类。
The flat my parents bought for me is a 135 -square-meter apartment in the Palm Hills Development zone, one of the most famous compounds. 父母为我购置的公寓位于棕榈山开发区，这个 135 平方米的单元属于当地最著名的封闭社区之一。
After my mother moved to Saudi Arabia, where she made a lot of money, we thought, “we need to invest in compounds”: a good investment even if we are not going to live in Egypt. So putting our money in real estate is better then putting it in the bank. The flat was paid for in installments every three months, and after three years, it was bought. I think the market is driven by these types of investments alone. 当母亲移居沙特阿拉伯赚取丰厚收入后，我们认定"必须投资封闭社区"：即便不打算在埃及定居，这仍是笔划算买卖。将资金投入房地产远比存入银行明智。这套公寓采用季度分期付款，三年后便完成产权交割。我认为这类投资行为正是驱动市场的唯一动力。
In the future, development might stop. But as far as I see it, it will still go on for a while, because it is a very long process and people are still buying. 未来某天，开发热潮或许会终止。但就我观察，这种趋势还将持续相当时间——毕竟这是个漫长进程，而购房者依然络绎不绝。
I think there are issues about how we are taught during our studies to perceive urban space. I always see this in the difference of opinions between professionals and residents. There will always be a conflict between studies that we have and the people’s opinion. I can say from living there, as well as hearing from my friends and other people, that they are really satisfied with these desert cities. They are having a nice life. Of course, we don’t have any class mixing, because if you don’t have enough money you wouldn’t live there. It’s a pity, but this is the situation. 我认为我们在学习过程中被教导认知城市空间的方式存在问题。这一点我总能在专业人士与居民之间的意见分歧中看到。我们的研究结论与民众观点之间始终存在冲突。根据我在此生活的经历，以及从朋友和其他人那里听到的反馈，可以说他们对这些沙漠城市非常满意。人们在那里过着美好的生活。当然，这里不存在阶层融合，因为如果资金不足就无法在此居住。这很遗憾，但现状就是如此。
Markus Elkatsha worked for the real estate development corporation SODIC (Sixth of October Development and Investment Company) for eight years before joining the City Science Group at the MIT Media Lab in late 2016. In this interview with Charlotte Malterre-Barthes, he talks about his experience with the company (and the institutions that govern the development process). With insights into the issues with Egypt’s investment and urban planning strategies, the new desert development areas of SODIC, as well as key points for understanding the situation of new towns today, his perspective is that of an informed actor, shedding light on the interests, issues, and practices of investors engaged in the making of Cairo’s new cities while looking towards the future of urban development in the desert. 马尔库斯·埃尔卡察曾为房地产开发商 SODIC（十月六日发展与投资公司）工作八年，于 2016 年底加入麻省理工学院媒体实验室的城市科学小组。在这篇与夏洛特·马莱尔-巴特斯的访谈中，他谈及了在这家公司（以及主导开发进程的相关机构）的工作经历。通过剖析埃及投资与城市规划策略的症结、SODIC 新建沙漠开发区的情况，以及理解当今新城现状的关键要点，他以知情实践者的视角，揭示了参与开罗新城建设的投资者们的利益诉求、现实困境与操作手法，同时展望了沙漠地区城市发展的未来图景。
I am an architect and urban planner. I lived in Egypt as a teenager, but did my undergraduate education in Rhode Island at Roger Williams University, and my graduate studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). During my nine years working at the architecture firm Machado and Silvetti Associates in Boston, we won a competition for the Olayan School of Business on the AUB campus in Beirut. In the process, I was introduced to Angus Gavin, who was responsible for the urban design department at Solidere International, the Beirut-based development company that was awarded the post-civil war renovation and reconstruction of downtown Beirut. At the time, Solidere and SODIC were working together to develop two mixed-use city centers Eastown and Westown in Cairo. I was recruited by SODIC, in partnership with Solidere, to develop the original master plan for these projects. 我是一名建筑师和城市规划师。青少年时期曾在埃及生活，本科就读于罗德岛罗杰威廉姆斯大学，研究生阶段在麻省理工学院(MIT)深造。在波士顿 Machado and Silvetti Associates 建筑事务所工作的九年期间，我们团队赢得了贝鲁特美国大学校园内奥拉扬商学院的竞标项目。借此契机，我结识了安格斯·加文——他当时担任贝鲁特开发商 Solidere 国际公司的城市设计部门负责人，这家企业承担了贝鲁特市中心战后改造与重建工程。当时 Solidere 正与埃及开发商 SODIC 合作开发开罗的两个多功能城市中心项目 Eastown 和 Westown。受 SODIC 邀请，我联合 Solidere 为这些项目制定了最初的总体规划方案。
"Greater Cairo has been named the world's fastest-growing city in 2017, with an expected population increase of 500,000 this year alone. Can authorities cope with the population explosion?"
Euromonitor International, Feb 2017 "大开罗地区被列为 2017 年全球发展最快的城市，仅今年人口预计就将增加 50 万。当局能否应对这场人口爆炸？"——欧睿国际，2017 年 2 月
Is it correct that the public planning of desert cities evolved from a desert-conquering, city-making program into an investment mechanism? When did that happen? 沙漠城市的公共规划是否确实从征服荒漠、建造城市的计划演变成了投资机制？这种转变是何时发生的？
There are two sides to the story. The safe-investment-mechanism side of the story is very important, but it is not all of it. The fundamental problem with real estate development in Egypt generally-not just with desert development, but also with the new high-rise residential buildings in the center-is the delivery 这个故事有两面性。安全投资机制的一面固然重要，但并非全部。埃及房地产开发的根本问题——不仅存在于沙漠开发项目，也存在于市中心新建的高层住宅——在于交付环节。
methodology: the way real estate financing works and how lending practices work, and the reality that the very antiquated laws do not protect developers or banks. In Europe or North America, if you buy a house, you can take out a mortgage for thirty years, and you are protected from inflation because the government issues long-term bonds (thirty-year or more) so banks do not raise the interest rates. At the same time, banks are protected, because mortgage recipients have an obligation to pay and there is a legal framework in place that protects all participating parties. If recipients do not pay, banks can foreclose and take houses away and so on and so forth. This is very clear in the Western world. In Egypt, the extreme socialist and squatter right laws make it almost impossible for modern finance mechanisms to function, resulting in unviable interest rates. If you’ve lived in a building for seven years, it is almost legally impossible to get evicted. If you don’t pay your mortgage, no problem: the bank will be in litigation for the next thirty years to try to get you out. 方法论：房地产融资的运作方式与贷款实践的现实情况，以及极其陈旧的法律既无法保护开发商也无法保护银行的现状。在欧洲或北美，购房者可申请三十年期的抵押贷款，且能规避通胀风险——因为政府发行长期债券（三十年期或更久），银行便不会提高利率。与此同时，银行也受到保护，因为抵押贷款接收方有还款义务，且存在保护所有参与方的法律框架。若接收方违约，银行可行使止赎权收回房产，诸如此类。这套机制在西方世界非常明晰。而在埃及，极端社会主义政策和占地者权利法几乎令现代金融机制无法运转，导致贷款利率高得脱离实际。若你在某栋建筑居住满七年，法律上几乎不可能将你驱逐。即便不偿还抵押贷款也无妨：银行将陷入长达三十年的诉讼拉锯战才可能让你搬离。
“The shocking reality is that in Cairo, twenty percent of the apartments are empty and closed. So, while the vacancy rate is very high in SODIC, it is also generally very high in Cairo”. 令人震惊的现实是，开罗有 20%的公寓空置并关闭着。因此，尽管 SODIC 的空置率非常高，但开罗的整体空置率也普遍居高不下。
So the inertia of the state protects residents 因此政府的惯性保护了居民against private financial institutions. 免受私营金融机构的侵害。
Exactly. The shocking reality is that in Cairo, twenty percent of the apartments are empty and closed. So, while the vacancy rate is very high in SODIC, it is also generally very high in Cairo. 确实如此。令人震惊的现实是，开罗有 20%的公寓空置并关闭着。因此，尽管 SODIC 的空置率非常高，但开罗的整体空置率也普遍居高不下。
This phenomenon is not because of desert urbanization. This phenomenon is because of [messed-up,] antiquated finance mechanism. Almost all new construction in and around Cairo is handed over as Core And Shell (typically only seen in commercial and retail in more developed markets). The definition of Core and Shell is defined as the minimum level of completion to be designated a shelter, and does not include any interior finishes or MEP installation, nor does it include basics such as internal plumbing and electricity. In addition to a weird handing-over process whereby you, as the individual, have to finish and equip your house on your own, design options are limited. The whole proposition is a compromise with the current mechanism of the real estate market. I can give you an example: friends of mine have two kids-one is four and the other is eight. They bought a house for each child, thinking that over the next fifteen years, they will be able to fit it out-when they 这种现象并非源于沙漠城市化，而是由于[混乱且]过时的金融机制。开罗及其周边几乎所有新建项目都以"核心与外壳"（Core And Shell，通常仅见于更发达市场的商业和零售地产）形式交付。所谓"核心与外壳"是指达到最低居住标准的结构框架，不包含任何内部装修或机电设备安装，甚至不包括基础的水电管线。除了这种需要业主自行完成房屋装修的怪异交付流程外，设计选择也极为有限。整个方案都是对当前房地产市场机制的妥协。举个例子：我的一对朋友有两个孩子，一个四岁一个八岁。他们为每个孩子各买了一套房，盘算着未来十五年里慢慢装修——等孩子们
can afford to buy a kitchen, they will buy a kitchen, when they can afford to put in the marble they’ll do it. It is, in a sense, a mortgage system, or a long term payout of “you do what you can, when you can.” This contributes to the permanently unfinished look of desert cities. 当人们买得起厨房时，他们就会置办厨房；当负担得起大理石装修时，他们就会进行装潢。从某种意义上说，这就像按揭系统，或者说是一种"量力而行、逐步完善"的长期兑现方式。正是这种做法造就了沙漠城市永远未完工的独特风貌。
What you are saying is that everything that is getting built now will be progressively inhabited in the next twenty years. You believe in a future with occupied, dense new towns in the desert. 你的意思是，现在建造的所有设施将在未来二十年间逐步投入使用。你相信这些沙漠新城终将形成人口稠密的居住区。
Yes. Cairo is growing at a rate of four percent every year. There is no other option. 没错。开罗正以每年 4%的速度扩张。除此之外别无选择。
However, this four percent growth does not necessarily correspond to a population that can afford to move to one of the upscale desert developments. 然而，这 4%的增长人口未必都具备迁居高端沙漠社区的经济实力。
True. The issue is increasingly being brought up. More and more developers are looking at middle- and lower-income housing, and that is the next big economic frontier. Development companies that are aware of this are gearing up for a different model than the one you currently see out here. 确实。这个问题正日益受到关注。越来越多的开发商开始关注中低收入住房市场，这将成为下一个重要的经济前沿领域。意识到这一点的开发公司正在为不同于当前模式的运营方式做准备。
"Cairo is growing at a rate of four percent every year. There is no other option." "开罗正以每年 4%的速度扩张。我们别无选择。"
How is SODIC reacting to that? SODIC 对此作何反应？
If mortgage laws would change, more people could afford a home in desert cities. Currently, informal housing is absorbing the majority of the growth, where there is a strong economy for it. Housing is not cheap in the informal settlements. People pay six hundred Egyptian pounds a month for rent (more now). It is a real market. If dwellers would pay that amount towards a thirty-year mortgage, they could afford a better house. Currently, a majority of the lowincome population is living in squalor, simply because financial mechanisms do not to allow them to live better by providing access to formal housing. I am not saying that what they could afford would be Westown or Eastown, but it would be better than the current situation. More developers would be ready to invest in that kind of enterprise, and SODIC could be one of them. 若抵押贷款法规得以改革，将有更多人能在沙漠城市置业。目前非正规住房吸纳了大部分增长需求，这类住房市场已形成强劲的经济规模。非正规定居点的住房并不便宜，居民每月需支付 600 埃及镑租金（现今更高）。这是个真实存在的市场。若居民将这笔钱用于 30 年期的抵押贷款，他们本可负担更好的住房。当前多数低收入群体生活在肮脏环境中，仅仅因为金融机制未能通过提供正规住房来改善他们的居住条件。我并非说他们能负担得起西山镇或东山镇那样的社区，但总比现状要好。更多开发商会愿意投资这类项目，SODIC 可能就是其中之一。
Transportation is one of the crucial issues for desert cities: one can 交通是沙漠城市面临的关键问题之一：人们可以
only live out there if one can afford a private car or taxi services. This 只有能负担得起私家车或出租车服务的人才能在那里生活。这
essentially excludes seventy percent of the population of Cairo. 实质上将开罗 70%的人口排除在外
Correct. However, at SODIC, we provide some public transit. Many developers are also saying, "it is much easier for me to provide a bus and bring people out here to work, rather than move my business 确实如此。不过在 SODIC，我们提供了一些公共交通服务。许多开发商也表示："与其把公司搬过去，不如提供班车接送员工来这里工作要容易得多。"
closer." The 2030 plan for transportation includes a light rail line to SODIC. 2030 年交通规划中包括一条通往 SODIC 的轻轨线路。
Do you consider this new light rail line-if it really materializes-to be a prerequisite for full occupancy in SODIC developments and desert cities in Sixth of October generally? 您认为这条新规划的轻轨线路——如果真能建成——会成为 SODIC 开发项目和十月六日城沙漠新城实现完全入住率的先决条件吗？
1 Rent-control laws in Egypt date from the early twentieth century, when evacuate tenants was first abolished. In the socialist Nasser era, a statute was passed allowing the inheritance of rented units, which permitte the continuation of across generations. Law passed under Anwar Sadat allowed tenants to sublet or exchange the unit they occupied without approval from the landlord. This, combined with the rental inheritance law, marked the near-full elimination of landlords rights over their property, while still for their maintenance. 1 埃及的租金管制法可追溯至 20 世纪初，当时首次废除了驱逐租客条款。在纳赛尔社会主义时期，通过了一项允许租赁房屋继承的法令，使租赁权得以世代延续。萨达特时期通过的法律允许租户未经房东同意即可转租或交换所租住的房屋。这些法规与租赁继承法相结合，几乎完全剥夺了房东对其房产的权利，同时仍要求房东承担维护责任。
After maintaining the bulk of the aforementioned laws for over two decade Hosni Mubarak passed Rent Law No. 4 in 1996 which exempted units built after the date from flat owners reluctant to 在维持上述大部分法律二十余年后，胡斯尼·穆巴拉克于 1996 年颁布了第 4 号租金法，规定此后建造的单元不受不愿出租的公寓业主限制
rent them out. See: Salma Mansour, “New Law, Old Problems: The Egyptian Rent Control Dilemma,” The Chronicles [The Cairol (Fall 2009): 40-43. 出租它们。参见：萨尔玛·曼苏尔，《新法律，老问题：埃及租金管制困境》，《开罗纪事》（2009 年秋季刊）：40-43 页。
For Sixth of October it is. For SODIC it is not. We are catering to a more affluent clientele that does not need public transport. There is a diversity of desert-development types. There is the palatial, fully detached housing model, which is the majority. But we are now leaning towards multifamily mixed-use typologies, within the economic parameters that govern the development process. 十月六日城适用，SODIC 则不适用。我们服务的客群更为高端，无需依赖公共交通。沙漠开发模式呈现多样化形态，其中宫殿式全独立住宅是主流类型。但如今我们正转向多户混合用途的开发模式，这仍受制于房地产开发过程中的经济参数约束。
Are you aware of the trend of people 你可知道人们纷纷
(especially younger families) moving away from downtown Cairo, but still commuting in because the majority of working opportunities are there? （尤其是年轻家庭）正从开罗市中心迁出，但仍需通勤前往市中心，因为大部分工作机会集中在那里？
There are pockets of employment around downtown Cairo, industrial zones and in addition to several large office or commercial complexes in Sixth of October and East Cairo, with a growing amount of headquarters providing employment in the suburban areas. The real problem is that there is no employment for lower-income residents-such as those working in operations or back offices in banks. Those jobs are still, for the most part, in the rent-controlled areas of Cairo were space is cheap. Many banks have their back offices in incredible buildings downtown. Rent control is distorting the realities of where people can live. ^(1){ }^{1} I would change these rentcontrol laws. The price of land in the desert is shockingly expensive; people live in informal areas while rent-controlled spaces downtown are occupied by offices… 开罗市中心周边、工业区以及十月六日城和东开罗的几处大型办公或商业综合体都分布着就业点，郊区也涌现出越来越多提供就业机会的企业总部。真正的问题在于低收入居民——比如银行运营或后勤部门的员工——难以就近就业。这些岗位目前仍主要集中在开罗租金管制区域，那里空间成本低廉。许多银行的后勤部门甚至设在市中心租金低廉的宏伟建筑里。租金管制政策扭曲了人们的实际居住选择。 ^(1){ }^{1} 我会改革这些租金管制法律。沙漠地带的地价高得惊人，导致人们只能栖身非正规居住区，而市中心的租金管制空间却被办公场所占据...
One of the main issues for SODIC is the low occupancy rates in its gated communities. SODIC 面临的主要问题之一是其封闭社区的入住率偏低。
Are there any mechanisms or regulations that prevent this or help the company to deal with this? 是否有任何机制或法规能防止这种情况，或帮助公司应对这一问题？
There are no regulations, but our strategy is to develop more mixed-use developments to entice people to move here, as opposed to it 虽然没有明文规定，但我们的策略是开发更多混合用途项目来吸引人们搬迁至此，而非
being a purely investment location. A lot of these developments are truly dead. They look great, but they are completely insular, gated communities without entertainment or retail venues and include very little in the way of services or day-to-day amenities. 作为一个纯粹的投资地点。这些开发项目很多实际上毫无生气。它们看起来很棒，但完全是封闭的、与世隔绝的社区，没有娱乐或零售场所，几乎不提供任何服务或日常生活便利设施。
Westown offers dense residential buildings rather than single-family houses. Usually, NUCA’s regulations are very strict and they only allow for low-density developments. What are the possibilities for dialogue with NUCA and what space for maneuvering is there for SODIC or any company that wants to reach higher density using another type of development? 西城提供的是密集住宅楼而非独栋住宅。通常情况下，新城市社区管理局（NUCA）的规范极为严格，仅允许低密度开发。与 NUCA 展开对话的可能性有哪些？对于 SODIC 或任何希望通过其他开发模式实现更高密度的公司而言，存在怎样的运作空间？
"It has a map of the area and an Excel spreadsheet. At the bottom of that sheet, a maximum footprint and a maximum built-up area are allowed. " "该区域配有地图和 Excel 电子表格。表格底部注明了允许的最大占地面积和最大建筑面积。"
Very little. Almost zero. NUCA is still working with land use maps that were developed during the era of auto-centric urban planning. There is a major impediment for different types of desert development because of NUCA’s reluctance. For example, when we got the zoning permit for Eastown and Westown-higher density areas-we had to have the support of the Ministry of Housing. A ministerial decree allowed us to consolidate our constructable area into Westown while letting Allegria (a high-end, low-density area) be bigger, in a trade-off deal. Now in Eastown, with Solidere, a credible partner, we went to the Ministry of Housing with a McKinsey report in hand that advocated for higher density, which in return, we had to buy. We were in a very unique position, since no other developer has ever done this. 微乎其微。几乎为零。新城市社区管理局仍在沿用汽车导向型城市规划时代制定的土地利用方案。由于该机构的消极态度，各类沙漠开发项目都面临重大阻碍。例如当我们为东城和西城——这两个高密度区域——申请分区许可时，必须获得住房部的支持。通过一项部长级法令的斡旋，我们才得以将可建设面积集中到西城，同时让高端低密度的 Allegria 社区获得更大开发空间。如今在东城项目上，我们与值得信赖的合作伙伴 Solidere 公司，带着麦肯锡支持高密度开发的报告前往住房部——这份报告还是我们自费购买的。这种情况极为特殊，此前从未有开发商采取过类似做法。
To what extent is NUCA actually enforcing those rules? 新城市社区管理局实际执行这些规定的力度有多大？
NUCA is a bureaucratic institution enforcing zoning laws developed in the 1980s. It has a map of the area and an Excel spreadsheet. At the bottom of that sheet, a maximum footprint and a maximum built-up area are allowed. When we submit a project, it gets reviewed on a very cursory level for content (circulation, road widths, etc.), but it is the footprint and built up area at the bottom that matters. We cannot exceed a certain built-up area, and it becomes a very commercial issue. NUCA’s position is that you are allowed to build 100,000 square meters; 100,001 is not acceptable. Once something is built, we are also tightly controlled. What happens is, in a retail zone for instance, NUCA sends to the local building authority the parameters of what SODIC is allowed to build on this plot. Afterwards, the authority goes into a standard reviewing NUCA 是一个执行上世纪 80 年代分区法规的官僚机构。他们掌握着区域地图和 Excel 表格，表格底部标注着允许的最大占地面积和最大建筑面积。我们提交项目时，他们只会粗略审核内容（动线设计、道路宽度等），但真正关键的是表格底部那两个数字指标。建筑面积绝不能超标，这直接关系到商业利益。NUCA 的立场很明确：允许建造 10 万平方米，但 10 万零 1 平米就绝不通融。项目建成后监管同样严格，比如在零售区，NUCA 会向地方建设部门发送 SODIC 在该地块的准建参数，之后相关部门就会按标准流程进行审查。
process: a code review, an architectural review, all with reference to NUCA parameters. If something is not respected, we get penalized and there is a hearing. Some violations can be settled with a fee, but sometimes you have to bulldoze and take down, which we have had to do in the past. Why we are under so much scrutiny is because the amount of money involved is colossal. 流程：包括代码审查、架构审查，所有环节都需参照 NUCA 参数标准。如有违规行为，我们将面临处罚并召开听证会。部分违规可通过罚款解决，但有时必须强制拆除——我们过去就曾被迫执行过。之所以受到如此严苛的监督，是因为涉及的资金规模极其庞大。
So there is an actual enforcement of rules, unlike what is happening in downtown and in the informal areas. That’s an interesting contrast, because in the rest of the country, a lot of things are built and the law is not enforced at all. 因此这里存在真正的规则执行机制，与市中心和非正规区域的情况截然不同。这种对比非常耐人寻味，因为在埃及其他地区，大量建筑拔地而起却完全不受法律约束。
That is my argument every single day when I am with the authorities! We have been accused of violation for adding ten square meters to gain access to a roof deck and NUCA tells us: “you are over your allowed buildable area.” It becomes very petty. The problem with this oversight process in general is that there is very little intellectual capacity in the system; it is a very bureaucratic and numeric process. Right now, within the entire institution, there are very few credible urban planners. Decision-makers are not really able to address current issues like overpopulation, rapid urbanization, lack of water, and so on. There needs to be a reassessment of the existing protocol-if not a leadership change. 这就是我每天与当局争论的焦点！我们因为增加了十平方米的屋顶平台通道被指控违规，新城市社区管理局（NUCA）对我们说："你们超出了允许的建筑面积。"这变得非常斤斤计较。这种监管流程的根本问题在于，整个系统缺乏专业智慧；这是一个极度官僚化和数字化的过程。目前在整个机构内部，真正可信的城市规划师寥寥无几。决策者实际上无法解决当前面临的问题，比如人口过剩、快速城市化、水资源短缺等等。现有的管理协议需要重新评估——甚至需要领导层的更替。
"Desert development is the only mode for growth, in the face of the loss of agricultural land." "面对农业用地的流失，沙漠开发是唯一的增长模式。"
What is the position of SODIC in this gloomy perspective? When there is no dialogue possible with NUCA, and design is limited to finding loopholes, what are the possibilities for a change toward more sustainable models of development that companies are actually willing to pursue? 在这种黯淡的前景下，SODIC 公司持何种立场？当与新城市社区管理局（NUCA）无法进行对话，设计仅限于寻找漏洞时，企业真正愿意追求的、向更可持续发展模式转变的可能性在哪里？
At SODIC-and we are one of the few companies doing thatwe are lobbying many groups within the government to reform aspects of the development process: financing, above all, with many mortgage strategies being discussed. SODIC is a strong advocate of improving the financial mechanisms, so that we can provide more with less. This is one way we are trying to make change. Second, we are also involved in the regulatory frameworks in East Cairo now, as we recently acquired a large plot (650 acres) in the area, near the New Capital site. We have an entire department that is very active, working on government relations to address urban planning issues, pushing the right agendas. I don’t think change will happen tomorrow, but we are definitely pushing. For SODIC, the Sixth 在 SODIC——我们是少数几家这样做的企业之一——我们正在游说政府内部的多个团体，以改革开发流程的某些方面：尤其是融资问题，目前正在讨论多种抵押贷款策略。SODIC 大力倡导完善金融机制，从而实现"少投入多产出"。这是我们推动变革的方式之一。其次，我们现在也参与了东开罗的监管框架制定，因为我们最近在该地区新行政首都附近收购了一大片土地（650 英亩）。我们设有专门的部门积极运作，通过政府关系处理城市规划问题，推动正确的议程。虽然变革不会一蹴而就，但我们无疑在持续发力。对 SODIC 而言，第六
of October episode is coming to a close, and we are now focusing on East Cairo with more mixed-use, longer-term-investmenttype properties. I do believe that Cairo needs to expand. Desert development is the only mode for growth, in the face of the loss of agricultural land. Not only that, but Cairo cannot grow elsewhere anymore, with marshland to the north and industrial complexes to the south. There is just no more land. It’s done. 十月篇章即将落幕，此刻我们将目光转向东开罗，那里有更多混合用途的长期投资型地产。我坚信开罗必须扩张。面对农业用地的流失，沙漠开发是唯一的增长模式。不仅如此，由于北部是沼泽地、南部是工业区，开罗已无处可拓。土地资源已然耗尽。
“What would be needed is a better social diversity of users and owners. This is related more to a lack of responsive financial mechanisms rather than design.” "关键在于实现用户与业主群体更好的社会多样性。这更多与缺乏灵活响应机制的金融工具有关，而非设计问题。"
What about the role of designers or architects in that type of development? Can design be a remedy of sorts to the current situation? 设计师和建筑师在此类开发中应扮演什么角色？设计能否成为当前困境的某种解药？
We would be doing much more in terms of design if we could: higher densities for community-based development as opposed to single-family, stand alone communities; integration of the community, as in mixed-use developments that combine retail, commerce, and housing to provide more vibrant environments; and climatic responsiveness. Currently, single-use development is the norm in Cairo, which leads to a whole set of problems. There is a limit to incorporating new designs as a counter strategy, and we are up against that limit every day. What would be needed is a better social diversity of users and owners. This is related more to a lack of responsive financial mechanisms rather than design. 若能实现，我们将在设计方面做得更多：开发更高密度的社区型住宅，而非独栋独立社区；推动社区融合，例如发展集零售、商业与住宅于一体的综合项目，营造更具活力的环境；同时增强气候适应性。目前开罗仍以单一功能开发为主，这引发了一系列问题。作为应对策略，新设计的融入空间已接近极限，我们每天都在触碰这个边界。真正需要的是使用者和业主群体更好的社会多样性。这更多与缺乏灵活金融机制有关，而非设计本身的问题。
MECHANISMS OF DESERT GITIES 沙漠城市的运作机制
Designing and building a new city nowadays is not far from playing the computer game SimCity. Like the toolbox of urban elements in SimCity’s interface, contemporary urban planning tools offer an automatic, steppyning or from scratch. The result is the creation of a built environment-but is this really the conception of a city? Is simply combining parameters such as adequate land, sufficient financial capital, zero environmental footprint, outstanding landmarks, and a catchy name enough to consider the result an urban entity? Rarely is the inhabitant the main subject of urban configurations, the starting point of planning efforts focused on the physical production of space and its programmed activities. 如今设计和建造一座新城，与玩电脑游戏《模拟城市》相差无几。就像《模拟城市》界面中的城市元素工具箱那样，当代城市规划工具提供了自动化、分步骤或从零开始的建造方式。最终成果是建成的人造环境——但这真的能称之为城市构想吗？仅仅将充足的土地、雄厚的资金、零环境足迹、地标性建筑和朗朗上口的名字等参数组合起来，就能将其视为城市实体吗？城市规划的起点往往聚焦于空间的物质生产及其预设功能，而居民很少成为城市构型的主体。
The configuration of a new city is usually designed using a set of principles and rules that organize various elements: its modus operandi. The Harvard Project on the City suggests that “for all its apparent complexity, once you know the rules, a city is easy to build.” ^(1){ }^{1} An analysis of the modi operandi of new cities from different erasthe RomanCity, the ModernistCity, and the DigitalCity-as models of urban production, provides a framework for understanding the case of the DesertCity. 新城的规划通常遵循一套组织各类要素的原则与规则——即其运作模式。哈佛城市研究项目指出："尽管城市看似复杂，但一旦掌握规则，建造城市其实很简单。" ^(1){ }^{1} 通过分析不同时代新城建设的运作模式——以罗马城市、现代主义城市和数字城市作为城市生产的范本——我们得以构建理解沙漠城市案例的框架。
The RomanCity was defined by rules applied to new territories in order to establish imperial authority. The ModernistCity suggested an ordered and rational urban form offering universal solutions in favor of an efficient administrative power. The contemporary city of the digital era is the output of a mechanistic thinking, of processed numbers and statistics. Epitomizing this approach, new technologies and computer programs like Esri CityEngine make it possible to simulate and design a city in real timealmost a professional equivalent to SimCity. In the context of Egypt, twenty-seven new cities, as listed by the New Urban 罗马城市的规则被用于新征服的领土，以确立帝国权威。现代主义城市则提出有序理性的城市形态，为高效行政权力提供普适性解决方案。数字时代的当代城市是机械化思维的产物，由经过处理的数字与统计数据生成。以 Esri CityEngine 等新技术和计算机程序为例，它们能实时模拟设计城市，堪称专业版的模拟城市游戏。在埃及语境下，新城市社区管理局列出的二十七座新城
Communities Authority (NUCA), have been built in the desert in the last four decades, with very ambitious population targets and generous figures concerning their program. This quantification of urban space suggests the dominance of the exchange value over the use value of the city. The city thereby turns into a commodity, a machine that must operate according to the commands of the market. 过去四十年间，由埃及新城市社区管理局（NUCA）主导的沙漠新城建设始终伴随着雄心勃勃的人口目标与庞大的规划数据。这种对城市空间的量化指标，揭示了交换价值对城市使用价值的绝对支配。城市由此异化为商品，成为必须遵循市场指令运转的机器。
The RomanCity: The Romans developed a set of basic instructions for configuring every new city. The location and its comparative advantages-strategic position; access to trade, water and transportation; topography; and climate-define the type of city to be founded. The city is organized in a rectangular form with the cardo and decumanus crossing at the approximate center; a perimeter is determined, leaving agricultural land beyond the borders; and secondary roads are laid out in the manner of a chessboard. The city is then programmed with standardized components-public buildings, monuments, and infrastructure. The first “generic city” is thus successfully installed. ^(2){ }^{2} Modifications according to the local topographical, climatic and cultural conditions follow so that the generic city becomes specific. ^(3){ }^{3} The term urbs characterizes the material constitution of the RomanCity. Civitas refers to the political status of its inhabitants, their condition of citizenship. Urbs and civitas are complementary. ^(4){ }^{4} But as a city evolves over time, the economic impetus of urbs gradually takes over the political idea of civitas. 罗马城：罗马人为每座新城规划制定了一套基本准则。选址及其相对优势——战略位置、贸易通道、水源与交通条件、地形地貌及气候——决定了城市的类型。城市呈矩形布局，南北走向的卡多大道与东西走向的德库马努斯大道在近似中心处交汇；划定城市边界，外围保留农业用地；次级道路如棋盘般纵横交错。随后按标准化模块配置公共建筑、纪念碑与基础设施，首座"通用城市"就此成功落成。 ^(2){ }^{2} 继而根据当地地形、气候与文化特征进行调整，使通用城市转化为特色城市。 ^(3){ }^{3} "乌尔布斯"（urbs）一词体现了罗马城的物质构成，"奇维塔斯"（civitas）则指代居民的政治身份及其公民权属性，二者互为补充。 ^(4){ }^{4} 但随着城市发展演变，乌尔布斯的经济驱动力逐渐取代了奇维塔斯的政治理念。
The ModernistCity: Following the modernist ideals, new cities are to be built on a clear site, providing planners with a tabula rasa, a clean slate, to create their vision; the city is "to be planned as an engineer plans an industrial process, breaking it down into its essential functions (housing, work, recreation, and traffic), standardizing them, tailoring them, and reassembling 现代主义城市：遵循现代主义理念，新城应选址于开阔地带，为规划者提供一张白纸般的创作空间；城市"要像工程师设计工业流程那样进行规划，将其分解为基本功能（居住、工作、休闲和交通），实现标准化、定制化后重新组合"
Fig. 1: How to build a city-a twenty-step guide 图 1：如何建造城市——二十步指南
(1) Choose a location, (2) Ensure a reliable water supply, (3) Ensure a reliable money supply, (4) Think about jobs, (5) Do not alienate locals, (6) Devise a master plan, (7) Integrate transport, (8) Consider banning cars, (9) Make rubbish clever, (10) Maximize connectivity, (11) Aspire to carbon neutrality, (12) Start again, you’ve forgotten parks, (13) … and culture, (14) Not another funny-shaped island, (15) Make a statement, (16) Treat workers with respect, (17) Build fast. No, faster …, (18) Reeducate your new urbanites, (19) If you build it, they will come, (20) Give it a name (1)选址 (2)确保稳定水源 (3)确保资金链 (4)考虑就业 (5)避免本地冲突 (6)制定总体规划 (7)整合交通 (8)考虑禁车 (9)智能处理垃圾 (10)最大化互联 (11)追求碳中和 (12)重来，你忘了公园 (13)…还有文化设施 (14)别再建怪异岛屿 (15)树立标志 (16)尊重劳动者 (17)加速建设。不，再快些… (18)重塑新市民观念 (19)筑巢引凤 (20)赋予名称
Fig. 2: The RomanCity 图 2：罗马城
Fig. 3: The ModernistCity, Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin 图 3：现代主义城市——勒·柯布西耶的"瓦赞规划"
Fig. 4: The SimCity, the city of Allington 图 4：模拟城市——阿灵顿市
them (in the master plan) as a totality." ^(5){ }^{5} The main planning principle is zoning, resulting in areas dedicated to specific uses. To facilitate mobility, streets become specific in their functions, with, for example, car traffic separated from pedestrian movement. Automobile flows dominate and even shape the city. Furthermore, as summarized in Le Corbusier’s statement, “I propose one single building for all nations and climates,” local context is replaced by a simple geometry, devoid of historical or cultural references. ^(6){ }^{6} The concept of the Ville Radieuse (1933), with its zoned land use and geometric layout, became a modernist paradigm, influencing the design of well-known examples such as Chandigarh (1949) or Brasilia (1957). In the technocratic and positivist practice of city building, “the plan is the dictator” ^(7){ }^{7} and the architect the omniscient expert, as city planning is “too important to be left to the citizens.” ^(8){ }^{8} "（在总体规划中）将它们视为一个整体。" ^(5){ }^{5} 核心规划原则是功能分区，形成特定用途的专属区域。为提升交通效率，街道被赋予专门功能，例如实现车流与人行分离。机动车流占据主导地位，甚至塑造着城市形态。正如勒·柯布西耶所言"我提议为所有国家和气候建造同一种建筑"，当地文脉被简化为纯粹的几何形态，剥离了历史与文化参照。 ^(6){ }^{6} 1933 年提出的"光辉城市"概念，以其功能分区与几何布局成为现代主义范式，影响了昌迪加尔（1949）和巴西利亚（1957）等著名案例。在这种技术官僚与实证主义的城市建设实践中，"规划就是独裁者" ^(7){ }^{7} ，建筑师成为全知专家，因为城市规划"重要到不能交给市民决定"。 ^(8){ }^{8}
The DigitalCity: In contrast to the elitist perspective of the modernists, the digital era, with its advanced software and the development of the “simulation” gaming genre, has allowed each citizen to, at least playfully, envision and create a city from scratch. Beginning in 1989 with SimCity, these simulation games have allowed players to become mayors-or even dictators-and “build” their own city. As stated in the manual of the game, “Rome might not have been built in a day, but who says your city can’t be? The menu at the bottom of the screen has everything you need to turn an empty grass field into a booming metropolis.” ^(9){ }^{9} Building your SimCity starts with placing the streets (exclusively for cars) and zoning the plots (residential, commercial, or industrial). This perception of city-making represents a particular fantasy relating to urban planning: namely, “the myth of planning as engineering, a quasi-scientific exercise in tweaking traffic flows and directing people and jobs to the optimal locations.” ^(10){ }^{10} As a simulation of the urban environment, the game is obviously simplified. Yet, it incorporates the fundamentals of current city building and, through the way it is streamlined, expresses the actual worldview 数字之城：与现代主义者的精英视角不同，数字时代凭借其先进软件和"模拟"游戏类型的发展，让每位公民至少能以游戏化的方式，从零开始构想并创建一座城市。自 1989 年《模拟城市》问世以来，这类模拟游戏让玩家得以成为市长——甚至独裁者——并"建造"属于自己的城市。正如游戏手册所述："罗马或许不是一天建成的，但谁说你的城市不行呢？屏幕底部的菜单为你提供了一切工具，能将一片空旷草地变成繁华大都市。" ^(9){ }^{9} 建造模拟城市始于铺设街道（专为汽车设计）和划分地块（住宅区、商业区或工业区）。这种城市营造理念体现了一种特定的城市规划幻想：即"将规划神话视为工程学，通过微调交通流量、将人口和就业引导至最佳区位来实现准科学实践" ^(10){ }^{10} 。作为城市环境的模拟，这款游戏显然进行了简化处理。 然而，它融合了现代城市建设的基本原理，并通过其精简的方式，表达了真实的世界观
of its designers-if not of its players. 其设计者——如果不是其玩家的话——的
The Esri CityEngine software could be considered the professional version of SimCity. As a 3D-modeling computer program, it enables the creation of complex parametric models of urban environments through a predefined set of rules. The characteristics of the city (topography, street network, building types, etc.) are expressed through parameters (GIS data, regulations, proportions, geometry, textures, patterns). Modeling with CityEngine starts with the creation of a street network and the subdivision of plots before generating the buildings. These, thanks to procerng the to procedural modeling technology, can be made to vary from one another. The city model can be re-designed and re-adjusted by changing the parameters to achieve a certain urban aesthetic. It is thus possible to develop and test different scenarios. Additionally, different urban environments become comparable based on their respective figures. Quantitative modeling and analysis has created the illusion of objectivity in the physical output of the planning process Esri CityEngine 软件堪称专业版的《模拟城市》。作为一款三维建模计算机程序，它能够通过预定义的规则集创建复杂的参数化城市环境模型。城市特征（地形、街道网络、建筑类型等）通过参数（GIS 数据、规范、比例、几何形状、纹理、图案）得以呈现。使用 CityEngine 建模时，首先创建街道网络并划分地块，随后生成建筑群。得益于程序化建模技术，这些建筑可以呈现出差异化特征。通过调整参数来重塑城市美学效果，使得城市模型能够被反复设计与修改，从而开发测试不同规划方案。此外，基于量化数据的不同城市环境变得可相互比较——这种定量建模与分析方式，在规划成果中营造出客观性的幻象。
The DesertCity: In the Egyptian context, the planners’ blank canvas is the desert, an empty terrain on which new cities could be delivered. The original aim of Egypt’s desert cities was to divert population away from the crowded Nile Valley into a new, modern, and ordered urban environment. Since the 1970s, desert cities have been designed at a “grandiose scale” to express this “grandiose ideal.” ^(11){ }^{11} In practice, however, the land is subdivided and allocated for distinct uses after setting up the infrastructure, resulting in over-scaled, monofunctional compounds that are filled with buildings laid down in repetitive patterns. The future inhabitants are ignored in these planning practices-a legacy of the modernist planning approach, a fact that is unambiguously summarized in the statement of a NUCA official: “We have to complete our plans. We cannot look to see if people come or not. They will come.” ^(12){ }^{12} Lately, 3D-modeling computer programs have also been implemented in the design of the DesertCity. In the official presentation of the recently launched New 沙漠之城：在埃及的语境中，规划者的空白画布便是沙漠，一片可承载新城市建设的空旷之地。埃及沙漠城市的最初目标是将人口从拥挤的尼罗河谷分流至崭新、现代且有序的城市环境中。自 20 世纪 70 年代以来，沙漠城市便以"宏大尺度"进行设计，以体现这种"宏伟理想"。 ^(11){ }^{11} 然而实践中，基础设施建成后土地被细分并划作不同用途，最终形成功能单一、尺度夸张的建筑群，其中布满重复模式排列的楼宇。这些规划实践完全忽视了未来居民——这是现代主义规划方式的遗留问题，正如新城市社区管理局官员那句直白的总结："我们必须完成规划。不能等着看是否有人迁入。他们终会来的。" ^(12){ }^{12} 近期，3D 建模计算机程序也被应用于沙漠之城的设计中。在最新启动的新城官方展示中，
Capital project for Egypt, a rendered map of the country showing a huge green area in the desert was accompanied by architectural visualizations depicting daily scenes with lush promenades, Dubai-esque architecture, and people strolling by in the foreground. An ultra-organized whole new world is manifested from the macro-scale down to the tiniest detail, advocating a perception of how the city and society should be. These images “are used to discuss designs, negotiate contracts, buy and sell property, and even constitute legal documents,” thus establishing their authority over reality. ^(13){ }^{13} establishig heir a. It is this blind belief in images that allows for a practice of ruling through drawing, raising the issue of a “regime of images and graphics.” ^(14){ }^{14} 埃及首都项目展示了一幅渲染地图，沙漠中呈现出一片广阔的绿色区域，并配有建筑效果图，描绘了绿树成荫的步道、迪拜风格的建筑以及前景中漫步的人群。从宏观尺度到最微小的细节，一个高度组织化的全新世界被具象化，宣扬着对城市与社会应有形态的认知。这些图像"被用于讨论设计方案、协商合同、买卖房产，甚至构成法律文件"，从而确立其对现实的权威性。正是这种对图像的盲目信任，使得"通过绘图进行统治"成为可能，进而引发了"图像与图形统治体系"的问题。
Operative methods of building new cities from scratch serve to assert a certain power and authority. They embody the incentives and manifest the vision for the urbanity that is created. Seen through this lens, the urban form of the DesertCity stands for safeguarding governmental authority and its orientation in favor of private interests and massive speculative investments. The new cities in Egypt have been advertised in association with a desirable lifestyle, stimulating the real estate market and distracting from the real challenges that the country faces. The modus operandi of the DesertCity is the reproduction and replication of an internationally dominant model, in which the inhabitant as a social and political subject is absent. The original civitas of the RomanCity appears to have been lost. Building new cities by merely distributing components in space that work for the optimal and simplified organization of the urban form may satisfy the “rules” of the global economy, but it does not result in an urban entity. Such an entity can only be achieved when the specific locus and the inhabitant as citizen are reintroduced into the equation. The approach of the contemporary designer and planner, is pivoting in this direction by renouncing thenever actual-innocence of playing SimCity. 从零开始建设新城的运作方式，旨在彰显某种权力与权威。它们既体现了建设动机，也昭示着对所创造城市形态的愿景。由此观之，沙漠之城的城市形态象征着对政府权威的维护，以及其对私人利益与大规模投机投资的倾向性。埃及的新城建设总是与理想生活方式绑定宣传，既刺激了房地产市场，又转移了人们对国家真实挑战的注意力。沙漠之城的运作模式复制了国际主流范式，其中居民作为社会与政治主体的身份是缺席的。罗马古城原有的公民精神似乎已然消逝。仅通过空间功能组件的优化简化分布来建造新城，或许能满足全球经济的"规则"，却无法形成真正的城市实体。唯有将特定场所和作为公民的居住者重新纳入考量，方能实现这样的实体。 当代设计师与规划师的思路正转向这一方向，摒弃了模拟城市游戏那种永远天真无邪的玩法。
1 Harvard Project on the City, “How to Build a City: Roman Operating System,” in Mutations, ed. Rem Koolhaas et. al. (Barcelona: ACTAR Editorial, 1 哈佛城市研究项目，《如何建造城市：罗马操作系统》，收录于《突变》，雷姆·库哈斯等编（巴塞罗那：ACTAR 出版社，
2. The term 2. 术语
The term generic city is introduced in Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau’s S,M,L,XLS, M, L, X L and refers to a city without history created on a plane, a surface; see: Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, S, M, L, XL, ed. Jennifer Sigler (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1997). "通用城市"这一概念由雷姆·库哈斯与布鲁斯·毛在 S,M,L,XLS, M, L, X L 中提出，指代平面上创造的、没有历史的城市；参见：雷姆·库哈斯与布鲁斯·毛，《S,M,L,XL》，詹妮弗·西格勒编（纽约：The Monacelli 出版社，1997 年）。
3 The Roman city is known as a " 200%200 \% city "because these customizing operations allow for a city that is 100%100 \% generic and 100%100 \% specific, see: Harvard Project on the City, “How to build a city,” 18. 3 这座罗马城市被称为" 200%200 \% 城市"，因为其定制化操作既能满足 100%100 \% 通用性又兼顾 100%100 \% 特殊性，详见：哈佛城市项目《如何建造一座城市》第 18 页。
4 Pier Vittorio Aureli, The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 6. Leonie Sandercock, Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cices (Alexand Def Modernism and the Decline of Place: The Case of Surrey City Centre, Canada," Planning Perspectives 20, no. 4 (2005): 418. Natrasony and Don, “The Rise of Modernism and the Decline of Place,” 420. 4 皮埃尔·维托里奥·奥雷利，《绝对建筑的可能性》（马萨诸塞州剑桥市：麻省理工出版社，2011 年），第 6 页。莱奥妮·桑德科克，《走向世界都市：多元文化城市规划》（亚历克斯和现代主义的衰落与场所的消逝：以加拿大萨里市中心为例》，《规划展望》第 20 卷第 4 期（2005 年）：第 418 页。纳特拉索尼与唐，《现代主义的兴起与场所的衰落》，第 420 页。
7 Le Corbusier’s dictum as quoted in Amit Tungare, "Le Corbusier’s Principles of City Planning and their Application in Virtual Environments (master’s thesis, Carleton University, 2001), 31. 7 勒·柯布西耶的格言引自阿米特·通加雷《勒·柯布西耶城市规划原则及其在虚拟环境中的应用》（卡尔顿大学硕士论文，2001 年），第 31 页。
8 Richard Moe and Wilkie Carter, Changing Places; Rebuilding Community in The Age of Sprawl (Boston: Don, "The Rise of Modernism and the Decline of Don, “The Rise of Modernism and the Decline of Place,” 418. 8 理查德·莫伊与威尔基·卡特，《变迁之地：蔓延时代社区重建》（波士顿：唐，《现代主义的兴起与场所的衰落》，第 418 页。
9 “Manual,” Sim City, accessed July 29, 2016, http:// www.simcity.com/en_US/manual. 9 “手册”，《模拟城市》，2016 年 7 月 29 日访问，http://www.simcity.com/en_US/manual
10 Ronald Woudstra, “Sim City through the eyes of a city planner,” PlaNYourCity (blog), September 20, 2013, https://planyourcity.net/2013/09/20/sim-city-through-the-eyes-of-a-city-planner/. 10 罗纳德·沃德斯特拉，“城市规划师眼中的《模拟城市》”，《规划你的城市》（博客），2013 年 9 月 20 日，https://planyourcity.net/2013/09/20/sim-city-through-the-eyes-of-a-city-planner/。
11 David Sims, Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster (Cairo, New York: AUC Press, 2014), 296. 11 大卫·西姆斯，《埃及的沙漠梦想：发展还是灾难》（开罗，纽约：AUC 出版社，2014 年），第 296 页。
12 Ibid., 126. 12 同上，第 126 页。
13 Adham Selim, “Capital Cairo: A Regime of Graphics,” Mada Masr, August 5, 2015, http://www. madamasr.com/sections/culture/capital-cairo-regimegraphics. 13 阿德汉·塞利姆，《首都开罗：图形统治》，Mada Masr，2015 年 8 月 5 日，http://www.madamasr.com/sections/culture/capital-cairo-regimegraphics.
14 Ibid. 14 同上。
Fig. 5: The DesertCity, Cairo’s New Capital 图 5：沙漠之城——开罗新首都
A Brief Report on Cairo's New Towns
FELIPE COMBEAU, GUIDO GRECO 开罗新城简报 | 菲利佩·孔博、吉多·格雷科
“It will be a planned, controlled community; a showcase for American industry and research, schools, cultural and educational opportunities. In EPCOT there will be no slum areas because we won’t let them develop.” "这将是一个经过规划、受控的社区；一个展示美国工业与研究的窗口，提供优质学校、文化与教育机会。在 EPCOT 不会出现贫民区，因为我们不会允许其形成。"
Walt Disney, 1966.^(1)1966 .^{1} 沃尔特·迪士尼， 1966.^(1)1966 .^{1}
Since the 1960s, two urban phenomena of great magnitude have coexisted in Cairo: large surfaces of agricultural land are being urbanized through the expansion of “informal” settlements, while even larger areas of the desert are being developed and turned into new towns. But whereas informal Cairo efficiently houses more than twothirds of the city population, state-promoted desert cities have absorbed less than five percent of the population. ^(2){ }^{2} These cities are the outcome of forty years of questionable planning based on imported Western urban principles, which have merely served the government’s proclivity for construction. 自 20 世纪 60 年代以来，开罗并存着两大城市现象：一方面通过"非正规"住区的扩张，大量农业用地被城市化；另一方面更广袤的沙漠地带被开发成新城。但讽刺的是，非正规开罗高效容纳了全市三分之二以上人口，而政府推动的沙漠新城仅吸纳了不足 5%的居民。 ^(2){ }^{2} 这些新城是四十年规划实践的产物，其基于西方城市理念的移植却沦为政府营造政绩的工具。
Desert cities were originally intended to be autonomous industrial settlements for the working class, design to redistribute the growing population of Cairo. Within a very short time, however, they became exemplars of the Western suburban model that followed tested patterns in real estate development. The desert offered the perfect tabula rasa, first for implementing schematic and functionalist urban plans and then for creating vast speculation schemes to benefit a chosen few. 沙漠新城最初定位为工人阶级自给自足的工业聚居地，旨在分流开罗激增的人口。但很快它们就沦为房地产开发的标准模板——西方郊区模式的翻版。广袤沙漠成为完美画布：先被用来实施机械的功能主义规划，继而沦为少数利益集团投机炒作的试验场。
Two main urban models form the DNA of these cities: the modernist ville fonctionnelle, on the one hand, and American suburbia, on the other. They both illustrate a systematic transition from socialist patronage to real estate partnership. The reference for forthcoming desert developments such as the “New Capital” will predictably be the urban models of the Persian Gulf, which reflect the goal of positioning Cairo as a “global city” and renewing, once again, the illusion 这些城市的基因由两种主要都市模式构成：一方面是现代主义的功能性城市，另一方面则是美国式郊区。二者共同展现了从社会主义庇护模式向房地产合作模式的系统性转变。可以预见，即将开发的沙漠新城（如"新行政首都"）将以波斯湾都市为蓝本，这折射出将开罗定位为"全球城市"的野心，并再次通过雄心勃勃的新城市化进程重演发展的幻象。
of development through new and ambitious urbanization processes. （注：译文根据中文表达习惯调整了部分语序，将"once again"提前至"重演"之前以增强连贯性；"ville fonctionnelle"保留法语原词的文化内涵，采用"功能性城市"的意译；长句拆分为符合中文阅读节奏的短句，同时保持原文的批判性语调）
Taking “new towns” as a modern and controversial invention to alleviate the problems of the city as a starting point, the following examples of Cairo’s new towns will be illuminated below: Nasr City (1960), Sixth of October (1982), and Dreamland (1995). Together, they illustrate the transition from a social-functionalist to a speculative model of urbanization. This report intends to provide a critical examination of the fortyyear desert urbanization process that has become one of the preferred instruments of economic production and expression of political power in Egypt, even as informally developed areas and their urban challenges have remained neglected. 以"新城"这一旨在缓解城市问题的现代而备受争议的发明为切入点，下文将阐释开罗三大新城的典型案例：纳赛尔城（1960）、十月六日城（1982）和梦幻乐园（1995）。这些案例共同展现了从社会功能主义模式向投机性城市化模式的转变。本报告旨在批判性地审视埃及长达四十年的沙漠城市化进程——尽管非正规开发区域及其带来的城市挑战始终被忽视，这一进程已成为该国经济生产和政治权力表达的首选工具之一。
NEW TOWNS: MODERNITY AS TABULA RASA 新城：现代性作为白板
“The city is doomed . . . we shall solve the city problem by leaving the city.” "城市注定消亡......我们将通过逃离城市来解决城市问题。"
Henry Ford, 1924. ^(3){ }^{3} 亨利·福特，1924 年。 ^(3){ }^{3}
One of the most influential ideas in modern urbanism is the planning of new towns, which was formulated by Alfred Marshall and implemented by Ebenezer Howard in the late nineteenth century as a way to achieve an ordered and rational urban form. It claimed to offer universal solutions to the problems and perceived chaos of the industrial city and its population growth. ^(4){ }^{4} Escape from the existing city-a solution made possible through industrial means such as, notably, modern transportation -was a revolutionary idea holding the promise of a fascinating panacea. New towns presented planners and politicians with a blank canvas to create their vision of a modern urban society. Modernity became synonymous with a tabula rasa, and Cairo’s desert fringe was a perfect example of one. 现代城市规划中最具影响力的理念之一是新城镇规划，这一构想由阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔提出，埃比尼泽·霍华德在十九世纪末付诸实践，旨在实现有序理性的城市形态。该理念宣称能为工业城市的人口增长及其混乱问题提供普适解决方案。 ^(4){ }^{4} 逃离现有城市——这种通过现代交通等工业手段实现的解决方案，曾是一个革命性理念，承载着完美灵丹妙药的美好承诺。新城镇为规划者和政客提供了实现现代都市社会愿景的空白画布。现代性由此与"白板理论"画上等号，而开罗的沙漠边缘正是这一理论的绝佳范例。
In Egypt, the “new town” concept was adopted after the 1952 Revolution with the creation of Nasr City, during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government. Later on, under Anwar Sadat and the Infitah (the economic opening to the West starting in 1974), the official new-town program was introduced and implemented starting in the early 1980s. ^(5){ }^{5} Originally conceived as a solution to Cairo’s overcrowding and congestion, the program was further intended to curtail development on agricultural land in the Nile Valley and the Delta. The new towns were meant to be self-contained growth poles in the desert that would absorb and redistribute people and activities from Cairo, thereby offering affordable housing and a healthy environment. While some new towns, notably Tenth of Ramadan and Sixth of October, have been considerably successful in attracting industry, the relocation of people has remained limited: between 1970 and 2010, desert cities have managed to attract only about 600,000 people. ^(6){ }^{6} 埃及在 1952 年革命后采纳了"新城"理念，纳赛尔政府时期建立了纳赛尔城。随后在安瓦尔·萨达特执政及 1974 年开始的经济开放政策（对西方开放）背景下，官方新城计划于 1980 年代初正式启动并实施。 ^(5){ }^{5} 该计划最初旨在解决开罗过度拥挤和交通拥堵问题，同时遏制尼罗河谷及三角洲地区农业用地被侵占的现象。这些沙漠新城被规划为自给自足的增长极，用以吸纳和重新分配开罗的人口与经济活动，从而提供经济适用住房和健康生活环境。尽管十月六日城和斋月十日城等部分新城在吸引工业方面成效显著，但人口迁移效果有限：1970 至 2010 年间，沙漠城市仅成功吸引了约 60 万居民。 ^(6){ }^{6}
NASR CITY: NATIONALISM AND URBANIZATION 纳斯尔城：民族主义与城市化
The Ministry of Defense began developing Nasr City in northeastern Cairo starting in 1958, in part as a way to establish a new administrative complex near the major army installations in Heliopolis. Nasr City can be considered a prequel to the official new-town program established decades later. The city was initially announced as a new districtextension of Cairo, but its brief was changed mid-process, first to become Egypt’s new capital, and then finally the “City of the Revolution.” ^(7){ }^{7} The project brochure claimed that the city would be “planned according to the latest city planning theories.” For the first time, modernist urbanism was put into practice in Egypt. Planned after World War II in a time of great optimism, Nasr City was a typical high-modernist development built in the name of “the people,” the recipients of state-sanctioned modernity. 国防部于 1958 年开始在开罗东北部开发纳赛尔城，部分原因是为了在赫利奥波利斯主要军事设施附近建立一个新的行政综合体。纳赛尔城可被视为数十年后正式新城建设计划的先声。该项目最初被宣布为开罗的新城区延伸，但在建设过程中几经调整：先是被定为埃及新首都，最终确定为"革命城"。 ^(7){ }^{7} 项目宣传册宣称该城将"依据最新城市规划理论进行设计"。现代主义城市规划理念首次在埃及得到实践。纳赛尔城是二战后在乐观主义盛行的时代背景下规划的，以"人民"——这个国家认可的现代化受益者——为名建设的典型高度现代主义开发项目。
The master plan was designed by the Egyptian architect Karim Sayed, following twentieth-century urban planning principles: 总体规划由埃及建筑师卡里姆·赛义德设计，遵循二十世纪城市规划原则：
rigidly separated land use, low residential density, green belts and commercial spines, playgrounds and parks, segregated industries, and buffer zones to protect the new town from any future encroachments. ^(8){ }^{8} The city had two parts connected by Nasr Road. The northwest part was divided into large districts and groups of public facilities, industrial zones, sport facilities to host Olympic games, and relocated state agencies. ^(9){ }^{9} The southeast part was organized in smaller districts distributed in a grid, with housing blocks and services built around public gardens. This residential area was planned to accommodate a maximum of two hundred thousand inhabitants, with a density of twenty-five thousand inhabitants per square kilometer. 严格划分的土地用途、较低的居住密度、绿化带与商业主干道、游乐场和公园、隔离的工业区，以及防止新城未来遭受侵占的缓冲带。 ^(8){ }^{8} 这座城市由纳斯尔路连接的两部分组成。西北部分划分为大型行政区、公共设施群、工业区、奥运会体育场馆以及迁入的政府机构。 ^(9){ }^{9} 东南部分采用网格状布局的小型社区，住宅楼与服务设施围绕公共花园而建。该居住区规划最高容纳二十万居民，人口密度为每平方公里两万五千人。
Nasr City’s construction was slow and the Olympic games never materialized. Despite being considered by some scholars today to be one of the most prosperous areas in Cairo, ^(10){ }^{10} Nasr City was built on military-owned land to mainly to serve a government elite and foreign diplomats, and thus included relatively little low-income housing. ^(11){ }^{11} Moreover, the rational monotony, repetition, and standardization of the urban form in this development could be associated with the ills and failures of modernist planning. 纳赛尔城的建设进展缓慢，奥林匹克运动会也从未在此举办。尽管如今一些学者认为这里是开罗最繁荣的区域之一， ^(10){ }^{10} 但纳赛尔城最初是在军事用地上兴建的，主要服务于政府精英和外国外交官，因此低收入住宅相对较少。 ^(11){ }^{11} 此外，该城区建设中体现出的理性单调、重复性以及标准化的城市形态，往往与现代主义规划的弊病和失败联系在一起。
SIXTH OF OCTOBER: THE FUNCTIONALIST CITY 十月六日城：功能主义之城
The first master plan for Cairo, which included Nasr City as a key component, was drafted to control the urban growth of Egypt’s capital. Issued in 1956, it focused on increasing areas for urban settlement through the development of industrial zones and housing for the working class. Six satellite cities were planned on the desert plains on both sides of the Nile Valley as a result. In 1977, Anwar Sadat officially launched the planning for the first generation of desert cities. These new towns were envisioned as being selfsufficient, explicitly aiming to attract new residents and industrial development, as well as public and private investments. 开罗的首个总体规划将纳赛尔城作为核心组成部分，旨在控制埃及首都的城市扩张。该规划于 1956 年颁布，重点通过开发工业区和工人阶级住宅区来增加城市居住面积，由此规划在尼罗河谷两侧的沙漠平原上建设六座卫星城。1977 年，安瓦尔·萨达特正式启动第一代沙漠城市的规划工作。这些新城被构想为自给自足的城市单元，明确以吸引新居民、促进工业发展以及吸纳公私投资为目标。
Sadat’s new-town program was a sign of the ideological shift from socialist reform to an open economy (as manifested, for example, in a partnership with the United States). 萨达特的新城计划标志着埃及从社会主义改革转向开放经济的意识形态转变（例如体现在与美国建立合作伙伴关系等举措上）。
The original, 1979 plan for Sixth of October bore visible traces of its influences: the linear cities of the Soviet Union of the early 1920s, and the functionalist schemes of 1930s CIAM. Based on linear planning units placed along a main service spine, the original layout was meant to be easily constructed in phases, managed, and extended into the desert to the west. The first phase occupied an area of 9,166 feddans ( 4,124 hectares) and was divided into three parts: industrial, residential, and tourist areas. This layout is surprisingly similar to Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse of 1930, although the green areas that were provided for in the zoning plan remain desert today. 1979 年最初规划的十月六日城明显受到双重影响：既有 1920 年代早期苏联线性城市的影子，又带有 1930 年代国际现代建筑协会（CIAM）功能主义方案的印记。该规划以沿主干服务轴线分布的线性单元为基础，旨在实现分阶段简易建设、便于管理，并能向西侧沙漠持续延伸。一期工程占地 9,166 费丹（4,124 公顷），划分为工业区、住宅区和旅游区三部分——这种布局与勒·柯布西耶 1930 年提出的"光辉城市"惊人相似，尽管规划中的绿化带至今仍是荒漠。
While considered relatively successful in attracting industry, Sixth of October failed to attract middle- and low-income families and generate as many jobs as promised. From the 1990s on, Sixth of October took a different direction and started expanding largely through exclusive gated communities (such as Sheikh Zayed in the north and Dreamland in the south, and so on). 虽然十月六日城在吸引工业投资方面相对成功，却未能兑现创造就业的承诺，也未能吸引中低收入家庭入驻。自 1990 年代起，该城转型发展封闭式高端社区（如北部的谢赫扎耶德城和南部的梦幻乐园等），由此开启了扩张新篇章。
The transition to a neoliberal economy in the 1990s created the conditions for the privatization and commodification of land. An urban model new to the Egyptian context emerged: gated communities. Vast areas of the desert surrounding Cairo have since been privatized for the benefit of real estate developers, who have controversially been linked to political power. ^(13){ }^{13} 20 世纪 90 年代向新自由主义经济的转型为土地私有化和商品化创造了条件。一种埃及前所未有的城市模式应运而生：封闭式社区。开罗周边广袤的沙漠地带自此被私有化，成为房地产开发商牟利的工具——这些开发商与政治权力的关系一直备受争议。 ^(13){ }^{13}
Dreamland is one of the first compounds of this kind. Construction began in 1995, and the development currently occupies 800 hectares, forming an extension of Sixth of October. Upon completion, the cost of the construction is estimated to rise to 2.64 billion US dollars. Dreamland includes all the amenities needed to attract wealthy locals and international visitors: exclusive apartments and villas, recreational and commercial facilities, shopping malls, business hubs, luxury resorts, and sport and entertainment facilities. 梦幻乐园是此类封闭社区的首批代表之一。该项目于 1995 年动工，目前占地 800 公顷，构成十月六日城的延伸部分。竣工时预计建设成本将攀升至 26.4 亿美元。园区内配备吸引本土富豪与国际游客的全套设施：专属公寓与别墅、休闲商业场所、购物中心、商务枢纽、豪华度假村以及体育娱乐设施。
Dreamland replicates American planned communities, following the principles of ‘New Urbanism.’ It is organized around a golf course, a theme park, and a shopping 梦幻乐园仿照美国规划社区，遵循"新都市主义"原则。整个社区以高尔夫球场、主题公园和购物
Fig. 1: View of the New Capital model 图 1：新行政首都模型景观
mall, following a hierarchy of curving roads that come together in a picturesque arrangement. Buildings replicate suburban American housing types, with pitched roofs and arched walls, all painted with light pastel colors. Indeed, the developer, Bahgat Group, specifically described Dreamland as “the Orlando of the Middle East.” ^(14){ }^{14} Most of the new developments surrounding Cairo are the results of collaboration between local offices and North American and European engineering and architecture firms-an arrangement meant to ensure the correct replication of tested urban standards and business models. 购物中心，遵循着蜿蜒道路的层级设计，最终汇聚成如画般的布局。建筑复制了美国郊区的住宅类型，带有斜屋顶和拱形墙壁，全部涂以柔和的浅色调。事实上，开发商巴哈特集团特别将梦幻城描述为"中东的奥兰多"。 ^(14){ }^{14} 开罗周边大多数新开发项目都是当地事务所与北美及欧洲工程建筑公司合作的成果——这种合作模式旨在确保对成熟城市标准和商业模式的精准复制。
Once transplanted to the Egyptian desert, the American suburban model produced large areas of exclusive residential compounds for speculative purposes, which boast more than sixty percent vacancy even while using up public resources (land, infrastructure, and the machinery of government). 当美国郊区模式被移植到埃及沙漠后，催生了大量以投机为目的的专属住宅区。这些住宅区即使消耗着公共资源（土地、基础设施和政府机器），空置率仍高达 60%以上。
Dreamland, like some other desert compounds, was designed to satisfy a particular way of life, and forms part of a mostly successful national strategy to capture local savings and foreign investment. As a result, the Egyptian authorities and real estate developers keep promoting similar and increasingly ambitious projects. 梦幻乐园与其他沙漠住宅区一样，其设计初衷是为了满足特定生活方式需求，同时也是埃及吸纳国民储蓄与外资这一基本成功国策的组成部分。因此，埃及当局与房地产开发商不断推进着愈发雄心勃勃的同类项目。
For the last fifty years, the urbanization of the desert has not been successful in tackling the problems it was nominally intended to address: population growth, urban encroachment on agricultural land, and lack of affordable housing. On the contrary, it has proven to be an intractable and systematic top-down policy that has simply avoided and bypassed urban problems, in the process generating new ones such as social segregation, land speculation, unsustainable use of resources, and corruption-and creating manifest risks for the national economy. The new town was initially adopted as a remedy for urban woes, subsequently transitioned to a socialist-functionalist urban model, and finally became a tool for speculation. Today, this persistent will to develop the desert is continuing with increasing ambition. The 过去五十年间，沙漠城市化进程并未有效解决其表面宣称要应对的问题：人口增长、城市侵占农地、保障性住房短缺。相反，事实证明这是一项顽固的系统性自上而下政策，仅仅回避和绕过了城市病，在此过程中却催生了社会阶层割裂、土地投机、资源不可持续利用和腐败等新问题，更对国家经济构成显著风险。新城建设最初被作为城市病的解药引入，继而转型为社会主义功能主义城市模式，最终沦为投机工具。如今，这种开发沙漠的顽固意志正以越来越大的野心持续蔓延。
New Capital project, announced in 2015, is planned to house five million people on the eastern periphery of Cairo. It is meant to reinvent the notion of the desert city as panacea, importing the Persian Gulf model of development to secure Cairo a position as a global city in the Globalization and World Cities Research Network (GaWC) rankings. ^(15){ }^{15} 新首都项目于 2015 年宣布启动，计划在开罗东部边缘地带容纳五百万人居住。该项目旨在重塑沙漠城市作为万能良方的概念，引入波斯湾发展模式，以确保开罗在全球化和世界城市研究网络（GaWC）排名中获得全球城市的地位。 ^(15){ }^{15}
While the Egyptian government has repeatedly sought to plan the (desert) city in a top-down fashion, the reality is that since 1960, Cairo grew from a city of four million to a megacity of seventeen million mainly through informal settlements. Two thirds of the population lives in these highly dense and compact areas, which occupy mainly agricultural land. Research has indicated that these districts even accounted for over eighty percent of housing construction from the 1970s through the 1990s. ^(16){ }^{16} Even though informal housing is, in fact, a highly flexible and adaptable form that is appropriate for the circumstances of its inhabitants, such neighborhoods have been pathologized as ashwa’iyyat (random or haphazard areas) by government officials and the local media. ^(17){ }^{17} Despite the evident challenges posed by such areas, which suffer from lack of infrastructure, a dearth of public spaces and services, congestion, and pollution, the state has been unable to intervene in them effectively. 尽管埃及政府多次试图以自上而下的方式规划（沙漠）城市，但现实情况是，自 1960 年以来，开罗从一座四百万人口的城市发展成为一千七百万人口的超级大都市，主要依靠非正式定居点的扩张。三分之二的人口生活在这些高度密集紧凑的区域，而这些区域主要占据了农业用地。研究表明，从 1970 年代到 1990 年代，这些区域甚至占据了住房建设的八成以上。 ^(16){ }^{16} 尽管非正式住房实际上是一种高度灵活、适应居民生活环境的居住形式，但这类社区被政府官员和当地媒体污名化为"ashwa'iyyat"（杂乱无章的区域）。 ^(17){ }^{17} 尽管这些区域存在明显挑战——基础设施匮乏、公共空间与服务短缺、交通拥堵和污染严重——但政府始终未能对其进行有效干预。
By understanding these two sizeable urban phenomena that have shaped Cairo’s metropolitan reality, one comes to see that top-down development and the imposition of schematic order has been an ineffective urban management strategy. It thus appears imperative to critically examine desert cities and question the process behind Cairo’s modernization-and especially the paradigms that underpin it-as well as the role of the government as its main promoter. Hopefully, after fifty years of neglect, urban planning and design can finally reorient Cairo’s urban development and reestablish the state’s engagement in society. 通过理解这两个塑造开罗大都市现实的重大城市现象，人们逐渐认识到自上而下的发展和强加规划秩序是一种低效的城市管理策略。因此，批判性地审视沙漠城市、质疑开罗现代化进程背后的运作机制——尤其是支撑这一进程的范式体系——以及政府作为主要推动者的角色显得至关重要。在历经五十年的忽视之后，城市规划与设计或许终能重新定位开罗的城市发展方向，重建国家与社会的互动关系。
1 “Walt Disney’s original E.P.C.O.T. film (1966) HD FULL VERSION,” YouTube video, 25:48, from Ham Luske (director) and Marty Sklar 1 "沃尔特·迪士尼原版 E.P.C.O.T.概念影片（1966 年）高清完整版"，YouTube 视频，25 分 48 秒，导演汉姆·拉斯克与马蒂·斯克拉
(screenwriter), E.P.C.O.T. / Florida Film (WED Enterprises, 1966), posted by “TheOriginalEpcot,” watch?v=sLCHg9mUBag. （编剧），E.P.C.O.T./佛罗里达电影（WED 企业，1966 年），由"TheOriginalEpcot"发布，watch?v=sLCHg9mUBag。
2 David Sims, “Residential Informality in Greater Cairo: Typologies, Representative Areas, Quantification, Valuation, and Causal Factors” Eeport prepared for the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies and the Institute for Liberty 2 戴维·西姆斯，《大开罗地区非正规住宅：类型学、典型区域、量化评估、价值分析及成因研究》，为埃及经济研究中心和自由研究所撰写的报告
3 Henry Ford, Ford Ideals: Being A Selection from “Mr. Ford’s Page” in The Dearbor Independent (Michigan: Dearborn Publishing Company, 1926), 157. 3 亨利·福特，《福特理想：选自〈迪尔伯恩独立报〉"福特先生专栏"》（密歇根州：迪尔伯恩出版公司，1926 年），157 页。
4 Peter Hall and Mark Tewdwr-Jones, Urban and Regional Planning, 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 31. 4 彼得·霍尔与马克·特德-琼斯，《城市与区域规划》第五版（纽约：劳特利奇出版社，2010 年），31 页。
5 After WWII, new towns were also adopted in order to prevent sprawl. For example, the region of Paris established in 1965 a schema directeur, whose main growth by creating new autonomous settlements along an infrastructural axis with employment, housing, services, and so on. 5 二战后，为遏制城市无序扩张，新城建设模式得到推广。例如巴黎大区在 1965 年制定的总体规划中，提出沿交通轴线建设具备就业、居住和服务功能的独立新城作为主要发展策略。
6 David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City Out of Control (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2010), 86. 6 戴维·西姆斯，《解读开罗：失控城市的逻辑》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2010 年），86 页。
7 Mohamed Elshahed, “Cities of Revolution: On the Politics of Participation and Municipal Management in Cairo” in Participation in Art and Archttecture: Spaces of Participation and Occupatio eds. Martino Stieris and Mechtild Widrich 7 穆罕默德·埃尔沙希德，《革命之城：论开罗的参与式政治与市政管理》，收录于《艺术与建筑中的参与：参与空间与占领空间》，马蒂诺·斯蒂里斯与梅克蒂尔德·维德里希合编
8 Karim Sayed was also responsible in 1957 for the master plan for the reconstruction of Port Said after the destruction of the city during the Suez Crisis. 8 卡里姆·赛义德还于 1957 年负责了塞得港重建总体规划，该城在苏伊士运河危机期间遭到毁坏。
9 The stadium and other facilities were designed by Werner March, the first architect of the 1936 Olympic Stadium in Berlin. 9 体育场及其他设施由维尔纳·马赫设计，他是 1936 年柏林奥林匹克体育场的首位建筑师。
10 Marc Frochaux and Aurel Martin, “Nasr City,” (seminar paper, ETH Studio Basel Contemporary City Institute, Winter 2010), 216. 10 马克·弗罗肖与奥雷尔·马丁，《纳斯尔城》（研讨会论文，巴塞尔 ETH 当代城市研究所，2010 年冬季），第 216 页。
11 Andre Raymond, Gairo, trans. Willard Wood 11 安德烈·雷蒙德，《开罗》，威拉德·伍德译
12 Curcinkoski, Press, 2000), 348, 354. Reconsidering the Speculative Naty That Never Was: Urbanization (New York: Princeton Architemporary Press, 2015), 23. 12 库尔辛科斯基出版社，2000 年），第 348、354 页。《重思从未实现的投机性城市化》（纽约：普林斯顿当代建筑出版社，2015 年），第 23 页。
13 Khaled Adham, “Globalization, Neoliberalism, and New Spaces of Capital in Cairo,” Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review 17, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 20. 13 哈立德·阿德汉，《全球化、新自由主义与开罗资本新空间》，《传统住宅与聚落评论》第 17 卷第 1 期（2005 年秋季刊）：第 20 页。
Ibid. 27. 同上，第 27 页。
15 The New Capital project will be the next “official” attempt to modernize Egypt through a new settlement in the desert east of Cairo. This time the urban model adopted is “Gulf urbanism,” a medley of American models (skyscrapers and suburbia) embellished with energy-efficient gadgets and Islamic decorations. The New Capital was presented as a “global capital” that will join the exclusive club formed by London, New York Paris, Tokyo, and Dubai, etc. Occupying seven hundred square kilometers of desert, this city is plan, which was designed by the American office 15 新行政首都项目将成为埃及通过开罗东部沙漠地带新建定居点来实现现代化的下一个"官方"尝试。此次采用的都市模式是"海湾城市化"——一种融合了美国模式（摩天大楼与郊区住宅）并点缀着节能装置与伊斯兰装饰的混合体。这座规划占地七百平方公里的沙漠新城由美国 SOM 建筑设计事务所操刀，设计方案包含迪拜风格的摩天大楼、足球场等设施，政府机构预计将集体迁入新都，使开罗逐渐丧失政治影响力（五十年前对纳斯尔城也曾有过类似预期）。项目首期工程耗资将达数十亿美元。
SOM (Skidmore, Owings and Merrill), includes Dubai-style skyscrapers, a football stadium, and government membssies are expected to relocate to the New Capital, leaving Cairo powerless (the same was expected to happen with Nasr City fifty years ago). The first stage of the project will cors dollars, and Ching the main states and 16 Galila SOM（Skidmore, Owings and Merrill）的设计方案包含迪拜风格的摩天大楼、足球场，政府机构预计将集体迁入新都，使开罗逐渐丧失政治影响力（五十年前对纳斯尔城也曾有过类似预期）。项目首期工程耗资将达数十亿美元，并将容纳主要国家机构和 16 Galila
Contrôle" in “Le Caire, la Ville Spontanée Sous Sontrôlé,” in "Monde Arabe, Villes, Pouvoirs et Maghreb-Machrek, no. 143 (1994): 36. 《失控的开罗：自发之城》中"管控"章节，载《阿拉伯世界：城市、权力与马格里布-马什雷克》第 143 期（1994 年）：第 36 页。
17 W. Judson Dorman, “The Politics of Neglect: The Egyptian State in Cairo, 1974-98,” (PhD diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2007), 25. 17 W. Judson Dorman，《忽视的政治：1974-98 年间埃及政府在开罗的治理》（博士论文，伦敦大学亚非学院，2007 年），第 25 页。
Fig. 2: View of Ard el-Lewa, an informal settlement in West Cairo 图 2：西开罗非正式定居点阿尔德勒瓦的景观
Plans for desert-land reclamation were introduced in Egypt after the 1952 revolution as one of the most important strategies of the government to relieve congestion in Cairo’s central areas. ^(1){ }^{1} Established in the 1970s by the Egyptian Ministry of Housing, the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) had the mission and goal of redistributing inhabitants by developing new population centers in the desert, thereby stopping the further urbanization of agricultural land once and for all. In order to reach this objective, 22 official new towns were to be built in Greater Cairo, away from the historic city. This strategy appeared promising at first, aiming to attract people as an act of pursuing a dream, offering a new lifestyle with facilities that had never existed in Cairo before. The populations of the new towns, however, remained extremely small compared to the original targets, which may in part be due to the fact that it did not cater to all income levels. 1952 年革命后，埃及政府将沙漠土地开垦计划作为缓解开罗中心区拥挤问题的重要战略之一。 ^(1){ }^{1} 埃及住房部于 1970 年代成立的新城市社区管理局（NUCA），肩负着通过在沙漠中开发新人口中心来重新分配居民、永久阻止农业用地进一步城市化的使命与目标。为实现这一目标，大开罗地区计划在远离历史城区的位置建设 22 座官方新城。该战略最初前景可观，旨在通过提供开罗前所未有的设施与全新生活方式，吸引人们追逐梦想。然而这些新城的人口规模与最初目标相去甚远，部分原因可能在于其未能满足各收入阶层的需求。
The contrast between these unoccupied new towns and the highly dense informal settlements merits a critique of such formal urban schemes. Cairo’s failure calls into question the architect’s responsibility and designs, as well as the residential architecture produced out of them. An investigation into the housing typologies in new towns could reveal a relationship between residential architecture-a 这些空置新城与高度密集的非正规住区之间的鲜明对比，值得对这种正规城市规划方案进行批判。开罗的失败案例引发了对建筑师责任与设计理念的质疑，同时也质疑了由此产生的住宅建筑。对新城镇住宅类型的研究或许能揭示住宅建筑与...
fundamental component of a city-and an unsuccessful urban scheme. This study will examine specific cases in the city of Sixth of October. 城市的基本组成部分——以及一个失败的城市规划方案。本研究将考察十月六日城的具体案例。
Residential architecture in Sixth of October, which is located 32 kilometers west of Cairo and was established in 1979making it the second oldest city of the new towns program-can be roughly categorized into three types according to income level. These types include subsidized affordable housing for lower-income classes, private apartment buildings on subdivided land for 位于开罗以西 32 公里处的十月六日城（建于 1979 年，是新城镇计划中历史第二悠久的城市）的住宅建筑，根据收入水平大致可分为三种类型。这些类型包括面向低收入群体的经济适用补贴住房，以及通过土地分割开发建设的私人公寓楼。
middle-income classes, and luxurious villas in upscale gated communities for high-income classes. Among these types, five cases are analyzed below. 中产阶级的中等收入住宅区，以及高收入阶层专属的高档封闭社区中的豪华别墅。在这些类型中，以下分析了五个案例。
PUBLIC HOUSING IN SIXTH DISTRICT 第六区公共住房
Publicly funded, the state-led housing program “Sixth of October Public Housing” was intended for people with low income ^(5){ }^{5}. Originally planned as an economically independent city within the industrial zone in Sixth of October, the housing in Sixth District was meant to be occupied mostly by industrial workers. This type of construction is characteristic of the earliest stages of development in Sixth of October. 由国家主导、公共资金支持的"十月六日公共住房"计划面向低收入群体 ^(5){ }^{5} 。该项目最初规划为十月六日工业区内的经济独立城市，第六区住房主要面向产业工人。这类建筑是十月六日市早期发展阶段的典型特征。
The standard typology consists of a fivefloor building. Each floor has two apartments and one staircase shared between them. An apartment has a size of approximately 56 square meters, which is mirrored to produce the other apartment on the floor. In each unit, there are two bedrooms sharing a single bathroom, as well as an open kitchen and a living room. Each room is well ventilated with a window. The whole building complex usually consists of ten to twelve building blocks overlooking a common courtyard space with trees. This courtyard is publicly accessible, as there is no fence. Often, the ground-floor rooms facing the street are used for small retail shops, though this is technically illegal in the area: the regulation by NUCA does not allow for commercial uses in the residential zone. Each unit can accommodate a family of two to five people. If there are children, each bedroom could be occupied by two. Aesthetically, the building is a simple concrete structure with brick infill, without plastering or paint. Additionally, customizations of apartments by residents can be seen in doors, windows, balconies. 标准户型为五层建筑。每层设有两套公寓，共用一部楼梯。单套公寓面积约 56 平方米，通过镜像对称布局形成同层另一套公寓。每套单元内设两间卧室共享一个卫生间，并配有开放式厨房与客厅。所有房间均设有通风窗户。整个建筑群通常由 10 至 12 栋楼组成，围合出栽种树木的公共庭院空间。因未设围栏，庭院可自由进出。临街底层房间常被用作小型零售商铺，尽管该区域法规上禁止此类用途——根据新城市社区管理局规定，住宅区不得进行商业活动。每套单元可容纳 2 至 5 口之家，若有儿童则每间卧室可住两人。建筑外观为未粉刷的简易混凝土结构，砖块填充墙体，居民可在门窗、阳台等部位进行个性化改造。
In comparison with other types of housing in Sixth of October, this type is succeeding 与其他类型的十月六日城住宅相比，这种类型正在取得成功
Bedroom 卧室
Bathroom 卫生间
Bathroom 卫生间
Living room, kitchen 客厅、厨房
Balcony 阳台
Floor area: 56 square meters 建筑面积：56 平方米
Price: $6,000-$8,000 价格：6000-8000 美元
(source: https://egypt.aqarmap.com) （来源：https://egypt.aqarmap.com）
Figure 1: Plan of a typical public-housing unit in Sixth of October. 图 1：十月六日城典型公租房单元平面图
in having high rates of occupancy. The neighborhood also features semi-formal infrastructural activity such as tuk-tuks, minibuses and kiosks-these can also be found in informally urbanized areas. The shortcomings of public housing units in Cairo’s new towns are the higher cost per square meter, lack of flexibility for further extension, and the small living areas (11.2 该社区保持着较高的入住率，同时具备半正规化的基础设施活动，如突突车、小巴和售货亭——这些在非正规城市化区域同样常见。开罗新城公租房单元的缺陷在于每平方米成本较高、缺乏后续扩建灵活性，以及居住面积偏小（人均 11.2
square meters per person, nearly two square meters less than the average for typical units in informal areas). ^(2){ }^{2} These units are better ventilated and well lit, however, and have lower density. 平方米，较非正规区域典型单元平均值低近两平方米）。 ^(2){ }^{2} 不过这些单元通风采光更佳，且人口密度较低。
PRIVATE-PUBLIC HOUSING IN HARAM CITY 哈拉姆城公私合营住宅项目
This project, developed by Orascom Development-an international development company founded by an Egyptian entrepreneur in 1989-was launched in 2007 as a housing program for low-income families. The project encompasses around seventy thousand housing units, and is located southwest of Sixth of October. The developer provided two- to three-floor buildings, with each floor accommodating two to four apartments with an average surface area of 48 square meters. Each apartment is composed of two bedrooms sharing a single bathroom, a closed kitchen, and a living room with a balcony. The buildings are detached from their neighboring buildings, and thus are open on three sides. The layout of the building is rather compact, and common spaces are considered smaller than the ones in Sixth District. The three open façades allow for cross ventilation and good exposure to daylight. Only being serviced by the public street network, the compound is isolated because it is far from the central area of Sixth of October. There are neither job opportunities nor public transportation options in the neighborhood. Some interventions by inhabitants are noticeable, such as the addition of walls as fences surrounding each house, which signals privacy issues. Aesthetically, it is different from the public housing type due to its plastered outer walls. This type of housing was intended to be affordable for low-income households; however, because the private sector developed the housing as a profitoriented system, in line with its original intention, it turned into a rather expensive housing settlement. Thus, prices do not match the purchasing power of the lowerincome population. 该项目由奥拉斯康开发公司（1989 年由埃及企业家创立的国际开发企业）于 2007 年启动，旨在为低收入家庭提供住房解决方案。项目坐落在十月六日城西南部，包含约七万套住宅单元。开发商提供二至三层的建筑，每层设置 2-4 套平均面积 48 平方米的公寓。每套公寓包含两间共用卫生室的卧室、封闭式厨房以及带阳台的客厅。建筑采用三面开敞的独立布局，与相邻楼栋保持间距。相较于十月六日城第六区，该项目的建筑布局更为紧凑，公共空间也相对较小。三面开敞的立面设计实现了良好的穿堂通风和自然采光。由于远离十月六日城中心区且仅依靠公共路网连接，该社区处于相对孤立状态，周边既缺乏就业机会，也没有公共交通设施。 居民的一些改造措施显而易见，比如在每栋房屋周围加筑围墙作为栅栏，这暗示着隐私问题。从美学角度看，由于外墙抹灰处理，这类住宅与公共住房类型截然不同。此类住房本意是为低收入家庭提供经济适用房，但由于私营部门将其开发为以盈利为导向的体系，最终形成了价格高昂的住宅区，导致房价与低收入人群的购买力严重脱节。
Figure 2: Plan of a typical unit in Haram City 图 2：哈拉姆城典型单元平面图
PRIVATE APARTMENT BUILDINGS 私人公寓楼
This type is generated by the subdivision of desert land into smaller plots. These are then sold to private developers or investors who build on them. This is a housing type for middle-income dwellers that is common in Sixth of October, and can be found around the central area of the city. Characterized by a higher density compared to other types, this type of residence has five to six floors, with two apartments per floor-symmetric units with an area of approximately 165 square meters each. Typical units can accommodate up to seven people. There are three bedrooms and three bathrooms, 此类住宅源于将沙漠地块细分为较小地块，随后出售给私人开发商或投资者进行建设。这是十月六日城常见的中等收入住宅类型，多分布于城市中心区域。相较于其他类型，该住宅具有更高密度特征，通常为五至六层建筑，每层设两套对称单元，每套面积约 165 平方米。标准单元最多可容纳七人居住，配备三间卧室及三间卫生间。
a closed kitchen, and a living room with balcony. Each room has access to fresh air and natural light, with a ventilation shaft that ensures cross ventilation. The building complex often overlooks an open common space with trees and garden-if maintained. The plot is directly accessible from a public street, even though the building has its own parking space. There is a large variety in type and aesthetic for this type of residential building, as adjustments are made according to each owner’s needs and requests. Exterior walls are plastered and painted and lend a more luxurious look to the building. The ornamental façade covered in balconies reflects both the real estate market’s taste as well as the owner’s preferences. The symmetrical layout facilitates rental or future developments. 封闭式厨房，以及带阳台的客厅。每个房间都能获得新鲜空气和自然光，通风井确保空气对流。建筑群通常俯瞰着树木葱郁的花园式公共空间——如果维护得当的话。地块可直接从公共街道进入，尽管建筑配有专属停车位。这类住宅建筑在类型和美学上呈现多样化，会根据每位业主的需求进行调整。外墙经过粉刷处理，赋予建筑更奢华的外观。布满阳台的装饰性立面既体现了房地产市场的品味，也反映了业主的偏好。对称布局便于出租或未来改造开发。
This type of housing is usually sold, but often remains empty. In the early 2000s, middle-class dwellers purchased plots in the new towns as a safe investment following the real estate boom. They do not reside in the house but instead hire a bawab, or doorman, who guards the property until the land prices increase, so as to generate a profit when selling it. Many families purchase plots and build a house for their children either to live in or to sell. ^(3){ }^{3} 这类住宅通常会被出售，但往往长期空置。21 世纪初，随着房地产热潮兴起，中产阶级居民将新城的土地购置视为稳妥投资。他们并不实际居住，而是雇佣一名"巴瓦布"（即门卫）看守房产，待地价上涨后转售获利。不少家庭会为子女购置地块建房，或供其居住，或待价而沽。 ^(3){ }^{3}
VILLA IN MENA GARDEN CITY 美纳花园城别墅
This type of housing is aimed at high-income dwellers. Located in Mena Garden City, a gated community with eight hundred villas developed between 2003 and 2009, the housing can be found on land near the central axis of Sixth of October. The compound offers three types of villas, with sizes ranging from 286 to 333 square meters. A villa consists of a two-floor apartment with a kitchen, a large, open living room, and a dining room on the ground floor, and four bedrooms with an additional living room on the upper floor. Each bedroom has an attached bathroom and balcony, and are well ventilated and exposed to light. This unit can accommodate at least eight people, or two families. The balconies and the windows are key elements of the façade, as the type 此类住宅面向高收入人群。项目位于十月六日城中心轴线附近的 Mena Garden City 封闭社区，这个 2003 至 2009 年间开发的社区包含 800 栋别墅。小区提供三种户型，面积从 286 至 333 平方米不等。每栋别墅为双层结构：首层设有厨房、开放式大客厅及餐厅；二层配备四间卧室与额外客厅。所有卧室均附带独立卫浴和阳台，通风采光良好。该户型至少可容纳八人或两个家庭。阳台与窗户作为建筑立面的关键元素...
Bedroom 卧室
Bathroom 卫生间
Kitchen 厨房
Living room 客厅
Balcony 阳台
Floor area: 165 square meters 建筑面积：165 平方米
Price: $64,000\$ 64,000 售价： $64,000\$ 64,000
(source: https://egypt.aqarmap.com/) （来源：https://egypt.aqarmap.com/）
Figure 3: Plan of a typical unit in a private development in Sixth of October 图 3：十月六日城某私营开发项目的标准单元平面图
is usually designed in the style of Western villas. On the plastered exterior, the entrance is marked by a pediment and columns that highlight the luxurious character of the building. Each villa is surrounded by a fenced private garden and, in addition, is located in a gated compound. The company that manages the compound offers maintenance and security systems. 这类住宅通常采用西式别墅风格设计。粉刷的外立面上，门廊的山花墙与立柱突显出建筑的奢华气质。每栋别墅都配有围栏环绕的私人花园，且坐落于封闭式社区内。物业管理公司提供维护与安保服务。
This type of housing for higher-income dwellers is peculiar to the formal urban areas of the new towns. The model of the suburban gated community found all over the world is also found in Egypt, and in 这种面向高收入人群的住宅形式是新城镇正规城区的特色。风靡全球的封闭式郊区社区模式在埃及同样存在，尤其集中体现在
the new towns in particular. This is most likely due to their extremely low density. The regulations requiring very low density set by NUCA are considered to have led to the development of the suburban model in Egypt. The remoteness and emptiness of new towns, as well as the luxurious segregated lifestyle that take place in them, correspond to the wishes of upper-class individuals who do not desire to live among the rest of the population. 新兴城镇中。这很可能源于其极低的人口密度。埃及新城社区管理局制定的超低密度规划条例，被认为直接催生了该国的郊区化发展模式。新城镇的偏远空旷与其中上演的奢华隔离式生活，恰好契合了上层阶级不愿与大众混居的心理诉求。
The villas in the Allegria development represent another variation of gated community, developed by SODIC (Sixth of October Development and Investment Company) in 2011. It differs from others because of additional rooms and luxury services such as nanny’s rooms and study rooms. Furthermore, housing compounds by SODIC are characterized by the strong influence of marketing efforts on the compounds’ designs. For instance, star architects are hired to design their signature units or create golf courses-a profitable use of the large open space required by regulations. 阿莱格里亚开发区的别墅是封闭社区的另一种变体，由十月六日发展与投资公司（SODIC）于 2011 年开发。其独特之处在于增设了保姆房、书房等额外空间及豪华服务。此外，SODIC 开发的住宅区显著特点是营销策略对社区设计的强烈影响——例如聘请明星建筑师设计标志性单元，或建造高尔夫球场（这种对法规要求的大面积开放空间的高利润利用方式）。
FACTORS FOR THE FAILURE OF NEW TOWNS 新城建设失败因素
None of the new towns in the desert have reached their population targets. ^(4){ }^{4} This brief study of the residential architecture in Sixth of October shows that, at first sight, the housing types cannot be considered the main cause for low occupancy rates and poor population growth. Firstly, the houses provided in new towns appear livable and do not show any critical defects. Basic qualities such as ventilation and natural lighting are provided. Secondly, there is a certain variety in typologies, targeting different social classes, although the actual affordability of the units is questionable. 沙漠中的新城镇无一达到预期人口目标。 ^(4){ }^{4} 对十月六日城住宅建筑的简要研究表明，乍看之下，住房类型并非低入住率和人口增长缓慢的主因。首先，新城镇提供的住宅具备宜居性，未显现任何严重缺陷，通风采光等基本品质均有保障。其次，尽管实际支付能力存疑，但户型设计确实针对不同社会阶层呈现多样化。
Thus, other factors must be considered to identify the causes behind the failure of new towns. For instance, there is the fact that housing in new towns is primarily a tool of investment for Egyptians: it functions as a safe deposit for savings rather than as an actual place to live. The houses are guarded 因此必须考量其他因素以探究新城镇失败的根源。例如，新城镇住房对埃及人而言主要是投资工具——其功能更接近于储蓄保险箱而非实际居所。这些房屋被严密看守
Floor area: 333 square meters 建筑面积：333 平方米
Price: $330,000 - $500,000 (http://www.mlseg.org/) 售价：33 万至 50 万美元（http://www.mlseg.org/）
Figure 4 : Plans of the Villa in Mena Garden city. 图 4：米娜花园城别墅平面图
by bawabs and remain empty. Additionally, none of the “affordable houses” have delivered on adequate prices and conditions for the lowest-income populations. The minimum costs for housing are too high for the lower classes. NUCA’s expenditures are increasing faster than the population growth rate, and the amount of money invested for a person to move to and live in a new town is very high. ^(5){ }^{5} Furthermore, with regards to climate, none of the housing type provide enough shade for the scales neighborhood. While the of the buildings conditions inside by individu vidual interventions, the over-scaled buffer zones and lack of design for public spaces are impeding the creation of livable neighborhoods. 这些由巴瓦布（bawabs）管理的房屋至今仍空置着。此外，所有"经济适用房"都未能为最低收入群体提供合适的价格和居住条件。对底层民众而言，住房的最低成本仍然过高。新城管理局（NUCA）的支出增速远超人口增长率，用于吸引并安置一个人迁居新城的资金投入高得惊人。 ^(5){ }^{5} 就气候适应性而言，现有住宅类型均未能为社区提供足够的遮阳空间。虽然居民可通过自行改造改善室内建筑环境，但过大的缓冲带和公共空间的设计缺失，正阻碍着宜居社区的形成。
These factors indicate some possibilities for intervening rather than totally rejecting the existing situation. For example, the financial efficiency of housing in informal settlements could be referenced to develop an affordable housing scheme. Additionally, changing regulations that limit density could allow for better layouts for housing compounds and private apartments. Gated communities could be designed more prudently, since architects are involved. There is also leeway to propose a better model for the development process. Residential architecture is one of the many tools that make make a city. The sound strrewns mostly consists of (ventilation, li the middle and space) that mainly target however, the upper social classes. In Cairo, is nerre the of residential architecture is not used for its original purpose, namely creating real homes for real people, but has instead been abused in the service of investment and profit. 这些因素表明，我们有可能通过干预而非全盘否定现状来改善局面。例如，可以借鉴非正规住区住房的财务效率，制定经济适用房计划。此外，通过修改限制建筑密度的法规，可以为住宅小区和私人公寓创造更合理的布局。由于建筑师的参与，封闭式社区的设计可以更加审慎。在开发流程方面也存在改进空间。住宅建筑只是塑造城市的众多工具之一。良好的居住环境本应包含（通风、采光和空间等）要素，但这些主要服务于社会上层阶级。在开罗，住宅建筑已背离其本质目的——为真实人群创造理想家园，反而沦为投资与牟利的工具。
1 Hanne Kirstine Adriansen. “Land Reclamation in Egypt: A Study of Life in the New Lands,” Geoforum 40 (2009): 664-674. 1 汉妮·柯尔斯汀·阿德里安森，《埃及土地复垦：新垦区生活研究》，《地理论坛》第 40 期（2009 年）：664-674 页。
2 Statistic based on a comparison between two sources: Brian Lee and Magnus Nickl, “The Desert City of 6. October” (student project, "Cities in the Middle East: Part Septemberseminar at ETH Studio Basel, September- 2 数据基于两处来源的对比：布莱恩·李与马格努斯·尼克尔，《十月六日沙漠城》（学生项目，《中东城市：巴塞尔工作室九月研讨会论文集》，苏黎世联邦理工学院，9 月-
Figure 5 : Floor plans for a villa in Allegria, Sheikh Zayed 图 5：谢赫扎耶德 Allegria 社区别墅户型图
December 2010), accessed July 31, 2016, http://www.studio-basel.com/assets/files/ files/11_6thOctober_web.pdf and Marc Angélil and Charlotte Malterre-Barthes, ed., Housing Cairo, the Informal Response (Berlin: Ruby Press, 2016), 135. 2010 年 12 月），2016 年 7 月 31 日访问，http://www.studio-basel.com/assets/files/files/11_6thOctober_web.pdf 以及马克·安杰利与夏洛特·马尔泰尔-巴尔特斯编，《开罗住房：非正规应对方案》（柏林：Ruby 出版社，2016 年），第 135 页。
3 Rana El Rashidy and Reem El Attar, interview by Jide Sleiman Haidar as part of the "Desert Cities/ 2016 18, 3 Rana El Rashidy 与 Reem El Attar 接受 Jide Sleiman Haidar 采访，作为"沙漠城市/2016 18"项目部分内容
Wostafa Zohdy, “Egypt’s New Cities: Neither Just nor Efficient,” Tadamun, December 31, 2015, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.tadamun. co/2015/12/31/egypts-new-cities-neither-just-- Le NuxICP_yjZo. 沃斯塔法·佐赫迪，《埃及新城市：既不公正也不高效》，Tadamun，2015 年 12 月 31 日，2017 年 8 月 14 日访问，http://www.tadamun. co/2015/12/31/egypts-new-cities-neither-just-- Le NuxICP_yjZo。
Lee and Nickl, “The Desert City of 6. October.” Statistic based on a comparison between two Desert City of 6. October" (student project, “Cities in the Middle East: Part Two-Cairo” seminar at ETH Studio Basel, SeptemberDecember 2010), accessed July 31, 2016, http://www.studio-basel.com/assets/files/ files/11_6thOctober_web.pdf and Marc Angélil and Charlotte Malterre-Barthes, eds., Housing Cairo, the Informal Response (Berlin: Ruby Press, 2016), 135. 李与尼克，《十月六日沙漠城》。统计数据基于对两份资料的比较：一份是《十月六日沙漠城》（学生项目，出自 2010 年 9 月至 12 月巴塞尔 ETH 工作室"中东城市：第二部分——开罗"研讨会），2016 年 7 月 31 日访问，http://www.studio-basel.com/assets/files/files/11_6thOctober_web.pdf；另一份是马克·安杰利与夏洛特·马尔泰尔-巴特斯合编的《开罗住房：非正规应对方案》（柏林：Ruby 出版社，2016 年），第 135 页。
The development of new towns represents a persistent Egyptian dream that has been renewing itself since the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite revolutions and changes in regimes and leaders, nothing seems to put a halt to the continuous pursuit of creating new cities, with ambiguous and mostly failed results. An evolution in legislation is easily discernible along the way. The new towns and their associated policies are a means of speculative development catering to an investor elite, serving a succession of political agendas and justifying a deeply bureaucratic and opaque state administration. Vocal discontent concerning the new towns has been widespread in the past decades, with criticisms ranging from their unaffordability for average citizens to the poorly developed shopping offerings and the low level of services (schools, health facilities, or transportation systems). Could the evolution of new-town legislation described above be one of the main reasons for the failed state of these towns? A timeline of urban design policies and housing legislations could explain the patchy and unscrupulous development of these new towns. 新城开发代表着埃及一个持久的梦想，自贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔时代以来不断自我更新。尽管经历了革命、政权更迭和领导人变换，似乎没有什么能阻止持续创建新城市的追求，但其结果却模糊不清且大多以失败告终。在此过程中，立法的演变清晰可辨。这些新城及其相关政策是为投资精英服务的投机开发手段，迎合了一系列政治议程，并为高度官僚化和不透明的国家管理提供了理由。过去几十年里，对新城的公开不满普遍存在，批评从普通市民难以负担房价，到商业配套发展滞后，再到服务设施（学校、医疗机构或交通系统）水平低下。上述新城立法的演变是否正是这些城市陷入失败状态的主要原因之一？城市设计政策和住房立法的时间线或许能解释这些新城发展中的零散与肆无忌惮。
GENERAL TIMELINE OF THE NEW TOWNS 新城发展总体时间线
In the euphoric time following the 1973 victory in the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat seized the opportunity to propose his vision for Egypt. With the Waraqat Uktubar (October Working Paper), he launched the Infitah (Open-Door Policy) and paved the way for the establishment of the first desert cities on public land between 1974 and 1979. ^(1){ }^{1} The realization of these new towns has been met with numerous criticisms. One of the main ones, which has also been acknowledged by the Ministry of Housing, is the failure to meet the planned goal of five million 在 1973 年赎罪日战争胜利后的欢腾时期，埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特抓住机遇提出了他对埃及的愿景。通过《十月工作文件》，他启动了"开放政策"，并为 1974 至 1979 年间在公共土地上建立首批沙漠城市铺平了道路。 ^(1){ }^{1} 这些新城的建设成果遭到了诸多批评。其中最主要的批评——住房部也承认这一点——是未能实现到 2005 年吸引 500 万
inhabitants by 2005. ^(2){ }^{2} The 2006 Census calculated only 766,000 inhabitants in all of the new towns. Moreover, a troublesome phenomenon is also identified in real estate development. Most of the new construction has been developed with little consideration for local dynamics, target beneficiaries, financial growth, and effective market incentives. Bearing in mind that all of the basic infrastructure must be provided from scratch, the establishment of new towns is an expensive endeavor, relying on state investments. ^(3){ }^{3} Their continued development represents a heavy burden on the national budget. 居民的计划目标。 ^(2){ }^{2} 2006 年人口普查显示，所有新城居民总数仅为 76.6 万人。此外，房地产开发中还暴露出一个棘手现象：大多数新建项目都很少考虑当地发展动态、目标受益群体、财政增长及有效的市场激励机制。考虑到所有基础设施都需从零开始建设，新城的建立完全依赖国家投资，是一项耗资巨大的工程。 ^(3){ }^{3} 这些城市的持续发展对国家财政构成了沉重负担。
NEW-TOWN LEGISLATION 新城立法
Between 1952 and 2004, 24 laws were issued to regulate public land. The most important of them are the Desert Land Law (Law 143/1981); the State Private Domain Law (Law 7/1991), which mainly concerns the means of apportioning public land among sectoral agencies; the Public Land Allocation Law (Law 5/1996); and the laws regulating authority over public desert lands. However, the most important is the one identified as Law 59/1979. ^(4){ }^{4} This law is the preeminent legislative framework for the Egyptian new-towns policy, spawning the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) of the Ministry of Housing, an economic authority tasked with establishing new communities. The explicit main goal of the new towns was to attract population, create an industrial base outside of the Nile Valley, and attract both public and private investments. Law 59/1979 vested NUCA with extensive powers to develop public land and generate profit from real estate development. Indeed, NUCA has more authority than the governorates and ministries combined, especially in terms of social housing, as more than fifty percent of the country’s social housing is located 1952 年至 2004 年间，埃及共颁布了 24 部规范公共用地的法律。其中最重要的是《荒漠土地法》（1981 年第 143 号法）；主要涉及公共用地在部门机构间分配方式的《国家私有领域法》（1991 年第 7 号法）；《公共土地分配法》（1996 年第 5 号法）；以及规范公共荒漠土地管辖权的相关法律。但最具里程碑意义的是 1979 年第 59 号法。 ^(4){ }^{4} 该法律是埃及新城政策最重要的立法框架，由此诞生了住房部下属的新城市社区管理局（NUCA）——一个负责建立新社区的经济管理机构。新城建设的明确主要目标是吸引人口、在尼罗河谷以外建立工业基地，并吸引公共和私人投资。1979 年第 59 号法律赋予 NUCA 开发公共用地并通过房地产开发获利的广泛权力。事实上，NUCA 拥有的权限甚至超过各省和部委的总和，特别是在社会住房领域——全国超过 50%的社会住房都位于
Fig. 1: Cover of Law 59/1979 图 1：1979 年第 59 号法律封面
in the new towns. ^(5){ }^{5} It enabled a flexible corporate tax policy in order to attract investors to the large industrial zones of the new developments: industrial plots could be bought at a bargain price, with a ten-year tax break. ^(6){ }^{6} As a rule, there is a five-year time frame in which owners must excavate the plot and construct at least one unit on it. If this is not achieved, NUCA has the authority to repossess the land. Yet as only part of the construction was required to take place for owners to keep their plots, unfinished or stalled developments were already the norm even before the major buildup of desert cities in the 1980s. 在新城镇中。 ^(5){ }^{5} 该政策实行灵活的企业税收制度，以吸引投资者入驻新开发的大型工业区：工业用地可以低价购入，并享受十年免税期。 ^(6){ }^{6} 按照规定，业主需在五年期限内完成地块开挖并至少建造一个单元。若未能达标，新城市社区管理局有权收回土地。但由于业主只需完成部分建设即可保留地块，早在 1980 年代沙漠城市大规模建设之前，烂尾工程就已屡见不鲜。
NUCA is not solely responsible for the urban development in the desert, however, as development was already happening there before Law 59 was established in 1979. Other government entities, such as the armed forces, the Ministry of Interior, staterun housing companies, and many others, also participate in the juicy speculative market of desert sites by developing residential units, industrial zones, and housing compounds. Finally, while Law 59/1979 foresaw the concession of new towns to local government authorities, this still has not happened due to a lack of management knowledge and maintenance budget. 新城市社区管理局（NUCA）并非沙漠地区城市开发的唯一责任方，因为在 1979 年第 59 号法律颁布前，该区域的开发活动就已存在。其他政府实体——包括武装部队、内政部、国有住房公司等诸多机构——也通过开发住宅单元、工业园区和居住社区，积极参与利润丰厚的沙漠地块投机市场。值得注意的是，虽然 1979 年第 59 号法律曾预见将新城镇管理权移交地方政府，但由于缺乏管理经验和维护预算，这一规划至今未能实现。
BUILDING REGULATIONS FOR NEW TOWNS 新城镇建设规范
The promotion of Egyptian new towns is regulated exclusively by governmental urban planning policies. There are currently two distinct sources of unbuilt land for housing: either state-owned and privately held land or legally controlled agricultural land. ^(7){ }^{7} There are various means to finance private housing projects. Developer equity is usually required for the land purchase, while bank loans are sometimes taken out to finance construction. It is common, however, for the developer to sell units “off plan,” using a system of payments in installments. 埃及新城的开发完全由政府城市规划政策主导。目前未开发住宅用地主要有两种来源：国有与私有土地，以及受法律管控的农业用地。 ^(7){ }^{7} 私人住宅项目的融资渠道多样。开发商通常需自筹资金购地，有时会申请银行贷款用于工程建设。但更常见的做法是开发商采用分期付款方式"预售"期房。
The Unified Building Code enacted in 2008 (Law 119/2008) is the core legislation for both urban development and housing 2008 年颁布的《统一建筑规范》（第 119/2008 号法律）是城市发展与住房建设的核心法规
construction in Egypt. ^(8){ }^{8} It combined urban planning and urban development standards from the Planning Law (Law 4/1982) and construction and building regulations from the Construction Law (Law 106/1976). The Unified Building Code stipulates modern, high-standard design for both housing types and neighborhoods. However, it introduced no real changes concerning lowcost construction, making the development of affordable housing very difficult. This inability to reflect existing urban patterns and morphologies is leading in many cases to the growth of informal settlements. The Unified Building Code aims to allow Unified Building Code aims to allow more local control of planning and supposedly more flexible and realistic standards for subdivision and building; however, its executive regulations, which were introduced in March 2009, intend to impose even stricter hierarchical regulations on all aspects of planning, local development, and building. 埃及的建筑规范。 ^(8){ }^{8} 该规范综合了《规划法》（1982 年第 4 号法律）中的城市规划与发展标准，以及《建设法》（1976 年第 106 号法律）中的施工与建筑条例。《统一建筑规范》对住宅类型和社区设计提出了现代化高标准要求，但未对低成本建筑作出实质性调整，导致经济适用房开发举步维艰。这种无法反映现有城市格局与形态的缺陷，正催生大量非正规住区的蔓延。该规范本意是赋予地方更多规划自主权，采用更灵活务实的土地细分与建设标准；然而 2009 年 3 月颁布的实施细则，却试图对规划审批、地方开发和建筑施工各环节实施更为严格的层级管控。
At the local level, the administrative division of governorates, which was introduced with Law 43/1979, controls urban planning and manages activities such as housing provision, land development, and infrastructure construction. According to the law, each plan has to be reviewed and approved by both the local executive and the people’s councils before being signed by the governor. ^(9){ }^{9} 在地方层面，1979 年第 43 号法律确立的省级行政区划负责管控城市规划，并管理住房供给、土地开发和基础设施建设等活动。根据该法律规定，每项规划必须经地方行政机构和人民委员会审议批准后，才能由省长签署生效。 ^(9){ }^{9}
The population density of new towns should not exceed 100 people per feddan (238 people per hectare). The average width of residential streets in existing cities is six to eight meters and the minimum width of new streets is ten meters, including sidewalks. The width of a minimum-sized lot should be at least ten meters, while its corresponding depth should not exceed two times the width. The ideal building height is one-and-a-half times the width of the road. Thus, on a road that has a width of ten meters, for example, the building heights cannot be more than fifteen meters (five floors). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that only sixty percent of lot coverage is currently allowed in the new towns. ^(10){ }^{10} 新建城镇的人口密度不得超过每费丹 100 人（即每公顷 238 人）。现有城市住宅街道的平均宽度为六至八米，而新建街道的最小宽度（含人行道）需达到十米。最小地块的宽度至少应为十米，其进深不得超过宽度的两倍。理想建筑高度应为道路宽度的一倍半，例如十米宽的道路两侧建筑不得超过十五米（五层）。此外需特别说明，当前新建城镇仅允许 60%的建筑覆盖率。 ^(10){ }^{10}
Current land subdivision laws require 33 percent of the land to be set aside for public uses (amended in 2014 to 25 percent). According to land-use standards, the spatial separation of residential, service, and industrial zones is required. The landuse segregation in new towns is occasionally even more intense. 现行土地细分法规要求将 33%的土地预留作公共用途（2014 年修订为 25%）。根据土地使用标准，必须对住宅区、服务区和工业区进行空间分隔。新城中的土地使用分隔有时甚至更为严格。
IMPLICATIONS 影响
These regulations, as well as the automated system of land allocation in the new towns, are largely responsible for the questionable spatial quality of these cities. Not only are there huge distances within city borders, but the main urban core also fails to serve the neighboring areas. Patchy development is an issue as well. Plots were sold off to individuals taking advantage of the tax break, only to be left with unfinished construction, as the five-year rule was never applied. The development of desert cities is problematic because these cities are solely founded on economic and market values, sold off in a wholesale way, designed as if on a blank slate, and catered to by a developerfriendly set of laws that is unreliably applied. ^(11){ }^{11} 这些规定，连同新城镇土地分配的自动化系统，很大程度上导致了这些城市空间质量的堪忧状况。不仅城市边界内存在巨大距离，主要城市核心区也未能有效服务于周边区域。零散开发同样是个问题——地块被出售给利用税收优惠政策的个人，却因五年规则从未落实而留下烂尾工程。沙漠城市的发展困境在于：它们纯粹建立在经济和市场价值基础上，以批发方式出售土地，仿佛在白纸上进行规划设计，并受制于一套对开发商友好却执行不力的法律体系。 ^(11){ }^{11}
To exacerbate the situation, the institutional framework that embraces the new-town policy has proven baffling in its complexity. First, the 1979 New Communities Law sanctioned the creation by presidential decree of special zones in the desert for new towns, while Law 143/1981 created a hierarchy of institutions through which approval for an assignment of land must pass. According to this, the Ministry of Defense may first identify any area as a military zone or one of strategic importance. Then, the Supreme Council for Antiquities has to examine if an area is of archaeological interest and may declare it protected and unbuildable. Next, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources can assign areas for petroleum or mining prospection. After these actors had their say, priority for access to desert land continues as follows: the Ministry of Agriculture, NUCA, the Tourist 更令人困扰的是，实施新城政策的制度框架复杂得令人费解。首先，1979 年《新社区法》授权通过总统令在沙漠划定新城特别区，而 1981 年第 143 号法律则建立了一套土地审批的层级机构体系。根据该体系，国防部可优先将任何区域划为军事区或战略要地；随后最高文物委员会需核查该区域是否具有考古价值，并可能将其列为不可建设的保护区；接着石油与矿产资源部可划拨区域用于石油或矿产勘探。在这些机构行使权力后，沙漠用地审批优先级依次为：农业部、新城市社区管理局、旅游开发局、工业发展局，最后才轮到住房部及其附属机构。
Development Authority (TDA), the General Authority for Industrial Development, and the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA). Each of these national entities has their own policies dictating how desert lands under its jurisdiction are allocated to farmers, citizens, and developers, leading to a very complex and bureaucratic growth procedure. ^(12){ }^{12} 开发管理局（TDA）、工业发展总署和埃及环境事务署（EEAA）。这些国家机构各自制定了管辖范围内沙漠土地如何分配给农民、公民和开发商的政策，导致发展程序极其复杂且充满官僚主义。 ^(12){ }^{12}
Legislation and policies certainly carry a part of the responsibility in the failure of new towns. Dormant laws, randomly applied laws that enable high-risk assets, and frameworks discouraging financial activities by the lower classes are serious reasons why the new towns cannot attract productive investments to support the local economy or enough population to fulfill the task of decentralizing Egypt. On the contrary, policies facilitated exploitative profits gained by real estate companies and foreign investors from land sales without substantial returns for the national budget. Through this retrospective study of newtown policies, the conclusion could be drawn that this collection of laws that does not serve inhabitants’ needs, as well as the rigid bureaucratic system that privileges the upper class, are critical contributors to the current state of desert cities. 立法与政策无疑在新城建设的失败中负有部分责任。休眠的法律、随意实施的高风险资产法规，以及阻碍底层阶级金融活动的制度框架，都是新城无法吸引生产性投资来支撑当地经济、或吸引足够人口实现埃及分散化发展目标的重要原因。相反，这些政策为房地产公司和外国投资者通过土地销售获取剥削性利润提供了便利，却未给国家财政带来实质性回报。通过对新城政策的回溯性研究可以得出结论：这套既不能满足居民需求的法律体系，以及优待上层阶级的僵化官僚系统，正是导致沙漠城市当前困境的关键因素。
1 David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2010), 74. 1 大卫·西姆斯，《解读开罗：失控城市的逻辑》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2010 年），第 74 页。
2 David Sims, Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster? (Cairo: The American University “United Nations Common Country Assessmen in Egype: Background Paper on Uren Planking, Management, and Administration” (unpublished manuscript, United Nations Programme for Hum Settle 2005 ), 60 Summe Toman Settlements, 2005), 60. 2 大卫·西姆斯，《埃及的沙漠梦想：发展还是灾难？》（开罗：美国大学《联合国埃及共同国家评估：城市规划、管理与行政背景文件》（未出版手稿，联合国人类住区规划署，2005 年），60 页。托曼定居点，2005 年），60 页。
Ibid., 61. 同上，第 61 页。
4 bid., 61. 同上，第 61 页。
5 Sims, nderstanding Cairo, 77. avid stms, Nousing Profile," (unpublished draft, Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities and the UN-Habitat 5 西姆斯，《解读开罗》，77 页。大卫·西姆斯，《住房概况》（未出版草案，住房、公共设施与城市社区部及联合国人居署）
6 World Bank, Arab Republic of Egypt: Urban Sector Update, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), 55, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/749891468023382999/Urban-sector-update. 6 世界银行，《阿拉伯埃及共和国：城市部门最新动态》第 1 卷（华盛顿特区：世界银行，2008 年），55 页，http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/749891468023382999/Urban-sector-update.
7 This dichotomy between state-owned and privately held land is a rising phenomenon. The housing 7 这种国有土地与私有土地的分化现象正日益凸显。住房
built by the private sector targets the high end 私营部门建造的住房主要面向高端市场
of the housing market. In the new towns, private developments range from 150 to 350 square meters there are also some down-market units with between 115 and 150 square meters. 在新建城镇中，私人开发的住宅面积从 150 到 350 平方米不等，同时也存在一些面积介于 115 至 150 平方米的经济型单元。
8 Sims, “United Nations Egypt Housing Profile,” 95-96. 8 西姆斯，《联合国埃及住房概况》，95-96 页。
9 Some governorates have established an urban planning department to assume the roles stated in the physical planning law. In some cases, they have begun such as in Cairo and C preparation of Sims "United Nations Egypt Housing 9 部分省份已设立城市规划部门来履行《实体规划法》规定的职责。例如在开罗等地，他们已开始着手准备西姆斯《联合国埃及住房
10 Sims, " 10 西姆斯，"
11 World Bank, Arab Republic of Egypt: Urban Sector Update, 60. 11 世界银行，《阿拉伯埃及共和国：城市部门最新动态》，第 60 页。
12 David Sims, Case Study on Managing Urban Expansion in the Cairo Metropolitan Region (Cairo: on top of this confounding succession of entities another actor was spawned by a piece of legislation in 2001: the National Center for Planning of State Land Uses (NCPSLU) is an agency directly reporting to the prime minister, and is responsible for public land throughout Egypt. However, this the then-prime minister applied until NCPSL operational with directors, a budget, and a ge manager. An interesting feature of the NCPSL is that although the prime minister appoints its board, this is done “on recommendation” of the Minister of Defense. Unsurprisingly, the NCPSLU has still not drawn up any inventory of land, created land-use plans for development, whoce its initial goal. which was its initial goal. 12 大卫·西姆斯，《开罗大都会区城市扩张管理案例研究》（开罗：在这令人困惑的实体更迭之上，2001 年一项立法又催生了一个新机构——国家国有土地用途规划中心（NCPSLU）。该机构直接向总理汇报，负责全埃及的公共土地事务。然而，时任总理直到 NCPSL 配备主任、预算和总经理后才真正运作该机构。NCPSL 一个耐人寻味的特点是：虽然其董事会由总理任命，但需"根据国防部长的推荐"进行。不出所料，NCPSLU 至今仍未完成土地清册编制工作，也未能制定其最初目标所要求的土地开发用途规划。
GEORGIOS KALDIS, OLGA VOUGIOUKALAKI 乔治奥斯·卡尔迪斯，奥尔加·沃吉奥卡拉基
The modern history of Egypt is inextricably linked to that of its military. Since 1952, the armed forces have played an important role in the social, economic, and political scene in Egypt, functioning as a parallel government. Information is inconsistent concerning the full extent of the army’s properties and its share in Egypt’s economy. As the owner of most of the country’s desert land, the armed forces are an omnipresent self-appointed developer of the new (desert) cities. Within this setup, opaque procedures have established monopolies that facilitate profiteering by the ruling generals and certain elite families close to them. Neoliberal approaches intensified social inequality by funneling large investments from agriculture and industry to high-end real estate. In contrast to the successful military cities of the first generation, many of the new desert cities that were meant to decongest Cairo and revive the economy are today either isolated luxury compounds or dysfunctional, almost vacant suburbs. 埃及的现代史与其军队密不可分。自 1952 年以来，武装力量在埃及社会、经济和政治舞台上扮演着重要角色，俨然构成一个平行政府。关于军方资产规模及其在国民经济中的占比，各方数据始终存在出入。作为全国大部分荒漠土地的实际所有者，军方自封为新（沙漠）城市的全能开发商。在这种架构下，不透明的操作程序催生了垄断体系，为掌权将领及其亲近的权贵家族创造了牟利空间。新自由主义政策将农业和工业领域的大笔投资导向高端房地产业，加剧了社会不平等。与第一代成功的军事城镇形成鲜明对比的是，许多旨在疏解开罗人口压力、提振经济的新建沙漠城市，如今要么沦为孤立的豪华飞地，要么成为功能失调、近乎空置的郊区。
The Egyptian military complex-which encompasses the Ministry of Defense and army members as well as ex-generals and upper-class supporters of the regimehas strongly influenced the course of the country’s planning history. This sway has intensified since the Revolution of 1952, with the armed forces increasing their power and autonomy within the Egyptian state and thereby strengthening their relationship with the real estate market. Starting with the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the post-1952 era is characterized by the militarization of the state and the awarding of high-level, administrative positions to people loyal to the government. It was during this time that the first official master plan for urban expansion in the desert was introduced, although it was never realized. ^(1){ }^{1} After the Six-Day War, the military expanded its 埃及军事集团——包括国防部、军方成员、退役将领及政权上层支持者——深刻影响了该国规划史的进程。自 1952 年革命以来，这种影响力持续增强，武装力量在埃及国家机器中的权力与自主性不断扩大，从而强化了其与房地产市场的关联。从贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔执政时期开始，1952 年后的时代特征表现为国家军事化，以及将高级行政职位授予效忠政府的人士。正是在这一时期，首个官方沙漠城市扩张总体规划被提出，但始终未能实现。 ^(1){ }^{1} 六日战争后，军方进一步
territorial holdings, taking further tracts of desert land under its control. Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, adopted a policy of “de-Nasserization,” opening the door to private-sector investment in Egypt with the Infitah in 1974. The first generation of desert cities was constructed then, within the burgeoning neoliberal framework. During Hosni M Mosni Mubarak s term, the neoliberal approach expanded further, falling under the scope of “privilege and patronage.” ^(2){ }^{2} In the 1980s, after the Peace Treaty with Israel, the army’s interest in economic and real estate activities increased. ^(3){ }^{3} Egypt introduced financial liberalization via structural adjustments on the requirements of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. ^(4){ }^{4} New managerial positions in the bureaucracy were created, which in the 2000s were occupied by retired officers who further broadened their profitable 领土扩张，进一步控制了更多沙漠地带。纳赛尔的继任者安瓦尔·萨达特推行"去纳赛尔化"政策，通过 1974 年的经济开放政策（Infitah）为埃及私营部门投资打开大门。第一代沙漠城市正是在新自由主义框架兴起时期建造的。穆罕默德·胡斯尼·穆巴拉克执政期间，新自由主义模式进一步扩张，落入"特权与庇护"的范畴。 ^(2){ }^{2} 1980 年代埃以和平条约签订后，军队对经济和房地产活动的兴趣与日俱增。 ^(3){ }^{3} 埃及根据世界银行和国际货币基金组织的要求，通过结构性调整实施金融自由化。 ^(4){ }^{4} 官僚体系中新设的管理岗位在 2000 年代被退役军官占据，这些人进一步拓展了其盈利性
Fig. 1: Anwar Sadat and Richard Nixon in front of the pyramids, 1974: a turning point in Egypt’s economic policies 图 1：1974 年安瓦尔·萨达特与理查德·尼克松在金字塔前的合影：埃及经济政策的转折点 form joint ventures 组建合资企业
Fig. 2: Timeline of events facilitating the military’s expansion in the desert 图 2：推动军方沙漠扩张的重大事件时间轴
military-based businesses in industries ranging from food production to real estate. A capitalist mode of development was applied to housing development, and gated communities, compounds, and up-market subdivisions were introduced to the desert cities. ^(5){ }^{5} Real estate became the latest target in the all-embracing involvement of what could be called “Military, Inc.” 从食品生产到房地产等行业的军事背景企业。住房开发采用了资本主义发展模式，封闭社区、大院和高档住宅区被引入沙漠城市。房地产成为所谓"军事公司"全面介入的最新目标。
With this background in mind, this study evaluates the neoliberal approach of the military’s corporate activities within the desert cities. The domination of the army in the creation of new cities in the amy are desert contributed to the emergence of unsustainable cities that have never reached their initial targets, both in terms of occupancy rates and entrepreneurial activities. Desert cities were conceived as a response to acute housing issues. The departure from this initial intention, up to and including the adoption of real estate as an income-generating tool, served the interests of the ruling elite at the expense of those of the country’s majority. The question that arises, then, is whetherin this rigid system-there is space for changing the position of the armed forces, governmental agencies, and private investors handling these developments in order to include a broader social spectrum. 基于这一背景，本研究评估了军方在沙漠新城建设中采用的新自由主义模式。军队主导沙漠新城的开发，催生出一系列不可持续的城市——无论是入住率还是商业活动，这些城市都未能实现最初规划目标。沙漠新城本是为解决严峻住房问题而构想，但背离初衷转向房地产开发作为创收工具的做法，最终沦为统治精英牟利的工具，牺牲了国家大多数人的利益。由此引出的核心问题是：在这个僵化的体系中，是否存在调整军方、政府机构及私人开发商角色的空间，以使更广泛的社会群体能够参与发展进程？
THE MILITARY AND THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 军队与埃及经济
The particularity of the Egyptian military resides in the neoliberal expansion of its activities into the civilian economic sphere, an intertwining that contrasts to its physical segregation from Egyptian society. ^(6){ }^{6} Discussing the influence of the armed forces on the country’s economy has been a taboo in Egyptian politics. ^(7){ }^{7} Over the last few decades, the army has insisted on concealing data about its financial interests and economic activities, keeping it out of reach for the public. ^(8){ }^{8} Estimates of the percentage of the Egyptian economy under military control range from five to sixty percent, with most analysts considering it to be between 25 to forty percent. ^(9){ }^{9} 埃及军队的特殊性在于其活动向民用经济领域的新自由主义扩张，这种交织状态与其同埃及社会在物理上的隔离形成鲜明对比。 ^(6){ }^{6} 讨论武装力量对国家经济的影响在埃及政治中一直是个禁忌话题。 ^(7){ }^{7} 过去几十年来，军方始终坚称要隐瞒其金融利益和经济活动的数据，使公众无从得知。 ^(8){ }^{8} 关于埃及经济受军方控制比例的估算从 5%到 60%不等，多数分析人士认为这一比例介于 25%至 40%之间。 ^(9){ }^{9}
Cities under construction 建设中的城市
Existing cities 现有城市
Cities with military involvement 涉及军事的城市
(1) New Salheia （1）新萨勒希亚
(2) Tenth of Ramadan （2）斋月十日城
(3) El-Obour （3）奥布尔城
(4) Shorouk （4）舒鲁克城
(5) Al-Badr （5）巴德尔城
(6) New Cairo （6）新开罗
Fig. 4: An example of contemporary military urbanism east of Nasr City: (1) Ezbet el-Hagana, an informal settlement for Nubian soldiers (2) Military officers’ compound (3) Army industrial area 图 4：纳斯尔城东部当代军事城市化示例：(1) 哈加纳贫民区——努比亚士兵的非正式定居点 (2) 军官住宅区 (3) 军队工业园区
While a portion of the military budget is obviously associated with defense activities, the classified part is not related to these, but rather to profits generated by the production of non-military goods and services. ^(10){ }^{10} Khaled Fahmy, head of the history department at the American University in Cairo, calls it a “grey economy, in the sense that we know very little of [it], [it is] not subject to any Parliamentary scrutiny, [and] the Egyptian government auditing office has no control or knowledge of [it].” ^(11){ }^{11} 虽然部分军事预算显然与国防活动相关，但机密部分与之无关，而是来自非军事商品和服务生产所产生的利润。 ^(10){ }^{10} 开罗美国大学历史系主任哈立德·法赫米称之为"灰色经济，因为我们对其知之甚少，不受任何议会监督，埃及政府审计办公室也无法控制或了解"。 ^(11){ }^{11}
The Ministry of Defense absorbs seventy billion Egyptian pounds from the state’s budget and receives additional funding from the United States of America (USAID) to the tune of 1.3 billion US dollars annually. ^(12){ }^{12} While there is no accurate data regarding the extent of the lucrative activities of the army, it is known that these 国防部每年从国家预算中吸收七百亿埃及镑，并额外获得来自美国（通过美援署）约 13 亿美元的资助。 ^(12){ }^{12} 尽管缺乏关于军队盈利活动规模的准确数据，但众所周知这些活动
cover all major sectors of the economy, such as running cafeterias, managing gas stations, farming livestock, and trading real estate on behalf of the government. ^(13){ }^{13} 涵盖了经济的所有主要领域，例如经营食堂、管理加油站、畜牧养殖以及代表政府进行房地产交易。 ^(13){ }^{13}
THE MILITARY AND REAL ESTATE 军队与房地产
The first-generation desert cities such as Nasr City were developed during the 1970s by and for the army. These new cities provided “relatively sumptuous flats” for armed-forces personnel, which was an emerging upper-middle class engaging in its own entrepreneurial activities. ^(14){ }^{14} 第一代沙漠城市（如纳赛尔城）由军队在 20 世纪 70 年代开发，并服务于军队。这些新城市为武装部队人员提供了"相对豪华的公寓"，当时正形成一个从事自主创业活动的上层中产阶级。 ^(14){ }^{14}
One could argue that this was the beginning of the army’s involvement with real estate. In the 1980s, the military started to speculate on the value of its land holdings, selling off former military camps adjacent to Egypt’s larger cities to finance new desert-city projects. Together with construction companies, the armed forces invested in the construction of resorts and other complexes, which led them to owning hospitals, compounds, social clubs, educational institutions, and factories. ^(15){ }^{15} These activities created a certain type of military urbanism, whereby the officer-elite live secluded in their own “mini-villages”: self-sufficient enclaves, intentionally isolated from the civilian population. ^(16){ }^{16} 可以说这是军方涉足房地产的开端。20 世纪 80 年代，埃及军方开始对其持有的土地价值进行投机，通过出售大城市周边的旧军营来为沙漠新城项目筹措资金。军队与建筑公司合作，投资兴建度假村等综合设施，由此逐步掌控了医院、住宅区、社交俱乐部、教育机构和工厂。 ^(15){ }^{15} 这些活动催生了一种特殊的军事城市化模式：军官精英阶层隐居在自给自足的"微型村落"中，这些刻意与平民区隔离的飞地构成了他们的独立王国。 ^(16){ }^{16}
During the Mubarak era, 250,000 military conscripts were forced into retirement to guarantee the sovereignty of the president’s regime. ^(17){ }^{17} These retirees were hired in government agencies dealing with land-related affairs. Ex-generals dominated the Central Construction Apparatus of the housing ministry, which builds dwellings and infrastructure and plays a leading role in New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA). ^(18){ }^{18} To this day, the exact amount of land owned by the army is not known. 在穆巴拉克执政时期，为确保总统政权的稳固，25 万军事应征人员被迫退役。 ^(17){ }^{17} 这些退役人员被安置在负责土地事务的政府机构中任职。退役将领们主导着住房部的中央建设机构，该机构负责住宅和基础设施建设，并在新城市社区管理局（NUCA）中发挥着领导作用。 ^(18){ }^{18} 时至今日，军方实际拥有的土地数量仍是个未知数。
THE MILITARY’S “MONOPOLY” AND PROFITEERING 军队的"垄断"与牟利
The competition between military and non-military enterprises is imbalanced, because the Egyptian armed forces enjoy certain privileges. With de facto control over 军事与非军事企业之间的竞争并不平等，因为埃及武装部队享有某些特权。凭借对...的实际控制权
almost all non-agricultural land in Egypt, the army owns approximately 87 percent of the country’s area and is additionally allowed to seize any public land for defense purposes. ^(19){ }^{19} However, it has used this prerogative many times for commercial purposes as well, such as in the case of the Armed Forces Land Projects Agency. ^(20){ }^{20} The military’s authority and prestige within the Egyptian state allows it to act above the law, disregarding regulations that apply to other organizations. ^(21){ }^{21} The armed forces also benefit from access to cheap labor by underpaying recruits (the monthly salary ranges between seventeen to twenty-eight US dollars). ^(22){ }^{22} Thus, the military has the ability to price projects much lower than both private-sector companies and stateowned enterprises. 埃及几乎所有的非农业用地都归军队所有，约占国土面积的 87%，此外军方还被允许以国防目的征用任何公共土地。然而，军方多次将这一特权用于商业目的，例如武装部队土地项目管理局的案例。埃及军方在政府体系中的权威与声望使其能够凌驾于法律之上，无视其他机构需要遵守的规章制度。武装部队还通过压低新兵薪资（月薪介于 17 至 28 美元之间）获取廉价劳动力。因此军方在项目报价上既能大幅低于私营企业，也能低于国有企业。
In order to further increase its profits, the Egyptian army has sought partnerships with overseas companies, mainly in the form of public-private partnerships-an economic growth mechanism coherent with neoliberal policies. Large infusions of capital from state banks, loans from international institutions, and intensified privatization facilitated the creation of joint ventures with Gulf conglomerates and non-domestic multinationals. ^(23){ }^{23} In addition to benefiting from tax exemptions, military corporations are attractive to investors from abroad, being able to bypass bureaucratic issues that usually hinder other private-sector companies. ^(24){ }^{24} 为谋求更高利润，埃及军方积极寻求与海外企业建立合作关系，主要采取公私合营模式——这种经济增长机制与新自由主义政策一脉相承。通过国有银行大量注资、国际机构贷款以及加速私有化进程，军方成功促成与海湾财团及跨国企业的合资项目。 ^(23){ }^{23} 军事企业不仅享有免税特权，其规避官僚程序的能力对海外投资者也极具吸引力，这些程序往往制约着其他私营企业的发展。 ^(24){ }^{24}
Foreign investment further increased in 2015, when President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi-a former general-enacted a decree granting the army freedom to set up private businesses in collaboration with foreign investors, continuing the legacy of granting privileges to the armed forces. ^(25){ }^{25} 2015 年外资投入持续增长，时任总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西（前军方将领）颁布法令，授权军队可与外国投资者联合创办私营企业，延续了赋予武装部队特权的传统。 ^(25){ }^{25}
Through its cooperation with international companies, the military seeks to gain maximum profit from the development of new towns. The guaranteed revenue from the development of high-end compounds often stands in contrast to actual housing needs. The army rarely invests in low-income housing, as it does not result in immediate and tangible economic profits. A 通过与跨国企业的合作，军方试图从新城开发中获取最大利润。高端住宅项目带来的稳定收益往往与实际住房需求形成鲜明对比。由于无法产生立竿见影的经济效益，军方极少投资低收入住房项目。
typical example is the “One Million Social Housing Program” introduced by Sisi, whereby the army is to build one million units for low-income youths in collaboration with the United-Arab-Emirates-based Arabtec Holding. ^(26){ }^{26} According to its press release, the construction company in fact promotes development that resembles upper-class gated communities rather than affordable dwellings, despite its stated intention. Sisi’s annulment of NUCA’s obligation to pay part of its revenue to the Social Housing Fund further shows that the regime is solely interested in profitable business. ^(27){ }^{27} The class of military officers is thus becoming richer, aggravating economic and social divides. 典型案例是塞西推出的"百万套社会保障房计划"，军方本应与阿联酋阿拉伯技术公司合作，为低收入青年建造百万套住房。 ^(26){ }^{26} 但该公司新闻稿显示，尽管宣称建设保障房，实际推动的却是类似富人封闭社区的开发模式。塞西取消新城市社区管理局向社会保障住房基金上缴部分收益的法定义务，进一步表明政权只关注盈利性业务。 ^(27){ }^{27} 军官阶层因此日益富裕，加剧了经济与社会分化。
While the economic hegemony of the military is a pressing issue, it appears this status quo will prove difficult to change. Desert cities are constructed for the privileged classes, while the underprivileged masses are left on the margin of this development. Instead of channeling the state’s budget towards solving the pending housing crisis, the Egyptian authorities continue to spend on the endless development of vacant new towns, even as other densely populated areas remain poorly equipped in services. 虽然军队的经济霸权是个紧迫问题，但现状似乎难以改变。沙漠城市是为特权阶级建造的，而贫困大众则被排除在这种发展之外。埃及当局没有将国家预算用于解决悬而未决的住房危机，反而持续投资于无止境开发空置的新城镇，与此同时其他人口稠密地区的服务设施依然匮乏。
Fundamental reforms would be necessary to ensure that military-related businesses do not distort the market through their prerogatives and lack of transparency. This unilateral dependence on the construction sector as the main engine of the Egyptian economy could worsen in the future, thanks to two fundamental problems facing the country: food and housing. The combination of military entrepreneurism, profit-oriented real estate development, and neoliberal policies has proven to be a financial “success story” so far, but only for a small segment of the population. 必须进行根本性改革，才能确保与军队相关的企业不会凭借其特权和不透明的运作扭曲市场。由于埃及面临粮食和住房这两个根本性问题，这种以建筑业作为经济主要引擎的单边依赖未来可能会进一步恶化。军事企业家精神、以利润为导向的房地产开发和新自由主义政策的结合，迄今为止被证明是一个金融"成功故事"——但仅对一小部分人而言。
A slogan heard during the 2011 revolution claims: “the army and the people are one hand” (el-geysh we-l-sha’b iyd wahda). On the contrary, it appears they never had common interests. Against all odds, the Egyptian people, particularly the working classes, have been successful in managing 2011 年革命期间流传着一句口号："军队与人民是一只手"（el-geysh we-l-sha’b iyd wahda）。但事实恰恰相反，双方似乎从未有过共同利益。尽管困难重重，埃及人民尤其是工人阶级成功实现了自主管理
their own communities. Autonomously, they have created bright examples of urban culture (like the Syrian Market in Sixth of October, the urban gardening ventures by bawabs, etc.) in the most unexpected of places, including in extremely hostile environments like the desert cities. Bottomup actions like these have created spaces that have the hallmarks of a healthy urban life, showing the way towards a bright future without military or government interference. 他们自主地在最意想不到的地方——包括沙漠城市这样极端恶劣的环境——打造出璀璨的城市文化典范（如十月六日城的叙利亚市场、门房们发起的都市农耕项目等）。这些自下而上的行动开辟了具有健康都市生活特质的空间，在没有军方或政府干预的情况下，为光明未来指明了道路。
1 This was the 1956 Master.Plan of Cairo, see: David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City Out of Press, 2010), 74. 1 这是 1956 年的《开罗总体规划》，参见：David Sims，《理解开罗：失控城市的逻辑》（2010 年出版），第 74 页。
2 In the words of Yezid Sayigh, the officers’ corps did not depart from the scene but, rather, “became invisible by virtue of its ubiquity.” The officers’ role in the civilian sphere “became as pervasive others but also, crucially, by its members,” Egypt has become an “officers’ republic”; see: Nim Raphaeli, “Egyptian Army’s Pervasive Role in National Economy,” Inquiry and Analysis series no. 1001, The Middle East Media Research Institute, July 29, 2013, https://www.memri.org/reports/ 3 The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed on March 26, 1979 by Egyptian was signed on and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin Sadat 4 Ray Bush, “Coalitions for Dispossession and Networks of Resistance? Land, Politics and Agrarian Reform in Egypt,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 391-405. 2 用 Yezid Sayigh 的话说，军官集团并未退出舞台，而是"因其无处不在而隐于无形"。军官在民事领域的作用"不仅通过他人，更关键是通过其成员变得无孔不入"，埃及已成为一个"军官共和国"；参见：Nim Raphaeli，《埃及军队在国家经济中的渗透性角色》，中东媒体研究所第 1001 号分析报告，2013 年 7 月 29 日，https://www.memri.org/reports/ 3 《埃以和平条约》于 1979 年 3 月 26 日由埃及总统萨达特和以色列总理梅纳赫姆·贝京签署 4 Ray Bush，《剥夺的联盟与抵抗的网络？埃及土地政治与农业改革》，《英国中东研究杂志》第 39 卷第 3 期（2011 年）：391-405 页。
5 Sims, Understanding Cairo, 78-79 5 西姆斯，《解读开罗》，第 78-79 页
6 Hillel Frisch, “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army, Midde East Review of International Affairs 5, 7 Law 313/1956 bans the 6 Hillel Frisch，《埃及军队的枪炮与黄油》，《中东国际事务评论》第 5 卷 7 1956 年第 313 号法律禁止
concerning the Egyptian Any news their prior approval. Armed Forces without 关于埃及的任何消息需事先获得军方批准。
8 Zeinab Abul-Magd, “The Army and the Economy in Egypt,” Egypt Independent, December 24, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/army-and-economy-egypt/. 8 泽纳布·阿布尔-马格德，《埃及军队与经济》，埃及独立报，2011 年 12 月 24 日，http://www.egyptindependent.com/army-and-economy-egypt/。
haldle Egyptian Military Empire,” middleeastmonitor, July 09, 2014, https://www. military-empire/. 掌控埃及军事帝国，中东监察网，2014 年 7 月 9 日，https://www. military-empire/。
10 Abul-Magd, “The Army and the Economy in Egypt.” 10 阿布尔-马格德，《埃及军队与经济》。
11 Sherine Tadros, “Egypt Military’s Economic Empire,” Al Jazeera, February features/2012/02/2012215195912519142 hth/ 11 谢琳·塔德罗斯，《埃及军方的经济帝国》，半岛电视台，2012 年 2 月专题报道/2012/02/2012215195912519142 hth/
12 Abul-Magd, “The Army and the Economy in Egypt”; Ramadan, “The Egyptian Military Empire.” 12 阿布-马格德，《埃及军队与经济》；拉马丹，《埃及军事帝国》
13 Abul-Magd, “The Army and the Economy in Egypt.” 13 阿布-马格德，《埃及军队与经济》
14 Robert Springborg, Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation 14 罗伯特·斯普林伯格，《穆巴拉克的埃及：碎片化》
of the Political Order (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 105. 政治秩序（科罗拉多州博尔德：西景出版社，1989 年），第 105 页。
15 Tadros, “Egypt Military’s Economic Empire”; Ramadan, “The Egyptian Military Empire.” Frisch, “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army,” 7-9. 15 塔德罗斯，《埃及军方的经济帝国》；拉马丹，《埃及军事帝国》。弗里希，《埃及军队的枪炮与黄油》，第 7-9 页。
17 Tadros, “Egypt Military’s Economic Empire.” Yezid Sayigh, "Above the State: The Officers’ August 1, 2012, http://carnegie-mec.org/2012/08/01/ above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt-pub-48972. Ramadan, “The Egyptian Military Empire”; see also: Desert Land Law and Law 17/2001. “… an agency known as the Armed Forces including residential buildings, on public lands taken over by the military” see: Raphaeli “Egyptian Army’s Pervasive Role in Nationa Economy.” 17 塔德罗斯，《埃及军方的经济帝国》。叶齐德·萨伊赫，《凌驾于国家之上：军官共和国在埃及》，2012 年 8 月 1 日，http://carnegie-mec.org/2012/08/01/ above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt-pub-48972。拉马丹，《埃及军事帝国》；另见：《沙漠土地法》和 2001 年第 17 号法律。"……一个被称为武装力量的机构，包括住宅建筑，在军方接管的公共土地上"，见：拉斐利，《埃及军队在国家经济中的普遍角色》。
21 The military have always been protected from legal and parliamentary oversight. Even Mohamed Morsi, the first democratically elected civilian president, did not have full constitutional powers and forces, see: 21 军方始终免受法律和议会监督。即使是第一位民主选举产生的文职总统穆罕默德·穆尔西，也不拥有完全的宪法权力和力量，见：
22 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Tech politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 260; Ramadan, “The Egyptian Military Empire.” 22 蒂莫西·米切尔，《专家统治：埃及、技术政治与现代性》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，2002 年），第 260 页；拉马丹，《埃及军事帝国》。
23 Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher, "Egypt’s Generals and ransnational Capital, Middle East Report, no. 262 (Spring 2012), http://www.merip. capital. 24 Raphael 23 莎娜·马歇尔与约书亚·斯塔彻，《埃及将军与跨国资本》，《中东报告》第 262 期（2012 年春季刊），http://www.merip.capital。24 拉斐尔
Narion, Egyptian Army’s Pervasive Role in 25 tional Economy." 纳里昂，《埃及军队在国民经济中的渗透性角色》
Egypt’s Sisi Allows Army to Establish ForeignThe New Arab, December , 20. establish-foreign-funs-sis-alows-army-to- 《埃及塞西允许军队设立外国基金》，《新阿拉伯人报》，12 月 20 日。establish-foreign-funs-sis-alows-army-to-
26 Bel Trew, “Multilious Prei Solve Egypt’s Housing Crisis,” Al-Moust 25, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/hi/ originals/2014/03/egypt-housing-uae-arabtecshortage.html. 26 贝尔·特鲁，《多城记：能否解决埃及住房危机》，Al-Moust 25，2014 年，http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/hi/ originals/2014/03/egypt-housing-uae-arabtecshortage.html。
27 This annulment was an amendment to Decree 33/2014, see: Mostafa Zohdy, "Egypt’s New Cities: Nether Just nor Eist, Namun, December 3/, 2015, hip.jo WeHx01uCwkJ. WeHx01uCwkJ. 27 该废止令是对第 33/2014 号法令的修订，参见：穆斯塔法·佐赫迪，《埃及的新城市：既不公正也不存在》，Namun，2015 年 12 月 3 日，hip.jo WeHx01uCwkJ. WeHx01uCwkJ.
From the State’s Strategies to Inhabitants’ Tactics 从国家战略到居民策略
“Any step forward in a real movement is better than a dozen programs.” “在实际行动中迈出的任何一步，都比一打计划要好。”
Karl Marx, 1875 卡尔·马克思，1875 年
The desert cities around Cairo have failed to realize the dream that they had promised. Envisioned as self-contained towns accommodating a growing population, they are programmed as finite structures. Their design is a direct translation of a specific program superimposed on the pristine desert landscape-an almost literal equivalent of a tabula rasa. Pursuing the dream of totally controlled and manageable space, their design excludes the unplanned, the unexpected, and the heterogeneous. Adapting the modernist paradigm of zone-based planning as the main tool for programming, the government visualized these cities as stagnant spaces of residence, consumption, and production. Despite this limiting vision, the inhabitants of new towns have found ways to outmaneuver the imposed rules. In view of past mistakes, it is necessary to elaborate on an alternative understanding of program in design and planning by juxtaposing the passive concept of program with the active operation of programming. This distinction can be compared to Michel de Certeau’s distinction between strategy and tactic. Defined as “a calculus of force-relationships, which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an environment,” a strategy assumes an operational space that can be clearly circumscribed. ^(2){ }^{2} In contrast, a tactic is described as “a calculus which cannot count on a spatial or institutional localization.” ^(3){ }^{3} Here, the absence of a place means that time becomes a pivotal factor in the way tactics operate in a certain environment. Tactics are therefore posited as an attribute of ongoing processes and active conditions, which is comparable to the aforementioned 开罗周边的沙漠城市未能兑现它们曾经许下的承诺。这些被规划为容纳不断增长人口的独立城镇，本质上只是有限的结构体。其设计理念是将特定方案直接强加于原始的沙漠景观之上——几乎等同于在一张白纸上作画。为了追求完全可控、可管理的空间理想，这些设计排除了计划外的、意外的以及异质性的元素。政府采用分区规划的现代主义范式作为主要规划工具，将这些城市构想为居住、消费和生产的静态空间。尽管存在这种局限性的愿景，新城的居民仍找到了规避强加规则的方法。鉴于过去的失误，有必要通过将被动式的"方案"概念与主动式的"规划"操作并置，重新阐释设计与规划中对"方案"的另类理解。这种区分可比拟米歇尔·德·塞托对"战略"与"战术"的划分。 "战略"被定义为"一种力量关系的演算，当意志与权力的主体（所有者、企业、城市、科研机构）能够从环境中分离出来时，这种演算就成为可能"，它预设了一个可明确界定的操作空间。 ^(2){ }^{2} 相比之下，"战术"被描述为"一种无法依赖空间或制度定位的演算"。 ^(3){ }^{3} 此处，场所的缺失意味着时间成为战术在特定环境中运作的关键因素。因此，战术被设定为持续过程和动态条件的属性，这与前文
understanding of programming. When its wider nature and multiple meanings are taken into account, the notion of program ceases to be characterized by a simple dichotomy of success and failure. 对编程的理解具有可比性。当考虑到其更广泛的本质与多重含义时，"方案"概念就不再以简单的成败二分法为特征。
PROGRAM AND THE CITY 方案与城市
Despite the various interpretations of program in architecture, the most common understanding of the word unjustly reduces it to a list of specific functional requirements that are often accompanied by surface allocations. Over the course of the past century, the term troubled architects due to its elusive meaning, which was influenced by the tendencies of each epoch, the modes of production, and their effect on people’s lives. Modernism developed a deterministic approach towards function and form, aligning itself with the requirements of industry. Efficiency and standardization mandated form to follow function, and to a certain extent to follow the demands of the program. The postwar dominance of modern architecture and its importance as a tool of social reform required architects to search for new instruments with which they could interpret their contemporary reality. Reintroducing a stronger connection with human beings and putting program on the sidelines, they moved away from the closed mindset of functionalism. In the post-postmodern era, the term was reevaluated by recognizing in its character the inventiveness of programmatic potential. The ambiguity of program became even more apparent with the growing importance of the computer sciences. A new meaning of the term defines it as “a sequence of coded instructions that can be inserted into a mechanism,” enabling it to perform in a specified manner. ^(4){ }^{4} This empowered architects to see program and its realization as a tool that can be changed and “reprogrammed at will.” ^(5){ }^{5} 尽管人们对建筑学中"功能规划"一词有各种不同的诠释，但最常见的理解却错误地将其简化为一系列具体功能需求的清单，往往还附带平面分配方案。在过去一个世纪里，这个术语因其含义的模糊性而困扰着建筑师——这种模糊性受到每个时代的思潮、生产模式及其对人类生活影响的左右。现代主义发展出一种功能与形式的决定论方法，使其与工业需求保持一致。效率与标准化要求形式追随功能，在某种程度上也要求其遵循功能规划的需求。战后现代建筑的主导地位及其作为社会改革工具的重要性，促使建筑师们寻找新的工具来诠释他们所处的现实。通过重建与人类更紧密的联系并将功能规划置于次要位置，他们逐渐摆脱了功能主义的封闭思维。在后现代之后的时代，人们重新评估了这个术语，在其特性中认识到规划潜能的创造性。 随着计算机科学的重要性日益凸显，程序概念的模糊性变得更为明显。这个术语的新定义将其描述为"可插入机械装置的一系列编码指令"，使其能够以特定方式运作。 ^(4){ }^{4} 这使建筑师得以将程序及其实现视为可随意更改和"重新编程"的工具。 ^(5){ }^{5}
What is the output of a program when it concerns the design of a city? It materializes the strategy, which organizes land, people, and their governance. For these reasons, program is often reduced to a utilitarian tool that serves the agendas of the ruling class. This unilateral approach to the use of program ought to be compared to the multifaceted nature of space and its production. The project of a city reflects an idea of how people should act in a given environment, where a constant interaction between the physical and social spheres is happening. In this regard, Henri Lefebvre’s triad of perceived, lived, and conceived space provides an important lens to interpret the complex conditions of space. He categorizes “spatial practice” as the physical space with all the “particular localizations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation.” “Representational space” is “space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols,” accounting for an immense flow of events, changing according to the desires and projections of the inhabitants. ^(7){ }^{7} Time is directly connected to their actions, which consist of an attempt to territorialize themselves temporarily with the use of tactics. Lefebvre also mentions the “representation of space, as the conceptualized space of scientists, planners, architects, and social engineers, all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived.” ^(8){ }^{8} Interwoven on many levels, these three spaces add to the city’s complexity and indeterminacy. To grasp the nature of these qualities, Lefebvre highlights process as an active component of spatial production. Against this background, a program for a city formulated only on a strategic level is prone to fail. Therefore, a shift from program to programmingunderstood as a process-will help to embrace the holistic condition of space and, to a wider extent, of a city. 当涉及城市设计时，一个规划方案的产出是什么？它使战略具象化——这种战略组织着土地、人民及其治理体系。正因如此，规划方案常被简化为服务于统治阶级议程的功利工具。这种对规划方案的单边运用方式，应当与空间及其生产的多维本质进行对照。城市项目反映着人们对特定环境中行为方式的构想，在这里，物质领域与社会领域持续发生着交互作用。就此而言，亨利·列斐伏尔提出的感知空间、生活空间与构想空间三元论，为解读空间的复杂状况提供了重要视角。他将"空间实践"归类为具有"每个社会形态特有的局部化特征与空间集合"的物理空间；"再现空间"则是"通过相关意象与符号被直接体验的空间"，承载着随居民意愿与规划而变化的巨大事件流。 ^(7){ }^{7} 时间与他们的行动直接相关，这些行动包含着运用策略实现暂时性自我领土化的尝试。列斐伏尔同时提到"空间的再现——作为科学家、规划师、建筑师和社会工程师的概念化空间，他们将生活体验、感知现实与构想方案混为一谈。" ^(8){ }^{8} 这三个空间在多重层面上相互交织，加剧了城市的复杂性与不确定性。为把握这些特质的本质，列斐伏尔强调过程作为空间生产的能动要素。在此背景下，仅从战略层面制定的城市规划方案极易失败。因此，从静态方案转向动态编程——将编程理解为持续过程——将有助于把握空间的整体状态，进而更全面地理解城市。
PROGRAMMING IN THE DESERT 沙漠中的编程
Launched in the 1970s by President Anwar Sadat, the program to create self-sufficient cities around Cairo intended to direct 这项由安瓦尔·萨达特总统于 1970 年代发起的计划，旨在开罗周边建设自给自足的城市群落
population into the desert to prevent further urban growth along the Nile. With this project, the Egyptian state was building a new national narrative of a modern society, advanced and capable of conquering the vast lands of the desert. Reinforced by this well-constructed narrative, this project created the image of an alternative life for Egyptians, away from the dense and maligned downtown. However, this promise also played into neoliberal interests as a profit-generating tool. ^(9){ }^{9} 将人口迁入沙漠以防止尼罗河沿岸城市进一步扩张。通过这一项目，埃及政府正在构建一个现代化社会的新国家叙事——先进且有能力征服广袤沙漠。这个精心构建的叙事强化了项目影响力，为埃及人描绘出远离拥挤不堪、饱受诟病市中心的另一种生活图景。然而这种承诺也沦为新自由主义利益的牟利工具。 ^(9){ }^{9}
The planning of these cities originates in the Fordist mode of production and consumption. Cities were programmed with a strict separation between dwelling and workplace, as well as between free time and working time. Standardization, the hallmark of the Fordist system, influenced the architectural output, resulting in the repetition of housing typologies. These actions resulted in monofunctional cities that were spatially and socially segregated. It takes just one visit to one of today’s desert cities to realize that the state’s attempts at planning have become, in fact, the opposite-a result of the tactical operations of its inhabitants. By re-programming the space according to their needs, inhabitants participate in the production of space. Three examples illustrate the way they take advantage of the formally designed public spaces. 这些城市的规划源自福特主义的生产与消费模式。城市被设计为居住区与工作场所严格分离，休闲时间与工作时间泾渭分明。作为福特主义体系标志的标准化影响了建筑产出，导致住宅类型的重复复制。这些举措造就了功能单一、空间与社会双重割裂的城市。只需走访当今任何一座沙漠城市便会发现，政府的规划企图实际上已走向反面——这恰恰是居民战术性操作的结果。通过根据自身需求重新规划空间，居民们参与了空间生产。以下三个案例展现了他们如何利用那些经过正式设计的公共空间。
The first example concerns downtown Sixth of October and the so-called “Syrian Market” area. Retailers and small entrepreneurs here bypassed existing laws by appropriating public space for their own needs. Numerous Syrian refugees who had settled in the area created the need for jobs, which consequently led to the establishment of many stores in the food and drink sectors. The expanding businesses then created demand for more space, resulting in people extending their operations outside of property limits. Through closing the passage between two buildings and adding to storefronts with portable furniture, business owners transformed the original plan. This re-organization led to the production of new demarcated spaces. The growing spatial needs of the people, unable to be answered 第一个案例涉及十月六日城中心区及所谓的"叙利亚市场"区域。这里的零售商和小企业家们通过占用公共空间来满足自身需求，从而绕过了现行法规。大量定居于此的叙利亚难民催生了就业需求，进而促使食品饮料行业涌现出众多店铺。不断扩张的商业活动又产生了对更多空间的需求，导致人们将经营区域扩展到物业界限之外。商家们通过封闭两栋建筑间的通道、用可移动家具扩展店面等方式，彻底改变了原有规划。这种空间重组催生了新的边界划分。民众日益增长的空间需求
by the state and its laws, were and still are satisfied by self-organized activities. In this way, citizens have managed to enrich the center of the city both in terms of built substance and social interactions. 无法通过国家法律得到满足，过去和现在都依靠自发组织活动来填补。通过这种方式，市民们成功地从建筑实体和社会交往两个层面丰富了城市中心区。
Fig. 1: Closed passage on the Syrian Market, Sixth of October 图 1：十月六日城叙利亚市场被封闭的通道
Another example reveals the peculiar nature of an imported suburban model, the villa compound. In this particular example, the central public space formed by the surrounding villas, which was meant to be a green and lively square for the neighborhood, had ended up an abandoned lot-not much different from the surrounding desert. A highly polarized 另一个例子揭示了进口郊区模式——别墅小区的奇特本质。在这个具体案例中，原本设计为社区绿色活力广场的别墅围合中央公共空间，最终沦为与周围荒漠无异的废弃地块。高度分化的
Egyptian society had prevented the square from gaining the quality and liveliness of a communal space. Subsequently, representatives of the lower social classes, the bawabs, took advantage of the wasteland to cultivate small vegetable beds. ^(10){ }^{10} By doing so, they not only benefitted from the unused land, but also changed the space from a fallow lot to something that is much closer to the green collective square it was meant to be. In this regard, the modernist approach regarding program may be criticized for its reliance on finite solutions and its inability to both anticipate and accommodate change. 埃及社会阻碍了这个广场获得公共空间应有的品质与活力。随后，作为社会底层代表的看门人开始利用这片荒地种植小型菜圃。通过这种方式，他们不仅从闲置土地中获益，更将原本荒废的空间转变为更接近设计初衷的绿色集体广场。就此而言，现代主义的功能规划方法因其依赖固定方案、无法预见并适应变化而值得商榷。
Fig. 2: Residential compound with vegetable beds on a square, Sixth of October 图 2：十月六日城某住宅区内广场上的菜圃
Festivities in Egypt can also be considered tactical operations in that they expose how limited the scope of a defined program really is. The design of neighborhoods and living quarters in the desert cities thoughtlessly replicates housing types and distributes public space according to models imported from foreign contexts. 埃及的节庆活动亦可视为战术行动，它们揭示出既定规划方案的实际范围何其有限。沙漠城市中社区与住宅区的设计，盲目照搬外来住房类型，并依据异域语境引入的模式分配公共空间。
Fig. 3: Urban situation during festivities, Sixth of October 图 3：十月六日城节庆期间的街景
As a result, they appear ill-fitteo to local phenomena such as temporary festivals for weddings or funerals. During these special occasions, the street transforms into an outdoor, semi-private space in which family 这种规划导致城市空间难以适应婚礼或葬礼等临时庆典这类本土活动。在这些特殊场合，街道会转变为半私密的户外空间，供家族
members and neighbors can participate. The physical space is demarcated by colorful decorations and temporarily excluded from its everyday function. In this instance, tactics used within the framework of strategic planning prove to be resistant, flexible, and able to adjust to perpetual mutations. Similar appropriations of space can be seen in informal neighborhoods around Cairo, as well as on the public streets of desert cities, and are independent of the spatial qualities and physical dimensions of the spaces that are thereby transformed. 成员与邻里共同参与。物理空间被鲜艳的装饰物划界，暂时脱离日常功能。在此情境下，战略规划框架内运用的战术展现出顽强韧性、灵活应变能力，并能适应持续的空间异变。类似的空间挪用现象既见于开罗周边的非正规社区，也出现在沙漠城市的公共街道上，且不受被改造空间本身物质属性与物理尺度的限制。
PROGRAM AS A PROCESS 作为过程的程序
Even though the three cases analyzed here differ in method, they all reveal the “failures” of a rigid, programmatic approach to urban planning. Cities expose the complexity of multiple, heterogeneous, and often contradictory scenarios where program should not be considered as something finite but rather as a process that can be extended, transformed to open new possibilities. Cities therefore cannot be seen as merely a realization of a given programmatic brief of uses, strictly superimposed on a certain territory. 尽管本文分析的三个案例在方法上各不相同，但它们都揭示了僵化、教条式城市规划方法的"失效"。城市展现了多重、异质且往往相互矛盾的复杂场景，在此规划方案不应被视为既定结果，而应是一个可延展、可转化以开启新可能性的过程。因此，城市不能简单视作某种严格叠加在特定地域上的既定功能方案的实现。
The necessity for a new approach becomes evident in light of the current transition from a material to an immaterial mode of production. The former Fordist spatial-temporal interrelation of work and life does not comply with the changing reality. The new post-Fordist condition is dominated by the production of ideas, images, and social relations. As Martino Tattara and Pier Vittorio Aureli argue, “within this condition architecture is completely liberated from any functionalist and programmatic duty, and serves production only by virtue of being there as framework, as place.” ^(11){ }^{11} 在当前从物质生产向非物质生产模式转型的背景下，新方法的必要性显而易见。旧有福特主义模式下工作与生活的时空关联已无法适应变化的现实。新的后福特主义时代以思想、图像和社会关系的生产为主导。正如 Martino Tattara 和 Pier Vittorio Aureli 所言："在这种情境下，建筑完全摆脱了任何功能主义与程式化的义务，仅通过作为框架、作为场所存在来服务于生产。" ^(11){ }^{11}
In this context, the contemporary urban condition is characterized by diversity, complexities, and differences rather than by segregation and standardization. A new approach towards planning through programming could envision the symbiosis of two complementary ways of operating: 在此背景下，当代城市状况的特征是多样性、复杂性和差异性，而非隔离与标准化。通过规划编程的新方法，可以构想两种互补运作方式的共生关系：
strategy and tactics. According to de Certeau, “strategies are able to produce, tabulate, and impose spaces, whereas tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces.” ^(12){ }^{12} The synergy of these two elements could provide a condition able to integrate multiple and often contradictory forces in the process of the city’s development and evolution, in Egypt and elsewhere. 战略与战术。正如德塞都所言："战略能够生产、制表并强加空间，而战术只能利用、操纵和转移这些空间。" ^(12){ }^{12} 这两种要素的协同作用能够创造一种条件，在埃及及其他地区的城市发展与演变过程中，整合多种往往相互矛盾的力量。
1 Letter from Karl Marx to W. Bracke in Brunswick, London, May 5, 1875, in Marx/Engels Selected Works, vol. 3 (Moseow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 11-12. 1 卡尔·马克思 1875 年 5 月 5 日于伦敦致 W.布拉克的信，收录于《马克思恩格斯选集》第 3 卷（莫斯科：进步出版社，1970 年），第 11-12 页。
2 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life trans. Steven Rendall (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), xix. 2 米歇尔·德·塞托，《日常生活的实践》，史蒂文·伦德尔译（伯克利、洛杉矶、伦敦：加州大学出版社，1984 年），xix 页。
3 Ibid. 3 同上。
“Program,” Merriam-Webster.com, accessed October 16, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/program. "Program（程序）"，Merriam-Webster.com，2017 年 10 月 16 日访问，https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/program。
ALTERNATIVE URBAN FUTURES 另类城市未来
5 Amanda Reeser Lawrence and Ashley Schafer, “Re:Programming,” PRAXIS: A Journal of Writing and Builing 8 (2006): 5. 5 阿曼达·瑞瑟·劳伦斯与阿什利·谢弗，《重新编程》，PRAXIS：写作与建筑期刊第 8 期（2006 年）：第 5 页。
6 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 33. 6 亨利·列斐伏尔，《空间的生产》，唐纳德·尼科尔森-史密斯译（牛津：布莱克威尔出版社，1991 年），第 33 页。
7 Ibid., 39. 7 同上，第 39 页。
Ibid., 38. 同上，第 38 页。
For further information on the Egyptian condition see: David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City of Control (Cairo: The American Univer Dreams: Development or Disaster? (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2015), as well as Timothy Mitchell, Rules of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 关于埃及现状的更多信息，可参阅：大卫·西姆斯，《理解开罗：一座管控之城的逻辑》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2015 年）；以及蒂莫西·米切尔，《专家法则：埃及、技术政治与现代性》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，2000 年）。
10 A bawab is a kind of servant for an Egyptian family chores. 10 巴瓦布（bawab）是埃及家庭中负责日常杂务的仆人角色。
11 Pier Vittorio Aureli and Martino Tattara, “A Simple Heart,” in DOGMA: 11 PROJECTS (London: Architectural Association, 2013), 22. 11 皮埃尔·维托里奥·奥雷利与马蒂诺·塔塔拉，《一颗简单的心》，收录于《教条：11 个建筑项目》（伦敦：建筑协会出版社，2013 年），第 22 页。
12 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 30. 12 德·塞托，《日常生活实践》，第 30 页。
CHARLOTTE MALTERRE-BARTHES 夏洛特·马尔泰尔-巴尔特
It is easy to be critical of the urbanization taking place in new towns. But as designers question the situation of desert cities in general and of Sixth of October in particular, they must also come up with alternative modes of planning and urbanization. 人们很容易对新兴城镇的城市化进程提出批评。但设计师们在质疑沙漠城市整体状况、特别是十月六日城现状的同时，也必须提出替代性的规划与城市化模式。
The demand for housing is still high, as Egyptians seek safe investments for their savings. The political powers in force today are responding to this demand and willing to pursue the urban development of desert lands, as the ongoing New Capital project proves. Thus, it is safe to assume that urban developments in the desert will continue. 由于埃及民众寻求安全的储蓄投资渠道，住房需求依然旺盛。正如新行政首都项目所证明的，当今执政的政治力量正在回应这种需求，并愿意推进沙漠地带的城市开发。因此可以合理推断，沙漠地区的城市开发仍将持续。
NUCA (New Urban Communities Authority) is the main authority for the allocation of desert land and the enforcement of construction regulations. The institution is known to be largely inflexible. The development of residential, commercial, and industrial zones is then handed over to construction conglomerates, investors, and private developers who target large businesses or the high- and middle-income classes. The government also runs public housing schemes for Egyptians with modest incomes, which are often remotely located and poorly equipped. This is to say that urban development in desert cities is done in a largely unsustainable, poorly designed, and socially segregated manner that produces an urban environment of questionable quality. 新城市社区管理局(NUCA)是沙漠土地分配和建筑法规执行的主要管理机构。该机构以作风僵化著称。住宅区、商业区和工业区的开发随后被移交给建筑集团、投资者和私人开发商，这些开发商主要面向大型企业或中高收入阶层。政府也为收入不高的埃及人提供公共住房计划，但这些住房通常位置偏远且设施简陋。这意味着沙漠城市的城市化发展在很大程度上是不可持续的、设计拙劣的，并且存在社会隔离，最终形成的城市环境质量堪忧。
To define alternative urban futures for Sixth of October, the designers of the following projects take a stand on what they believe the city should be and identify what is the conceptual motor for change. For each project, a strategy or a tactic was developed, including the definition of a program (timeline, functions, actors, financing, etc.) and its crucial ingredients. 为了为十月六日城规划不同的城市未来方案，以下项目的设计者们就他们认为这座城市应该成为的样子表明了立场，并确定了推动变革的核心概念。每个项目都制定了相应的战略或策略，包括规划方案（时间表、功能、参与者、资金等）及其关键要素的定义。
The NUCA construction regulations that are currently in place are considered, but are re-negotiated in certain cases. 现行的 NUCA 建设法规虽被考虑在内，但在某些情况下会进行重新协商。
Each of the seven projects presented here proposes a program and an urban design concept, illustrating a vision of urban space and its qualities while explaining how an alternative urban future for Sixth of October, and possibly other desert cities, could be envisioned. 此处展示的七个项目均提出了规划方案与城市设计理念，既阐释了城市空间的愿景与特质，也探讨了如何为十月六日城乃至其他沙漠城市构想另一种城市未来图景。
Un-gated Community proposes an urban grid in which each block hosts a different housing typology, answering the needs of desert-city dwellers from all walks of life while offering climatic solutions and social diversity. Symbiosis is a simple, smart urban-design tactic that acts as a Trojan horse, designing a city that works for both wealthy residents and their domestic helpers. In Praise of Shadows adopts shading devices as a design tool to create a pedestrian-friendly, shaded, inclusive city. Using a generic residential fabric as the material out of which all other activities are carved out, Urban Continuum designs public spaces first, promoting common uses as the prerequisite for a heterogeneous, inclusive desert city. Arguing that the repetitive and monotonous urban production currently taking place can be hijacked, Dispelling Mirages proposes a hyper-densification strategy to diversify and improve urban qualities. Urban Synergy draws from existing desert-city typologies, superimposing functions and forms to propose a new design tool for achieving a rich, varied, and pleasant urban life. Graft argues that the way the informal areas of Cairo are produced could be the right manner to urbanize the desert, albeit within a certain framework-a provocative but urbanely sound proposal for desert-city development. 开放式社区规划提出一种城市网格方案，每个街区采用不同的住宅类型，既能满足沙漠城市各阶层居民的居住需求，又能提供气候适应性解决方案并促进社会多样性。《共生》运用简洁智慧的城市设计策略，如同特洛伊木马般巧妙构建出同时服务富裕居民与其家政人员的城市空间。《阴翳礼赞》将遮阳装置转化为设计工具，打造出行人友好、绿荫环绕的包容性城市。《城市连续体》以普通住宅肌理为基底，通过优先设计公共空间，将共享功能作为构建多元包容沙漠城市的前提条件。《幻象消解》指出当前重复单调的城市建设模式可被颠覆，提出超高密度策略以丰富和提升城市品质。《城市协同》借鉴现有沙漠城市类型学，通过功能与形态的叠加，为营造丰富多元、宜居宜人的城市生活提供全新设计工具。 格拉夫特认为，开罗非正规住区的生成模式或许正是沙漠城市化的正确路径——当然需要在一定框架内实施。这个关于沙漠城市发展的提案虽具争议性，却展现了城市规划层面的合理性。
Three sites in Sixth of October and Sheik Zayed have been chosen as hypothetical implementation locations. The assembled proposals do not pretend to solve the difficult question of desert development, yet they prove that designers can indeed come up with more sustainable, socially inclusive, and attractive designs to produce better urban futures. 研究团队选取了十月六日城和谢赫扎耶德城的三处场地作为概念实施方案选址。这些方案合集并非要解决沙漠开发的所有难题，但它们证实了设计师完全能够提出更具可持续性、社会包容性和吸引力的设计方案，从而创造更美好的城市未来。
The site is located in the north of Sheikh Zayed city. It has been given the name SODIC (Sixth of October Development and Investment Company) after the major real estate development company in Cairo. The surface of the plot is around 2,910 square kilometers, or 693 feddans. There is a significant difference in altitude between the periphery of the plot and the center, measuring at maximum 45 meters. Existing road infrastructure surrounds the site and there are also roads under construction within it. A still-undeveloped zone crossing Sheikh Zayed city connects the area with the central “spine” of Sixth of October. The prevailing development in the surrounding area is characterized by exclusive and mainly residential gated compounds targeting the wealthy upper class, such as Allegria, Westown, Al Rabwa, and Beverly Hills. Most of these compounds have extensive green areas intended for golf courses and promote a luxurious suburban lifestyle. To the south, closer to Sixth of October, un-gated, mixed-use compounds are also being developed. There are various building types in the area, such as villas, townhouses, and multi-story apartment buildings. However, there are also private commercial (e.g. Designopolis, the Strip, and the Westown Hub), educational (e.g. the British International School of Cairo), and office complexes (e.g. the Polygon). Transportation is dependent on private vehicles. 该地块位于谢赫扎耶德城北部，以开罗大型房地产开发公司"十月六日发展与投资公司"（SODIC）命名。地块面积约 2,910 平方公里（693 费丹），外围与中心区域存在显著高差，最大落差达 45 米。现有道路环绕地块边界，内部亦有在建道路网络。一条横贯谢赫扎耶德城的待开发区域将此地与十月六日城的中央"脊柱"相连。周边主要开发模式为针对富裕阶层的封闭式高端住宅社区，如欢乐城、西城、拉布瓦和比佛利山庄等，这些社区普遍配备大面积绿地规划为高尔夫球场，主打奢华郊区生活方式。往南靠近十月六日城方向，则正在开发开放式混合功能社区。区域内建筑类型多样，包括别墅、联排住宅和多层公寓楼等。 然而，这里也分布着私营商业区（如 Designopolis 购物中心、The Strip 商业街和 Westown Hub）、教育机构（如开罗英国国际学校）以及办公综合体（如 The Polygon 大厦）。交通出行主要依赖私人车辆。
According to the existing master plan, the northern part of the site belongs to SODIC, the southwest part is designated for the development of a High-Class Compound Area, and the southeast part is reserved for a central service spine with mixed-use typologies. The current SODIC regulations allow for a footprint of 40 to 45 percent of the plot area and demand setbacks on the front and back sides, leading to low-density development. 根据现有总体规划，场地北部属于 SODIC 地产公司，西南部规划为高端复合社区开发区，东南部则预留为中央服务轴线，将容纳混合功能业态。现行 SODIC 开发条例允许建筑基底面积占地块面积的 40%至 45%，并要求前后留出退界距离，这导致了低密度的开发模式。
Gated communities are large urbanized areas that are closed off by gates and walls at their perimeters. Generally, they are real estate projects that sell the idea of luxury, privacy, and security at the cost of public space. This project contests this typology, proposing the alternative scenario of an “un-gated community.” Envisioned for current residents of desert cities, this new 封闭式社区是通过围墙和大门将整个城市化区域封闭隔离的大型住区。这类房地产项目通常以牺牲公共空间为代价，向购房者兜售奢华、隐私和安全的居住理念。本设计提案质疑这种开发模式，提出"开放式社区"的替代方案。这个为沙漠城市现有居民构想的新 model accommodates their desire for safety and privacy while eliminating walls. 模式在满足安全性与隐私需求的同时，彻底摒弃了实体围墙的设定。
In a redefinition of the sense of privacy usually promoted in classical gated communities, walls are eliminated at the urban scale: neighborhoods function as urban filters, while the individual residential units foster a sense of “open privacy.” A rational grid of 100 meters by 100 meters, oriented toward the prevailing wind direction and adjusted to the topography, is served by a street network that follows shadow projections. Three main axes connect the most important existing roads and accommodate public transport, plazas, and administrative buildings. Three main areas are organized according to the density of their blocks, with five different types of residential blocks for inhabitants from varied social backgrounds. This project thus proposes an alternative to gated, unsustainable, closed-off communities by designing an open, green, and empathetic urban environment. 在重新定义传统封闭社区通常推崇的隐私观念时，该项目在城市尺度上消除了围墙：社区充当城市过滤器，而独立住宅单元则营造出"开放隐私"的氛围。一个 100 米×100 米的理性网格系统，顺应主导风向并适应地形，其街道网络遵循阴影投射布局。三条主要轴线连接最重要的现有道路，容纳公共交通、广场和行政建筑。三大区域根据街区密度进行组织，为不同社会背景的居民提供五种不同类型的住宅街区。因此，该项目通过设计一个开放、绿色且富有同理心的城市环境，为封闭式、不可持续的隔离社区提供了替代方案。
Courtyards 庭院
Open Privacy 开放隐私
Type 09: Private villa 09 型：私人别墅
(1) Section south-north (2) Third floor (3) Second floor (4) Ground floor (1) 南北向剖面 (2) 三层 (3) 二层 (4) 首层
(5) Underground floor (5) 地下层
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
In a desert climate, the color white is used to repe the heat of the sun. By applying this principle in scmi-urban context, a cooler environment can be 在沙漠气候中，白色被用来反射太阳的热量。将这一原理应用于半城市场景中，可以营造出更为凉爽的环境。
achieved. 已实现
Desert cities are designed following strict zoning principles and are highly car dependent. Challenging the anti-pedestrian street conditions in most desert cities, which are caused by both large-scale urban schemes and their associated dependency on the automobile, this project proposes a walkable city. Here, shading became the principal criteria in designing the district. The city thus functions as a network of shadows that connects its surroundings and creates a cool, livable environment where urban and public activities can prosper. 沙漠城市严格遵循分区规划原则，高度依赖汽车出行。针对多数沙漠城市因大规模城市规划及汽车依赖导致的步行环境恶化问题，本项目提出打造一座适宜步行的城市。在这里，遮阳成为区域设计的核心准则。整座城市将构成阴影网络系统，衔接周边环境，营造凉爽宜居的公共活动空间。
Fig. 1: Nile University Site Plan, scale 1:25,0001: 25,000 图 1：尼罗大学总平面图，比例尺 1:25,0001: 25,000
(1) Sheykh Zayed (2) Sixth of October (1) 谢赫扎耶德 (2) 十月六日城
The site is located in Sheikh Zayed city, in its southernmost district. It is situated off the Twenty-Sixth of July highway, which connects Cairo with Sixth of October. Irregularly shaped, it measures three kilometers along the east-west axis and one kilometer along the north-south one, covering a total area of 2.06 square kilometers, or 490 feddans. The topography is almost flat. 该地块位于谢赫扎耶德城最南端区域，毗邻连接开罗与十月六日城的七月二十六日高速公路。地块呈不规则形状，东西轴向长约三公里，南北轴向宽约一公里，总面积 2.06 平方公里（合 490 费丹），地形近乎平坦。
The plot is already divided and allocated for different uses, probably due to the high land values stemming from its very central location. Currently, the only existing buildings on the plot are found parallel to the Twenty-Sixth of July highway, on the other side of a green buffer zone. These include the buildings on the Nile University Campus in the southern part, as well as mixed-use buildings for administrative, touristic, and retail uses-such as the Ministry of Tourism, the offices of the Egyptian Federation of Tourism Chambers, the Giza Palace Hotel, the Galleria40 mall, and the Arkan Mall-in the eastern part. 该地块已按不同用途划分并分配完毕，这很可能源于其核心区位带来的高昂地价。目前地块上仅存的建筑群平行于七月二十六日大道分布，与绿化缓冲带隔路相望。南侧坐落着尼罗河大学校区的建筑群，东侧则聚集着行政、旅游与零售混合用途建筑——包括旅游部大楼、埃及旅游商会联合会办公楼、吉萨宫酒店、Galleria40 购物中心和 Arkan 商场。
Two developments are planned for the rest of the plot. For the center, the proposed master plans envision the construction of Zayed Crystal Spark, a pyramid-shaped tower that will be the highest in Greater Cairo. The western part, on the other hand, will be the site of the Beit al-Watan residential compound, which will follow the predominant model of residential development. 其余地块规划了两大开发项目。根据总体规划方案，中心区域将建造扎耶德水晶火花大厦——这座金字塔形塔楼将成为大开罗地区最高建筑。而西侧区域则将开发名为"祖国之家"的住宅社区，该项目将延续当地主流的住宅开发模式。
The areas adjacent to the site mostly include residential compounds targeted at the middle and upper-middle classes. Current regulations for these areas allow for buildings to cover up to forty percent of the plot, leaving sixty percent unbuilt, while the maximum height for buildings is fifteen meters (a ground floor plus four stories). 场地周边区域主要为面向中高收入阶层开发的住宅小区。现行规划条例规定这些区域的建筑密度不得超过 40%，需保留 60%的空地，同时建筑限高 15 米（即一层加四层结构）。
Life in the desert does not have to take place in a desolate, fragmented, and segregated form, but could instead happen in 沙漠生活不必以荒凉、割裂与隔离的形式呈现，而完全可以在
Existing development model 现有发展模式
a lively, urban, and diverse environment. As an alternative to the current ideal and model of the exclusive compound, this project promotes inclusivity through a diversity of social classes and usages. By redefining the contour of the site, redrawing its boundaries, and reimagining current practices, this design aims to generate a productive symbiosis among inhabitants of various backgrounds. Inclusivity can be spatially expressed through tactics that, once adopted, will result in a classically attractive yet resistant development model. 一个充满活力、都市化且多元的环境中展开。作为当前封闭式小区理想模式的替代方案，本项目通过融合不同社会阶层与功能用途来促进包容性。通过重新定义场地轮廓、重塑边界并革新现有实践，该设计旨在为不同背景的居民创造互利共生的生活空间。包容性可通过空间策略实现，这些策略一旦实施，将形成既经典迷人又具有韧性的开发模式。
The SODIC area presents an extreme situation of exclusive, mainly gated compounds that target the wealthy upper classes. Challenging the complex and largely unfair relationships between different classes, this project attempts to transform the existing boundaries that separate communities. Spaces and uses are designed to transform the dividing wall into a habitable border for both sides. Through a rearrangement of existing facilities as well as new structures, a new edge is established. There is a benevolent duplicity in its design. Facilities appear intended for the obvious clients-the wealthy-yet offer new spaces and possibilities for the secret clients: the great variety of people in the area who serve the wealthy. SODIC 区域呈现了一种极端状况——专为富裕阶层打造的封闭式门禁社区。该项目旨在挑战不同阶层间复杂且极不公平的关系，试图改造现有社区隔离边界。通过空间与功能的重新设计，将分隔墙转化为两侧居民共享的生活化边界。通过对现有设施的重组及新建构筑物，形成一条新型边界线。其设计暗含善意双关：看似为显性客户（富裕阶层）服务的设施，实则也为隐性客户（区域内服务富裕阶层的各类人群）提供了新空间与可能性。
This new development model is applied on the given site following the local topography. Four districts are organized and filled with slightly modified versions of the existing types: villas, townhouses, apartments, and mixed-use spaces. These are all surrounded by the new type of boundary. People living and working in the area are no longer separated by a “hostile” wall; on the contrary, they can occasionally meet and interact in the new space suggested at the edge. 这一新型开发模式顺应场地地形展开，规划出四个功能分区，植入经适度改良的既有建筑类型：别墅、联排住宅、公寓及综合空间。所有区域均由新型边界环绕。在此生活工作的人们不再被"敌对式"围墙隔离，相反地，他们能在这条边界建议的新空间中偶遇互动。
Sixth of October has been designed following zoning principles and developed in a fragmented way. Public space is scarce and practices of everyday life are hindered from unfolding. The city is composed of dispersed residential compounds and its urban fabric is not continuous. Microbusinesses struggle to find fertile ground in the city to flourish, as the retail sector is dominated by “big box” shopping malls. The automobile is a prerequisite for a livable life in Sixth of October, dictated by the need to reach the far-fetched commercial and residential destinations throughout the sprawling city. 十月六日城遵循分区规划原则设计，以碎片化方式发展。公共空间稀缺，日常生活行为难以展开。这座城市由分散的住宅社区组成，其城市肌理缺乏连续性。由于零售业被"大盒子"购物中心主导，小微企业难以在城市中找到蓬勃发展的沃土。在这座不断扩张的城市中，要抵达各处遥远的商业与住宅目的地，汽车成为十月六日城宜居生活的先决条件。
The project proposes a new district organized as a so-called “urban continuum.” An urban continuum is understood as a series of urban spaces designed to boost the civic and financial life of the site in question. These spaces are carved out of the generic built residential mass and designed as one continuous body, rather than as fragments. Street grids tie together the miscellaneous subtracted spaces, thus creating strong interdependencies and correlations. Where the grids intersect, points of “friction” are created. This is where urbanity happens and where archetypes of subtracted space, such as squares, courtyards, and recessions are found. These elements act as incubators of civic efflorescence, serving inhabitants while raising social interaction and urban participation. 该项目提出了一种被称为"城市连续体"的新型城区规划理念。所谓城市连续体，是指一系列旨在激活特定区域市民生活与经济活力的城市空间组合。这些空间并非零散片段，而是从常规住宅建筑群中精心雕琢而出，形成一个有机整体。街道网格将各类减法空间紧密联结，形成强烈的功能互依与空间关联。在网格交汇处产生的"摩擦点"，正是城市活力迸发之处——广场、庭院、退界等经典减法空间原型在此涌现。这些元素如同市民文化繁荣的孵化器，在服务居民的同时促进社会交往与城市参与。
By carving smaller spaces for microbusinesses and public uses out of the built residential mass, this project aims to foster the commons that are almost absent from desert cities today. This ensemble of subtracted spaces attempts to create urban coherence: the “urban continuum.” 通过在住宅建筑群中开辟小微商业与公共用途的紧凑空间，该项目致力于培育当今沙漠城市中几乎绝迹的公共生活场域。这套减法空间体系试图构建一种城市肌理的连贯性，即"城市连续体"概念。
Desert cities are made of an endless repetition of luxurious freestanding villas and vacant land, urban ruins generated by selling a “mirage” of comfort and wealth. 沙漠城市由无数重复的奢华独栋别墅与闲置土地构成，这些城市废墟源于对舒适与财富"海市蜃楼"的贩卖。
To dispel this mirage and fix the city, this project proposes densification, diversification, and “dynamization” of the existing urban fabric using new floor area ratios, housing types, and programs. 为驱散这种幻象并重塑城市，本项目提出通过新容积率、住宅类型和功能规划，对现有城市肌理进行加密、多元化和"动态化"改造。
The project’s strategy of incrementally densifying the existing built fabric uses tools that are applied depending on the existing programmatic variations and offset sizes. These are complemented by residential, service, mixed-use, and cultural activities. Residential neighborhoods are restructured through courtyards, shaded outdoor spaces, and urban density. Recreational and cultural programs connected by pedestrian walkways improve the livability of the site. The urban assemblage results in a continuous façade with intermittent recessions, which creates different kinds of enclosed and outdoor spaces that allow for various activities to happen throughout the site and beyond. 项目采用渐进式加密策略，根据现有功能差异与退界尺寸灵活运用规划工具。这些措施与住宅、服务设施、混合功能及文化活动形成互补。住宅区通过庭院、遮阳户外空间和城市密度进行重组。由步行道串联的休闲文化设施提升了场地宜居性。最终形成的城市聚合体呈现连续立面与间歇性退台，创造出各类围合与开放空间，使多样化活动得以在整个场地及更广区域发生。
The project subscribes to the belief that there is no need to build new cities in Cairo, as there are abundant spaces that have been left inactive within the desert cities existing already. Through transforming the existing urban morphology, an alternative and livable urban life is created. 该项目秉持一个理念：无需在开罗新建城市，因为现有的沙漠城市中已有大量闲置空间未被利用。通过改造现有城市形态，可以创造出另一种宜居的城市生活。
Fig. 1: Existing building typology on site 图 1：场地现有建筑类型
The existing situation consists of a reperitive typology of empty, freestanding villas, in a strictly residential neighborhood. 现状是由空置的独立别墅组成的重复建筑类型，位于严格限定的住宅区内。
The proposal densifies and transforms the existing typology, introducing a variety of programs. Formerly free-standing villas are brought together into a compact. lively neighborhood with diversified activities and shaded courtyards. 该提案通过引入多样化功能，对现有建筑类型进行加密和改造。原本分散的独立别墅被整合成紧凑而充满活力的社区，配有多元化活动和荫凉庭院。
Fig. 2: Densification type 1: residential ( 3 m offset) 图 2：致密化类型 1：住宅区（3 米退界）
Monotonous neighborhood 单调的街区
0.4 FAR 容积率 0.4
0.6 FAR 容积率 0.6
Fig. 1: Buffer Zone Site Plan, scale 1:25,000 图 1：缓冲区场地平面图，比例尺 1:25,000
The site is defined as a “buffer zone” between an industrial and a residential area. It is a legacy of the first master plan for Sixth of October, which was developed in 1979. Although the area is designated as a green area according to the zoning plan, it currently remains bleak and undeveloped. 该场地被定义为工业区与住宅区之间的"缓冲地带"，源自 1979 年制定的十月六日城首版总体规划。虽然根据分区规划该区域被划定为绿地，但目前仍处于荒芜未开发状态。
The plot is oriented along a northwest-southeast axis (rotated 36 degrees west from north) and features a fairly flat topography. The site measures 5,400 meters in length, 260 meters (on the southeastern end) and 500 meters (on the northwestern end) in width, and is surrounded by highways. The total area is 2.21 square kilometers: seven times bigger than al-Azhar Park (0.3 square kilometers), the biggest public park in Cairo. The central “spine” of Sixth of October, which was planned for offices and commercial buildings, crosses the site in the upper part. Because of a lack of public transportation, people rely on informal transportation to reach the area. 地块呈西北-东南走向（自正北向西偏转 36 度），地形较为平坦。场地全长 5400 米，宽度东南端为 260 米、西北端达 500 米，四周被高速公路环绕。总面积 2.21 平方公里——相当于开罗最大公园爱资哈尔公园（0.3 平方公里）的七倍。十月六日城规划用于办公楼和商业建筑的中央"脊柱带"从场地北侧穿过。由于缺乏公共交通，人们主要依靠非正规交通工具抵达该区域。
Current regulations in the surrounding residential areas allow one to build up to forty percent of the plot, leaving sixty percent unbuilt-as green areas, for instance-and thus replicating western suburban models. Most of the buildings are limited to a height of fifteen meters: a ground floor plus four floors. 现行周边住宅区法规允许地块开发率不超过 40%，剩余 60%需保持非建筑状态（例如作为绿地），这种规划效仿了西方郊区模式。大多数建筑限高 15 米，即地面层加四层结构。
The location and scale of the site offers many possibilities in terms of urban design: the existing residential and industrial areas in the surroundings could be linked together, for example, or the site could be used to implement autonomous projects or develop new programs, considering the plot as a tabula rasa. If we assume that this site is never going to be used as a green area, what are its urban potentials or functions, in view of the challenges faced by Sixth of October? 该地块的区位与规模为城市设计提供了多种可能性：例如可将周边现有住宅区与工业区进行联动整合，或将场地视为白板实施独立项目、开发新规划方案。若假设该地块永远不会用作绿地，面对十月六日城当前面临的挑战，其潜在城市功能或用途有哪些？
Since the 1960s, two urban phenomena of great magnitude have emerged in Greater Cairo: the loss of agricultural land to expanding “informal” settlements, and the urbanization of desert lands through the creation of new towns. Following a largely unplanned pattern of densification, the so-called informal districts of Cairo are now home to about sixty percent of the city population, while the formally planned desert cities, the outcome of a speculative process, features a seventy percent vacancy rate. Thanks to its high density, informal urbanization offers solutions to Cairo’s urban challenges that modern top-down urbanism has failed to deliverindeed, the latter has only generated additional problems such as segregation, land speculation, unsustainable use of resources, corruption, and so on. This project is based on the belief that desert development could provide affordable housing for middleand low-income families if informal mechanisms were grafted onto currently vacant land. Suburbanization processes could be improved through combining top-down, formal systems such as land provision and subdivision, urban utilities, public spaces, and other existing services in desert cities with bottom-up, informal mechanisms-a plot measuring one qirat (approx. 175 square meters), incrementally built up by one developer or owner, for example-and features such as high density. 自 20 世纪 60 年代以来，大开罗地区出现了两大城市现象：一是农业用地被不断扩张的"非正规"定居点侵占，二是通过建设新城镇实现的荒漠土地城市化。遵循着基本无规划的密集化发展模式，开罗所谓的非正规区域如今容纳了约 60%的城市人口，而那些经过正式规划的沙漠新城——投机性开发的产物——却面临着 70%的空置率。凭借其高密度特性，非正规城市化提供了解决开罗城市难题的方案，而这些正是现代自上而下城市规划所未能实现的——事实上，后者反而催生了诸如社会隔离、土地投机、资源不可持续利用、腐败等一系列新问题。本项目基于这样的理念：若将非正规机制嫁接到当前闲置土地上，沙漠开发或可为中低收入家庭提供经济适用住房。 通过将自上而下的正规系统（如沙漠城市中的土地供应与划分、城市公用设施、公共空间及其他现有服务）与自下而上的非正规机制相结合——例如由单个开发商或业主逐步建造的约 175 平方米（1 基拉特）地块——并融入高密度等特征，郊区化进程可以得到改善。
The project takes the form of a city-within-a-city housed within a vacant plot. The land is divided to balance two main traditional components: the city, on the one hand, and the walled garden used for agricultural purposes, on the other. The city is arranged as a calibrated grid, which provides order and utilities to individual developments in a fairly regulated manner. While this strategy has been modified to fit a particular context, it is intended to be a universal solution: a prototype for an urban strategy that could be replicated in any other desert context, each time taking on the finite form of a singular urban artifact. 该项目采用"城中城"的形式，选址于闲置地块。土地划分兼顾两大传统要素：一方面是城市区域，另一方面是用于农业的围墙花园。城市区域采用经过校准的网格布局，以高度规范的方式为个体开发项目提供秩序和基础设施。虽然这一策略已根据具体环境进行调整，但其本质是一个通用解决方案：作为可复制的城市策略原型，适用于任何其他沙漠环境，每次都能以独特城市产物的最终形态呈现。
Alternative Urban Futures 另类城市未来图景
INFORMAL GAIRO 非正式开罗
The urban layout is the legacy of irrigation patterns in which density is maximized. 城市布局是灌溉模式的遗产，其中密度被最大化。
A typical plot allows for one building that occupies 100 percent of the plot area. 典型的地块允许建造一栋占据 100%地块面积的建筑。
The average building has three blind facades, and is built with concrete frames and brick infill. 普通建筑拥有三面无窗立面，采用混凝土框架和砖块填充结构。
Public space is limited to narrow and repetitive streets. 公共空间仅限于狭窄且重复的街道。
Blocks 街区
N/A 无
Buildings 建筑
1280
Inhabitants 居民人数
46,080
Density 人口密度
1,843pp.//ha1,843 \mathrm{pp} . / \mathrm{ha}.
Building floor area 建筑楼面面积
184,320m^(2)184,320 \mathrm{~m}^{2}
Floor area ratio 容积率
73,7%73,7 \%
Courtyards ratio 庭院占比
-
Street-floor ratio 沿街面占比
26.3%26.3 \%
Blocks N/A
Buildings 1280
Inhabitants 46,080
Density 1,843pp.//ha.
Building floor area 184,320m^(2)
Floor area ratio 73,7%
Courtyards ratio -
Street-floor ratio 26.3%| Blocks | N/A |
| :--- | :--- |
| Buildings | 1280 |
| Inhabitants | 46,080 |
| Density | $1,843 \mathrm{pp} . / \mathrm{ha}$. |
| Building floor area | $184,320 \mathrm{~m}^{2}$ |
| Floor area ratio | $73,7 \%$ |
| Courtyards ratio | - |
| Street-floor ratio | $26.3 \%$ |
GRAFT 嫁接式规划
The new urban layout grafts the typical 12 xx12m12 \times 12 \mathrm{~m} plot to rearrange it in blocks to configure a dense grid. 新型城市布局采用典型的 12 xx12m12 \times 12 \mathrm{~m} 地块模式，将其重组为街区单元，构建出密集的网格结构。
The grid acts as a framework to support growth and organize access to urban utilities. 这个网格体系作为支撑城市发展的框架，同时统筹安排市政设施的分布。
The new block is composed of eight qirats arranged around a central courtyard. Every building thus has two open façades while preserving a high level of density. 每个新街区由八座 qirat 建筑环绕中央庭院构成。这种布局使每栋建筑都拥有两面开放立面，同时保持了高密度特性。
An arcaded ground floor creates shaded spaces while preserving the order of the façade in the lower levels. 带拱廊的底层在保留低层立面秩序的同时，营造出荫蔽的过渡空间。
Blocks 街区
Buildings 建筑
Inhabitants 居民
Density 密度
Building floor area 建筑楼面面积
Floor area ratio 容积率
Courtyards ratio 庭院比例
Street-floor ratio 临街面比例
Overlapping Existing Forms and Functions for Better Urban Qualities 重叠现有形态与功能以提升城市品质
Desert cities often convey the feeling of constructed reality and artificial urbanity. Aiming for a socially inclusive, complex, and heterogeneous city, the project Urban Synergy opposes this fabricated sense of reality. The pursuit of profit, veiled under claims of success and modernity, is at the root of the production of new cities. This has resulted in strict spatial, social, and functional segregation, whereby buildings stand as mere space “occupiers” instead of defining space and its functions. Empty buildings throughout the desert cities stand as testament to this. 沙漠城市常给人一种人造现实与刻意都市化的感觉。旨在打造社会包容、多元复合的"城市协同"项目，正是对这种虚构现实感的反抗。在成功与现代性宣称的掩盖下，对利润的追逐成为新城建设的根本动因，这导致了严格的空间、社会与功能隔离——建筑沦为单纯的"空间占据者"，而非空间及其功能的定义者。遍布沙漠城市的空置建筑正是这种状况的明证。
Tapping into existing, fragmented districts of the city, Urban Synergy proposes an outcome greater than the sum of its separate parts. First, a catalog of Sixth of October’s urban elements identifies current forms, densities, uses, energies, and socio-economic functions, gathering information on both the physical environment and social milieu. Second, collective uses and spatial characteristics (mainly in housing and industrial areas) are superimposed to improve coexistence in the city. Through this almost formal and abstract exercise, the project attempts to generate new interpretations and uses of space, exploring the possibilities offered to break existing, “unreal,” and immovable urban patterns. Spaces can be aggregated without strictly determined characteristics and functions. Urban Synergy is a plea for imbalance, offering both a planning strategy for producing urban opportunities through synergies and a possible way out from the false urban appearance of the new cities. 《开罗沙漠城市》节选译文：
通过整合城市现有分散的片区，"城市协同"计划旨在实现超越各部分简单相加的整体效益。首先，项目对十月六日城的城市要素进行全面梳理，识别现有形态、密度、用途、活力及社会经济功能，同时收集物质环境与社会环境数据。其次，将集体使用需求与空间特征（主要集中在居住区和工业区）进行叠加优化，以提升城市共生机能。通过这种近乎形式化的抽象推演，该项目试图对空间进行创新诠释与利用，探索打破现有那些"虚幻"且僵化的城市模式的可能性。空间聚合不必严格限定特征与功能，"城市协同"本质上是对非平衡态的追求——既提供了通过协同效应创造城市机遇的规划策略，也为摆脱新城市虚假表象指明可能路径。
Alternative Urban Futures 另类城市未来图景
Case study 2, scale 1:3,000 案例研究 2，比例尺 1:3000
REFLECTING ON DESERT URBANIZATION IN EGYPT 埃及沙漠城市化进程的思考
Planning for a Metropolitan Future that Never Arrives DAVID SIMS 为大都会未来而规划：永不到来的明天 戴维·西姆斯
All of the plans and policies related to Greater Cairo’s expansion rely on the continued availability of public land, and these plans are underpinned by the massive designation, conversion, and servicing of this land for urban uses. While in theory this is an envious situation that many metropolitan areas across the world wish they could have, in Greater Cairo the exploitation of this resource over decades has relied on a misplaced faith that modern, high-standard, low-density, sprawling, and car-oriented developments operating under top-down bureaucratic dirigisme would quickly create jobs, absorb the increasing metropolitan population, and provide an attractive alternative to informal urban settlements. That this was not happening was already apparent in the 1990s, but the same policies have been continued and even accelerated, with more and more desert tracts assigned for new-town expansion. The government’s announcement in 2015 that they will create a new administrative capital east of Cairo on 700 square kilometers of land represents the most extreme confirmation of these policies. 所有涉及大开罗地区扩张的规划与政策，都依赖于公共土地的持续供应。这些规划的核心在于将大量土地划拨、转化并配套基础设施以供城市开发。理论上，这种条件令全球众多大都市艳羡不已，但大开罗地区数十年来对土地资源的开发利用，始终建立在一种错位的信念之上——认为在官僚主导的自上而下管控模式下，建设现代化、高标准、低密度、蔓延式且以汽车为导向的开发区，就能快速创造就业岗位、吸纳不断增长的大都市人口，并为非正规居住区提供具有吸引力的替代选择。早在上世纪 90 年代，这种设想的落空就已显露无遗，但同类政策不仅延续至今，甚至不断加速推进，越来越多的荒漠地块被划拨用于新城扩张。2015 年政府宣布将在开罗东部 700 平方公里的土地上建设新行政首都，堪称这些政策最极致的体现。
The boundaries of Cairo’s desert cities, 2009, 2009 年开罗沙漠城市的边界
THE NEW TOWNS AROUND CAIRO 开罗周边的新城镇
The success of some large up-market residential and commercial schemes (at least 一些高端住宅和商业项目（至少
in terms of invested capital and speculative profits) in the new towns has given these developments a veneer of achievement, but there has been a near complete failure to create communities and economies in which the mass of the metropolitan population could thrive. In effect, there has been a continued reliance on a supply-side, social-engineering approach that refuses to understand markets and socio-economic realities. 就投入资本和投机利润而言，新城镇的开发表面上取得了成就，但在为都市大众创建繁荣社区和经济方面几乎彻底失败。实际上，这些开发仍依赖于供给侧的社会工程手段，拒绝理解市场和社会经济现实。
Supply-side approaches and rigid landdevelopment procedures have made it difficult for the new towns to attract even a fraction of their intended population targets. The populations of seven new towns around Cairo (not counting Tenth of Ramadan) had only reached 465,000 inhabitants by 2006 ( 600,000 counting Tenth of Ramadan), representing a meager 3.3 percent of Greater Cairo’s population at that time. It is clear that these towns do not offer the kinds of housing, choice, and livelihoods that would entice even a small portion of Cairene families, especially those who continue to crowd into the city’s huge informal areas. The reasons are many, and will be explained in the following. 供给侧策略与僵化的土地开发程序使得这些新城难以吸引到预期人口目标中的一小部分。截至 2006 年，开罗周边七座新城（不含十月六日城）总人口仅达 46.5 万（若计入十月六日城则为 60 万），仅占当时大开罗地区总人口的 3.3%。显然，这些新城未能提供足以吸引哪怕少数开罗家庭——尤其是那些持续涌入城市庞大非正规住区的人群——的住房选择与谋生机会。个中缘由诸多，下文将逐一阐明。
1. UNAFFORDABLE AND INACCESSIBLE SUBSIDIZED SOCIAL 1. 难以负担且难以获得的补贴性社会住房
HOUSING IN THE NEW TOWNS 新城镇中的困境
The new towns around Cairo have been a main target of the government’s various subsidized social-housing programs, all of which have been aimed at those of “limited income.” NUCA alone built 210,000 units from 1982 to 2005 in Cairo’s new towns. Similarly, most subsidized housing projects built under both the Cooperative Housing Authority and the Housing Development Bank, which together produced over 350,000 units nationally in the 1982-2005 period, were located in Cairo’s new towns. And under the 2005-2011 National Housing Program (which aimed to build 500,000 开罗周边的新城镇一直是政府各类补贴性社会住房计划的主要实施地，这些计划都针对"低收入群体"。仅新城区管理局(NUCA)在 1982 至 2005 年间就在开罗新城镇建造了 21 万套住房。同样，由合作住房管理局和住房开发银行（两者在 1982-2005 年间全国共建超过 35 万套住房）建设的大多数补贴性住房项目也都位于开罗新城镇。而 2005-2011 年国家住房计划（目标建设 50 万套住房）
units all over Egypt), at least forty percent were located in Cairo’s new towns. And the current One Million Unit Social Housing Program aims to locate at least thirty percent of its units in Greater Cairo’s new towns. But these programs rely on arbitrary methods to distribute units, rarely relate to the needs of target families, attract considerable speculative intent, and result in housing units that are very poorly located and are only conveniently accessible by private cars. It is no surprise that vacancies in newer public housing units in Cairo’s desert new towns commonly exceed sixty percent. 埃及全国范围内），至少有百分之四十位于开罗的新城镇。而当前实施的"百万套社会住房计划"则旨在将至少百分之三十的住房单元布局在大开罗地区的新城镇中。但这些分配方案采用随意性极强的分配方式，很少考虑目标家庭的实际需求，反而吸引了大量投机意图，最终导致分配的住房单元区位极差，仅能通过私家车便捷抵达。开罗沙漠新城中较新的公共住房空置率普遍超过百分之六十，也就不足为奇了。
2. HIGH STANDARDS AND RESTRICTIONS IN THE NEW TOWNS 2. 新城镇的高标准与严苛限制
Another factor that discourages the majority of Egyptians from moving to the new towns are the high standards and restricted uses imposed by NUCA authorities on private housing developers and on builders in individual subdivisions. The regulations concerning allowed plot exploitation and building standards are extremely strict, which, combined with the large unit sizes, make development of residential units very expensive. As a result, virtually all privately built housing units available on the market are completely unaffordable to the large majority of Cairo’s households, even if financing were to be available-which, for almost all, it is not. Furthermore, in the new towns, it is prohibited in most buildings to open retail shops, services, or offices. Workshops and repair shops are almost unknown, and even kiosks are discouraged. These prohibited uses are precisely those that generate so much employment and so many business opportunities in Cairo proper. In effect, the vast micro and small informal business sector, which generates at least forty percent of jobs in urban Egypt, is almost totally excluded from the new towns. 另一个阻碍大多数埃及人迁往新城镇的因素，是国家城市社区管理局（NUCA）对私人住宅开发商和个体分区建筑商实施的高标准与用途限制。关于地块开发许可和建筑标准的规定极为严格，加之住宅单元面积普遍偏大，导致住宅开发成本极其高昂。因此，市场上几乎所有私人建造的住宅单元，即便存在贷款渠道（而事实上绝大多数人根本无从获得），对开罗绝大多数家庭而言都完全无力承担。此外，新城镇大多数建筑内禁止开设零售商店、服务场所或办公室，修理铺和维修店几乎绝迹，甚至连报刊亭都受到限制。而这些被禁止的业态，恰恰是开罗市区创造大量就业和商业机会的核心领域。实际上，占埃及城市就业至少 40%的庞大非正规小微商业部门，几乎完全被排除在新城镇发展体系之外。
3. POOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT TO THE NEW TOWNS 3. 新城镇薄弱的公共交通系统
Perhaps the most serious problem facing the limited-income family who might choose to 或许那些可能选择居住在开罗沙漠城市的低收入家庭面临的最严峻问题
move to one of the new towns around Cairo is transport. In fact, poor transport services have for years been identified as one of the major obstacles to the development of Cairo’s new towns. With the exception of Fifteenth of May and to a lesser extent el-Obour, all of the new towns around Cairo are located many kilometers away from the city’s central areas or from any existing large urban agglomerations. Distance remains a crucial factor in Cairo’s urban space. Location and mobility do count, and crucially. Good road links and rapid and affordable public transport are needed for the new towns to become fully integrated with the metropolitan area. Over the years, the government has made considerable efforts to develop major transport corridors out into the desert. These corridors have improved general traffic movement to the new towns somewhat, but it must be remembered that at best only fifteen percent of Greater Cairo’s households own a private car, and the lack of good and rapid public transit remains a serious problem. 迁居开罗周边新城镇面临的首要难题便是交通。事实上，多年来落后的交通服务一直被视作制约开罗新城发展的主要障碍之一。除五月十五城及规模较小的奥布尔城外，开罗周边所有新城镇均距市中心区域或现有大型城市群数十公里之遥。距离因素在开罗城市空间布局中始终占据关键地位——区位与交通通达性确实至关重要。要使新城镇真正融入大都会区，必须配备优质道路网络与快捷实惠的公共交通体系。多年来政府虽大力开发通往沙漠地带的主要交通走廊，这些通道虽在一定程度上改善了前往新城的整体交通状况，但需知大开罗地区仅有不到 15%的家庭拥有私家车，优质快速公交系统的缺失仍是严峻的现实问题。
The long distances that must be covered not only represent a significant loss of time and expenditure of energy; more importantly, they translate into public-transportation fares that are hardly affordable to a struggling lower-income family residing in the new towns. There are a number of highvolume transport projects (bus rapid transit, light rail, and super-trams) on the drawing boards that aim to improve public transport to new towns in both the western and eastern deserts, but the economic costs of such ventures mean that either these fares will be unaffordable to the masses or that they will need to be heavily subsidized. It is no coincidence that none of these schemes have so far seen the light of day. 长途跋涉不仅意味着大量时间和精力的消耗；更重要的是，对于居住在新城的低收入家庭而言，公共交通费用几乎难以承受。目前规划中有多个大运量交通项目（快速公交、轻轨和超级有轨电车），旨在改善东西部沙漠新城的公共交通，但这类项目的经济成本意味着：要么票价令大众无法承受，要么需要巨额补贴。这些方案至今无一落地实施，绝非偶然。
4. POOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT INSIDE THE NEW TOWNS 4. 新城内部公共交通匮乏
Even if, somehow, public transit to and from the new towns could be made convenient, fast, and affordable, movement within the new towns is and will remain an intractable problem. The issue is, again, space and 即便往返新城的公共交通能奇迹般地变得便捷、快速且经济实惠，新城内部的交通仍将是个棘手难题。问题的根源依然在于空间布局与
distance. The new towns are planned on such huge scales that traversing them from one part to another involves journeys that exceed most trajectories to be found within Cairo proper. For example, Sixth of October, with a 2006 population of less than 180,000 inhabitants, encompasses an area of over 400 square kilometers, an area as large as all of central Greater Cairo-home to some twelve million inhabitants. ^(1){ }^{1} These huge distances in Sixth of October are also to be found within the other new towns around Cairo and in particular in New Cairo, whose current boundaries encompass a colossal 350 square kilometers, which almost equals the extent of Sixth of October. The distances from one part of New Cairo to another are staggering. 远处。这些新城镇的规划规模如此庞大，从一个区域到另一个区域的穿行距离，甚至超过了开罗市区内大多数行程。以十月六日城为例，2006 年居民不足 18 万，却占地 400 多平方公里——相当于拥有约 1200 万人口的大开罗中心城区总面积。 ^(1){ }^{1} 这种超长距离同样存在于开罗周边的其他新城镇，尤其是占地达 350 平方公里的新开罗，其规模几乎与十月六日城相当。在新开罗不同区域间的移动距离，更是达到了令人咋舌的程度。
Today, public transport hardly exists within the new towns, and what services do operate are provided mostly by private/ informal minibuses that only serve the main concentrations of public-housing estates or the main traffic nodes. Taxis and tuktuks may ease the problem somewhat, but again distances and low densities make the generalized use of this relatively cheap form of transport impossible. There are plans to create internal bus networks in some of the new towns, and these might be marginally feasible if the routes went through wellpopulated areas that could support frequent private shuttle bus services. But the scattered form of development so common in the new towns, plus the extremely lowplanned residential densities, means that potential ridership is thin and such services would need to be heavily subsidized. 如今，这些新兴城镇内几乎不存在公共交通系统，现有的运营服务主要由私营/非正规的小型巴士提供，这些车辆仅服务于公共住宅区的主要聚集地或主要交通节点。出租车和三轮摩托车或许能稍缓困境，但过长的距离与过低的人口密度，使得这种相对廉价的交通方式难以普及。部分新城计划建立内部公交网络，若线路途经人口稠密区并能支撑频繁的私营接驳巴士服务，或勉强具备可行性。然而新城建设中普遍存在的分散式开发模式，加之规划中极低的居住密度，意味着潜在乘客数量稀少，此类服务将需要巨额补贴才能维持。
Of course, such tremendous distances to and within the new towns would not be a problem if everyone could rely on their own cars and if Cairo’s road networks could handle the huge extra load. Certainly, most of those who live in the high-end residential compounds and some of those who work or study in the new towns will own cars, but the same cannot be said for those with more modest means. For the large majority, car ownership will remain a dream for decades. Such a glaring fact somehow seems to escape many planners and higher-level 当然，如果人人都能拥有私家车，且开罗的道路网络能够承受巨大的额外负荷，那么往返新城及在城内通勤的遥远距离本不成问题。确实，高端住宅区的多数居民以及部分在新城工作学习的人会拥有汽车，但对经济条件一般者而言却非如此。对大多数人来说，拥有汽车在未来几十年内仍将是奢望。如此明显的事实却似乎被许多规划者和高层
government officials. Even a private-car commuter will have to think twice about the cost implications of living in a new town, as daily trips in excess of 100 kilometers are common. 政府官员所忽视。即便是开车通勤的私家车主，面对动辄每日超百公里的往返路程，也不得不慎重考虑居住在新城带来的交通成本压力。
Have these inconvenient facts relating to Cairo’s new towns been considered by government planners and decision-makers? Looking at current plans and projects and at the enthusiastic pronouncements by officials, the answer is a resounding no. In fact, the rhetoric positing new towns as Cairo’s inevitable future seems to become ever more dominant. The minister of housing recently posed the question: where would Cairo be without the new towns? For him, people would otherwise be living on top of each other in dense misery in the deteriorating, existing city. The only solution is to create more new towns! And he was proud to announce that currently there were nine additional new towns being launched throughout Egypt. In other words, reality seems easily ignored, while the rhetoric becomes fact. 政府规划者和决策者是否考虑过这些与开罗新城相关的不便事实？从当前规划项目与官员们热情洋溢的声明来看，答案显然是否定的。事实上，将新城视为开罗必然未来的论调似乎正变得愈发强势。住房部长近期提出：若没有这些新城，开罗将何去何从？在他看来，否则人们只能在日益恶化的旧城区里拥挤不堪地艰难度日。唯一解决方案就是建造更多新城！他自豪地宣布，目前埃及全境另有九座新城正在启动。换言之，现实似乎被轻易忽视，而 rhetoric（说辞）却成了既定事实。
1 Sixth of October measures 19.5 kilometers in an east-west direction and 23.6 kilometers in a northsouth direction. These distances are significantly greater than that from Tahrir Square in the city center all the way to Cairo Airport. The original commercial spine in Sixth of October is almost seven kilometer son, this is greater than this to al-Azhar Park. This is greater than the distance across central Cairo from Cairo University to al-Azhar Park. 十月六日城东西跨度 19.5 公里，南北纵贯 23.6 公里。这个距离远超从市中心的解放广场到开罗机场的里程。该城最初的商业主干道延伸近七公里，比前往爱资哈尔公园的距离更远，甚至超过了从开罗大学横穿市中心到爱资哈尔公园的全程。
CLAIMING THE DESERT 征服荒漠
How Decades of Agricultural Expansion Paved the Way for Desert Cities 数十年农业扩张如何为沙漠城市铺路
CHARLOTTE MALTERRE-BARTHES 夏洛特·马尔泰尔-巴尔特
“Why should we not emerge from this narrow valley to new horizons in the land where there is space and water?” "我们为何不走出这狭窄的河谷，去往拥有广阔空间和水源的新天地？"
-Anwar Sadat ^(1){ }^{1} ——安瓦尔·萨达特 ^(1){ }^{1}
In 1964, the United Arab Republic (the formal name of Egypt until 1971) released a set of two stamps celebrating “Electricity” and “Land Reclamation,” with the former showing an image of the Aswan High Dam and the latter depicting a farmer driving a tractor over sand and trailed by a house, a windmill, and a wheat spikelet. ^(2){ }^{2} In 2002, the Egypt Post issued another stamp. This one represented a colorful image of the Mubarak Pumping Station, reading “Toshka Land Reclamation Project.” Spanning over almost four decades, these memorabilia illustrate the continued political relevance of the conquest of the desert in Egypt. They show the continuous commitment of Egyptian politicians to land-reclamation schemes, from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s socialist agenda to Hosni Mubarak’s neoliberal aspirations, as well as the enduring popularity of these endeavors. As Robert Mabro has put it: “much glamour is attached to desert reclamation.” ^(3){ }^{3} But beyond the glamour, agrarian fields within the zimam (the border zone between cultivated and desert land) also constitute a productive, quantifiable, taxable, and controllable territory. ^(4){ }^{4} In fact, Ottoman rulers had already attempted to increase the surface available for agriculture and, by extension, raise tax revenues. In the nineteenth century, the irrigation works of the khedive Muhammad Ali propelled the modern process of land reclamation by facilitating land cultivation at the immediate limits of the so-called “Old Lands” in the Nile Delta and Nile Valley. Restricted by the irregular flow of the Nile, the efforts undertaken by the khedive and his successors focused on restoring abandoned, swampy, and saline agriculture lands. Colonial 1964 年，阿拉伯联合共和国（埃及 1971 年前的正式国名）发行了一套两枚纪念邮票，主题分别为"电力"与"土地开垦"。前者展示了阿斯旺高坝的雄姿，后者描绘了农民驾驶拖拉机穿越沙地的场景，画面后方还点缀着一栋房屋、一座风车和一穗麦子。 ^(2){ }^{2} 2002 年，埃及邮政又发行了一枚新邮票，以绚丽色彩呈现穆巴拉克抽水站，并标注"托什卡土地开垦工程"。这些跨越近四十年的纪念品，生动诠释了埃及征服沙漠的政治意义始终未减。它们既体现了从纳赛尔的社会主义纲领到穆巴拉克新自由主义蓝图期间，埃及政界对垦荒计划的一贯重视，也反映了这类工程持久不衰的民众号召力。正如罗伯特·马布罗所言："土地开垦总是笼罩着迷人光环。" ^(3){ }^{3} 但抛开光环效应，位于 zimam（耕地与沙漠交界带）的农业区还具有更实质的意义——它们是可生产、可量化、可课税且易管控的疆域。 事实上，奥斯曼统治者早已尝试扩大农业用地面积以增加税收。十九世纪时，赫迪夫穆罕默德·阿里的灌溉工程推动了现代土地开垦进程，使尼罗河三角洲与尼罗河谷所谓"旧土地"边缘地带得以耕作。受尼罗河流量不稳定的限制，赫迪夫及其继任者的努力主要集中在恢复废弃的沼泽地与盐碱地。殖民
powers continued the practice with mixed results. Because of these developments and the succession of infrastructure works on the river, private investors, companies, and colonial authorities reclaimed 400,000 feddans (circa 200,000 hectares) between 1892 and 1952. ^(5){ }^{5} Following the Land Reform Act of 1952, agricultural expansion became a central preoccupation of the new regime, which sought food security for the nation and aimed to achieve it by intensifying desert developments. 政权延续了这一做法但成效参差。得益于这些发展及尼罗河上相继建成的基础设施工程，1892 至 1952 年间私人投资者、企业与殖民当局共开垦了 40 万费丹（约 20 万公顷）土地。随着 1952 年《土地改革法案》颁布，农业扩张成为新政权核心要务，政府既追求国家粮食安全，又试图通过加强沙漠开发来实现这一目标。
Desert-land projects appeared to be an ideal solution to Egypt’s problems, offering clean slates for establishing new rural societies through social and physical engineering on a large scale-and without requiring demolition. The conquest of the desert, supported by water infrastructure, became a topic of prime political importance under Nasser and remains an enduring feature of national modernization and food security narratives today, with its implementation spanning over decades. ^(6){ }^{6} In the postcolonial period, the evolution of modern land reclamation programs can be divided into four phases: a pioneering phase (1952-1959), an investment phase (19601968), a reassessment phase (1969-1978), and a privatization phase (1979-1996). 沙漠城市项目似乎是解决埃及问题的理想方案，通过大规模社会与实体工程为建立新型农村社会提供空白画布，且无需拆除现有建筑。在水资源基础设施支持下征服沙漠的构想，在纳赛尔时期上升为首要政治议题，并作为国家现代化与粮食安全叙事中经久不衰的主题延续至今，其实施历程已跨越数十年。 ^(6){ }^{6} 后殖民时期，现代土地开垦计划的演进可分为四个阶段：开拓阶段（1952-1959）、投资阶段（1960-1968）、重新评估阶段（1969-1978）以及私有化阶段（1979-1996）。
The first phase (1952-1959) saw the implementation of major pilot projects aiming to expand agricultural land and create a new rural social order. In April 1953, a state-controlled project called Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir started in Tahrir Province. Located on parts of the Western Desert, the project was supported by the government through financing, organizational direction, and technical cadres. ^(7){ }^{7} The area was close to Cairo, with access to an aquifer and water from the Nile. The goal was to reclaim 1.2 million feddans and build eleven new villages. Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir followed socialist guidelines loosely based on Soviet models, 第一阶段（1952-1959 年）实施了旨在扩大耕地面积、建立新型农村社会秩序的重大试点项目。1953 年 4 月，由国家主导的"解放省管理局"项目在解放省启动。该项目位于西部沙漠部分地区，政府通过资金支持、组织指导和技术骨干提供保障。 ^(7){ }^{7} 该区域毗邻开罗，可利用尼罗河水源及地下含水层。项目目标是开垦 120 万费丹土地，并新建 11 个村庄。解放省管理局遵循基于苏联模式松散制定的社会主义指导方针，
including limited land ownership, communal living, and programs for training, education, and desert adaptation. ^(8){ }^{8} The land was collectively cultivated and exploited using mechanized technologies. Financing came from the sale of royal properties, production profits, and Soviet funding. Considered extremely successful, Mudiriyyat al-Tahrir was later developed into a large-scale facility producing fruit for export. Scholars argue that it was the model for Mubarakera projects like Toshka. ^(9){ }^{9} Abis, a project of smaller scope, was launched in May 1953 in a marshy area close to Alexandria as part of the collaborative program called the “Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Services Project” (EARIS). On the swamps around Lake Mariut, workers built dykes, pumped and drained surface water, and dug and leveled canals. ^(10){ }^{10} The 37,000 feddans that were reclaimed as a result (in Abis, Kom Oshim, and Quta) went to landless farmers. EARIS was joint-funded by Egypt and the United States (with fifteen million and ten million US dollars, respectively), the latter of which supplied direct technical assistance and a significant amount of surplus equipment. ^(11){ }^{11} The scheme had socioeconomic and urban components, with “each farmer… given five acres of land, a house and a cow.” ^(12){ }^{12} In 1958, Nasser also announced a “New Valley” project in the Western Desert. Described by sociologist Omnia El Shakry as reflecting a “pioneering ethic,” desert developments responded to the need for a substantial increase of available cultivated area that was triggered by Nasser’s policies of land redistribution to rural populations. ^(13){ }^{13} Such projects belonged to a socialwelfare framework that envisioned social engineering, agricultural productivity, and territorial growth as steps toward national modernization. Combining urbanization and the disciplining of rural populations in its schemes, these holistic approaches were paradigmatic of land reclamation projects under Nasser. The farming of “New Lands,” such as the Abis and Tahrir projects, included the creation of new urban centers that would accommodate local authorities, services, and housing for workers. A new narrative 包括限制土地所有权、集体生活以及培训、教育和沙漠适应计划。土地采用机械化技术进行集体耕种和开发，资金来源于王室财产出售、生产利润和苏联资助。穆迪里亚特·塔赫里尔项目被认为极其成功，后来发展成为大规模出口水果的生产基地。学者认为这是托什卡等穆巴拉克时代项目的典范。规模较小的阿比斯项目于 1953 年 5 月在亚历山大附近沼泽区启动，属于"埃及-美国农村改善服务计划"（EARIS）合作项目的一部分。工人们在马里乌特湖周围沼泽修建堤坝、抽排地表水，并开挖平整运河。最终开垦的 37,000 费丹土地（位于阿比斯、科姆奥希姆和库塔地区）分配给了无地农民。该项目由埃及和美国联合资助（分别出资 1500 万和 1000 万美元），美方还提供了直接技术援助和大量剩余设备。 ^(11){ }^{11} 该计划包含社会经济与城市发展双重维度，"每位农民...将分得五英亩土地、一套住房和一头奶牛"。 ^(12){ }^{12} 1958 年，纳赛尔还宣布在西沙漠实施"新河谷"工程。社会学家奥姆尼亚·埃尔·沙克里指出，这些沙漠开发项目体现了"拓荒精神"，其动因源于纳赛尔推行土地再分配政策后农村人口激增，亟需大幅扩展可耕作面积。 ^(13){ }^{13} 此类工程被纳入社会福利框架，将社会工程改造、农业生产率提升与疆域扩张视为国家现代化进程的重要阶梯。这些整体性方案将城市化建设与农村人口规训相结合，成为纳赛尔时期土地开垦项目的典范。"新土地"耕作计划（如阿比斯与解放工程）包含建设新型城市中心，用以安置地方政府机构、配套服务设施及工人住宅区。由此构建的新叙事
emerged. Agricultural activities on desert land were posited as the solution to Egypt’s rapidly expanding population, providing employment and physical space, becoming overall “an economic investment … a social endeavor and a political imperative.” ^(14){ }^{14} 沙漠中涌现出农业活动，被视为解决埃及人口激增问题的方案——既能提供就业机会和生存空间，本质上更是"一项经济投资...社会工程与政治要务"的复合体。 ^(14){ }^{14}
The second phase was one of rapid investment, which mainly corresponded to the first and second Five-Year Plans of 1960-1965 and 1965-1970. Formulated by the General Authority for Desert Development (GADD) and the Land Reclamation Authority, the first Five-YearPlan aimed to reclaim 521,000 feddans in the Delta (in Northern Tahrir) through irrigation with Nile water and another 300,000 feddans using underground and High Dam reservoir water. With the dam, the government had in fact begun to promote and fund large-scale, state-run projects, such as state-owned farms. However, by the end of the period, less than half of the total reclaimed land was under cultivation. The second FiveYear Plan aimed for one million feddans, and involved foreign firms. The plan was drawn up by the Egyptian Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Land (EAUDRL), a sub-unit of the Ministry of Land Reclamation. Only about 169,000 feddans were reclaimed before the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, causing economic turmoil and restricting further expansion. The only major project undertaken after the war was Noubariya (an extension of South Tahrir and North Tahrir), which was located west of the Delta and was a mechanized farm supported by the Soviet Union’s money and expertise. While land reclamation in the previous era had served a distributional agenda of providing farms for the landless, the program now took a noticeable turn towards higher agricultural production, national income, government revenue, and foreign-exchange targets. 第二阶段是快速投资期，主要对应 1960-1965 年和 1965-1970 年的第一、第二个五年计划。由沙漠开发总署（GADD）和土地开垦局制定的首个五年计划，旨在通过尼罗河灌溉开垦三角洲地区（北塔赫里尔）52.1 万费丹土地，并利用地下水和高坝水库水源再开发 30 万费丹。随着大坝建成，政府开始推动并资助大型国营项目，如国营农场。但到期末，实际耕作面积不足总开垦土地的一半。第二个五年计划目标为 100 万费丹，并引入外资企业参与，由土地开垦部下设的埃及土地开发利用局（EAUDRL）编制方案。1967 年六日战争爆发前仅开垦约 16.9 万费丹，战争引发的经济动荡阻碍了后续扩张。 战后实施的唯一重大项目是努巴里亚（南塔希尔和北塔希尔的延伸区），位于三角洲以西，是由苏联资金和技术支持的机械化农场。前一时期的土地开垦旨在为无地农民分配农场，具有分配性质，而此时的计划明显转向提高农业生产、国民收入、政府财政收入和外汇创收目标。
The third phase (1969-1978) coincided with a reassessment of land-reclamation programs, a decrease in their pace, and an overall shift in national politics toward a disengagement of the state. In 1969, Nasser began to recognize the relative failure of reclamation programs. The ensuing policy 第三阶段（1969-1978 年）恰逢土地开垦计划的重新评估、实施速度放缓，以及国家政治整体转向政府放权。1969 年，纳赛尔开始认识到开垦计划相对失败。随后的政策
adjustments promoted land privatization, mechanization for more intensive production, and the dismantling of state farms. After Nasser’s death in 1970, land was leased for a period of forty years to agricultural workers on state farms (five feddans), to young graduates (ten to twenty feddans), and to large private companies from both Egypt and abroad. With land reclamation proving expensive, barely productive, and lacking in economic returns, preference was given to projects set on improving productivity of existing reclaimed lands. To sum up, the model developed after Nasser was “simply expanding cultivation to larger tracts of land via capital intensive projects.” ^(15){ }^{15} Even though the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 allowed for a major increase in the water available for reclamation, the government suspended all reclamation projects in March 1972. Shifting to serve a more urban agenda, Anwar Sadat introduced his “New Map for Egypt” in 1974, calling for the creation of a “new population map of Egypt” based on an extensive new-town program and “desert invasion” (Ghazw al-Shara’). ^(16){ }^{16} The first desert city was built in 1977, followed by “a variety of new urban structures including satellite cities, new towns, and new settlements.” ^(17){ }^{17} In the decade following 1977, only 40,000 feddans were reclaimed. ^(18){ }^{18} In 1978, searching for alternative sites for development to redistribute the Egyptian population, Sadat said in an interview: “Why should we not emerge from this narrow valley to new horizons in the land where there is space and water?” ^(19){ }^{19} The creation of the “New Valley Governorate” in 1980 to oversee a vast, still sparsely populated region anticipated the upcoming desert development. This new impulse given to desert appropriation corresponded to adjustments in national ideology and political circumstances, and marked the fourth phase of land reclamation, which was one based on privatization (1980-1996). The United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund were supportive of Sadat’s liberalization agenda. Paradigmatic of this period, which sought a reactivation of large-scale American and international 政策调整推动了土地私有化、机械化以促进集约化生产，并解散了国营农场。1970 年纳赛尔去世后，土地以四十年租期分别租赁给国营农场农业工人（5 费丹）、青年毕业生（10 至 20 费丹）以及埃及国内外的私营大企业。由于土地开垦成本高昂、产出微薄且缺乏经济回报，政府优先考虑提高现有垦殖地生产力的项目。总而言之，纳赛尔之后的模式"仅仅是通过资本密集型项目将耕作扩展到更大面积的土地"。 ^(15){ }^{15} 尽管 1971 年阿斯旺高坝的建成大幅增加了可用于垦殖的水资源，政府仍在 1972 年 3 月暂停了所有垦殖项目。随着政策转向服务城市化议程，安瓦尔·萨达特于 1974 年提出"埃及新地图"计划，主张通过大规模新城建设计划和"沙漠入侵"(Ghazw al-Shara’)来创建"埃及新人口分布图"。 ^(16){ }^{16} 第一座沙漠城市建于 1977 年，随后涌现了"包括卫星城、新城镇和新定居点在内的多种新型城市结构"。 ^(17){ }^{17} 1977 年后的十年间，仅开垦了 4 万费丹土地。 ^(18){ }^{18} 1978 年，萨达特在寻找替代发展地点以重新分配埃及人口时接受采访时表示："我们为何不走出这条狭窄的河谷，去往拥有广阔空间和水源的新天地？" ^(19){ }^{19} 1980 年设立的"新河谷省"负责监管这片广袤但人口稀少的区域，预示着即将到来的沙漠开发。这种对沙漠开发的新动力与国家意识形态和政治环境的调整相呼应，标志着以私有化为基础的第四阶段土地开垦（1980-1996 年）。美国、世界银行和国际货币基金组织都支持萨达特的自由化议程。这一时期以重启大规模美资和国际投资为特征，
assistance, was the New Land Development Project, which was launched with World Bank funding in 1980. The project’s objective was to increase “agricultural production in order to reduce the dependence of Egypt on food imports, and to save foreign exchange.” ^(20){ }^{20} Against the backdrop of state land being sold to private investors for reclamation, Public Law 143/1981 was passed in 1981. The law stipulated that any unfarmed land outside of the zimam was to be classified as state-owned desert land, which was nevertheless available for purchase by individuals or firms. The law essentially removed the public sector’s legal monopoly on reclamation, opening the process to private, foreign companies. The government auctioned big tracts of landsometimes as large as 50 feddans-and created holding companies to take over management of existing sites, while incentivizing commercial ventures on reclaimed land. Whereas the Nasser regime had favored and protected farmers, establishing new rural communities around a network of cooperatives, the Sadat government took a different stand. Farming rents were revised upward, tenants’ tenure rights revoked, and rural-disputes committees dismantled, as “nearly anything can be justified in terms of ‘food security,’ and increased production.” ^(21){ }^{21} This reversal was epitomized by the showcase farm of Salhia (Salhiya, Salihiya), 150,000 to-be-reclaimed feddans for export crops in the Eastern Desert near Ismailia. In 1980, while driving a US tractor on the green fields of Salhia, President Sadat proclaimed: “We have found the solution for food and housing.” ^(22){ }^{22} Running on central-pivot irrigation, the Salhia Agricultural Project was built and developed by the firm Arab Contractors. Despite being a private joint venture where forty percent of the farm shares were owned by foreign investors (PepsiCo, the International Swedish Marketing Group, Arizona Farmers, etc.), the company received substantial government subsidies. A World Bank report from 1983 praised the project as a great “combination of urban housing development and agricultural 《开罗沙漠城市》中提及，1980 年世界银行资助启动的"新土地开发计划"旨在"提高农业产量以减少埃及对粮食进口的依赖，并节省外汇储备"。 ^(20){ }^{20} 在此背景下，1981 年颁布的第 143 号公法规定：任何未纳入耕作体系的闲置土地均被划归为国有荒漠用地，但允许个人或企业购买。该法案实质上废除了公共部门对垦荒权的法律垄断，向私营外资企业开放了这一领域。政府通过拍卖大面积土地（有些地块达 50 费丹），并成立控股公司接管现有垦区的经营管理权，同时鼓励企业在改良土地上开展商业投资。与纳赛尔政权通过合作社网络建立新农村社区、优待保护农民的做法不同，萨达特政府采取了截然相反的立场。 农业租金被上调，佃农的租佃权被剥夺，农村纠纷委员会被解散，因为"几乎所有举措都能以'粮食安全'和提高产量为由合理化"。 ^(21){ }^{21} 这种政策转向的典型代表是萨利赫亚示范农场——位于伊斯梅利亚附近东部沙漠、计划开垦 15 万费丹土地用于出口作物种植。1980 年，萨达特总统驾驶美国拖拉机驶过萨利赫亚的绿色田野时宣称："我们已找到解决粮食和住房问题的方案。" ^(22){ }^{22} 采用中心支轴灌溉系统的萨利赫亚农业项目由阿拉伯承包商公司承建开发。尽管这是外资（百事公司、瑞典国际营销集团、亚利桑那农场等）持股达 40%的私营合资项目，但仍获得大量政府补贴。1983 年世界银行报告称赞该项目完美"融合了城市住房开发与农业"。
development.” The institution advised that “New Lands development must also consider urban development” to stem the increasing pressure of population on land. ^(23){ }^{23} The report also stated that improvement of agricultural production on “Old Lands” needed to be considered, while being less enthusiastic about the future of reclaimed “New Lands.” Because of low water availability, it capped the development rate at about 100,000 families on 500,000 feddans (assuming five feddans per family) as a nation-wide, long-term target. It also claimed that agricultural settlements on reclaimed lands ought to be combined with non-agricultural settlements to yield any success. Furthermore, the Bank warned against the “great danger of squandering” resources by channeling existing water supplies into unproductive, water-intensive, and politically motivated undertakings. ^(24){ }^{24}. Bank experts concluded that the expansion of existing urban centers would be less costly than developing new towns in the desert, but still argued for new urban communities on unused “New Lands” next to Egyptian cities. Both pieces of advice, namely the promotion of agricultural and urban projects as well as the urbanization of “New Lands,” were consistent with Sadat’s land policies. Take New Salhia, for instance: created by presidential decree in 1982, it was a large urban center built next to the existing and dilapidated city of Salhia and belonged to the first generation of Sadat’s New Cities program. Based on modernist planning guidelines, with a population target of 80,000 inhabitants, New Salhia is now home to 40,000 inhabitants distributed over 5,500 housing units. The city, like New Damietta (1980) and New Noubariya City (1987), was classified as a “special nature” community, because of its agricultural functions. 发展。”该机构建议，“新土地开发必须同时考虑城市发展”，以缓解人口增长对土地造成的日益加剧的压力。 ^(23){ }^{23} 报告还指出，需要提升“旧土地”的农业生产效率，但对开垦“新土地”的前景持保留态度。由于水资源匮乏，报告将全国长期发展目标设定为：在 50 万费丹土地上（按每户 5 费丹计算）安置约 10 万户家庭。同时强调，开垦区的农业定居点必须与非农业定居点相结合才能取得成功。此外，世界银行警告称，若将现有水资源调配至低效益、高耗水且受政治动机驱动的项目，将面临“资源严重浪费的巨大风险”。 ^(24){ }^{24} 世行专家最终认定，扩建现有城市中心比在沙漠中建设新城成本更低，但仍主张在埃及城市周边未开发的“新土地”上建设新型城市社区。 这两项建议——即推动农业与城市项目以及"新土地"的城市化进程——都与萨达特的土地政策相契合。以新萨利希亚为例：这座根据 1982 年总统令建立的大型城市中心，毗邻破败的旧萨利希亚城，属于萨达特"新城市计划"的第一代项目。按照现代主义规划准则设计，目标人口 8 万的新萨利希亚，如今分布着 5500 套住房，居住着 4 万居民。与 1980 年建立的新杜姆亚特、1987 年建立的新努巴里亚城一样，该城因其农业功能被列为"特殊性质"社区。
Although hailed as a model farm, Salhia was plagued by enormous financial losses and technical failures. ^(25){ }^{25} Indebted, the farm was privatized and restructured into a joint-venture agricultural company in 1992 (the New Salhiya Investment and Development Company), which is now owned by a consortium of banks and the 尽管被誉为模范农场，萨利希亚却长期遭受巨额亏损与技术故障的困扰。 ^(25){ }^{25} 由于负债累累，该农场于 1992 年私有化并重组为合资农业企业（新萨利希亚投资开发公司），目前由银行财团与
Arab Contractors company. As of 2016, only 36 out of 112 central water pivots were still functioning. ^(26){ }^{26} From 1982 onwards, reclamation efforts focused on sandy desert soils (west of the Delta, in the Sinai, and in Upper Egypt, parallel to the Nile Valley). In 1983, a third Five-Year Plan stipulated the reclamation of 500,000 feddans by 1987. 阿拉伯承包商公司。截至 2016 年，112 个中央喷灌枢纽中仅有 36 个仍在运转。 ^(26){ }^{26} 自 1982 年起，垦荒工程重点转向沙质荒漠土壤（三角洲西部、西奈半岛及上埃及尼罗河谷平行地带）。1983 年出台的第三个五年计划规定，到 1987 年需完成 50 万费丹土地的改良任务。
Encouraging the private and cooperative sectors’ participation in the reclamation programs, the government managed to create about 132,000 feddans for the public sector and 58,000 for private companies. After Sadat, President Mubarak pursued similar liberal reclamation policies. Agricultural strategies still envisioned increased agricultural productivity, aiming to diminish the country’s reliance on imported food, particularly wheat, and reduce population density in the Nile Valley and Delta. In 1986, a study for a master plan for land use was undertaken to identify areas most appropriate for expanding irrigation. ^(27){ }^{27} The resultant Land Master Plan was an essential document that went on to determine years of land-reclamation projects. The plan involved the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Dutch-Egyptian company EuroconsultPACER Consultants. The General Authority for Rehabilitation Projects and Agricultural Development (GARPAD) supervised the survey, which was based on the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) High Dam soil survey, satellite data, and other soil studies and was done at scales of 1:250,0001: 250,000 and 1:50,000.^(28)1: 50,000 .{ }^{28} According to the plan, 2.88 million feddans appeared suitable for development using Nile water and canal water pumps. ^(29){ }^{29} 政府鼓励私营和合作社部门参与垦荒计划，成功为公共部门开垦约 13.2 万费丹土地，为私营企业开垦 5.8 万费丹。萨达特之后，穆巴拉克总统延续了类似的自由化垦荒政策。农业战略仍着眼于提高农业生产力，旨在减少国家对进口食品（尤其是小麦）的依赖，并降低尼罗河谷及三角洲地区的人口密度。1986 年，政府启动土地利用总体规划研究，以确定最适合扩大灌溉的区域。 ^(27){ }^{27} 最终形成的《土地总体规划》成为此后多年土地开垦项目的指导性文件。该规划由埃及农业与土地开垦部（MALR）、荷兰外交部以及荷兰-埃及合资企业 EuroconsultPACER 咨询公司共同参与制定。 由重建项目与农业发展总局（GARPAD）主导的此次勘测，以联合国粮农组织（FAO）的高坝土壤调查为基础，结合卫星数据及其他土壤研究，分别采用 1:250,0001: 250,000 和 1:50,000.^(28)1: 50,000 .{ }^{28} 比例尺进行。规划显示，288 万费丹土地适合通过尼罗河水与运河水泵进行开发。 ^(29){ }^{29}
In 1987, the Graduates Project, or Mubarak Project (also known as the “Mubarak Project for Developing and Serving the Land Allocated to Young Graduates,” Qura al-Kharigeen), was initiated. Unemployed high school and college graduates, as well as other social beneficiaries, received plots of “New Lands” with an area of five feddans. GARPAD offered graduates a first leaching of the soil, a house, 1987 年启动了毕业生项目（又称穆巴拉克项目，全称为"青年毕业生土地开发与服务穆巴拉克项目"，即 Qura al-Kharigeen）。该项目为失业的高中及大学毕业生和其他社会受益者分配了五费丹面积的"新土地"。重建项目与农业发展总局为毕业生提供了土壤首次淋洗、房屋、
and a monthly salary of fifty Egyptian pounds for a period of four years. At the same time, the fourth Five-Year Plan (1988-1992) pursued an ambitious reclamation target of 750,000 feddans, or 150,000 per year. However, as neither the government nor international donors could deliver the necessary funds, the private sector was encouraged to engage in reclamation, with the state providing the necessary infrastructure. This was a critical moment in the early 1990s: when the Mubarak regime, upon realizing that land-reclamation projects were a budgetary strain, handed over desert development to private companies. Following this trend, a fifth Five-Year Plan (1993-1997) aimed at creating 572,000 以及为期四年、每月五十埃及镑的薪资待遇。与此同时，第四个五年计划（1988-1992 年）制定了开垦 75 万费丹（年均 15 万费丹）的宏伟目标。但由于政府和国际捐助方均无法提供充足资金，政府开始鼓励私营部门参与垦荒，由国家负责配套基础设施建设。1990 年代初这一关键转折点上，穆巴拉克政权意识到土地开垦项目已成为财政负担，遂将沙漠开发权移交私营企业。在此趋势下，第五个五年计划（1993-1997 年）拟开垦 57.2 万费丹土地——考虑到实际完成 46.99 万费丹的成果，该目标已基本达成。私营企业为其中半数区域的基础设施建设提供资金，参与度持续提升。此外，垦荒项目私有化也标志着农业生产重心从粮食作物转向经济作物（如园艺产品和棉花）出口。
feddans-a target almost reached considering that 469,900 feddans were reclaimed. Privatesector involvement grew as companies financed infrastructure development in half of these areas. Additionally, the transfer of reclamation projects to the private sector signaled a shift from food-crop production to cultivation of agricultural exports (such as horticultural commodities and cotton). 费丹——考虑到实际开垦面积达 46.99 万费丹，该目标已接近完成。私营企业通过为半数垦区提供基础设施建设资金，参与程度不断提高。这种经营权转移还标志着农业生产模式的根本转变：从粮食种植转向经济作物（如园艺产品与棉花）的出口导向型栽培。
The privatization of the Egyptian economy, various policies, and market reforms of the agricultural sector put in place under Mubarak have been detrimental to both national food security and agricultural labor forces. Law 96/1992, which reversed the tenancy guarantees of Nasser’s Agrarian Reform Act of 1952, epitomized this struggle, as has been outlined by Ray Bush. ^(30){ }^{30} Four decades of land reclamation projects offer proof of how ideologies concerning sociospatial organization evolved-from programs promoting rural villages based on semisocialist utopias to practices of neoliberal urban development benefiting governmental elites. 穆巴拉克时期推行的埃及经济私有化、各项政策及农业部门的市场改革，既损害了国家粮食安全，也伤害了农业劳动力群体。雷·布什指出，1992 年第 96 号法令废除了纳赛尔 1952 年《土地改革法案》中的佃农保障条款，集中体现了这场变革的冲突本质。 ^(30){ }^{30} 四十年的土地开垦项目见证了社会空间组织理念的演变轨迹——从建设半社会主义乌托邦式乡村的计划，逐步转向为政府精英服务的新自由主义城市发展实践。
The current phase in land reclamation follows the Egypt 2017 Urban Development Plan, a twenty-year strategy (1997-2017) for urbanization and land reclamation launched in 1996 that claims to cope with rising population and improve food security. Merging schemes for both rural and urban areas, the plan builds upon existing agricultural and urban-development 当前阶段的土地开垦遵循《埃及 2017 城市发展规划》，这项 1996 年启动的二十年战略（1997-2017）宣称要应对人口增长并提升粮食安全。该规划整合了农村与城市地区的发展方案，建立在现有农业和城市发展基础之上
strategies, albeit at an unprecedented scale. 24.4 million people are to settle into the desert. Of these, 13.3 million inhabitants would move to forty-four new cities and the rest to land-reclamation projects on 4.3 million feddans. ^(31){ }^{31} Yet, in view of the current low occupancy rates in existing desert settlements, it is highly unlikely that these goals will be reached in the near future. The Egyptian proverb that goes “it is better to spend one year in the delta then one day in the desert” should serve as a cautionary tale to governments. 策略，尽管规模空前。2440 万人将迁居沙漠地带，其中 1330 万居民将入住 44 座新城，其余则前往 430 万费丹的土地复垦项目。 ^(31){ }^{31} 然而，鉴于现有沙漠定居点的低入住率，这些目标在短期内极难实现。埃及谚语"宁在三角洲住一年，不在沙漠待一日"应成为政府的警世之言。
1 Jeannie Sowers, “Remapping the Nation, Critiquing the State: Environmental Narratives and Desert Land Reclamation in Egypt,” in Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and Nerredrica, eds., Diana K. Davis and Edmund Burke 111 (Athens, OH : Ohio University Press, 2011), 167. 1 珍妮·索尔斯，《重绘国界，批判国家：埃及的环境叙事与沙漠土地复垦》，载《中东与北非的环境想象》，戴安娜·K·戴维斯与埃德蒙·伯克编（俄亥俄州雅典市：俄亥俄大学出版社，2011 年），第 167 页。
bypt, the terms “land reclamation” and brought und designates desert land Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 99. 埃及，"土地复垦"一词特指沙漠土地——罗伯特·马布罗，《埃及经济 1952-1972》（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1974 年），第 99 页。
4 The zimam is an abstract border between cultivation and desert, with lands cutwers and land inside the zimam taxed by centry or public land. Whe Egyptian Economy, 98. Ibid., 99. 4 "zimam"是耕地与沙漠之间的抽象边界，界外土地免税，界内土地需向中央或公共土地纳税。《埃及经济》，第 98 页。同上，第 99 页。
7 Sarah Voll, “Egyptian Land Reclamation since the Revolution,” The Middle East Journal 34, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 127-48. 7 萨拉·沃尔，《革命后埃及的土地开垦》，《中东期刊》第 34 卷第 2 期（1980 年春季刊）：127-48 页。
8 See: Reem Abou-El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt: connecting Donew York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group 2015) (1021) Abou-FI-Fall Revolut 8 参见：里姆·阿布-埃尔-法德尔，《革命埃及：连接》纽约：劳特利奇/泰勒与弗朗西斯集团 2015 年版（1021 页）阿布-法德尔革命
10 Tom Zalla, “Availabilithary Egypt, 107. Data for the New Lity and Quality of Agricultural Associates Inc Ministry of A (airo: Government of Egypt, / Unit Land Reclamation Develon for International 10 汤姆·扎拉，《革命埃及的可用性，107 页》农业协会可用性与质量数据（开罗：埃及政府/国际土地开垦发展部）
11 Development, 2000), 9. 11 开发署，2000 年，第 9 页。
The Science expanding the Nile’s Watershed: Egypt,” in Water on Sand: Emid Rectal Histories the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Alan Milhoil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 251-72. 《拓展尼罗河流域的科学：埃及》，收录于《沙上之水：中东与北非环境史》，艾伦·米尔霍伊尔编（纽约：牛津大学出版社 2012 年版），251-72 页。
12 Sardara Singh Johl, “Irrigation and Agricultural Development” (paper presented at the International Expert Consultation on Irrigation Agricultural Development, Baghdad, Iraq, 12 萨达拉·辛格·乔尔，《灌溉与农业发展》（发表于伊拉克巴格达国际灌溉农业发展专家咨询会的论文，
Sec. Onnia WI Shany, Cairo as Capital of Socialist CN21 Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized 《开罗沙漠城市》
第二节 温妮·沙尼，《作为社会主义 CN21 首都的开罗：新全球化时代的政治、文化与城市空间》
Middle East., ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 74. 中东地区，戴安·辛格曼与保罗·阿马尔编（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2006 年），第 74 页。
14 Sowers, “Remapping the Nation, Critiquing the State,” 159. 14 索尔斯，《重绘国家版图，批判国家政权》，第 159 页。
El Shakry, “Cairo as Capital of Socialist Revolution?,” 81. 埃尔·沙克里，《开罗作为社会主义革命之都？》，第 81 页。
16 See: Anwar Sadat, The October Working Paper, Presented by President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat, April, 1974 (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, State Information Service, 1974). 16 参见：安瓦尔·萨达特，《十月工作文件》，由总统穆罕默德·安瓦尔·萨达特提交，1974 年 4 月（开罗：阿拉伯埃及共和国，新闻部，国家信息服务处，1974 年）。
17 Dona J. Stewart, “Cities in the Desert: The Egyptian New-Town Program,” Annals of the Association 0/00). 462 (s thers 86, no. 3 (September the " 17 唐娜·J·斯图尔特，《沙漠中的城市：埃及新城计划》，《协会年鉴》第 86 卷第 3 期（9 月），第 462 页。
18 Sayedion Poly in Study of New Land Allocation Program, ed. Reforriculture Implementation Unit Ministry of Agriculture & Land Reclamation (n.p.: US Agency for International Development, Agriculture Policy Reform Program, Reform Design and Implementation Unit, 1999). 18 赛义迪翁·波利，《新土地分配计划研究》，农业与土地复垦部农业改革实施单位编（出版地不详：美国国际开发署农业政策改革项目组，改革设计与实施单位，1999 年）。
19 Sowers, “Remapping the Nation, Critiquing the State,” 167. 19 索尔斯，《重绘国家版图，批判国家政权》，第 167 页。
20 World Bank, Agricultural Operations Division, Report 10631, "Project Completion Report: New May 8, 1992, http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/686961468247225017/text/multi-page txt. 20 世界银行农业运营部，第 10631 号报告《项目完工报告：新土地》，1992 年 5 月 8 日，http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/686961468247225017/text/multi-page.txt。
21 John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, NJ: 22 Princeton University Press, 1983), 300. 21 约翰·沃特伯里，《纳赛尔与萨达特时代的埃及：两个政权的政治经济学》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1983 年），第 300 页。
for Egypt’s Political Soul (Cambridge, MA. Harvar University Press, 1990), 32. 《埃及政治灵魂之争》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1990 年），第 32 页。
23 World Bank, Europe Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, Report 4133-EGT, “Arab Republic of Egypt: Selected Issues in Agriculture, Irrigation and Land Reclamation,” May 20, 1983, 31. 23 世界银行，欧洲中东和北非地区办事处，报告 4133-EGT，《阿拉伯埃及共和国：农业、灌溉与土地开垦若干问题》，1983 年 5 月 20 日，第 31 页。
24 Ibid., 37. 24 同上，第 37 页。
25 Donna Robinson Divine, review of Directions of Change in Rural Egypt, eds., Nicholas S. Hopkins and Kirsten mestergard, Digest of tiddle East Studies 8, 1. 25 唐娜·罗宾逊·迪瓦恩，对《埃及农村变革方向》的书评，编者：尼古拉斯·S·霍普金斯与克尔斯滕·梅斯特加德，《中东研究文摘》第 8 卷第 1 期。
27 See: David E. Sims, Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster? (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2014). 27 参见：大卫·E·西姆斯，《埃及的沙漠梦想：发展还是灾难？》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2014 年）。
28 W. J. Dorman, “Exclusion and Informality: The Praetorian Politics of Land Management in Cairo, Egypt,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37, no. 5 (September 2013): 1584-610. 28 W·J·多尔曼，《排斥与非正规性：埃及开罗土地管理的禁卫军政治》，《国际城市与区域研究杂志》第 37 卷第 5 期（2013 年 9 月）：1584-1610 页。
29 Zalla, Agricultural Data for the New Lands in Egypt. 29 扎拉，《埃及新垦区农业数据》
30 Ray Bush, Poltics, ower and overty: Twenty Years of Agricultural Reform and Market no. 8 (2007): 1599-615. 30 雷·布什，《政治、权力与贫困：二十年农业改革与市场》第 8 期（2007 年）：1599-1615 页
31 Yahia Shawkat and MennatuAllah Hendawy, “Myths and Facts of Urban Planning in Egypt,” Built Environment Observatory, November 20, 2016, http://marsadomran.info/en/policy_analysis/urbanen/2016/11/501/. 31 叶海亚·肖卡特与门纳图拉·亨达维，《埃及城市规划的迷思与现实》，建成环境观察站，2016 年 11 月 20 日，http://marsadomran.info/en/policy_analysis/urbanen/2016/11/501/
MARC ANGÉLIL, CARY SIRESS 马克·安杰利尔，卡里·西雷斯
In 1978, President Anwar Sadat announced his ambition to provide “food for every mouth and a house for every citizen.” This foregrounded two chronic problems plaguing Egypt at the time, namely insufficient provisions for sustenance and shelter. ^(1){ }^{1} The National Democratic Party (NDP), which was founded in same year, would supposedly resolve both in one move. The creation of this new party was a response to the 1977 bread riots, which had weakened the state’s position. In this regard, Sadat’s promise to feed and house the masses had an understandable sense of urgency; it was an act of political survival, one made to redeem his political power and strengthen that of the ruling class. The pledge proved so successful in subduing angry crowds that it was adopted as the NDP’s motto, augmented with the promise to deliver “prosperity for all.” ^(2){ }^{2} 1978 年，总统安瓦尔·萨达特宣布其雄心壮志——要让"人人有饭吃，户户有房住"。这直指当时困扰埃及的两大痼疾：粮食短缺与住房不足。同年成立的民族民主党（NDP）宣称要一举解决这两个问题。该党的创立是对 1977 年面包暴动的回应，那场骚乱曾动摇国家政权。就此而言，萨达特关于温饱与住房的承诺带着迫切的现实考量；这是维系政治生存的手段，旨在重振其个人权力并巩固统治阶级地位。这项承诺在平息民众怒火上成效显著，甚至被采纳为民族民主党的口号，并追加了"全民繁荣"的新诺言。
While evocative of the previous period of Nasserite socialism, Sadat’s slogan had a capitalist leaning insofar as it was part of a plan to inaugurate a shift away from a socialist planned economy and align the country with Western interests. This particular alliance of political and economic agendas was the cornerstone of his infitah policy, which literally meant the “opening up” of the nation “to freer trade, foreign investments, and market economics.” ^(3){ }^{3} Recall that in the context of Arab-Israeli tensions during that period, Egypt would become a key United States ally-a partnership viewed as mutually beneficial, in that peace was to be restored in the region in return for funds to purchase, among other commodities, American grain. 虽然萨达特的口号令人联想到纳赛尔社会主义的前一个时期，但其资本主义倾向显而易见——它作为一项计划的一部分，旨在启动从社会主义计划经济转型，使国家与西方利益结盟。这种政治与经济议程的特殊结合，构成了其开放政策的基石，该政策字面意思是"向更自由的贸易、外国投资和市场经济开放国家"。 ^(3){ }^{3} 需知在当时阿以冲突的背景下，埃及将成为美国的关键盟友——这种伙伴关系被视为互惠互利，因为该地区将恢复和平，作为回报埃及将获得资金用于购买包括美国谷物在内的各类商品。
At face value, infitah seemed benevolent as a policy shift, pointing to an imminent win-win situation for all parties involved. The policy did indeed open up a flow of money, which in turn invigorated Egypt’s floundering economy. But the plan was inherently flawed. Whereas the declared intention was to install a free market for a 表面看来，开放政策作为一项转型政策似乎充满善意，预示着所有相关方即将迎来双赢局面。该政策确实开启了资金流动，进而振兴了埃及举步维艰的经济。但该计划存在根本性缺陷。虽然公开宣称的意图是要建立一个服务于
free society, infitah in fact launched an experiment to reengineer the entire system of the country by diverting investments from the public to the private sector, a process that was in turn intended to rid the nation of what was seen as an inefficient, overly bureaucratic, and wasteful public apparatus inherited from a bygone era. The newfound emphasis on private investment turned Egypt into a veritable laboratory for testing a neoliberal economy avant la lettre. With the cards reshuffled, a new elite emerged, and along with it, strict loyalty to the ruling party. “The streets were filled with candy and chocolate,” with so many new luxuries for the nouveau riche who profited from infitah. ^(4){ }^{4} While promised as a reward for the people, “prosperity for all” in truth meant prosperity for a select minority. With the “opening,” the domestic market was flooded with imported goods that competed with locally crafted items, in the process stifling national industries, eliminating entire artisanal sectors, and putting multitudes out of work. A state visit by Sadat to Washington, D.C. in the mid-1970s only added insult to injury: he was said to have prefaced his announcement of infitah to US leaders with the Egyptian proverb “if you want success, give bread to the baker,” most likely implying in this context that the proverbial “baker” was the private sector and the “bread,” American foreign investment. Despite the cost to his people, Sadat was utterly convinced that Egypt had to be brought into the political and economic sphere of the United States in order to move forward on the capitalist path of development. 自由社会，实际上"开放政策"启动了一场重塑国家整个体系的实验——通过将投资从公共部门转向私营领域。这一进程旨在摆脱那个被视作低效、过度官僚且浪费的旧时代遗留的公共机构。对私人投资的新重视使埃及成为了新自由主义经济的试验场，可谓名副其实。随着权力洗牌，一个新精英阶层崛起，随之而来的是对执政党的绝对忠诚。"街道上到处都是糖果和巧克力"，那些从开放政策中获利的新贵们享受着如此多的新奢侈品。 ^(4){ }^{4} 虽然承诺作为对人民的回报，但"全民繁荣"实际上只意味着少数人的繁荣。随着"开放"，国内市场充斥着与本土手工制品竞争的进口商品，这一过程扼杀了民族工业，摧毁了整个手工业领域，并使大量人口失业。 萨达特在 20 世纪 70 年代中期对华盛顿特区的国事访问更是雪上加霜：据称他在向美国领导人宣布经济开放政策时，引用了埃及谚语"欲成其事，先予面包于面包师"作为开场白——在这个语境下，谚语中的"面包师"很可能暗指私营部门，而"面包"则象征美国的外来投资。尽管民众为此付出代价，萨达特仍坚信埃及必须融入美国的政治经济势力范围，才能沿着资本主义发展道路前进。
Infitah brought with it not only an increase of urban poverty throughout the nation, but also the outright dispossession of the rural peasantry. Sadat’s campaign to bring capitalism to Egypt overturned a long-established ban on foreign land ownership and, by weakening the power base of existing farm cooperatives, cleared the 经济开放政策不仅导致全国城市贫困加剧，更使农村农民彻底丧失土地所有权。萨达特推行的埃及资本主义化运动，不仅废除了长期存在的外国人土地所有权禁令，还通过削弱现有农业合作社的权力基础，为
way for the large-scale commercialization of agriculture. Such measures opened up land to corporate interests and worked to “de-socialize” territory, dismantling basic institutions put in place earlier under President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s socialist vision for the countryside. The country began to undergo a fundamental shift that would forever alter the already tenuous relationship between the urban and rural domains. 为农业大规模商业化铺平了道路。这些措施向企业利益集团开放土地，并致力于"去社会化"领土，瓦解了早前在贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔总统社会主义乡村愿景下建立的基本制度。埃及开始经历一场根本性转变，这将永远改变城市与乡村之间本就脆弱的关系。
The economic infitah was thus coupled with a territorial infitah involving not only the reorganization of space, but also the redistribution of populations within it. A migration of people was set in motion: displaced farmers began to leave their land for urban centers in ever-larger numbers, facing no other choice than to seek work there and become consumers of food commodities rather than producers of basic food staples. In response to the emerging problem of overcrowded cities, Sadat laid the groundwork for constructing new desert cities on the outskirts of the capital. The opportunity to build on virgin ground aroused much excitement, especially within the community of planners and investors, since a new and improved Egypt could now be built from scratch—uncrowded, organized, and finally modern. But most importantly, there would be no new construction on agricultural land, as was increasingly the case due to mass migration to the capital. The grand vision of cities in the desert, one that foresaw more than a dozen new urban nodes around Cairo alone, called for a massive spatial decentralization by which flows of people and goods would be redistributed outward rather than inward toward the core: an exodus, of sorts, of a cheap labor force that would be housed in subsidized tenements and employed in new factories in satellite cities. ^(5){ }^{5} The key point was that these new, formalized workers’ settlements on uninhabited, gov-ernment-owned territory were to generate revenue for the state, and by extension, for the business enterprises of the military. 经济开放政策随之带来了领土开放，这不仅涉及空间重组，更意味着人口在其中的重新分布。一场人口迁徙就此展开：失去土地的农民开始大规模离开农田涌向城市中心，除了在那里寻找工作、从基本粮食生产者转变为食品商品消费者外别无选择。面对日益严重的城市拥挤问题，萨达特为在首都郊区建设新沙漠城市奠定了基础。在处女地上进行建设的机会激起了极大热情，尤其在规划者和投资者群体中——因为一个崭新、改良且最终现代化的埃及如今可以从零开始建造：不再拥挤、井然有序。但最重要的是，这将避免在农业用地上进行新建设，而随着人口大规模迁往首都，这种情况正日益增多。 在沙漠中建造城市的宏伟愿景，仅开罗周边就规划了十余个新城区节点，旨在通过大规模空间分散化，将人流物流从核心区向外围重新分配：某种形式的廉价劳动力外迁——这些工人将住进政府补贴的廉租房，在卫星城的新工厂就业。 ^(5){ }^{5} 关键在于，这些在政府所有的无人区新建的正规工人定居点，将为国家创收，进而为军方商业企业带来收益。
Though the process was slow to be implemented under Sadat, the seed was nonetheless planted for what would become a conquest of the barren periphery of 尽管萨达特执政时期实施进程缓慢，但征服贫瘠边缘地带的种子已然播下
Cairo. But only with the next regime would capital truly begin to flow into the desert, albeit with the influx of an affluent class. President Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-year rule beginning in 1981 raised the workings of Egypt’s market liberalization to a new level. The amplified scope of infitah would come to reconfigure not just the nation’s economy, but also the manner in which the politics of space would be addressed in the coming decades. 开罗。但直到下个政权时期，资本才真正开始涌入沙漠地带，尽管伴随着富裕阶层的涌入。1981 年开始的胡斯尼·穆巴拉克总统三十年执政期，将埃及的市场自由化运作提升至新高度。不断扩大的开放政策不仅重塑了国家经济格局，更深刻影响了未来数十年间空间政治的处理方式。
The state worked in collusion with big business under Mubarak, with the situation eventually burgeoning into a turbocharged version of a public-private partnership. Members of the cabinet, the parliament, the military, and the party were given preferential treatment when allocating resources and awarding contracts. Under the aegis of crony capitalism, land was served up in a clever scheme of concessions and fiscal exemptions, with prime property often sold below market value and offered as a tax haven to NDP loyalists. Veiled by a series of laws facilitating transactions, many of which involved foreign corporations, corruption was at the heart of the metropolitanization of Cairo’s outskirts. The desert became the new speculative frontier, triggering a real estate bonanza and earning fortunes for those in power. To get a sense of the scale of the operation, by the early 1990s the property market grew to replace “agriculture as the country’s fourth-largest investment sector after oil, manufacturing, and tourism.” ^(6){ }^{6} Large swaths of the desert were fast becoming a commodity in the real estate sector. And with this would come the ubiquitous malls, McDonalds, manicured golf courses, country clubs, gated communities, and the like that accompany car-driven urbanization à l’américaine, as if dropped into the desert from another world. These would merely be the accoutrements of a consumer “Eden” that in reality always requires the full gamut of infrastructure and attendant service industries, not to mention labor force, to keep the dream running. Of course, such development also requires a vast amount of resources, not least of which is water, which is only available in such amounts in this 穆巴拉克执政时期，政府与大企业相互勾结，最终将公私合作关系推向极致。内阁成员、议员、军方及党派人士在资源分配和合同授予中享有特权。在裙带资本主义的庇护下，土地通过精妙的特许经营与税收豁免方案被瓜分——优质地产常以低于市场价出售，成为民族民主党忠诚者的避税天堂。在一系列便利交易的法律掩护下（其中多涉及外资企业），腐败成为开罗郊区都市化的核心驱动力。沙漠化作新的投机前沿，引发房地产热潮，为当权者攫取巨额财富。若要理解这场运作的规模：截至 1990 年代初，房地产业已取代农业成为"继石油、制造业和旅游业之后埃及第四大投资领域"。广袤沙漠正迅速蜕变为房地产市场的交易商品。 随之而来的将是无处不在的购物中心、麦当劳、修剪整齐的高尔夫球场、乡村俱乐部、封闭式社区等美式汽车城市化产物，它们仿佛从另一个世界空降到这片沙漠。这些不过是消费主义"伊甸园"的装饰品，实际上始终需要全方位的基础设施和配套服务业——更不用说劳动力——来维持这个美梦运转。当然，这种发展模式还需要消耗大量资源，尤其是水资源，而在这个
context when diverted from agriculture. 语境下，如此规模的水资源只能从农业用水调拨而来。
A development project that epitomizes the kind of profiteering underway in the desert is the suburban enclave Palm Hills, which was initiated in the early 2000 s as part of the city of Sixth of October. Luxury villas surrounded by palm trees are clustered around a golf course offering stunning views of the Great Pyramids beyond. The Maghrabi and Mansour families, the majority shareholders of Palm Hills Developments (the company behind the venture), had direct ties to the ruling regime at the time, with family members having served in high posts in Mubarak’s cabinet. Having bought significant expanses of state-owned land at bargain rates since the mid-1990s, Palm Hills, with its links to financial institutions such as Deutsche Bank, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and Credit Suisse, had grown to become one of the largest land banks in Egypt, controlling an inventory of property holdings all over the country. ^(7){ }^{7} Just prior to the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, and no doubt due to mounting criticism directed at government leaders, questionable land transactions such as those benefitting Palm Hills Developments came under fire, prompting an Egyptian judicial panel to prosecute and subsequently arrest a number of its company executives. They were charged with squandering public funds by way of land purchases far below market value, a form of “land grabbing” that amounted to 46 million US dollars in lost revenue for the state. ^(8){ }^{8} But their internment would not last long, for a series of amendments to investment laws were passed under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi that would exonerate those charged with wrongdoing, thereby reinstating the pre-revolution status quo of “a business elite pampered by the government.” ^(9){ }^{9} 棕榈山郊区飞地开发项目堪称沙漠中牟利行为的典型代表。该项目于 21 世纪初作为十月六日城的一部分启动，豪华别墅群环绕棕榈树而建，簇拥着可远眺吉萨金字塔群的高尔夫球场。作为项目运营方棕榈山开发公司的大股东，马格拉比家族与曼苏尔家族与当时执政政权关系密切，其家族成员曾在穆巴拉克内阁担任要职。自 20 世纪 90 年代中期以来，该公司以低廉价格收购大量国有土地，并凭借与德意志银行、汇丰银行及瑞士信贷等金融机构的关联，逐步发展为埃及最大的土地储备商之一，掌控着遍布全国的房地产资产组合。 ^(7){ }^{7} 就在 2011 年阿拉伯之春起义前夕，由于针对政府领导人的批评日益加剧，类似棕榈山开发公司受益的可疑土地交易遭到猛烈抨击，促使埃及司法委员会起诉并逮捕了该公司多名高管。他们被指控以远低于市场价购地的方式挥霍公共资金，这种"土地掠夺"行为导致国家损失了 4600 万美元财政收入。 ^(8){ }^{8} 但这些人的监禁并未持续太久，在阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西总统任期内，一系列投资法修正案获得通过，使得那些被指控不当行为者获得免责，从而恢复了革命前"政府纵容商业精英"的现状。 ^(9){ }^{9}
But projects like Palm Hills are only the more recent outgrowth of a surge in development that gradually gained momentum in the succession from Sadat, to Mubarak, to el-Sisi. Within half a century, the physiognomy of Cairo underwent a drastic mutation with the emergence of a new ring of urbanization circumscribing 然而像棕榈山这样的项目，不过是自萨达特、穆巴拉克到塞西政权更迭过程中逐渐加速的开发热潮的最新产物。短短半个世纪内，随着新一圈城市化版图环绕开罗崛起，这座城市的肌理发生了剧烈变异。
the city, producing a belt of archipelagos scattered over the desert land on the fringes of the capital. The Greater Cairo periphery, as described by geographers Leïla Vignal and Eric Denis, has morphed over time into a metropolitan “zone, or rather a halo structured by poles and corridors” whose “circulation is organized in relation to the center, but its most intense exchanges are structured around flows that no longer pass by way of the center.” ^(10){ }^{10} This process of territorial hybridization began to engulf large parts of the Nile Valley, producing “a diffusion of urbanity over a vast area through the growth and interlinkages of agro-towns, urban villages, and new industrial towns,” resulting in a form of capital-driven spatial accumulation. ^(11){ }^{11} In place of simply more units of “urban space,” what is encountered here is a distended “space of urbanization,” a landscape made operational purposely for the circulation of resources at the service of amassing capital. The flow of people and goods within this system is aided by conduits of infrastructure like that of Cairo’s new ring road, which, while connecting different nodes of Greater Cairo, extends far beyond them to link up with other cities in both the Delta and Upper Egypt. Yet not all modes of transportation are formally organized. Other means include informally run microbuses and tuk-tuks imported from India, which provide affordable accessibility to and from working-class neighborhoods or informal settlements that have sprung up in the interstices of the urbanized belt. Consequently, the resulting spread of development is by no means homogeneous, given that it merges formal and informal-planned and unplanned-processes of urban production that defy cut-and-dry distinctions. 这座城市在首都边缘的荒漠地带形成了一片星罗棋布的群岛状地带。地理学家莱拉·维格纳尔和埃里克·丹尼斯所描述的大开罗外围，已逐渐演变为一个都市化的"区域，或者说由极点和廊道构成的光环"，其"交通组织仍与中心区相关联，但最密集的交流已围绕不再经由中心区的流动而构建"。 ^(10){ }^{10} 这种地域混合化的进程开始吞噬尼罗河谷的大片区域，通过农业城镇、都市化村庄和新工业城镇的发展与互联，实现了"城市化在广阔地域的扩散"，最终形成资本驱动的空间积累模式。 ^(11){ }^{11} 这里呈现的并非简单叠加的"城市空间"单元，而是一个膨胀的"城市化空间"——这片景观被刻意设计成服务于资本积累的资源流通体系。 在这个系统中，人员和货物的流动得益于开罗新环城公路等基础设施通道的辅助。这条环城公路不仅连接大开罗地区的各个节点，更延伸至远方，将三角洲地区和上埃及的其他城市串联起来。然而并非所有交通方式都经过正规组织。其他出行手段包括非正规运营的小巴和从印度引进的突突车，它们以低廉的价格连通工人阶级社区或城市化地带间隙自发形成的非正规聚居区。因此，这种发展蔓延绝非均质化的过程，它融合了正规与非正规、规划与非规划的城市生产机制，使得泾渭分明的划分难以成立。
But the territorial opening of Egypt under the iterations of infitah would extend much further than the metropolitan region of Cairo and the urbanized zones along the Nile. The amount of farmland was diminishing at an alarming rate as a result of informal encroachment on arable land; new territory for agriculture was needed. Mubarak’s effort to reclaim land for crop production at an industrial scale, for example, was directed 然而埃及在开放政策（infitah）迭代下的领土扩张，其范围远不止开罗大都会区及尼罗河沿岸的城镇化地带。由于对耕地的非正式侵占，农田面积正以惊人速度缩减，亟需开辟新的农业用地。例如穆巴拉克推动的工业化规模耕地复垦计划，其目标就指向
Fig. 1: The golf club of the Palm Hill residential development in Sixth of October, as promoted in the December 2010 Palm Hills Developments newsletter 图 1：2010 年 12 月 Palm Hills Developments 通讯中宣传的十月六日城棕榈山住宅区高尔夫俱乐部
Fig. 2: A rendering of the Nile Corniche as envisioned in the government-sponsored strategic plan “Cairo Vision 2050” 图 2：政府资助战略规划"开罗 2050 愿景"中构想的尼罗河滨水区效果图
even deeper into the desert with the Toshka development project. It was concocted to engineer a second Nile Valley that would eventually irrigate a huge portion of arid land and convert it into a fertile basin that would become one of the world’s largest single farms by 2020-a mega-project that could be considered Mubarak’s Aswan High Dam. Unable to convince financial institutions that this was at all feasible, the government was forced to seek supplemental funding. This was secured through a form of futures trading using land as collateral, whereby private-sector investors were offered prime acreage-although with a slew of hidden caveats that mired them in what was fast becoming a “white elephant” project. ^(12){ }^{12} With the venture on quasi-firm ground, work nevertheless began on the Mubarak Pumping Station as well as on an initial phase of Sheikh Zayed Canal, which was to span more than 300 kilometers. Many deals were made and funds concentrated in the hands of a few, with select construction companies prospering in the venture. In all, a sense of national bravado prevailed, with Egyptian television repeatedly broadcasting building crews and their heavy earthmovers toiling under the desert sun. The paradox here is that the buildup of this costly agro-industry, which could resolve the domestic grain shortage and feed a population if properly managed, was actually geared to generate fruit and vegetable exports primarily to Europe and the Gulf States. The income generated would flow to the financial elite at home and abroad. This monumental “public works” project, aiming to open Egypt to the global economy and make it a key player in the food order, was in the end nothing more than a grand trap, one wagered at the expense of the people and in contradiction to Sadat’s earlier vow of “prosperity for all.” But the grand vision never came to full fruition, given such setbacks as the overly salinized desert soil and its compacted clay substrate, as well as the brute reality of either too little money available from lenders-who themselves faced insolvency-or too much corruption built into the overall system. 托什卡开发项目将开垦范围延伸至沙漠更深处。该项目旨在打造第二条尼罗河谷，最终灌溉大片干旱土地，将其转变为肥沃的盆地，计划到 2020 年成为全球最大的单体农场之一——这项可与穆巴拉克时代的阿斯旺高坝比肩的超级工程。由于无法说服金融机构相信其可行性，政府被迫寻求补充资金。最终通过以土地为抵押的期货交易形式获得资金，向私营投资者出让优质地块——尽管附带大量隐性条款，使投资者深陷这个迅速沦为"华而不实"的项目中。 ^(12){ }^{12} 尽管基础尚不稳固，穆巴拉克抽水站和全长 300 多公里的谢赫扎耶德运河一期工程仍破土动工。众多交易促成资金集中于少数人手中，部分建筑公司从中牟取暴利。 总体而言，一种民族主义的豪情弥漫其间，埃及电视台不断播放建筑工队驾驶重型推土机在沙漠烈日下劳作的画面。讽刺的是，这项耗资巨大的农业工业化建设——若能妥善管理本可解决国内粮食短缺、养活人口——实际上却主要面向欧洲和海湾国家出口果蔬。产生的收益将流向国内外金融精英阶层。这项旨在使埃及融入全球经济、成为粮食秩序关键参与者的宏伟"公共工程"，最终不过是以人民利益为赌注的华丽陷阱，与萨达特早年"全民繁荣"的誓言背道而驰。但由于沙漠土壤过度盐碱化、黏土底层板结等障碍，以及残酷现实——贷款方自身面临破产导致资金严重短缺，或整个体系根深蒂固的腐败——这一宏大愿景从未完全实现。
The escalating spiral of ever-grander projects looked even further into the future with the Cairo 2050 master plan. The Mubarak administration, caught as it was in the centrifugal pull of vision upon vision to solve problem after problem, looked to other global city schemes such as Paris 2020, Abu Dhabi 2030, Singapore 2050, and London 2066 for a model of hyper-modernity to emulate. ^(13){ }^{13} This time, Mubarak did not turn to the desert, but rather back to the center of Cairo to deliver his dream of a sparkling new urban core with high-rise buildings, wide boulevards, and the latest in green technology and transportation infrastructure, all plugged into the Nile Corniche and setting the stage for another round of mega-development. Swaths of the urban population were to be relocated according to the plan, including many living in those informal settlements that happened to lie in the path of the venture, thereby threatening to set off yet another round of forced resettlement and signaling still more false pretenses of the government’s ostensible solidarity with the poor. What brought such monumental visions to a halt were the 2011 protests, which erupted due to deep-seated collective resentment at the gross inequities that had ensued for decades under authoritarian regimes in the region. And projects of the nature promoted by Mubarak were, for the people of Egypt, the all-too-blatant embodiment of unjust development. 随着《开罗 2050 总体规划》的出台，愈发宏大的项目螺旋式升级将目光投向更遥远的未来。穆巴拉克政府深陷于用愿景叠加来解决层出不穷问题的离心力中，转而从巴黎 2020、阿布扎比 2030、新加坡 2050 和伦敦 2066 等全球城市方案中寻求可效仿的超现代性模板。 ^(13){ }^{13} 这一次穆巴拉克并未转向沙漠，而是重回开罗市中心，试图实现其闪耀新都市核心的梦想——这里将矗立摩天大楼，拓展宽阔林荫道，应用最前沿的绿色科技与交通基础设施，所有规划都与尼罗河滨大道衔接，为新一轮超大规模开发铺路。根据该计划，大量城市居民面临搬迁，包括许多恰好位于项目路径上的非正规住区居民，这或将引发新一轮强制迁移潮，再次暴露政府表面声援贫民实则虚与委蛇的伪善面目。 2011 年的抗议活动使这些宏大的愿景戛然而止。这场爆发源于民众对专制政权统治下数十年来严重不平等现象的深恶痛绝。对埃及人民而言，穆巴拉克推动的这类项目正是不公正发展的赤裸体现。
The call for freedom and democracy during the Arab Spring was short-lived; the government under el-Sisi returned to status quo politics in Egypt, albeit with even more authority, force, and oppression. With customary rule reinstated, el-Sisi would pursue his own grands projets, with works of an even grander scope than those of his predecessors. Two of the most prominent of these were the expansion of the Suez Canal and the construction of a new capital city. Both projects were announced at the March 2015 Egypt Economic Development Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, in front of invited emirs, heads of state, leaders from international financial institutions, corporate executives, and hundreds of would-be 阿拉伯之春期间对自由民主的呼声转瞬即逝。塞西政府以更强大的权威、武力和压迫手段恢复了埃及的政治现状。随着常规统治的回归，塞西开始推行比前任们规模更为庞大的宏伟工程，其中最引人注目的两项是苏伊士运河扩建工程与新行政首都建设计划。这两个项目都在 2015 年 3 月沙姆沙伊赫埃及经济发展大会上，当着受邀的埃米尔们、国家元首、国际金融机构领导人、企业高管以及数百位潜在
investors. The event was meant to reassure the business community that the climate of political turmoil was a thing of the past. 投资者的面宣布。此次活动旨在向商界保证，政治动荡的时代已成为过去。
Fig. 3: Master-plan rendering for Egypt’s 图 3：埃及总体规划效果图
New Capital by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, released under the motto "celebrating the city’s economic engine at an investment conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, March 2015 由 Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 设计的新行政首都，2015 年 3 月在沙姆沙伊赫投资会议上以"庆祝城市经济引擎"为口号发布
The Suez Canal expansion project foresees, in addition to a refurbishment of the existing channel, a geographical makeover of the entire region, with a new network of highways and tunnels to service industrial and commercial economic zones to be built along an infrastructural corridor advertised as “Egypt’s gift to the world.” However it was the other posl for be capital to be built from scratch that gained the most media coverage-a project undoubtedly reminiscent of Sadat’s desert cities, but now brought to a higher level of grandeur. ^(14){ }^{14} The sheer scale of the plans, along with the projected cost of forty-five billion US dollars, certainly must have caught the attention of all in attendance, given that, if completed, the currently nameless city would add a territory as big as Singapore to the metropolitan footprint of Cairo-and all that was to be realized within less than a decade. Some say that Dubai was the true model for this venture, considering that early on it was to be bankrolled by the same Emirati royals behind the construction of the Burj Khalifa. This would explain why the Emirates’ ruler Sheikh Mohammed Al Maktoum was seated in the front row of the conference, as if placed there to witness firsthand the latest iteration of the 苏伊士运河扩建项目不仅规划对现有航道进行翻新，更将对整个区域实施地理重塑——沿这条被誉为"埃及献给世界的礼物"的基础设施走廊，将新建高速公路与隧道网络，为沿线工业及商业经济区提供服务。然而最受媒体瞩目的，却是另一座从零开始建造的行政首都计划，这个无疑令人联想到萨达特时代沙漠城市的项目，如今被提升到了更为宏大的层面。 ^(14){ }^{14} 鉴于这座尚未命名的新城若建成，将使开罗大都会区新增相当于新加坡国土面积的领土，且全部工程需在十年内完成，其庞大规划规模与四百五十亿美元的预算成本，必然引起了所有与会者的关注。考虑到该项目早期由建造哈利法塔的阿联酋王室注资，有人认为迪拜才是这个雄心计划的真正蓝本。 这或许解释了为何阿联酋统治者谢赫·穆罕默德·本·拉希德·阿勒马克图姆会坐在会议前排——仿佛特意安排他亲历这场已席卷海湾地区乃至更远地域的
“Dubai Effect” already sweeping across the Gulf and beyond. Yet, maybe the new city being planned is set to become more than just another Dubai or the capital of Egypt, ultimately becoming the capital of the Arab World. Be that as it may, this vision signals a new spatio-economic infitah that is being a new spation "o s " tis staged as the next opening of the country, marking its geopolitical arrival as a neoliberal state while predictably repressing in the process the commonplace ills still plaguing Egyptian society. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that if this project is realized, the downtrodden majority will most likely be left to struggle for subsistence amid the current congestion of Cairo, possibly turning it into an even bigger informal agglomeration, while the New Capital will no doubt remain reserved for the affluent class on Cairo’s new periphery. "迪拜效应"最新篇章。然而这座规划中的新城或许注定不止步于成为另一个迪拜或埃及新都，终将崛起为整个阿拉伯世界的首都。无论如何，这个愿景标志着一种新型空间经济开放政策正在上演，被塑造为国家的新一轮门户开放，既标志着埃及作为新自由主义国家的地缘政治崛起，又不可避免地在此过程中压制着仍困扰埃及社会的普遍顽疾。不难想象，若该项目落成，被压迫的多数人极可能被迫在开罗现有的拥挤环境中为生存挣扎，或许使其演变为更庞大的非正规聚居区，而这座新首都无疑将继续为开罗新边缘地带的富裕阶层所独占。
Caught in a vicious circle, Egypt seems to have had no option other than to dream up ever-bigger schemes to pay off ever-bigger foreign debts. What appears as a series of “openings” ushered in by infitahs has escalated into uncertain pacts that threaten the very future of a country and its people. With this unsettling prospect, Egypt may be in store for another opening: only this time from below, with public frustration again vented in a cascade of anger that spills out into paved and unpaved streets alike, in another revolution that might close down, once and for all, the apparatus of dispossession that continues to contort the nation. 埃及似乎陷入了一个恶性循环，除了构想越来越宏大的计划来偿还日益膨胀的外债外别无选择。这些看似由经济开放政策带来的一系列"开放"举措，已升级为威胁国家与人民未来的不确定性协议。面对这一令人不安的前景，埃及可能即将迎来另一场"开放"——只不过这次是自下而上的，公众的挫败感将再次通过喷涌而出的愤怒宣泄，席卷铺装与未铺装的街道，在另一场革命中或许能永久关闭那个仍在扭曲这个国家的剥夺机制。
1 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 126. 1 塔雷克·奥斯曼，《悬崖边的埃及：从纳赛尔到穆巴拉克》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，2010 年），第 126 页。
2 The full version of the party’s motto reads “food for every mouth, a house for every individual, and prosperity for all,” thereby upping the ante on Sadat’s promise to his people; for more on its historic context, see: Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Fircs and society, 1945-90 (London: Taylor & 3 Francis, 1991), 115. 2 该政党完整口号写道"人人有饭吃，个个有房住，全民享繁荣"，从而提高了萨达特对人民的承诺筹码；相关历史背景详见：德里克·霍普伍德，《埃及：国家与社会，1945-90 年》（伦敦：泰勒与弗朗西斯出版社，1991 年），第 115 页。
“The, Egypt on the Brink, 117. "《悬崖边的埃及》，第 117 页。
The Support for Radical Islam and Sadat’s Controversial Alliances,” Egypt’s Modern Pharaohs, episode 2, directed by Jihan El-Tahri, (London: BBC World, 2015). 《对激进伊斯兰的支持与萨达特的争议性联盟》，《埃及现代法老》第二集，导演：吉汉·埃尔-塔赫里，（伦敦：BBC 世界频道，2015 年）。
5 Dona J. Stewart, “Cities in the Desert: The Egyptian New-Town Program,” Annals of the 5 多娜·J·斯图尔特，《沙漠中的城市：埃及新城计划》，《美国地理学家协会年刊》
Association of American Geographers 86, no. 3 (September 1996): 462. 美国地理学家协会期刊 第 86 卷第 3 期（1996 年 9 月）：462 页
6 Julia Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 71. 6 朱莉娅·埃利亚查，《剥夺的市场：开罗的非政府组织、经济发展与国家》（北卡罗来纳州达勒姆：杜克大学出版社，2005 年），第 71 页
7 See: Yasseen Mansour (chairman and chief executive officer of Palm Hills Developments), Athmane Benzerroug (Deutsche Bank), Patrick Gaffney (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), and Mohamed Ashour (Nacem Brokerage), "Final Transcript: Palm Hills Development Discussion regarding Company telephone conference concerning the Palm Hills project, September 29, 2010. 7 参见：亚辛·曼苏尔（棕榈山开发公司董事长兼首席执行官）、阿特曼·本泽鲁格（德意志银行）、帕特里克·加夫尼（汇丰银行）和穆罕默德·阿舒尔（纳西姆经纪公司），"最终会议记录：关于棕榈山项目的公司电话会议讨论"，2010 年 9 月 29 日
8 Salma El-Wardani, “Egypt’s Mansour Brothers Debut on Forbes List, as One of Them Faces Profiteering Charges,” Ahram Online, March 10, 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/3/12/7402/Business/Economy/ Egypts-Mansour-brothers-debut-on-Forbes-list,-as-o.aspx. 8 萨尔玛·埃尔-瓦尔达尼，"埃及曼苏尔兄弟首次登上福布斯榜单，其中一人面临牟取暴利指控"，《金字塔报》在线版，2011 年 3 月 10 日，http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/7402/Business/Economy/Egypts-Mansour-brothers-debut-on-Forbes-list,-as-o.aspx
9 Dina Zayed and Ehab Farouk, “Egypt Legal Body Orders Palm Hills Deal Scrapped,” The Daily News Egypt, March 1, 2011. 9 迪娜·扎耶德与埃哈卜·法鲁克，《埃及法律机构勒令棕榈山项目交易作废》，《埃及每日新闻》，2011 年 3 月 1 日。
Leila Vignal and Eric Denis, "Cairo as Regional/ ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 127. 莱拉·维格纳尔与埃里克·丹尼斯，《开罗作为区域/编：黛安·辛格曼与保罗·阿马尔》（开罗：开罗美国大学出版社，2006 年），第 127 页。
11 Asef Bayat and Eric Denis, “Who is Afraid of Ashwaiyyat? Urban Change and Politics in Egypt,” Environment and Urbanization 12, no. 2 (October 2000): 195. 11 阿塞夫·巴亚特与埃里克·丹尼斯，《谁在畏惧棚户区？埃及的城市变迁与政治》，《环境与城市化》第 12 卷第 2 期（2000 年 10 月），第 195 页。
12 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 273-75. 12 蒂莫西·米切尔，《专家统治：埃及、技术政治与现代性》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，2002 年），第 273-75 页。
Nada Tarbush, “Cairo 2050: Urban Dream or Modernist Delusion?,” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2012): 172. atrick Pingsley, A New New Cairo: Egypt Plans £30£ 30 bn Purpose-Built Capital in Desert," The Guardian, March 16, 2015, https://www.theguardian. com/cites/2015/mat/1, capital-city-desert. 纳达·塔布什，《开罗 2050：都市梦想还是现代主义妄想？》，《国际事务期刊》第 65 卷第 2 期（2012 年春/夏季刊）：172 页。帕特里克·平斯利，《新新开罗：埃及计划耗资 450 亿在沙漠建造定制首都》，《卫报》2015 年 3 月 16 日，https://www.theguardian.com/cites/2015/mat/1, capital-city-desert.
A Necessity or Repeated History?
MIRETTE KHORSHED, LAWRENCE VALE, KHALED TARABIEH 必要之举还是历史重演？ | 米雷特·科尔谢德、劳伦斯·韦尔、哈立德·塔拉比赫
The idea of relocating a capital is nothing new. In fact, Egypt’s capital has been relocated numerous times, with the administrative capital of the nation situated at different locations throughout its history. With the earliest signs of human life along the Nile River dating as far back as 400,000 years ago, and the first remains of habitation going back almost 7,000 years, Egypt has a long history and context for today’s proposal. ^(1){ }^{1} 迁都构想并非新鲜事物。事实上，埃及首都曾历经多次迁移，在其历史长河中，国家行政中心曾坐落于不同地域。尼罗河沿岸最早的人类活动痕迹可追溯至 40 万年前，而首批定居遗迹则有近 7000 年历史，这一深厚的历史背景为当今的迁都提案提供了丰富注脚。
Memphis was the first capital of the Ancient Kingdom of Egypt, situated at the current location of Giza. During the period of the Middle and New Kingdom, the capital was moved to Luxor (otherwise known as Thebes, or the city of the god Amon), marking the transition between the old kingdom and later dynasties ^(2){ }^{2}. Likewise, under Greek and Roman rule, the administrative center of Egypt was relocated to the newly founded city of Alexandria, whose sea-side location “gave a clear signal that the focus of Graeco-Macedonian Egypt was going to be the Mediterranean area both for trade and military purposes.” ^(3){ }^{3} 孟菲斯是古埃及王国的第一个首都，位于现今吉萨所在地。在中王国和新王国时期，首都迁至卢克索（又称底比斯或阿蒙神之城），标志着古王国与后续王朝的过渡 ^(2){ }^{2} 。同样，在希腊和罗马统治下，埃及的行政中心迁至新建的亚历山大城，其海滨位置"明确表明希腊-马其顿时期埃及的重心将转向地中海区域，无论是出于贸易还是军事目的" ^(3){ }^{3} 。
The capital changed once again with the Arab conquest. Fustat was founded in the year 642 AD and constitutes the base of today’s Cairo, setting “the foundation of what was to become one of the largest capitals of the Arab world.” ^(4){ }^{4} Proposals to relocate the administration outside the center of the city were floated even then, as the historian Andre Raymond has discussed: “[then] governor Abd al-Aziz had already taken steps to move the center of the government to Hilwan in 689 [AD], perhaps to escape the plague that afflicted Fustat.” ^(5){ }^{5} In each of these cases, although the reasons for relocation were different from those motivating today’s proposals, the suggested solutions to these various circumstances have often been the same. 阿拉伯征服后，首都再度变迁。公元 642 年建立的福斯塔特城构成了今日开罗的根基，奠定了"这座日后成为阿拉伯世界最大都市之一的基础"。 ^(4){ }^{4} 历史学家安德烈·雷蒙德指出，当时就已出现将行政机构迁出市中心的提议："[时任]总督阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹早在公元 689 年就采取行动将政府中心迁往赫勒万，或许是为了躲避困扰福斯塔特的瘟疫。" ^(5){ }^{5} 尽管这些迁都动因与当今提案不同，但针对不同境况提出的解决方案却往往如出一辙。
The idea of creating a new administrative center outside the growing 在日益扩张的都市外围建立新行政中心的构想
boundaries of Greater Cairo is therefore neither new to Egypt nor unique to the country. Even in more recent history, “the issue of moving the Egyptian capital away from Cairo has periodically surfaced in semi-serious national discussion over the last twenty years.” ^(6){ }^{6} Ever since the sudden migration of citizens from rural areas towards urban settlements in the late 1950s, government authorities have been making similar attempts to deal with Cairo’s growing population and rapid urbanization. A number of new cities were proposed to decentralize the megacity, two of which were Nasr City and Sadat City-which, at least initially, were also intended to help relocate the administrative functions outside the original boundaries of Cairo. These previous attempts and proposals, however, were often cited later as negative examples that failed to fulfill their intended objectives and become the intended new administrative centers. 因此，大开罗的边界扩张对埃及而言既不新鲜，也非该国独有。即便在更近的历史中，"将埃及首都迁离开罗的议题在过去二十年里已多次出现在半严肃的全国性讨论中"。自 1950 年代末期民众突然从农村向城市聚居地迁移以来，政府当局就持续采取类似举措应对开罗日益增长的人口和快速城市化进程。为分散这座超级大都市的职能，曾规划建设多座新城，其中纳斯尔城和萨达特城至少在初期也被赋予将行政职能迁出开罗原边界的使命。然而这些先前的尝试与提案，后来常被援引为未能实现预期目标、未能成为规划中新行政中心的失败案例。
Nasr City (Madinat Nasr) was, as the name indicates, a project launched by thenpresident Gamal Abdel Nasser. Planned just outside the boundaries of the existing city, Nasr City was intended to accommodate government functions, housing settlements, and sports and recreational facilities for youth. Today, a large portion of the original master plan has arguably been fulfilled, and the city has grown such that Nasr City is currently an integral part of Cairo. Although the city is successful to the extent that it fulfilled many of the functions intended for it, it today contains some of the most densely inhabited districts in Cairo, and much can be learned from its design process and planning outcomes. 纳赛尔城（Madinat Nasr）正如其名，是由时任总统贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔发起的城市规划项目。该城最初规划在开罗既有城区外围，旨在承载政府职能、住宅区以及青年体育休闲设施。如今，原总体规划的大部分内容已基本实现，城市发展使得纳赛尔城现已成为开罗不可分割的组成部分。尽管该城成功实现了诸多预期功能，但如今却形成了开罗人口最稠密的区域之一，其设计过程与规划成果仍具有重要借鉴意义。
Sadat City (Madinat al-Sadat), planned for a location about 100 kilometers northwest of Cairo, is placed well outside the boundaries of Cairo’s growing 萨达特城（Madinat al-Sadat）规划建于开罗西北方向约 100 公里处，完全位于开罗不断扩张的边界之外
metropolitan region on one of the major highways linking Cairo to Alexandria-an 连接开罗与亚历山大两大城市的主干道沿线都会区
artery referred to as the Desert Road. Although initially planned to accommodate " 165,000 jobs in 25 years for the 500,000 target population," today Sadat City only houses approximately 150,000 residents. ^(7){ }^{7} Furthermore, although the original scheme had included the relocation of government buildings to the new site, these relocations failed to materialize. 这条被称为"沙漠公路"的动脉干道。尽管最初规划"25 年内为 50 万目标人口提供 16.5 万个就业岗位"，但如今的萨达特城仅容纳约 15 万居民。此外，虽然原方案包含政府机构迁址计划，但这些搬迁最终未能实现。
Besides those plans that have specifically attempted to create new administrative centers, recent regional planning initiatives have attempted to ameliorate Cairo’s current overpopulation and congestion through the creation of new satellite cities outside of the capital. These satellite cities were originally designed as self-sustaining communities that could draw large portions of the population outside of the center at these various nodes. As a result of these initiatives, satellite cities such as New Cairo and Sixth of October were created on both the eastern and western edges of downtown Cairo. However, the success of these initiatives seems only partial, as the creation of economic employment opportunities was curtailed during their development plans. Many of these satellite cities therefore only ended up as residential zones, leaving the majority of their populations dependent on job opportunities in the center. The reliance on the original city has resulted in significant dependency on daily commutes between the satellite cities and downtown Cairo, with many residents leaving their suburban homes by day and returning at night. This daily inflow and outflow of residents, not only from and to downtown Cairo but also the Cairo metropolis and beyond, has resulted in heavy traffic, especially during peak rush hours in the mornings and late afternoons. Furthermore, informal buses and other modes of unofficial transportation, along with many other forms of unplanned growth, have resulted in congestion and decline in the quality and capacity of the existing infrastructure. Satellite cities, although intended as self-sustaining communities, have thus failed to deliver on 除了那些专门试图建立新行政中心的规划外，近期的区域规划方案还试图通过在首都外围建设卫星城来缓解开罗当前的人口过剩和交通拥堵问题。这些卫星城最初被设计为自给自足的社区，旨在将大量人口从中心城区分散到这些外围节点。在此规划推动下，新开罗城和十月六日城等卫星城相继出现在开罗市中心的东西两侧边缘地带。然而这些举措仅取得了部分成功，因为在开发过程中经济就业机会的创造受到了限制。许多卫星城最终仅成为住宅区，导致大部分居民仍需依赖中心城区的工作机会。对原城区的依赖造成了卫星城与开罗市中心之间大规模的日常通勤潮，许多居民白天离开郊区住所前往市区工作，夜晚再返回卫星城居住。 居民每日往返于开罗市中心、都会区乃至更远地区的通勤潮，导致交通严重拥堵，尤以早晚高峰时段为甚。此外，非正规巴士等非法运营车辆的无序增长，加之其他缺乏规划的发展模式，使得现有基础设施不堪重负，服务质量和承载能力持续下降。卫星城虽被规划为自给自足的社区，却始终未能实现
their vision and are still heavily reliant on Cairo’s original center for support. This has resulted in extensive sprawl between the original boundaries of the city and its new settlements. 这一愿景，至今仍高度依赖开罗老城区的资源供给。这种状况导致城市原有边界与新兴居住区之间形成了大范围的无序扩张地带。
Furthermore, a process privileging land development before infrastructure planning and a lack of transportation systems linking these cities has further exacerbated the failure of these plans, as the public transportation currently in place is 更严重的是，土地开发优先于基础设施规划的建设流程，以及连接这些城市的交通系统缺失，进一步加剧了规划失败——因为现有公共交通体系
incapable of supporting the vast numbers of residents needing to commute to work daily. This has resulted in an overcrowded and overburdened road and bus system, and has forced many to depend on independently run “microbus” systems or-for those who can afford it-private cars. Due to the costs associated with creating an efficient railway line between these satellite cities and the city center, railway and/or metro lines have not been developed. Although expansion plans for the future do exist, unless their construction is prioritized the plans give current residents little to no hope for improved conditions in the near future. 无法满足大量居民每日通勤的需求。这导致道路和公交系统不堪重负，迫使许多人依赖私营的"小巴"系统，或是有能力者选择私家车出行。由于在卫星城与市中心之间建设高效铁路线成本过高，铁路和地铁线路至今未能发展。尽管未来扩建计划确实存在，但除非优先推进建设，否则当前居民在短期内几乎看不到改善现状的希望。
These new “desert cities,” as they are often referred to, struggle not only with ensuring accessibility to and within them, but also with creating thriving economic centers, attracting a diversity of socioeconomic groups, and forming their own identities. 这些常被称为"沙漠新城"的卫星城，不仅面临着内外交通可达性的难题，还需应对打造繁荣经济中心、吸引多元社会阶层群体以及建立自身城市认同等挑战。
One of these newly planned satellite cities is New Cairo. New Cairo (al-Qahira el-Gadida) is situated in the eastern area of Cairo and can be accessed directly using the ring road. Currently housing one-and-a-half million inhabitants, it is located in the area between the Cairo-Suez desert road and the Cairo-el-Ain el-Sokhna desert road. Unlike Nasr City and Sadat City, New Cairo was built according to a plan focused on growth in phases, the inclusion of urban anchors and institutions, and a new real estate policy. The initial phase consisted of establishing three settlements out of a total of ten that were suggested for the Greater Cairo region: the First Settlement (el-Tagamoa el-Awal), the Third Settlement (el-Tagamoa el-Thaleth), 这些新规划的卫星城之一是新开罗。新开罗（阿拉伯语：al-Qahira el-Gadida）位于开罗东部地区，可通过环城公路直达。目前拥有 150 万居民，地处开罗-苏伊士沙漠公路与开罗-艾因苏赫纳沙漠公路之间的区域。与纳赛尔城和萨达特城不同，新开罗是按照分阶段发展、包含城市锚点与机构设施以及新房地产政策的规划建造的。初期阶段从大开罗地区规划的十个居住区中选定了三个进行建设：第一居住区（阿拉伯语：el-Tagamoa el-Awal）、第三居住区（阿拉伯语：el-Tagamoa el-Thaleth）
and the Fifth Settlement (el-Tagamoa el-Khames). Earlier compounds such as Zizinia and el-Rehab had introduced the self-sufficient community approach and a new real estate development model, capitalizing on the incentives offered by the government at that time, the concurrent desert development policy, and cheap land prices-with plots offered for as low as one Egyptian pound per square meter of land with no infrastructure. Because of New Cairo’s proximity to Nasr City, Heliopolis, Cairo International Airport, Suez City, and others, as well as existing access roads and the new ring road, early investors showed great interest in developing new housing with distinct characteristics, offering new models for living while remaining connected to the economic, administrative, and social infrastructure of the existing city. ^(8){ }^{8} While the initial plans did not foresee a new administrative capital, New Cairo today is home to a number of government and higher-education institutions, banks, a few petroleum and communications companies, and large-scale shopping districts. 以及第五定居点（el-Tagamoa el-Khames）。早期的社区如 Zizinia 和 el-Rehab 开创了自给自足的社区模式与新型房地产开发范式，充分利用了当时政府提供的优惠政策、同步推进的沙漠开发政策以及低廉的地价——未配备基础设施的地块每平方米售价可低至一埃及镑。由于新开罗毗邻纳斯尔城、赫利奥波利斯、开罗国际机场、苏伊士城等区域，且享有现有道路网络与新环城公路的交通优势，早期投资者对开发具有独特品质的新型住宅表现出极大热情，在保持与现有城市经济、行政和社会基础设施连接的同时，提供了创新的居住模式。 ^(8){ }^{8} 虽然最初规划并未预见这里会成为新行政首都，但如今新开罗已汇聚众多政府机构、高等教育学府、银行、部分石油与通信企业，以及大型商业区。
URBAN DESIGN AND NEW CITIES 城市设计与新城建设
Looking at the urban environment of these new cities, one is able to identify many repeated patterns in the urban morphology, streetscape design, and urban fabric. Furthermore, by following the urban planning process leading up to the proposal of the new administrative capital, certain patterns in the urban planning and urban design approaches can be noted. Although many of the problems facing new urban agglomerations have been widely identified and discussed, little of the literature has focused on the urban design patterns of these new cities (as opposed to the planning and/or the individual architecture of their components). The challenges faced by new cities will therefore be illustrated further from an urban design perspective: as the accumulation of the many policies, financial and investment strategies, and planning and coordination operations involved in the 审视这些新兴城市的城市环境，人们能够识别出城市形态、街道景观设计和城市肌理中大量重复的模式。进一步追溯新行政首都的规划过程，可以注意到城市规划与设计方法中存在的特定范式。尽管新城面临的诸多问题已被广泛认知和讨论，但现有文献很少聚焦于这些新城的城市设计模式（而非其规划层面或单体建筑构成）。因此，我们将从城市设计的视角进一步阐释新城面临的挑战——这些挑战正是由相关政策体系、金融投资策略以及规划协调机制等要素
process. Understanding the urban design challenges recurrent in existing new cities is essential for the success of any new city (administrative or not) and for future urban planning and urban design projects in general. 长期累积形成的。理解现有新城中反复出现的城市设计挑战，对于任何新城（无论是否行政首都）的成功建设，以及未来城市规划设计项目的整体发展都具有决定性意义。
Taking the proposal for Egypt’s new administrative capital as a case study, this analysis will examine official announcements and released schematic drawings to focus on the urban design of the master plan of the city. The proposal exhibits an ambitious project and scale, with plans to include a new center for government, business and investment districts, as well as cultural, educational, and industrial areas, among others. Proposed for a site approximately 45 kilometers away from the center of the old city, the city lies on the outer peripheries of the Greater Cairo Region. 本文以埃及新行政首都规划方案为案例，通过分析官方公告与公布的方案图纸，重点探讨该城市总体规划中的都市设计。该方案展现出宏大的项目规模与雄心，计划打造集政府中心、商业投资区、文化教育区及工业区等多功能于一体的新城。选址位于大开罗地区外围，距旧城中心约 45 公里。
In a megaproject of this scale, the design aspect is only a small portion of the entire process, which must take larger financial, economic, and political constraints into consideration. However, although it is only a small fraction of the process, it is at the same time the most long lasting of the four considerations. Political administrations may evolve or change, while economic and financial impacts may be redirected or restructured; buildings and large-scale developments, however, are almost semipermanent, offering physical, social, and financial resistance to change. Despite this, however, the design phases for projects in many cities across the world are accelerated with little consideration for longer-term impacts. In the case of the new administrative capital, where it has taken just little over a year to progress from the announcement of the vision, concept, and location to the beginning of construction, it is clear that the design phase of the project was shortchanged. Indeed, the absence of urban coordination was not unexpected, given how little the wider community was consulted and how urban design regulations have been disregarded in the past. This section will therefore focus on where urban design and the development of a thriving, 在如此规模的大型项目中，设计环节只是整个流程的一小部分，必须综合考虑更宏观的财政、经济和政治约束。然而尽管只是流程中的微小环节，设计却是四大考量因素中影响最为持久的。政治管理可能更迭变迁，经济与财政影响或可调整重构；但建筑与大型开发项目近乎半永久性存在，从物理空间、社会关系到资金投入都对变革形成阻力。但令人遗憾的是，全球众多城市的项目设计阶段往往被加速推进，鲜少考虑长远影响。以新行政首都为例，从愿景概念选址公布到破土动工仅用一年有余，显然压缩了本应充分展开的设计周期。事实上，考虑到公众咨询的严重缺失以及过往对城市设计规范的漠视，出现城市规划协调缺位的情况并不令人意外。 因此，本节将重点关注城市设计与繁荣发展、
livable, and independent city meet by taking two important aspects of a good city into consideration: sustainability and public space. 宜居且独立自主的城市建设之间的交汇点，通过考量优秀城市的两个重要方面：可持续性与公共空间。
URBAN DESIGN CONSIDERATION 1: 城市规划考量一：
SUSTAINABILITY 可持续性
Since the success of the administrative capital and its goal to become a selfsustaining city is strongly dependent on the self-sufficiency of the city as an entire system, the focus of this analysis will be on that system. In order to discuss the components of this particular city’s system, it is also essential to make a clear distinction between the administrative complex-the “capitol”-and the larger “capital” city itself, which may serve other needs or purposes not limited to administrative functions. ^(9){ }^{9} Historically, however, the construction of new capitals and “capitols” in Egypt has not been an all-encompassing solution to the problems of old capitals or historical cities. Similar to how new capitals have satisfied or failed their objectives to varying degrees, their rates of construction and degrees of completion have also varied widely. Forecasting or predicting the outcome of a proposal is a difficult task, especially in an environment of economic instability, political fluctuation, and social uncertainty. Furthermore, the measures or standards by which a city might be evaluated are highly subjective, depending on the views maintained by individuals, the interests of various political, social, and ethnic groups, as well as the perspectives held by local and international leaders and communities. 鉴于行政首都的成功及其成为自给自足城市的目标，很大程度上取决于整个城市系统的自给自足能力，本次分析将聚焦于这一系统。要探讨这座特定城市系统的构成要素，必须明确区分行政建筑群——即"核心区"——与更广义的"首都"城市本身，后者可能服务于行政职能之外的其他需求或目的。 ^(9){ }^{9} 然而从历史经验看，埃及新建首都与"核心区"的举措，从未能彻底解决旧都或历史名城面临的种种问题。正如新首都实现目标的程度参差不齐，其建设速度与完成度也存在着巨大差异。在充满经济动荡、政治波动与社会不确定性的环境中，对规划方案结果进行预判是项极具挑战性的任务。 此外，评判一座城市的标准或尺度具有极强的主观性，这取决于个人观点、不同政治社会群体与族裔的利益诉求，以及地方与国际领导层及社群的立场态度。
The general trends in architecture in Egypt, in combination with the preconceived notions held by designers and architects, have led many designers to import Western trends and ideals ínto their work to fit the general perceived ideal of modernity. In an attempt to “modernize” the built environment, many design elements have been transplanted without accounting for drastically different environmental conditions. Whereas glass façades might be 埃及建筑界的整体趋势，加之设计师与建筑师固有的观念定式，导致许多从业者在作品中盲目引入西方潮流与理念，以迎合大众对现代性的普遍想象。为了打造"现代化"建筑环境，大量设计元素被直接移植，却未充分考虑截然不同的环境条件。例如玻璃幕墙或许
suitable in cold environments where sun and warmth are welcome, in the hot, arid climate surrounding Cairo, using such materials presents immense environmental challenges and causes heavy energy consumption, as extensive cooling systems become necessary to compensate for the amount of heat gain. 适用于渴望阳光与温暖的寒冷地区，但在开罗周边炎热干燥的气候条件下，使用此类材料会带来严峻的环境挑战，并导致能源消耗激增——为抵消大量热量获取，必须配备大功率制冷系统。
Therefore, it is important that the city’s measures of sustainability take into consideration wider and more interrelated relationships. One of the goals of the new city is to ensure that seventy percent of all rooftops are covered with solar panels or green rooftops and that forty percent of the right of way is dedicated to pedestrians and bicycles, in order to further promote the city’s vision as a “Walkable City.” ^(10){ }^{10} Since direct sunlight is in high abundance across Egypt, such sources of renewable energy have high potential for covering at least a portion of the energy needs in different sectors. However, the simple installation of such systems is not a comprehensive solution for sustainability. 因此，城市可持续性措施的制定必须考量更广泛且相互关联的要素。这座新城的目标之一是要确保 70%的屋顶覆盖太阳能板或绿化屋顶，并将 40%的道路路权分配给行人和自行车，以进一步推动"步行友好城市"的愿景。 ^(10){ }^{10} 由于埃及全境阳光充沛，这类可再生能源极有潜力满足不同领域的部分能源需求。但仅安装这些系统并不能构成完整的可持续性解决方案。
“Sustainability” is a word that is abused across the world, used vaguely in various different contexts to mean different things. It is essential, however, that efforts promoting sustainability are taken to the next level in order to truly meet international levels of sustainability. In order for such a leap to be made, it is essential that the perception of sustainable cities is moved away from the superficial notion of sustainability as just building solar-powered buildings or individual solar farms. Instead, true sustainability involves creating a fullyfledged ecosystem that holds a city together, made possible by applying systems thinking and promoting efficient and integrated designs that account for growth and change in technology. “可持续性”是一个在全球范围内被滥用的词汇，在不同语境中被模糊地用来表达各种含义。然而，必须将推动可持续性的努力提升到新高度，才能真正达到国际可持续性标准。要实现这样的跨越，关键在于改变对可持续城市的认知——不能仅停留在建设太阳能建筑或独立太阳能农场这类表面概念。真正的可持续性需要构建一个完整的生态系统，通过运用系统思维，推行兼顾技术发展与变革的高效综合设计方案，使城市形成有机整体。
URBAN DESIGN CONSIDERATION 2: PUBLIC AND OPEN SPACE 城市设计考量二：公共与开放空间
Open and truly public space is a rare commodity in central Cairo. Few spaces can truly be defined as designated public spaces. Although public gardens and the occasional stretch of open space can be 在开罗市中心，真正开放的公共空间实属稀缺资源。能被明确定义为指定公共空间的区域屈指可数。尽管公共花园和零星分布的开放空间偶尔可见，
Fig. 1: 3-D representation of the New Capital 图 1：新行政首都三维效果图
found, these spaces are rarely designed for public use and are often fenced off, gated, or interfered with by various forms of privatization. Indeed, the only abundant public spaces available across all districts could be the road and street networks, which, although theoretically belonging to the car, are encroached upon not only by pedestrians, but also by youth seeking open spaces to play, vendors seeking affordable locations to set up their temporary stalls, and more permanent services in the form of local coffee shops and retail spaces. These encroachments onto the streetscape indicate not only an absence of sufficient open space, but also a lack of accommodation of retail needs and services. 人们发现，这些空间很少为公共使用而设计，常常被围栏阻隔、设门管控，或受到各种私有化形式的侵占。事实上，各区域唯一充裕的公共空间或许只有道路网络——尽管理论上属于车辆，却不仅被行人侵占，更成为青年寻找空地玩耍、摊贩寻觅廉价位置支起临时摊位，以及本地咖啡馆和零售店等更永久性服务的聚集地。这些对街道景观的侵占现象，不仅揭示了开放空间的不足，更反映出对零售需求与服务配套的缺失。
In many ways, the inclusion of large, open green spaces in many of the developments being built in newly formed satellite cities and private gated communities appears to be in reaction to the absence of such spaces within the central city. In this regard, the plans for the new city appear to be no different in their attempt to increase access to open space. Critically, however, it appears that a differentiation between “open space,” “public space,” and “green space” has been lost in this case: the terms are used 在许多方面，新规划的卫星城和封闭式私人社区中大规模开放绿地的建设，似乎正是对市中心缺乏此类空间的回应。就此而言，新城的规划在增加开放空间可达性方面并无二致。但关键在于，这种情况下"开放空间"、"公共空间"与"绿地"的概念区分已然模糊：这些术语在埃及各地的设计和实施阶段
loosely and interchangeably during design and implementation phases all across Egypt. 都被随意混用，彼此替代。
Although the three terms “open space,” “public space,” and “green space” are distinct from each other in nearly every urban context, this distinction is particularly significant in a hot and arid climate such as Egypt’s. This is because in a harsh desert climate, it cannot be expected that every open space or public space can be greened with vegetation due to the extensive amounts of irrigation that would be necessary for upkeep. Moreover, the fact that a space is green does not immediately mean that it is public; in fact, many public gardens in Egypt are often gated and accessible only during certain hours, holidays, or occasions. Similarly, that a space is public does not necessarily mean it must be open: public space could also be comprised of a semi-enclosed space or even a set of enclosed buildings that are open to the public. A distinction between such categories is necessary, as each of these three spaces have different purposes and must therefore be considered and used in the right context. 尽管"开放空间"、"公共空间"和"绿地空间"这三个术语在几乎所有城市语境中都存在差异，但在埃及这样炎热干旱的气候条件下，这种区分显得尤为重要。因为在严酷的沙漠气候中，由于植被维护需要大量灌溉，不能指望每个开放空间或公共空间都能实现绿化。此外，空间绿化并不意味着它必然向公众开放——事实上，埃及许多公共花园通常设有围栏，仅在特定时段、节假日或特殊场合开放。同样，公共空间也不一定必须是开放式的：公共空间也可以由半封闭空间甚至一组向公众开放的封闭建筑组成。区分这些类别十分必要，因为这三类空间具有不同功能，必须在恰当的语境中加以考量与利用。
Taking these two measures of a good city as examples, it is clear that there is 以这两个衡量优秀城市的标准为例，显然
much that can be learned from the existing struggles of the historical city as well as its new satellite cities. From these experiences come lessons as well as the potential to reevaluate current urban-planning methods, processes, and design outcomes. Since this new administrative capital is viewed as a national project, the assessment of the new city must be regarded with consideration of national demands and needs, while keeping in mind lessons learnt from the relocation plans of the past. Given the depth and breadth of the struggles Egypt faces today, it is easy to overlook the origins and reasons behind the complexity of the problems. Without an understanding of their origins, new cities face the risk of failing for the same reasons. It is therefore essential to see Cairo as a series of experiences and lessons from which much can be learned, both for its own future development and for the development of other urban areas across Egypt. 从这座历史名城及其新建卫星城现有的困境中可以汲取诸多经验。这些经历既带来了教训，也提供了重新评估当前城市规划方法、流程和设计成果的可能性。由于这座新行政首都被视为国家项目，评估新城时必须综合考虑国家需求和诉求，同时牢记过往迁都计划中的经验教训。鉴于埃及当前面临困境的深度与广度，人们很容易忽视问题复杂性的根源与成因。若不了解这些根源，新城很可能会重蹈覆辙。因此必须将开罗视为一系列可资借鉴的经验教训宝库，这不仅关乎其自身未来发展，更对埃及全国其他城市区域的建设具有重要价值。
Note: 注：
Parts of this short essay draw on the author’s Master in City Planning thesis, "Cairo’s New Administrative Capital-Wedian City: Lessons from the Past and for the Future, completed at the Massachusetts institute of lechnology. The author wishes to specially acknowledge advisor, as well as Brent Ryan and Khaled Tarabieh readers. 本文部分内容源自作者在麻省理工学院完成的城市规划硕士论文《开罗新行政首都——韦迪安城：历史镜鉴与未来启示》。作者特别感谢导师以及布伦特·瑞安与哈立德·塔拉比赫两位评阅人的指导。
1 Robert L. Tignor, Egypt: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 1 罗伯特·L·蒂格诺，《埃及简史》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2010 年）。
2 Mohga Embaby, "Promoting Cultural Identity along Streetscape Redesign: ‘Case Studies in Cairo Engineering Research and Technology 4, no. 5 (May 2015): 1248-63. 2 莫哈·恩巴比，《街道景观改造中的文化认同提升：开罗案例研究》，《工程研究与技术》第 4 卷第 5 期（2015 年 5 月）：1248-63 页
3 Alan B. Lloyd, Ancient Egypt : State and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 3 艾伦·B·劳埃德，《古埃及：国家与社会》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，2014 年）
4 André Raymond, Cairo, trans. Willard Wood (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2000), Ibid., 23. 4 安德烈·雷蒙德，《开罗》，威拉德·伍德译（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，2000 年），同前，第 23 页。
6 Salah El-Shakhs, “Sadat City, Egypt and the Role of New Town Planning in the Developing World,” Journal of Architectural & Planning Research 11, no 3 (1994): 239-59. 6 萨拉赫·沙赫斯，《埃及萨达特城与发展中国家新城规划的作用》，《建筑与规划研究期刊》第 11 卷第 3 期（1994 年）：239-59 页。
Ministry of Development and New Communities, Advisory Committee for Reconstruction, The Development of Sadat City (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, Advisory Committee for Reconstruction, 1978). 发展与新社区部重建咨询委员会，《萨达特城发展规划》（开罗：阿拉伯埃及共和国住房与重建部重建咨询委员会，1978 年）。
“New Cities,” New Urban Communities Authority, eg/english/New Communities/dww.newcities.gov. Lawrence I Vale Architecture Power and Natio Identity, 2nd ed. (London/New York: Rourtional 2008). "新城市"，新城市社区管理局，eg/english/NewCommunities/dww.newcities.gov。劳伦斯·I·韦尔《建筑、权力与国家认同》第二版（伦敦/纽约：劳特利奇出版社，2008 年）。
10 “The Capital Cairo,” Vimeo video, 7:44, posted by “Cube Consultants,” August 30, 2016, https:// vimeo.com/180717384. 10 《首都开罗》，Vimeo 视频，7 分 44 秒，由"Cube Consultants"发布于 2016 年 8 月 30 日，https://vimeo.com/180717384。
Studying Cairo’s desert cities raises an obvious yet often overlooked question: What is a city? Are Fifteenth of May, Tenth of Ramadan, or Sixth of October cities? In other words, are they autonomous urban environments offering inhabitants places for working and living, services, leisure, and the necessary networks and infrastructures that facilitate the functionality of these spaces and improve the quality of life? Measuring these developments following twentieth-century understandings (following CIAM, for example) of what a city is or should be will yield the conclusion that these are not cities. Then what are these developments, and how can architects and planners approach them as scholars and as designers? The present book provides a wide-angle approach to understanding Egypt’s desert cities, their past, their present, and their potential futures. 研究开罗的沙漠城市引出了一个显而易见却常被忽视的问题：什么是城市？五月十五日城、斋月十日城或十月六日城算城市吗？换言之，它们是否具备自主的城市环境，为居民提供工作生活空间、服务设施、休闲场所，以及维系这些空间运转并提升生活品质的必要网络与基础设施？若以二十世纪（例如遵循 CIAM 标准）对城市本质的认知来衡量这些开发项目，结论将是这些并非真正意义上的城市。那么这些开发项目究竟是什么？作为学者和设计者，建筑师与规划师应如何审视它们？本书以广角视野探讨埃及沙漠城市的过去、现状与未来可能性。
Cairo’s desert cities and other govern-ment-led developments built over the past five decades on the outskirts of the Egyptian capital have failed in nearly all aspects that have historically attracted Egyptians to urban life: walkability, proximity between places of work and habitation, availability of services, a vibrant commercial and cultural life, and the possibility of mixing between different strata of society. In fact, these developments hold nearly the opposite traits: they are extremely segregated socially; they lack any sort of cultural life; they are designed for vehicular traffic, rather than for walking; and they forego the mixed-use, vibrant streets of traditional Egyptian cities, limiting commercial spaces to closed-off malls. So how did we get here? 开罗的沙漠城市及其他由政府主导、在过去五十年间建于埃及首都郊区的开发项目，几乎在所有传统上吸引埃及人选择城市生活的方面都遭遇了失败：步行友好性、工作与居住场所的邻近性、服务设施的便利性、充满活力的商业文化氛围，以及不同社会阶层交融的可能性。事实上，这些开发项目呈现出几乎完全相反的特质：它们在社会层面极度隔离；缺乏任何形式的文化生活；规划设计以车辆通行为导向而非步行；摒弃了传统埃及城市混合用途的活力街道，将商业空间局限在封闭的购物中心内。我们何以至此？
The poor urban management of Cairo since the 1970s, paired with enormous population growth-due in large part to internal migration of residents from other cities in Egypt seeking a better life-has resulted in two dichotomous urban forms. The first is the informality that encircles and 自 1970 年代以来，开罗糟糕的城市管理，加上主要由埃及其他城市居民为寻求更好生活而涌入造成的人口激增，催生了两种截然不同的城市形态。第一种是环绕着...（此处译文截断，因原文未完整提供）
often punctuates the historic/planned city. Cairo’s informal housing was the topic of the previous book by the Master of Advanced Studies in Urban Design at the ETH Zurich. The second result has been heavy investment in desert-city development, enabled by redirecting major portions of infrastructural spending. These trends are two sides of the same coin, and they reflect the deep inequalities in post-Nasser Egypti society and its economy. Both Egyptian growth that absorbe Both the informal of Cairo’s current residents and the desert where only a small fraction of the pulation lives are entirely dependent on the existing city as it was built up to 1970. The neglected urban core of Cairo is both the raison d’être and the antithesis of the informal settlements and desert cities. 历史/规划城市中常可见其身影。苏黎世联邦理工学院高级城市设计硕士课程的上一部著作便以开罗的非正规住房为主题。第二个结果是对沙漠城市发展的大规模投资，这是通过将基础设施支出的主要部分重新定向实现的。这两种趋势是一体两面，反映了后纳赛尔时代埃及社会与经济中深刻的不平等现象。无论是吸纳开罗现有居民的非正规聚居区，还是仅容纳极少数人口的沙漠地带，都完全依赖于 1970 年前建成的既有城市。被忽视的开罗城市核心，既是非正规住区与沙漠城市存在的理由，又是其对立面。
One of the most useful starting points for understanding Cairo’s desert cities is the seemingly simple task of listing, identifying, and defining those developments. The first section of this book provides a chronology that, surprisingly enough, has never been presented before in the context of a scholarly book. The chronology defines and lists the major desert developments that were driven by the expansionist logic of the Sadat and Mubarak years, but it also includes important precursors such as Heliopolis and Nasr City. The chronology also includes and anticipates the mysterious New Capital that is being propelled forward by the governing military regime, with its projected population of five million inhabitants. While the driving logics behind Heliopolis, Sixth of October, and the New Capital are rather different, seeing all these developments as part of a continuum of the desire to urbanize the desert around Cairo yields interesting readings of this history. It was only in the last century that the desert, long seen as the boundary for urban life, was transformed into an endless horizon of possible urban futures. 要理解开罗的沙漠城市群，最实用的切入点莫过于对这些开发项目进行看似简单的罗列、识别与定义。本书首章提供了一份年表——令人惊讶的是，这类学术著作中从未有过如此系统的梳理。这份年表不仅界定了萨达特和穆巴拉克时代扩张主义逻辑催生的主要沙漠开发项目，还收录了赫利奥波利斯、纳斯尔城等重要先驱案例，更预见了当前军政府推动的神秘"新行政首都"（规划人口达五百万）。虽然赫利奥波利斯、十月六日城与新首都背后的驱动逻辑大相径庭，但若将这些开发视为开罗周边沙漠城市化连续进程的不同阶段，便能对此历史产生耐人寻味的解读。就在上个世纪，这片长期被视为城市生活边界的荒漠，才被重塑成承载无限城市未来的地平线。
The essays and interviews in this book shed light on the historical, economic, and political contexts of these cities. “Who owns the desert?” looms as an essential question for understanding the dynamics and driving forces behind this trend. But the question that remains open for debate and analysis has to do with the urban planning models implemented in the desert. In other words, is it possible for better-designed, more equitable cities to be built in the desert under the current matrix of military control over land and resources, undemocratic municipal governance, and Egypt’s insatiable real estate market? Are the current urban models the only possible ones given the realities that govern Egypt’s urban development? Why do trained architects and planners play merely a bureaucratic role in the current system? Given the circumstances, Egypt’s desert cities are missed opportunities for the architectural and planning professions to experiment with new models. Instead, they have become terrains for partially realized, always incomplete, and piecemeal implementation of entirely outdated plans. 本书中的文章与访谈揭示了这些城市的历史、经济及政治背景。"谁拥有沙漠？"这一核心问题，对于理解这股潮流背后的动力机制至关重要。但仍有待探讨分析的关键议题，则关乎沙漠中实施的城市规划模式。换言之，在当前军事力量掌控土地资源、市政治理缺乏民主、埃及房地产市场贪得无厌的格局下，能否在沙漠中建造设计更优、更公平的城市？受埃及城市发展现实所限，现有城市模式是否已成唯一选择？为何受过专业训练的建筑师与规划师，在当前体系中仅能扮演官僚角色？在此情境下，埃及的沙漠城市本可成为建筑与规划行业试验新模式的良机，却沦为实施严重过时方案的试验场——这些方案支离破碎、半途而废，永远处于未完成状态。
This is precisely the opportunity seized by the contributors to the Alternative Urban Futures section of this book. Rather than stopping at critique and analysis, the seven projects presented here propose ways for moving forward. While the proposals are presented largely as schematic interventions, they form the basis for new forms of architectural and urban-planning practices tailored specifically to Cairo’s desert cities. Such approaches of analysis and design have not yet emerged as a solid field of inquiry within Egypt’s universities, where voices advocating for alternative and critical engagement with Egypt’s current desert-city models are muted and where many members of the faculty praise or directly participate in the failed plans implemented today. Thus, despite the schematic character of the seven proposals, they not only present ideas for other futures for Cairo’s desert cities, but also gesture towards other approaches for making architectural education in Egypt relevant again to the country’s urban reali-ties-of which the desert cities that encircle Cairo are a large part. 这正是本书《另类城市未来》章节撰稿人们把握的契机。七项提案并未止步于批判分析，而是提出了前进路径。虽然这些方案多以纲要式介入呈现，但它们为开罗沙漠城市量身定制的新型建筑与城市规划实践奠定了基础。此类分析设计方法尚未在埃及高校形成稳固的研究领域——在那里，倡导对埃及现行沙漠城市模式进行批判性替代方案的声音被压制，许多教员反而赞扬或直接参与当下实施的那些失败规划。因此，尽管七项提案具有纲要性质，它们不仅为开罗沙漠城市提供了另类未来构想，更指向了使埃及建筑教育重新对接国家城市现实（环绕开罗的沙漠城市正是其重要组成部分）的其他可能路径。
GLOSSARY 术语表
al-Izba Bahariyya … 巴哈里亚绿洲...
bawab qquad\qquad
Area intended for the upper class in Egypt Literally means “doorman”: an individual, usually living in a ground-floor apartment, who guards and takes care of the building 专为埃及上层阶级规划的区域 字面意思是"看门人"：通常居住在一楼公寓，负责看守和维护整栋建筑的个体
feddan qquad\qquad Longitudinal area of farmland equivalent to 4,200 square meters 费丹 qquad\qquad 相当于 4200 平方米的纵向农田面积单位
Infitah qquad\qquad The “open door” policy: economic and political liberalization under Anwar Sadat 开放政策 qquad\qquad 安瓦尔·萨达特执政时期推行的经济政治自由化政策
qirat qquad\qquad Area of land equivalent to 175 square meters 基拉特 qquad\qquad 相当于 175 平方米的土地面积单位
Waracat Uktubur qquad\qquad October Working Paper 瓦拉卡特·乌克图布尔 qquad\qquad 十月工作文件
Inc. ............................... 公司...............................
Incorporation 股份有限公司
LE ................................ 埃及镑...............................
Livre égyptienne (Egyptian Pound) 埃及镑（埃及货币单位）
m qquad\qquad 米 qquad\qquad
meter 米
km ............................... 千米...............................
kilometer 千米
co. .............................. company
Inc. ............................... Incorporation
LE ................................ Livre égyptienne (Egyptian Pound)
m qquad meter
km ............................... kilometer| co. .............................. | company |
| :--- | :--- |
| Inc. ............................... | Incorporation |
| LE ................................ | Livre égyptienne (Egyptian Pound) |
| m $\qquad$ | meter |
| km ............................... | kilometer |
ACRONYMS 缩略语
ASLA qquad\qquad American Society of Landscape Architects 美国景观设计师协会（ASLA）
CAPMAS 埃及中央公众动员和统计局（CAPMAS）
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 中央公共动员与统计局
CSCEC qquad\qquad China State Construction Engineering Corporation 中国建筑集团有限公司 qquad\qquad China State Construction Engineering Corporation
EEDC qquad\qquad Egypt Economic Development Conference 埃及经济发展大会（EEDC）
FAR qquad\qquad Floor Area Ratio 容积率 qquad\qquad 建筑面积比率
GBC qquad\qquad Green Building Council 绿色建筑委员会 qquad\qquad Green Building Council
GOPP qquad\qquad Green Building Council 绿色建筑委员会 qquad\qquad 绿色建筑协会
GPRS qquad\qquad General Organization of Physical Planning GPRS qquad\qquad 物理规划总局
GTZ 德国技术合作公司
Green Pyramid Rating System 绿色金字塔评级体系
HDB qquad\qquad Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit HDB qquad\qquad 技术合作协会
HHCP qquad\qquad Housing and Development Bank HHCP qquad\qquad 住房与发展银行
IMF qquad\qquad Helman Hurley Charvat Peacock / Architects, Inc. IMF qquad\qquad 赫尔曼·赫尔利·查瓦特·皮科克建筑事务所
LLP 有限责任合伙 qquad\qquad International Monetary Fund qquad\qquad 国际货币基金组织
MHUUD qquad\qquad Internone und
MoU qquad\qquad
Limited Liability Partnership 有限责任公司合伙制
Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development 住房、公用事业和城市发展部
NCPSL … Memorandum of Understanding NCPSL … 谅解备忘录
NDC’s 国家发展委员会 qquad\qquad National Center for Planning of State Land Uses qquad\qquad 国家土地利用规划中心
New Desert Cities 新沙漠城市计划
NRIAG qquad\qquad National Research Institute of Astronomy and Geophysics NRIAG qquad\qquad 国家天文与地球物理研究所
New Urban Communities Authority 新城市社区管理局
NUCA qquad\qquad 新城市管理局 qquad\qquad
National Urban Policy Study 国家城市政策研究
SODIC qquad\qquad
National Urban Policy Study 国家城市政策研究
Sixth of October Development and Investment Co. 十月六日开发投资公司
SOM
SWA
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP
TMG
Stephen Wen & Associates Architects
UDC
Talaat Moustafa Group 塔拉特·穆斯塔法集团
USAID 美国国际开发署
Urban Development Consortium 城市发展联盟
United States Agency for International Development 美国国际开发署
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Urban Ecology in New Desert Cities 新沙漠城市的城市生态
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Fig. 1: Golf club of the Palm Hills 图 1：棕榈山高尔夫俱乐部
residential development on the edge of 位于开罗卫星城十月六日城边缘的
Cairo’s satellite town 6th of October City as promoted in the December 2010 Palm Hills Developments newsletter (courtesy Palm Hills Developments) 2010 年 12 月棕榈山开发公司简报中宣传的开罗卫星城十月六日城（图片由棕榈山开发公司提供）
Fig. 2: Rendering of the Nile Corniche as envisioned in the government-sponsored strategic plan Cairo Vision 2050, devised in 2008 to position the city as a global player (courtesy Egypt’s General Organization for Physical Planning) 图 2：2008 年政府主导的战略规划《开罗 2050 愿景》中构想的尼罗河滨海大道效果图，旨在将开罗打造为全球重要城市（图片由埃及国土规划总局提供）
Fig. 3: Master plan rendering by Skidmore, Owings and Merrill for Egypt’s new capital city released under the motto “celebrating the city’s economic engine” at an investment conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, March 2015 (courtesy Skidmore, Owings and Merrill LLP) 图 3：2015 年 3 月沙姆沙伊赫投资会议上，Skidmore, Owings and Merrill 公司以"颂扬城市经济引擎"为主题发布的埃及新行政首都总体规划效果图（图片由 Skidmore, Owings and Merrill LLP 提供）
CONTRIBUTORS 贡献者
MARC ANGÉLIL is a professor in the Department of Architecture at ETH Zurich. His research focuses on the social and spatial development of metropolitan regions across the world. He has authored or co-authored several books, including Housing Cairo: The Informal Response (2016), on the informal urbanization of Egypt’s capital, Cidade de Deus! City of God! (2013) on informal mass housing in Rio de Janeiro, Indizien (2006) on the political economy of urban territories, and Cities of Change: Addis Ababa (2010) on urban transformation in developing countries. 马克·安杰利尔是苏黎世联邦理工学院建筑系的教授。他的研究聚焦于全球大都市区域的社会与空间发展。他撰写或合著了多部著作，包括探讨埃及首都非正规城市化现象的《开罗住房：非正规应对》（2016 年）、研究里约热内卢非正规大规模住房的《上帝之城！》（2013 年）、分析城市领土政治经济学的《迹象》（2006 年），以及关注发展中国家城市转型的《变革之城：亚的斯亚贝巴》（2010 年）。
DANIEL ARIÑO ESPALLARGAS is an architect and construction engineer with a degree from ETSALS Barcelona. He is a recipient of an award from AGAUR (Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i Recerca). Daniel has taught at ETSALS and worked at HPK Architekten in Switzerland. 丹尼尔·阿里尼奥·埃斯帕利亚加斯是拥有巴塞罗那 ETSALS 学位的建筑师与建筑工程专家，曾获加泰罗尼亚大学与研究资助管理局（AGAUR）奖项。丹尼尔曾在 ETSALS 任教，并任职于瑞士 HPK 建筑事务所。
CLUSTER (Cairo Lab for Urban Studies, Training, and Environmental Research) is an Egypt-based platform for art, urban research, and design initiatives in downtown Cairo that was co-founded by Omar Nagati and Beth Stryker. CLUSTER aims at establishing a critical space for architecture and urban discourse. Omar and Beth have been involved with the MAS Urban Design in Egypt since 2014. CLUSTER（开罗城市研究、培训与环境实验室）是由奥马尔·纳加蒂和贝丝·斯特赖克共同创立的埃及艺术平台，致力于开罗市中心的城市研究与设计项目。该机构旨在为建筑与城市议题建立一个批判性讨论空间。自 2014 年起，奥马尔与贝丝便持续参与埃及 MAS 城市设计项目。
FELIPE COMBEAU holds a degree in architecture from Universidad Católica de Chile. He has worked at Elemental, and with Enrique Browne Arquitectos. Since 2016, he has been a part of Rick Joy Architects, in Tucson, Arizona. 费利佩·孔博毕业于智利天主教大学建筑系，曾任职于 Elemental 建筑事务所及恩里克·布朗尼建筑师事务所。2016 年起加入美国亚利桑那州图森市的里克·乔伊建筑师团队。
AIKATERINI CHRISTOPOULOU graduated in architecture from the Department of Architectural Engineering at the University of Patras in 2014. She interned at Deltarchi in Athens. Her diploma thesis, (An alternative future for Athens), was exhibited at the Pan-Hellenic Exhibition of Architectural Projects. 艾卡捷里尼·克里斯托普洛于 2014 年毕业于帕特雷大学建筑工程系建筑专业，曾在雅典 Deltarchi 事务所实习。其毕业设计《雅典的另一种未来》曾参展希腊全国建筑项目展览。
ERIC DENIS holds a Ph.D. in urban and economic geography from the University of Caen, France, and an Habilitation à diriger des Recherches from Panthéon-Sorbonne University in Paris. He is a senior research fellow at the CNRS (director of research at the Géographie-Cités Lab, Paris). He lived in Cairo for over a decade (19932003). He has also worked in Sudan and currently conducts research in India. His research concerns metropolitan changes, social division of urban territories, and the evolution of urban systems, with a particular focus on territorial transformations and international comparisons. He has authored over fifty papers and books, including Atlas of Cairo (2000), Villes et urbanisation de l’Egypte (2007), and Subaltern Urbanization in India (2017). 埃里克·德尼持有法国卡昂大学城市与经济地理学博士学位，以及巴黎先贤祠-索邦大学指导研究资格。他现任法国国家科学研究院（CNRS）高级研究员（巴黎城市地理实验室研究主任）。他曾在开罗生活十余年（1993-2003 年），并在苏丹工作过，目前主要在印度开展研究。其研究领域涵盖大都市变迁、城市空间的社会分化及城市体系演变，尤其关注地域转型与国际比较。他已发表五十余部专著及论文，包括《开罗地图集》（2000 年）、《埃及城市与城市化》（2007 年）及《印度底层城市化》（2017 年）。
EKKACHAN EIAMANANWATTANA graduated in architecture from Chulalongkorn University. He has extensive professional experience working in Singapore with Mok Wei Wei and in Thailand with Creative Crews (projects include the Victoria Theatre and Concert Hall, the Lee Kong Chian Natural History Museum, and an office for the Association of Siamese Architects). 埃卡禅·伊亚玛纳瓦塔纳毕业于朱拉隆功大学建筑系。他拥有丰富的新加坡执业经验，曾与莫玮玮合作，并在泰国 Creative Crews 事务所任职（参与项目包括维多利亚剧院与音乐厅、李光前自然历史博物馆及暹罗建筑师协会办公楼）。
MOHAMED ELSHAHED is a Cairobased architect, independent researcher, and writer. He is the curator for the British Museum’s Modern Egypt Project. Elshahed has a Bachelor’s degree in architecture from the New Jersey Institute of Technology, holds a Master’s degree in Architecture from MIT, and teaches architectural history at the American University in Cairo. His doctoral degree from New York University, “Revolutionary Modernism? Architecture and the Politics of Transition in Egypt, 1936-1967,” focused on architecture and urban planning in Egypt during the period of political transition around the 1952 coup d’état. 穆罕默德·埃尔沙赫德是一位常驻开罗的建筑师、独立研究员兼作家，现任大英博物馆现代埃及项目的策展人。他拥有新泽西理工学院建筑学学士学位、麻省理工学院建筑学硕士学位，并在开罗美国大学教授建筑史。其纽约大学博士学位论文《革命现代主义？1936-1967 年埃及转型政治中的建筑》聚焦 1952 年政变前后埃及政治转型期的建筑与城市规划。
GUIDO GRECO graduated in architecture from Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Since 2012, he has been working with 吉多·格雷科毕业于罗萨里奥国立大学建筑系。自 2012 年起，他先后供职于
Faure Malamud Riveira Arquitectos and with Diego Arraigada Architects. Guido has also taught at the Facultad de Arquitectura, Planeamiento y Diseño, Argentina. 福尔·马拉穆德·里维拉建筑事务所与迭戈·阿拉伊加达建筑事务所，并曾在阿根廷建筑规划与设计学院任教。
GEORGIOS KALDIS is a licensed architect in Greece with a diploma from the National Technical University of Athens. During his exchange at HafenCity Universität Hamburg, he conducted research on the industrial archaeology of Germany as part of his final project. He has worked in Athens and in Šencur (Slovenia). 乔治奥斯·卡尔迪斯是希腊注册建筑师，持有雅典国立技术大学颁发的学位证书。在汉堡港口城市大学交换期间，他围绕德国工业考古学开展了毕业设计研究。曾在雅典和斯洛文尼亚什恩库尔两地执业。
YORGOS LAVANTSIOTIS holds a 约戈斯·拉万齐奥蒂斯持有
diploma in architecture and graduated with highest honors from the Department of Architecture at the University of Thessaly in 2015. Between 2011-2012, he studied at the Universität Darmstadt as an exchange student. In 2014, he worked as a teaching assistant at the University of Thessaly under Lois Papadopoulos. 建筑学学位证书，2015 年以最优异成绩毕业于色萨利大学建筑系。2011-2012 年间作为交换生就读于达姆施塔特工业大学。2014 年在洛伊丝·帕帕多普洛斯教授指导下担任色萨利大学助教。
CHRISTINA LAZOU holds a diploma in architecture from the National Technical University of Athens, from which she graduated with highest honors in 2014. She has practiced in Shanghai (UNIT-architects) and in Athens (MOB-architects, MRAarchitects). She completed the MAS Urban Design as a Geisendorf Foundation Scholar. 克里斯蒂娜·拉祖持有雅典国立技术大学建筑学学位证书，2014 年以最高荣誉毕业。曾先后在上海（UNIT 建筑事务所）和雅典（MOB 建筑事务所、MRA 建筑事务所）执业。作为盖桑多基金会学者完成城市设计高级研究硕士课程。
CHARLOTTE MALTERRE-BARTHES is an architect and urban designer. She is Director of Studies of the MAS in Urban Design, where she investigates the urban dynamics of Cairo. Since 2011 she has been conducting research and teaching with Prof. Dr. Marc Angélil. She is currently completing a doctoral degree on food and territories, with Egypt as a case study. She co-founded the urban research and design office OMNIBUS and edited, with Marc Angélil, the publications The School, the Book, the Town (2013) and Housing Cairo: The Informal Response (2016). 夏洛特·马尔泰尔-巴尔特斯是一位建筑师和城市规划设计师。她担任城市设计硕士项目（MAS）的学术主任，专注于开罗城市动态研究。自 2011 年起，她与马克·安杰利尔教授共同开展研究和教学工作。目前正在攻读博士学位，以埃及为案例研究食物与地域的关系。她联合创立了城市研究与设计事务所 OMNIBUS，并与马克·安杰利尔共同编辑出版了《学校、书籍、城镇》（2013 年）和《开罗住房：非正规应对策略》（2016 年）。
KATARZYNA PANKOWSKA holds a diploma with distinction in visual arts from the School of Fine Arts in Warsaw. In 2015, 卡塔日娜·潘科夫斯卡以优异成绩获得华沙美术学院视觉艺术专业文凭。2015 年，
she graduated with highest honors from Warsaw University of Technology with a master’s in architecture and urban planning. Her diploma project was awarded the best diploma of the year by the Architects’ Chamber of Warsaw. 她以最高荣誉毕业于华沙理工大学，取得建筑与城市规划硕士学位。其毕业设计荣获华沙建筑师协会年度最佳毕业设计奖。
HUGO DOS REIS VIEIRA PINTO received his diploma in architecture from the Academy of Architecture of Mendrisio, Switzerland, graduating in Atelier Valerio Olgiati in 2012. 雨果·多斯雷斯·维埃拉·平托于 2012 年毕业于瑞士门德里西奥建筑学院，在瓦莱里奥·奥尔吉亚蒂工作室获得建筑学文凭。
He worked at Celoria Architects in Switzerland and, in 2016, completed the MAS Urban Design as a Geisendorf Foundation Scholar. 他曾在瑞士的 Celoria 建筑事务所工作，并于 2016 年以盖森多夫基金会学者身份完成了城市设计硕士课程。
DAVID SIMS is an economist and urban planner based in Egypt since 1974. In addition to having worked in several Arab, Asian, and African countries, he has led studies on urban development, industrial estates, tourism, and other aspects of Egypt’s economic geography and spatial development. He is the author of Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City out of Control (2010) and Egypt’s Desert Dreams (2016). 戴维·西姆斯是一位经济学家和城市规划师，自 1974 年起常驻埃及。除在多个阿拉伯、亚洲和非洲国家工作外，他还主导了关于埃及城市发展、工业园区、旅游业及其经济地理与空间发展等领域的多项研究。其著作包括《解读开罗：失控城市的逻辑》（2010 年）和《埃及的沙漠梦想》（2016 年）。
CARY SIRESS is an architect and Senior Researcher at the Future Cities Laboratory (FCL) in Singapore as well as Guest Professor at the Graduate School of Architecture of Nanjing, China. His doctoral dissertation at the ETH Zurich is entitled “The Urban Unconscious: Mediating the Psyche and the City in the Twentieth Century” and concerns crosspollinations of seemingly autonomous, unrelated fields of inquiry. 卡里·西尔斯是新加坡未来城市实验室的高级研究员兼建筑师，同时担任中国南京建筑研究所客座教授。他在苏黎世联邦理工学院的博士论文题为《城市无意识：二十世纪心灵与城市的媒介研究》，探讨了看似独立无关的研究领域之间的交叉影响。
JIDE SLEIMAN HAIDAR graduated with a master’s in architecture with highest honors from the Institute of Fine Arts of the Lebanese University in 2015. Her final project was exhibited at the Arab Architecture Exhibition in Alexandria, Egypt, representing Lebanon. Jide has practiced in Lebanese and French architectural offices such as Dar Al Handasah, RENABO, and FMCP. JIDE SLEIMAN HAIDAR 于 2015 年以最优异成绩获得黎巴嫩大学美术学院建筑学硕士学位。她的毕业设计曾代表黎巴嫩参展埃及亚历山大举办的阿拉伯建筑展。Jide 曾在 Dar Al Handasah、RENABO 及 FMCP 等黎巴嫩与法国建筑事务所执业。
SOMETHING FANTASTIC is a design practice founded by three architects, Leonard Streich, Julian Schubert and Elena Schütz. The firm’s agenda is based on the idea that architecture is affected by everything and vice versa-does affect everything-and therefore working as architects implies a broad interest and involvement in the world. Something Fantastic’s practice includes de exhibitions, furniture, buildi development schemes. partners write (es. Next to designing, the Press, 2012), 2.g2 . \mathrm{g}. Something Fantastic, Ruby Urba 2012 at ETH MAS Urban Design), lecture, and art direct. In 2016 the studio was responsible for the design of the German Pavilion at the 15th La Biennale di Venezia entitled Making Heimat. Germany Arrival Country. SOMETHING FANTASTIC 是由三位建筑师伦纳德·斯特莱希、朱利安·舒伯特和埃琳娜·舒茨创立的设计事务所。该事务所的理念基于建筑与万物相互影响的哲学——既被万物塑造，亦反塑万物——因此建筑师的工作意味着对世界保持广泛的兴趣与介入。事务所的业务涵盖展览策划、家具设计、建筑开发方案等多元领域。创始合伙人还从事写作（如参与编著《Ruby Press, 2012》）、教学（如担任 ETH MAS 城市设计课程导师）、讲座及艺术指导工作。2016 年，该工作室负责设计了第 15 届威尼斯建筑双年展德国馆"打造家园·德国，抵达之国"的展览方案。
SOFIA SYMEONIDOU holds a diploma in architecture from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. She studied at the University of Portsmouth (UK), and also worked at Tsamourtzi Architectural Office in Thessaloniki. 索菲娅·西梅奥尼杜持有塞萨洛尼基亚里士多德大学建筑学文凭，曾于英国朴茨茅斯大学进修，并在塞萨洛尼基的察穆尔齐建筑事务所工作。
MIRETTE KHORSHED graduated in 2017 from the Master in City Planning program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. While there, she specialized in City Design and Development and wrote her thesis on the urban design proposal of Cairo’s new administrative capital. Prior to MIT, she completed her undergraduate degree in architecture at the American University in Cairo, Egypt. 米雷特·科尔谢德于 2017 年毕业于麻省理工学院城市规划硕士项目。在校期间，她专攻城市设计与开发，并以开罗新行政首都的城市设计方案作为毕业论文主题。在进入麻省理工之前，她获得了埃及开罗美国大学建筑学学士学位。
SHINJI TERADA graduated from Niigata University, Japan, in 2011 with a Master of Engineering in architecture. From 2011 to 2013, he was involved in several urban planning studies related to the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research program in Japan. 寺田慎二于 2011 年毕业于日本新潟大学，获建筑学工程硕士学位。2011 年至 2013 年间，他参与了日本科研补助金项目相关的多项城市规划研究。
YAO-TING WU graduated from the TungHai University Department of Architecture (THU) in 2007. From 2008 to 2014, he worked on public spaces in Yilan city and with Fieldoffice Architects+Huang ShengYuan in Taiwan. 吴耀庭 2007 年毕业于东海大学建筑系。2008 年至 2014 年间，他致力于宜兰市公共空间项目，并与台湾田野工作建筑师事务所+黄声远团队合作。
MARIA TSAGKA holds a diploma in architecture from the University of Thessaly. She collaborated with FluxOffice and decaArchitecture in Athens, and participated in the 2014 Venice Architecture Biennale as part of the Greek Pavilion. Her work as an assistant set designer was presented in the National Theatre of Greece, the Onassis Cultural Centre, the Theater Augsburg, and the Théâtre National de Strasbourg. 玛丽亚·察卡持有塞萨利大学建筑学文凭，曾与雅典 FluxOffice 及 decaArchitecture 事务所合作，并作为希腊馆成员参与 2014 年威尼斯建筑双年展。其舞台美术助理作品曾亮相希腊国家剧院、奥纳西斯文化中心、奥格斯堡剧院及斯特拉斯堡国家剧院。
CATERINA VIGUERA graduated from the Escola Superior d’Arquitectura de Barcelona (ETSAB) in 2011. She worked with the artist Vito Acconci and Storefront for Art and Architecture in New York. She also gathered three years of experience as an architect in Zürich. 卡特琳娜·维格拉 2011 年毕业于巴塞罗那高等建筑学院（ETSAB），曾与艺术家维托·阿肯锡及纽约 Storefront 艺术与建筑机构合作，并在苏黎世积累三年建筑师从业经验。
OLGA VOUGIOUKALAKI holds a diploma in architecture and graduated with highest honors from the National Technical University of Athens in 2015. In the same year, she received the Limmat Award of Excellence. She studied at the Universität Stuttgart as an exchange student and practiced in Chania (Greece) and Maribor (Slovenia). 奥尔加·沃吉奥卡拉基 2015 年以最优异成绩获雅典国立理工大学建筑学文凭，同年荣获 Limmat 卓越奖。她曾作为交换生就读于斯图加特大学，并在希腊干尼亚与斯洛文尼亚马里博尔两地实践。
SEUNGHEE YANG is a Korean urbanist. She studied civil, urban, and geosystem engineering at Seoul National University, and architecture at Tsinghua University. She worked as a researcher and practitioner in Korea and China, where her work has been published and exhibited. 杨承熙（SEUNGHEE YANG）是韩国城市规划学者。她先后在首尔国立大学攻读土木、城市与地理系统工程专业，在清华大学研修建筑学。她曾在韩国和中国从事研究与实践工作，其成果已发表并参展。
AKNAW YOHANNES TADDESE is an architect and urban planner. He graduated from the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building Construction and City Development (EiABC). He has assisted with research projects on sustainable architecture and has worked at Zero Carbon Designs/STRAWTEC in East Africa. He won the first prize in the ARCHIGINEER AFRICA international design competition. He completed the MAS Urban Design as a Geisendorf Foundation Scholar. 阿卡纳·约翰尼斯·塔德塞（AKNAW YOHANNES TADDESE）是建筑师兼城市规划师，毕业于埃塞俄比亚建筑、施工与城市发展学院（EiABC）。他参与过可持续建筑研究项目，并在东非 Zero Carbon Designs/STRAWTEC 公司工作，曾荣获 ARCHIGINEER AFRICA 国际设计竞赛一等奖。作为盖桑多基金会学者，他完成了城市设计硕士课程。
Appendix 附录
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 致谢
This book is based on a research and design studio conducted in Zurich and Cairo during the academic year 2015-2016. We would like to thank all that have offered their collaboration, input, and support during this time. We are grateful to Omar Nagati, Beth Stryker, Kareem Ibrahim, Heba Hussein, Mostafa Aly Salem, and John Hanna. Thanks go to MSA University for hosting us in Sixth of October. Many thanks also go to Mohamed Rafik Sadek for agreeing to be our “desert cities” photographer. 本书基于 2015-2016 学年在苏黎世和开罗开展的研究设计工作室成果。我们要感谢在此期间提供合作、建议与支持的所有人士，特别感谢奥马尔·纳加提、贝丝·斯特赖克、卡里姆·易卜拉欣、赫芭·侯赛因、穆斯塔法·阿里·萨利姆和约翰·汉纳。感谢十月六日城 MSA 大学对我们的接待。同时衷心感谢穆罕默德·拉菲克·萨德克同意担任我们的"沙漠城市"专题摄影师。
We would like to thank Maryam Kamal, Rana Tarek Kamal, Omneya El Kamali, Ehsan Naguib, Reem El Attar, Rana El Rashidy, Eman Farouk, Ahmed El Melegy, and all the staff at CLUSTER. Our sincere thanks also to Hamdy Reda for his great insight and welcoming hospitality in Ard el-Lewa. 我们要向玛丽亚姆·卡迈勒、拉娜·塔里克·卡迈勒、奥姆尼亚·埃尔卡迈利、埃桑·纳吉布、里姆·阿塔尔、拉娜·拉希迪、伊曼·法鲁克、艾哈迈德·梅莱吉以及 CLUSTER 机构全体工作人员致谢。特别感谢哈姆迪·雷达在阿尔德勒瓦社区给予的深刻见解与热情款待。
Special appreciation is due to David Sims, Eric Denis, Heba Hussein, Aly el-Shafei, Andreas Boden, Fabienne Hölzel, Eirini Kasioumi, and Ludwig Engel for their presentations and input during the “Desert Cities Workshop” conducted in Zurich in March 2016, as well as to Matias Echanove, Rahul Srivastrava, Doreen Heng Liu, Rainer Hehl, Kenny Cupers, Michael Martin, Nele Dechmann, Miro Roman, Diana AlvarezMarin, Kim Förster, Sarah Nichols, Nils Havelka, Dubravka Sekulic, Daniela Ortiz dos Santos, and Harald Stühlinger for their influential lectures and teaching sessions during the second semester of the MAS program. 特别感谢 David Sims、Eric Denis、Heba Hussein、Aly el-Shafei、Andreas Boden、Fabienne Hölzel、Eirini Kasioumi 和 Ludwig Engel 在 2016 年 3 月苏黎世"沙漠城市研讨会"上所做的精彩演讲与贡献；同时感谢 Matias Echanove、Rahul Srivastrava、Doreen Heng Liu、Rainer Hehl、Kenny Cupers、Michael Martin、Nele Dechmann、Miro Roman、Diana AlvarezMarin、Kim Förster、Sarah Nichols、Nils Havelka、Dubravka Sekulic、Daniela Ortiz dos Santos 和 Harald Stühlinger 在 MAS 项目第二学期极具影响力的讲座与教学课程。
We are also grateful to Mark Elkatsha, Kareem Ibrahim, Sarah Graham, and Edi Medilanski for their productive comments at the final presentations in May 2016. 我们还要感谢 Mark Elkatsha、Kareem Ibrahim、Sarah Graham 和 Edi Medilanski 在 2016 年 5 月终期汇报中提出的建设性意见。
We are also grateful to Sascha Delz for his tutoring and help on writing the essays, in the frame of the Urban Mutations on the Edge seminar. 衷心感谢 Sascha Delz 在"边缘城市突变"研讨课框架内对论文写作的指导与帮助。
Finally, thank you to the staff at Professor Marc Angélil’s chair for their support, feedback, and comments during the MAS process, in particular Ciro Miguel, as well as Roxanne De Raeymaecker for her assistance throughout the year. 最后，特别致谢 Marc Angélil 教授教席团队在整个 MAS 项目过程中给予的支持与反馈，尤其是 Ciro Miguel 的付出，以及 Roxanne De Raeymaecker 全年提供的协助。
The content of this publication was realized by students of the Master of Advanced Studies in Urban Design at ETH Zurich．The program was initiated by the Chair of Professor Marc Angélil at the Department of Architecture，in collaboration with the Future Cities Laboratory at the Singapore－ETH Center for Global Environmental Sustainability． 本出版物内容由苏黎世联邦理工学院城市设计高级研究硕士课程的学生完成。该项目由建筑系马克·安吉利尔教授教席发起，并与新加坡-苏黎世联邦理工学院全球环境可持续性未来城市实验室合作开展。
Editors：Marc Angélil， Charlotte Malterre－Barthes Concept：Charlotte Malterre－Barthes and Something Fantastic－Julian Schubert，Elena Schütz，Leonard Streich Design：Something Fantastic Art Dept． （J．Schubert，E．Schütz，L．Streich with Ruben Bernegger，Julius Fischötter， Ahmad Hammoud and Fernanda Tellez Velasco） 编辑：马克·安杰利、夏洛特·马特尔-巴特斯
概念：夏洛特·马特尔-巴特斯与非凡事物工作室（朱利安·舒伯特、埃琳娜·舒茨、伦纳德·斯特莱希）
设计：非凡事物工作室艺术部（朱利安·舒伯特、埃琳娜·舒茨、伦纳德·斯特莱希与鲁本·伯内格、尤利乌斯·菲施埃特、艾哈迈德·哈茂德、费尔南达·特列斯·贝拉斯科合作）
MAS Urban Design teaching team： Charlotte Malterre－Barthes（Director of Studies），Something Fantastic－Julian Schubert，Elena Schütz，Leonard Streich MAS 城市设计教学团队：
夏洛特·马特尔-巴特斯（学术主任）、非凡事物工作室（朱利安·舒伯特、埃琳娜·舒茨、伦纳德·斯特莱希）
Typeface：Caslon 540 LT 字体：卡斯隆 540 LT
Paper：Munken Print White 90 g Printing：Medialis 用纸：蒙肯纯白 90 克 印刷：Medialis
Every effort has been made to optain proper credit information and permission． However，we have used a small number of images for which copyright holders could not be identified．It has been our assumption that such images belong to the public domain．If you claim ownership of any of the images presented here，and have not been properly identified，please notify Ruby Press and we will be happy to make an acknowledgement in a reprint of this publication． 我们已尽最大努力获取正确的署名信息和使用许可。然而，仍有少量图片无法确认版权持有者。我们默认此类图片属于公共领域。若您对书中任何图片拥有版权但未被正确署名，请联系 Ruby Press 出版社，我们将在本书重印时予以补正。
Printed in Germany ISBN 978－3－944074－17－7 德国印刷 ISBN 978－3－944074－17－7
This publication was made possible with the generous support of：ETH Zurich， ETH Zurich Department of Architecture， Singapore－ETH Centre for Global Environmental Sustainability，Future Cities Laboratory 本出版物得以出版，承蒙以下机构慷慨资助：苏黎世联邦理工学院、苏黎世联邦理工学院建筑系、新加坡-ETH 全球环境可持续性中心、未来城市实验室
form joint ventures 组建合资企业
model accommodates their desire for safety and privacy while eliminating walls.
