REFORMED
ETHICS 개혁주의 윤리학

CREATED, FALLEN, AND CONVERTED HUMANITY
창조, 타락, 회심한 인간

edited by JOHN BOLT ...
HERMAN BAVINCK ...

REFORMED ...
ETHICS ...

番 VOLUME ONE ’

\frac{122}{35}

...

REFORMED ETHICS 개혁주의 윤리학

CREATED, FALLEN, AND CONVERTED HUMANITY
창조되고, 타락하고, 회개한 인류

HERMAN BAVINCK edited by JOHN BOLT
헤르만 바빙크 지음, 존 볼트 편집with JESSICA JOUSTRA, NELSON D. KLOOSTERMAN, ANTOINE THERON, DIRK VAN KEULEN
제시카 주스트라, 넬슨 D. 클루스터만, 앙투안 테론, 디르크 판 퀼렌 공동 작업

B) ...BakerAcademic ...a division of Baker Publishing Group Grand Rapids, Michigan
미시간 주 그랜드래피즈 소재 베이커 출판 그룹의 자회사

© 2019 by John Bolt ...
Published by Baker Academic
베이커 아카데믹 출간
a division of Baker Publishing Group
베이커 출판 그룹의 한 부서
PO Box 6287, Grand Rapids, MI 49516-6287 ...
www.bakeracademic.com ...
Ebook edition created 2019
2019년 제작된 전자책 버전
Ebook corrections 07.31.2019
전자책 수정 사항 2019.07.31
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means-for example, electronic, photocopy, recording-without the prior written permission of the publisher. The only exception is brief quotations in printed reviews.
저작권은 출판사에 있습니다. 출판사의 사전 서면 허가 없이는 본 출판물의 일부를 복제, 저장 또는 전송(전자, 복사, 녹음 등 어떠한 형태로든)할 수 없습니다. 인쇄된 서평에 인용하는 경우만 예외로 합니다.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is on file at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
도서관 의회 출판물 목록 데이터는 워싱턴 DC의 의회 도서관에 보관되어 있습니다.

ISBN 978-1-4934-1444-4 ...
Unless indicated otherwise, Scripture quotations are from the ESV® Bible (The Holy Bible, English Standard Version®), copyright © 2001 by Crossway, a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers. Used by permission. All rights reserved. ESV Text Edition: 2011
별도로 표기되지 않는 한, 성경 인용문은 ESV® 성경(English Standard Version®)에서 인용하였으며, © 2001 Good News Publishers의 출판 사역인 Crossway의 저작권입니다. 사용 허가를 받았습니다. 모든 권리는 보유합니다. ESV 본문 버전: 2011

Scripture quotations labeled KJV are from the King James Version of the Bible.
KJV로 표기된 성경 인용문은 킹제임스 버전(KJV) 성경에서 인용하였습니다.
Scripture quotations labeled NIV are from the Holy Bible, New International Version®. NIV®. Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984, 2011 by Biblica, Inc.

^{TM}

^{TM}

Zondervan의 사용 허가를 받았습니다. 전 세계적 권리 보유. www.zondervan.com

Quotations of the Heidelberg Catechism, the Belgic Confession, and the Canons of Dort are from the translations produced by the joint task force of the Reformed Church in America and the Christian Reformed Church in North America and available at https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/confessions.
하이델베르크 교리문답, 벨직 신앙고백, 도르트 신조의 인용문은 북미 개혁교회(RCA)와 기독교개혁교회(CRC)의 공동 작업팀이 번역한 버전을 사용하였으며, https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/confessions에서 확인할 수 있습니다.

For Rimmer and $†$ Ruth De Vries
리머와 루스 드 브리즈에게

in gratitude for your kingdom-minded generosity
왕국을 향한 너그러운 마음에 감사하며

Contents 목차

Cover …

\underset{―}{i}

...
Half Title Page … ii ...
Title Page … iii ...
Copyright Page … iv
저작권 페이지 … iv
Dedication … v ...
Editor’s Preface … ix ...
Abbreviations … xvii ...
Introduction to Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics by Dirk van Keulen and John Bolt … xxi ...
Introduction … 1 ...
§1 Historical Overview of Christian Ethics …

\underset{―}{2}

...
§2 Terminology …

\underset{―}{17}

...
§3 Division and Organization of Ethics … 23 ...
§4 Foundation and Method of Ethics … 25 ...
Book I Humanity before Conversion … 31 ...

Essential Human Nature … 33 ...
§5 Human Beings, Created in God’s Image … 35 ...
§6 The Content of Human Nature … $\underset{―}{44}$ ...
§7 Human Relationships … $\underset{―}{49}$ ...
Humanity under the Power of Sin … 77 ...
§8 The Devastation of the Image of God in Humanity … 78 ...
§9 The Organizing Principle and Classification of Sins … $\underset{―}{100}$ ...
The Self against the Neighbor and God … 117 ...
§10 Sins of Egoism in the Narrow Sense … 118 ...
§11 Sins against the Neighbor … 129 ...
§12 Sins against God … 139 ...
The Fallen Image of God … 147 ...
§13 The Image of God in Fallen Human Beings … 148 ...
Human Conscience … $\underset{―}{165}$ ...
§14 The Conscience … $\underset{―}{167}$ ...
The Sinner and the Law … $\underset{―}{215}$ ...
§15 The Law … $\underset{―}{216}$ ...
§16 Natural Morality … 228 ...
Book II Converted Humanity … 237 ...
Life in the Spirit … 239 ...
§17 The Nature of the Spiritual Life … 240 ...
§18 The Origin of the Spiritual Life … $\underset{―}{253}$ ...
§19 The First and Basic Activity of the Spiritual Life … $\underset{―}{264}$ ...
Life in the Spirit in the Church’s History … $\underset{―}{273}$ ...
§20 Mysticism, Pietism, and Methodism … 275 ...
The Shape and Maturation of the Christian Life … 315 ...
§21 The Shape of the Christian Life: The Imitation of Christ $\underset{―}{317}$ ...
§22 The Growth of the Spiritual Life … 341 ...
Persevering in the Christian Life … 361 ...
§23 Security and Sealing $\underset{―}{363}$ ...
Pathologies of the Christian Life … $\underset{―}{415}$ ...
$§ 24$ Diseases of the Spiritual Life and Their Roots 417 ...
Restoration and Consummation of the Christian Life … 461 ...
§25 Means of Restoration … 462 ...
§26 Consummation of the Spiritual Life; Meditation on Death … $\underset{―}{493}$ ...
Bibliography … 495 ...

Selected Scripture Index $\underset{―}{528}$ ...

Name Index

\underset{―}{541}

...
Subject Index

\underset{―}{554}

...
Back Cover 565 ...

Editor's Preface ...

The book you hold in your hands took a long journey to get there, an unlikely, unplanned, and uncharted journey. It is the first volume of a projected three-volume set that gives readers access to Herman Bavinck’s lectures on Reformed ethics, delivered to his students at the Theological School in Kampen, from 1883/84 through the fall of 1902. Though the work is methodologically identical to Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics, and there are hints that Bavinck may have intended eventually to publish it, he did not, leaving behind only a 1,100-page handwritten manuscript. After Bavinck’s death in 1921, the manuscript languished in the Bavinck Archives at the Historical Documentation Center for Dutch Protestantism (1800 to present) at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, until it was discovered by Dirk van Keulen in 2008.1 Readers of this volume are, therefore, among the privileged first group to gain access to Bavinck’s systematic reflection on theological ethics since his own students who heard the lectures in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. ...

History buffs love playing “What if?” parlor games, and the temptation is hard to resist when reflecting on the pilgrimage of this material from Bavinck’s own hand to this published translation. The word that comes to mind for me, with intentional bilingual wordplay, is “wonder.” In the Dutch language (German Wunder) the word means “miracle.” I want to be careful not to devalue the word “miracle” with overuse, but it is accurate to say that I and the editorial team that worked on this project are filled with wonder and awe at God’s gracious, providential care and guidance as we make this work available for the worldwide church. Not only were we richly supplied by generous benefactors with ample provisions for a long and demanding journey, but so many unconnected events had to fall into place at just the right time for the project even to get started, much less brought to successful completion. All this feels like the inverse of the well-known proverb, “For want of a nail . . . the kingdom was lost,”

^{2}

a series of connected events that positively and constructively accumulated to help ...
publish this work. In remarkable ways, today has proved to be just the “right time” for this project. ...

This project is unimaginable without the preparatory project of translating and publishing the English version of Bavinck’s four-volume Reformed Dogmatics, completed in 2008. To commemorate this occasion, along with the centenary of Bavinck’s Princeton Stone Lectures, “The Philosophy of Revelation,”

\underset{―}{3}

in September 2008 Calvin Theological Seminary hosted a conference, “A Pearl and a Leaven: Herman Bavinck for the 21st Century.” In preparation for this conference, while researching Bavinck material for a paper on the imitation of Christ, Dr. Dirk van Keulen “stumbled on” the Reformed Ethics manuscript (along with others) in the Bavinck archives. After he presented his paper, reporting the discovery of his find, an international group of Bavinck scholars conferred and agreed that the manuscript needed to be translated and published. They also indicated the value of creating a network of scholars and students interested in staying informed about each other’s research and scholarship. The Bavinck Institute at Calvin Theological Seminary, the Bavinck Society, and the annual electronic journal, The Bavinck Review, were the result. 4 To sum this up: the Reformed Dogmatics project paved the way for these Reformed Ethics volumes by bringing together people (including a supportive publisher) who had demonstrated the competent ability to complete it; and the positive reception of the Reformed Dogmatics also created a large audience of students, pastors, and scholars eager to see this work on ethics become available. ...

In addition, to be able to speak of a “group” of Bavinck scholars in 2008 was itself quite remarkable. When I completed my dissertation on Bavinck in 1982, sixty years after Bavinck’s death, mine was only the fifth doctoral dissertation devoted to Bavinck’s theology; 5 there was no “community” of Bavinck scholars. However, since that time another nine doctoral dissertations have been defended, either focused entirely on Bavinck or making significant contributions to Bavinck scholarship by analyzing his theology and comparing it with others.

\underset{―}{6}

In addition, an international congress on Bavinck’s theology at the 150th anniversary of his birth was held in Kampen, the Netherlands, on October 28-30, 2004, and a collection of twenty lectures given there was published under the conference’s theme, “Encounters with Bavinck.”

^{7}

And finally, a full-length biography of Bavinck in the English language has also appeared. 8 ...

All this is to say that conditions were ripe for generating interest and support for translating and publishing Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics in English. But that is not all; we have to go back to the earlier and equally unlikely project of translating and publishing his Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was well known and appreciated in North America, and an early attempt was made to translate it into English. 9 William Hendrickson had competed the translation of the first part of volume 2 (The Doctrine of God) by July 1930, but had to wait until 1951 to see it published. 10 No additional volumes were translated, perhaps because during this same time the basic outline of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics was being introduced to North American Reformed students of theology through the writings of Louis Berkhof, professor at Calvin Theological Seminary from 1906 to 1944.11 Berkhof published his own Reformed Dogmatics in two volumes in 1932, followed by an accompanying Introduction to Reformed Theology as a separate volume that same year.

\underset{―}{12}

However, in the preface to his Introduction to Reformed Theology, “Berkhof acknowledged that the general plan of his work was based on the first volume of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek and that in a few chapters he followed Bavinck’s argumentation as well.” 13 Henry Zwaanstra concludes that “Berkhof’s theology was essentially the theology of Herman Bavinck.” 14 It was through Berkhof’s Systematic Theology that I was indirectly introduced to Herman Bavinck during my student days at Calvin Seminary. 15 ...

With this popularity of Berkhof’s Systematic Theology in view, who could have contemplated the possibility of translating Bavinck’s fourvolume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek into English? Why would a publisher take on this major project of bringing a late nineteenth-century Dutch theology, and a competitor to Berkhof, into print? By the 1990s the memory of Herman Bavinck had practically vanished from the Dutch immigrant community of Reformed people, restricted for the most part to the Christian Reformed Church of North America, a relatively small denomination. Where would the market be for such a venture? Who was interested? To be truthful, while I was still in the dissertation-writing stage of my PhD program, a Canadian publisher, knowing that I was working on Bavinck, passed on to me a translation of one section and asked for advice about publishing it. For a variety of reasons, I strongly recommended against it. When I began teaching at Calvin Seminary in the fall semester of 1989, the ...
very notion of translating this work was farthest from my mind. If the efforts in the 1930s had floundered, among other reasons undoubtedly because of the worldwide Depression, who today would be willing to front the required cost, now substantially increased? The prospect for this project was remote and its possible success highly unlikely. And then . . . ...

Shortly after I began teaching at Calvin Seminary, I was approached by a number of graduate students from Korea who wanted to study Bavinck’s theology. They arranged for John Vriend to translate, on an ad hoc basis, key sections of the Reformed Dogmatics. When the demand grew, he raised the possibility of a more systematic approach to translating the entire work, indicating his willingness to serve as translator. The then-president of Calvin Seminary, James De Jong, convened a group of pastors and seminary teachers from West Michigan, along with Rich Baker, president of Baker Publishing Group, at a lunch meeting to discuss forming a translation society for this purpose. From this gathering the ecumenical Dutch Reformed Translation Society was formed in January 1994. We started by doing two sections as trial balloons; the second half of volume 4 (eschatology) was published in 1996 as The Last Things: Hope for This World and the Next, and the second half of volume 2 (creation) in 1999 as In the Beginning: Foundations of Creation Theology. Thanks to the positive response to these two volumes, the board of the DRTS, with the encouragement of Baker Publishing, committed to completing all four volumes. Volumes 1 through 4 appeared, in successive order, in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008. We therefore completed our work roughly one hundred years after Bavinck ended his work on the second, revised, and definitive edition of his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. ...

During the same time we began work on our project, Calvin Theological Seminary inaugurated its new doctoral program. Under the leadership of my colleague and friend Richard Muller, CTS over time developed a reputation for being a place to study Reformed theology and especially the Protestant orthodoxy of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Bavinck’s late nineteenth-century appropriation of this tradition and bringing it into engagement with modern theology and philosophy served as a perfect complement to this; CTS graduate students provided much-needed informed assistance for work on the Reformed Dogmatics and now continue to provide help on the Reformed Ethics. ...

As translators and editors of the Reformed Ethics, we faced numerous new challenges not encountered in the earlier project. Rather than a text carefully edited and prepared for publication, we were working from a digitally transcribed 1,100-page handwritten manuscript that Bavinck used for his lectures to his students. In many places the text consists of series of phrases and key words in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin that required significant additional narrative sinew and tissue on Bavinck’s skeleton to create a readable, understandable work. After experimenting with rigorous scrupulosity and placing all editorial completions, insertions, and transitions in the conventional square brackets [ ], we have decided to forgo the practice for the most part, although instances of substantial construction and reconstruction will be indicated in the footnotes. We also wanted to keep the text clean from the excessive clutter of parentheses or brackets and foreign-language original words, phrases, or titles that are significant from a scholarly point of view. All of these will generally be provided in footnotes, using the following abbreviations: DO = Dutch-language original; FO = French-language original; GO = German-language original; GrO = Greeklanguage original; HO = Hebrew-language original; LO = Latin-language original. (Occasionally, Bavinck creates an interesting term or phrase by combining a non-Dutch term with a specific Dutch word; e.g., the combination of Dutch and German in in zichzelf begründen. We mark these as DO/GO.) Exceptions to this practice of putting foreign terms in footnotes can be found in sections where Bavinck engages in significant word-study analysis of important biblical terms, and it was necessary to highlight them in the text. 16 Paralleling the Reformed Dogmatics, a précis prepared by the editor is provided for each chapter. The length and complexity of Bavinck’s chapters are a challenge for even the best-informed and attentive reader, and the précis serve as narrative outline guides. All this is to say that you will be reading a work that has been significantly reconstructed and amplified for clarity and utility. However, we have not altered its message; you are hearing the genuine voice of Herman Bavinck, including prejudices we might not share and claims with which we might disagree. Furthermore, those who are eager to have full access to the original for scholarly, historical purposes will be able to consult the Dutch critical edition being prepared simultaneously by Dirk van Keulen and to be published by Boekencentrum, Zoetermeer, the Netherlands. ...

An important part of the “wonder” we experienced with the publication of this volume comes from the gratitude we feel to God for the many people who have contributed to the project. This is our “Thank you!” For more than twenty years now, from the beginning of my work as editor of the Reformed Dogmatics and now continuing with the Reformed Ethics, Baker Academic has been a wonderful partner, everything one could wish for in a publisher. Executive vice president Jim Kinney has served with distinction for many years on the board of the Dutch Reformed Translation Society, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Reformed Ethics project, has demonstrated flexibility and encouragement when the project morphed from an initial one-volume work to its current three volumes, and has been a good friend and wise counselor. Wells Turner, who headed Baker’s editorial team on the Reformed Dogmatics, was the initial point person for the Reformed Ethics and provided helpful counsel and competent service as we struggled with the numerous editorial decisions involved with a translated and unedited text. Tim West, who has assumed the leadership of editing this volume and the two that remain, has also been a patient, understanding, and constructive partner. Thank you to both. ...

The board of the Dutch Reformed Translation Society has been a source of encouragement, good advice, and financial backing from the beginning. For that reason, thanks are also due to the many who have supported the DRTS with their gifts over the past twenty years. The Heritage Fund of Calvin Theological Seminary provided funds to make possible our weeklong editorial team sessions in the summers of 2015, 2016, and 2017. Dr. Rimmer and Mrs. Ruth De Vries 17 have been generous contributors to the greater project of bringing the work of Dutch neo-Calvinism to the attention and utility of the non-Dutch-speaking world through, among other things, the work of the Kuyper Center at Princeton Theological Seminary and the Kuyper Translation Project headquartered at the Acton Institute in Grand Rapids, Michigan. They also stepped in at critical moments when we needed funds to keep the work going on Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics. For all that and more, Rimmer and Ruth, thank you! This book is for you. ...

We would not have been able to continue our work without the support of a number of other friends of good Reformed theology: Sid and Cate Jansma, Doug and Kathy Kool, Ray and Linda Mulder, Henk and Sharon Ottens, John and Candy Steen, Harry and Joan Van Tol, the estate of Hubert and Aletta Slegers, and the 110+ members of the Bavinck Society. Your ...
kindness and generosity are also one of the important “wonders” that come to mind in my reflections about our work. ...

For a number of reasons already mentioned, Calvin Theological Seminary was the right place for this project. Herewith my thanks to the administration and board of CTS for several sabbatical leaves and a publication leave. The following CTS students provided essential assistance in researching obscure references, chasing down internet resources and links, creating bibliographies, and copyediting and proofreading: Ashley Stam-Bonnes, Thiago da Silva, Laura De Jong, Gayle Doornbos-Kloostra, Jessica Joustra, Philip Djung, Philip Kim, Antoine Theron, and Erin Zoutendam. 18 The high quality of that assistance may be inferred from the fact that two members of that list are also included in the list of editorial team members who not only met for an intensive weeklong session in the summer of 2015 but also were willing to repeat the experience in 2016 and 2017. In addition, they continued to work on the material, translating and editing, during the time between our summer sessions. To Jessica Joustra, Nelson D. Kloosterman, Antoine Theron, and Dirk van Keulen: working with you on this wonderful manuscript has been a joy, intellectually and spiritually. Our friendship, shared deep appreciation for Herman Bavinck, and our common bond in Christ are the greatest “wonder” of this project. ...

And finally, I want to thank those whose translating (and editing) skills were an essential part of this production: Raymond Blacketer, Harry Boonstra, Anthony and Femke Elenbaas, Gerrit Sheeres, and Harry Van Dyke. Your work was not easy. Working from a manuscript that was compact and even fragmentary and that included Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, and German words, phrases, and works presented challenges that you met and conquered. Translating can be a lonely work, but we trust that seeing the final product and knowing that you played an important role in bringing it forth may provide its own rewards. Well done and thank you! There were times when I as editor reached the limit of my linguistic ability. The following helped me too many times to keep track of the number: Ken Bratt for Latin, Barbara Carville for German, Dean Deppe and Jeff Weima for Greek, Herman De Vries for Dutch and German, Arie Leder and Carl Bosma for Hebrew (and Dutch), and Richard Muller for all of the above and more. Both Dirk van Keulen and I are also indebted to Dr. J. P. de Vries, who transcribed Herman Bavinck’s handwritten manuscript into an electronic format for our great benefit. Thank you all! ...

Note to the Reader ...

The English Standard Version has been our default Bible translation; to be true to Bavinck we wanted a translation that was more “literal” and less “dynamically equivalent” in its approach to the biblical text. Other translations used will be clearly marked in the text. ...

The World Wide Web has been another of the “wonders” for those of us working on this project. Not only does it make the task of tracking bibliographic items much easier (e.g., via WorldCat); the several projects dedicated to digitizing the books of ages present and past has been a real gift. My appreciation for Google Books, Internet Archive, and the Hathi Trust Digital Library, in particular, is unbounded. We discovered that most of the sources Bavinck cites are available online. Adding all these links to our footnotes would have added a significant number of pages to this volume and made it more expensive as well as cumbersome and unattractive. Instead, as part of our editorial work on this volume, we have created files for each chapter (and the bibliography) consisting only of the footnotes and hyperlinks to what we judge to be the best of these sources online. This will be a major time-saver for students and scholars who want to explore any of the subjects covered in this volume, and has the added bonus of increasing one’s bibliographic “repertoire” of contemporary ethics, adding important works from the history of Christian ethical reflection that researchers should but usually do not know. Information on how to access these files will be available on the website of The Bavinck Institute at Calvin Theological Seminary at https://bavinckinstitute.org/. ...

inspiratie; and Bolt, Theological Analysis. However, scholarly attention at the highest (doctoral) level to Bavinck’s philosophy and psychology of education, his pedagogy, began shortly after his death; for details see note 4 in our “Introduction to Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics.” ...
6. Hielema, “Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption”; Gleason, “Centrality of the unio mystica”; van Keulen, Bijbel en dogmatiek; van den Belt, Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology; Burger, Being in Christ; de Wit, On the Way to the Loving God; Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism; Huttinga, Participation and Communicability. ...
7. Harinck and Neven, Ontmoetingen met Bavinck. ...
8. Gleason, Herman Bavinck. ...
9. See Bolt, “Bavinck Speaks English,” 120-22. ...
10. Published in Grand Rapids by Eerdmans; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977. ...
11. For more on Louis Berkhof, including the relationship of his own Systematic Theology to Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, see Zwaanstra, “Louis Berkhof.” ...
12. Published in Grand Rapids by Eerdmans. The multivolume edition, minus the Introduction (Prolegomena), was brought into a single volume and repackaged under the title Systematic Theology in 1938; it went through numerous printings, and a new edition that incorporated the Introduction was published in 1996. In part or whole it has been translated into Chinese, French, Korean, Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish. For more on the history of Berkhof’s Systematic Theology, in particular the prolegomena, Introduction to Reformed Theology, see Richard Muller’s preface to the 1996 combined edition of Berkhof’s Systematic Theology. ...
13. Zwaanstra, “Louis Berkhof,” 166. ...
14. Zwaanstra, “Louis Berkhof,” 167. ...
15. In addition, one of my systematic theology professors, Anthony Hoekema, who was deeply indebted to Bavinck, frequently referred to him in class and even passed out to us his own translations of a few key passages from the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, notably “The Wideness of God’s Mercy,” one of the last sections of Bavinck’s eschatology (RD, 4:724-27). ...
16. Notably in chap. 2, §8, where Bavinck explores biblical imagery and terminology for humanity in the state and condition of sin. ...
17. Ruth De Vries went to be with her Lord and Savior on August 29, 2018, while this volume was in its final stages of production. We miss her. ...
18. It is also worth mentioning that this is an international group with representatives from Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, South Africa, and South Korea as well as the United States. ...

Abbreviations ...

ACW	Ancient Christian Writers ...
ANF	The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. 10 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1885-96. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950-51. ...
ASV	American Standard Version ...
Bavinck Archives ...	Archive no. 346 of the Historical Documentation Centre, Free University, Amsterdam. ...
BLGNP	Biographisch Lexicon voor de Geschiedenis van het Nederlandse Protestantisme. 6 vols. Kampen: Kok, 1978-2006. ...
ca. ...	circa, about ...
CEV chap(s). ...	Contemporary English Version chapter(s) ...
Christ. Encycl. $^{1}$ ...	Christelijke Encyclopaedie voor het Nederlands Volk. Edited by F. W. Grosheide, et al. 6 vols. Kampen: Kok, n.d. [1925?-1931]. ...
Christ. Encycl. $^{2}$ ...	Christelijke Encyclopedie. Edited by F. W. Grosheide and G. P. van Itterzon. 2nd rev. ed. 6 vols. Kampen: Kok, 1956-61. ...
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum ...
CTJ	Calvin Theological Journal ...
d. ...	died ...
Denzinger ...	Denzinger, Henry. The Sources of Catholic Dogma. Translated by Roy J. Deferrari. Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto, 2002. ...
DO ed. note ...	Dutch original editor's note ...
ESV	English Standard Version ...
ET	English translation ...
FC	Fathers of the Church ...
FO	French original ...
GE-De Jong ...	de Jong, J. M. "Gereformeerde ethiek van Profess. Dr. H. Bavinck." Bavinck Archives, no. 197. ...
GELindeboom ...	Lindeboom, Cornelis [?]. "Gereformeerde ethiek—Dictaat van Prof. Bavinck." Library of the Protestant Theological University at Kampen. ...
GE-Van der Veen ...	Veen, Reinder Jan van der. "Gereformeerde ethiek. Acroam. van: Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck." Library of the Protestant Theological University at Kampen. ...

GO	German original ...
GrO ...	Greek original ...
HO	Hebrew original ...
Institutes ...	John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion ...
ISV	International Standard Version ...
KJV	King James Version ...
LCL	Loeb Classical Library ...
lit. ...	literally ...
LO	Latin original ...
LSJ	Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. ...
NIV	New International Version ...
NLT	New Living Translation ...
no(s). ...	number(s) ...
NPNF1	A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by Philip Schaff. 1st series. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 18871900. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956. ...
NPNF $^{2}$ ...	A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. 2nd series. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1890-1900. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952. ...
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version ...
p(p). ...	page(s) ...
$P G$	Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca. 161 vols. Edited by J.-P. Migne. Paris: Migne, 1857-66. ...
$P L$	Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 221 vols. Paris: Migne, 1844-65. ...
PRE $^{1}$ ...	Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by J. J. Herzog. 1st ed. 22 vols. Hamburg: R. Besser, 1854-68. ...
PRE $^{2}$ ...	Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by J. J. Herzog and G. L. Plitt. 2nd rev. ed. 18 vols. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1877-88. ...
PRE $^{3}$ ...	Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by Albert Hauck. 3rd rev. ed. 24 vols. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1896-1913. ...
RD	Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics. Edited by John Bolt. Translated by John Vriend. 4 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003-8. ...
$R E$	Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Ethics. The present translation of "Gereformeerde Ethiek." Bavinck Archives, no. 56. Historical Documentation Centre, Free University, Amsterdam. ...
RSV	Revised Standard Version ...
SchaffHerzog ...	The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. 13 vols. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson. London and New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1906-14. ...
$S T$	Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae ...
TBR	The Bavinck Review ...

GO German original GrO Greek original HO Hebrew original Institutes John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion ISV International Standard Version KJV King James Version LCL Loeb Classical Library lit. literally LO Latin original LSJ Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. NIV New International Version NLT New Living Translation no(s). number(s) NPNF1 A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by Philip Schaff. 1st series. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 18871900. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956. NPNF ^(2) A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. 2nd series. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1890-1900. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952. NRSV New Revised Standard Version p(p). page(s) PG Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca. 161 vols. Edited by J.-P. Migne. Paris: Migne, 1857-66. PL Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 221 vols. Paris: Migne, 1844-65. PRE ^(1) Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by J. J. Herzog. 1st ed. 22 vols. Hamburg: R. Besser, 1854-68. PRE ^(2) Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by J. J. Herzog and G. L. Plitt. 2nd rev. ed. 18 vols. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1877-88. PRE ^(3) Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by Albert Hauck. 3rd rev. ed. 24 vols. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1896-1913. RD Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics. Edited by John Bolt. Translated by John Vriend. 4 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003-8. RE Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Ethics. The present translation of "Gereformeerde Ethiek." Bavinck Archives, no. 56. Historical Documentation Centre, Free University, Amsterdam. RSV Revised Standard Version SchaffHerzog The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. 13 vols. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson. London and New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1906-14. ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae TBR The Bavinck Review

| GO | German original | | :--- | :--- | | GrO | Greek original | | HO | Hebrew original | | Institutes | John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion | | ISV | International Standard Version | | KJV | King James Version | | LCL | Loeb Classical Library | | lit. | literally | | LO | Latin original | | LSJ | Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. | | NIV | New International Version | | NLT | New Living Translation | | no(s). | number(s) | | NPNF1 | A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by Philip Schaff. 1st series. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 18871900. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956. | | NPNF ${ }^{2}$ | A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. 2nd series. 14 vols. New York: Christian Literature Co., 1890-1900. Reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952. | | NRSV | New Revised Standard Version | | p(p). | page(s) | | $P G$ | Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca. 161 vols. Edited by J.-P. Migne. Paris: Migne, 1857-66. | | $P L$ | Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 221 vols. Paris: Migne, 1844-65. | | PRE ${ }^{1}$ | Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by J. J. Herzog. 1st ed. 22 vols. Hamburg: R. Besser, 1854-68. | | PRE ${ }^{2}$ | Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by J. J. Herzog and G. L. Plitt. 2nd rev. ed. 18 vols. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1877-88. | | PRE ${ }^{3}$ | Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Edited by Albert Hauck. 3rd rev. ed. 24 vols. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1896-1913. | | RD | Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics. Edited by John Bolt. Translated by John Vriend. 4 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003-8. | | $R E$ | Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Ethics. The present translation of "Gereformeerde Ethiek." Bavinck Archives, no. 56. Historical Documentation Centre, Free University, Amsterdam. | | RSV | Revised Standard Version | | SchaffHerzog | The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. 13 vols. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson. London and New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1906-14. | | $S T$ | Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae | | TBR | The Bavinck Review |

Introduction to Herman Bavinck's Reformed Ethics ...

Dirk van Keulen and John Bolt ...

The Professor and His Manuscripts ...

On August 24, 1882, the synod of the Dutch Christian Reformed Church

^{1}

appointed Herman Bavinck to be a professor at its Theological School in Kampen. He began his duties with an inaugural address on January 10, 1883, “The Science of Sacred Theology.”

\underset{―}{2}

His primary teaching responsibility was dogmatics or systematic theology and culminated in his four-volume magnum opus, the Reformed Dogmatics.

\underset{―}{3}

This is the work for which he is best known and his major theological legacy. 4 ...

However, it is not well known that during the years of his professorate at Kampen, Bavinck also taught ethics. Several documents which Bavinck used for his lectures in ethics are stored in the Bavinck archives.

\underset{―}{5}

For example, the archives contain a small lecture notebook which likely dates from the beginning of Bavinck’s career at Kampen (or even earlier).

\underset{―}{6}

In this notebook, Bavinck arranges his ethics course into ten sections: (1) “Sin,” (2) “Human Beings as Moral Creatures,” (3) “Election (The Foundation of the Christian Life),” (4) “Faith (The Source and Organizing Principle of the Christian Life),” (5) “Penance (The Origin of the Christian Life),” (6) “Law (The Rule of the Christian Life),” (7) “Freedom (The Privilege of the Christian Life),” (8) “The Altruistic Character of Christian Life,” (9) “The Relation between Christian and Civic Life,” and (10) “The Christian Life in Community.”

^{-}

...

In addition to this small notebook, the archives contain an extensive manuscript of some 1,100 pages with the title Reformed Ethics. 8 The numerous notebooks in which Bavinck wrote the manuscript have been severely damaged; many pages have been torn from each other, and the paper is crumbling. Furthermore, the manuscript is incomplete. It breaks off in the middle of a discussion about the Christian family. In the margins of ...
the text, Bavinck has added notes and references to literature studied or published after he wrote the initial draft and repeated his series of lectures. It is this manuscript that serves as the basis for this volume and the two that will follow. ...

It is difficult to date the document. Because of its length and elaborate references to Holy Scripture as well as to Protestant theologians from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, Bavinck must have worked on it for years. Though incomplete and in rough form, there is sufficient material in this manuscript for a multivolume work on Reformed ethics. Although it is not possible to date the origin of the Reformed Ethics based on the data in the manuscript itself, there is correlative evidence which suggests that Bavinck used his Reformed Ethics manuscript during the academic years 1884-86 and 1894-95. This evidence is found in two other unpublished, handwritten manuscripts. ...

The first manuscript, “Reformed Ethics. Class Notes of Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck,” was written by Reinder Jan van der Veen (1863-1942), who studied theology at Kampen from September 1878 until July 1886 and whose signature is on the manuscript’s title page.

\underset{―}{9}

Van der Veen’s manuscript of 327 pages originally consisted of two volumes, but unfortunately the first volume has been lost. On several pages in the second volume, van der Veen dates his class notes, providing evidence that these notes refer to Bavinck’s lectures in ethics of the years 1884-85 and 188586. The lost first volume likely contained notes on Bavinck’s lectures of the year 1883-84, the first year of Bavinck’s professorate at Kampen! ...

The second manuscript, “Reformed Ethics-Class Notes from Prof. Bavinck,” is a 406-page manuscript, registered at the Library archives of the Protestant Theological University at Kampen in 1983.10 Unfortunately, there is no information available about the manuscript’s author or origin. It is possible that the library obtained the manuscript in 1983 and failed to note its origin. But it is also possible that the manuscript was present in the library for many years and was not catalogued until 1983. Whatever the case may be, comparison with other manuscripts in Kampen’s library suggests that that the author may have been Cornelis Lindeboom (18721938), who studied theology at Kampen in the years 1889-95.11 The manuscript can, therefore, be dated tentatively to the year

1895 . \underset{―}{12}

...

Both manuscripts offer a fine impression of Bavinck’s lectures on ethics. The text of the manuscripts is written down very carefully. Every sentence ...
is completely written out and grammatically correct. The style is typically Bavinck’s. When, for instance, biblical references to a theme are listed, this is done exactly as biblical references are listed in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics. The style of the manuscripts, therefore, gives the impression that Bavinck verbally dictated the text. 10 ...

Moreover, it is striking that the structure of van der Veen’s and Lindeboom’s class notes is almost identical to the composition of Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics manuscript. This similarity makes it likely that Bavinck gave these lectures on ethics in the school years 1884-86 and then again in 1894-95. If this inference is correct, the manuscript can be dated going back to the first years of Bavinck’s professorate at Kampen. ...

At the same time, there is evidence of some distance between Bavinck’s lectures and the texts from his students’ notebooks. This is suggested by passages that indicate either in-class or after-class engagement and even disagreement by students with their professor’s judgment. On page 150 of Lindeboom’s text there is a reference to John 6:29: “Faith is the work of God.” An accompanying observation follows: “This scripture passage was perhaps chosen wrongly by the professor; ‘of God’ is here an objective genitive.” 13 A comment like this is most likely the sort that is added by a student after class. The student notes provide us with a clear impression of Bavinck’s lectures in 1895. ...

Lindeboom’s comment about John 6:29 is also a reminder that Bavinck repeatedly referred to Scripture and engaged in exegesis of biblical texts, along with his many references to Protestant theologians (Reformed and Lutheran) from the era of Protestant Orthodoxy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as more recent eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury theologians. Since these are unlikely to have been added after class by students, it is reasonable to claim that the structure-the main lines as well as the details-must be attributed to Bavinck himself. ...

The Structure of Bavinck's Reformed Ethics ...

As mentioned earlier, it appears that Bavinck worked on the manuscript of Reformed Ethics for years. This was the period in which he was also working on his Reformed Dogmatics. The four volumes of the latter were ...
published successively in the years 1895, 1897, 1898, and 1901. It is not surprising, therefore, that Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics resembles his Reformed Dogmatics in several ways. ...

A good example of this resemblance is the similar structure of the two works. Bavinck begins the Reformed Dogmatics with an introduction to the science of dogmatic theology and its method and organization.

\underset{―}{14}

He follows this with a chapter on the history and literature of dogmatics. 15 The Reformed Ethics manuscript has a similar introduction, although Bavinck reverses the order by beginning with an outline of the history of Reformed ethics and its literature. 16 He follows this with sections on terminology, organization, and methodology. 17 ...

Bavinck prefers the term “ethics” to “morality.” 18 The task of ethics is to describe the birth, development, and manifestation of spiritual life in reborn humanity.

\underset{―}{19}

In other words, “ethics is the scientific description of the grace of Jesus Christ in operation, i.e., his divine life-content in the Form of a person’s life.”

\underset{―}{20}

...

Bavinck considers ethics and dogmatics to be closely related but also insists that they be distinguished. He put it this way in the Reformed Dogmatics: ...

Dogmatics describes the deeds of God done for, to, and in human beings; ethics describes what renewed human beings now do on the basis of and in the strength of those divine deeds. In dogmatics human beings are passive; they receive and believe; in ethics they are themselves active agents. In dogmatics, the articles of faith are treated; in ethics, the precepts of the decalogue. In the former, that which concerns faith is dealt with; in the latter, that which concerns love, obedience, and good works. Dogmatics sets forth what God is and does for human beings and causes them to know God as their Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier; ethics sets forth what human beings are and do for God now; how, with everything they are and have, with intellect and will and all their strength, they devote themselves to God out of gratitude and love. Dogmatics is the system of the knowledge of God; ethics is that of the service of God. $^{21}$ ...

In his Reformed Ethics manuscript Bavinck describes the difference in identical terms: ...

Dogmatics proceeds from God; ethics returns to God. In dogmatics, God loves us; in ethics, therefore, we love him.

^{\underset{―}{22}}

...

The method of ethics, Bavinck argues, is the same as in dogmatics. The point of departure is God’s revelation; Holy Scripture is the principle of knowledge and the norm for ethics.

\underset{―}{23}

Accordingly, three methodological steps must be distinguished: (1) collecting and systematizing biblical data, (2) describing how these data have been adopted in the church, and ...
(3) developing these data normatively or thetically with a view to our own time.

\underset{―}{24}

This threefold method in his Reformed Ethics manuscript follows exactly the way Bavinck proceeds in the Reformed Dogmatics. ...

With respect to the composition of his ethical theory, Bavinck first discusses the ethical frameworks of several other Protestant theologians, including Antonius Driessen, Willem Teellinck, Campegius Vitringa, Benedictus Pictetus, Petrus van Mastricht, August Friedrich Christian Vilmar, Hans Lassen Martensen, Heinrich Heppe, and Adolf von Harless. After observing that these theologians follow roughly the same general structure, Bavinck chooses a similar, traditional, tripartite structure himself: ...
I. Humanity before conversion, in the condition of sin, conscience, morality; this is the realm of natural ethics. ...
II. Converted humanity: the new life in its preparation, origin, aspects, circumstances, aids, blessing, marks, sickness and death, fulfillment; this is the realm of practical theology. ...
III. Regenerated humanity in the family, vocation, society, state, and church. ...

Bavinck indicates that he intends to end his ethics on an eschatological note with some reflections on the kingdom of God “in its origin, development, and completion.”

\underset{―}{25}

Later in the manuscript Bavinck expands his structure by dividing the second part into two: Converted Humanity (Humanity in Conversion) and Humanity after Conversion. 66 He then adds a fourth part: “The Life-Spheres in Which the Moral Life Is to Be Manifested.” In our edition, these four parts will be designated as Books I-IV.

\underset{―}{27}

...

A Brief Overview of Book I ...

In the remainder of this introduction we will provide a general overview of the main themes and topics of Reformed Ethics. The tripartite structure described above clearly demonstrates the thoroughly dogmatic character of the work. Dogmatics precedes ethics, and ethics is completely dependent on dogmatics. This interrelationship is confirmed when we read the first part of Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics: “Humanity before Conversion.” This part is divided into three chapters and twelve sections. In the table below, the lefthand columns are the titles used in this volume; to their right are Bavinck’s original Dutch titles.

\underset{―}{28}

The table also reveals that while we retained Bavinck’s basic fourfold division of the material, we divided the chapters differently, primarily to even out the length of each chapter as much as possible. In this section, Bavinck’s three chapters became our six. ...

Book I: Humanity before Conversion ...	Deel 1: De Mensch voor de Bekering ...
Chapter 1: Essential Human Nature ...	Hoofdstuk 1: De Menschelijke Natuur, op Zichzelf Beschouwd ...
(The Essence of Humanity) ...	Het Wezen van de Mensch ...
§5 Human Beings, Created in God’s Image ...	De Mensch, Geschapen naar Gods Beeld ...
§6 The Content of Human Nature ...	De Inhoud der Menschelijke Natuur ...
§7 Human Relationships ...	De Levensvertrouwingen/Betrekkingen van den Mensch ...
Chapter 2: Humanity under the Power of Sin ...	Hoofdstuk 2: De Mensch in de Toestand der Zonde ...
§8 The Devastation of the Image of God in Humanity ...	De Oude/Natuurlijke Mensch ...
§9 The Organizing Principle and Classification of Sins ...	Beginsel en Verdeeling der Zonden ...
Chapter 3: The Self against the Neighbor and God ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 2) ...
§10 Sins of Egoism in the Narrow Sense ...	Zelfzuchtige Zonden in Engeren Zin ...
§11 Sins against the Neighbor ...	Zonden tegen den Naaste ...
§12 Sins against God ...	Zonden tegen God ...
Chapter 4: The Fallen Image of God ...	Hoofdstuk 3: De Zedelijke Natuur des Menschen in den Toestand der Zonde ...

Book I: Humanity before Conversion ...	Deel 1: De Mensch voor de Bekering ...
§13 The Image of God in Fallen Human Beings ...	Het Beeld Gods in den Gevallen Mensch ...
Chapter 5: Human Conscience ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 3) ...
§14 The Conscience ...	Het Geweten ...
Chapter 6: The Sinner and the Law ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 3) ...
§15 The Law ...	De Wet ...
§16 Natural Morality ...	De Justitia Civilis ...

In his first chapter, on “human nature considered on its own,” Bavinck begins with the crucial starting point for ethics: human creation in the image of God. He derives three basic principles from human creation in God’s image: (1) originally human beings were good; (2) it is impossible to understand human morality apart from God; and (3) human nature was corrupted by sin. Bavinck defends these basic principles against Fichte, Hegel, Rothe, and Darwin.

\underset{―}{29}

...

Bavinck devotes the second chapter of Book I to the doctrine of sin, distinguishing those topics that properly belong in dogmatics from those that should nonetheless be discussed in ethics. He assumes and does not examine the dogmatic understanding of “the origin, essence, and nature of sin,” as well as “the changed relation to God brought about by sin, namely guilt and punishment of sin.”

\underset{―}{30}

At the same time, theologians like Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), Friedrich Adolph Lampe (1683-1729), August Friedrich Christian Vilmar (1800-68), and others, taught him that the doctrine of sin did need to be dealt with in theological ethics as well.

\underset{―}{31}

In an extensive examination of biblical terminology for sin, Bavinck explores the many dimensions and varieties of sins. This is the proper task of ethics. Specifically, ethics considers the “appearances, forms, manifestations of the one sin,” and Bavinck asks, “Is it possible to construct a system from that variety and number, and is there a connection between them all? In other words, is there an organizing principle from which all sins can be objectively and substantively derived?”

\underset{―}{32}

...

Bavinck, therefore, proceeds to develop a typology of sin. He agrees with writers who posit egocentricity or self-centeredness to be the “organizing principle” of sin, with the two important qualifications that this be ...
understood “in a very broad sense and include the problems of haughtiness and unbelief,” and that “it is not understood as though all sins logically flow from this foundation.” 33 Bavinck distinguishes three basic types of sins: (1) sins against oneself, (2) sins against one’s neighbor, and (3) sins against God. Each of these three types can be further divided into sensual sins and spiritual sins.

\underset{―}{34}

Thus, sins against one’s neighbor are sins in which the neighbor or what belongs to the neighbor is used for oneself. These sins can be sensual in character: sins against the neighbor’s decency, property, or life. They also can be spiritual in character: sins against the neighbor’s good reputation or authority. 35 Bavinck’s ethical doctrine of sin, therefore, is clearly a supplement to the doctrine of sin offered in his Reformed Dogmatics. ...

In his third chapter, on “the moral condition of humanity in the state of sin,” Bavinck describes the consequences of sin for human nature, for soul and body, and for reason, will, and feelings, and he concludes that the natural person lacks all capacity for doing good. 36 God preserves humanity, however, by his general grace, which curbs the human inclination to do evil. Even fallen human beings retain a reasonable, moral nature which manifests itself in their consciences. 37 The conscience is bound to God’s law, and Bavinck, therefore, follows his section on conscience with one on law (natural and moral) and another on the way in which law takes shape in individuals, society, and the state.

\underset{―}{38}

...

A Brief Overview of Book II ...

Book II, “Converted Humanity,” offers a comprehensive analysis of the spiritual life of the Christian. Bavinck organized the material into a single chapter with ten sections.

\underset{―}{39}

Here is a table with the divisions used in this volume on the left and those of the Dutch original to the right. 40 ...

Book II: Converted Humanity ...
Chapter 7: Life in the Spirit ...
§17 The Nature of the Spiritual Life ...
§18 The Origin of the Spiritual Life ...

Deel 2: De Mensch in de Bekering ...
Hoofdstuk 1 ...
De Natuur van het Geestelijk Leven ...
Oorsprongen van het Geestelijk Leven ...

Book II: Converted Humanity ...	Deel 2: De Mensch in de Bekering ...
$§ 19$ The First and Basic Activity of the Spiritual Life ...	De (Eerste, Grond) Werkzaamheid van het Geestelijk Leven ...
Chapter 8: Life in the Spirit in the Church's History ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 1) ...
§20 Mysticism, Pietism, and Methodism ...	Mysticisme, Pietisme, en Methodisme ...
Chapter 9: The Shape and Maturation of the Christian Life ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 1) ...
§21 The Shape of the Christian Life: The Imitation of Christ ...	De Vorm van het Geestelijk Leven (De Navolging van Christus) ...
§22 The Growth of the Spiritual Life ...	De Ontwikkeling van het Geestelijk Leven ...
Chapter 10: Persevering in the Christian Life ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 1) ...
§23 Security and Sealing ...	De Verzekering (en Verzegeling) ...
Chapter 11: Pathologies of the Christian Life ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 1) ...
§24 Diseases of the Spiritual Life and Their Roots ...	De Krankheden van het Geestelijk Leven en Hare Oorzaken ...
Chapter 12: Restoration and Consummation of the Christian Life ...	(continuation of Hoofdstuk 1) ...
§25 Means of Restoration ...	Middelen tot Herstel ...
§26 Consummation of the Spiritual Life; Meditation on Death ...	Volmaking van 't Geestelijk Leven; Meditatio Mortis ...

For Bavinck, the basic principle of ethics is loving God, a love that is accomplished by the Holy Spirit. 41 Thus, regeneration is the origin of the spiritual life (§18), and faith is its fundamental activity (§19). Before setting forth his own constructive view of the spiritual life, Bavinck devotes a lengthy historical section to what he considers aberrations to a healthy Christian life in the history of Christian mysticism and pietism (§20). The heart of such a spiritual life is to be found in the imitation of Christ, a topic that intrigued and captivated Bavinck throughout his life. 42 Christ is not only a king, a priest, and a prophet, he argues, but also a model, an example, and an ideal. This implies that we must follow Christ. 43 The imitation of Christ does not mean that we are to duplicate his way of living literally or physically, not even his poverty, chastity, and obedience, as was taught in Roman Catholic monasteries. 44 Nor does imitating Christ involve ...
any kind of mysticism or a rationalistic obedience to Christ’s commandments.

\underset{―}{45}

For Bavinck, rather, imitating Christ consists in “the recognition of Christ as a Mediator.” Christ must take shape in us inwardly, while outwardly our lives must be shaped in conformity with the life of Christ. The imitation of Christ becomes manifest in virtues like righteousness, sanctity, love, and patience. 46 ...

Bavinck continues this chapter with sections on the growth of the spiritual life, the assurance of faith, pathologies of the spiritual life (i.e., the struggle between flesh and spirit, temptations, and spiritual abandonment), remedies to restore spiritual life (prayer, meditation, reading God’s Word, singing, solitude, fasting, vigils, and vows), and finally the consummation of spiritual life after death. 47 ...

The very long section on assurance of faith 48 is especially striking since one could well ask whether this theme is appropriate for ethics. After a long historical survey of the topic Bavinck pays special attention to the doctrine of the marks 49 of a genuine believer, such as grief over sin, love of God’s Word, and serving God. This section undoubtedly reflects the situation of the Dutch Christian Reformed Church 50 in Bavinck’s day, including Bavinck’s own responsibility as a seminary professor for this church. In the tradition of the Secession,

\underset{―}{51}

the doctrine of the marks of grace was a difficult theme, one which directly influenced the spirituality of the local churches. Moreover, discussions about this doctrine could be linked to heated disputes over Abraham Kuyper’s theory of presumptive regeneration.

\underset{―}{52}

It is telling, therefore, that we find in van der Veen’s and Lindeboom’s class notes on this section a reference to Bavinck’s own years as a minister in the congregation of the Christian Reformed Church at Franeker! The report is of a woman “in his former congregation who was sealed by Isaiah 27:1.”

^{53}

There are no other references to Bavinck’s pastorate in Franeker in either the van der Veen or Lindeboom texts. ...

It is also interesting that Bavinck twice criticizes Abraham Kuyper in this section, a critique also noted in both van der Veen’s and Lindeboom’s class notes.

\underset{―}{54}

Kuyper’s views on so-called presumptive regeneration were highly controversial in his Christian Reformed denomination. 55 Notwithstanding his important position as a leading teacher in that church, Bavinck was very careful to avoid public criticism of Kuyper. 56 That he was willing to do so in the more private setting of a classroom indicates the vital importance Bavinck attributed to the doctrine of assurance and the marks of grace. ...

A Brief Overview of Book III ...

Since the translation of Books III and IV will be published in future volumes, our treatment here will be even briefer than it was for Books I and II. Book III has the title “Humanity after Conversion” and is composed of four chapters: (1) “Sanctification in General” (§§27-31);

57

(2) “Duties toward God” (§§32-35); (3) “Duties toward the Self” (§§36-42); and (4) “Duties toward the Neighbor” (§§43-49). The operative term in this book is “duty.” After a general discussion on the relationship between the Christian and the law, 58 Bavinck indicates why he rejects the Roman Catholic distinction between precepts and counsels of perfection,

\underset{―}{59}

discusses the so-called adiaphora, or acts that are morally indifferent,

\underset{―}{60}

and, finally, discusses the clash of moral duties. 61 These topics are mentioned briefly in the Reformed Dogmatics,

\underset{―}{62}

but their broad elaboration in the Reformed Ethics shows that Bavinck intentionally distinguished topics in dogmatics from those in ethics and also that he regarded his Reformed Ethics as a complementary companion to the Reformed Dogmatics. ...

In Book III, chapters 2-4, Bavinck connects the doctrine of duty to the Ten Commandments. In the second chapter, he analyzes the first four commands as duties toward God, including a lengthy section on the Fourth Commandment and the Sabbath. 63 In the third chapter, duties toward ourselves, he discusses this duty in general (self-preservation, self-love, self-denial, §36), then toward our bodily life in general (§37), including food and drink (§38), clothing (§39), and life itself (§40). Bavinck then considers duties toward bodily life that flow from the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Commandments (§41). Our final duty to ourselves is the duty we have toward our soul (§42). Finally, in the fourth chapter Bavinck discusses Christian charity and links this duty to the Sixth through Tenth Commandments (§§43-49). ...

A Brief Overview of Book IV ...

In the fourth part of Reformed Ethics Bavinck planned to discuss how the Christian life should manifest itself in various spheres. The only extant ...
chapter (§§50-58) is devoted to the family. Bavinck explains in detail the obligation to marry, impediments to marriage, degrees of consanguinity, engagement, the celebration of marriage, the nature of marriage, divorce, and the relationship between husband and wife.

\underset{―}{64}

Then the document breaks off. Bavinck would likely have added sections on topics such as raising children, brothers and sisters, friendship, vocation, society, nation, and church. This much may be inferred from the introduction of the manuscript and from another unpublished document in the Bavinck Archives, which was likely used by Bavinck in his lectures on ethics and which most likely dates from the 1880s or possibly from the 1890s. 65 As we shall see, these multiple manuscripts also provide a clue to the intriguing question: Why did Bavinck never publish a finished monograph on Reformed Ethics? ...

Intermezzo: The Question of Publication ...

As we have already noted, Bavinck must have worked on his Reformed Dogmatics and his Reformed Ethics at the same time for many years, and his clear demarcation between the subject matter of dogmatics and that of ethics suggests that his Reformed Ethics was intended as a companion to his Reformed Dogmatics. So, then, why did Bavinck not finish and publish his Reformed Ethics? This question is even more compelling when we realize that around 1900 there was an urgent need in the Dutch Reformed Churches for a Reformed ethics. In 1897, Wilhelm Geesink, professor of ethics at the Vrije Universiteit, delivered a rectorial address, “Ethics in Reformed Theology,” in which he complained about “the dearth of specifically Reformed ethical studies in our time.” 66 Bavinck himself was fully aware of this need. In the preface to his 1902 published lecture, Morality Today, he wrote the following: “Our circles lack good literature that discusses and elucidates moral principles and applies them to the questions of the day. We suffer from a lamentable shortfall that will hopefully be overcome soon through the cooperative work of many.”

\underset{―}{67}

...

With this “dearth” (Geesink) and “lamentable shortfall” (Bavinck),

\underset{―}{68}

why did Bavinck not publish his Reformed Ethics? Possibly because he was reluctant to give an impression of upstaging his Vrije Universiteit colleague ...

Geesink, who was responsible for teaching ethics in the faculty Bavinck had just joined. If so, Bavinck’s situation would have been comparable to the position in which Abraham Kuyper found himself with respect to dogmatics. Kuyper gave up on a plan to write a Reformed dogmatics after he completed his three-volume Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology in 1894 when he heard that Bavinck was working on such a project. 69 Geesink did in fact write a Reformed ethics, but it was prepared for publication by Valentijn Hepp and published posthumously in 1931.70 Or did Bavinck have another reason for not publishing his Reformed Ethics? ...

Perhaps another manuscript gives a clue here. ...

The de Jong Manuscript on Reformed Ethics ...

The Bavinck Archives also contain another handwritten manuscript with the title “Reformed Ethics of Prof. Bavinck.”

\underset{―}{11}

Like the van der Veen and Lindeboom manuscripts, the de Jong manuscript is composed of lecture notes. The manuscript’s author is Jelle Michiels de Jong (1874-1927), who began studying theology at Kampen in September 1901. In 1903 de Jong followed Bavinck to Amsterdam to continue his studies at the Free University.

\underset{―}{72}

Subsequently, he worked as a minister in the small Frisian villages of Foudgum (1906), Wons (1913), and Duurswoude (1918-24).

\underset{―}{73}

De Jong signed the title page of the manuscript and dated it “November 1902”-a few weeks before Bavinck moved from Kampen to the Free University on December 16, 1902.74 De Jong’s date explains why the manuscript is incomplete: Bavinck no longer gave lectures in ethics at Kampen after November 1902. Just like the van der Veen and Lindeboom manuscripts, the de Jong manuscript often gives the impression that the text comes from Bavinck himself. We even find a sentence with the verb in the first person singular. 75 ...

The de Jong manuscript, of 331 pages, begins with a general introduction about terminology, definitions of key terms like “habit,” “usage,” “custom,” and “morality,” along with key differences between them.

\underset{―}{6}

As in the other manuscripts, Bavinck prefers to use the term “ethics” to describe this discipline rather than “morality” or the German Sittenlehre.

\underset{―}{77}

The task of ethics is “to let us see and know the principle and the system of morality.” 78 ...

After this general introduction the manuscript is divided into two parts: philosophical ethics (pp. 18-139) and theological ethics (pp. 139-331). This order is something of a surprise considering what we noted earlier about Bavinck’s understanding of the relation between ethics and dogmatics along with his comments about the method of both disciplines. Bavinck stated the relation thus: ...

In dogmatics we are concerned with what God does for us and in us. In dogmatics God is everything. Dogmatics is a word from God to us, coming from outside of us, from above us; we are passive, listening, and opening ourselves to being directed by God. In ethics, we are interested in the question of what it is that God now expects of us when he does his work in us. What do we do for him? Here we are active, precisely because of and on the grounds of God’s deeds in us; we sing psalms in thanks and praise to God. $\underset{―}{9}$ ...

The key point here is that the method of both disciplines must be identical. The point of departure is God’s revelation; Holy Scripture is the principle of knowledge and the norm for ethics. 80 But now, Bavinck turns to philosophy! ...

Bavinck begins by raising the classic questions: “What is good?” and “Why is it good?” 81 In Bavinck’s view ethics is grounded in philosophy; thus, “someone’s philosophical ethics,” he writes, “will be in accordance with the principles of his philosophy.” 82 Bavinck proceeds as usual with an outline of the history of philosophical ethics, opting for a systematic approach. 83 He describes and analyzes six philosophical systems that seek the principle and the norm for ethics in humanity itself. 84 This survey is followed by an analysis of nine philosophical systems which seek the principle and the norm for ethics outside of humanity. 85 Finally, Bavinck discusses what he terms “the despair of all morality or pessimism” (Eduard von Hartmann, Arthur Schopenhauer). 86 ...

For the most part these descriptions are stated in a neutral and instructional style, and Bavinck withholds his own judgments, making comments only a few times. At the end of the section on classical Greek philosophy, for instance, Bavinck observes that many Scholastic theologians adopted Aristotelian thought in their ethics. According to Bavinck, “in itself there is no great objection to this.”

\underset{―}{87}

“We can profit,” continues Bavinck, “from Aristotelian thought, and without doubt, in its essentials, Aristotle’s Ethics is the best philosophical ethics available” because of its “agreement with Christian ethics that human morality involves developing all the gifts and powers given to us in harmonious ...
agreement with our moral nature.” Aristotle’s “only error was to think that human beings could achieve this ideal in their own strength.” 88 Bavinck is very critical of the ethics of evolutionism and severely opposes the theories of Darwin repeatedly. 89 Present-day readers will find it striking that Bavinck hardly pays any attention to Nietzsche. Bavinck occasionally mentions his name,

\underset{―}{90}

but compared with other philosophers the treatment of Nietzsche seems inadequate. This is understandable, however, when we realize that around 1900 Nietzsche was not well-known in the Netherlands.

\underset{―}{91}

...

The second part of the de Jong manuscript is devoted to theological ethics. Two sections can be distinguished. On pages 139-60 we find a short outline of Bavinck’s theological ethics. It is possible that Bavinck began his 1901-2 lectures on ethics in September 1901 with philosophical ethics.

\underset{―}{92}

Producing these lectures took so much time that Bavinck could not offer his students an elaborated theological ethics before the summer of 1902. For that reason, he confined himself to an outline. ...

Bavinck begins his outline with an introduction to the following topics: related terminology; the inadequacy of philosophical ethics (i.e., theoretically speaking philosophical ethics cannot find a norm for morality, and practically speaking it cannot overcome human selfishness); the relationship between dogmatics and ethics; and the history and organization of theological ethics.

\underset{―}{93}

After the introduction Bavinck divides his theological ethics into three chapters: (1) “The Doctrine of the Moral Subject,” which is then divided into twelve sections;

\underset{―}{94}

(2) “The Doctrine of the Law,” which has four sections covering broad topics related to law that are followed by ten sections, one devoted to each of the Ten Commandments;

95

and (3) “The Purpose of Morality,” with nine sections.

96

...

From this we can discern both similarities and differences between the de Jong manuscript and Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics manuscript. Both manuscripts begin with humanity created in the image of God and conclude with the kingdom of God. Furthermore, themes and contents of many sections are duplicated. But there are also noteworthy differences. ...

In the first place, the titles of the main parts differ. In the Reformed Ethics manuscript we have the dogmatic- and schematic-sounding “Humanity before Conversion,” “Converted Humanity,” and “Humanity after Conversion.” In the de Jong manuscript, we find the more philosophicalsounding “The Doctrine of the Moral Subject,” “The Doctrine of Law,” and ...
“The Purpose of Morality.” In the second place, the first and the second parts of the Reformed Ethics manuscript have been fused together into the first chapter of the de Jong manuscript. In the third place, the third and the fourth parts of the Reformed Ethics manuscript have become the second and the third chapters of the de Jong manuscript. As a result, the composition of the de Jong manuscript corresponds roughly with the composition Bavinck sketched in the introduction of his Reformed Ethics manuscript. Finally, the doctrine of sin in the first part of the Reformed Ethics manuscript has been moved to the second chapter of the de Jong manuscript. Page 161 of the de Jong manuscript restarts its numbering at chapter 1, section 1: “Humanity as the Image of God.” 97 Detailed sections follow on human vocation, fallen humanity, the organizing principle and classification of sins, stages and development of sin, and the image of God in fallen humanity. All of these are recognizable from Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics and from the student notes of those lectures. From this it seems safe to conclude that Bavinck had decided to deliver his lectures on theological ethics once more after the summer of 1902.98 Thus, the placement of the doctrine of sin in chapter 2 of the de Jong manuscript is striking, for Bavinck discusses sin again in the first part of his Reformed Ethics. This repetition may be explained as Bavinck-realizing that his forthcoming transfer to Amsterdam was taking more time than he liked-reusing his Reformed Ethics manuscript in the autumn of the year 1902. ...

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Ethics, and Philosophical Ethics ...

During his long career, Herman Bavinck was interested not only in dogmatics but also in ethics. 99 This is evident from Bavinck’s other writings. Bavinck obtained his doctorate in 1880 at the University of Leiden with a dissertation on the ethics of Ulrich Zwingli. 100 One year later he published two articles on the human conscience. 101 In 1885-86 Bavinck wrote a series of three articles on the imitation of Christ. 102 He revisited this topic in 1918 and published it as The Imitation of Christ and Life in the Modern World. 103 We have already referred to his 1902 lecture/booklet Morality Today. We could also note Bavinck’s speech “Ethics and Politics,” ...
which he delivered at a meeting of the Dutch Royal Academy of Science in 1915. 104 And finally, we need to mention his writing on the question of war during World War I.

\underset{―}{105}

...

We have also shown that Bavinck lectured extensively and repeatedly on ethics during his professorate at Kampen and that the parallels in method and contrasts in content of the Reformed Dogmatics and the Reformed Ethics indicate that Bavinck was working simultaneously on both projects and that he intended the latter to be a companion to the former. Comparison of the Reformed Ethics manuscript with the van der Veen and Lindeboom manuscripts shows that Bavinck, at least in 1884-86 and 1894-95, delivered his lectures on ethics from his Reformed Ethics manuscript. And, it is important to note, comparison of the Reformed Ethics manuscript with the de Jong manuscript reveals that Bavinck struggled with the composition of his ethics. In the introduction of Reformed Ethics he opts for a traditional composition in three parts. The subsequent, detailed elaboration, however, consists of four parts. The de Jong manuscript shows how Bavinck returned to a composition in three parts but bade farewell to the scheme “Humanity before Conversion,” “Converted Humanity,” and “Humanity after Conversion.” Perhaps he became dissatisfied with its dogmatic simplicity. The biggest difference between Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics manuscript and the de Jong manuscript is the place of philosophical ethics. In Reformed Ethics (and in the van der Veen and Lindeboom manuscripts) Bavinck pays hardly any attention to philosophical ethics. In the de Jong manuscript, however, the whole first part is devoted to it. ...

We should not conclude from this difference that Bavinck taught philosophical ethics for the first time in the academic year 1901-2. In an earlier section of this essay (“A Brief Overview of Book IV”) we referred to another unpublished manuscript, Ethiek, which probably dates from the 1880s (or possibly from the 1890s). 106 In this document Bavinck discusses philosophical ethics in general, gives a brief outline of its history, and surveys contemporary views of it. 107 Compared with the de Jong manuscript, the outline in “Ethics” is somewhat simplified, although Bavinck voices critiques more explicitly. The “Ethics” manuscript also shows that Bavinck paid attention to philosophical ethics in his lectures on ethics earlier than the academic year 1901-2. Possibly he taught ethics in a biennial program in which philosophical ethics alternated with theological ethics. ...

In the Bavinck Archives we find another manuscript, though a relatively small one, that probably dates back to Bavinck’s last years at Kampen.

\underset{―}{108}

After an introduction the manuscript is divided into two parts: (1) philosophical ethics and (2) Reformed ethics. The first philosophical sections are briefly worked out. Compared with the de Jong manuscript, almost all the section titles are the same. The only changes in the philosophical part are two added sections, one on “Buddhism” and another on “Anarchism.” It is likely that Bavinck delivered his 1901-2 lectures in ethics with this smaller manuscript in front of him. ...

When we compare all these manuscripts, it becomes evident that Bavinck’s interest in philosophy increased during his years at Kampen.

\underset{―}{109}

At minimum we must conclude that by 1902, philosophy had become a serious discussion partner for Bavinck. It seems that Bavinck had become convinced that Reformed ethics could no longer afford to neglect philosophy. We see this in his 1902 lecture/booklet Morality Today and in his 1915 speech “Ethics and Politics.” Philosophical engagement has an important place in both publications. At the same time we see a diminishing number of references to the writings of sixteenth- through eighteenthcentury Protestant theologians. Frequent references to Protestant “fathers” in the Reformed Ethics manuscript (and in the van der Veen and Lindeboom manuscripts) have become rare in the de Jong manuscript. These differences between the Reformed Ethics and the de Jong manuscript may also explain why Bavinck did not publish the former: he was no longer satisfied with it. Its composition had to be changed, with likely more philosophical input. This is of course conjecture; we do not know beyond any reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, we believe it is a reasonable conjecture. ...

A final word concerning a conventional portrait in Bavinck scholarship about the last decade of his life at the Vrije Universiteit. It has frequently been alleged that during his years at Amsterdam, after the second edition of his Reformed Dogmatics had been published (1911), Bavinck lost interest in dogmatics and instead turned to questions in culture, philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. While there is indeed a shift in Bavinck’s published work during these years along the general lines just sketched, the claim is vastly overstated and was corrected some years ago by George Harinck, Kees van der Kooi, and Jasper Vree when they published Bavinck’s notes on an ecclesiastical conflict in the Gereformeerde Kerken Nederland (GKN) surrounding the controversial views of a certain Rev. ...

Abstract ...

J. B. Netelenbos. 110 The notes show that Bavinck did not lose his interest in dogmatics but was actively engaged in important questions before the synod of the GKN. And, on the other side of the coin, the ethical manuscripts in the Bavinck Archives that we have examined in this essay clearly show that Bavinck was already interested in philosophy and culture during his time at Kampen. We agree, therefore, with Jan Veenhof’s proposition that we should not exaggerate the distance between Bavinck’s first (Kampen) and second (Amsterdam) periods and that we should not interpret the differences between the two periods as a disjunction, creating “two Bavincks.” 111 ...

This introduction is the fruit of Dirk van Keulen’s research and was originally presented at the “A Pearl and a Leaven: Herman Bavinck for the 21st Century” conference in Grand Rapids, Michigan, in September 2008 and published as “Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics: Some Remarks about Unpublished Manuscripts in the Libraries of Amsterdam and Kampen,” TBR 1 (2010): 25-56. It has been adapted and revised for this volume by John Bolt with Dirk van Keulen’s concurrence and approval. The first-person judgments toward the end of this essay are originally those of van Keulen and based on his research but are shared by Bolt. ...

The Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk. ...
Bavinck, De wetenschap der heilige godgeleerdheid. ...
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. The volumes of the first edition (Kampen: Bos) appeared 18951901; a second, revised and enlarged edition (Kampen: Kok) was published 1906-11. ...
The emphasis on theological is deliberate. Although scholarly work on Bavinck the theologian did not begin until some thirty years after his death in 1921, significant attention, both in Europe and in North America, was paid to his educational philosophy and writings on pedagogy in the two decades immediately following his death: Rombouts, Bavinck, gids bij de studie van zijn paedagogische werken; Brederveld, Hoofdlijnen der paedagogiek van Dr. Herman Bavinck; van der Zweep, De paedagogiek van Bavinck; Jaarsma, Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck; and van Klinken, Bavinck’s paedagogische beginselen. ...
Archive no. 346 of the Historical Documentation Centre, Free University, Amsterdam (hereafter abbreviated as “Bavinck Archives”). Note: the numbers for the Bavinck Archives are revised from van Keulen, “Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics,” because of a recataloguing at the Historical Documentation Center. ...
This notebook may hark back to Bavinck’s days as a student in Leiden; the sections overlap perfectly with the ten chapters of his dissertation, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli. ...
Bavinck Archives, no. 184. DO: §1. De zonde; §2. De mens als zedelijk wezen; §3. De verkiezing (grondslag van het christelijk leven); §4. Het geloof (bron en principe van het christelijk leven); §5. De boete (ontstaan van het christelijk leven); §6. De wet (regel van het christelijk leven); §7. De vrijheid (voorrecht van het christelijk leven); §8. Het altruïstisch karakter van het christelijk leven; §9. De verhouding van het christelijk tot het burgerlijk leven; §10. Het christelijk leven in de gemeenschap. ...
Bavinck Archives, no. 56. DO: Gereformeerde ethiek. ...
DO: “Gereformeerde ethiek. Acroam. van: Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck,” Library of the Protestant Theological University at Kampen, shelf mark 101A20 (hereafter abbreviated as GE-Van der Veen); ...
biographical information from van Gelderen and Rozemond, Gegevens betreffende de Theologische Universiteit Kampen, 1854-1994, 110. ...
DO: “Gereformeerde ethiek-Dictaat van Prof. Bavinck,” Library of the Protestant Theological University at Kampen, shelf mark E2 (hereafter abbreviated as GE-Lindeboom). ...
Cornelis Lindeboom (1872-1938), the only son of Kampen’s New Testament professor Lucas Lindeboom (1845-1933), studied theology at Kampen from September 1889 until July 1895 (van Gelderen and Rozemond, Gegevens betreffende de Theologische Universiteit Kampen, 1854-1994, 116). After one year of study at Lausanne he worked as a minister in Sprang (1896), Bolnes (1900), Apeldoorn (1905), Gorinchem (1908), and Amsterdam (1914-37). See Lindeboom and Lindeboom, In uwe voorhoven; Wielenga, “Ds. C. Lindeboom”; and Mulder, “Lindeboom, Cornelis.” ...
The manuscript refers once to volume 1 of the first edition of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (GE-Lindeboom, 38). Because this volume was published in 1895, the manuscript must be dated to this year or later. If it is true that Cornelis Lindeboom is the author of the manuscript, the date can be narrowed more precisely to 1895 because Lindeboom ended his studies at Kampen in the summer of that year. This date would also explain why the manuscript is incomplete. The notes break off in the middle of a discussion of the Ten Commandments. Bavinck probably continued this discussion after the summer of 1895, when Lindeboom no longer attended Bavinck’s classes. ...
DO: Deze tekst is wellicht foutief gekozen door den Prof: “Gods” is Gen. Obj. hier. ...
RD, 1:25-112. ...
RD, 1:115-204. ...
$R E, § 1$ .
$R E, § § 2 - 4$ .
$R E, § 2$ : “We choose ‘ethics’ [ethiek] because the word does not yet carry the negative associations [kwade reuk = “evil smell”] that ‘morality’ [moraal] has, at least as understood in terms of moral preaching [zedepreek]. In addition, a distinction is usually made between ‘morality’ understood as practical morality, rules for living, inductively describing what is externally done, and ‘ethics’ as the more strictly scientific and deductive expression of what is. Practical morality is the cluster of rules by which people live and is thus an inductive description of what people outwardly do. Ethics is thus deeper and normative.” Cf. GE-Lindeboom, 10. ...
GE-Lindeboom, 14; cf. RE, §2: “Ethics must concern itself with (a) how human beings as rational, responsible beings appropriate and use the gifts and powers of the first creation and accept the gospel of grace; (b) how humans are regenerated and how that life remains subject to sickness, temptation, and struggle; and © how, in ethical lives, human acts (of understanding, will, etc.) are directed toward God’s law, which is to be manifested in all circumstances of their lives. In other words, ethics is concerned with the preparation, birth, development, and outward manifestation of the spiritual person.” ...
RE, §2; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 14: “Ethics is the scientific description of the realization [verwerkelijking] of Christ’s grace in our personal human life; in other words, it describes the realization of God’s salvation [heil] in us.” ...
RD, 1:58. ...
Translated from GE-Lindeboom, 14-15; cf. RE, §2. ...
DO: kenbron, norma; RE, §4; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 21. ...
RE, §4; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 22. ...
RE, §3; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 18. ...
Cf. GE-Lindeboom, 23, 137, 256. ...
In our edition, volume 1 will contain Books I-II, volume 2 will contain Book III, and volume 3 will contain Book IV. ...
The divisions and titles are almost identical in the GE-Lindeboom manuscript. ...
RE, §5; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 25-30; cf. RD, 2:530-62 (chap. 12: “Human Nature”); Bavinck begins this chapter with these words: “The essence of human nature is its being [created in] the ...
image of God.” ...
RE, §8; Bavinck discussues these topics in RD, 3:25-190. ...
RE, §8; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 49; Buddeus, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis; Lampe, Schets der dadelyke Godt-geleertheid; Vilmar, Theologische Moral. ...
RE, §9. ...
$R E, § 9$ .
RE, §§10-12; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 70-80. ...
RE, §11; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 75-79. ...
RE, §13; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 86. ...
RE, §§13-15; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 81-91, 124; RD, 3:32. We see here a prime example of Bavinck’s distinction between dogmatics and ethics. Bavinck pays little attention to the human conscience in Reformed Dogmatics, apart from this comment in 3:173 about Adam and Eve’s transgression in Gen. 3: ...

Immediately after the fall, the eyes of Adam and Eve were opened, and they discovered that they were naked. Implied here is that they knew and recognized that they had done wrong. ...
Shame is the fear of disgrace, an unpleasant and painful sense of being involved in something wrong or improper. Added to the shame was fear before God and the consequent desire to hide from him-that is to say, the human conscience was aroused. Before the fall, strictly speaking, there was no conscience in humans. There was no gap between what they were and what they knew they had to be. Being and self-consciousness were in harmony. But the fall produced separation. By the grace of God, humans still retain the consciousness that they ought to be different, that in all respects they must conform to God’s law. But reality witnesses otherwise; they are not who they ought to be. And this witness is the conscience. ...
In addition to his extensive treatment of the subject in §14 (chap. 5 below), Bavinck published an article on conscience already in 1881: “Het geweten” (ET: Bavinck, “Conscience”). ...
38. RE, §§15-16; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 124-36. ...
39. RE, §§17-26; we have divided the material into six chapters in this volume. ...
40. This outline is virtually identical to that of GE-Lindeboom. ...
41. RE, §17; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 5; GE-Lindeboom, 139. ...
42. See Bolt, Theological Analysis; Bolt, “Christ and the Law.” Bavinck published two essays on the imitation of Christ, one at the beginning of his academic career, 1885-86, and the other in 1918; both are published in English translation in Bolt, Theological Analysis, 372-440. ...
43. RE, §21; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 41-42; GE-Lindeboom, 174. ...
44. RE, §21; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 56-58; GE-Lindeboom, 184-85. ...
45. RE, §21; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 57-58; GE-Lindeboom, 185; the outline here is practically identical to that used by Bavinck in his 1885-86 “Imitation of Christ” article, more evidence of the manuscript’s date. The essay appeared in the journal De Vrije Kerk (The Free Church), a monthly periodical “of Christian Reformed voices” that sought to bring the church out of its isolation in order to engage the cultural and scientific challenges of the day. One of its stated goals was “to oppose a superficial and unhealthy mysticism with a more biblical spirituality.” Bavinck served as its editor from 1881 to 1883 (Bolt, Theological Analysis, 80-81). ...
46. RE, §21; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 58-60; GE-Lindeboom, 185-87. ...
47. RE, §§22-26; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 60-160; GE-Lindeboom, 187-255. ...
48. RE, §23, “Security and Sealing” (chap. 10). ...
49. DO: kentekenen. ...
50. DO: Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk. ...
51. The Secession of 1834 from the national Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk), which led to the formation of the Christian Reformed Church (Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk). This church established its own theological school in Kampen in 1854. ...
52. See Veenhof, “History of Theology and Spirituality in the Dutch Reformed Churches”; Veenhof, “Discussie over het zelfonderzoek.” ...
53. GE-Van der Veen, 89: “Prof. B. vertelde, dat een vrouw uit zijn vroegere gem. verzegeld was geworden door Jesaja 27:1!”; GE-Lindeboom, 208: “Ja zelfs heb ik in mijne Gemeente te Franekeraldus verhaalde Prof. Bavinck-eene vrouw gekend, die verzegeld was met Jes. 27:1.” The reference to Franeker is missing in

R E

, and provides a rare instance of a Bavinck classroom pastoral ad lib. The exclamation mark in the van der Veen manuscript is telling; Isa. 27:1 is an extraordinary text by which one is sealed by the Holy Spirit: “In that day the LORD with his hard and great and strong sword will punish Leviathan the fleeing serpent, Leviathan the twisting serpent, and he will slay the dragon that is in the sea.” ...
54. RE, §22; see GE-Van der Veen, 101-3, 113; GE-Lindeboom, 217, 226. We do not find Kuyper’s name elsewhere in the GE-Van der Veen and GE-Lindeboom manuscripts. ...
55. For an excellent introduction to this controversy and Bavinck’s own perspective on it, see Bavinck, Saved by Grace; the editor’s introduction is a superb overview of the historical and theological issues in the controversy. ...
56. The emphasis on “public” is deliberate; he did privately indicate such disagreement to his students, notably in his differences with Kuyper on the matter of theological encyclopedia and the nature of theology. In a letter to Kuyper (October 29, 1894) he expressed his reservations directly but then added this: “I am reluctant to discuss all this in public. The manner in which some discuss your work and judge it on the basis of isolated statements offends me. I do not wish to support such a critique in any way” (cited by Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus, 24). ...
57. Bavinck also discusses the topic of sanctification in RD, 4:230-72. ...
58. RE, §27; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 161-80; GE-Lindeboom, 256-66. ...
59. LO: praecepta, consilia; RE, §28. ...
60. RE, §29. ...
61. LO: collisio; RE, §30. ...
62. RD, 4:239, 260. ...
63. RE, §§32-35; cf. GE-Van der Veen, 268-327; GE-Lindeboom, 325-85. ...
64. Here are the topics of the nine sections: §50, the family in history; §51, marriage as an obligation; §52, impediments to marriage; §53, degrees of consanguinity; §54, engagement/betrothal; §55, consummation of marriage; §56, the nature/essence of marriage; §57, divorce; §58, husband and wife. ...
65. The document has the title Ethiek and can be found in the Bavinck Archives, no. 197. After an introductory section covering terminology, the “Ethics” document contains sections about philosophical ethics in general, principal schools of philosophical ethics, a brief history of philosophical ethics, and contemporary views of philosophical ethics. These sections are followed by a short sketch of Reformed ethics comprising three main sections: (1) an introduction (with subsections on terminology, the history of Reformed ethics, and the foundations of Reformed ethics); (2) the untitled first part, divided into (a) doctrine of sin, (b) the origin of spiritual life, © its development, (d) its consummation, (e) its resources, (f) its blessing, and (g) its norm; and (3) the second part, entitled “Revelation of That [Spiritual] Life in the World” and divided into (a) in the family (here Bavinck plans to speak of marriage; monogamy; the single state; second marriage; adultery; celibacy; divorce; the duties, aim, and blessing of marriage; parents and children; upbringing; education; brothers and sisters; shaping of character; servants; family friends; and friendship), (b) in vocation, © in society, (d) in the state, (e) in the church, and finally (f) a section on the kingdom of God. ...
66. Geesink, De ethiek in de gereformeerde theologie, 6: “Deze armoede van onzen tijd aan specifiek Gereformeerde ethische studie.” ...
67. Bavinck, Hedendaagsche moraal, 7. ...
68. DO: armoede, jammerlijk tekort. ...
69. Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der heilige godgeleerdheid; see Stellingwerff, “Over de bibliotheek en de boeken van dr. A. Kuyper.” Kuyper’s lectures on dogmatics to his Vrije Universiteit students between 1880 and 1902 did get unofficially published in a number of five-volume editions as Dictaten dogmatiek. ...
70. Geesink, Gereformeerde ethiek. ...
71. De Jong, “Gereformeerde ethiek van Profess. Dr. H. Bavinck,” hereafter abbreviated as GE-De Jong. The Library of the Protestant Theological University at Kampen preserves a handwritten duplicate of the GE-De Jong manuscript (shelf mark 187D15). This anonymous duplicate once belonged to G. C. Berkouwer, longtime professor of dogmatics at the Vrije Universiteit. He received the manuscript as a gift on the occasion of his inaugural address on October 11, 1940. ...
72. Van Gelderen and Rozemond, Gegevens betreffende de Theologische Universiteit Kampen, 122. ...
73. Gemeenten en predikanten, 316; see also van der Meulen, “Ds J. M. de Jong.” ...
74. Van Gelderen and Rozemond, Gegevens betreffende de Theologische Universiteit Kampen, 32. ...
75. GE-De Jong, 26. ...
76. DO: gewoonte, gebruik, zede, zedelijkheid; GE-De Jong, 1-12; cf. 153. ...
77. GE-De Jong, 12-17. ...
78. DO: “Ethiek heeft dus tot taak om ons te doen zien en kennen: Het Principe in de eerste plaats en het systeem van het zedelijke in de tweede plaats” (GE-De Jong, 17). ...
79. RE, §2; cf. GE-Lindeboom, 14-15. ...
80. DO: kenbron, norma. This results, as we have seen, in a threefold methodology: (1) collecting and systematizing biblical data, (2) describing how these data have been adopted in the church, and (3) developing these data normatively or thetically with a view to our own time (

R E, § 4

). ...
81. GE-De Jong, 24. ...
82. GE-De Jong, 23, 142. ...
83. GE-De Jong, 25-26. ...
84. They are (1) the rational ethics of classical Greek philosophy; (2) the ethics of a special moral faculty, a semen virtutis or moral sense (Ralph Cudworth, Henry More, Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson); (3) the ethics of moral sentiment (Adam Smith); (4) the ethics of aesthetic formalism (Johann Friedrich Herbart); (5) the ethics of practical reason (Immanuel Kant); and (6) the ethics of intuitive cognition (Thomas Reid); GE-De Jong, 26-64. ...
85. They are (1) in God; (2) in nature (Heraclitus, the Stoa, Tolstoy); (3) in the government (Thomas Hobbes); (4) hedonism (Aristippus); (5) eudaemonism (Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius); (6) the ethics of self-improvement (zelfvolmaking, Spinoza); (7) utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill); (8) the ethics of evolutionism (Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer); and (9) positivism (Auguste Comte); GE-De Jong, 64-128. ...
86. GE-De Jong, 129-38. ...
87. DO: “Op zichzelf is hiertegen niet zoo groot bezwaar” (GE-De Jong, 36). ...
88. DO: “Ook met de gedachten van Aristoteles kunnen we onze winst doen en zonder twijfel is de Ethiek van Aristoteles de beste philosophische ethiek in hoodzaak; Want wat is het schone er in? Dat hij met de Christenen hierin overeenstemt dat de mensch in het zedelijke al de hem geschonken gaven en krachten harmonisch ontwikkelen moet in overeenstemming met zijne zedelijke natuur. Hij dwaalt alleen daarin dat dat ideaal voor den mensch in eigen kracht bereikbaar zou zijn”; GE-De Jong, 36. ...
89. See, for example,

G E

-De Jong, 18, 161, 166, 174, 205, 281, 291-92. In his other writings Bavinck sharply and frequently criticizes Darwin: see RD, 2:83, 511-20, 525-26, 535-37; Bavinck, “Evolution”; cf. de Wit, “Beeld van gorilla.” ...
90. See GE-De Jong, 24, 136-38, 176, 251, 267; there is also a paucity of references to Nietzsche in the Reformed Dogmatics: RD, 1:118; 2:44, 89, 210, 526; 3:59, 238, 531; 4:258, 647. ...
91. To the best of our knowledge, Abraham Kuyper introduced Nietzsche’s philosophy in the Netherlands in his 1892 rectorial address entitled De verflauwing der grenzen; ET: “Blurring of the Boundaries.” ...
92. Other evidence, however, suggests that Bavinck taught theological ethics during the academic year 1901-2 and again in 1902-3; see Handelingen der twee-en-zestigste vergadering, 26, and cf. Almanak van het studentencorps 1903, 37. During the year 1900-1901 Bavinck would have taught “Survey of the History of Ethics” (“Overzicht van de geschiedenis der ethiek”), which could be interpreted as philosophical ethics; see Handelingen der een-en-zestigste vergadering, 35, and cf. Almanak van het studentencorps 1902, 33. Perhaps de Jong attended Bavinck’s lectures in ethics one year before he officially started his theological studies. ...
93. GE-De Jong, 139-45. ...
94. DO: “Deel A: Leer van het zedelijk subject.” The sections are §1: humanity as image of God (“De mensch als beeld Gods”); §2: disruption of the image of God by humans (“Verstoring van het beeld Gods door de mensch”); §3: humans as moral creatures in the situation of sin (“De mensch als zedelijk wezen in de toestand der zonde”); §4: the content of human morality (“De inhoud van het zedelijke in de mensch”); §5: human moral qualities (doctrine of virtue) (“De zedelijke kwaliteiten van de mensch [leer van de deugd]”); §6: human moral activity (“De zedelijke handelingen van de mensch”); §7: inadequacy of natural morality (“Ongenoegzaamheid der natuurlijke moraal”); §8: special grace (“Bijzondere genade”); §9: the spiritual life ("'t Geestelijk leven"); §10: growth in the spiritual life (“Ontwikkeling van het geestelijk leven”); §11: connecting spiritual life and moral life (“Geestelijk leven in verband met het zedelijk leven”); and §12: special gifts (“Bijzondere gaven”); GE-De Jong, 145. ...
95. DO: “Deel B: Leer van de wet.” The four general sections are §13: the law as a rule of gratitude (“De wet als regel der dankbaarheid”); §14: the nature of the (moral) law (“De natuur der [zede]wet”); §15: division of the law (“Verdeeling der wet”); and §16: breaking the law (“Overtreding der wet”). Sections 17-26 comprise the ten sections on the Commandments. ...
96. DO: “Deel C: Het doel van het zedelijke.” The nine sections are §27: the purpose of morality (“Doel der zedelijkheid”); §28: the glory of God (“De eere Gods”); §29: the purpose of the moral good for individual persons (“Doel van het zedelijk goede van den enkelen mensch”); §30: the moral good of families ("'t Zedelijk goede van de familiën"); §31: the moral good in society ("'t Zedelijk goede in de maatschappij"); §32: the moral good in the sphere of social interaction ("'t Zedelijk goede in den kring van het gezellig leven"); §33: the state (“De staat”); §34: the church from a moral perspective (“De kerk uit zedelijk standpunt”); and §35: the kingdom of God (“Het rijk Gods”). In §32, the Dutch word gezellig is notoriously difficult to translate; it suggests settings and social interactions that are “enjoyable,” “pleasant,” “convivial,” “entertaining,” and, applied to homes, “cozy.” In view is the informal social life of human beings rather than formal or “official” interactions. ...
97. GE-De Jong, 161-80. ...
98. This conclusion is also warranted by information provided in the minutes of the Directors of the Theological School in Kampen concerning a course to be taught by Bavinck: “In the school year 1902/03, DV, Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck will cover [among others] Ethics: the doctrine of humanity’s moral nature in the situation of sin” (“Door Prof. Dr. H. Bavinck [zal D.V. in den cursus 1902/03 behandeld worden]: [ . . . . Ethiek: De leer van de zedelijke natuur des menschen in den toestand der zonde”); see Handelingen der twee-en-zestigste vergadering, 26. ...
99. Cf. Bolt, “Christ and the Law.” ...
100. Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli. ...
101. Bavinck, “Het geweten.” ...
102. Bavinck, “De navolging van Christus.” ...
103. Bavinck, De navolging van Christus en het moderne leven. ...
104. Bavinck, “Religion and Politics.” ...
105. See van Keulen, “Bavinck and the War Question.” ...
106. Bavinck, Ethiek, Bavinck Archives, no. 197. ...
107. The brief outline of the history of philosophical ethics is divided into three sections: (1) Greek philosophy; (2) newer times (Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza); and (3) newest philosophy: criticism and speculation (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher). Furthermore, Bavinck discusses five “contemporary views of philosophical ethics”-namely, independent morality, positivism, utilitarianism, evolution theory, and pessimism. ...
108. Bavinck, “Gereformeerde Ethiek,” Bavinck Archives, no. 61. ...
109. For an overview of Bavinck’s attitude toward philosophy, see Veenhof, “De God van de filosofen.” ...
110. Harinck et al., “Als Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende.” ...
111. Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 101; cf. Harinck, “Eén uur lang is het hier brandend en licht geweest.” ...

Introduction ...

We will develop our concept or idea of Christian ethics from the ground up, from the actual history of the church’s practice and reflection. Christianity entered the Greco-Roman world, where philosophers of various schools provided answers to questions about individual morality and common life in society. Christians became known for their high moral conduct and wrote about such ethical matters as patience, prayer, penance, chastity, celibacy, and marriage. When the church became more established in the world, the world also entered the church and brought forth an ascetic and monastic response. The church developed its moral teachings as part of its practice of discipline and penance. Moralism and legalism were real dangers. ...

Through the work of Peter Lombard, Albert the Great, and especially Thomas Aquinas, medieval theology produced an impressive virtue ethics, including the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love and the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Bonaventure is the foremost representative of a more contemplative and spiritual approach to the Christian life, but this gave way to the speculative mysticism developed by Meister Eckhardt, Johannes Tauler, Jan van Ruysbroeck, Thomas à Kempis, and the Theologia Germanica. ...

The Reformation separated Christian or theological ethics from philosophical ethics, using the law of the Ten Commandments as the basis for the former, and often structuring the latter with the help of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Calvin integrated a biblical ethics into his dogmatics, and many Reformed thinkers followed suit. Some sought to give guidance for the spiritual lives of Christians by developing casuistry-judging and deciding moral matters in specific instances or cases. Reformed thinkers, however, ...
were more inclined to writing works of “practical theology” or “spiritual theology,” along with works in “ascetic theology” that spell out required duties and practices. In particular, ascetic theology directs us to the means by which piety is exercised, especially prayer, fasting, vigil, and so forth. ...

Since 1750 the discipline of ethics can be characterized by the equivalent terms of eudaemonistic, utilitarian, and rationalistic. In various ways the moral life became a matter of self-determination, with the spirit of human subjects in one way or another overcoming the limitations of nature and matter. The distinction between religion and morality, the church and the world, disappears. ...

The term “ethics” comes from Greek words that signify accustomed places, habits, and manners. The word “morality” has Latin roots and points to the customary manner of people’s lives in community. Since a normative understanding of the Christian life must be more than custom or the perceived practice of a society, we understand “ethics” to be the more scientific and normative designation of what is and what ought to be. Ethics probes deeply and reaches high to the idea of the Good, the essence of what is truly human. Morality must be free and not coerced and lead to the flourishing of what is essentially and truly human. ...

Ethics is “the art of fruitful, godly living and dying well, to God’s glory.” Our moral life must not be identified with our religious life of fellowship with God, but it must also never be separated from it. Each must become manifest in the other: what we do must give evidence of who we are. Ethics concerns itself with how we use our natural, created gifts, how we receive the gospel of grace and are regenerated, and how our lives, remaining subject to sickness, temptation, and struggle, can be directed to God’s law. ...

Our ethics proceeds from God and is through God and for God. It is this relation to and dependence upon Holy Scripture that distinguishes theological ethics from philosophical ethics. The method of theological ethics is identical to that of dogmatic theology: we gather material from Scripture and arrange what it says about sins, regeneration, sanctification, and the like; we ...
examine carefully the way the Christian church in its history has handled this material; we develop this further and apply it to our own day. Because ethics deals with the course of the Christian life, its content can be divided into the human condition before conversion (natural ethics), regenerated humanity (practical theology), and the life of regenerated humanity in a variety of social spheres. ...

§1. Historical Overview of Christian Ethics¹ ...

We begin with the history of Christian ethics so that we will be able to see the idea of ethics arising and growing in the Christian church, and then, on the basis of history, establish our concept of Christian ethics. The idea of ethics arose among the Greeks, who divided philosophy into dialectics (principles of thought, logic), physics (principles about the being of things), and ethics (principles about the actualizing of laws of reason and morality, concerning what is good in human conduct). Socrates was the father of ethics and sought its foundation in reason and knowledge. Plato deepened this and called virtue the harmony or health of the soul. Aristotle provided a practically useful, measured morality that was satisfying in practice and found its basis in the will. The Stoics placed the foundation of ethics in disposition, the Epicureans in desire, and the followers of Plotinus in contemplation. Morality deepened and strengthened to the degree that life became worse. These philosophical ethics were characterized by intellectualism. Among the common folk, ethics was joined with politics. Ethics was always political, civil justice

\underset{―}{\underset{―}{2}}

or moral customs that became law. Piety is temperance, moderation, and sound judgment;

\underset{―}{3}

morality is righteousness or justice, 4 a matter of acknowledging the rights of others, giving to each person what is due to them.

\underset{―}{5}

...

Antiquity ...

Christianity arose in the world of a thoroughly depraved antiquity.

\underset{―}{6}

In its earliest days, people noted the distinctive lives of Christians and described their conduct and their motives for obeying characteristic Christian ...
commandments and admonitions. Christians lived as their Lord had while hoping for the future return of Christ. 7 ...

The first Christian ethicist was Clement of Alexandria, followed by Origen, who became ascetically spiritualistic. The West remained more practical and reserved as its morality became more tied to the church. In particular, Tertullian wrote about ethical subjects such as patience, prayer, penance, chastity, and monogamy. 8 For him ethics is above all teaching about virtues. With Constantine the world pushed into the church, and monasticism along with asceticism rose in opposition. Representatives of this ascetic spirit include Athanasius, Basil the Great’s Ascetica, 9 Gregory of Nyssa, and others. Monks were considered the true “philosophers.” “Desensualization became morality.” 10 ...

The Western church was more practical, but morality became more legalistic. Lists of good works such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimages arose, and a distinction was made between mortal and venial sins. The kingdom of God was identified with the church, while the earthly realm was not acknowledged and valued in its own right. This was true even for Augustine, whose influential ethical works include On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 11 Concerning the Nature of Good, 12 and Enchiridion. 13 ...

Ecclesiastical morality amounted to this: evil is forbidden, the good is commanded, that which is “in-between” 14 is free, and the perfect is recommended. Precepts were distinguished from counsels, and lower virtues from higher virtues. This distinction was paired with the doctrine of penance: the church forgives and imposes penance. This gave rise to “penitential books” (Theodore,

\underset{―}{15}

Bede,

\underset{―}{16}

etc.): lists of tariffs for sins. Casuistry, developed first by Raymund in the thirteenth century,

\underset{―}{17}

was a pragmatic way to investigate whether or not something was a sin, the extent of the sin, and the price of the penance. In this way the boundary between good and evil was blurred; casuistry led to probabilism,

\underset{―}{18}

which was perfected by the Jesuits and opposed by Pascal in his Provincial Letters. The collections of the moral teachings of the church fathers 19 by the Venerable Bede, Isidore of Seville, and John of Damascus, along with Alcuin’s Of Virtues and Vices,

\underset{―}{20}

provided a bridge to Scholasticism.

\underset{―}{21}

...

Middle Ages ...

In the prior era, a systematic treatment of ethics was still lacking. People started with a collation of moral proverbs after the example of the pagan philosophers; gospel became law. The Scholastics, however, began a systematic treatment of ethical ideas. Peter Lombard (d. 1164) provided the example by starting with the virtues, then sins, followed by the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love), then the cardinal virtues (justice, courage, prudence, and temperance), and finally the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (according to the Vulgate of Isa. 11:2-3): wisdom, understanding, counsel, power, knowledge, fear of the Lord, and delight in the fear of the Lord. This structure was essentially retained by Alexander of Hales (ca. 1186-1245), Albert the Great (d. 1280), and by the greatest ethicist of them all, Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). Thomas considers ethics in the First and Second Parts of the Second Part of his Summa theologiae. In the First Part he discusses the virtues in general (Ia IIae qq. 49-89), the affections and passions (qq. 21-48), freedom (qq. 8-18), law (qq. 90-108), and grace (qq. 109-13). 22 In the Second Part he deals with the specific

\underset{―}{2} \underset{―}{3}

three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love (IIa IIae qq. 1-46), followed by the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance (qq. 47-170). This is in substance a virtue ethic. ...

Mysticism reacted against the scholastic method. Its representatives included Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173), and Bonaventure (ca. 1217-74), all of whom combined contemplative and ascetic elements in the direction they took mysticism, especially in the speculative mysticism developed by Meister Eckhardt (ca. 1260-ca. 1328). Other important figures include Johannes Tauler (d. 1361), Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293-1381), Thomas à Kempis (ca. 1380-1471), and the German Theology.

\underset{―}{24}

...

The Reformation ...

The Reformation introduced another basis for morality. Works were separated from grace, faith became the principle of virtue, and Scripture was considered the only source of moral knowledge. As a result, philosophical ethics was taken to be essentially different from Christian ethics, which acquired its own basis, content, and purpose. ...

The Reformers did not treat ethics as a separate discipline, but they did set forth ethical principles.

\underset{―}{25}

Melanchthon treated ethics in his ...

Commonplaces,

\underset{―}{26}

where he gives an exposition of the Ten Commandments and also covers ethical subjects such as natural law, good works, penance, and prayer. For a considerable time this structure governed the foundation of theological ethics. Melanchthon also composed philosophical ethics in his commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 27 and his 1538 Book of Moral Philosophy.

\underset{―}{28}

As a result, philosophical and theological ethics were not clearly distinguished from each other. Georg Calixt (1586-1656) was the first to properly separate them in his 1634 Abridgement of Moral Theology.

\underset{―}{29}

Johann Conrad Dürr (1625-77), in his Handbook of Moral Theology,

\underset{―}{30}

constructed the first ethical system in the Lutheran Church. Other Lutheran ethicists include Johann Adam Osiander (1657-1724), Gebhardt Theodor Meier (1633-93), Johann Wilhelm Baier (1647-95), and Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729).

\underset{―}{31}

Casuistry was treated by Balduin,

\underset{―}{32}

Olearius, Dannhauer, König, and Dedekenn.

\underset{―}{33}

Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten (1706-57) was influenced by the philosophy of Christian Wolff. 34 Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1693-1755)

^{35}

took ethics in a eudaemonistic direction, as did Michaelis

\underset{―}{36}

and Bahrdt.

\underset{―}{37}

A supranaturalist ethic was provided by Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753-1812).

\underset{―}{38}

...

Reformed Churches ...

The ethical literature in the Reformed Churches is much richer and more edifying. 39 Dogmatics and ethics are still united in Zwingli. Above all, he sought ethical reformation, a renewal of life and morality in accordance with Holy Scripture. His fundamental error was in his understanding of the relation between civil and divine justice, between nature and grace.

\underset{―}{40}

Calvin did not treat ethics separately but throughout his Institutes, especially in book III, chapters 6-10, where, in order, he deals sequentially with regeneration (poenitentia), 41 self-denial, cross-bearing, meditation on the future life, and the proper use of this life. Other important ethical themes included Christian liberty (III.xix), prayer (III.xx), and the exposition of the moral law (II.viii). Calvin developed ethics from a purely Christian foundation and distinguishes it clearly from philosophical ethics. Many Reformed thinkers continued to include ethical material in their dogmatics: Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563),

\underset{―}{42}

Georg Sohn (1552-89),

\underset{―}{43}

and the Leiden Synopsis. 44 Others treated it in a second volume (teaching on faith and teaching on love). This was done by Polanus;

45

Heidegger ...
(locus 14);

\underset{―}{46}

Hoornbeeck;

\underset{―}{47}

van Mastricht, who wrote a theology emphasizing morals and duties;

\underset{―}{48}

Wollebius (book II);

\underset{―}{49}

Ames (book II);

\underset{―}{50}

Brakel (book II);

\underset{―}{51}

Marcus Friedrich Wendelin;

\underset{―}{52}

and others. ...

The following separated ethics from dogmatics: Lambert Daneau, who divided the material into three parts (anthropological foundation, law, and virtues); 53 Bartholomew Keckermann, in his Systema Ethices; 54 Antony Walaeus, whose “Compendium of Aristotelian Ethics Called Back to the Norm of Christian Truth”

\underset{―}{55}

is also divided into three parts: (a) “Concerning the highest good,” (b) “Concerning the natural virtues in general,” and © “Concerning the particular virtues”; 56 Daniel Puerari in his Logical and Ethical Theses;

\underset{―}{57}

Amyraut of Saumur, who worked historically in his sixvolume Christian Morality; 58 and Antonius Driessen, Evangelical Ethics. 59 The order of sins first, followed by duties to God, neighbor, and self, was followed by Bénédict Pictet in his Christian Ethics.

\underset{―}{60}

In his “First Elements of Christian Ethics,” J. H. Heidegger does not tie himself strictly to the Decalogue, but utilizes more of Aristotle and divides the subject into love toward God and love toward neighbor.

\underset{―}{61}

J. F. Ostervald of Neuenberg wrote “A Compendium of Christian Ethics.”

\underset{―}{62}

Other writers include Werenfels

\underset{―}{63}

and J. A. Turretin.

\underset{―}{64}

J. G. Altmann of Bern first considers the natural state of humanity,

\underset{―}{65}

then the civil order, etc., and abandons the Decalogue, distinguishing between natural and revealed ethics.

\underset{―}{66}

J. F. Stapfer of Bern adopted the philosophy of Christian Wolff; the Dutch edition of his ethics appeared in 1760.

\underset{―}{67}

Daniel Wyttenbach of Marburg was another Wolffian,

\underset{―}{68}

while J. C. Beck concentrated on the Decalogue. 69 With Samuel Endemann’s Institutes of Moral Theology

\underset{―}{0}

a distinctive Reformed ethics comes to a close; Endemann utilizes numerous Lutheran theologians. ...

All of these works, from Daneau to Endemann, are to a greater or lesser degree under the influence of philosophical ethics, initially from Aristotle, and then from Wolff. The division between Christian ethics and philosophical ethics had not yet been completely developed. In fact, Peter Martyr Vermigli used Aristotle’s Ethics as a foundation for his lectures on ethics;

\frac{71}{1}

using a pagan morality held back the formation of his own ethics. The following are significant:

\underset{―}{72}

Jean La Placette,

\underset{―}{73}

Samuel Basnage, John Forbes of Corse, Daniel Whitby, Simon Oomius, Petrus Wittewrongel, and Jacques Saurin. 74 ...

The Spiritual Life: Casuistry and Ascetic Theology ...

In addition to these works on ethics-each of which has the moral life as its object-casuistry had its own development. Casuistry stands in relation to ethics as jurisprudence (case law) does to the philosophy of law. 75 In general, judging and deciding specific cases coincided with the treatment of the moral law: What must I do in this specific instance? However, casuistry became its own theological science and pushed real ethics to the side. Examples of casuistry in Scripture include Matthew 22:15-22 (Is it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar?); Luke 14:3 (Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath?); and 1 Corinthians 7:8, 10 (Paul’s instruction to the married and the unmarried). Casuistry was developed further by Tertullian, by Augustine, and then with great subtlety in the Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae. 76 All possible situations were considered, and the door was opened to all sorts of arbitrariness. The freedom of the individual was taken away, the conscience was confused, and the result was skepticism and probabilism. The last-mentioned strategy enabled someone to be free from a command if one could appeal to some spiritual authority who could have given permission.

\underset{―}{7}

...

The Reformers did not have their own distinctive ethics or casuistry. However, they faced situations in which they had to make judgments about marriage, usury, tribute and taxes, obedience to civil authority, and so forth. In and of itself, casuistry is a good thing; we all need it. Therefore, it also developed among the Reformed, but definitely not in the manner that earlier Scholasticism had done it-in fact, particularly in opposition to it. A form of casuistry was developed by William Perkins, professor at Cambridge, who wrote an “Anatomy of the Human Conscience”

\underset{―}{78}

along with a casebook of the conscience.

\frac{79}{2}

Perkins first provides a general doctrine of good and evil and a categorization of sin and then asks a series of questions: First, how can one come into God’s favor and be assured and comforted? Second, how does one stand in relation to God? How is one to serve him and beseech him? How must one use the Word, the sacraments, and oaths? And finally, how do we stand in relation to our neighbor? How we must conduct ourselves? and so forth. Perkins’s student William Ames also wrote a book on casuistry

\underset{―}{80}

that sets forth the duties of humans in a practical manner, through questions and answers. A third casuist is Johannes Alsted, whose Theology of Cases

\underset{―}{81}

was designed to comfort the conscience in the face of various trials. 82 ...

Casuistry has a right to exist; there are difficult instances that need adjudication. But as long as one does not multiply the instances with excess subtlety, the medieval casuistry, avoided by the Jesuits, is actually a special section of ethics. Except for the three just-mentioned, casuistry was no longer practiced in the Reformed churches. Maresius wanted nothing to do with it. 83 A few continued with it-Joseph Hall, 84 Jeremy Taylor, 85 Robert Sanderson66-but the practice died out. It did, however, continue in the Lutheran Church for a long time. The following topics were included in it:

\underset{―}{87}

1. laws; 2. human activities: [which include] (a) games of chance, (b) dances, © theater; 3. duties toward God; 4. duties to self, including discussions of self-denial and warnings against impurity, drunkenness, and suicide; 5 . duties to others, including discussions of kindness, almsgiving, 88 and giving offense;

\frac{89}{9}

6. duties of spouses, including discussions of polygamy, adultery, and divorce; 7. duties of parents, including discussion of nurture/education in (a) the Christian faith and (b) life at all age levels, for boys and girls; 8. masters and servants; and 9. magistrates and subjects. ...

In addition, included in the field of ethics are all those activities in which the life of the spirit is the object, activities that are ordinarily spoken of as “practical theology” or the “spiritual life.” 90 Works in this vein include Hoornbeeck’s Practical Theology and C. Vitringa’s Types of Practical Theology or the Spiritual Life.

\underset{―}{91}

H. Witsius, in Practical Divinity,

\underset{―}{92}

divides the material into duties toward God, duties to self, and duties to our neighbor. Lampe’s Sketch of Practical Theology

\underset{―}{93}

joins together practical, moral, casuistic, and ascetic theology. Other works include Antonius Driessen, The Old and New Man, Brought to a Collection of Practical Theology; J. H. Hottinger, Types of the Christian Life; and Simon Oomius, Institutes of Practical Theology.

\underset{―}{94}

Edifying reading material from the writings of W. Teellinck can be found in F. Ridderus, The Man of God. 95 ...

To all of this, we need to add ascetic theology, theology that is concerned with required dutes and practices. 96 Ascetic theology directs us to the means by which piety is exercised, especially prayer, fasting, vigil, and so forth, and thus has its right to exist. After all, the purpose of ethics is that we grow in grace and not stay at the level of theory. The term has a bad odor thanks to the monastic ascetic practices of the Middle Ages. But there is a genuine, biblical, Reformed ascetic theology, summed up in 1 Timothy 4:7 (cf. Acts 24:16): “Train yourself in godliness.”

\underset{―}{97}

Properly, it is not a discipline on its own, though it was practiced in the early church; for ...
example, Basil the Great penned his Ascetica.

\underset{―}{98}

In the Reformed Church, others followed suit, especially in England: Lewis Bayly, The Practice of Piety (1672);

\underset{―}{99}

Jeremy Taylor, The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living (1688);

\frac{100}{2}

R. Baxter, A Christian Directory, or, A Summ of Practical Theology (1678);

\underset{―}{101}

H. Hammond, A Practical Catechism (1644);

\underset{―}{102}

Willem Teellinck, “The Most Important Christian Practices”;

\underset{―}{103}

G. Voetius, The Exercise of Piety;

\underset{―}{104}

P. van Mastricht, the third part of TheoreticoPractica Theologia (Ascetica);

\underset{―}{105}

Pierre Roques, The True Pietism;

\underset{―}{106}

R. Allestree, The Whole Duty of Man;

\underset{―}{107}

Ewald Kist, Ascetica

\underset{―}{108}

To these we can add various and sundry writings on prudence, the attributes of the pastor:

\underset{―}{109}

Fr. Junius, Ecclesiasticus;

\underset{―}{110}

Vedelius, The Wisdom of the Ancient Church;

\underset{―}{111}

and so forth. ...

Ethics in the Nineteenth Century ...

Since 1750 the discipline of ethics can be characterized as eudaemonistic, utilitarian, and rationalistic. (The terms are equivalent.) 112 A new era commenced with Kant, who opposed utilitarianism, acknowledged the majesty of duty, and banned all heteronomy. Kant provided only an abstract and legalistic morality. Schleiermacher published his Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theory in 1803, and after 1812/13 lectured on virtues and duties, the highest good, the permissible, and the distinction between natural law and moral law.

\underset{―}{113}

This was followed by Sketch of a Moral System, produced by Alexander Schweizer (1835), 114 and subsequently published by Twesten under a different title, An Outline of Philosophical Ethics,

\underset{―}{115}

in 1841. Yet another version was produced by Ludwig Jonas in 1843 under the title The Christian Ethic.

\underset{―}{116}

...

Schleiermacher’s theological ethics is rooted in his philosophy. It is to his credit that he deals with the ethical material systematically; there is a unity in it. The good, according to Schleiermacher, is the existence of rationality in nature. Ethics is concerned about activity in this sense: the church, the ecclesiastical common spirit (which is the Holy Spirit)

\underset{―}{117}

must become realized in the individual, just as philosophical ethics studies the reason that is realized in nature. However, the church is surely not the norm for morality? And if it were, which church? There are no objective norms in Schleiermacher, no adequate designations of good and evil. Evil is mere denial. ...

Richard Rothe’s Theological Ethics

\underset{―}{118}

is filled with beautiful, rich, deep insights but suffers from three foundational errors. First, Rothe understands ethics as a discipline within speculative theology and constructs it entirely on the basis or source of Christian consciousness. The foundation is therefore subjectivist, with the subject standing above the Christian faith, although Rothe still considers Christianity to be the absolute truth. Second, Rothe has an erroneous understanding of ethics itself. Everything personal is moral; everything that occurs through the power of human selfdetermination is ethical. The ethical process involves freeing ourselves from what is natural, material, and self-seeking, and becoming personal spirits. Sin is a necessity and thus not really sin. Finally, for Rothe, what is religious is attached to the ethical; the religious is merely the form, while the ethical is the content. The ethical devours the religious life; the latter has no independent existence, and the church must morph into the state. ...

In addition, the following are the foremost ethicists of the ninetenth century: (a) Gottlieb Chr. A. von Harless, Christian Ethics (1842).

\underset{―}{119}

The title is “Christian” but the content is Lutheran (for example, with respect to regeneration). The volume is not constructed and executed well and is difficult to read. He does understand the Christian life properly as a life out of and in Christ, but he fails to do justice to many themes-law, duties, sanctification-because of the way he divides the material into the blessing of salvation, the possession of salvation, and the preservation of salvation.

\underset{―}{120}

(b) Christian Friedrich Schmid, Christian Ethics (1861);

\underset{―}{121}

a fine, foundational, philosophically sharp work. © A. Wuttke, Manual of Christian Ethics (1861),

\underset{―}{122}

contains a great deal of historical material but is less in the Scriptures than above and beyond them. It also lacks a systematic order and method. (d) Ph. Th. Culmann, Christian Ethics (1864-66),

\underset{―}{123}

has depth in spite of being built on a mystical foundation; however, it is excessive and theosophical. (e) Martensen’s three-volume Christian Ethics

(1871 - 78) \underset{―}{124}

is clear and expansive but lacks precise delineation of the distinctively Christian and substitutes general ideas for specific issues. His viewpoint is existential-ethical 125 and, occasionally, modernist. (f) A. F. C. Vilmar’s Theologische Moral (1871)

\underset{―}{126}

is morally serious and definitely Christian but also occasionally displays a strained rigorism and fanciful exegesis.

\underset{―}{127}

...

§2. Terminology $^{128}$ ...

The term “ethics” comes from the Greek

\tilde{η}

日oc, which is “a lengthened form of

^{'}

धocs” and in the first place signifies “an accustomed place: in plural the haunts or abodes of animals.” With respect to humans it signifies both temper, character, and disposition, on the one hand, and habit, custom, and manner, on the other. The plural indicates manners (Latin mores).

\underset{―}{129}

The term is found in the New Testament at 1 Corinthians 15:33: “Do not be deceived: bad company corrupts good character”;

\underset{―}{130}

at Acts 16:21: “by advocating customs unlawful for us as Romans to accept or practice”;

1 \underset{―}{131}

and at Acts 26:3: “You are familiar with all the customs and controversies of the Jews.” 132 Originally

\tilde{n} \tilde{θ}

os meant “dwelling,” “stay,” “action,” “manner of acting.” It is not identical in meaning to morality (mores), but is a certain kind of morality (Quintilian).

\underset{―}{133}

It is often used as a synonym for тро́тос (= manner, way, kind, character). ...

The Latin mos refers to the manner of people’s lives as it flows forth from the disposition, character, and life of nations; that is to say, it equals custom, morals, and manners. 134 According to Vilmar, mos is “more ‘internal’ than

\tilde{η}

Hoc.” 135 However, Dorner argues the exact opposite. 136 With respect to their etymological work, whether we translate mos as “morality” or “ethics” is a matter of indifference. We choose “ethics” because the word does not yet carry the negative associations that “morality” has, at least as understood in terms of moral preaching. In addition, a distinction is usually made between morality understood as practical morality and ethics as the more purely scientific and deductive expression of what is. Practical morality is the cluster of rules by which people live and is thus an inductive description of what people outwardly do. Ethics is thus deeper and normative.

\underset{―}{137}

This parallels the distinction between ethics and moral philosophy.

\underset{―}{138}

...

The Dutch word zede, the German Sitte, and Sanskrit sat all refer to “living, dwelling”;

\underset{―}{139}

a similar word in the Gothic language is sidus, which is used in the Gothic version in 1 Corinthians 15:33 and 2 Timothy 3:10.140 Nomads do not have moral customs;

\underset{―}{141}

customs and morals develop when people “sit,” when they settle down and dwell in a place.

\underset{―}{142}

...

For our scientific purposes this etymology is insufficient; it provides only the normative principle that we are concerned about life in society. All ...
societies have already existing and firm customs, rules, social behaviors, and morals from which one may not deviate. One’s nation, family, and circle determine an individual’s conduct. Morality consists of what is in agreement with the dominant customs. Scripture does not speak of morality but of righteousness, holiness, and godliness, because it always views human beings in terms of their relationship to God, who rules their conduct. According to etymological explanations of morality, a moral life is a life that is normatively governed by and in agreement with the customs of the people. ...

But gradually this moral life was viewed in a more profound way. A rational person cannot, upon reflection, locate the highest norm for living within customs, which can serve only as a standardized norm.

\underset{―}{143}

There has to be another, higher, absolute standard. People looked for the essence of morality - what is moral in its own right, independent of society’s judgment and valid for all people at all times. There has to be a foundation for ethics, a supreme basis, a comprehensive and all-regulating principle that governs all conduct always. Morality, in other words, cannot be custom, but must be an idea, something that does not just exist but must be; something that needs to be concretized in real life. This is the idea of the Good, the ethical ideal, the idea of the truly human or humane. Morality is thus considered more deeply than what is customarily human; it is normed by the essence of the human. ...

Consequently, there are two crucial dimensions in morality. First, it involves free acts of human personality and not those that are necessary or arbitrary. Second, the norm for morality is what is essentially human, or humane. ...

This is a purely formal understanding, and materially, we see great differences of opinion on how to conceive of these dimensions. No one is in full agreement with another about what constitutes “normal humanity.” It is the task of philosophical ethics to search after this and to provide definitions of the normally human and to indicate the foundations and maxims of morality. On the face of it, this exploration cannot be in conflict with Christian ethics, any more than the truly human in itself is in conflict with the genuinely Christian. However, in reality, these often conflict. At this time, we are not entering into the questions of philosophical ethics, but only with specifically Christian ethics. Today, when one considers the etymology of the word “ethics,” the designation “Christian ethics” seems ...
like a contradiction in terms. “Christian” suggests a different norm than the word “ethics,” understood as the genuinely human or humane. That raises the question: Is a Christian and Reformed ethic possible? 144 In other words, can one speak of a moral life among Reformed Christians? Most definitely! For these reasons: ...

The moral life is not degraded by conversion; our moral life provides the form, first for our natural life and then for our spiritual life. Our life as a member of a family, in vocation, in society, in church, in the state, in art and science, remain the same. That has to be considered in ethics. ...
Faith, regeneration, and sanctification are effected in us by God in a human manner, in accord with our nature, character, etc.; that is to say, in an ethical manner. Our thinking, feeling, willing, acting, our whole being and our whole life, can and must be viewed from a moral perspective. ...

There is, therefore, such a thing as Christian ethics because (a) the life of Christ is implanted in us in a moral way and is developed, and (b) the life of Christ manifests itself outwardly. Presupposed here is the existence of a moral life with its own basis, content, and goal; a moral life by which human beings can be or become what they should be. To accept in part or whole the possiblity that such a moral life does not exist is anti-Christian and is to stand in the broken covenant of works. The content of such a socalled moral life is either natural, Adamic, and sinful, or it is spiritual, a regenerated life, the life of Christ. ...

This spiritual life can also be considered in its own right as a life from God and in saving fellowship with him. We are able to investigate that life in its origin, its maladies, its conflict, and its development. Thus we describe the life history of the person in Christ. Reformed theologians did so under the rubric of practical theology (e.g., Driessen

\underset{―}{145}

and Witsius

\underset{―}{146}

), the “old” and “new” person (Costerus

\underset{―}{147}

), the person in Christ (van den Honert148), and active theology (Lampe149). This is a necessary task. We need to know the nature, character, and fruit of the spiritual life, because we need to unmask hypocrites, lift up the downtrodden, comfort the sorrowful, heal the sick, and guide the strong. Diagnosis of the spiritual life is ...
necessary especially for a pastor. Soul care is exceedingly important. A person’s salvation sometimes hangs on a single word, a hint, or advice. ...

Now we face the difficult question: Are ethics and this practical theology two distinct disciplines, or can they be handled together? It seems that they are two distinct things because ethics is concerned with morality, and practical theology with religion; religion and morality must not be confused or mixed together. At the same time, there is much to be said for considering them together. (It remains good and necessary, nonetheless, for one to write about the spiritual life as something distinct; this does not, however, mean that they are two distinct disciplines.) Here are some reasons for keeping them together: ...

If ethics is separated from practical theology, the human factor is treated too lightly and ethics is set free from dogmatics, leading to Pelagianism. ...
As we have seen, the only content or the matter of the moral life is the spiritual life of fellowship with God-that is, religion. ...
Considering the spiritual life and moral life together guards us against seeing the moral life as a life unto itself; it protects us from establishing a covenant of works. ...
Even though religion and morality are two distinct things, they are nonetheless intrinsically bound together. One must manifest itself in the other. What we do must give evidence of who we are. Treating practical theology and ethics together furthers the mutuality of religion and morality; protects us from letting the spiritual life drift into feeling, quietiesm, or Pietism; and helps it [the spiritual life] to become evident in deeds, in action, in walking according to God’s Word. Keeping them together also expresses the conviction that a normal and true life of faith must reveal itself through a strong moral life. ...

We can now specify what ethics is. ...
There is much to be said against the idea of treating ethics, as we have described it, as a separate discipline. One should link it either to dogmatics or to practical theology. We choose the latter because ethics that is linked with dogmatics does not properly come into its own; far too much is left undiscussed and ignored. History teaches that ethics is most closely bound ...
with practical theology, but a pure, complete division of the two is impossible. ...

Ethics must concern itself with (a) how human beings as rational, responsible beings appropriate and use the gifts and powers of the first creation and accept the gospel of grace; (b) how humans are regenerated and how that life remains subject to sickness, temptation, and struggle; and © how, in ethical lives, human acts (of understanding, will, etc.) are directed toward God’s law, which is to be manifested in all circumstances of their lives. In other words, ethics is concerned with the preparation, birth, development, and outward manifestation of the spiritual person. Ethics is the “developmental history of people redeemed by God,” 150 the “scientific description of the grace of Jesus Christ in operation, i.e., his divine lifecontent in the form of a human person’s life.” 151 Ethics describes the concretizing of the kingdom of God in humanity; the origin, growth, and completion of Christ’s body;

\underset{―}{152}

in other words, how, from beginning to end, on the foundation of and by means of God’s acts for us and in us, the regenerated community comes into being. Ethics is the truth about our internal and external sanctification (Daneau), 153 the art of living unto God (van Mastricht),

\underset{―}{154}

the art of fruitful, godly living and dying well (Pictet).

\underset{―}{155}

...

The distinction between dogmatics and ethics has become clear. 156 The difference does not lie in the fact that the former deals with the understanding and knowledge, while the latter is concerned with the will and conduct.

\underset{―}{157}

This would boil down to a division of human beings into two parts, of which one half is purely intellectual and the other purely ethical. No. In dogmatics

\underset{―}{158}

we are concerned with what God does for us and in us. In dogmatics God is everything. Dogmatics is a word from God to us, coming from outside us and above us; we are passive, listening, and opening ourselves to being directed by God. In ethics, we are interested in the question of what it is that God now expects of us when he does his work in us. What do we do for him? Here we are active, precisely because of and on the grounds of God’s deeds in us; we sing psalms in thanks and praise to God. In dogmatics, God descends to us; in ethics, we ascend to God. In dogmatics, he is ours; in ethics, we are his. In dogmatics, we know we shall see his face; in ethics, his name will be written on our foreheads (Rev. 22:4). Dogmatics proceeds from God; ethics returns to God. In dogmatics, God loves us; in ethics, therefore, we love him. ...

The difference, therefore, does not consist in our weakening the doctrine of election in our examination of ethics, or that we become semi-Pelagian by allowing the human person finally “to come into his own” to achieve his rightful place. All Pelagianism must be rooted out; it is simply anti-ethical. It is precisely because God is everything that humans are truly great. There is no division of labor here where God does his part and we do ours. Not at all! We establish our calling precisely because God works all in all. This is a mystery: just because God is everything, we can be great. A mystery, yes, but far better this mystery than a Pelagian, Remonstrant slice of the Gordian knot that divides God and humanity so that God cannot be God and human beings cannot be genuinely human. ...

§3. Division and Organization of Ethics ...

In earlier centuries, ethics was frequently little more than instruction in virtues

\underset{―}{159}

and duties,

\underset{―}{160}

listed one after another in an unsystematic manner. This changed with Schleiermacher, who, in his philosophical ethics, insisted that the moral life can and must be considered from three perspectives that complement each other. As a duty the good stands over against human beings as commandment, a “must”; as virtue it is the power to do the good; as goal it is the ideal that duty pursues in harmony with virtue. 161 From these we get instruction in duties, in virtues, and in moral goods.

\underset{―}{162}

According to Schleiermacher, up to that point each one of these has been emphasized with a resulting ethic of law (Kant), an ethic of virtues (a “flat morality”), or a eudaemonistic, utilitarian ethics (the highest good). Instead, Schleiermacher claimed that the ethical is first of all brought forth in all three of these notions, that any two always produce the third, that duty cannot be fulfilled without virtue, virtue cannot exist without being normed by duty, and the highest good can only be realized by virtue that is identical with duty. ...

This order, followed by Rothe,

\underset{―}{163}

may be fine for philosophical ethics, but it cannot be used in theological ethics, however insightful it may be. It is an abstract scheme, and the material of theological ethics cannot be incorporated into it. It is an extrinsic division that defies the maxim that a ...
proper ordering of the material must arise from the content itself. The good is not law (but grace); it is not goal or human striving (but gift!). ...

In some sense, the division is not difficult. Ethics is the description of the Christian life, and its course is therefore given to us. For all intents and purposes the divisions of the Protestant orthodox are virtually the same. Driessen’s “Practical Divinity” 164 is divided into two parts: the old person and the new. Teellinck’s “The Man of God” 165 into three parts: humanity in sin, regenerated, flourishing/blessed. 166 Vitringa deals only with the spiritual life: its nature, origin, states, and perfection. 167 Pictet considers the disordered human condition, virtues in general, and then virtues particularly with a view to God, the neighbor, and ourselves;

\underset{―}{168}

van Mastricht considers only the virtues with respect to God and our neighbor;

\underset{―}{169}

Vilmar divides the material into sin, regeneration, etc., and sanctification. 170 Other divisions are found in Martensen: life before conversion, in imitation of Christ, in the spheres of family, state, etc.;

\frac{171}{17}

in Heppe: humanity before possessing salvation, in possession of salvation, and in confirmation of salvation’s possession;

\underset{―}{172}

and in Harless: “the content of salvation” (humanity, law, gospel), the acquiring of salvation (regeneration, conversion), the preservation of salvation (piety, virtues in vocations, spheres).

\underset{―}{173}

...

We thus obtain a threefold division: ...

Humanity before conversion, in the condition of sin, conscience, morality; this is the realm of natural ethics. ...
Converted humanity: the new life in its preparation, origin, aspects, circumstances, aids, blessing, marks, sickness and death, fulfillment; $\frac{174}{}$ this is the realm of practical theology. ...
Converted humanity in the family, vocation, society, state, and church. $\underset{―}{175}$ ...

Those three sections will be treated in what follows and concluded in a summary, which will incorporate the result of ethical actions: the kingdom of God in its origin, development, and completion. 176 ...

§4. Foundation and Method of Ethics ...

Up to this point we have not yet clearly defined the theological character of ethics. Rothe

\underset{―}{177}

and Vilmar

\underset{―}{178}

both call their work “theological ethics,” which is appropriate but insufficient, as can be seen from the significant differences between them. The question therefore is: “What is theological about the work?” According to Rothe, speculation that proceeds from selfconsciousness is philosophical, whereas speculation that proceeds from the fact of God-consciousness-that is, from self-consciousness determined by God-is theological. Theology proceeds from God; philosophy comes to God from the outside. In Rothe’s view, God is really nothing more than an idea of God that he develops dialectically and from which he deduces all moral concepts. Vilmar considers the theological character of ethics to be found in the real and objective saving deeds of God. This is correct. Theological ethics does not proceed from a nature in humanity, in a principle embedded in creation, but from a revealed principle that comes from God and his deeds, his words for and to us, deeds and words that lead us back to God and find in him their goal. ...

One could object here that in ethics we consider the regenerated human person as the subject and that we consider the regenerate from the perspective of who they are and what they do on the basis of God’s acts. Does this then not set aside the theological character of ethics? Not in any way, and for the following reasons: ...

We are considering the regenerated or converted person 179 who has been “born of God” in a supernatural manner; in other words, not the “natural” but the “theological” human person. ...
We are considering regenerated persons not from the human side but as God views them and desires that we consider them. This is something we are not naturally capable of doing; we can truly do it insofar as it is revealed to us. ...

Our ethics is therefore theological because truth in ethics, to the extent that it can be said to be true, is revealed to us; it is supernatural. Our ethics proceeds from God, is through God, and is for God. Also, in our ethics it is God who reveals to us the truth about sin, regeneration, sanctification, how we are to live in the state, and so forth. ...

The foundation of ethics now becomes clear to us. We understand this foundation differently from that of philosophical ethics, where the basic ...
principle can be taken, for example, as intuitive or utilitarian morality. Rather, we take it in the sense of a source of knowledge, in parallel with dogmatics. 180 Since we are speaking of theological ethics, there can be only one source of knowledge that discloses to us God’s viewpoint. And then, having abandoned natural theology, we have only Holy Scripture as the source. Scripture is the rule for teaching/doctrine and life. Our Confession of Faith says simply that Scripture is “for the regulating . . . of our faith.” 181 Ethics is as closely related to and fully dependent on Holy Scripture as is dogmatics. On this point Vilmar is correct. 182 But, for the rest, matters are up for grabs. One person defines “Christian” in terms of the current beliefs and practices of the Christian community, another by what is consistent with the spirit of Jesus. 183 Rothe claims that Holy Scripture is the norm of speculative theology, but very little comes of it in practice. 184 From the fact that Reformed people, without noting it every time, derive their entire teaching on virtues and duties from the Ten Commandments and the Lord’s Prayer, it is clear that they also consider Scripture as the source and norm of ethics. This is what the Heidelberg Catechism does. 185 Daneau is correct in claiming that philosophical ethics and Christian ethics proceed from different sources; the former is derived from nature, the latter from Scripture. 186 According to Samuel Endemann, “Revealed moral theology is taken from the whole of Scripture in the Old and New Testaments.” 187 ...

There are differences over the use of the Old Testament. Even Lessius 188 claimed that the Old Testament had no place in ethics. 189 This is incorrect; the Old Testament has as much value and authority for ethics as it does for dogmatics. 190 The moral law in the Old and New Testaments is identical; Christ set forth no new moral laws. Nonetheless, we must not lose sight of the differences between the Old and New Testaments. This is a difficult question because the Old Testament is, on the one hand, absolutely the word of God and, on the other, also historical. In general, this is the rule to follow: whatever in the Old and New Testaments is not of temporal, passing, historical significance, but of significance for the church of all ages, is authoritative both in dogmatics and ethics. ...

Its derivation from Scripture is what gives ethics its Christian, theological character. But our concern is also with a Reformed ethics. Ever since roughly 1750 there has been an aversion to distinguishing ethics along confessional, ecclesiastical lines. According to Endemann,

\underset{―}{191}

there is no difference between Reformed and Lutheran ethics (not so for Roman ...

Catholic ethics); our differences in theology “truly do not change our practice of the truth.” 192 (Unfortunately! Doctrine with no influence on life.) It was believed, and this conviction grew stronger and stronger, that the moral realm was a free territory where everyone could agree; while differences existed in theology, the moral law was the same for everyone. This was the illusion by which people sought to find unity in the church, in the school, and in the state, an illusion that still lives on. But it is an illusion; the history of our age has proved that. It is true, nonetheless, that confessional differences do not become apparent in ethics as quickly as in theology. There are two reasons for this: ...

because it takes a long time before life gets turned around and governed by new doctrine: we tend to remain inconsistent for some time, sticking with the tradition; ...
because the differences in ethics are often internal: externally, for example, we stay the same while the motives and intentions of our actions are different; it is these that really determine what is ethical. ...

At the present time, there is general agreement, albeit rather reluctantly by some (after all, it was a grand illusion), that ethics too is an ecclesiastical matter.

\underset{―}{193}

Doedes

\underset{―}{194}

denies any distinction: Jesus presents us with only one vision of the Christian life, not a Reformed or Lutheran or Roman Catholic one; it is the task of ethics simply to find that one presentation. What superficial chitter-chatter! Whether one likes it or not, there are differences. Harless calls his work Christliche Ethik, Beck the same, Rothe uses Theologische Ethik and Vilmar Theologische Moral-but it is clear again and again, on every page, whether an author holds to a Lutheran or Reformed or Roman Catholic theology or another. Since this is factually so, let us acknowledge it. According to Doedes, however, this is a failure: we must strive for a Christian ethic alone. Undoubtedly, but we will achieve this by searching not behind or above ecclesiastical differences but precisely through them. A Christian ethic lies before us. The general “catholic” Christian church subsists in the diversity of church communions. In addition, it is fortunate that there is a variety of ethical presentations; it is evidence that doctrine does daily influence life (let us not restrict this influence even more) and has the advantage that the Christian life is seen as even more rich when it is viewed from a variety of perspectives. ...

We offer here, therefore, a Reformed ethics, which is quite a different type of Christian living than the Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, the Anabaptist, the Methodist, the Moravian, the Darbyist, and so forth. How is this Reformed ethic derived? Do we include in our sources the confessions, writers, and church historians? In that case we would have two sources: Scripture and Reformed documents. This is not permitted; it would be quite un-Reformed. Holy Scripture is the only source of our knowledge and stands by itself alone; neither a confession nor any other writing stands beside it.

\underset{―}{195}

How, then? After all, we do need to use these Reformed documents; we may not isolate ourselves from them and withdraw to our solitary rooms to read and explain Scripture. What, then, is our relationship to them? In the same way that the words “Christian” and “Reformed” are joined together in the name “Christian Reformed Church.” This does not mean half Christian and half Reformed, or one-quarter Christian and threequarters Reformed Church. There is no division here, no composition, no conglomeration. Instead, it means “Christian, in the sense of being ‘Reformed,’” “Christian as it is most purely and clearly understood and confessed in the Reformed Church.” “Christian Reformed Ethics” thus says the same thing as “Christian ethics, as it is most purely confessed and derived from Holy Scripture in the Reformed Church.” “Christian” and “Reformed,” therefore, do not represent a contrast, a composition, or a juxtaposition but a synthesis, a unity. It is Christian and, precisely for that reason, Reformed. That which is Christian comes to us through Reformed lenses; it shines most purely through the Reformed prism. ...

The method thus becomes clear; it is identical to that of dogmatic theology. ...

We need to gather together the material from Holy Scripture and arrange what it teaches about sins, regeneration, sanctification, the relationship between parents and children, and so forth. ...
We need to examine carefully the way in which the Christian church has handled this material, particularly the Reformed churches, taking note of: ...
a. the way in which thinkers took ethical dogma very seriously; all the “older writers” [oude schrijvers] have to be considered here. ...
b. the articulation of this “ethical dogma” in the confessions; the harvest is not rich here, although there is something; for example, in ...

the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord's Days 34-52 are completely ethical. ...

c. in what manner and to what extent this “ethical dogma” comes to expression in the lives of Christians, particularly in the Reformed Church; a great deal of attention must be paid to this. ...
3. Finally, we need to develop this further in a normative way and apply it to our own day, in particular pointing the way by which we can complete ethical dogma (ascetics, not distinct from but shining through each topic). ...

Ed. note: Bavinck originally wrote “naam en begrip” (lit., “name and idea”; i.e., “terminology”) but struck this through so as to start with “Historical Overview of Christian Ethics.” He thus intentionally reversed the order he used in the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, where “naam en begrip” comes first (RD, 1, chap. 1) and is followed by the history of dogma (chaps. 3-6). ...
LO: justitia civilis. ...
GrO: $σ ω φ ρ σ σ u ́ v η$ . ...
GrO: ઈıкаюоúvท. ...
LO: suum cuique. Ed. note: The term comes from Aristotle; see Rhetoric 1366B: “Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law” (Aristotle, Rhetoric [trans. Roberts and Bywater]). ...
Ed. note: For literature about the history of Christian ethics, see the historical sections of works of the following authors in the bibliography: W. M. L. de Wette, F. Schleiermacher, A. Wuttke, A. Neander, H. J. Bestmann (part 1, pagan and biblical ethics), E. von Hartmann (Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins), W. Gass, C. E. Luthardt (“Die christliche Ethik,” in Zöckler, Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften), J. T. Beck (Vorlesungen, 1:1-75), F. J. Winter (Die Ethik des Clemens von Alexandrien), J. G. Walch, and the literature that follows in the notes. The order in the preceding list is Bavinck’s. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck develops his own understanding of the heart of Christian ethics from the early church’s emphasis on the imitation of Christ; see chap. 9, §21. ...
Ed. note: Tertullian, Of Patience (ANF 3:707-14); On Prayer (ANF 3:681-92); On Repentance (ANF 3:657-79); On Exhortation to Chastity (ANF 4:50-58); On Monogamy (ANF 4:59-73). ...
Ed. note: Bavinck simply inserted the Greek term n $θ$ rká in the text. According to Quasten (Patrologia, $3 : 211$ ), “Ascetica is the title of a group of thirteen writings attributed to Basil.” The bestknown of these is Moralia (Tà $\dot{η} θ ι κ α ́$ ), “a collection of eighty rules or moral instructions (regulae), each of them supported by quotations from the New Testament.” ...
GO: “Entsinnlichung werd Sittlichkeit.” Ed. note: Bavinck does not provide a reference for this phrase, but he may have obtained it from Luthardt, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, 1:6, 16-18. ...
De moribus ecclesiae et catholicae (ET: On the Morals of the Catholic Church; NPNF1 4:4163). Bavinck mentions only De moribus ecclesiae here, though this work is usually accompanied by another written in the same year (AD 388), De moribus Manichaeorum (On the Morals of the Manichaeans; NPNF1 4:69-89). ...
De natura boni (ET: Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans; NPNF1 4:351-65). ...
Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate (ET: The Enchiridion; NPNF1 3:237-66). ...
GrO: ઈıá popoc. ...
Ed. note: This is a reference to Theodore of Tarsus (602-90), archbishop of Canterbury from 668 to 690. See Charles-Edwards and Lapidge, Penitential of Theodore. ...
Ed. note: This is a reference to the English monk the Venerable Bede (672-735), best known for his Ecclesiastical History of the English People. Though a penitential book was attributed to him, many historians since Bavinck dispute this. See Laistner, “Was Bede the Author of a Penitential?”; cf. Frantzen, “Englishness of Bede.” ...
Ed. note: This is a reference to Raymund of Penyafort (1175-1275), a Catalan Dominican friar who compiled the Decretals of Gregory IX, a major component of Roman Catholic Canon Law. Bavinck cites as his source Zöckler, Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften, 3:484. Zöckler is likely also the source of Bavinck’s references to Theodore and Bede. ...
Ed. note: “Probabilism” is a term used in moral philosophy to refer to the view that when a matter of conscience is difficult, one only has to satisfy the criterion that a choice is probable even if the opposite is more probable. The doctrine was defended by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuits such as Luis Molina (1528-81) and severely criticized by Blaise Pascal, in his Provincial Letters, as promoting moral laxity. ...
Scintillae patrum. ...
De virtutibus et vitiis liber ad Widonem Comitem (PL 101:613-38D). ...
Ed. note: Bavinck listed the Venerable Bede (672/673-735) only as the author of a Scintillae patrum and linked Alcuin (ca. 740-804) with Isidore of Seville (ca. 560-636) and John of Damascus (ca. 650-ca. 750). Koch brings this group together in his Handbook of Moral Theology, 1:51: “The ecclesiastical writers of the early Middle Ages contented themselves with gathering up the moral teachings of the Fathers, expounding and adapting them to practical use by means of encyclopedic collections known as Libri Sententiarum, Scintillae Patrum, or Sacra Parallela. It is sufficient to mention St. Isidore of Seville, St. John of Damascus, St. Bede, St. Peter Damian, and Alcuin.” ...
Ed. note: It is clear from the order of the list in this sentence and in the next that Bavinck is providing a topical summary rather than an analytic summary of ST Ia IIae and IIa IIae; the specific references in the parentheses have been added by the editor. ...
LO: in specie. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck adds “German theology” (“Duitsche Theologie”) as the concluding item after a list of three names. The context, however, suggests that this may be a reference to the anonymous medieval German spiritual treatise published by Martin Luther in 1516 and 1518 and given the simple title Deutsch Theologia. Or it could simply be a general reference to the German tradition of spirituality. For a contemporary English translation see Luther, Theologia Germanica. ...
On Luther, see Luthardt, Die Ethik Luthers; on Calvin, see Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvins; on Zwingli, see Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli. ...
Loci Communes. ...
Melanchthon, Enarratio. Ed. note: According to Sinnema, “Discipline of Ethics,” 11, “Melanchthon lectured on Aristotle’s Ethics at least eight times, beginning in 1527-28, and from this teaching came his 1529 commentary.” ...
Melanchthon, Philosophiae Moralis. Ed. note: The numerous authors and titles that follow in the text and in the notes have been checked with or provided by the online Post-Reformation Digital Library, http://www.prdl.org. ...
Calixt, Epitome Theologiae Moralis. ...
Dürr, Enchiridion Theologiae Moralis. ...
Osiander, Theologia Moralis; Meier and Holste, Disputationes Theologicae; Baier, Compendium Theologiae Moralis; Buddeus, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis. ...
Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck clarifies his manuscript’s simple reference to “Balduinus” with a reference to Johann Georg Walch’s Bibliotheca Theologia Selecta, 2:1127 (VI, § xiii). Walch refers ...
to Friedrich Balduin’s Tractatus de Casibus Conscientiae (1628), which is undoubtedly the work Bavinck had in mind and is part of a larger work, Balduin’s Tractatus Luculentus. Balduin (15751627) was a Lutheran professor of theology at Wittenberg (1607-27). ...
Ed. note: Bavinck mentions no first name or title for the last four men named in this sentence but is most likely referring to Lutheran theologian Johannes Olearius (1639-1713), professor of Greek and later of theology at Leipzig, and his Doctrina Theologiae Moralis; Lutheran theologian Johann Conrad Dannhauer (1603-66) and possibly his Collegium Exercitationum EthicoPoliticarum; Georg König (1590-1654), Lutheran professor of theology at Altdorf and author of Casus Conscientiae; and Georg Dedekenn (1564-1628), a Lutheran theologian and author of Trewhertzige Warnung. ...
Baumgarten, Unterricht von rechtmäßigen Verhalten eines Christen. Ed. note: Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was the preeminent German philosopher between Leibniz and Kant, noted for his high claims for autonomous human reason. ...
Mosheim, Sitten-Lehre der Heiligen Schrift. Ed. note: Eudaemonism is a theory of ethics that identifies moral value with what produces human happiness. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck gives no first name or title; he likely had in mind Lutheran theologian Daniel Michaelis (1621-52), author of De Primo Hominis Primi Peccato Exercitatio. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck gives no first name or title; he likely had in mind Lutheran theologian Carl (or Karl) Friedrich Bahrdt (1741-92), author of Christliches Sittenbuch fürs Gesinde and System der moralischen Religion. ...
Reinhard, System der Christlichen Moral. Ed. note: For Bavinck’s assessment of “supranaturalism,” see RD, 1:355-62; 2:539-48. At this point Bavinck adds a separate line in the manuscript, “Roman Catholic Ethicists,” and refers to Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1113-25 (VI, §§ xi-xii). Walch’s list of some forty names and treatises includes the important Jesuit casuists Tomàs Sanchez (1550-1610), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Gabriel Vásquez (15491604), and Leonard Lessius (1554-1623). ...
Cf. Schweizer, “Die Entwicklung des Moralsystems”; Lobstein, “Zum evangelischen Lebensideal.” ...
Ed. note: Cf. Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli, esp. chap. 9, “Christian Life and Civic Life.” ...
Ed. note: Unlike the later Protestant orthodox theologians who developed highly differentiated orders of salvation (ordines salutis) in which “regeneration” became a technical term for the newbirth initiation of salvation, Calvin uses poenitentia more broadly for the new life, especially repentance; see Institutes, III.iii, esp. III.iii.9. ...
Musculus, Common Places of Christian Religion. ...
Sohn, Methodus Theologiae, in Operum, 1:154-82. Ed. note: Sohn treats ethics under God’s postlapsarian work of providence, where it is one of three aspects of God’s civil rule (the other two are economics and politics). ...
Polyander et al., Synopsis Purioris Theologiae. Ed. note: Bavinck edited the sixth edition of this work, which was published in 1881. ...
Polanus von Polansdorf, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae, books VIII-X. ...
Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae Christianae. Ed. note: Locus XIV is titled “De decalogo.” ...
Hoornbeeck, Theologia Practica. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706), Theoretico-Practica Theologia. This work is divided into two parts. “Mastricht himself argues that the ‘art of living to God’ consists of two aspects: how one is made spiritually alive and, being alive, how one lives to God (Deo vivere).” After the eight books of the first part, which “could be described as systematic theology,” the second major section “presents an outline of moral theology (idea theologiae moralis) and theologia ascetica.” Moral theology, in turn, “is divided into three sections: (1) Christian ...
obedience in general, (2) religion, i.e., obedience in relationship to God, and (3) justice, i.e., obedience in relationship to one’s neighbor” (Neele, Petrus van Mastricht, 67-70). ...

Ed. note: Bavinck usually cites the Dutch translation of van Mastricht’s work, Beschouwende en praktikale godgeleerdheit, which is being translated into English for the first time and will be published under the auspices of the Dutch Reformed Translation Society. To facilitate access in all versions, references will be given by part (I, II, III), book (i, ii, iii, iv, etc.), chapter (

1, 2, 3, 4, 5

, etc.), and paragraph number (§). Each reference will thus have this format: I.ii. 2 §3. The three parts of Theoretico-Practica Theologia are (in Latin/Dutch): I. Theologia/Godgeleerdheid; II. Idea Theologia Moralis / Zedelyke godgeleerdheid; III. Hypotyposis Theologiae Asceticae, de exercitia pietatis / Plichtvermanende godgeleerdheit. This more complete information clarifies Bavinck’s own references, which are usually given simply in terms of the Dutch volume number (I-IV) and the page. Cross-references to the 1749-53 Dutch edition used by Bavinck appear in square brackets indicating the volume and page numbers (e.g., [4:357]). ...
49. Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to Johannes Wollebius (1589-1629), author of Theologiae Epitomen, “First Book: Concerning the Knowledge of God”; “Second Book: Concerning the Worship of God” deals with virtues and works as explained by the Decalogue. ...
50. Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to Ames, Marrow of Theology. Ames divides theology into two parts and his work into two books: “Faith in God” and “Observance to God” (p. 79). ...
51. Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to W. à Brakel (1635-1711), Christian’s Reasonable Service. Book II of the Dutch version is contained in vols. 3 and 4 of the English translation and covers the Christian life of sanctification, the Ten Commandments, the Lord’s Prayer, and the practice of Christian discipleship. ...
52. Wendelin, Philosophia Moralis. ...
53. Daneau, Ethices Christianae. ...
54. Keckermann, Systema Ethicae Tribus Libris. ...
55. Walaeus, Compendium Ethicae Aristotelicae. ...
56. Walaeus, Compendium Ethicae Aristotelicae. LO: (a) de summo bono; (b) de virtutis natura in genere; © de virtutibus singularibus. ...
57. Puerari, Theses Logicae atque Ethicae. Bavinck’s manuscript mistakenly indicates Johannes Polyander (1568-1646), professor of theology at Leiden (1611-46) and one of the contributors to the Leiden Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (Polyander et al.), as the author of Theses Logicae atque Ethicae, which is properly attributed to Daniel Puerari (1621-92), professor of philosophy at Geneva. ...
58. Amyraut, La morale chrestienne. ...
59. Driessen, Evangelische zedekunde. ...
60. Pictet (1655-1724), De christelyke zedekunst. ...
61. Heidegger (1633-98), Ethicae Christianae Prima Elementa. ...
62. Ostervald, Ethicae Christianae Compendium. ...
63. Ed. note: Bavinck does not identify this author more precisely or provide a title. The two possibilities are Peter Werenfels (1627-1703), professor of New Testament at Basel and author of Dissertatio Theologica de Sabbathi Moralitate and the ten-volume Dissertationis Theologicae de Velamine Iudaeorum, and Samuel Werenfels (1657-1740), professor of theology at Basel and author of Philosophiae Moralis. ...
64. J. A. Turretin, Dilucidationes. ...
65. LO: status hominum naturalis. ...
66. J. G. Altmann (1697-1758), professor of philosophy at Bern (1734-57) and author of Delineatio Oratoriae Sacrae Brevibus Praeceptis Exhibita. ...
67. Stapfer, Sittenlehre (Dutch: De zeden-leer). Ed. note: On Christian Wolff, see n. 34 above. ...
68. Wyttenbach (1706-79), Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae et Moralis. Ed. note: Daniel Wyttenbach (1706-79) was a Reformed theologian who served as professor of theology at the ...

University of Marburg from 1756 until his death. He is not to be confused with Daniel Albert Wittenbach/Wyttenbach (1746-1820), who was an Arminian-Remonstrant philosopher. ...
69. J. C. Beck (1711-85), Synopsis Institutionum. Ed. note: The last section of this work is titled “Practical Theology” (Theologiae Practicae); the Ten Commandments are covered in the first eleven chapters and followed by additional sections on the summary of the divine law, the Lord’s Prayer, and the sacred ministry. ...
70. Endemann, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis. ...
71. Hoedemaker, De verhouding der ethiek tot de dogmatiek, 35. ...
72. Ed. note: For the most part, Bavinck takes the following summary list of names (and works) from de Wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre, 174-76. ...
73. La Placette (1629-1718), La morale chrétienne and various pamphlets; see Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1109-10 (VI, § x). ...
74. De Flottemanville, Morale théologique et politique; Forbes, Opera Omnia; Whitby, Ethices Compendium; Oomius, Dissertatie van de onderwijsingen in de practycke der godgeleerdheid; Wittewrongel, Oeconomia Christiana; Saurin, Abregé de la théologie et de la morale chrétienne. ...
75. DO: rechtsphilosofie. ...
76. Ed. note: ST IIa IIae qq. 1-170. ...
77. LO: sententia probabilis. ...
78. Ed. note: Perkins, Anatomia Sacra Humanae Conscientiae; as we will see in chap. 5, §14, Bavinck uses a Dutch translation, Perkins, Eene Verhandeling van de Gevallen der Conscientie. ...
79. Perkins, Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience. ...
80. Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof. ...
81. Alsted, Theologia Casuum. ...
82. Ed. note: At this point, Bavinck inserts in square brackets: “In the Lutheran Church: Balduinus †1627, Finck 1631, Dunte 1636, König 1654, Kessler 1658, Dannhauer, Osiander, Olearius, Bechmann, etc.” He also adds a marginal reference to Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1127 (VI, § xvi). The entire bracket is footnoted: “See E. Schwarz, ‘Casuistik,’ PRE1 2:608-19.” In addition to Schwarz’s article, Bavinck also gathers his information from de Wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre, 173-74. ...
83. Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to Samuel Maresius (1599-1673), author of Collegium Theologicum and Systema Theologicum. Chap. 8 of the latter deals with the law (De Lege). ...
84. Ed. note: Joseph Hall (1574-1656) was an Anglican, Reformed theologian and author of Resolutions and Decisions of Divers Practical Cases of Conscience. Hall deals with “Cases of Profit and Traffick,” “Cases of Life and Liberty,” “Cases of Piety and Religion,” and “Cases Matrimonial.” Bavinck also refers to the German translation of this work, Gewissens Rath. ...
85. Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium. ...
86. Sanderson, De Obligatione Conscientiae. Ed. note: Bavinck refers to Rivetus, Praelectiones, in the note and adds in the margin Lodensteyn, Weegschaal; Maccovius, Casus Conscientiae. ...
87. Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1141-60 (VI, § xvi). Ed. note: The Latin titles of Walch’s topics, with the pages on which they are treated, are 1. de legibus (1140-41); 2. de actionibus humanis (1141-45); 2a. ludi fortunae (1141-42); 2b. saltationes (1141-44); 2c. ludi theatreales (1144-45); 3. de officias erga deum (1145-46); 4. de officiis erga se ipsos (1145-49); 5. de officiis erga alios (1149-50); 6. de officiis coniugum (1150-59); 7. de officiis parentum (115960); 8. de officiis dominorum et servorum (1160); and 9. de officiis imperantium et subditorum (1160). ...
88. GrO:

ε λ ε η μ o σ u ́ v η

. ...
89. LO: de scandalis. ...
90. LO: theologia practica; vita spirituali. ...
91. Hoornbeeck, Theologiae Practicae; Vitringa, Typus Theologiae Practicae. ...
92. Witsius, Prakticale godgeleertheid. ...
93. Lampe, Schets der dadelyke Godt-geleertheid. ...
94. Driessen, Oude en nieuwe mensch; Hottinger, Typus Vitae Christianae; Oomius, Institutiones Theologiae Practicae. ...
95. De mensche Godts. ...
96. Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1171-83 (VI, § xviii). ...
97. GrO: үv́

μ ν α ζ ε δ ε \overset{`}{σ ε α v t o ̀ v π ρ o ̀ s ε v σ ε ́ ß ε ı α v .}

...
98. Ed. note: See n. 9 above. ...
99. Ed. note: Bavinck wrote “Bayle,” but is most likely referring to Bayly (ca. 1575-1631), Practice of Piety. A Dutch translation edited by Gisbert Voetius was published in 1642: De practycke ofte oeffeninge der godsaligheydt. There is also a German edition: Praxis Pietatis. ...
100. Taylor, Rule and Exercises of Holy Living. Ed. note: Between the lines, Bavinck added: “also in German” (Die Richtschnur und Ubung eines Heiligen Wandels). Bavinck’s information comes from Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1107 (VI, § x). ...
101. Baxter, Christian Directory. ...
102. Hammond, Practicall Catechisme. ...
103. Ed. note: Most likely Bavinck has in view here Whately, Corte verhandelinge van de voornaemste christelicke oeffeninghen, which was translated by Teellinck. The English original of this work was apparently never published. ...
104. Voetius, De praktijk der godzaligheid. ...
105. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, III.i-iv [4:669-840].
105. 반 마스트리흐트, 《이론-실천 신학》, III.i-iv [4:669-840].
106. Roques, Le vray pietisme ou traité. ...
107. Allestree, Whole Duty of Man. Ed. note: Bavinck indicates that the author is unknown; this work has also been attributed to Lady Dorothy Coventry Pakington, Richard Sterne, John Fell, and Humphrey Henchman.
107. 알레스트리, 《인간의 온전한 의무》. 역자 주: 바빙크는 저자를 알 수 없다고 표기했으며, 이 작품은 도로시 코벤트리 패킹턴 여사, 리처드 스턴, 존 펠, 험프리 헨치만 등에게도 귀속된 바 있습니다.
108. Ed. note: Most likely Bavinck is referring to Kist, Beöeffeningsleer. An English translation, with the translator identified in the preface simply as V., was published in 1852.
108. 역자 주: 바빙크는 아마도 키스트(Kist)의 《Beöeffeningsleer》를 언급한 것으로 보입니다. 1852년에 V.라는 이니셜만 밝힌 번역자가 영역본을 출판했습니다.
109. Walch, Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta, 2:1162-71 (VI, § xvii).
109. 발흐(Walch), 《Bibliotheca Theologica Selecta》 제2권, 1162-71면 (VI, § xvii).
110. Junius, Ecclesiastici. Ed. note: Junius’s book I provides a theology of the church (“de ecclesiae”); book II deals with offices of the church: pastors, elders, deacons, teachers (doctors), and all believers (“de ecclesiae administrationibus”); book III with qualifications for office in the church and the duties of those offices (“de formis”).
110. 유니우스(Junius), 《Ecclesiastici》. 역자 주: 유니우스의 저서 제1권은 교회론("de ecclesiae")을 다루며; 제2권은 교회 직분들(목사, 장로, 집사, 교사[박사], 그리고 모든 신자들)에 관한 내용("de ecclesiae administrationibus")을; 제3권은 교회 직분 자격과 그 직무들("de formis")을 다룹니다.
111. Vedelius, De Prudentia Veteris Ecclesiae, Libri Tres. ...
112. Ed. note: Bavinck noted this equivalence with equal signs: “eudaemonistic

=

utilitarian

=

rationalistic.”
112. 역자 주: 바빙크는 다음과 같이 등호를 사용하여 동등성을 표시했습니다. "행복주의적(eudaemonistic) = 공리주의적(utilitarian) = 합리주의적(rationalistic)."
113. Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre. Ed. note: Bavinck had “1819” in his text, but Schleiermacher lectured on the doctrine of goods, virtues, and duties from 1812/13 through 1817; see Schleiermacher, Lectures on Philosophical Ethics, v. The Lectures volume includes an extensive historical overview of Schleiermacher’s lectures and writings on ethics, pp. vii-xxx.
113. 슐라이어마허, 『기존 윤리학 비판의 기본 원리(Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre)』. 역자 주: 바빙크는 본문에 "1819년"이라고 기록했으나, 슐라이어마허는 1812/13년부터 1817년까지 선(善), 덕(德), 의무에 관한 교의를 강의했습니다. 슐라이어마허의 『철학적 윤리학 강의(Lectures on Philosophical Ethics)』, v를 참조하십시오. 해당 강의집에는 슐라이어마허의 윤리학 강의 및 저작에 대한 방대한 역사적 개요(pp. vii-xxx)가 포함되어 있습니다.
114. Schleiermacher, Entwurf eines systems der Sittenlehre. ...
115. Schleiermacher, Grundriß der philosophischen Ethik. ...
116. Ed. note: Schleiermacher, Die christliche Sitte nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt. ...
117. GO: “Gemeingeist = heilige Geist.” ...
118. Rothe, Theologische Ethik. ...
119. Von Harless, Christliche Ethik. ...
120. GO: das Heilsgut, der Heilsbesitz, die Heilsbewahrung. ...
121. C. F. Schmid, Christliche Sittenlehre. ...
122. Wuttke, Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre. ...
123. Culmann, Die christliche Ethik. ...
124. Ed. note: It is a challenge to track the publication history of Martensen’s Christian Ethics; some dates in WorldCat (https://www.worldcat.org) entries are uncertain, and many entries fail to specify the edition. As best as can be determined, the original Danish work, Den christelige Ethik, was published from 1871 to 1878 in Copenhagen by Gyldendal. It consisted of two parts, published in three volumes: “General Part” (vol. 1), “Special Part I: Individual Ethics” (vol. 2), and “Special Part II: Social Ethics” (vol. 3). An English version of vol. 1 was translated from the Danish by C. Spence and published in 1871 by T&T Clark. A German edition of vol. 1, Die christliche Ethik, was published in 1871 by R. Besser. Vols. 2 and 3 in German, Die individuelle Ethik and Die sociale Ethik, were published in 1878 by the same publisher. Vol. 2 was translated into English from the German by W. Affleck and published in 1881 by T&T Clark. Vol. 3 was translated from the German by Sophia Taylor and published in 1882 by the same publisher. There is also a volume that combines two of the authors in this paragraph: Martensen and Harless, Christian Ethics.
124. 역자 주: 마르텐센의 《기독교 윤리학》 출판 역사를 추적하는 것은 어려운 과제입니다. WorldCat(https://www.worldcat.org) 항목의 일부 날짜는 불확실하며, 많은 항목이 판본을 명시하지 않고 있습니다. 최대한 확인한 바에 따르면, 원본 덴마크어 작품 《Den christelige Ethik》은 1871년부터 1878년까지 코펜하겐의 Gyldendal에서 출간되었습니다. 이 작품은 두 부분으로 구성되어 총 3권으로 발행되었습니다: "일반부"(제1권), "특별부 I: 개인 윤리"(제2권), "특별부 II: 사회 윤리"(제3권). 제1권의 영어판은 C. Spence가 덴마크어에서 번역하여 1871년 T&T Clark에서 출판되었습니다. 제1권의 독일어판 《Die christliche Ethik》은 1871년 R. Besser에서 출간되었습니다. 제2권과 제3권의 독일어판 《Die individuelle Ethik》과 《Die sociale Ethik》은 1878년 동일 출판사에서 발행되었습니다. 제2권은 W. Affleck이 독일어에서 영어로 번역하여 1881년 T&T Clark에서 출판되었으며, 제3권은 Sophia Taylor이 독일어에서 번역하여 1882년 동일 출판사에서 발행되었습니다. 또한 이 단락에 언급된 두 저자(마르텐센과 할레스)의 작품을 합친 《Christian Ethics》도 존재합니다.
125. Ed. note: Bavinck succinctly describes Martensen as “ethisch,” which we have translated with the double term “existential-ethical.” The term is mistranslated as simply “ethical” because it refers to a specific school of Dutch theology in the late nineteenth century whose leaders were Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818-74) and J. H. Gunning (1829-1905). Both emphasized the personal, relational, existential, and Christocentric character of the Christian faith. Truth is an “ethical” or relational reality. For a brief summary of this “ethical theology” in the Dutch Reformed Church, see Blei, Netherlands Reformed Church, 80-81. Also see Bavinck, De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye.
125. 역자 주: 바빙크는 마르텐센을 간결하게 "ethisch(윤리적)"이라고 묘사하는데, 우리는 이를 "실존적-윤리적"이라는 이중 용어로 번역했습니다. 이 용어를 단순히 "윤리적"으로 오역하는 것은 19세기 후반 네덜란드 신학의 특정 학파를 가리키기 때문이며, 이 학파의 지도자들은 다니엘 샹트피 드 라 소세(1818-74)와 J. H. 군닝(1829-1905)이었습니다. 두 사람 모두 기독교 신앙의 개인적, 관계적, 실존적, 그리스도중심적 성격을 강조했습니다. 진리는 "윤리적"이거나 관계적인 실재입니다. 네덜란드 개혁교회 내 이 "윤리적 신학"에 대한 간략한 요약은 블레이의 <네덜란드 개혁교회> 80-81쪽을 참조하십시오. 또한 바빙크의 <다니엘 샹트피 드 라 소세 교수의 신학>도 참조하십시오.
126. Vilmar, Theologische Moral. ...
127. On the literature of ethics, see Runze, Ethik, 1:1-16 (“Einleitung”); Schulze, “Zur Geschichte der christlichen Ethik.” Ed. note: Bavinck failed to note that the previous volume of the journal containing Schulze’s two-part article, Theologisches Literaturblatt, also contained a survey of philosophical ethics; see Rabus, “Eine Moralphilosophie aus dem Kreise der neuen Scholastik.” Bavinck also refers to Philosophisches Jahrbuch, Theologisches Jahresbericht, and other journals.
윤리학 문헌에 관해서는 Runze, Ethik, 1:1-16("서론")과 Schulze, "기독교 윤리학의 역사에 관하여"를 참조하라. 역자 주: Bavinck은 Schulze의 두 부분으로 구성된 논문이 실린 이전 호의 Theologisches Literaturblatt에 Rabus의 "새로운 스콜라 철학 계열의 도덕철학"이라는 철학적 윤리학 개요가 포함되어 있음을 언급하지 않았다. Bavinck은 또한 Philosophisches Jahrbuch, Theologisches Jahresbericht 및 기타 학술지를 참조하고 있다.

The first 35 volumes of Philosophisches Jahrbuch are available at https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008883008, and a useful index for vols. 1-20 (1888-1907) is at https://archive.org/details/philosophischesj1a20gruoft.
Philosophisches Jahrbuch의 초기 35권은 https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008883008에서 이용 가능하며, 1-20권(1888-1907)에 대한 유용한 색인은 https://archive.org/details/philosophischesj1a20gruoft에서 확인할 수 있다.
128. Ed. note: The Dutch title is “Naam en Begrip” (“Name and Idea”).
128. 역자 주: 네덜란드어 제목은 "Naam en Begrip"("이름과 개념")이다.
129. Ed. note: Liddell, Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. "

\hat{n} θ

oc." These first two sentences are a constructed elaboration, based on Liddell and Scott, of Bavinck’s cryptic text. Bavinck’s point is that the

ε^{'} θ \circ ς / \hat{η} θ

os semantic field has the double signification of behaviors, habits, customs, manners, and rituals on the one hand and the personal moral disposition, character, and temper of people on the other. Furthermore,

ε^{'} θ

oç has the former primarily in view while

\hat{η} θ

os points to the latter, fuller meaning.
129. 역자 주: 리델(Liddell)의 『중급 그리스어-영어 사전』, "

\hat{n} θ

oc" 항목 참조. 처음 두 문장은 리델과 스콧(Liddell and Scott)을 바탕으로 바빙크의 암호 같은 텍스트를 구성적으로 확장한 것이다. 바빙크의 요점은

ε^{'} θ \circ ς / \hat{η} θ

os의 의미 영역이 한편으로는 행동, 습관, 관습, 예절, 의식 등을, 다른 한편으로는 개인의 도덕적 성향, 성품, 기질을 이중적으로 의미한다는 것이다. 더 나아가

ε^{'} θ

oç는 전자의 의미를 주로 지칭하는 반면,

\hat{η} θ

os는 후자의 더 풍부한 의미를 가리킨다.
130. GrO:

μ \overset{`}{η} π λ α v α ̂ σ θ ε

ФӨɛípovouv ท̋

θ η

хрпотà ò

μ λ

íal какаí. ...

132. GrO:

μ α ́ λ ι σ τ α γ ν ω ́ σ τ η ν

őv

τ α σ ε π α ́ ν τ ω ν τ \hat{ω} ν

кас

α

’Iov

δ α

íovs

ε θ \hat{ω} ν τ ε

. ...
133. Ed. note: Bavinck’s text has “niet = mores, maar morum quaedam proprietas (Quintiliaan).” Bavinck has taken this straight from Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:3; Vilmar identifies Quintillian’s Institutes 6.2 as the source.
133. 역자 주: 바빙크의 원문에는 "niet = mores, maar morum quaedam proprietas (Quintiliaan)"이라고 되어 있다. 바빙크는 이 내용을 빌마르(Vilmar)의 『신학적 도덕』 1:3에서 그대로 인용했으며, 빌마르는 퀸틸리아누스(Quintillian)의 『수사학 원론』 6.2장을 출처로 밝히고 있다.
134. Ed. note: Bavinck uses the single term zede here.
134. 역자 주: 바빙크는 여기서 zede라는 단일 용어를 사용합니다.
135. GO: mehr etwas Inneres. Ed. note: Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:3-4; in the margin Bavinck added: Heraut 487, a reference to Abraham Kuyper’s commentary on Lord’s Day 8 of the Heidelberg Catechism (Q&A 6), republished in Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno, 1:176-82.
135. 독일어 원문: mehr etwas Inneres. 역자 주: 빌마르, 『신학적 도덕』 1:3-4; 바빙크는 여백에 'Heraut 487'이라고 추가했으며, 이는 아브라함 카이퍼가 하이델베르크 교리문답 제8주일(문답 6)에 대한 주석을 가리키는 것으로, 후에 카이퍼의 『E Voto Dordraceno』 1:176-82에 재수록되었습니다.
136. Ed. note: I. A. Dorner, “Ethik.” ...
137. Ed. note: Bavinck’s terms are “inwendig, principieel, deductief.” The term principieel is characteristic of Kuyperian neo-Calvinism, and although North American neo-Calvinists use “principial,” principieel is best translated as “normative.” ...
138. DO: zedenleer, zedenkunde. ...
139. DO: wonen. ...
140. Ed. note: Variants of sidus in the passages Bavinck cites are found in the Gothic Bible of Ulfila (ca. 311-83), the missionary and Bible translator to the Goths. Bavinck’s source for this is Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:4. Bavinck’s reference to the Gothic Bible illustrates the fluidity of the terms for ethics/morality in Scripture. According to Vilmar, the Gothic sidus appears once in the New Testament as a translation of

η = η

( 1 Cor. 15:33; “morals”); it was also inserted in the text of 2 Tim. 3:10 to explain the two terms

τ \hat{n} \hat{α} γ ω \hat{η} \hat{η}

(“conduct”) and

τ \hat{η} π ρ o θ ε ́ σ ε l (" p u r p o s e ")

. Modern translations capture this by translating

τ \hat{n} \hat{α} γ ω γ \hat{n}

as “my conduct” (ESV, NRSV) or “my way of life” (NIV). ...
141. DO: zeden. ...
142. Cf. von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht, 2:15-20; for the opposing view see Freybe, “Die Bedeutung der Sitte.” ...
143. LO: norma normata. ...
144. Ed. note: In the preceding sentences, where he speaks of “Christian ethics,” Bavinck originally wrote “Christian Reformed” (“Christ. Geref.”), but crossed out “Geref.” ...
145. Driessen, Oude en nieuwe mensch. ...
146. Witsius, Prakticale godgeleertheid. ...
147. Ed. note: Bavinck’s reference to “Costerus” is not entirely clear. Old and New Man is the title of Antonius Driessen’s work (above). Bavinck may have had in mind Florentius Costerus (16351703), author of De geestelike mensch, in sijn begin, voort-gang, en uyt-eynde, voor-gestelt in verscheyden predicatien, 2nd rev. ed. (Hoorn: Stoffel Iansz., 1695). ...
148. Van den Honert, De mensch in Christus. ...
149. Lampe, Schets der dadelyke Godt-geleertheid. ...
150. Ed. note: Bavinck’s quotation, “Entwicklungsgeschichte des von Gott erlösten Menschen,” is his own reconstruction of two phrases in Harless, Christliche Ethik, 2: “geschichtlicher ...
Entwicklungsprozess im Leben der von Christo gewonnenen Seelen” and “Entwicklungsgeschichte der von ihm erlöseten Menschen.” Bavinck is quoting from Harless’s first edition; the revised and expanded sixth edition, as well as the English translation based on the sixth edition, does not have these passages. Instead, Harless indicates his concurrence with a definition of ethics given in Jäger, Die Grundbegriffe der Christlichen Sittenlehre, 9. Jäger distinguishes ethics from dogmatics, with the latter describing the “creating, revealing, and saving deeds of God,” while ethics reflects on the way in which those deeds “take shape in individual persons as free beings in their life activities.” ...
151. Beck, Vorlesungen über Christliche Ethik, 1:84. ...
152. Ed. note: The source is unknown. Bavinck inserted a question mark in the text. ...
153. Daneau, Ethices Christianae. ...
154. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.“Prologue” [4:521]: “The art of living for God . . . consists of two parts: (a) knowing how we who are spiritually dead can be made alive, and (b) having been made alive how we can live for God. The first is found in faith [in fide]; the second in the obedience of faith [in obedientia fidei].” ...
155. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst. ...
156. Ed. note: Cf. RD, 1:56-58. ...
157. Which was the way the Reformed theologian Voetius distinguished dogmatics from ethics. ...
158. Ethics is also concerned with how the understanding must be regenerated, sanctified, etc. ...
159. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst. ...
160. Frequently also expansion of the Decalogue. ...
161. Cf. Chr. D. F. Palmer, “Die christliche Lehre vom höchsten Gut”; Heman, “Schleiermachers Idee.” ...
162. GO: Pflichtenlehre, Tugendlehre, Güterlehre. ...
163. Rothe, Theologische Ethik. Ed. note: See Bavinck’s discussion of Rothe toward the end of §2 above. ...
164. DO: Practikale godgeleertheid. ...
165. DO: De mensche Godts. ...
166. Ed. note: Bavinck here alludes to a work of W. Teellinck, De mensche Godts, which consists of a description of human beings in eight “states”: (1) corrupt nature (verdorven nature), (2) regeneration and conversion (der wedergeboorte en bekeeringe), (3) the good life (des wel levens), (4) government (der regeringe), (5) offenses (der struyckelingen), (6) miseries (der ellenden), (7) reformation (“der reformatie”), and (8) blessedness (der geluck-saligheyd). De mensche Godts was prepared for publication by Franciscus Ridderus and also published under his name: De mensche Godts: Uyt de geschriften en tractaten van Willem Teellingh (1658). ...
167. Vitringa, Korte schets. ...
168. Ed. note: Here Bavinck paints in broad summary strokes the sequence of chapters in Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst. ...
169. Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.ii.1-15 and iii.1-8 (Theologia Moralis; Zedelyke godgeleertheid); the two chapters have the titles “Concerning Religion” (De Religione; Van den godsdienst) and “Concerning Righteousness and Injuries against the Neighbor” (De Justitita et Injuria versus Proximum / Van de rechtvaardigheit en onrechtvaardigheit, of verongelykinge omtrent den naasten) [4:564-668]. ...
170. Ed. note: Bavinck is referring to Vilmar, Theologische Moral. The first volume includes, after the introduction, part I, " Doctrine of Sin" (Lehre von der Sünde) or “History of Illness” (Krankheitsgeschichte). The second volume includes part II, “The Doctrine of Regeneration and Conversion” (Lehre von der Wiedergeburt und Bekehrung) or “History of Cures” (Heilungsgeschichte), and part III, “The Doctrine of Sanctification” (Die Lehre von der Heiligung) or “History of Healing” (Genesungsgeschichte). ...
171. Martensen, Christian Ethics, 1:53. ...
172. Heppe, Christliche Sittenlehre. Ed. note: Heppe’s “System of Ethics” consists of three parts, successively titled “The Human Person and the Saving Good in Itself” (Der Mensch und das Heilsgut desselben), “The Possession of Salvation” (Der Heilsbesitz), and “The Preservation of Salvation’s Possession in the Essential Ordinances and Relationships of Human Life” (Die Bewährung des Heilsbesitzes in den wesentlichen Ordnungen und Beziehungen des menschlichen Lebens). ...
173. Ed. note: Harless’s System of Christian Ethics is subdivided into three parts: “The Blessing of Salvation” (Das Heilsgut), “The Possession of Salvation” (Der Heilsbesitz), and “The Preservation of Salvation” (Die Heilsbewahrung). ...
174. Ed. note: Bavinck inserts a parenthetical reference here to Vitringa and Beets. The former is clearly Vitringa, Korte schets. The latter may be the Dutch Reformed poet, pastor, and Leiden University professor Nikolaas Beets (1814-1903). ...
175. Ed. note: The original manuscript contains the following lines, crossed out by Bavinck: “Each of these three sections is preceded with a special introduction or foundation that is anthropological and includes the following general presuppositions: humanity created originally in the image of God, with a moral nature, freedom, religion, and morality.” ...
176. Ed. note: Book IV of Bavinck’s manuscript, “The Life-Spheres in Which the Moral Life Must Be Manifested,” has only three sections, all under the chapter title “The Family, Marriage, Divorce” (§§50-58). But Bavinck’s notes indicate that four additional chapters were planned: “Society,” “Art and Science,” “The State,” and “The Church, Humanity, and the Kingdom of God.” A brief overview of this material may be found in an appendix in vol. 3 of Reformed Ethics. ...
177. Rothe, Theologische Ethik. ...
178. Vilmar, Theologische Moral. ...
179. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck wrote, “Consider church history, also a theological discipline.” ...
180. LO: principium cognoscendi. Ed. note: RD, 1:207-33. ...
181. Belgic Confession, art. 5. ...
182. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:15. ...
183. Ed. note: Bavinck provides no specifics here, but the former sounds a great deal like Schleiermacher and the latter like Ritschl. ...
184. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §10. ...
185. Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Days 34-52. ...
186. Ed. note: See Daneau, Ethices Christianae, 3:3-8 (book I, chap. 2). ...
187. Endemann, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, 1:11 (§3). The Latin reads: “theologia moralis revelata ex tota sacra scriptura Veteris et Novi Testamenti est desumenda.” ...
188. Ed. note: Leonardus Lessius, SJ (1554-1623), was professor of theology at Leuven. ...
189. According to Endemann, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, 1:12 (§3). ...
190. Contra J. T. Beck, Vorlesungen über christliche Ethik, 1:103. ...
191. Endemann, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, 1:12 (§3). ...
192. LO: “Veritatis practicas plane non mutat”; Endemann, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, 1:11 (the opening sentence of §3). ...
193. Hagenbach, Encyklopädie und Methodologie, 362-63 (§92). ...
194. J. I. Doedes, Encyclopedie der christelijke theologie, 196-97n3. ...
195. Ed. note: Bavinck inserted an additional page between pp. 24 and 25 of the manuscript, on which the following was written: “Scripture and confession are not two sources. Because a confession is not a source, nothing wells up from it. A source, no matter how small, brings something forth. ‘Reformed’ adds nothing to ‘Christian’: a confession calls attention to Scripture. Reformed people say: ‘Behold the pure water; others have also brought forth water, but with a polluted pail.’” ...

教 Book I ...

HUMANITY BEFORE CONVERSION ...

1 Essential Human Nature ...

How we must live is determined by our answers to the fundamental questions of our origin, purpose, and destiny.- Scripture teaches us that the image of God belongs to the very essence of our humanity, created good, fallen, and redeemable in Christ. For Christians the moral good is not a purpose or ideal to be achieved through striving and exertion; it is a gift, a condition of being, a state. We must be good in order to do good. Adam was created good, and, after his fall, the Second Adam provides the gift of new righteousness and holiness. ...

This confession directly contradicts the contemporary dogma that we become good through the conflict between our ego, which strives for autonomy, and the external world of nature and matter, which restricts us; the end goal is to overcome nature by reason and spirit. This is part of a pantheistic worldview in which God himself becomes a person only after a process of overcoming. This movement from below to above, from the material to the spiritual, from the earthly to the heavenly, from humanity to God, from the visible to the invisible, from the temporal to the eternal, directly contradicts Christian belief in revelation. It is a system from the abyss. ...

We believe that the image of God belongs to the essence of our humanity; humanity apart from God, therefore, is unimaginable; all human beings always and everywhere stand in some relation to God. To be fully and truly human we must image God. As imagebearers of God, we consist of body and soul, which exist together in a reciprocal interaction of spirit and matter that is complex and ...
mysterious. This must not be understood dualistically, although while the body cannot live without the soul, the soul can exist apart from the body. Persons are unities of body and soul; we are persons because we can say “I.” Our consciousness of this “I” develops gradually and is a wonder, inexplicable and simply to be accepted. Its two movements are theoretical (thinking and knowing) and practical (willing and doing), and both are mediated by feeling. These three abilities are distinct, have their own laws, and are free acts of the one person. ...

Human beings find themselves in three relations to what is external to them: to God (religion), to other persons (morality), and to nature. People cannot be viewed atomistically as mere individuals: we are members of a human race in a relationship to God that is an office or post of obedience and service to him. This is true religion and rests upon and arises from knowledge of God; its essence is piety. The word “religion” is derived from a Latin root that means “regathered” and reminds us that repetition of God’s commands and ordinances is necessary for their observance. This is objective religion-walking in the ways of the Lord-which must be matched by subjective religion-that is, faith or believing. The objective is not the product of the subjective but a gift of the Holy Spirit. Religion should not be defined as “communion with God” because it makes subjective religion all-important and devalues objective religion. Instead, it is the distinctive relationship or position of human beings to God, expressing itself in all of life and based on the distinctive relation of God to human beings. ...

Our relation to other persons begins before birth and starts in the family, which is the type of all other relations in society and the state. Our life in all these relationships constitutes our moral life and must be guided by a standard that is external to us. For Christians that standard is the Word of God. Our moral lives have always been connected to our religious lives, but they are properly distinct, with the latter governing the former. Though the two tables of the law come from one Lawgiver and constitute a single law, it is important to distinguish religion (our love toward God) from morality (our love toward our neighbor). The Bible itself keeps ...
them close and connected but still distinct. The two sinful misconstruals of the relation between religion and moralityabsolute separation and identification-both lead to false religion and poor morality. Either morality is divorced from God and true virtue becomes impossible, or God is identified with the world and religion is completely absorbed by ethics and eventually disappears. The Sabbath can and should penetrate the other days of the week, but the fullness of this Sabbath penetration will not be realized in this dispensation and awaits the next. ...

§5. Human Beings, Created in God's Image ...

Questions about what human beings are, where they are headed, and the end and purpose of their existence depend on the answer to a prior question: Where did human beings come from? Origin determines direction and purpose. There is a big difference between saying that human beings are the image and offspring of the chimpanzee and orangutan and saying they are the image and offspring of God, between saying human beings are from below and saying they are from above. That governs the entire discipline of ethics. Without the Bible, it is impossible to answer the question of where human beings are from, and thus no answer can be given to the questions of what they are or where they are headed: one can only surmise, suspect, presuppose, and philosophize. The Greeks regarded human beings as autochthonous, as having originated from the earth, by chance, of their own accord. And contemporary thought, under the influence of materialistic pantheism,

\underset{―}{l}

which erases all boundaries, levels all things and makes all things uniform, sees human beings as originating from a primate ancestry through a series of missing links and extinct mediating forms (species) influenced by natural selection and the struggle for survival over the course of many millennia. No one has furnished proof of this; it is not a conclusion reached by science or even a hypothesis that is occasionally borne out. No, it is simply a philosophical idea which people assume because they will not recognize a Creator God. This was openly stated by Professor du BoisReymond in Berlin.

^{3}

...

By proceeding from a wholly different presupposition we reach a different ethic. Ethics in the true sense of the word does not exist within a Darwinian framework. 4 Every view of human beings starts from an axiom, a point of departure, a proposition of faith or hypothesis. This is the case with Darwin as well: his proposition of faith is that a human being is an evolved animal. For us, on the other hand, by faith, we understand that human beings are created in the image of God and are God’s offspring (Acts 17:28). This has to be a fixed and controlling principle when we examine humankind, a presupposition that governs all further reflection. To call human beings God’s image is to say that the human person is God’s likeness, his portrait in miniature, his imprint, effigy, or ectype. 5 The image of God is the human similarity to God whereby we display, in our own creaturely way, the highest perfection of God.

\underset{―}{6}

We are God’s image with respect to all of our existence, in the soul with all its capabilities (thinking, feeling, willing) and also in the body.

^{7}

...

The image of God, therefore, exists ...

in the essence of our humanity: with soul and body as substrate; ...
in the capacities and abilities of that essence: knowing, feeling, willing, and acting; ...
in the properties and gifts of that essence and their capabilities: holiness, knowledge, righteousness. 8 ...

But the question now arises: What is the relation between the human essence and those properties of the image of God? In other words, is the image of God the essence, the nature of a human being, or something added to its nature? The Flacians say the image of God (thus also its properties, including original righteousness)

\underset{―}{9}

belongs to the essence, the nature of human beings. 10 This cannot be correct, because then humanity, on losing its original righteousness, would have lost and changed its essence. The Roman Catholics say that human beings were created with an unblemished nature11-hence neither righteous nor unrighteous by nature-and that original righteousness was added as a “superadded gift” to curb the naturally existing disharmony between flesh and spirit.

\underset{―}{12}

But this also cannot be correct because then the struggle between flesh and spirit would be natural and good, coming directly from God, who would then be the cause of sin. The Reformed say that the image of God is neither the sum ...
and total of human essence nor a “superadded gift.” Rather, Reformed theology understands the image of God in a broad sense to include the essence and capabilities of a human being, while a narrower sense of the image involves true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.

\underset{―}{13}

As original righteousness it belongs naturally to a human being, so that human essence or nature can no longer be complete and right without it. The image of God, therefore, belongs to the essence of human beings, although not in the Flacian sense.

\underset{―}{14}

...

This statement is of paramount importance for ethics. First, because it implies that humans were good by nature, that the image of God by nature properly belonged to them, that they did not need to become good, holy, and righteous but were so already. Human beings by nature possessed goodness. This directly contradicts contemporary teachings. J. G. Fichte (1762-1814) taught with impressive intellectual power that morality only comes into existence out of conflict. The intelligent ego strives after freedom, selfsufficiency, and independence and wants to be absolutely autonomous but finds itself restricted by the non-ego. The non-ego has to be conquered and pushed back; the ego has to dominate the non-ego; reason has to rule over nature, and spirit over matter. Morality, thus, is the result of conflict, struggle, and wrestling; it lies at the end of the road, it is not a point of departure but an end goal. The ego is born as restricted by the non-ego (which is sinful, because for Fichte sin is restriction). ...

Similarly, for Hegel, humanity is at first only natural and evil by nature; it needs to free itself from the power of nature and, as spirit, needs to break free from nature and oppose it. For Schleiermacher, too, the goal of ethos is that nature becomes reason and spirit. The position of Rothe in his Theologische Ethik is similar; for him the personhood of God is itself the result of a process because the Spirit cannot be made but must bring himself forth, be his own effect and cause. 15 This is also the case with human beings. 16 God can create spirits only mediately; that is, he creates material creatures, which then raise themselves up out of materiality toward spirituality.

\underset{―}{17}

The ego is its own act and action only; the human being thus destines itself to be ego, a person. And morality exists in the fact that personhood becomes spirit. 18 The personal creature has to treat itself as an end in itself19 and has to create itself. Rothe writes, “Morality is what is caused, what becomes by means of creaturely self-determination, more specifically through the personal creature’s own self-determination in the ...
human’s earthly created sphere.”

\underset{―}{20}

Rothe sketches the moral process

\underset{―}{21}

as one in which human beings determine themselves absolutely to become persons, and this task is twofold: (a) it is moral with respect to our material nature, which has to be appropriated and be made our instrument;

\underset{―}{22}

and (b) it is religious, religion being the process by which we become spirits, through our own causality. 23 Thus, we become immortal, and so forth, through our own action.

\underset{―}{24}

...

Overall, therefore, morality is a goal, the result of a process, an ideal which human beings finally reach through their own efforts and selfdetermination. This ethics, constructed on pantheism, a philosophy of process, and the theory of evolution, shares with pantheism an extraordinary number of core ideas. Everywhere in the physical, ethical, religious, civil, social, and political domains, the higher development is seen as having evolved from the lower. From below to above, from the material to the spiritual, from the earthly to the heavenly, from humanity to God, from the visible to the invisible, from the temporal to the eternal. This is directly the opposite of what we confess as Christians because it is directly contrary to God’s revelation. It is a system from the abyss. It has influenced a good deal of the ethics of our day, and yet many believers do not perceive its terrifying nature but unconsciously accept its thoughts and perspectives, which only fit in that anti-biblical system. Thus Harless speaks of a purpose which is given to the Christian in Christ, and Martensen considers morality as an idea, an end goal, a final task for the will.

\underset{―}{25}

Vilmar, however, understood this better.

\underset{―}{26}

...

Directly opposing these pantheistic theories 27 is the view of human beings as created in God’s image. The moral and the good is not an ideal hovering far off in the distance from humanity and which we need to reach. The good is not the end goal of life, a destination for humans, but the foundation on which we stand and the environment within which we stand. The good is not before us but above us and behind us; we stand in it with both feet and are upheld by it. Adam did not have to become good, he was good and had to ensure that he remained good. This is not striving and chasing after something, but remaining and resting in that which he was and had. He came from the hand of God holy, righteous, and wise. It is utterly false to say that holiness could not be inborn and cocreated but must be the result of a process of free self-determination, of one’s own action. Holiness is a gift; otherwise we shall never have it. But we receive it now, at once, ...
through justifying faith in Christ. For this reason, moral virtue (holiness, the image of God) is one, a seamless garment, which cannot be reached and obtained in piecemeal fashion. Whoever has moral virtue has it wholly; whoever lacks it in part lacks it completely. The Stoics already recognized this. From evil to good is not a walkway or bridge; we reach it only by a leap (a leap of life rather than the proverbial fatal leap, to change the expression). It is precisely the fundamental error of pantheism that it wipes out all boundaries, relativizes all oppositions, and reduces the distinction between sin and holiness, God and devil, to a difference of degree only.

\underset{―}{28}

For Christians, therefore, Adam was holy and had to remain such. The fall into sin was not a step forward, but undoubtedly a fall, a downfall. The moral good, therefore, is not a purpose or ideal to be obtained through striving and exertion; it is a gift, a condition of being, a state. It remains true forever that a tree has to be good if it is to bear good fruit.

\underset{―}{29}

Pantheism also obliterates the distinction between human beings and animals and views us as developing from an animalistic (unthinking, etc.) state into our humanity. ...

Now it is true that Reformed Christians, in distinction from Lutherans, can also speak of a goal in the case of Adam: we acknowledge that Adam had not yet reached the end; he did not yet have eternal life; he did not yet have the ability not to sin.

\underset{―}{30}

In that sense we can also speak of a goal in the case of Adam. But there is also a significant difference. We do not consider this “end” so much a goal as a result. Adam did not have to strenuously exert himself to obtain it but had merely to do what his own nature recommended-that is, to remain what he was. The command not to eat was a prohibition. 31 By remaining what he was, he would obtain what he was not. ...

That we cannot understand or imagine humanity without God and that all human beings always and everywhere stand in some relation to God is the second implication of the claim that the image of God belongs to the essence of our humanity. God is the archetype, the exemplar, the original. We are only truly human to the extent that we display God, also in our daily lives. The human person, therefore, has to be viewed theologically, and also in ethics. Morality, too, finds its principle and standard in the relation in which a human being stands to God. This principle is also strongly contested in our time. It is Fichte who dominates our present age: he sees the essence of morality involving the ego governing the non-ego and reason governing nature; the world is the material content of our moral obligation. ...

This is also the case with Hegel: spirit has to realize its rational content, to mentally permeate nature. According to Schleiermacher the subject matter of ethics is reason acting on nature, and Rothe’s position is similar.

\underset{―}{32}

Humanity stands in relation to nature and to God. The first relation is moral, the second religious. The moral task of human beings is to condition nature as an organ, an instrument, to make nature our property, a natural organism. Here morality is not only a result but the result of a process, the unity of two (relative) opposites, the product of conflict and struggle. But it is also wrong to think that the good and the moral only become possible by and after struggle, for then good, in order to exist now and to come in the future, needs evil; light needs darkness, and God needs the devil. Evil is then inevitable and actually no longer evil but a necessary intermediate stop, a barrier, a limitation, a transition phase, the condition and sine qua non for the good. And this means that the good is no longer good, since it is not free, independent, and eternal. ...

As Christians we believe and teach the contrary. The first human was God’s image at once, good and holy; the struggle we now experience only came because of our falling away; it is a struggle with sin, in sin, and after sin. The good, as we see it, is victory, rest, salvation, peace, love; not “storm and stress”

\underset{―}{33}

but calmness. It is eternal, independent, free, in need of nothing, existing in and through itself and by itself, because God himself is the good and no goodness exists apart from him. Martensen also acknowledges the fact that morality cannot presuppose a struggle, etc., but thinks that, among other things, morality is the unity of opposites.

\underset{―}{34}

This is completely wrong. ...

Men like Fichte have to search for such binary structures because they view morality as a unity of opposites, as the result of struggle. Various names are used to describe these opposites. Autonomous philosophical ethics looks for them in the empirical and the ideal (reasonable) will; in the individual and in humanity, egoism and altruism (like Darwin and those following his thought); or in personality and in nature. 35 The first opposition, between the empirical and ideal will, does not work. It is an abstraction: human beings have but one will, and the (empirical) will is evil, sinful, inclined to hate God and the neighbor.

\underset{―}{36}

What some call the ideal or reasonable will is not a will-that is to say, power-but (since human beings are powerless) only an idea, an ideal, given to us by our conscience. In the battle between the empirical will and the idea of the good, the empirical ...
will always triumphs. The second opposition, between the individual and humanity, does not work either. It is completely socialist and sacrifices the individual for the sake of the majority, allowing a majority of one-half plus one to determine what is good and evil. ...

The third binary opposition, morality as the product of the conflict between personality and nature or reason and nature (Fichte, Schleiermacher, Rothe), is also not a viable option. This was essentially the view of the Greeks, a view that is once again being proposed by some of our anthropological philosophers in a somewhat more profound manner. Spirit and matter, personality and nature, are not inherently opposed (at least not originally; now, thanks to sin, they are); personality is by no means dissolved in its relations with nature. 37 But there is some truth in these oppositions: human beings stand in relation to themselves (with duties toward themselves), to their neighbors, and to nature, but all of this is only part of a whole, and to reduce our entire duty to any one of these would be wrong. Regarding nature, Genesis 1:28 teaches us to be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and so forth. There exists, therefore, also a relation between humans and animals. But that is by no means the only calling of humanity; it is only one of the entailments and consequences of being created in God’s image (Gen.

1 : 27

). And one must read carefully: to have dominion over the earth was not an end goal for human striving through considerable conflict. It was not a distant ideal, a destination at the end of a path of exertion. No! It was a part but not the sole content and consequence of being made in God’s image. Adam did not have to become lord and master of the earth, conquer it, and exercise dominion over it. Instead, he was the lord and master and sovereign and had to demonstrate this fact and continue to exercise lordship. ...

Martensen also argues against this contrast but replaces it with another: morality is produced by conflict, but not between personality and nature but between two personalities, me and you, will and will, specifically human will and God’s will. Thus he says that morality consists of the free unity of the human and the divine wills.

\underset{―}{38}

These are notes that sound orthodox,

\underset{―}{39}

embroidered with pantheistic philosophical patterns. But Martensen does not start with correct principles. He should have rejected the root idea that morality (being moral and good) is the result of struggle and a unity of opposites. That is a false notion. For us, the moral good is not something in ...
process of becoming but something that is. It is not a product but a producer; it is not a result but a point of departure. Furthermore, the foundational idea of the moral good is not derived from our relation to ourselves, to our neighbor, or to nature, but from the central, all-governing relation of human beings to God. Martensen gets this right. But one has to understand this properly. It does not mean that somebody who stands in the right relation to God (for example, one who is converted) is by virtue of this already moral and can be described as moral. This would blur the difference between religion and morality; more will be said about relation between them later. But it does mean that the relation to God is the central relation controlling everything. Humans are to be viewed as image-bearers of God in our relations to ourselves, our neighbors, and nature. This reality must be seen in and through everything we do or leave undone and in everything effected with us, in us, or through us. ...

In other words, that which is considered to be normally human cannot truly serve as the standard of ethics. It is not enough to be a person exercising dominion over nature. We can only be truly good at home, in the public square, and everywhere else, when we are the image of God. After all, we cannot know proper dominion over nature apart from God and his revelation. In an etymological sense, ethics has its roots in religion. The notion of ethics therefore cannot fully satisfy us; it is too narrow. Etymologically, the word points to humanity as the standard, but our standard is humanity as God’s image and thus, in the final analysis, God himself. ...

Third, the notion of humanity as God’s image entails the essence of human beings having been corrupted through sin. After all, the image of God is part of the essence of humanness, not a donum superadditum, not an added trimming. According to Rome, humankind is not corrupt and corrupted but is still what it was supposed to be; but it lost this accessory, this bridle, and because it is no longer controlled and restrained, concupiscence (which humans had before the fall as well) now reigns. ...

We would say that by the loss of the image of God people’s very essence became corrupted, deteriorated and twisted, 40 deformed, misshaped, and wrong. More about this, however, in chapter 2. Sin did not remove something and leave all the rest the same, as Rome would say. Neither did sin become the substance or essence of human beings. The human being remained a human being, not a machine, not a wooden thing or block, not a ...
devil, but a human being. But the human became abnormal; though still human, its humanity is cankered and rotten. ...

The ethical meaning of the covenant of works is relevant here. 41 The covenant of works assumes that humanity is the image of God. Humankind is good, but still has a task: good works. The covenant therefore involves not carefree idleness or quiet rest, as Rome and Luther described, but work, task, goal, thus exertion, zeal, and development of all powers and gifts. It involves becoming the image of God more and more through procreation, worship, and culture. From humanity’s creation in the image of God it follows that humans are moral beings and have to develop as such. In this regard the moral law must also be mentioned. The moral law is one of many sorts of law, 42 and its basic principle is love for God and one’s neighbor. At this point law must be mentioned because the very notion of sin presupposes law (see question 3 of the Heidelberg Catechism).

\underset{―}{43}

...

§6. The Content of Human Nature ...

That human beings are the image of God has to be central; it is the assumption and standard of all true anthropology. But other questions then follow: What does it mean to be human? Wherein does our humanity consist? What are the constituent parts of that humanity? Furthermore, is likeness of God the formal or the material essence of a human being? The usual answer to this question is to say that we consist of a soul and a body. In this answer it is helpful to conceive of human persons as having at once a spiritual and material, supernatural and natural, supersensory and sensory, heavenly and earthly, eternal and temporal side. ...

We do not fully understand the relation between body and soul. 44 We are sensory, reasonable beings; we have plantlike/vegetative life, animalistic life, and a thinking life. 45 Alternatively one could say that a human being has a body, a soul, and a spirit (or, as Hegel put it, life, consciousness, and self-consciousness). In this case, “soul” then has a broader meaning and refers to that which humans share with animals. In a narrower sense, contrary to what all materialists claim, the soul is the thinking, mental life of human beings and is not only different in degree but essentially distinct from vegetative and animal life. Materialism denies this fact, but matter as ...
such is without consciousness, and even supposing that matter could rise to a level of consciousness, such a consciousness would always remain the consciousness of something material. 46 But the soul is not only conscious, it is also conscious that it is not material; and it can imagine the total absence of matter in which its consciousness would remain. Moreover, while matter can only have a composite unity, the unity by which the soul is conscious of itself is of a simple, single, and noncomposite kind. For this reason du BoisReymond admits that self-consciousness cannot be physically explained. The soul, then, is essentially different from the body. It is not a property or quality of matter, but something on its own, yet related to the body. The soul depends on the body, as we see in sleep, sickness, and old age. It depends on the senses, through which the soul mainly receives content from outside. It also reveals itself to the outside world through language, voice, and organs of speech. Its character and temperament is formed by outside influences; climate, diet, nationality, gender have a great influence on human beings. ...

Conversely the body depends on the soul, as we see in sickness, in weeping, and in laughter. Similarly, the soul forms or shapes the body (hence the existence of physiognomy).

\underset{―}{47}

There is therefore a reciprocal influence of body and soul. This is also why a distinction is made between sensory nerves, by which something is brought from the outside to the inside, and a “sensation” is caused, and motor nerves, by which something is brought from inside to the outside, and a movement is caused. The nerves are the organ of interaction between body and soul. And there are various explanations of this interaction. Descartes, Geulinx, and Malebranche maintained that body and soul are completely heterogenous and that the one cannot operate upon the other. This is why they invented Occasionalism, according to which God is the mediator who repeatedly orders the sensible world (the body) according to our ideas, and orders the ideas (soul) according to the sensible world. This is a thoroughly mechanical system which does not really explain anything, because if the spiritual cannot produce effects on the material, how can God produce effects on bodies and in nature? It also tends toward pantheism (Spinoza) and attributes sin to God. Spinoza only recognized one substance of which spirit and matter were modes, and he saw no further need for explanation because both spirit and matter were ultimately suspended and subsumed in a single substance. Leibniz attempted to explain the interaction through what he called ...
preestablished harmony, 48 the eternal predetermination by God of the objective agreement of all things with one another. Kant did not offer an explanation because he wondered whether the duality of body and soul might merely be an assumption; over time it might appear that the two were not so dissimilar after all. Schelling and Hegel handle subject and object, spirit and matter, just as Spinoza did. 49 ...

It appears therefore that the reciprocal interaction of spirit and matter is a most complicated question which remains unresolved. All the attempted explanations basically suggest analogies between what is psychical and what is physical. And one should take into account that cause and effect do not have to be simultaneous: movement may only eventually produce heat, for example. And it is also the case that there are other interactions that cannot be explained, such as the effect of atoms upon one another, for example how sulphur reacts upon mercury to produce cinnabar.

\underset{―}{50}

...

To the extent that it involves a dualism, it is an error to define human beings simply as consisting of a body and a soul. While we do not accept materialism or spiritualism, we also do not accept the dualism of, for example, Plato, the Manichaeans, or the Ascetics. This is because Genesis 2:7 informs us that God formed Adam out of the dust

\underset{―}{51}

and breathed into him the breath of life,

\underset{―}{52}

so that he became a living soul.

\underset{―}{53}

The joining of dust and breath does not cause the two to exist dualistically next to each other but produces something new, a living unity, a living soul. We therefore subscribe to the position of Harmonism-namely, that matter does not continue its own existence and life next to the spiritual as one with equal rights, but that matter is subservient to and serves as instrument for the spiritual. The body cannot exist without the soul, but the soul can exist apart from the body. There is not a unity, identity, and sameness of matter and spirit, but a harmonious joining in which matter is subject to spirit. Briefly summarized, the body is an organism of the soul which inspirits, spiritualizes, eternalizes, and governs it. ...

The unity of the human being lies in his or her

I

. That is the root, the center, the kernel, the core of every person. Everything else lies around it and is near to it and attaches to it: I have intellect, feelings, a will, a body, hand, foot, etc., but I am . . . I. Holy Scripture calls this the heart, out of which are the issues of life (Prov. 4:23). We are persons because we can say “I.” This I is what forms our humanity in us, what is actually human. This I always and under all circumstances remains the same and identical with ...
itself. The I is a wonder, inexplicable, and simply to be accepted. This consciousness or

I

develops gradually. It starts with a sense of existence, which is usually initially painful. When a child first enters the world, she cries when air suddenly enters her lungs,

\underset{―}{54}

and senses a unity with the body (and senses pain in the foot but not, for example, in the table). But the child does not yet reliably distinguish herself from surrounding objects. She plays with her foot like she plays with a toy. Little by little she begins to sense that this hand or this foot is hers, and she distinguishes it from objects, and contrasts it with objects, and thus begins to sense her own individual existence.

\underset{―}{55}

Yet she still stands across from herself, and sees herself as an object, and refers to herself in the third person. But gradually56 the consciousness awakes that that object is I myself, gradually one comprehends oneself more fully, knows oneself (no longer feels oneself) and says, “I.” This is the sunrise in the inner life: the human person is no longer a stranger to himself, he has come to himself, all others stand outside, across from him. This I-consciousness then develops more and more, and understands itself more and more clearly, and distinguishes itself more definitely from what it has rather than is. What it is, is only the I.

\underset{―}{57}

That I has a real existence, it is no idea or representation,

\underset{―}{58}

but a being, or rather the being in us (all the others are but revelations of the I). It forms a complete unity, it always remains the same, it is simple and noncomposite, it is always the one, whole I that reveals itself. 59 It is nonspatial: although empirically united with a body, it has no length and breadth but is ubiquitous in the body, and where it is, the whole soul is. The soul does not really have a seat in the body; although it works mainly through the brain, it remains permanently identical, and the elderly know that their

I

is the same as it was during their childhood. 60 The soul is thus timeless, and therefore transcendant and supernatural. ...

This one, indivisible human

I

moves in two ways: ...

theoretical: thinking, knowing, receiving, and the ability of attraction whereby things are taken up in our spirit in a spiritualized form, and ...
practical: willing or doing, spontaneity and the ability of repulsion through which we realize the thoughts of our spirit outside of us. $\underset{―}{61}$ ...

Both the theoretical and practical abilities of the soul are mediated by feeling. A thought works through feeling to have an effect upon the will and ...
vice versa.

\underset{―}{62}

There are consequently three abilities of the

I

. These are not three parts, they are not three potencies separated from the

I

. In all three it is the same single, undivided, and entire

I

revealing itself. It is the same single and entire

I

which thinks, wills, and feels. It is not one part of the

I

which thinks and another part which wills, but it is the same

I \underset{―}{63}

which, when it works, reveals three sides of itself. All three abilities presume the

I

, the selfconsciousness, the foundation on which the edifice stands. ...

These three abilities have their own life, character, laws, and conditions. The laws of thought are different from those of the will. 64 The domain of the first ability, thinking, is perceiving through the senses, forming representations, keeping these representations in memory and reproducing it in unchanged form through remembering or in changed form through the power of imagination. It is also about thinking,

\underset{―}{65}

abstracting, forming concepts without representation, judging, deciding, and revealing all of these activities through language. The laws of thought are revealed through and in the activity of thinking. Logicians have derived the discipline of logic from the activity of thinking and according to the activity of thinking. The laws of thought are therefore a priori in our thinking soul. By thinking, we spiritually absorb the external world into ourselves. ...

The second ability, feeling, is passive and receptive. The soul and the body do not actively express themselves in the feelings, but are affected by the representations which each receives, whether pleasant or unpleasant.

\underset{―}{66}

The existence and life of the spirit are thereby hindered or promoted. All feelings can be one of two kinds: like or dislike, inclination or disinclination. These feelings are distinguished depending on the objects which affect us. The number of feelings is innumerable. They are often roughly divided into lower and higher feelings. Lower feelings include sensations of life, of energy and of exertion and their opposites; and all the sensual perceptions of taste, sight (such as colors), hearing (shrill tones, for example). Higher feelings are intellectual, aesthetic, moral, religious, selfesteem, and compassion. The domain of the second ability, feeling, is therefore the residence of our rich human life of feeling, all the variety of affections of admiration, anger, courage, ecstasy, fear, shame, remorse, despair, and the like. ...

The third ability, willing, can be either sensual or spiritual according to its content. Sensual willing is called a drive, desire, or urge, and is originally simply an instinct. It is really the urge for life and self- ...
preservation, comprising the desires for food, movement, freedom, and sex. There are also urges for social interaction, for honor, possession, rule, etc. These drives can become inclinations, tendencies, or passions (the desire for self-indulgence, lust, addiction to play, etc.). Spiritually this ability is primarily the willing of something. And to will is, properly speaking, the ability to do something for a reason, after preceding consideration; yet willing does not consist of an independent indifference and arbitrariness. The human will is free, but not unmotivated. It is free of compulsion whether by God or by the world. The will is a spontaneous ability of free self-determination according to the insight, and so on, which the

I

currently enjoys. Bruch says that freedom is an attribute not only of the ability of the will but of all three abilities; the I itself is free in its thinking, feeling, and willing. 67 ...

§7. Human Relationships $^{68}$ ...

Having investigated how we should view human beings (as the image of God) and what is involved in being human, we must now consider the relations humans have to what is external to them. People cannot be viewed loosely as mere individuals; human beings are not atoms or numbers. This atomistic view was the error of the French philosophers like Rousseau and is the fundamental error of revolutionary thought. The term “individual” belonged to the revolution and expressed its all-consuming character. Our fathers did not know the word “individualism” because for them there were no mere individuals; to be human was always to be the image of God, a member of the human race. For the revolution, humanity is an aggregate mass of individuals who can be arbitrarily combined, like the random collision of Epicurus’s atoms, into state, society, etc.

\underset{―}{69}

Today, individualism is still the basis of our politics. This result is inevitable, because once God is taken out of the picture and his providence denied, there is no conceivable reason why there should be social hierarchies, why one person should be richer than another, why one should rule and others be subjects. Instead, everything has to be made equal, smoothed out, leveled. (And the guillotine is the instrument to accomplish this.) This requires everything to be trimmed and cut away until what remains is equal in all respects. This ...
effort has to reach far back and deep into history. In reality, however, nothing remains.

\underset{―}{70}

The revolutionary view is false. We have to be understood in the relations in which we stand, naturally and historically. We all stand in a threefold set of relations: to God, to other human beings, and to nature. ...

1. Our Relation to God ...

As humans we are God’s image and have an innate idea of God. 71 Never and nowhere are we independent of God but always dependent on the highest power. Yet this is not the relation of which we are speaking here. Animals and plants are also dependent on God. All creatures live and move and have their being in God (Acts 17:28). Animals and plants also stand in relation to God. But in the case of humanity, that relation is a relationship and a post or office.

\frac{72}{An}

animal exists before God in a state of bondage, a human person in a state of dependence. This peculiar human relation to God we call “religion.” What is religion?

\underset{―}{73}

We are born to obey, know, and follow God. “By this bond of piety, we are bound and obligated to God, and this is whence it received the name ‘religion’ itself, not, as Cicero thought, from the word ‘reread.’”

\underset{―}{74}

“Religion ordains a person to live solely for God,” according to Augustine, Ambrose, and Jerome. Thomas wrote that religion “exists in giving God the service and honor which he is due.”

\underset{―}{75}

Thomas also distinguished between immediate acts of religion (prayer, offering) and mediate acts of religion elicited by sympathy, such as visiting widows.

\underset{―}{76}

...

According to Thomas, religion and piety are different things; one can also be pious toward one’s parents. Calvin defines religion as the sense of God’s excellencies, the sense that God is the one who sustains everything and is the source of all good. This feeling is “for us a fit teacher of piety, from which religion is born.” Piety is then described by Calvin as “that reverence joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces.” 77 “The seed of religion,” according to Calvin, “is implanted in all.” 78 Therefore, to know the excellencies of God nurtures piety, pietas, reverence and love for God, and this brings forth religion. ...

Zwingli says, “I take ‘religion’ in that sense which embraces the whole piety of Christians: namely, faith, life, laws, worship, sacraments.” Religion “involves two factors”: (a) the one to whom religion is directed (God) and ...
(b) those who reach out to God by means of religion. 79 Zwingli deals first with the subject of God and humanity. Religion began when God sought Adam and called, “Adam, where are you?”

\underset{―}{80}

God’s loyal devotion to his own children “springs from God even to our day, but for our benefit . . . pious devotion is complete only when we turn to the one who calls us away from ourselves and our designs.” When we have turned to him, our lives become a “clinging to God, therefore, with an unshakable trust in Him as the only good, as the only one who has the knowledge and the power to relieve all our troubles and to turn away all evils or to turn them to His own glory and the benefit of His people, and with filial dependence on Him as a father—this is piety, is religion.” 81 And somewhat later he writes, “True religion is that which clings to the one and only God.” And then: "Religion is the marriage of the soul and God."쁘2 ...

According to Polanus, religion does not consist of “certain external ceremonies,” but of “faith joined with an earnest fear of God, which . . . involves reverence and leads to the proper worship of God, in accordance with God’s law.” 83 Strictly speaking, “religion” is different from the “worship of God, as cause is different from effect. Religion or piety is the internal cause of the worship of God.” 84 And, according to Georg Sohn, the worship of God takes place when due honor is presented to the Triune God; “the efficient and impelling cause of divine worship is the knowledge of God.” 85 According to Heidegger, “religion is the proper method of giving glory to God.” 86 Elsewhere he writes, “Religion is reason rightly knowing and honoring the true God.” 87 Wyttenbach’s definition is similar. 88 ...

The following, then, are some features of the Reformed and Lutheran views:

\underset{―}{89}

...

In establishing what religion is, they start from true religion and on that basis determine what false religion is. This is especially the case with Zwingli. ...
The Reformed definition always makes it apparent that religion rests upon and arises from knowledge of God. The views of Calvin and Sohn serve as examples. ...
The Reformed maintain that the essence of religion is not abstract knowledge, but knowledge and activity (trusting, believing, willing faith). $\underset{―}{90}$ ...

Rationalists tear apart knowing from doing and simply place the one alongside the other in disjointed fashion, as they also do with systematic theology and ethics. According to Kant, religion is the knowledge of all our duties as divine commandments-here religion is subjected to ethics. According to Fichte, the moral world order, whose reign we have to advance ethically, is itself God. According to Hegel, religion is the selfconsciousness of the Absolute Spirit in the finite spirit. In this case, religion is only a matter of knowing. According to Schleiermacher, piety is neither knowing nor doing, but a certainty of feeling or of immediate selfconsciousness. 91 Schleiermacher, then, understood feeling not in our ordinary sense as a passive capacity, but as immediate self-consciousness. Religious worship is then a particular state, a change of self-consciousness, the highest, most powerful, full self-consciousness.

\underset{―}{92}

Most scholars (e.g., Twesten, Nitzsch, de Wette, von Hase, Wegscheider, and Hagenbach)

^{93}

followed Schleiermacher. Others placed greater emphasis on the conscience or made it the organ of religion (Schenkel, cf. Lange, Ebrard, and J. T. Beck).

\underset{―}{94}

Still others placed greater emphasis on the intellect, such as Stendel and Philippi; the latter defines religion as human "communion with God."95 ...

Religion always rests upon the communion of God with humans as they are restored in Christ, established by God’s revelation in word and deed. This is objective religion.

\underset{―}{96}

We subjectively approriate the revelation of God and enter that objectively established fellowship by faith. This faith is an act of the entire person, and it resides in the innermost center, in the heart. It is an immediate, original act, an act of the knowing and willing human person. Faith is not one or the other, orthodoxism or mysticism, but both. Feeling comes after faith; it is not faith’s root but its fruit. Conversion, however, starts with illumination of the mind. 97 According to des Amorie van der Hoeven Jr., religion is the essence of our humanity; religion is a fixed feature not of self-consciousness but of the “self,” of the being of persons. Human beings are human to the extent that they are religious. 98 ...

In Holy Scripture there is no name for what we call religion. 99 After all, we understand religion to encompass all human relations to God in their entirety and in all their connections. 100 Piety, love, trust, adoration, hoping on God, all taken together, are therefore what we describe as religion. Holy Scripture always deals with some concrete element of religion. Thus Scripture uses various names because it is not furnishing scientific theology ...
even though it provides the elements for such a science. In the Old Testament a common expression is to “walk with God” (Gen. 5:22 and 6:9) or to “walk before God” (Gen. 17:1). Especially common is “the fear of the Lord” (Prov. 1:7). The usual terms are to walk in his ways, laws, etc. (Ps. 119) or to know him (Hosea 6:6). In the New Testament the most common words are лíotıç (faith) and its cognate лıơtev́ɛเv (believe). Also important are the words

ε

Úoદ́ßɛเ

α

(“godliness” or “holy reverence for God,” as Cremer translates it) and

θ ε o σ ε ́ β ε ા α

(“godliness” or “the fear of the Lord”). 101 A more objective term, which can also have a negative meaning (as seen in Col. 2:18), is a word usually translated as “religious worship,” “religious practice,” or “rite.” 102 The religious way of life in an objective sense is also called the “way” or “road” (Acts 19:9; 22:4).

\underset{―}{103}

In a subjective sense it is usually called “faith,” which is undoubtedly a matter of the “heart” (Josh. 24:23; 1 Sam. 7:3; Ezek. 11:19; Prov. 23:26; Matt. 5:8; Rom. 10:10; Eph. 3:17; Phil. 4:7; Col. 3:15; Heb. 13:9) but also involves an intellectual element (Christ is the “truth” [John 1:14; 14:6; 17:3]). The heart is also the seat of the mind (Eph. 1:18). 104 The apostle Paul speaks of “the eye of the heart” (Eph. 1:18; cf. 4:23; Rom. 7:25; 12:2). In the Old and the New Testament, knowing as a theoretical-practical matter is greatly emphasized (Isa. 11:9; Jer. 31:34; Hosea 6:6; John 17:3 [cf. 6:29]; Col. 1:910; 2 Thess. 1:8; 1 Tim. 2:4). On the other hand, faith is the source of love for God and the neighbor and of good works. ...

According to Cicero, “religion” is derived from relegere (to go through or over again in reading, speech, or thought) and points to devout and observant religious people “who carefully reviewed and so to speak retraced all the lore of ritual.” 105 Further, the word “religious” was a term of approval and contrasted with “superstitious,” a term of censure.

\underset{―}{106}

Lactantius, however, disputed this and sought the etymology for “religion” in religare (to bind together). 107 Arguments in favor of Cicero’s view include appeals to passages in Cicero that link religion with the notion of obligation 108 and the fact that words ending in “-io” are derived from thirdconjugation verbs (cf. optio from opere). Lactantius’s view, however, is defended by Fleck, Hahn, and Lange.

\underset{―}{109}

...

It is peculiar that the Germans, including the early Reformed, always spoke of Lutheran or Reformed “religion.” Schleiermacher uses the term “piety” (Frömmigkeit), from the word vrum, which, according to J. G. Müller, was the Gothic word for primus or “first,” and also meant “virtuous, ...
useful, alert, valiant [in the liturgical form for baptism].” 110 It was related to the word vram, which meant “onward.” The word expresses only subjective religiosity; the Pharisees were also pious. Terms like “godliness,” “devotion,” or “piety” are too ethical, too practical, too specific to embrace everything which we include in the term “religion.” 111 The word “faith,” which is related to the terms “believe,” “promise,” “vow,” “betroth,” “allow,” and “love,” is also too specific for this purpose. 112 The root of “faith” expresses a loving surrender and dedication to someone. By contrast, “religion” is too external and the word “service” is too harsh,

\underset{―}{113}

insufficiently tender and affectionate. Des Amorie van der Hoeven Jr. suggests the expression: “Godward life.” 114 ...

So, then, what is religion? 115 It is of formost importance that we acknowledge Christianity as the only source for determining the essence of religion. To want to determine the essence of religion by trying to find what all religions have in common yields only an abstraction without substance. What is true and good in other religions can be determined and measured only by the true Christian religion.

\underset{―}{16}

One also has to distinguish between religion in an objective sense and in a subjective sense. Once we understand both, we may be able to grasp what they have in common. ...

What is objective religion? God himself shows us in the first table of the Decalogue. It consists of the service of God, 117 which is described for us in Holy Scripture: worshiping God alone, going to church, observing the Sabbath, using the sacraments, and communal prayer. Holy Scripture very fittingly describes it as walking in the Lord’s laws, duties, statutes, and ways. Objective religion thus corresponds with what God has revealed concerning himself and how he expects us to serve him; it corresponds with the Torah and with the Holy Scripture itself. Francken therefore says that religion is the content of Holy Scripture. 118 Philippi describes objective religion as the Christ-effected restoration of the communion of God with humanity. $\underset{―}{119}$ This raises the question whether religion is communion with God, which will be addressed presently. $\underset{―}{120}$ ...
What is subjective religion? The New Testament usually indicates subjective religion by the words “faith” or “believing.” 121 This faith resides in the heart (Rom. 10:10). It is with the heart that one believes unto righteousness; it is the center, the core, the innermost point of our being, our $I$ . And because faith resides in the I, it is an act of the whole human person, of mind, will, soul, and strength (Deut. 6:4-5; Matt. 22:37; Mark 12:30; ...

Luke 10:27). How is this faith worked in us? The Holy Spirit works it in us, but does so through the preaching of the Word, which aims at the mind and the will. It is thus mediated through mind and will: these are the two portals, points of entry to our innermost being, to our

I

, by which the Holy Spirit carries the seed of the Word into us and there causes faith to arise (Rom. 10:14-15). And just as faith, subjective religion, is mediated by the mind and the will, it proceeds from the I to again work on the mind and the will. The Reformed therefore did not make a mistake when they placed knowing and worshiping next to each other in the definition of religion. 122 Religion is mediated by both and manifests itself in both. Faith truly is knowing and trusting, and does not exist without both. And the Reformed definition is far better than Schleiermacher’s. Feeling is passive and receptive. Faith is reflected in feeling, and one who believes will experience, to some extent, feelings of contentedness and bliss. But faith is not identical to feeling. Rather, feeling is a fruit and reflection of faith. To be sure, Schleiermacher explained feeling as immediate self-consciousness. This is impossible, however; it cannot be both at once, it has to be either feeling or self-consciousness. The one can absolutely not include the other.

\underset{―}{123}

Faith, then, is the unity of knowing and being able, of knowledge and deed. 124 Its only object is God; it knows God, engages and deals with God. ...
3. What is the relation between objective religion and subjective religion? Polanus wrote, “Religion or piety is the internal cause of the worship of God, the former is the cause, the latter the effect.” 125 To some extent this is true. Subjective religion impels us and enables us to serve God according to his will. But objective religion is not the product, effect, and creation of subjective religion. Self-imagined or self-made objective religion is not service of God, but idolatry or self-willed worship126 (see, e.g., Matt. 15:9; Mark 7:7; Col. 2:23). No, objective religion is already there, contained and described in Holy Scripture. Only God can decide what objective religion is and how he wants us to serve him. Subjective religion begins by abandoning all self-willed religion and ceasing to be active, instead becoming passive and entering into the service of God according to his will. This is why Holy Scripture speaks of walking in the ways and laws of the Lord, and not walking according to our imagination. This is not compulsion, because subjective religion makes us willing to walk in the Lord’s ways. And objective religion, too, is no forced system, no pressing ...
or constricting mold for subjective religion. Quite the contrary; while objective religion is the pure and true and adequate form of the subjective, subjective religion is the perfectly fitting content of objective religion. Both are intended to permeate each other with increasing intimacy. To some extent it is still the case that objective religion stands over us like a law; it had to be objectively revealed as a rule for our lives to protect us from straying. But as subjective religion increases in us and as faith becomes stronger and more spontaneous, objective religion increasingly becomes our own being. The two may for the moment remain partially in conflict, but they are directed to each other and inclined toward each other. One day they will fully correspond. In heaven they will be one. ...

To conclude: religion should not be defined as communion with God. 127 This is currently a common definition, for example, of Oosterzee. 128 However, notice the following: (a) Communion is reciprocal. 129 There is communion between husband and wife but not between father and child, between whom an intimate relationship of piety exists. If there were religious communion between God and us, God, too, would have religion. This is not the case: religion is something human, the most human thing about our humanity,

\underset{―}{130}

and therefore to speak of “human religion” is really a pleonasm, a redundancy. (b) The definition “religion is communion between God and human beings” excludes all objective religion and makes it seem as if objective religion is a matter of indifference and inferior. But such a notion is contradicted by Holy Scripture, which in the Second Commandment identifies the sin of idolatry and specifies that it should be punished with death in the land of Israel. This idea, however, is reflected in the subjectivism of Schleiermacher and of the entire present age. ...
© Because of the reasons listed in (a) and (b), the definition “religion is communion between God and human beings” is incomplete and inaccurate. Religion is not the reciprocal rapport between God and a human being, and even less is it an activity or consciousness in us.

\underset{―}{131}

It is not the relation itself or the communion between God and humans as such but the “certainty of human subjects that they exist and live in this relation and communication,” a way of life for humans by virtue of and through the peculiar relationship between them and God. 132 Human beings stand in a special and unique relationship to God, essentially distinct from that of angels and animals and every creature, and are thus distinguished from all other creatures. Because of the unique relationship to God in which we ...
stand (come to stand by faith), this relationship is distinctively expressed in all of human life. And because God places himself in a relationship to human beings in a special way, they too place themselves in a unique relationship

\underset{―}{133}

to him. ...

Thus we obtain the following definition: Formally, religion

\underset{―}{134}

is the distinctive relationship or position of human beings to God, expressing itself in all of life, and based on the distinctive relation of God to human beings. 135 Materially, religion is the childlike relationship to God that arises in a human being, based on the reconciled relation in which God, in Christ and through the Holy Spirit, places himself to the believer. This makes God the object of believers’ knowledge and action and leads them to walk in the ways of the Lord, according to his will and for his glory. Religion is serving God in childlike fear, in faith, with all powers in the entirety of life according to his will and for his glory. Piety and religion are therefore not identical. 136 As Calvin correctly distinguishes, religion arises from piety. Religion is thus our human way of life with respect to God, determined by piety (our childlike relation to God). Religion is not communion with God and the spiritual life as such, but the piety that directs the mind, will, feeling, all powers, and all actions and the daily walk. Religion is decidedly a matter of the mind, of the will, of all the powers, flowing from a heart in right relationship to God. Religion is thus the relationship

\underset{―}{137}

of the whole person with heart, soul, etc. to God, governed by the standard of God’s will. ...

Incidentally it can be asked whether human beings also stand in a relationship with angels and whether we have duties to them. Without a doubt the angels serve humans (Pss. 34:7; 91:11; Isa. 37:36; Dan. 10:13; Matt. 4:6; 18:10; Luke 15:10; 16:22; Acts 12:15; Heb. 1:14). Contrary to Scripture, Roman Catholics say that we should bring them religious honor (Col. 2:18; Rev. 19:10; 22:8-9; Judg. 13:15-16). The Reformed say that religious honor is due unto God alone (Deut. 6:13; 10:20; Matt. 4:10). But civil honor is different (1 Cor. 11:10; 1 Tim. 5:21; Heb. 1:4). As the church we certainly live in relationship to them (see Eph. 3:10), and we also owe them duties of reverence and respect. At the same time, according to all of Holy Scripture, the evil angels also have influence on us, and we have to guard against them (Matt. 8:29; 10:1; 15:22; 17:21; 2 Tim. 2:25-26; 1 Pet.

5 : 8)

. This issue will also be addressed when we discuss temptation and other matters.

\underset{―}{138}

...

2. Our Relation to Other People ...

A person is the product of a community and does not exist alone but has been in relation to others since even before birth. Without the mutual relationship between others we would not have existed. We are born out of, in, with, and toward various relationships. This one relationship of family is germinal and is the type of all the others. From the household family and its relationships stem all the others in variegated complexity. The case is entirely different with the angels. Among them such a manifold, rich, and full set of relationships is absent: they are all equal, because all were created that way. There is only a hierarchy that by its manifold diversity may perhaps somewhat compensate them for what we possess. Birth or physical descent is therefore the foundation and germ of all human relationships. Yet this does not say enough. After all, this is also true of animals, because there too each variety descends from its single pair. This is something, therefore, that people and animals have in common. ...

But there is a distinction between animals and people in this matter, because with animals the physical relationship is the only one. The physical relationship becomes weaker and passes away as soon as the animal can function on its own, and then the animal lives by itself alongside its parents, brothers, and sisters. Kinship falls silent, the sensual is transitory and disappears. Animals form no family, society, or state. The mutual physical relationship is a passing one. For people, the physical, natural relation is also the first, and also passes away; but ethical relationships develop out of and on the basis of the physical. Although the natural relationship is first, the moral and spiritual relationships follow. People remain in relationship to each other until the end of their lives and beyond. Those ethical ties are many and manifold. ...

Relationships that center on the family. Such relationships are first of all physical but increasingly assume ethical dimensions. In the family these are rich and several: First, between husband and wife; second, between parents and children; third, between siblings; fourth, between all of these and domestic staff; fifth, between these and all who lodge with the family such as uncles, aunts, and grandparents. All relationships, even in such a small circle, are endlessly nuanced and varied and advance the richness of life and of human personality. ...
Relationships that exist in society and by virtue of society. When various sorts of people live together, relationships come into existence ...
through all attempts to elevate and sustain life, especially through trade and industry. These relationships give rise to a number of others: offices, trades, occupations, associations, partners, employers and employees, the rich and the poor, and the first, second, third, and presently even the fourth estates. $\underset{―}{139}$ These relationships become more numerous and complex depending on the size of the household. ...
Relationships of, in, and for the sake of the state. The society becomes a state. A group of people are a folk, a nation. Here we can identify the rights and duties of the citizen, civil liberties, justice for all, patriotism, the duty to serve the fatherland, war, government officials, and government and subjects. ...
Relationships of and for the sake of humanity. Just like every family and every nation, humanity in its successive generations is a unity, an organism to which we are related. We stand on the shoulders of our ancestors and have inherited their financial, moral, spiritual, and intellectual legacy, which makes our progress possible. What we think, feel, and enjoy we owe to those who went before us. Their science and skill are now ours. And these, in turn, create relationships of learned and unlearned, of teachers and students, and of schools and universities. ...

The relationships that people have cannot be numbered, and all, without exception, have a moral character. Life in these relationships is called the moral life. Morality is thus to live in appropriate relationships to people according to some requirement. (For us, this requirement is God’s law.) No actual moral life exists, however, where people can live according to this requirement in their own strength. We are by nature inclined also to hate our neighbor. 140 In the ordinary sense of the word, people are moral when they live according to the human standard-or, somewhat more profoundly, according to the notion of humanity-in all these relations. In our view, the moral person is one who also in this respect meets God’s standard, his law, and his demand, made known to us in his Word, also for the sake of these human relationships. ...

3. Our Relation to Nature ...

Our bodies were formed from the dust of the earth (Gen. 2:7). The constitutive parts of the earth (lime, iron, minerals, phosphorus, sulphur, magnesium, etc.) are also those of our bodies. What veins are for our ...
bodies, rivers are for the earth. Our bodily frame is related to that of the animals. We have a vegetative life in common with plants and animals and an animal life that we share with the animals. We live from the earth, from the worlds of plants and animals, and obtain food, shelter, and clothing from them. We obtain our instruments from the mineral realm. We are from the earth; our rhythm of rest and work is attuned to the rotation of the earth. The earth exists for the sake of humanity and has to be cultivated and subdued by us (culture). Plants and animals are examples and lessons for us (the ant, lion, snake, dove, etc.). As Jesus showed, nature provides a parable of the eternal, of the kingdom of heaven. Nature, toward which we have many duties and rights, shapes our character and temper, teaches us, points us to God, and serves as the source of our science. Our relationships to nature are manifold, and also have a moral character. Rothe unites our relationship to persons and our relationship to nature under the general category of the moral or ethical. 141 This is incorrect. There is a difference between our relationship to other persons and our relationship to impersonal nature such as plants and animals. The latter can be regarded as ethical only in a broader sense; otherwise it would be immoral to butcher animals. ...

4. Religion and Morality $\underset{―}{142}$ ...

Religion is a moral, spiritual phenomenon that belongs generally, formally, and psychologically to the moral dimension of life (in a psychic sense, morality is an act of the human will).

\underset{―}{143}

Furthermore, religion is governed by the moral law in all of its dimensions: knowledge, love (piety, religious practices), and worship. 144 Our attitudes and deeds, our entire life of the will, is also governed by law. In sum, religion is to morality (in terms of interhuman relations) what the first table is to the second table.

\underset{―}{145}

...

We have considered the threefold relations in which people are involved and can now look at the mutual connections among these relations. Specifically, we shall consider the connection between religion and morality, and for this purpose can include our relationship to nature under our relationship to other people. We are excluding from our discussion those who deny one of the two terms and for whom the issue of the relation between morality and religion no longer really exists. On the one hand, there are ascetics, monks who flee from the world and from other people, thus deny moral life, and would turn all of life into religion. In France, for ...
example, a nun is called la religieuse. The Roman Catholic Church is generally inclined to this error, wants to make everything ecclesiastical, and fails to recognize the independent domains of art, science, or the state. On the other hand, there are the humanists (materialists, also pantheists, like Fichte) who ridicule God and religion and dismiss them as childish fantasies or as a brain dysfunction. Recently this issue has become enormously complicated, because religion and morality are not properly defined or distinguished, a problem that arises when one starts from abstract ideas of religion and of morality instead of the concrete and true religion and morality that the Christian tradition provides. It is as impossible to find and describe an abstract thing called “morality” as it is to find and describe “religion” as an abstraction. Those who pose the issue this way are talking without making any progress. Both terms remain a variable

x

, unknown quantities, because they have not been defined. ...

Let me first give a concise summary of how pagans historically viewed the connection between religion and morality. 146 Among the fetish worshipers, religion is still the practice of magic and does not produce morality. Society produces a moral code of loyalty, honesty, bravery toward others and for the sake of others. When individuals begin to evaluate themselves according to objective norms, their consciences obtain moral content. But religion and morality are separate; sin and crime are distinct. But gradually they converge; that is to say, religion prescribes and proscribes a set of actions as well. As a result, religious and moral duties arise alongside each other. What is good in one area is wrong in another; the religious domain is morally indifferent. Yet the two areas converge, and a connection becomes established: self-sacrifice, the limitation of selfishness, which religion requires, benefits morality. Among Semitic and IndoGermanic peoples the connection became much more intimate. ...

Among the Semites, the gods still required child sacrifice, yet the gods were nonetheless thought to be human-in other words, lords and kings; state and church were one. Among the Indo-Germans, the gods were still powers of nature; but they were nevertheless expressions of what is good and wholesome, and increasingly became persons before whom oaths, marriages, and hospitality were sacred. Thus moral action surpassed religious activity, Yet, a large part of the moral life lay outside of religion, and vice versa. Among the Egyptians, religion had a high position, and in their case, morality ethicized the gods. Among the Greeks, the gods were ...
the guardians of measure, order, harmony, oaths, hospitality, and morals; morality here has religious motives. But for the rest, the gods often acted immorally and practiced adultery, theft, deceit, revenge, and the like. Philosophical ethics was therefore anti-religious. Among the Romans moral action also had religious motives. Public and familial life have a religious character. The religious state was supreme, and for this reason civic virtue was the highest form of morality. Among the Chinese, the state was the image of heaven, and the emperor was the standard for everything. Religion swallows up morality entirely. Among the Persians, there was a god for the good as well as an evil god. Religion and morality coincided. Among the Buddhists, there was, properly speaking, no such thing as moral action: there is not ethics, and everything belongs to ascetics. With Islam, God’s will is absolutely everything; morality is determined by Allah. ...

What we see everywhere, then, is that religion increasingly determines morality. The two areas progressively merge. What is considered good in one area cannot be seen as evil in the other. Paul shows the relation in Romans 1:23: the gentiles had transformed God into a corruptible human; therefore God has given them up in the lusts of their hearts. Idolatry leads to immorality. Unnatural acts follow the divinization of nature. And the higher the conception of God, the higher the morality.

\underset{―}{147}

...
2. In the present understanding of the connection between religion and morality, the issue is stated abstractly, so there is often a failure to make proper distinctions. According to Martensen, “The fundamental concept of the moral is therefore the unconstrained unity of man’s will and God’s will.” 148 Religion is human dependence on God; morality is the freedom that develops from dependence into independence, the acceptance of the proffered communion with God, so that religion disappears as morality grows. The religious is passive, and the ethical is active. In faith, religion and morality are one. But both are developing: the religious is union with God, and the ethical strives to become one with God; the religious person has everything, the ethical person has to acquire it. (But, we should ask, if one already has union with God, does one still need to become one with God?) ...

According to Rothe, moral development is partly religious and partly ethical, which involves subduing nature and becoming a spirit or person. To the same extent, then, that human beings (as ethical beings) spiritualize themselves and become persons, they sanctify themselves, and God comes ...
to live in them. God cannot live in matter, only in spirit.

\underset{―}{149}

It is necessary, then, that to a certain extent we first become spirit before God can indwell us. It is thus a religious development; as we increasingly become more ethical, we become more religious. 150 This religious development is initiated by God but is nevertheless mediated by the person, because piety is authentic communion, interaction between God and the person. 151 It is the case, after all, that even before persons are spirits, God acts on their nature and conditions and guides them toward the duty of orienting themselves in their relation to God. Religious development begins when a person agrees.

\underset{―}{152}

...

We can make a few summary comments about Rothe’s view at this point. (a) A person does not have a special religious organ; but religion exists because to be human is to be personal. (b) Religion, too, is mediated through human self-determination. © Religion, then, already presupposes a beginning of ethical development. ...

It is thus through that religious development that a divine consciousness and divine activity arise within a person.

\underset{―}{153}

Persons give themselves to God as instruments for his purpose, and that purpose is solely an ethical one. 154 The beginning of religion in us is determined by our ethical development (spirituality). Religion is real only in morality. Religion requires morality for truth, actuality, and concreteness. Morality is the primary product of the idea of communion with God. And morality requires piety to become perfect rather than just to exist.

\underset{―}{155}

...

Several additional comments can be made: (d) Piety is indeed different from morality, but morality arises only in piety; religion is the soul of morality, although, like the soul, it does not have a separate existence. (e) Religion without morality is enthusiasm, fantasy, a phantasm of piety, empty, without content. Morality without religion may be incomplete and abnormal, but it is not empty; on the contrary, it is something very real. ...

Some further observations about Rothe’s view of the relation between morality and religion: (f) Morality is thus a precondition for religion-this in fact places humanity first and God second. (g) There is such a thing as morality without piety, but not the other way around. (h) Religion does not have its own life or separate existence, but is absorbed by morality, the church by the state, worship by art. Yet many moderns follow Rothe’s position. According to Janet, morality is not complete without religion; religion is an essential element of humanity. Religion is not the theoretical ...
foundation of morality, but nevertheless is the basis of morality’s efficacy. Kant made God a postulate of morality. But Janet also says that to believe in virtue is to believe in God. Without God, virtue is an illusion; morality cannot exist without metaphysics. 156 ...
3. We first have to investigate the relation between objective religion and objective morality. The law of the Lord clearly tells us the relation between the first and the second table, our service to God and to our neighbor. (a) One heading appears above all the commandments, including the second table. God is also the lawgiver of the second table. (b) The law is one, it is an organism, and whoever violates one part of the law violates the entirety of the law (James 2:10). © The second table follows the first, not the other way around. As our Lord taught us: “So whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets” (Matt. 7:12). “This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Matt. 22:38-39; cf. Luke 10:27). (d) “Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law” (Rom. 13:10). ...

Both tables, then, constitute a single law, and in Holy Scripture they are always intimately conjoined and never divided. Both are issued by one lawgiver, both proceed from one principle, and both aim at one purpose. This is illustrated by the whole of Scripture. Samuel said, “To obey is better than sacrifice” (1 Sam. 15:22). The Lord said through Jeremiah, “If you truly amend your ways and your deeds, if you truly execute justice one with another, if you do not oppress the sojourner, the fatherless, or the widow, or shed innocent blood in this place, and if you do not go after other gods to your own harm, then I will let you dwell in this place, in the land that I gave of old to your fathers forever” (Jer. 7:5-7). Later Jeremiah records: ...

He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. ...
Is not this to know me? declares the LORD. (Jer. 22:16) ...

Similarly, the prophet Ezekiel describes one who is “righteous and does what is just and right” as one who “does not eat upon the mountains or lift up his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel” and, at the same time, as one who “does not defile his neighbor’s wife, . . . gives his bread to the hungry and covers the naked with a garment,” and does not engage in usury. In sum, that person “walks in my statutes, and keeps my rules by acting ...
faithfully-he is righteous; he shall surely live, declares the Lord God” (Ezek. 18:5-9). Many other Old Testament passages say the same: Psalms 40:7; 41:2; 51:19; Isaiah 1:12-20; 38:3; Hosea 4:1; 10:12; and especially Micah 6:8 (cf. Zech. 7:6; 8:16-17): ...

He has told you, O man, what is good; and what does the LORD require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God? ...

We find the same message in the New Testament: ...
Present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship. (Rom. 12:1) ...

Owe no one anything, except to love each other, for the one who loves another has fulfilled the law. (Rom. 13:8) ...

Religion that is pure and undefiled before God the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their affliction, and to keep oneself unstained from the world. (James 1:27) ...

If you really fulfill the royal law according to the Scripture, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” you are doing well. (James 2:8) ...

And this is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ and love one another, just as he has commanded us. (1 John 3:23) ...

The two tables therefore form a most intimate unity. But they are nevertheless two tables, never to be separated, but thoroughly to be distinguished. God himself distinguishes two tables of the law (Exod. 32:15; 34:1; Deut. 10:1; 1 Kings 8:9). In Matthew 22:38-39 they are distinguished as two commandments: the first and great, and the second like it. The two tables are therefore never confused but are ever kept distinct in such a way that the first has the second as consequence. The first table has God as object, the second the neighbor. In a certain sense the second table also has God as object, but indirectly, in and behind our neighbor. 157 The neighbor should be loved in God and for the sake of God. ...
4. We shall now consider the relation between subjective religion and morality in the human person as subject. The fear of the Lord is the foundation of all morality (Prov. 14:2, 26; 15:16; 19:23). To walk before the face of God includes morality (Gen. 5:22; 6:9; 17:1). Godliness is the root of humility (Prov. 22:4), generosity (Prov. 19:17), wisdom (Prov. 9:10; 15:33), and science (Prov. 1:7). Furthermore, the fear of the Lord is to hate ...
evil (Prov. 16:5). In the New Testament, faith is the principle of sanctification: ...

Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ has been born of God, and everyone who loves the Father loves whoever has been born of him. By this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and obey his commandments. For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments. And his commandments are not burdensome. For everyone who has been born of God overcomes the world. And this is the victory that has overcome the world-our faith. (1 John 5:1-4)

^{\underset{―}{158}}

...

The fruit of faith is love: ...
The aim of our charge is love that issues from a pure heart and a good conscience and a sincere faith. (1 Tim. 1:5) ...

Whoever says, “I know him,” but does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him, but whoever keeps his word, in him truly the love of God is perfected. By this we may know that we are in him: whoever says he abides in him ought to walk in the same way in which he walked. (1 John 2:4-6) ...

For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything, but only faith working through love. (Gal. 5:6) ...

So also faith by itself, if it does not have works, is dead. But someone will say, “You have faith and I have works.” Show me your faith apart from your works, and I will show you my faith by my works. (James 2:17-18) ...

Similarly, “every healthy tree bears good fruit, but the diseased tree bears bad fruit. A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire” (Matt. 7:17-19; cf. 12:33; Luke 3:9; 6:43-45). A tree is known by its fruit. ...

The examples of people given in Scripture also demonstrate the same connection between faith and deeds: Lydia (Acts 16:14-15); Tabitha (Acts 9:36); Cornelius (Acts 10:2, 48); Zacchaeus (Luke 19:8); the church at Colossae (Col. 1:4); the church at Thessalonica (1 Thess. 1:3). New birth brings about changed lives: “And such were some of you. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God” (1 Cor. 6:11). Love is a fruit of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22); faith in Christ Jesus results in love for the saints (Eph. 1:15). Paul’s prayer for the Ephesians is that their new faith may bring forth love, "that according to the riches of his glory he may grant you to be strengthened with power through his Spirit in your inner being, so that ...

Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith-that you, being rooted and grounded in love, may have strength to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled with all the fullness of God" (Eph. 3:16-19; cf. Col. 1:4). Love is the highest virtue, the bond of perfection: “And above all these put on love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony” (Col. 3:14). ...

So Scripture teaches that also subjectively religion and morality cohere intimately and inseparably. The one demonstrates itself and is authenticated in the other. The one is the fruit of the other. ...
5. The church of all ages has taught this, including Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, Lactantius, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin. 159 Zwingli showed the relation more psychologically and ethically. 160 For Zwingli, even the good works of the unbelievers were the fruit of faith. In answer to the question “What are good works?” the Heidelberg Catechism (Q&A 91) gives this answer: “Only those which are done out of true faith, conform to God’s law, and are done for God’s glory; and not those based on our own opinion or human tradition.” And this is what all the Reformed teach. There is no morality except what proceeds from faith, but also there is no faith without morality. 161 ...

We can now summarize: ...

Religion and morality are two distinguishable entities. ...
a. They are distinct in their connection: religion is original, morality is derived. The one is faith, the other is love, and faith and love are not the same. ...
b. They are distinct in terms of where they reside, their content, and their expression. Religion operates in the arena of the mind and cultivates reverence, awe, fear, modesty, gratitude, prayer, humility, etc. Morality operates in another arena and cultivates other affections: justice, a sense of obligation, honor, and order. ...
c. They are distinct in their outward expression. Religion in prayer, worship, church construction, and whatever belongs to the church; morality in life with people (love, self-denial, justice, duty, not coveting, not killing, not stealing, etc.). The religious sphere is thus a different one from the moral sphere; religion has an independent ...
arena, a unique expression, expresses itself in its particular way, and is not absorbed by morality (contrary to Rothe). ...
d. They are distinct in that the two tables describe especially the different expressions of these two kinds of life. ...
e. They are distinct in object. In religion, God is the only and immediate object; in morality, the neighbor is the closest object. $\underset{―}{162}$ ...
Religion and morality are never divorced. ...
a. The two tables are one law: God is the author of the two commandments; God is one, and thus there is one, unbreakable law for religion and morality. The second commandment is like the first. ...
b. The principle is one: the faith that grasps God produces love toward the neighbor. There is a psychological connection between faith and love, as we will see later. ...
c. The object is one: in our neighbor, God is to be loved; our neighbor is to be loved in God, through God, and for God’s sake. Indirectly, God is the object of the second table as well. ...

Such is the normal relation between religion and morality. But in what way has it become abnormal through sin? Sin leads to misconstruing the relation between religion and morality in two ways, both of which occur. ...

Religion and morality are absolutely separated. This was done by the fetish worshipers and more or less by all polytheists. After all, where there is more than one God, there is also more than one law; one god gives this law, another gives that one. So laws in the religious arena can be entirely different than those in moral, civil, social, political, or family arenas. Each god has its particular arena (there is a god of theft, of commerce, of murder, etc.) and issues his own law for that arena, different from and often contradicting the law of another god for another arena. As a higher conception of the gods is formed, and the gods converge, the various arenas of life also move closer and greater unity results. This is also the position of proponents of independent morality, $\underset{―}{163}$ whether they permit religion to exist alongside morality or completely reject it. ...

There are several arguments against this separation of religion and morality, but we should begin by recognizing that it contains a relative truth: religion and morality are two distinct things. They do not totally coincide. And there are two types or kinds of people: On the one hand, we find religious people full of fervor and admiration, with a rich emotional ...
life, men, women, and children of faith and of prayer, and who yet morally, when it comes to nobility of character and temperament, rank low, are permissive of much, lacking order, discipline, and honesty. We find this among enthusiastic, fanatic, mystical, pietistic sects. 164 On the other hand, we find ethical people with a meager sense of wonder, fervor, and enthusiasm, poor in emotional life, but strictly moral, reserved, measured, virtuous. Such were the Stoics (the Pharisees) and many modern people who have lost the faith. Now it is certainly true that such people can accomplish much morally; there is a certain measure of independent morality. People can contain themselves, direct themselves, suppress their passions, and pursue the ideal of humanity (although this is not true Godpleasing morality and breeds pride, self-righteousness, and similar vices). ...

This tendency of religious and ethical people can also be found in the church. Many children of God, who enjoy much in fellowship with God, are much looser when it comes to morality than some who are ethically strict but enjoy God less. 165 There is therefore a relative truth in the separation of religion and morality; but only a relative truth-the separation itself is wrong; for five reasons: ...
a. History demonstrates that religion and morality are related, as Paul indicated in Romans 1:23. A low concept of the gods is always accompanied by low concepts of morality. 166 It goes without saying: people who create and imagine a god for themselves who is cruel will be cruel themselves. People portray themselves in their gods. ...
b. Monotheism has at least established the connection that what is good in the religious arena cannot be evil in the moral arena. The same God rules and legislates in both. ...
c. Without metaphysics and religion, morality is rendered impossible, except in the form of utilitarianism. We therefore face mutually exclusive alternatives; either (a) good and evil are a priori, independent of our will and thought, and then there is metaphysics; or (b) good and evil become that a posteriori and are determined by us, in which case they are not properly good and evil, but only useful and harmful. 167 ...
d. “To believe in virtue is to believe in God.” 168 Virtue is an illusion without God because believing in the good includes believing that the good will rule, will triumph-otherwise, why do good? The ...
good, therefore, must be an absolute authority that can and will overcome all opposition. This cannot be an idea but must be a power, a person, God. For this reason Kant made God a postulate of morality. A kingdom of humaneness cannot exist without God. e. Psychologically, although there are two arenas in the human person, and although conscience and God-consciousness are not identical, nevertheless both exist within one and the same person. We connect our conscience (the law of the moral life) with our Godconsciousness involuntarily and spontaneously; we identify the giver of the moral law with the supreme power of our innate ideas.

\underset{―}{169}

...

This brings us to the second way that sin can lead to misconstruing the relation between religion and morality. ...
2. Religion and morality are identified. This happens in the point of view that denies either God or the world. From one side the world is denied and viewed as sinful by the ascetics, and morality is then absorbed by religion. From the other side, pantheists, for whom the world is God, deny God. To live for the world is then to live for God; a specifically religious life with a particular content and form does not exist because there is no personal God. Religion is then absorbed in morality. This was done by Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and to some extent by Rothe. It was also more or less under the influence of this idea that the Mediating Theologians

\underset{―}{170}

soon dismissed the life of the soul, the mystical life with God, as quietism, sickliness, and fanaticism. They wanted the life of the church to be transformed entirely into morality-as by de la Saussaye-and rejected all religion except what could be immediately turned into morality. They even considered the ethical to be the essence of the religious. In the Netherlands, the so-called ethical movement

\underset{―}{171}

also suffers from this shortcoming and robs religious life of its proper content; it regards religious life only as a further description, determination, and modification of the ethical life (cf. Rothe). But the religious life is the properly meaningful life. 172 The ethical movement has extended the consequences of pantheism into the field of religion and morality, as Tholuck and Vinet previously did in the field of the divine and the anthropological. 173 Religion in its entirety is then absorbed by ethical phenomena. There is some truth in this, because religion and morality are very closely connected. But: ...
a. Holy Scripture strictly distinguishes them: the law contains two tables, and Jesus speaks of the First and the Second Commandment. Love toward God is always distinguished from love toward our neighbor and never identified with it. The two are always mentioned alongside each other. Leviticus 19:18 says “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” a command that is repeated in James 2:8, where it is called “the royal law” (cf. Matt. 5:43; 19:19; 22:39; Mark 12:31; Rom. 13:9; Gal. 5:14). Then there are passages that direct the child of God only to “love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might” (Deut.

6 : 5;

cf.

11 : 1, 13, 22; 19 : 9; 30 : 6;

Josh. 22:5;

23 : 11

). And finally there are passages that link the two commands but still clearly distinguish them, as when Jesus summarized the law for the lawyer who questioned him about “the great commandment in the Law” (Matt. 22:36-40; par. Mark 12:29-31; Luke 10:25-28). There is a proper and distinct 174 love toward God, and another toward the neighbor. ...
b. This cannot be otherwise, because God and humanity are two different objects. The identification of religion and morality is the result of the identification of God and the world (pantheism). Although God and humanity are closely connected, and the world (humanity) is absolutely dependent upon God, nonetheless the world is something different from God. And as surely as the objects are different, the relations in which we stand to different objects must also be different; that is, religion and morality must be different. ...
c. It is true that love toward our neighbor is the proof and seal of love toward God. It is also true that I must love God in my neighbor and love my neighbor for the sake of God. Therefore morality in the broad sense may be called religion. I am called to serve God also in my profession and trade during the week. ...

Religion is therefore not a piece of life, but life itself. Our entire life must be serving God. But from this it follows that although the Sabbath can and should penetrate the other days, the other days must never penetrate the Sabbath. This is the mistake of the ethical movement. The Sabbath may not be pulled down to the level of the other days, but rather the other days should be elevated to the height of the Sabbath. In this dispensation, ...
however, the Sabbath remains and should remain alongside the other days and exert an influence upon them without swallowing them up. ...

Ed. note: Bavinck’s title for this chapter was “Human Nature Considered on Its Own” (De menschelijke natuur op zichzelve beschouwd). He inserted as an interlinear new title “The Essence of Humanity” (Het wezen van de mensch). Our title, “Essential Human Nature,” is intended to capture both ideas. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck regarded pantheism as one of the great threats of his day to a Christian worldview. See, inter alia, RD, 1:80; 2:408-15, 426-38; 3:42, 236, 299, 529; 4:60, 75, 92, 108, 161, 250, 576, 691, 699, 711. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck refers here to an essay by Emil du Bois-Reymond, “Naturwissenschaft und Philosophie von Nathusius,” in Zeitfragen des christlichen Volkslebens; it was not possible to verify this reference. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_du_Bois-Reymond. The reference to Nathusius is most likely to Martin Friedrich von Nathusius (1843-1906), author of Natuurwissenschaft und Philosophie: Zur beleuchtung der neuesten materialistchen Kundgebungen du Bois-Reymond u.a. (Heilbronn: Henninger, 1883). Bavinck deals with du Bois-Reymond’s views at greater length in his essay “Christianity and Natural Science,” 85-87, 101-2. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck’s note here reads “See last year’s lecture” (“Zie dictaat vorig jaar”), an indication that he used these notes over and over again. ...
Ed. note: See RD, 2:531-33. ...
Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iii.9, §30 [2:99]. Ed. note: For an explanation of the format we are using to cite this work, see the extended note in the introduction, §1, in the section “Reformed Churches” (pp. 8-9n48). The volume and page numbers come from the 1749-53 Dutch edition used by Bavinck. ...
Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iii.9, §31 [2:99]. ...
Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iii.9, §30-33 [2:99]. ...
LO: justitia originalis. ...
Ed. note: Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520-75) was a Lutheran reformer from present-day Croatia who held the view that the human fall into sin substantially transformed human nature into something evil. ...
LO: in puris naturalibus. ...
LO: donum superadditum. Ed. note: Bavinck’s critique of Roman Catholic thought on this point can be found in RD, 2:539-48. However, Bavinck’s treatment of Roman Catholic thought needs to be nuanced and corrected in places, particularly through a closer examination of Thomas Aquinas; see Bolt, Theological Analysis, 172n24, 180n29, 189n50. Cf. Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought. An affinity between Bavinck and Thomas has been clearly demonstrated recently by two younger scholars: Sytsma, “Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology”; and Van Raalte, “Unleavened Morality.” ...
Ed. note: These three terms that summarize the original image of God in Reformed orthodoxy are conflated from Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10. ...
Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iii.9, §44 [2:110-11]. ...
LO: sui ipsius effectus, causa sui; Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §§31, 34. ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §47. ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §73. ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §83. ...
GO: Selbstzweck. ...
GO: Selbstbestimmung; Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §87. Ed. note: Bavinck adds two German words after the quotation: kausirte = “caused”; gewordene = “become.” ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §§93-126. ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §§97-113. ...
LO: causa sui. ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §§109-10. ...
Harless, System of Christian Ethics, 5 (§2); Martensen, Christian Ethics, 1:4, 10-13 (§§1, 4). ...
Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:23-37. ...
Ed. note: What Bavinck calls “pantheism” here is better described as “panentheism.” On panentheism see Cooper, Panentheism; on Schleiermacher, see pp. 80-89, and on Schelling and Hegel, see pp. 90-119. ...
Ed. note: See Kuyper, “Blurring of the Boundaries.” ...
Ed. note: Matt. 7:17. ...
LO: non posse peccare. Ed. note: This phrase comes from Augustine and describes the fourth and final state in outline of redemptive history. In order, the four states of humanity are ...
(1) innocence: able to sin or not to sin (posse peccare aut non peccare); (2) fall: not able not to sin (non posse non peccare); (3) grace: able to sin or not to sin (posse peccare aut non peccare); and ...
(4) glory: not able to sin (non posse peccare). See Augustine, Enchiridion 118 (NPNF1 3:275). ...
DO: verbod. ...
Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §96-113. ...
GO: Sturm und Drang. Ed. note: The term is connected with the early Romantic movement in German music and literature in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It stressed individual subjectivity, action, and intense emotional freedom producing turbulence and turmoil in reaction to the constraints of Enlightenment rationalism. The term was popularized by the title of a work by German dramatist and poet Friedrich von Klinger (from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sturm_und_Drang). ...
Martensen, Christian Ethics, 1:10-13 (§4). ...
Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck added, “We cannot do away with God if we want to define the good; neither in the case of Kant nor by the socialists.” ...
Ed. note: Bavinck alludes here to Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 5: “Can you live up to all this [God’s Law] perfectly?” Answer: “No. I have a natural tendency to hate God and my neighbor.” ...
Cf. Martensen, Christian Ethics, 1:10-13 (§4), but use with discretion. ...
Cf. Martensen, Christian Ethics, 1:10-13 (§4). Ed. note: In the opening sentence of §5 (p. 13) Martensen speaks of “union with God . . . as the final aim of human effort.” ...
Ed. note: Bavinck originally wrote “shining” (schijnende) but changed it to “sounding” (klinkende). ...
DO: verwrongen. ...
Ed. note: On the covenant of works, see RD, 2:567-79, 585-88. This classic Reformed doctrine is defined in the Westminster Confession of Faith (7.2) as follows: “The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam; and in him to his posterity, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience.” ...
Ed. note: Bavinck inserts here a general reference to his Hedendaagsche moraal, a translation of which appears as an appendix in the third volume of Reformed Ethics. ...
Ed. note: Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 3: “From where do you come to know your sins and misery? The Law of God teaches me.” ...
Cf. Lindner, Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie, 11-25 (§§7-12); Lichtenfels, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 21-52. ...
Bruch, Theorie des Bewußtseins, 84-125. ...
Ed. note: Physiognomy (from Greek $φ$ úбıc $=$ nature, natural characteristics $+ γ v ω^{'} μ ω v =$ judge, interpreter) is “the assessment of a person’s character or personality from his or her outer appearance, especially the face.” Though it goes back to antiquity and possesses an extensive literature, “as understood in the past [it] meets the contemporary definition of a pseudoscience.” However, “recent studies have suggested that facial appearances do ‘contain a kernel of truth’ about a person’s personality” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physiognomy). The “recent study” cited here is Highfield, Wiseman, and Jenkins, “How Your Looks Betray Your Personality.” ...
LO: harmonia praestabilita. ...
Bruch, Theorie des Bewußtseins, 123. ...
Lindner, Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie, 18; cf. Stahl, Fundamente einer christlichen Philosophie, 48-50. Ed. note: Cinnabar is a bright red toxic mercury sulfide mineral with the chemical formula HgS; it was used as a pigment for jewelry and ornaments (http://geology.com/minerals/cinnabar.shtml). ...
HO: עָפָּ. ...
HO: נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים. ...
HO: נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 29. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 38. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 40. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 47. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 53. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 55-56. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 57, 58; Lichtenfels, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 48. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 133. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 135, 136. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 134n. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 138. ...
An animal has representations, but no comprehension. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 136. ...
Bruch, Bewußtseins, 139-43. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck’s heading was “The Life-Relations of Humans” (De levensverhoudingen van den mensch), and he inserted between the lines a different Dutch term, levensbetrekkingen (life’s posts/positions/jobs/offices); for the most part we will be translating betrekkingen as “relationships,” with the understanding that these relationships are not loose and undefined but stable, defined positions or offices. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck is reflecting the nineteenth-century Dutch historian and statesman Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer’s signature work Lectures on Unbelief and Revolution, lecture 9. Groen van Prinsterer insists that “the common foundation of all rights and duties lies in the sovereignty of God.” When this sovereignty is denied, it is true that “all men are, in a revolutionary sense, free and equal.” But then, he adds, “state and society disintegrate, dissolving into a collection of isolated human beings, of individuals-a term of the Revolution’s naively expressive of its all-destructive character” (p. 203). The Dutch original, Ongeloof en revolutie, 189, refers explicitly to Epicurus: “like the world according to the familiar system of Epicurus-‘from the chance concurrence of atoms’” (ex concursu fortuito atomorum), which Bavinck cites. Epicurus (341-270 BC) was a Greek philosopher known for his emphasis on sophisticated hedonism. ...
Cf. Groen van Prinsterer, Ongeloof en revolutie, 189; Lectures on Unbelief and Revolution, 203; Fabius, De Fransche revolutie, 72-85. ...
Ed. note: For more on Bavinck’s understanding of an “innate” or “implanted” knowledge of God, see RD, 1:302; 2:54, 59-68, 71-72. ...
DO: verhouding [is] eene betrekking; van der Hoeven, De godsdienst het wezen van den mensch, 28. Ed. note: See n. 68 above. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck refers here to the fuller treatment of religion in RD, 1:235-382, esp. 236-37. Bavinck also added two marginal notes at this point: ...
Vilmar, Dogmatik, 9. Ed. note: Bavinck points to Vilmar’s Dogmatik because in a footnote Vilmar explained the possible etymology of the word religio as either religare (= to bind together, from Lactantius) or religere (= to reread, do over, observe with care, from Cicero). See further the discussion on this issue later in the chapter. ...
Religion in the subjective sense (religio subjectiva) includes three things: (a) religious representation; (b) inclination, affection for the object of this religious representation; and © will or disposition to worship this object of religious representation. Religion thus includes the mind (recognition [cognitio]), inclination (affection [amor]), and will (intentional worship [cultus]). ...
LO: “Hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo et religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non, ut Cicero interetatus est, a relegendo,” cited by Hagenbach, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, §116; ET History of Christian Doctrines, 2:2 (§116). Ed. note: At issue here is whether Cicero’s link of religion with relegere (“to reread”) is etymologically correct. Bavinck here cites Lactantius, who contested this and posited religare (“to tie, bind”) as the source. As we shall see, Bavinck agrees with Cicero; he cites Lactantius at this point to underscore “the bond of piety, [by which] we are bound and obligated to God,” and not to indicate agreement with his etymology. ...
ST IIa IIae q. 81 art. 1; cf. RD, 1:239-40. ...
$S T$ IIa IIae q. 101 art. 4. ...
Institutes, I.ii.1. ...
Institutes, I.iv.1. ...
Zwingli, Commentary on True and False Religion, 57-58. ...
Zwingli, Commentary on True and False Religion, 89-90. ...
LO: “Ea adhaesio, qua (homo) deo utpote summo bono, inconcusse fidit, eoque parentis loco utitur, pietas est, religio est”; Zwingli, Commentary on True and False Religion, 90-91. ...
LO: “vera religio est, quae uni solique deo haeret; est animae deique connubium”; Zwingli, Commentarhy on True and False Religion, 92, 99. ...
Polanus von Polansdorf, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae, 575 (IX.i.A). ...
Polanus von Polansdorf, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae, 580 (IX.vi.A). ...
LO: “cultus Dei est, cum Deo uni et trino . . . debitus honor exhibetur; [causa] efficiens et impulsiva cultus divini est cognitio Dei”; Sohn, Operum, 1:110. Ed. note: The two Latin passages given by Bavinck are not direct quotations from Sohn. The first clause adequately summarizes the specific passage cited in Sohn; the second clause seems to have little connection to the specific reference, although see 1:164, where Sohn says this about honor: “ut & obedientiam eis praesient & reverentia debita eos profequantur”; on 1:203 Sohn uses phrasing similar to the second clause: “Ergo causa efficiens atque impulsiva hujus jejunii . . .” ...
LO: “religio est recta ratio deum glorificandi”; Heidegger, Medulla Theologiae Christianae, 2 (I.iv), according to Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre, 1:145. Ed. note: Bavinck captures the idea but not the exact words from Heidegger, who wrote, “The knowledge and worship of God comes under the name of Religion, which is the right way of rightly knowing and dutifully worshiping the true God” (“Notitia & cultus Dei Religionis nomine venit. quae Recta verum Deum rite cognoscendi, & piè colendi ratio est”). In the margin Bavinck added a reference to Hoornbeeck, Summa Controversianum Religionis, 7-11. ...
Heidegger, Medulla Theologiae Christianae, 2 (I.v); cf. Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre, 1:146. ...
Ed. note: See n. 68 in Bavinck’s introduction (p. 10). Wyttenbach’s definition of religion as “that which is rightly to be known about God and worshiped” (“quod sit rectas Deum cognoscendi ...
eumque colendi”) is found in his Tentamen Theologiae Dogmatica Methodo Scientifica Pertractate, 1:11 (no. 19); cf. Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre, 1:147. ...
Cf. Köstlin, “Religion.” ...
Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 21. ...
Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §3. ...
Van der Hoeven, De godsdienst het wezen van den mensch, 16. ...
Twesten, Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik; Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine; de Wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre; von Hase, Evangelische Dogmatik; Wegscheider, Institutiones Theologiae Christianae Dogmaticae; Hagenbach, Encyklopädie und Methodologie. ...
Ed. note: Bavinck is likely referring to Schenkel, Die christliche Dogmatik; Lange, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:185-96 (§36); Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:11; Bavinck provides no reference for J. T. Beck but may have had in mind Beck’s Outlines of Biblical Psychology, 142-48 (§27: “Relation of Heart to Revelation”). ...
GO: “Gemeinschaft des Menschen mit Gott”; Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1:46; ...

Stendel, Kritik der Religion. ...
96. LO: religio objectiva. ...
97. Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1:57-119. ...
98. Ed. note: Van der Hoeven, De godsdienst het wezen van den mensch. ...
99. Ed. note: Cf. RD, 1:237-38. ...
100. Hagenbach, Encyklopädie und Methodologie, 18. ...
101.

θ ε o σ ε ́ β ε ı α =

Hebrew jirath Elohim; Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon, s.v. ɛv̉oźßɛıa. ...
102. GrO: Өрпஏкદía. ...
103. GrO: ódóç. ...
104. GrO: voûc. ...
105. Cicero, De natura deorum II. 28 (trans. Rackham, p. 193). Ed. note: For the sake of clarity, Bavinck’s original has been reconstructed and amplified by the editor. ...
106. Cicero, De natura deorum II. 28 (trans. Rackham, p. 193). ...
107. Ed. note: The Lactantius reference is to Institutiones divinae IV.28. Etymological battles over the word “religion” go back to the early days of the Christian church, among Greek and Roman writers as well as Christian thinkers. For a helpful, brief survey of this discussion, see Hoyt, “Etymology of Religion.” Hoyt’s conclusion (128): “If all points are carefully considered, Cicero’s view would seem to be preferable, so that religion is not derived from religare, but from relegere.” ...
108. Ed. note: Hoyt, “Etymology of Religion,” 128; the passages are Oratio de domo 105, 106, 124. The idea here is that religion involves conscientious observance and keeping of God’s commands and ordinances. That is why they need to be reread and reread; in other words, liturgies are important. ...
109. Ed. note: Bavinck does not specify here but is likely referring to Fleck, System der christlichen Dogmatiek; Hahn, Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, 39; Lange, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:189 (according to Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1:6-7); Köstlin, “Religion,” 64150. ...
110. J. G. Müller, “Über Bildung und Gebrauch”; Köstlin, “Religion,” 649. ...
111. Ed. note: The first three terms translate two virtually synonymous Dutch words: godsvrucht and godzaligheid; “religion” translates godsdienst. ...
112. Ed. note: The etymological link between the words, which may not be evident in English translation, is clear in Dutch: geloof, gelooven, belofte, gelofte, verloven, veroorloven, and lieven. ...
113. DO: godsdienst, dienst. ...
114. DO: gode-leven; van der Hoeven, De godsdienst het wezen van den mensch, 5-6. ...
115. DO: godsdienst. ...
116. Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1:2-3. ...
117. LO: cultus Dei. ...
118. Francken, Stellige God-geleertheyd, 1:56. ...
119. Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1:47. ...
120. DO: gemeenschap met God. Ed. note: “Religion” in the preceding paragraph translated the Dutch word godsdienst. ...
121. GrO:

π

íotıc;

π ι σ τ ε v^{'} ε ι v

. ...
122. LO: cognoscere, colere; DO: godsdienst. ...
123. Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 1:52-71; Lange, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:133. ...
124. Ed. note: The first of the pairings involves a Dutch-language pun: kennen and kunnen. The second pair is kennis and daad. ...
125. LO: “religio (pietas) est causa interna cultus Dei”; Polanus von Polansdorf, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae, 580A. ...
126. GrO: દ́

θ ε λ

θ ρ η σ κ i_{α}

. ...
127. DO: gemeenschap met God. ...
128. Ed. note: Johannes Jacob van Oosterzee (1817-82) was a professor of biblical and practical theology at the University of Utrecht. Though Bavinck does not refer to a specific title, he may have in mind Christelijke dogmatiek. ...
129. DO: wederkerig. ...
130. Van der Hoeven, De godsdienst het wezen van den mensch, 5-6. ...
131. GO: Wechselrapport, Thätigkeit; DO: bewustzijn. ...
132. Köstlin, “Religion,” 641-42. ...
133. DO: verhouding. ...
134. Ed. note: Here and in the remainder of this paragraph, “religion” translates the Dutch godsdienst. ...
135. Ed. note: Bavinck uses the Dutch word verhouding (“relation”) to describe the relational direction from God to humanity, and the Dutch word betrekking (“post, position, job, office”) to describe the opposite direction from humanity to God. ...
136. Ed. note: Here and in the remainder of this paragraph, “religion” translates the Latin religio, and “piety” translates the Latin pietas or the Dutch godsdienst. ...
137. DO: betrekking. ...
138. Ed. note: In chap. 11. ...
139. Ed. note: Classically there were three estates: clergy, nobility, and common people; the growing prominence and power of the press in the nineteenth century led to its being referred to as the “fourth estate.” ...
140. Ed. note: Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 5. ...
141. GO: sittlich; Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §97. ...
142. DO: Godsdienst en zedelijkheid. See Kübel, “Sitte, Sittlichkeit”; Ritschl, “Religion und Sittlichkeit”; Fox, Religion and Morality; Kapp, Religion und Moral im Christenthum Luthers. Ed. note: Bavinck took the bibliographic information for Fox’s Religion and Morality from a review of the book by William Brenton Green Jr. in the Presbyterian and Reformed Review. ...
143. DO: Godsdienst; zedelijke, geestelijk verschinsel. ...
144. LO: cognitio; amor (pietas, religio); cultus. ...
145. Ed. note: This opening paragraph was a marginal note. ...
146. Cf. Schultz, “Religion und Sittlichkeit.” ...
147. Cf. Lamers, Godsdienst en zedelijkheid, 35-39. ...
148. Martensen, Christian Ethics, 1:12 (§4). Ed. note: Bavinck objects to this understanding of morality so prominent in his day because moral action increasingly displaces religion and worship. The direction is signaled by what follows in the sentence quoted here: the “unconstrained unity of man’s will and God’s will . . . signifies that man, in ministering adoration, makes his own person an instrument for the service of God; that in free devotion to the object of creation, and in conjunction with God, he brings the kingdom of humanity into the kingdom of God, which again requires that he, ...
as the servant of the Most High upon earth, should make himself the lord of nature.” Bavinck’s gentle question at the conclusion of the paragraph should not lead us to overlook that thoroughly Pelagian and immanent vision of the religious life

=

moral life described here. ...
149. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §114. ...
150. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §115. ...
151. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §116. ...
152. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §117. ...
153. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §118. ...
154. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §121. ...
155. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §124. ...
156. Janet, La morale, 596, 610-11; see further Cramer, Christendom en humaniteit, 203-31; ...

Hoekstra, “Godsdienst en Zedelijkheid”; Pfleiderer, Moral und Religion; Weygoldt, Darwinismus, 65 (morality is independent, but religion supports, ennobles, and idealizes it); Kuyper, “Natuurlijke Godskennis,” esp. pp. 72-87 (ET: Van Dyke, “Natural Knowledge of God”). ...
157. Cf. Ursinus, Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 93; Daneau, Ethices ...

Christianae, 1:127, 170; Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 1:502 (XIV.ix). ...
158. Ed. note: 1 John 5:4b is one of Bavinck’s favorite Scripture passages and the text of his only published sermon, “The World-Conquering Power of Faith.” ...
159. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job VII.23-24 (PL 75:780); Bernard of Clairvaux, On Loving God VIII (PL 182:987-89); Lactantius, Divine Institutes VI. 10 (ANF 7:172-73); ...
Augustine, City of God XIV. 1 (NPNF1 2:262); Luthardt, Die Ethik Luthers, 49-60, 68-71; Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvins, 28-35; Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, 1:178; 3:154. ...
160. Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli, 47-60. ...
161. Calvin, Institutes, II.viii-xi. ...
162. Cf. Ursinus, Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 34, Q&A 93. ...
163. DO: onafhankelijke zedeleer. Ed. note: Bavinck refers here to a deistic desire to separate all morality and ethics from any religious roots. One writer of Bavinck’s own day, citing this exact term from literature by Freemasons, tied it to the goals of all lodges in their vision for public education aimed at creating a Dutch national moral unity based on a common dedication to the golden rule and independent of any religious connection. See Ulfers, De loge en de school, 32. ...
164. Ed. note: Bavinck includes a general reference to “Anabaptists” here, failing to distinguish the peaceful and socially active followers of Menno Simons, for example, from revolutionary, millenarian Anabaptists such as John of Leiden in Münster and Thomas Müntzer, a leader of the German Peasants’ Revolt in 1525. ...
165. Kuyper, “Natural Knowledge of God,” 95: “It is often seen that many people who are strict about duties, unbending on rights, chaste without blemish, praiseworthy in conduct, are nevertheless completely incapable of tender feelings like meekness and admiration and indifferent to any need of prayer. The converse is also seen. Many people who are lax about duties and far from keen about rights can sometimes show strong feelings of respect and enthusiasm, of admiration and devotion.” ...
166. Lamers, Godsdienst en zedelijkheid, 34-39. ...
167. Lamers, Godsdienst en zedelijkheid, 11. ...
168. Janet, La morale, 610-11. ...
169. LO: idea innata. Ed. note: For a fuller discussion of innate ideas, see RD, 1:224; 2:53-54, 6368, 70-72. ...
170. GO: Vermittlungstheologie. Ed. note: “Mediating theology,” a school of nineteenth-century German theology influenced by Schleiermacher, sought to synthesize Christianity with modern idealistic philosophy into a rationally and morally defensible religion. Representatives include I. Dorner, J. Neander, Hans Martensen, K. Nitzsch, and J. Müller. See RD, 1:29-92. ...
171. DO: ethische richting. Ed. note: The “ethical” movement in the nineteenth-century Dutch Reformed Church represented a strongly Christocentric mediating theology that was strongly opposed to all forms of rationalism in the Christian life. The major representatives of this direction were Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818-74) and J. H. Gunning (1829-1905). The term “ethical” is necessary as a translation of the Dutch ethische, but it is potentially misleading for English readers, who should associate it with a word that more accurately describes the intention of these theologians, the word “existential.” His criticism notwithstanding, Bavinck took this school seriously, even writing one of his earliest monographs on its leading theologian: Bavinck, De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye. According to Bavinck, de la Saussaye’s error was to attempt a reorientation of Reformed theology along christological-anthropological lines (Bavinck, Theologie van . . . de la Saussaye, 10-19). ...
172. Kuyper, De vleeschwording des Woords, 225-35. Ed. note: This concluding chapter of the book was first published in De Heraut, no. 288 (July 1, 1883). ...
173. Ed. note: Friedrich August Gottreu Tholuck (1799-1877) was a German theologian and pulpit orator known for his evangelical piety; see Schaff, “Tholuck.” Alexandre Rodolfe Vinet (1797-1847) was a Swiss Reformed theologian who sought to reconcile the spirit of modernity with the gospel by emphasizing the individual and the separation of church and state. See Rüegg, “Vinet.” ...
174. Ed. note: “Proper and distinct” is our translation of the Dutch eigen (“own”). The word signifies what is properly characteristic of something, what intrinsically belongs to it, what is typical, what is its “own”; the translation “peculiar to” fits here, but the expression “peculiar love toward God” has too many misleading connotations today for it to be useful. ...

2 Humanity under the Power of Sin ...

The topic of sin properly belongs in dogmatics but also has to be discussed in ethics.

\underset{―}{1}

We need to consider the nature and effect of the first sin on human consciousness and on the condition or state of humanity. Sin is a turning away from God and a turning to self, a condition described in Scripture as the “old self,” “flesh,” or the “natural person” (in contrast with the “spiritual person”). “Flesh” is an ethical term signifying enmity with God and not intended to restrict sin to bodily, material life. Similarly, the contrast between “natural” and “spiritual” does not point us away from bodily life toward some ethereal, spiritual life, but to the divide between those who have been regenerated by the Spirit of God and those who have not. “Natural” people are defined by their soul, their own mind and will, instead of by the Spirit of God. ...

The soul, spirit, heart, or “I” of our humanity is the center of our knowledge, feeling, will, and conscience. All of these are darkened and corrupted by sin; as well, our bodies in all of their parts are defiled by sin and can be used in the service of sin. This state of natural humanity is called “death” and includes both physical and spiritual death. Negatively, spiritual death is the absence of true life; it is alienation from God. Positively, the spiritually dead person is still alive; in Holy Scripture death is never nonbeing. The basic principle, the driving force of spiritually dead people is not faith in God or love for him but selfish desire, a universal condition for all people not regenerated by God’s Spirit. ...

Human life is wholly corrupted and stained by sin, but there are grades or degrees of sin. Sin can grow or develop in individuals and ...
in nations and can be internal or publicly manifest. The corruption of our knowledge-consciousness, reason, intellect, conscience, imagination, memory-manifests itself by the way we have lost sight of the whole, the unity of truth in God, and are disconnected from real life. When we do not know God, who is the ground of all things, we truly know neither ourselves nor the world. Our minds become abstract, detached from life, both subjectively and objectively. Hence, the simplest godly person is wise; the most learned unconverted person is foolish. ...

The great variety of sins (along with the accompanying virtues) is usually drawn from the Decalogue. After all, the general character of sins is disobedience to God, lawbreaking, lawlessness. God’s law is not arbitrary, simply an act of his will, but rests in all his perfections, in his being, in his divine mind. The moral law is thus one, one entity, an organism with a material and inner lifeprinciple, the command of love. Though there are two commandments-love for God and love for neighbor-they are essentially one. Love is the organizing principle of the law, its summa, and therefore the organizing principle of the moral good. The good is determined by our relationship to God. We either worship the true God or we substitute another god in his place, a god for whom we live and to whom we dedicate ourselves. That substitute is the human Self, the “Ego” or “I.” The organizing principle of sin is self-love or egocentricity. It is at the same time a turning away from order to disorder, to chaos, to revolution. ...

We can classify sins in a number of ways: inherited or original sin and actual sins; actual sins can be sins of omission or commission (two sides of the same coin). There is a difference between sins as such (expressly forbidden by God’s law) and accidental sins that depend on circumstances. Starting with the conviction that egocentricity is the organizing principle of sin, we observe a twofold direction-of the flesh or of the human spiritwhich produces a double array of sins, one downward and animallike (sensual), the other upward and demonic. Sensual sins take pure, creaturely human desires and turn them into wicked passions and lusts. Spiritual sins are less public and may even accompany ...
outwardly good deeds, but they are more serious. Although it is legitimate to assess the gravity or lightness of sins by certain criteria, this must never be done with excessive subtlety that risks diminishing the seriousness of all sins. ...

Finally, we distinguish the egocentric subject who covets from the object being coveted. Within the subject, we distinguish sins of the spirit from sins of the body; the objects of human desiring can be reduced to three broad areas: material things, the neighbor, and God. ...

§8. The Devastation of the Image of God in Humanity $^{2}$ ...

We know what it is to be human according to God’s original design, in the state of rectitude, and we also know what we are in reality now as sinners. We will not discuss here the origin, essence, and nature of sin or the changed relation to God brought about by sin-namely, guilt and punishment of sin.

\underset{―}{3}

All of that is assumed here and will be treated insofar as it is necessary for our purpose. Vilmar includes the entire doctrine of sin in his Ethics, which is incorrect. 4 Nonetheless, sin must be discussed; it may not be passed over or treated merely in passing, as is done by many ethicists today. Our predecessors treated this subject better.

\underset{―}{5}

For instance, we must consider what we have become because of that sin—as it is revealed to us in God’s Word. Furthermore, we need to examine the effect of sin on humanity in all areas of life; and then, finally, actual sins must be identified, classified, and discussed (the taxonomy of sins). ...

The First Sin and Its Consequences ...

Therefore, in ethics we first ask about the effect of sinning on human beings as human. Sin began in human consciousness when Adam and Eve were tempted by a person, and was completed by the will. 6 By that act they disobeyed God and showed contempt for his love. But how could this one act work such a great turnabout in them, have such a powerful influence on them, that suddenly they became unholy, sinners, powerless, fallen man and ...
woman, fleshly, spiritually dead? Why were they not able to restore themselves in their consciousness and will after this one act and become good again? This is an important question, which is often not contemplated! ...

The first sin, with humans as with the angels, was an act, a free, conscious act; not a feeling, impression, or awareness but an act. That one act consisted of the following: ...

Eve allows the serpent to manipulate her consciousness, permits doubt to penetrate her consciousness, and allows herself to be charmed by the delusion that she will become something other, just as she feels she is able to become something other because her goodness is mutable. 7 ...
Through pride she is led to: ...
a. deny the consequences of sin: “You will not die” (Gen. 3:4); ...
b. deny the sin itself: “Your eyes will be opened” (Gen. 3:5); and ...
c. shift the sin to God himself: “God himself will set you free; you shall become as God” (Gen. 3:5). ...
Infected by pride, now that her will is inclined, she turns to the tree (Gen. 3:6) and sees that it is: ...
a. good for food-the lust of the flesh, ...
b. a delight to the eyes-the lust of the eyes, and ...
c. desirable for making one wise-the pride of life. 8 ...
Eve commits sin. ...

We see then that sin gains entrance through the consciousness, works on the imagination, arouses yearning, reaches for the ideal that is conjured up, and finally, having perceived it through the senses under the influence of that imagination, grasps for it. Thus, before the deed is accomplished, an entire process has occurred in a human being in one single moment. The whole person is affected by it, in spirit, soul, body, consciousness, feeling, and will. 9 This process proceeds as portrayed in James 1:14-15: “But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin when it is fully grown brings forth death.” 10 This is still how every concrete 11 sin originates. Our consciousness, assailed by doubt, conceives an idea; our imagination turns it into an ideal; our senses give form to that ideal in the sensory world; and our will tries to grasp it. The one sinful act is thus an act ...
of the entire person in which all our powers and capabilities participate to a larger or smaller degree. ...

But there is more. This act (even though it was not repeated immediately) leaves behind within humanity a condition or state. 12 All Pelagians deny this. For them sin is an act of the will that does not affect people who sin; people remain the same and may subsequently just as easily choose to do a good deed. Sin, therefore, resides only in the deed; the self of the person always remains pure. Bellarmine could therefore say “all sins are voluntary.”

^{13}

It has even been claimed that the New Testament word for

\sin 14

indicates only such individual sinful acts. But Romans 7:8-11 clearly teaches that sin is an indwelling active power that resides in a person; in 7:17-20 this is called “sin that dwells within me.” 15 Furthermore, in 7:23 the apostle speaks of “the law of sin that dwells in my members.” 16 ...

That one sinful act of Adam and Eve was already a turnabout of the whole person: consciousness, feeling, and will. It was lawlessness 17 (1 John 3:4), disobedience to God, transgression of the law, putting oneself outside established boundaries, abandoning dependence on God, rejecting his lordship, and putting oneself alongside God as one’s own god. Thus, it contained two elements: ...

turning away from God, enmity, hatred against God, scorning God, a refusal to surrender oneself-in other words, withholding oneself from God; and ...
turning to self, a commitment to self, a surrender to self-in other words, selfishness-a love of something other than God, namely, oneself; deification of self, glorification of self, adoration of self. ...

The first act therefore involved a change of condition or state whereby humanity turned away from God and turned (was turned) toward the creature. The act is thus immediately and undeniably a change of condition, existing differently, standing in a different relationship to God than before, a turnabout in the relation to God. ...

The question now arises: Is this a momentary or a permanent condition? Is humanity able and willing to put an end to this? Is this condition of such a nature that humanity can alter it, just as the first condition of rectitude was altered? Pelagius said yes; sin has power only as the result of habit. We contend, however, that this is impossible, since by this one act the will has ...
come to stand in an entirely different relation to God and is unable to want to change. The will has lost its real, material freedom (see below). Holy Scripture refers to the human person changed by sin as the “old man” or the “old self” (Rom. 6:6; Eph. 4:22; Col. 3:9) and as flesh (Gen. 6:3, 12), because “what is born of flesh is flesh” (John 3:6).

\underset{―}{18}

This language is especially characteristic of Paul (Rom. 7:5, 18, 25; 8:1-13; 9:8; 1 Cor. 1:26; 15:50; 2 Cor. 7:1; 10:2-3; 11:18; Gal. 2:20; 5:13; Eph. 2:3, 11; Col. 2:11). Language to describe the human condition after the fall includes “the body of sin” (Rom. 6:6; cf. v. 12; 8:10; Col. 2:11), “the natural person” (1 Cor. 2:14; 15:44, 45; James 3:15; Jude 19), and “by nature children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3).

\underset{―}{19}

Here the “natural person” is contrasted with the “spiritual person” (1 Cor. 2:15).

\underset{―}{20}

...

Biblical Terms for Life under Sin ...

THE "OLD SELF" 21 ...

Let us examine these terms in greater detail, beginning with the expression “the old man” or “old self.” This refers to the fallen human person in contrast to the renewed creature in Christ, the “new self.” 22 We have here, therefore, the human condition in its sinful degeneration, or, to use another term, “flesh.”

\underset{―}{23}

However, there is this one difference-namely, that the “old self” and the “new self” each flow forth from the activity of the flesh and the activity of the Spirit, respectively. In other words, they are the phenomena, the manifestations, of human nature itself, in the one case the fallen nature and in the other the new nature in Christ. ...

"FLESH" $^{24}$ ...

Let us now consider the biblical term “flesh.”

\underset{―}{25}

Ammon, Baur, Hausrath, and Pfleiderer

\underset{―}{26}

all argue that Paul was a dualist because he held that sin has its origin and seat in sensuality, in matter. But this conflicts immediately with the following facts: ...

With Paul, the body is a temple of the Lord, and all its members must be dedicated to the Lord (Rom. 6:13, 19; 12:1; 1 Cor. 6:13, 15, 19, 20); this conflicts with all spiritualism that Paul would have had to cherish were he a dualist. 1 Corinthians 6:13 even states that the body is “for the Lord, and the Lord for the body.” ...
Paul teaches the resurrection of the body in 1 Corinthians 15. ...
Paul is definitely not an ascetic; he considers marriage sacred and all food good (Col. 2:16; 1 Tim. 4:4). ...
Jesus also had flesh and nonetheless, according to Paul, was holy (2 Cor. 5:21), even though he was born of a woman (Gal. 4:4; cf. Rom. 9:5). $\underset{―}{27}$ ...
Paul also accepts the idea of evil spirits who have no flesh at all. ...

Furthermore, the way Paul uses the term “flesh” precludes this derivation of sin from sensuality. For Paul, the term

σ \dot{α} ρ ξ

has the same meaning it has in secular Greek and in the Septuagint, and as the Hebrew term בָּשָּר ...

It can mean the substance, the material stuff of our body ( 1 Cor. 15:39); all “flesh” is not the same kind of flesh. ...
It can mean the body itself, in contrast to the human person’s “spirit,” 28 as in Colossians 2:5: "For though I am absent in body, yet I am with you in spirit"29 (cf. 1 Cor. 5:3; 2 Cor. 7:5). Or it can be used in contrast with "heart"30 (Rom. 2:29; Eph. 2:11; Phil. 1:22). ...
There is also a broader use of בָּשָׂר in the Old Testament than there is of $σ α ́ ρ ξ$ in secular Greek-namely, referring to all earthly creatures in which there is sensory life, the earthly creature as such, especially human beings. $Σ α$ ’ $ρ ξ$ accents the difference with God by contrasting creaturely weakness, imperfection, and transience with God’s eternality (see esp. Deut. 5:26; Jer. 17:5; Ps. 56:4). This use occurs in Paul only seldom (Rom. 3:20; Gal. 2:16; 1 Cor. 1:29). ...
But Paul now broadens the concept of $σ α α β ξ$ even beyond the Old Testament use and turns it into an ethical concept-namely, to indicate a general life orientation that has turned away from God and toward the world. From this we get terms and expressions like “of the flesh” (Rom. 7:14), “in the flesh” (Rom. 8:8), “live according to the flesh” (Rom. 8:13), and “walking according to the flesh” (2 Cor. 10:2-3; cf. 1 Cor. 3:3). $\underset{―}{31}$ ...

The concept of flesh in Paul’s thought is therefore the same as what John calls the “desires” of the “world” ( 1 John 2:16)32-that is to say, earthly-mindedness, a desire directed toward the creature instead of the Creator. In this sense “flesh” is opposed to “spirit,” but ...
not to the human spirit, which is a natural, created human reality (Col. 2:5). 33 The human spirit, too, is sinful, subject to corruption (2 Cor. 7:1) and must be sanctified just as the human “soul” and human “body” must be sanctified (Rom. 12:1-2; 1 Cor. 7:34; Eph. 4:23; 1 Thess. 5:23). 34 Rather, “flesh” is opposed to the Spirit of God, to the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:3-9). 35 Paul continues in Romans 8 to describe this conflict using expansive expressions; the “flesh” is opposed to “the law of the Spirit of life in . . . Christ Jesus” (v. 2); “the Spirit of God [who] dwells in you” (v. 9); and “the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead” (v. 11).

\underset{―}{36}

Therefore, in Romans 7:6 “the new way of the Spirit” is set over against the “old way of the written code.”

\underset{―}{37}

To be “led by the Spirit” (Gal. 5:18; cf. vv. 5, 16-17, 22) is certainly identical to being “led by the Spirit of God” (Rom. 8:14). 38 “Flesh” therefore is the opposite not of the human spirit but of the Spirit of God, even though the human spirit is the seat of the Spirit of God (Rom. 8:9, 16).

\underset{―}{39}

This contrast between flesh and spirit is depicted by Paul especially in Romans and in Galatians 5:13-25, where “flesh” describes the entire human life in the state of sin, oriented to the things of this world. Among the fruits of the flesh (Gal. 5:19) are mentioned not only adultery and fornication but also idolatry, discord, rage, wrangling, and heresy-which are purely spiritual sins. ...
5. Thus, Paul is able ultimately to accept the closest connection between “flesh” and sin. He speaks of “sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3) and of the body as “the body of the flesh” (Col. 2:11).

\underset{―}{40}

The body is not the source of sin but its seat; it is “sin that dwells in me”-that is, in my flesh (Rom. 7:20). In fact, “the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God” (Rom. 8:7)

\underset{―}{41}

because it does not and cannot obey the law. Here “flesh” designates our sinful, carnal, creaturely direction and way of life. ...

Paul’s use of

σ α ́ ρ ξ

points to a humanity turned away from God, hostile toward God and his Spirit, and unable to produce anything good on its own. It also means that sin consists in turning away from God toward the creature and must be measured by our relationship to God. The Pauline use of

σ α α β ξ

may not and cannot be explained from anthropological perspectives or from ...
secular Greek, but only as an expansion of the Hebrew notion of בָּשָּׁר and from the depths of Paul’s own religious consciousness. ...

"NATURAL LIVING BEING" ...

We now turn to New Testament language for humans as natural living beings. The key terms are “soul” and an adjectival form of the word for soul modifying “man” or “human being.”

\underset{―}{42}

These refer to: ...

1. life, breath, the life of a single living being, or
2. the living being itself as individual, as a person. ...

Now the “soul” is the subject, the carrier of life in the individual living being, but the “spirit” is the basis, the principle of life. 43 A human person has a spirit, but is a living soul. 44 Because God has breathed into us the “breath of life,” the life-principle, we become “living beings.” 45 The spirit joining with the body makes it a living being. 46 That is why Paul says, “The first man Adam became a living being” while “the last Adam became a lifegiving spirit” (1 Cor. 15:45). 47 The soul therefore characterizes what distinguishes us uniquely as human persons. Similarly, in the New Testament, the soul carries the spirit within itself and is its appearance and manifestation (Phil. 1:27). The term “soul,” therefore, can be attributed only to the human spirit, while the term “spirit” applies also to God and the angels. 48 While soul and body can be separated from each other, spirit and soul can only be distinguished; the soul does not exist apart from the spirit. The “body” is the material organism animated by the “soul”; its substance, its matter, is “flesh.”

\underset{―}{49}

“Flesh” refers only to what is earthly; “body” can be applied also to heavenly bodies (the sun and so forth; 1 Cor. 15). ...

We turn now to the derivative adjective of the Greek term for soul,

\underset{―}{50}

which can mean (a) being alive or (b) having a soul; it refers to the natural life of a human person. In the New Testament “natural” does not stand over against “bodily” but is contrasted to “spiritual”-that is, to someone who has the Spirit of God and lives. 51 A human being is a “living soul” (1 Cor. 15:45); the body that is animated by the soul is thus a “natural body” (v. 44).

\underset{―}{52}

But Christ is a life-giving spirit and therefore has a spiritual body received in and after the resurrection. 53 Adam had a “natural body,” he was “from the earth” and had a mortal body that depended on eating, drinking, etc.

\underset{―}{54}

But Christ has a spiritual body, nourished by the Spirit, who quickens ...
it continuously. Here “natural” most certainly does not include sin; before his resurrection, Christ also had a “natural body,”

\underset{―}{55}

an Adamic body, though without sin. Furthermore, the notion of “natural” does not rule out Adam possessing a “spirit”; on the contrary, he first became a living soul when God breathed “spirit”

\underset{―}{56}

into him. But that spirit was not immediately the life-principle of the body, for the soul was its power. Therefore, the spirit was only the indirect means. ...

The natural is therefore something different from the spiritual, and the former precedes the latter ( 1 Cor. 15:46).

\underset{―}{57}

The contraposition in 1 Corinthians 2:14 is different; there the contrast is not between the first and second Adam but between the “psychical” and the “pneumatic” person.

\underset{―}{58}

The psychical or natural person has not yet been regenerated, has not yet received God’s Spirit. These are the people who are characterized as “natural,” those defined by their soul, their own minds and wills, instead of by the Spirit of God. Luther’s translation of

ψ

uxıко́с as “natural” is not literally correct (for then the text should read

φ

णбเко́

φ =

naturalis; чuxıко́с = animalis), but the thought is correct. The natural as such is not sinful or carnal. 59 After all, Adam was also a natural man. But while psychical people, those who define themselves by their souls instead of by the Spirit of God, are contrasted with spiritual people, it is actually unregenerate, sinful people who can be said to be “natural,” understood now as carnal ( 1 Cor. 3:1), in contrast to spiritual persons. 60 In the same way, Jude 19 speaks of “natural men” or “worldly people, devoid of the spirit.” 61 These people are nothing more than and no different from what they are by nature; they do have a human spirit-otherwise the text would say “no spirit”-but do not have the Spirit of God as they should have.

\underset{―}{62}

In the words of James 3:15: “This is not the wisdom that comes down from above, but is earthly, unspiritual, demonic.”

\underset{―}{63}

Now every natural person certainly is carnal, but not every carnal person can be said to be “natural” because the term “carnal” also applies to converts who allow themselves to be dominated by the flesh, as the Corinthians did (1 Cor. 3).

\underset{―}{64}

...

Scripture on "Natural" or Fallen Humanity ...

Now, what does Holy Scripture teach us about these natural persons? We will first consider this in general terms.

\underset{―}{65}

...

The soul, the spirit, the heart, the $I$ of our humanity does not reside in the periphery of our being but penetrates to our very core. 66 In Holy Scripture the heart is the center of our knowledge, feeling, will, the seat of our conscience; from the heart “flow the springs of life” (Prov. 4:23). That heart and all its imaginations are evil by nature: “The Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (Gen. 6:5). “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ They are corrupt, they do abominable deeds; there is none who does good” (Ps. 14:1). “The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately sick; who can understand it?” (Jer. 17:9). We have hearts of stone (Ezek. 36:26). And Matthew 15:19 makes it very clear: “For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false witness, slander.” The heart therefore must be renewed (Ezek. 18:31), purified (Acts 15:9), and guarded through faith in Christ (Phil. 4:7). The ground, the bottom, of that heart is thus corrupt, an impure, dirty wellspring; this is why all human capabilities are also corrupt: they are aspects of that heart. ...
a. The mind/understanding 67 is darkened in spiritual matters: “They are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hardness of heart” (Eph. 4:18; cf. 5:8). We do not know God: “For my people are foolish; / they know me not; / they are stupid children; / they have no understanding. / They are ‘wise’-in doing evil! / But how to do good they know not” (Jer. 4:22). Understanding must therefore be illumined by the Holy Spirit (Ps. 119:18; 2 Cor. 4:3-6). “The natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned” (1 Cor. 2:14); “For we ourselves were once foolish, disobedient, led astray, slaves to various passions and pleasures, passing our days in malice and envy, hated by others and hating one another” (Titus 3:3); “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God’” (Ps. 14:1). ...

In Holy Scripture, foolishness is rightly understood as a lack of divine insight, knowledge, wisdom. The mind has turned away from God and to the creature. We do have some knowledge of God, but as an image rather than as reality. The unregenerate person sees truths as images, as a painting; the regenerate person sees them in God himself and imprinted on the heart. Knowledge of the former leaves one cold and does not nourish (like painted ...
fruit); knowledge of the latter brings life. 68 The ideas we have of God are now always more or less false. ...
b. The will is also totally corrupted by sin: 69 “For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; indeed, it cannot” (Rom. 8:7; cf. Rom. 7:15: “For I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.”). “All of us also lived among them at one time, gratifying the cravings of our flesh and following its desires and thoughts. Like the rest, we were by nature deserving of wrath” (Eph. 2:3 NIV). And then, there are all those places in the New Testament where we are called “slaves of sin”: “We know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold under sin” (Rom. 7:14; cf. John 8:34). ...

Now the faculty of the will as such is not lost through sin; its spontaneity and freedom remain even after the fall. But the will always follows the mind. The mind has to know something first, then present it to the will, and then the will strives for it. That the mind comes first is necessary, because otherwise the will would not be a will but an unwitting, amoral, animal instinct.

\underset{―}{70}

The mind judges something and then (as practical reason,

\underset{―}{71}

conscience) evaluates it as good or evil. When reason deems it to be good, it arouses the will, else it disapproves. Before the fall the mind was good and thus distinguished well and caused the will to long for the good. The will was entirely good and inclined to do good. Moreover, the will had been created in such a way that it was natural for it to follow the good; it was a natural property of the will (not a superadded gift72); the will itself was holy, righteous, and therefore truly free. It was “will” in the true sense of the word. However, after the fall the mind is darkened and is unable to say what is truly spiritually good; it does not know the things of God and what is beneficial for itself. Now the will, which remains will, follows that erroneous, roaming mind and longs for the apparently good. Now, following that false idea, incorporated by Eve into her consciousness, the will tore itself loose from the ground in which it was planted and lost its material, true, natural freedom. What remained, however, is the will’s capacity to follow what the mind designates as good, spontaneously and without coercion. ...

As a result of the fall, therefore, the will remains as a human faculty, but its key ethical property, which was natural to it, was lost. 73 Thus the will is not indifferent, either before or after the fall. Formerly it followed the good ...
voluntarily; now it follows the darkened mind voluntarily. Formerly it enjoyed true, material freedom; now, only formal freedom. Sometimes the will is merely indifferent-for example, when our mind evaluates something and finds as many reasons for as against it and thus does not know what is good and what is evil. In that case the will stands between the two, of course, and is unable to choose (e.g., a profession). But that is a deficiency in the will and not something lovely. If we do not immediately see what is good and are unable to know it even after lengthy consideration, then this is a great deficiency in our mind and will. This formal freedom that the will still possesses is equal to servitude; the will voluntarily follows the darkened mind and serves sin and Satan. From this it follows that the will cannot at one time turn to the good and at another time to evil. Pelagius believed this was possible because he considered the will as untouched, intact, and whole. But the will is now incapable of doing good. This is so for two reasons. (a) The will follows the darkened mind and therefore must first bring into that consciousness another way of thinking. That is, enlightenment by the Holy Spirit must occur. (b) The will itself, which has been torn loose from its material genuine freedom and has lost its innate, original inclination toward the good, having been diverted in another direction, is inclined toward evil and aims at what is evil. The will is attached to evil morally (as a sheep longs for a green sprig) and therefore must be turned around, repositioned, re-created, and new divine strength infused into it. 74 Of course, its inability is the result of sin: “Can the Ethiopian change his skin or a leopard his spots? Then also you can do no good who are accustomed to doing evil” (Jer. 13:23; cf. Gen. 6:5; Rom. 7:7-15). We are “so corrupt that we are totally unable to do any good and inclined toward all evil.”

\underset{―}{75}

(See below regarding the good that a person is still capable of doing.) ...
c. Feelings

\underset{―}{76}

are the passions of hatred, wrath, love, etc., and have also been disoriented by sin: “But the wicked are like the tossing sea, for it cannot be quiet, and its waters toss up mire and dirt” (Isa. 57:20; cf. 2 Pet. 2:18-19). Materially, substantially, these passions are not sinful. Nor is sin found only in their excess, for then temperance and moderation would be sufficient, and Stoicism would yield the best morality. Instead, sin is found in the manner, the direction of those passions; their form is wrong. They are all animated, formed, not by love for God, but by selfishness. Concupiscence is its formative principle (Rom. 7:10: “commandment”). ...

This means, on the one hand, that the objects/images that spirit and body deposit in the soul as the seat of the feelings are impure, sinful, and corrupt; and, on the other hand, that the feelings themselves are corrupt, reflect impurity, are blurred and muddled. As a result, the passions are irregular, dissolute, inconsistent in their subjective movements as well as in the objects with which they are engaged. ...
2. The body 77 is also defiled by sin. It is a body “enslaved to sin” (Rom. 6:6) and subject to death (Rom. 7:24). Sin thrashes about in it and works on it; death and decay manifest themselves in it. That flesh, the body, is not the source of sin, because then asceticism would be redemption. But the body after the fall is the instrument of the sinful soul (mind, will, feelings). Human beings now misuse the body for sin and as an instrument of unrighteousness (Rom. 6:12-13), as a tool for their desires. That is, from the will, sin flows through the body to the outside and assumes form. And, conversely, we have fellowship with the world through the body; through its senses the body always provides new nourishment for its desires. Sin works through the body from the inside out and from the outside in. All this takes place through the body’s organs. ...

The eyes do not see (Matt. 5:29; 18:9). Since “the eyes of both [man and woman] were opened” (Gen. 3:7), the eyes no longer see (Deut. 29:4; Rom. 11:8), have a haughty look (Pss. 18:27; 101:5; Prov. 6:17) and an evil eye (Prov. 28:27), are not satisfied with seeing (Eccles. 1:8), and are blind (Isa. 35:5; 42:7) and full of adultery (2 Pet. 2:14) and lust (1 John 2:16). The eyes must therefore be enlightened: “The precepts of the Lord are right, / rejoicing the heart; / the commandment of the LORD is pure, / enlightening the eyes” (Ps. 19:8); “The Lord opens the eyes of the blind” (Ps. 146:8a); “Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened” (Isa. 35:5a; cf. 42:7). ...

The ears do not hear: “But to this day the Lord has not given you a heart to understand or eyes to see or ears to hear” (Deut. 29:4); “They have ears, but do not hear” (Pss. 115:6a; 135:17a; Jer. 5:21); “The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing” (Eccles. 1:8). The ears are dull (Isa. 6:10; Zech. 7:11) and must be unstopped: “Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, / and the ears of the deaf unstopped” (Isa. 35:5); “The Lord God has opened my ear, / and I was not rebellious; / I turned not backward” (Isa. 50:5).

\underset{―}{78}

...

The hands are slow and weak and may cause us to stumble: “Strengthen the weak hands, and make firm the feeble knees” (Isa. 35:3; cf. Heb. 12:12); ...
“If your hand or your foot causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away” (Matt. 18:8; Mark 9:43). The hands must therefore be strengthened, cleansed, and lifted up: “Draw near to God and he will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners, and purify your hearts, you doubleminded” (James 4:8; cf. Ps. 24:4). ...

The feet are unstable (Pss. 38:17; 94:18; 121:3), run to evil (Prov. 1:16), turn to evil (Prov. 4:27; 6:18; Isa. 59:7), cause one to sin (Matt. 18:8), and are swift to shed blood (Rom. 3:15). They must therefore be turned to God’s testimonies (Ps. 119:59), be held back from evil ways (Ps. 119:101), and have God’s Word as a lamp (Ps. 119:105). They should guide into the way of peace (Luke 1:79). ...

The neck is hardened and turned away from God: “Circumcise your hearts, therefore, and do not be stiff-necked any longer” (Deut. 10:16 NIV; cf. 2 Kings 17:14); “For I knew how stubborn you were; / your neck muscles were iron, / your forehead was bronze” (Isa. 48:4 NIV); “For our fathers have been unfaithful and have done what was evil in the sight of the Lord our God. They have forsaken him and have turned away their faces from the habitation of the Lord and turned their backs” (2 Chron. 29:6; cf. Jer. 2:27; 17:23; 19:15). ...

The tongue is an instrument for all sorts of evil: injustice and deceit (Job 27:4; Pss. 109:2; 140:3; Mic. 6:12; James 3:5-8), flattery (Ps. 5:9; Prov. 6:24), boasting (Ps. 12:4), slander (Ps. 15:3), sins (Ps. 39:1), evil (Ps. 140:11), and lying (Prov. 6:17; 26:28; Jer. 9:3, 5). It is said to be against the Lord (Isa. 3:8) and sharp, like a deadly arrow (Pss. 64:3; 140:3; Jer. 9:8). It is therefore to be punished in the eternal fire (Luke 16:24; Rev. 16:10-11). Above all, the tongue must be guarded from evil (Ps. 34:14) and must declare God’s righteousness (Pss. 51:15; 71:24). Then “the tongue of the righteous is choice silver” (Prov. 10:20), “a tree of life” (Prov. 15:4) that will “sing for joy” (Isa. 35:6; cf. 32:4; Acts 2:26; Rom. 14:11; 1 Pet. 3:10). ...

Likewise, the forehead reflects the human heart: demonstrating stubbornness, it is described as made of bronze (Isa. 48:4) or hard like flint (Ezek. 3:7-9). Unfaithfulness also shows on the brow: “Therefore the showers have been withheld, / and the spring rain has not come; / yet you have the forehead of a whore; / you refuse to be ashamed” (Jer. 3:3). A name on the forehead reveals a person’s true identity: “And on her forehead was written a name of mystery: ‘Babylon the great, mother of prostitutes and of earth’s abominations’” (Rev. 17:5). The foreheads of the righteous ...
must, therefore, be sealed: “Do not harm the land or the sea or the trees, until we have sealed the servants of our God on their foreheads” (Rev. 7:3; cf.

9 : 4; 14 : 1

). God’s name must be written on them: “They will see his face, and his name will be on their foreheads” (Rev. 22:4). ...

The mouth speaks arrogantly: “His mouth is filled with cursing and deceit and oppression; / under his tongue are mischief and iniquity” (Ps. 10:7); “They close their hearts to pity; with their mouths they speak arrogantly” (Ps. 17:10); "They open wide their mouths against me; / they say, “Aha, Aha! / Our eyes have seen it!” (Ps. 35:21); “Their mouth is full of curses and bitterness” (Rom. 3:14). Therefore, the mouth must be guarded with a muzzle (Ps. 39:1) so that it can speak God’s praise (Pss. 34:1; 51:15; 71:8; 109:30) and be free from all foul talk (Eph. 4:29; Col. 3:8; James 3:10). ...

The nose can indicate pride: the wicked put their noses in the air (Ps. 10:4 and so forth). 79 ...

The knees, when weak, show a lack of spiritual vitality: “Therefore lift your drooping hands and strengthen your weak knees” (Heb. 12:12; cf. Isa. 35:3). ...

All parts of the body, all its organs, can therefore be used in the service of sin as instruments of unrighteousness. All the senses-sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch - are corrupted; they long for what is sinful and convey that corruption to the spirit. In other words, the fall into sin did not merely occasion a loss of the spiritual life, our fellowship with God (Rome’s view). But precisely because of that loss, the natural life in all its forms and dimensions is corrupted as well. This corrupted natural life includes ...

the vegetative life, which resides especially in the stomach and intestines; this tends toward intemperance, rowdiness, and the like; ...
the animal life, which includes excessive sleep, rest, wakefulness, and lechery; here sin resides especially in the sexual organs; and ...
the actual rational life of people, their minds, wills, and feelings-all of which are totally corrupted. ...

The state of natural humanity is generally called death: “For while we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death” (Rom. 7:5). Here death is understood in the general sense as the opposite of bearing fruit for God: 80 ...
“The mind governed by the flesh is death” (Rom. 8:6 NIV).

\underset{―}{81}

This mind, “governed by the flesh,” stands in opposition to “the mind governed by Spirit,” which produces “life and peace.”

\underset{―}{82}

Our Lord also promised this life as a present reality to his followers: “Truly, truly, I say to you, whoever hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life. He does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life. Truly, truly, I say to you, an hour is coming, and is now here, when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live” (John 5:24-25). Paul sounds a similar note: “But God, being rich in mercy, because of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead in our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ” (Eph. 2:4-5). According to Cremer, the term “dead,” in the expression “dead in our trespasses [and sins],” denotes “the state of those whose life is appointed to death as punishment of sin.”

\underset{―}{83}

...

Similar passages include the following: ...
And Jesus said to him, “Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their own dead.” (Matt. 8:22; Luke 9:60) ...
“For this my son was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found.” So they began to celebrate. (Luke 15:24; cf. James 5:20: “Whoever brings back a sinner from his wandering will save his soul from death.”) ...

Do not present your members to sin as instruments for unrighteousness, but present yourselves to God as those who have been brought from death to life, and your members to God as instruments for righteousness. (Rom. 6:13) ...

Awake, O sleeper, / and arise from the dead, / and Christ will shine on you. (Eph. 5:14) ...
We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brothers. Whoever does not love abides in death. (1 John 3:14) ...

And to the angel of the church in Sardis write: “The words of him who has the seven spirits of God and the seven stars. 'I know your works. You have the reputation of being alive, but you are dead.”" (Rev. 3:1) ...

In the last example, the expression “but you are dead”

\underset{―}{84}

does not refer to moral inability but to inefficacy. According to Cremer, "death"은 refers to the death that Scripture identifies as “the punishment pronounced by God upon sin.” “Death therefore is a very comprehensive term, denoting all the punitive consequences of sin.” Temporal death is central to this: "The end of earthly life, which is more immediately called death, is always the point of the punitive sentence about which all the other elements in that sentence are grouped. This it is that gives the death of Christ its significance; cf. Acts ...

2:24; Heb. 2:9; 5:7; Rom. 6:3, 4, 5, 9; 1 Cor. 11:26; Phil. 2:8." 86 Death 87 is therefore the opposite of life through Christ, and therefore the condition of those who live under that judgment (John 5:24; 1 John 3:14; Rom. 7:10, 13,

24; 8 : 2, 6

). This is incorrect. 88 ...

This spiritual death consists of the following: ...

Negatively, the absence of true life, and in Holy Scripture this life is not a matter of abstraction, but refers to a concrete, content-full, authentic, and actual life that is found only in God and obtained through communion with Christ. Spiritual death thus means the absence of the spiritual (i.e., the holy, blessed, eternal life); it is alienation from the life of God (Eph. 4:18), being deprived of the glory of God (Rom. 3:28). It also means having lost the image of God, the knowledge of God, the love of God, faith and trust in God, and obedience to God. The substance of our thoughts, words, deedsthat is, the love for and knowledge of God, or the divine righteousness-has been lost; the form, although often also deformed, has remained in part as civic righteousness. 89 The appearance remains, the essence disappears. The righteousness, holiness—and thus also the blessedness—are lost. With respect to our duty, to what we must be, to the righteousness, love, knowledge of God; to the image of God—in a word, with respect to God and our true relationship to him, we are dead. ...
Positively, the spiritually dead person is still alive, however, and has life because in Holy Scripture death is never nonbeing. This spiritually dead person remains active, has and retains a spirit, a soul, and a body. 90 However, the basic principle, nature, direction, and fruit of this activity has changed completely. Since we are in the flesh, we think, reason, imagine, and work out of our dead condition (Rom. 7:5; Eph. 2:1-2). The Ephesians were formerly dead and at that point were living according to the course of this world. Positively, spiritual death consists especially in living according to this world, according to the flesh, and, negatively, this life (in sin) is specifically spiritual death. Both sides of this spiritual death, the positive and the negative, are therefore not two but one; they coincide, they occur together at the same time. First Timothy 5:6 says, therefore, of a self-indulgent widow: she is dead “even while she lives,” dead to righteousness, but ...
living for sin. Romans 6:1-2 calls this positive aspect “continuing in sin” and “living in sin.” Other texts speak of it as “walking [in disobedience]” (Col. 3:7); as “living according to the flesh” (Rom. 8:12-13); “living in sensuality, passions, drunkenness, orgies, drinking parties, and lawless idolatry” (1 Pet. 4:3; cf. 2 Pet. 2:10; 3:3; Jude 16-18). And this condition of living voluntarily in sin is also a condition of bondage to sin; sin has dominion over us, is our master. But believers are to consider themselves “dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 6:11). ...

This is a universal reality. All are under sin’s dominion (Rom. 3:9; 6:16-23), “sold under sin” (Rom. 7:14), “imprisoned under sin” (Gal. 3:22). 91 To those who thought they were free because they were Abraham’s children, Jesus said, “Truly, truly, I say to you, everyone who practices sin is a slave to sin” (John 8:34). 92 Paul speaks of being “captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members” (Rom. 7:23).

\underset{―}{93}

This is also evident when Scripture tells us that those who are in Christ have been delivered from Satan, “the prince of the power of the air” (Eph. 2:2; cf. 6:12; John 12:31; Acts 26:18; 2 Cor. 4:4; 2 Tim. 2:26; Heb. 2:14), and “from the domain of darkness” (Col. 1:13).

\underset{―}{94}

John speaks of all that is under the power of sin as “the world” and warns his readers: “Do not love the world or the things in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him” (1 John 2:15).

\underset{―}{\underset{―}{95}}

...

The basic principle, the driving force of such a life is thus not faith, love for God, but concupiscent desire. 96 These desires, inclinations, and passions are not sinful as such, but the direction in which they move makes them sinful; they do not focus on God, but on the

I

(selfishness), on the world. Their aim is not to glorify God, but to satisfy self; eating and drinking as such are not sins, but the manner makes them sinful; in the creature we are loving not God but self and the creature itself. The whole of human life is governed by this desire, in our individuality, in our civic life, socially, politically, morally, religiously, artistically, and scientifically. Augustine’s words are true indeed: "The virtues of the pagans are splendid vices."97 They have only the form, not the essence, the fabric, the substance of virtues, because they try to function as virtues apart from the living God. This desire is mentioned repeatedly in Scripture and is described with ...
different terms: “covetousness” (Rom. 7:8), “passions of the flesh” and “desires of the body and the mind” (Eph. 2:3), “deceitful desires” (Eph. 4:22), “worldly passions” (Titus 2:12), “one’s own desire” (James 1:14-15), “the desires of the flesh and the desires of the eyes and pride of life,” all of which is “not from the Father but is from the world” ( 1 John 2:16). 98 ...

The fabric

\underset{―}{99}

of this life-what fills this life, its contents-is sin; it is wholly corrupted, stained by sin.

\underset{―}{100}

But in spiritual death, considered positively (not negatively, for then, as explained above, all the unregenerate would be dead), there are grades or degrees. There is growth in the life that is lived in sin - that is, growth as far as the human race is concerned. 101 The sin that Eve introduced into the world gradually increased within her, Adam, and their children, especially first in the Cainites and later also in the Sethites. The world was ripe for destruction (the flood). God intervenes repeatedly in history by way of judgments whenever sin’s growth threatens to cause the human race to perish, and thus he bridles the power of sin through the flood, through the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the like. When such growth occurs among the nations, they must perish (the Babylonians, Assyrians, Greeks, Romans). In more recent times this is different because Christianity has the power to renew the nations (the Reformation, also of the nations, also in Roman Catholic countries). A similar growth of sin happens in the individual; no one body becomes suddenly bad. 102 That is why many live as respectable citizens; there is a difference between Socrates, Plato, and, for instance, Nero. Sin is a germ, present in every heart; but with some people, as a result of circumstances (including upbringing) conducive to sin, it comes to growth and development more than with others who enjoy a good upbringing, have a sedate character and a good temperament. The basic principle, the fabric, the fruit of all unregenerate people is one and the same, but its manifestation is different; there is always only a difference in degree, in form. With some this sinful life hardly manifests itself externally but remains completely internal; with some others it manifests itself in crankiness accompanied by an otherwise good attitude; with others in an outpouring of anger. These are people “who drink injustice like water” (Job 15:16). Many kinds of sin are the result: all kinds of sin - spiritual, character, attitudinal, carnal sins, etc.

\underset{―}{103}

...

The fruit, the result, of this life is death for all-that is, physical death. This fruit includes also what precedes this death—namely, a preparatory ...
disintegration process, a cancer 104 that is present in us from our conception. Our so-called development as individuals, as nations, also in art, science, and politics, is nothing but a slow death. Sin is the sting of death ( 1 Cor. 15:56), and that death begins with our coming into being. Within this death, thus considered, lie all disasters and ailments in the world that are not necessities of nature but the consequences of sin, which must therefore also be opposed. Culture therefore must be a struggle against sin and its consequences, an ethical rather than a physical battle. ...

Now, in order to understand clearly humanity in its natural condition (the "natural man"105), let us consider it particularly according to its capabilities and powers of soul, body, and spirit, and the influence that sin has had especially on them. Harmony and peace among them has been disrupted as sin dissolves everything; there is discord and conflict between conscience and being, reason and will, intellect and emotions, soul and body. Paul describes this dramatically in Romans 1:21-23: ...

For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things. ...

This description fits all people in our natural state: “And you, who once were alienated and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled in his body of flesh by his death, in order to present you holy and blameless and above reproach before him” (Col. 1:21-22). For unbelieving people “nothing is pure; but both their minds and their consciences are defiled” (Titus 1:15). These are people who “say to God, ‘Depart from us! We do not desire the knowledge of your ways’” (Job 21:14). They are “blind guides,” “blind fools” (Matt. 15:14; 23:16-19; cf. Luke 4:18; John 9:3941). The light of the gospel comes into a darkness (John 1:5), a darkness that “we were at one time,” but now we are “light in the Lord, children of light” (Eph. 5:8). Paul speaks of being “depraved in mind and deprived of the truth” (1 Tim. 6:5; cf. 2 Tim. 3:8). This comprehensive and thorough corruption from within is described well by our Lord: “What comes out of a person is what defiles him. For from within, out of the heart of man, come evil thoughts, sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, coveting, wickedness, deceit, sensuality, envy, slander, pride, foolishness. All these evil things come from within, and they defile a person” (Mark 7:22). ...

Intellect or knowledge in Holy Scripture is always practical, moral: ...

Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, / and to turn away from evil is understanding. (Job 28:28) ...

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; / all those who practice it have a good understanding. (Ps. 111:10) ...

The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, / and the knowledge of the Holy One is insight. (Prov. 9:10; cf. 14:29) ...

Good sense is a fountain of life to him who has it, / but the instruction of fools is folly. (Prov. 16:22) ...

The New Testament testifies that Christ is the one who brings truth, understanding, and life eternal: ...

And this is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. (John 17:3) ...

And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding, so that we may know him who is true; and we are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. (1 John 5:20) ...

Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I myself serve the law of God with my mind.

\underset{―}{106}

(Rom. 7:25) ...

The knowing aspect-consciousness, reason, intellect, conscience, imagination, memory-thus is totally corrupted by sin. The mind has been loosened from the will through sin; it has become immoral, one capability alongside others rather than within them. It is torn loose from life; the heart that is dead also kills the mind. Thus, we do have some knowledge of individual verities, but we do not know the truth, the system, the unity of all truth in God. We do not know God, who is the ground of all things, and thus we know neither ourselves nor the world. Our mind is abstract, detached from life, both subjectively and objectively. The simplest godly person is wise; the most learned unconverted person is foolish. Sin besots, blinds, darkens, by subjectively disconnecting the mind from true life (our being in God), by killing it, by removing reality from it, and by objectively disconnecting the objects of our knowledge (the world, ourselves) from God and by making them independent. We no longer see clearly and no longer see things in God and in his light (Ps. 36:9). ...

§9. The Organizing Principle and Classification of Sins $^{107}$ ...

Here we are not discussing what sin is-that is, in relation to God, which is how we can first determine the nature of sin. Here, that issue is being assumed from dogmatics.

\underset{―}{108}

Our question is more specific: There are innumerable sins, appearances, forms, manifestations of the one sin. Is it possible to construct a system from that variety and number, and is there a connection between them all? In other words, is there an organizing principle 109 from which all sins can be objectively and substantively derived? This question really belongs in ethics

\underset{―}{110}

along with the description of individual sins. A rubric in ethics, specifically derived from Holy Scripture, must set forth an enumeration and elucidation of all sins. A faithful likeness of the world’s true being must be held before the world, and all these sins must be traced to a common root. 111 Just as later we must unfold the image of a holy person, so now at the beginning we must describe the image of the sinful, natural person and the world. Those two images must be juxtaposed-that is how the contrast becomes clear. ...

The Decalogue and Disobedience ...

Usually such a list of sins (along with the accompanying virtues) is drawn from the Decalogue. This is how Calvin does it in his Institutes of the Christian Religion. 112 He first shows how a commandment must be understood and explained. This involves proscribing internal as well as external conduct-that is, not only external stealing but also stealing in thought-just as Christ explained the law in Matthew 5:21-48. Christ showed that the law contains much more than what is expressed and included in the words.

\underset{―}{113}

In each commandment a part expresses the whole, and one must therefore ask not simply what is stated but also why it is given to us. Thus in each commandment something good (positive) is commanded, and the opposite evil is forbidden, and vice versa. 114 And for every kind of transgression, God has forbidden only the most terrible and shameful things in order to scare us off even more.

\underset{―}{115}

Whether these hermeneutical rules are valid or might instead lead to all kinds of arbitrariness, we will discuss later when we consider the Decalogue.

\underset{―}{116}

...

However, they have been followed by every Reformed interpreter, as we can see in Lord’s Days 34-44 of the Heidelberg Catechism. In addition, see the second and third books of Lambert Daneau’s Ethices Christianae, where virtues and vices are also arranged under the Ten Commandments. 117 Others organize them more freely and classify virtues and vices in terms of those against God, the neighbor, and ourselves and then discuss them together. 118 Driessen, in chapter 1, discusses various vices of the old nature (love of the world, covetousness, fleshly lust, pride, anger, unbelief, dissembling, ingratitude, etc.) apart from any system. 119 But all of these writers include, more or less completely, a description of sins in the discipline of ethics. ...

We know from dogmatics that the general character of sins is disobedience to God, lawbreaking, lawlessness (1 John 3:4).

\underset{―}{120}

All sin presupposes a law; “where there is no law there is no transgression [nor imputation]” (Rom. 4:15). This text is often cited as proof that before the giving of the law on Sinai, God did not impute sin-imputation happened only after existing sin was considered sin. Then, appeal is also made to similar passages like Romans 5:13: “For sin indeed was in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is no law.” Paul goes on to say, “Now the law came in [between the promise to Abraham and the fulfillment] to increase the trespass,

\underset{―}{121}

but where sin increased, grace abounded all the more, so that, as sin reigned in death, grace also might reign through righteousness leading to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord” (Rom. 5:20). In Romans 3:18-20 Paul says that the law addresses only those who are under the law-knowledge of sin comes only through the law (see also Gal. 3:19-25).

\underset{―}{122}

...

Paul could not mean that there was no culpable sin deserving God’s wrath prior to the law of Moses, because in Romans 5:13 he says that “sin indeed was in the world before the law was given,” and as lawlessness ( 1 John

3 : 4

) sin is always punishable 123 God’s wrath is manifested against the pagans as well (Rom. 1:18); they are “by nature children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3).

\underset{―}{124}

Moreover, the law is not the cause of sin (Rom. 7:7-16). The reference to “wrath” in Romans 4:15 cannot mean consciousness of wrath, and in Romans 5:13 the word “counted” cannot be interpreted as subjectively imputed to one’s conscience.

\underset{―}{125}

For Paul says that Abraham obtained righteousness and became heir of the world through faith and according to the promise. One cannot obtain this or become this through the ...
law (for then faith and promise would be in vain), because the law brings only wrath, since no human can fulfill the law. But “now” (Paul does not say “because”) there was no law to which the fulfillment of the promise was linked; therefore, there was no transgression that would prompt God’s anger and thus destroy the fulfillment of the promise. Thus, Abraham’s inheritance and righteousness in no way depend on the law and its fulfillment. The promise is not destroyed through unbelief or sin (Rom. 3:3).

\underset{―}{126}

...

In Romans 5:12 Paul wants to demonstrate that sin and death entered the world through one man, Adam. And now he says in verse 14 that there was sin in the world also from Adam until Moses (Cain, Sodom, etc.), but at that time there was no law in terms of which sin could be adjudicated as transgression deserving death.

\underset{―}{127}

Thus death is the result of Adam’s deed. Therefore, according to Paul as well, all sin presupposes a law, especially the moral law, so called in distinction from the law of reason (logic), of nature, etc.-that is, that law which is instituted for human life and conduct. That law presupposes a Lawgiver. This cannot be Kant’s autonomous "I"for then our human nature would be torn into two parts, a commanding part and an obeying part, and why does the one command so sternly and the other feel obliged to obey? Nor can this be humanity itself, as claimed by Comte,

\underset{―}{128}

all Socialists, and Darwinists. This can only be God. God is the sole immediate object of our duty and obedience. 129 No person, no angel, no one other than God alone can obligate us to obey morally, in our conscience. Others can compel us, but that is exactly what is immoral; but when God commands something, then we feel instantly obligated to do it. ...

In order to find out the material principle in evil, we must first know the material principle in goodness. Evil can exist and be known only after the good is known. Thus we must ask: Is there a material principle in goodness, and if so, what is it? That such a principle exists must be denied by all who say that the moral law comes from a series of unrelated, arbitrary, atomistic commandments that rest only on an arbitrary act of God’s will: “This I wish, thus I command, let my will stand in place of reason.” 130 Thus also Scotus, who said something is good only because God wills it.

\underset{―}{131}

Thus there is no reason for it-evil would be good if God had desired this. The same view is held by Occam, Gabriel Biel, Pierre d’Ailly, and later by Descartes (however, for Descartes, thinking and willing are one with God), Pufendorf, and others.

\underset{―}{132}

Such tearing of God’s will from all his other ...
perfections leads to skepticism. 133 On the other hand, it is also false that the moral law stands by itself and would be able to bind us even if there were no God. 134 The good does not exist in abstraction; it is impossible to love the good in itself. It is only because the All-Good One exists that the good also exists. The moral law rests thus in God, not as sheer will, but in all his perfections, in his being, in his divine mind.

\underset{―}{135}

...

The moral law is thus one, one entity, an organism, and therefore has a material and inner life-principle. Jesus reduces all moral commandments, the whole law and the prophets, to two commandments: love to God and love to neighbor (Matt. 22:36-39; Mark 12:29-31). And these two are again essentially one: Jesus calls it the first and great commandment. The following passages reiterate this: “You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt. 5:48); “Love is the fulfilling of the law” (Rom. 13:10); “You shall be holy, for I am holy” (1 Pet. 1:16). Love is the organizing principle of the law, its summa. 136 And love, therefore, is also the organizing principle of the good. All virtue is one (Stoics), and the specific virtues, therefore, are all manifestations of love, they are all derived from love. Love of neighbor is thus essentially love of God. 137 The relation in which we subjectively stand toward God determines all our relations toward every creature (neighbor, world, Satan). And, objectively, it is God himself whom we love directly, for himself, and we love God indirectly in all creatures. ...

Sin is, then, the opposite of the good. 138 The good is determined by our relationship to God, and thus also the evil. Sin thus reverses our relationship to God and therefore also to the world, to our neighbor, to Satan, and to ourselves. It is precisely because the pagans have not glorified God that they are abandoned to dishonorable passions and the like (Rom. 1:2427).

\underset{―}{139}

People have turned away from God, their love has turned into hatred, and they have tried to dethrone God. ...

That is the negative side, however. Positively, who is now humanity’s god? They must have gods for whom they live and to whom they dedicate themselves. Sin consists concretely in placing a substitute on the throne. That substitute is not another creature in general, not even the neighbor, but the human self, the “ego” or “I.” The organizing principle of sin is selfglorification, self-divination; stated more broadly: self-love or egocentricity.

\underset{―}{140}

A person wants to be an “I,” either without, next to, or in the place of God. Turning away from God is simultaneously a turning to ...
self. Prior to this, God was the center of all human thought and action; now it is the person’s “I.” Humanity not only surrendered its true center but also replaced it with a false center. On the one hand, sin is a decentralization of all things away from God, a loosening, an undoing of bonds with Godatomism, individualism. On the other hand, it is at the same time also a concentration of everything around the human self, an attempt to subjugate everything to an individual “ego.” Thus sin is not only a matter of turning away from the existing order—in effect, undermining order—but also an establishing of another order, which actually is a disorder. Sin produces not only an alternative or counterorder but an anti-order; in a word: revolution. 141 ...

Holy Scripture also teaches this. The fall occurred because of a desire to be like God. The prodigal son demands: “Give me the share of property that is coming to me” (Luke 15:12). Repentance begins with self-denial: “Whoever loves his life loses it, and whoever hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life” (John 12:25). In the new life “none of us lives to himself, and none of us dies to himself. For if we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord. So then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord’s” (Rom. 14:7-8). Each one seeks the good of the other (1 Cor. 10:24, 33; Phil. 2:4). Christ “died for all, that those who live might no longer live for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised” (2 Cor. 5:15). Therefore, “It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Gal. 2:20). We are to look not only to our own interests but also to the interests of others (Phil. 2:4). Jesus even calls us to hate everything if we want to be his disciple, including our “own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even our own life” (Luke 14:26). The highest manifestation of sin is the “man of lawlessness [or sin] . . . who opposes and exalts himself against every socalled god or object of worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God” (2 Thess. 2:3-4). In the past, theologians were not as interested in the organizing principle of sin as in its beginning, in the origin of sin, and posited that origin in pride,

\underset{―}{142}

as Rome did, or in unbelief, as the Reformed did. They did not look for the organizing principle,

\underset{―}{143}

the source for classifying sins, because they found an order of treatment in the Decalogue. Nonetheless, they did classify sins. ...

Classification of Sins $\underset{―}{144}$ ...

The fundamental classification made by both Reformed and Lutheran theologians, as well as others, identified sins as inherited or original sin and actual sins (2 Thess. 2:3).

\underset{―}{145}

Actual sins were then classified in various ways:

\frac{146}{16}

according to their form-after the commandment-as sins of omission (James 4:17; Matt. 25:42; 1 John 3:17) and sins of commission (two sides of the same coin); or also sins as such (those expressly forbidden by God’s law; e.g., lying) and accidental sins (in certain circumstances, in a certain manner). 147 In the latter instance a deed might be good in itself but not proceed from a good foundation (faith) or for a good purpose (to the honor of God), or not be carried out in a good manner (because of the circumstances). Considering sins in terms of the source from which they proceed, we can distinguish sins of thought/heart, sins of words, and sins of deeds. 148 Distinctions are also made between sins of the spirit and sins of the flesh; those that come under divine justice and those that are judged by external or civil law. 149 And then there are sins performed in weakness, in ignorance, and in anger and haughtiness.

\underset{―}{150}

Sins can also be classified according to their object: sins against God, against others, or against ourselves. Further distinctions are made between secret and public sins and between those committed by the unconverted and those committed by the regenerated. 151 These classifications all have their merit; they can show us how easily and how much human beings can sin. The problem with them is that they are developed from an idea and not from an organic point of view; they point to the quantity of sin but fail to reveal the inner connection of all sins. ...

In Vilmar’s view, every sin is egocentricity

\underset{―}{152}

but is manifested in three areas of life, according to 1 John 2:16: “the desires of the flesh,” “the desires of the eyes,” and “the pride of life.” 153 Vilmar detects these three areas already in Satan’s temptation of Eve (the tree is good for eating and attractive to the eyes, and it provides understanding), in the temptation of Jesus, and again in the narrative of Cain’s descendants (Gen. 4:19-24). He relates all this to an anthropological trichotomy: sins of the body, sins of the soul, and sins of the spirit.

\underset{―}{154}

...

The first of these, the lust of the flesh, occurs when the “I” surrenders to the material things of the world and consumes them - the body is the organ suited for the material of the world. The soul is the organ suited for the second, the lust of the eyes, which occurs when the “I” surrenders to the form, the appearance of the world, and all reality dissolves into form. The ...
spirit is the organ for the third, the pride of life, in which all things are placed in subjection to the “I”-that is, when the “I” puts itself on par with God. Of course, these spheres do not lie separately alongside each other, but are intertwined within each other; each sin belongs in some sense to all three spheres, just as it does to the whole person. ...

Nevertheless, sins should be distinguished, and one person lives more in one of the spheres while another person lives in a different sphere. Similar distinctions have been made with respect to people groups: for example, the descendants of Ham have been associated with the first sphere (lust of the flesh), the Greeks with the second (lust of the eyes), and Romans with the third (pride of life).

\underset{―}{155}

...

All this is an essentially attractive and true discovery. However, Vilmar’s appeal to trichotomy, to Jesus’s temptation, and to Genesis 4:19-24 is rather far-fetched. To mention just one thing, the soul is not the organ suited for the form of the world. ...

The extent to which we agree with Vilmar will be shown in what follows. For now, we note that in 1 John 2:16 the apostle does not provide a classification of all sins. 156 John says that the love of the world and the love of God are mutually exclusive. This love of the world comprises three things: ...

the lust of the flesh-people try to possess and enjoy the goods of this world; ...
the lust of the eyes-they try to find satisfaction in what they see; ...
the pride of life-which leads to boasting. ...

These three are linked. Augustine already found in them a classification of all sins, as did Bede, who finds them back in the temptations of Adam and Jesus, and Lapide, who relates them to the Trinity. 157 Now it is true, John does not speak here of three distinct cardinal sins as Pascal does;

\underset{―}{158}

rather, John is speaking only of three main forms of love of the world. 159 Not all sins are included in this; 1 John 2:2-11 speaks of lovelessness, and verses 20-22 speak of untruthfulness. The substance of Vilmar’s claim had been denied earlier by Luther, Bengel, and Lücke (see also Lange and Meyer).

\underset{―}{160}

Idolatry, bearing false witness, and blasphemy cannot be included here. This means, therefore, that Vilmar is somewhat confused at times. ...

We follow a somewhat different classification. We do begin with the conviction that egocentricity 161 is the organizing principle of sin, noting the following qualifications: ...

Though egocentricity is foundational to all sin, this does not mean that every sin subjectively proceeds from egocentric motives. It is also possible to sin from a misunderstood love of neighbor or from misplaced zeal for God. Someone may steal, for instance, in order to provide bread for his children who suffer hunger; this is not from subjective, egocentric motives. But what we do intend to say is that objectively all sins may be traced back to egocentricity. We must therefore distinguish between an objective and a subjective organizing principle. The objective one is egocentricity, but, subjectively, motives may be quite diverse in different agents and circumstances. The objective organizing principle and subjective motivation for sins often differ. 162 Nevertheless, although this may not be conscious to the sinner, sin often proceeds from egocentricity, from the desire to exalt oneself. ...
This egocentricity is covetousness or concupiscence 163 and accompanies our birth (original sin) and is itself sin and the root of sin. Contrary to Rome, we teach that covetousness or concupiscence is sin. In itself, to desire is not sin; it was present in Adam (he desired food, drink, rest, and health [Gen. 2:24]) and in Christ (Matt. 4:2; John 4:7). There is a proper desire to serve God (Ps. 119:40; Luke 10:24; Rom. 7:22; Gal. 5:17; 1 Tim. 3:1). This is good. But covetousness consists of striving to obtain something for oneself apart from God. Wise people therefore consider coveting to be sin; egocentric desiring is sin. 164 Rome denies this and claims that we sin only when our will agrees with the desire. But the Tenth Commandment forbids covetousness (Matt. 5:28); Paul repeatedly calls it sin in Romans 7, and John says that it is not from the Father ( 1 John 2:16). We must struggle against it (Rom. 6:12). $\underset{―}{165}$ ...

Egocentricity develops in a twofold direction-of the flesh or of the human spirit-and produces a double array of sins, from mild to more serious. That twofold direction, whether of the flesh or of the spirit,

\underset{―}{166}

is either downward toward the animal or upward toward the devil. A dual array of sins is born from egocentricity: one animal-like (sensual) and the other demonic. The latter is inexplicable for someone who derives all sin from sensuality. According to Rothe, people start out as sensual and egocentric, but as such this is not sin. It becomes sin only when this ...
egocentricity is willed and established in and by the human personality. Sensual sin therefore is basic, but it can lead to spiritual sin. Rothe also acknowledges demons. 167 ...

Egocentricity and Sensual Sin ...

Now as far as the sensual array of sins is concerned, these can be easily deduced from egocentricity. Human beings of course have urges, inclinations that are focused on the external world, on matter and the form of things. It is these urges that our egocentricity turns into sensual sins. Originally these stood under the sacred will, were normed by God’s law and intended as creaturely pointers to the Creator. Created things were therefore the medium. This is still true after the fall, but now God is no longer the goal; the human person has become his or her own goal, and the world has become their means. Pure passions now turn into urges, impulses, ardor; that is to say, we no longer meet the world actively but passively as it makes us dependent and enthralls us; we are now the world’s servants. Because we cannot be satisfied with ourselves, except in an impoverished manner, we try to make that world subservient to ourselves and derive satisfaction from it. Whether we want to use the world to satisfy our nobler passions - thirst for knowledge, love of art - or our baser passions, our aims are always egocentric. This is the source of “the love of the world” ( 1 John 2:17; Titus 2:12). All endeavors, honor, arrogance, greediness, lust, etc. presume a world, something outside the self that has to satisfy this self. Similarly, in a negative way, the sins of sloth, languor, and laziness are all merely particular forms of egocentricity. In fact, even hatred of the world and flight from the world are egocentric. They are nothing more than unsatisfied egocentricity that then withdraws from the world and into the self in anger and misanthropy.

\underset{―}{168}

...

Egocentricity and Spiritual Sins ...

But the other aspect of sin, the demonic side, can also be explained by egocentricity. It is true that the demonic is more obviously and directly egocentric. For, in the case of loving the world, the world is always the medium, and thus the real aim, the satisfaction of the self, is more remote and therefore sometimes less conscious. Those sensual sins sometimes serve to restrain spiritual sins. 169 Those spiritual sins are less public, but ...
much worse. The sin of lying, which is actually deceiving oneself (since sin is a lie), and thus self-deception, and subsequently a deceiving of others, can ultimately progress to even relishing lying itself without being egocentric.

\underset{―}{170}

(This then leads to the question whether egocentricity is really the organizing principle of sin.) The sin of pride, which is the naked expression of the principle of egocentricity, boasts of knowledge and virtue and develops into spiritual pride; it then progresses beyond egocentricity into terrible hatred of God, into intentional blasphemy, cursing, conscious hatred of God, and into delighting in this. 171 All these spiritual sins as well are forms of egocentricity. Hatred against humanity and against God is provoked, wounded egocentricity.

\underset{―}{172}

...

All sins therefore display the same character: objectively, disobeying God, and subjectively, egocentricity. There is therefore really only one sin that comprises all others. In one sin we transgress all of God’s commandments, we offend the entire organism of the law, and we attack the authority of the God who gave all the other commandments. 173 The Roman Catholic distinction between mortal sin and venial sin is therefore incorrect. 174 By its nature no sin is forgivable. Every sin, even the smallest, deserves death, because (a) whoever does not uphold everything that is written is cursed (Deut. 27:26; Gal. 3:10) and (b) whoever stumbles at just one point of the law is guilty of breaking all of it (James 2:10). 175 Sins then are not independent from each other, as atoms, but in principle all other sins are contained in the one sin. No single sin is forgivable in and of itself-in other words, of no significance. Sin is forgivable only through the grace of God. There is only one exception to this: the sin against the Holy Spirit. 176 ...

That is the truth contained in the teachings of the Stoics. At the same time, however, as we have already noted, there are definite degrees of sin. One sin will reveal egocentricity more openly than the next. 177 The Stoics said that all sins are equal, equally serious. According to Augustine, the heretic Jovinian believed the same (although Jerome denied this), and according to Ambrose so did the Novatians. 178 Roman Catholic polemicists such as Robert Bellarmine 179 also accuse Protestants of this. It is true that every sin separates us absolutely from perfection and makes us lose our image of God absolutely; since there is no transition between good and evil, we find ourselves either on one side or the other. However, there is certainly development in sin, a worsening, a potential of sinking more deeply into sin. Holy Scripture clearly teaches us a basic distinction in Matthew 5:22 ...
when our Lord says, “But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother will be liable to judgment; whoever insults his brother will be liable to the council; and whoever says, ‘You fool!’ will be liable to the hell of fire.” Other Scripture passages teach the same: ...

And she has rebelled against my rules by doing wickedness more than the nations, and against my statutes more than the countries all around her; for they have rejected my rules and have not walked in my statutes. (Ezek. 5:6) ...

Then he said to me, “Have you seen this, O son of man? You will see still greater abominations than these.” (Ezek. 8:15) ...

Why do you see the speck that is in your brother’s eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye? (Matt. 7:3) ...

Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. (Matt. 11:21) ...

And that servant who knew his master’s will but did not get ready or act according to his will, will receive a severe beating. But the one who did not know, and did what deserved a beating, will receive a light beating. Everyone to whom much was given, of him much will be required, and from him to whom they entrusted much, they will demand the more. (Luke 12:47-48) ...

Therefore he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin. (John 19:11) ...
The gravity or lightness of sin is determined as follows: ...

according to the subject, depending on the extent of knowledge, the firmness of the will, etc. (Hosea 4:14; Luke 12:48; Heb. 10:26; John 15:22); ...
according to the object, whether it is a sin committed immediately against God or against the neighbor (and, furthermore, whether it is committed against the authorities, parents, etc.); ...
according to the nature of the sin: in general, murder is a greater sin than theft and spiritual sins greater than sensual ones, etc.; ...
according to the principle of intentionality, whether a sin proceeds from anger, from weakness, from ignorance, etc.; ...
according to the circumstances: according to Proverbs 6:30, stealing in circumstances of poverty mitigates the sin. ...

But we need to mention here that this distinguishing between sins must not be done with excessive subtlety. In that case, we would tend to overlook ...
and forget the sinful character of every sin.

\underset{―}{180}

No sin as such should ever be excused or justified. The same sinfulness exists in every sin. Nonetheless, there is a distinction; 181 for instance, whoever lusts after a woman or desires someone’s death has committed adultery or murder. Yet this is not the same as if someone had carried them out in actuality. As long as the sin resides in the mind and is not carried out in word and deed, there is still fear, shame, and reticence before God and his law, and there is still a restraint, a rein, a dam. Words are therefore worse than thoughts, and deeds worse than words. Whoever desires someone’s death, gives voice to this desire, and then acts on it is a triple murderer. For then the sin takes on form, binds a person to itself more firmly, and makes turning back from it much more difficult. ...

When we assume that sin is egocentricity, then the principle of classification may be sought in the subject who covets as well as in the object being coveted. In other words, this leads to two questions: To what do egocentric persons subordinate everything, and to what do they subordinate themselves? ...

To what do egocentric persons subordinate everything? In general, to themselves, to self (ego, “I”). But this self or “I” comprises a great deal. No one is able to subordinate everything in its entirety to one’s self. All people have something in themselves that they particularly favor and in which the ego is located and they find true life. All people have their own besetting sin. A person may subordinate everything to knowledge or desires (ambition) or feelings (passions of all kinds) or to the adornment of the body, or to carnality, and so forth. Regardless of the many organs and abilities we have, we will try to subordinate everything to these particular sovereigns. For that reason, there is infinite variety in sin. Two kinds of sin, however, stand out: sins of the spirit and sins of the body. $\underset{―}{182}$ ...
The principle of classification may also be sought in the object, in response to the question: What is it that we humans seek to subordinate to ourselves? One may say: in principle, everything; egocentric people consider that everything exists for themselves. Yet there are differences. In one person egocentricity is focused on this, in the other on something else. There is endless variety that includes money, property, spouse, power, objects of beauty, liquor, honor, fame, and the list goes on. But it is possible to distinguish three broad areas: material things (money, possessions, property, etc.), the neighbor (lying, murder, adultery), and God (unbelief, idolatry, superstition). Of course, these three areas do not exist ...
independently but devolve into each other: avaricious persons will err into lying, deception, killing of neighbor, and even, if God resists them, into lying to God and denying him. And yet we can distinguish, but not separate, these three areas. It should also be noted that every sin is sin against God, while sinning against the creature is most often also a sin against the neighbor. ...

When we now combine 1 and 2, we see three areas in which egocentricity is manifest, in each according to its own facet (as sensual or as spiritual egocentricity), as follows: ...

Sins that subordinate the creature/material things to ...
a. the spirit-possessiveness, avarice, thirst for knowledge; ...
b. the body-finery, appetite, laziness; ...
Sins that subordinate the neighbor to ...
a. the spirit-conceit, hunger for honor, hatred, anger, defamation, murder; ...
b. the body-adultery, fornication, theft, deceit, etc.; ...
Sins that subordinate God to ...
a. the spirit-unbelief, idolatry, blasphemy; ...
b. the body-sorcery, spiritism, miracle-working, etc. ...

Sins Involving the Lust of the Eye" (Von den Sünden der Augenlust), and “On the Sins of Pride” (Von den Sünden des Hochmuts). ...
5. E.g., Driessen, Evangelische Zedekunde; Lampe, Schets der dadelyke Godt-geleertheid; Buddeus, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis; and Mosheim, Kern uit de zede-leer der Heilige Schrift. ...
6. Kuyper, Work of the Holy Spirit; Kuyper, Concise Works of the Holy Spirit, 65-69 (1.4.13); this chapter originally appeared in De Heraut, no. 309 (November 25, 1883). ...
7. LO: mutabiliter bona. ...
8. Ed. note: The progression described under no. 3 is taken from 1 John 2:16: “For all that is in the world - the desires of the flesh and the desires of the eyes and pride of life-is not from the Father but is from the world.” ...
9. Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck added “Kempis, De imitatione Christi I:13” and “primo occurrit menti simplex cogitatio, deinde fortis imaginatio, postea delectatio et motus pravus et assensio” (“First, a mere thought comes to mind, then strong imagination, followed by pleasure, evil delight, and consent”). Kempis, Imitation of Christ 17. ...
10. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:121-22. ...
11. DO: dadelijke. ...
12. DO: toestand. ...
13. LO: omne peccatum est voluntarium; J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:194-99; 2:259306. Ed. note: Robert Francis Romulus Bellarmine (1542-1621) was a Jesuit cardinal and great defender of the Roman Catholic orthodoxy established at the Council of Trent (1545-63); his great apologetic work was Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei. ...
14. GrO:

α μ α ρ τ i ́ α

. ...
15. GrO: ท̀ oikovo

α

čv

^{'} μ

oì

α

μ ρ τ i ́ α

. ...

1:194-95.
17. GrO: àvouía. ...

19. GrO:

τ

σ \hat{ω} μ α τ \hat{η} ς α \dot{α} μ ρ τ i ́ α ζ; ψ v x ı κ o ̀ ζ δ ε ̀ α ́ v θ ρ ω π o ζ; τ ε ́ к v α φ u ́ σ ε ı o ́ p γ ท ิ ς .

...
20. GrO: ò

δ ε ̇ π v ε v μ α τ ı k o ́ c

. ...
21. GrO: ò

π α λ α 1 o ̀ ς α ́ v θ ρ ω π o ζ

. ...
22. GrO: ò каvvòs áv

θ ρ ω π \circ ς

. ...
23. GrO:

σ α ́ ρ ξ

. ...
24. GrO:

σ α ́ ρ ξ

; HO: בּ̧שָׂר. ...
25. See Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon, s.v. "

Σ α ́ ρ ξ

"; Cremer, “Fleisch”; J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:321-23; Martens, “Israëlietische leerwijze bij Paulus”; Ernesti, Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus, 32. ...
26. Ed. note: Ammon, Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre; Baur, Paul the Apostle; Hausrath, Der Apostel Paulus; Pfleiderer, Paulinism. ...
27. GrO:

γ ε v o ́ μ ε v o ζ

ćk үvvalkóç. ...
28. GrO:

π v ε \hat{v} μ α

; HO: רוּחַ , נֶפֶשׁ , לֵב , ...
29. GrO:

τ \hat{η} σ α ρ κ \overset{`}{l}

π ε 1 μ l, α λ λ α \dot{α} τ \hat{ω} π v ε u ́ μ α τ ι σ u ̀ v

μ \hat{ı} v

દì

μ

l. ...
30. GrO: к

α ρ δ i_{α}

. ...

32. GrO: દ́mı日vuía

τ \circ \hat{v}

кооцоvิ. ...
33. GrO:

σ α ́ ρ ξ; π ν ε \hat{v} μ α; τ o ̀ π ν ε \hat{v} μ α

àv

θ ρ ω^{'} π o v

. ...
34. GrO:

ψ v \times η^{'}; σ \hat{ω} μ α

. ...
35. GrO:

σ α ́ ρ ξ

;

τ

π ν ε \hat{v} μ α τ o \hat{v} θ ε o v

;

τ

π ν ε \hat{v} μ α

ớ

γ ı o v

. ...

π ν ε \hat{v} μ α τ o \hat{v} ε γ ε i ́ ρ α ν τ о ς τ o ̀ v

'In

σ o \hat{v} v

દ́k vɛkpôv. ...

37．GrO：каાvótns

π v ε u ́ μ α τ о ζ; π α λ α 1 o ́ τ η ς ү р α ́ μ μ α τ о ς

. ...
38．GrO：

α γ ε ́ σ θ α l τ \hat{ω} π ν ε u ́ μ α τ l;

ảyźo幍

τ \hat{ω} π ν ε u ́ μ α τ l θ ε o u ̂

. ...
39．GrO：

σ α ́ ρ ξ; π v ε \hat{v} μ α

àv

θ ρ ω ́ π o v; π v ε \hat{v} μ α θ ε o \hat{v}

． ...
40．GrO：

σ α \overset{`}{α} ξ

α μ α ρ τ i ́ α ζ; σ \hat{ω} μ α τ \hat{η} ς σ α ρ κ o ́ ς

． ...
41．GrO：то̀

φ

ро́v

η μ α τ \hat{η} ς σ α ρ κ o ̀ ς ε ̌ x θ ρ α ε i ζ θ ε o ́ v .

...
42．GrO：

ψ u x y^{'};

áv

θ ρ ω π o ζ

ψ \cup χ ı κ o ́ c;

HO：נֶפֶשׁ． ...
43．GrO：

ψ v \times {\hat{η}}^{'}; π v ε v \hat{μ} α;

HO：רוּחַ． ...
44．HO：נֶפֶשׁ ；רוּחַ． ...
45．HO：נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה ；רוּחַ． ...
46．HO：נֶפֶשׁ ；רוּחַ． ...
47．GrO：

ψ \cup χ \overset{`}{η} ν ζ \hat{ω} σ α ν; π ν ε \hat{v} μ α ζ ω о π o l o u v

. ...
48．GrO：

ψ v \times η^{'}; π v ε v \hat{μ} α

． ...
49．GrO：

σ \hat{ω} μ α; ψ v \times η^{'}; σ α ́ ρ ξ

． ...
50．GrO：wuxıkóc ...
51．GrO：

ψ v x 1 κ o ́ c;

；

σ ω μ α τ ı k o ́ c; π v ε v μ α τ ı k o ́ c

. ...
52．GrO：

ψ \cup x \overset{`}{η}

そう

ω σ α; σ \hat{ω} μ α

ψ

uxıко́v． ...
53．GrO：

π v ε v \hat{u} α ζ ω o π o l o u v v; σ \hat{ω} μ α π v ε v μ α τ ı k o ́ v

. ...
54．GrO：

σ \hat{ω} μ α

ψ

uxıко́v；хоїко́с． ...
55．GrO：

σ \hat{ω} μ α

ψ

uxıко́v． ...
56．GrO：

π v ε v \hat{u} α

；HO：רוּחַ． ...
57．GrO：ұvxıко́с；лvɛvuatıко́с． ...
58．Ed．note：However，both 1 Cor．2：14 and 15：46 use the same pair of contrasting adjectives， фuxıко́（＂psychical，＂＂natural＂）and

π v ε u μ α τ ι κ o ́ ς (" s p i r i t u a l ") . I n 15 : 46, m o d e r n t r a n s l a t i o n s r e n d e r

π ν ε \cup μ α τ ι κ o ́ v

as＂spiritual＂but differ on translating

ψ u x

lко́v．Most translate it as＂natural＂（ESV， KJV，NIV，NLT），but some choose＂physical＂（RSV，NRSV，CEV）．Bavinck accepts the translation ＂natural，＂even though it is not literally correct，but observes that

φ

vorkó

ζ

is ordinarily used for ＂physical．＂To underscore Bavinck＇s point here，we introduced the translation＂psychical．＂ ...
59．GrO：

ψ

uxıко́с；

α

uxpт

ω λ

о́с；

σ α ρ κ

ко́с． ...
60．GrO：ұvxıко́с；лvɛvuatıкоі́；

σ α ρ κ

ки́со́；

σ

व́pкıvoc． ...
61．GrO：

ψ \cup x 1 κ o 1 ́, π ν ε \cup ̂ μ α μ \dot{η}

हैхоvтɛс． ...
62．GrO：

π ν ε \hat{v} μ α; μ η \bar{η} π v \bar{v} μ α

． ...

64．GrO：фихіко́с；

σ α ρ κ

ко́с． ...
65．DO：ziel，geest，hart，Ik；cf．van den Honert，De mensch in Christus，49－84；Vitringa，Korte schets（chap．16，pp．327－56，deals with spiritual death）；Driessen，Oude en nieuwe mensch，44－73； Mosheim，Kern uit de zede－leer der Heilige Schrift，1：17－125（I．i）；Love，Theologia Practica，505－ 64；Vilmar，Theologische Moral，1：179－94；van Mastricht，Theoretico－Practica Theologia，I．iv．4， §§7－22［2：328－36］；Borst，Geestelicke geness－konst，130－39．Ed．note：In the margin Bavinck added：＂here also the idea of ко́бนос．＂For an explanation of the format we are using to cite van Mastricht＇s Theoretico－Practica Theologia，see the extended note in the introduction，§1，in the section ＂Reformed Churches＂（pp．8－9n48）．The volume and page numbers come from the 1749－53 Dutch edition used by Bavinck． ...

66．Cremer，＂Geist des Menschen＂；Kuyper，Principles of Sacred Theology． ...
67．DO：verstand．Ed．note：In the margin Bavinck added the following Scripture references： 1 Cor．1：23－24；2：14； 2 Cor．11：3；Gal．1：6－7；Rom．1：21－23；John 16：2． ...
68．Driessen，Oude en nieuwe mensch， 49.
68. 드리센, 《옛 사람과 새 사람》, 49쪽.
69．Cf．Étienne Gaussen according to de Moor，Commentarius Perpetuus，2：1052－54；Gaussen （d．1675）was professor of theology at the University of Saumur，1664－75． ...
70. Ed. note: Cf. Bavinck, Beginselen der psychologie, 54-74, 160-78. ...
71. LO: ratio practica. ...
72. LO: donum superadditum.
72. 라틴어: donum superadditum(추가된 선물).
73. De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 2:1052-54.
73. 더 무어, 『영구 주석』, 2:1052-54.
74. Canons of Dort, III/IV, Rejection of Errors 6. ...
75. Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 3, Q&A 8. ...
76. DO: gevoel. 76. 네덜란드어: gevoel (감정).
77. DO: lichaam. ...
78. Ed. note: The following paragraphs on the hands, feet, neck, tongue, forehead, mouth, nose, and knee have been modified and in some cases rearranged for flow and readability. ...
79. Ed. note: Bavinck here follows the 1637 Statenvertaling: “De goddeloze, gelijk hij zijn neus omhoog steekt, onderzoekt niet; al zijn gedachten zijn, dat er geen God is” (lit., “The ungodly, as he puts his nose up, does not seek [God]; all his thoughts are that there is no God”).
79. 역자 주: 바빙크는 여기서 1637년 스타텐버탈링(Statenvertaling)을 따릅니다: "경건하지 않은 자는 코를 높이 들고 탐구하지 않으니, 그의 모든 생각은 하나님이 없다는 것이라"(원문: "De goddeloze, gelijk hij zijn neus omhoog steekt, onderzoekt niet; al zijn gedachten zijn, dat er geen God is").
80. GrO: карлочо́рยv

τ \hat{φ} θ ε \hat{φ}

.
81. GrO: то̀ чро́vทนа тทิડ барко́с Өа́vaтос.
81. GrO: то̀ чро́vทа тทิડ барко́с Өа́vaтос.
82. GrO: то̀

φ

póvทนa тоvิ

π v ε u ́ μ α τ o ζ ζ ω \hat{η}

каì દiph́vn.
83. GrO: vɛкро́с; vɛкрои́s тоîs

π α ρ α π τ ω ́ μ α σ ι v

каì

τ α i ̂ ς

’

α μ α ρ τ i ́ α ı ς

; Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon, 426, s.v. “vɛкро́q.” ...
84. GrO: кaì vɛkpòs દર્i.
84. GrO: кaì vɛkpòs દр્i.
85. GrO: Өа́vatoc.
86. Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon, 284, s.v. “Өа́vatoç.” Ed. note: Cf. Cremer’s comments on vɛкро́с: “Nɛкро́с corresponds with

θ α ́ v α τ о ς

as the state of man when he has suffered the penal sentence of death, and therefore like

θ

ávatoç it is often used in N. T. Greek to denote the state of men still living; and we may understand it of the state of those whose life is appointed to death as the punishment of

\sin

; but not, as is so often supposed, of so-called ‘spiritual death’” (426). ...
87. GrO: Өа́vatoç. 87. 그리스어 원문: Θάνατος.
88. See Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 3:384.
88. 필리피(Philippi), 《교회 신앙론》(Kirchliche Glaubenslehre), 3권 384면 참조.
89. LO: justitia divina; justitia civilis; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:182. ...
90. GrO:

π ν ε \hat{v} μ α; ψ v \times \hat{η}; σ \hat{ω} μ α

. ...

92. GrO: ઈоû入ós દ́otıv тทิร

α

uxptíą. ...

96. DO: grondbeginsel, drijfkracht; GrO: દ́mı日vuía; LO: concupiscentia; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:183; de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 2:1055. ...
97. LO: paganorum virtutes splendida vitia sunt. ...

นoû ко́бนov દ́otív. ...
99. DO: stof. ...
100. Vitringa, Korte schets, 343. ...
101. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:187-92. ...
102. LO: nemo repente pessimus. ...
103. See

§ 9

below on the classification of sins. ...
104. DO: tering. ...
105. GrO: ớvӨрळाos

ψ \cup x

ко́с. ...
106. GrO: voûc. ...
107. Luthardt, Kompendium der theologischen Ethik, §22, “Division of Sins” (Die Unterschiede der Sünden); cf. Laurillard, De zeven hoofdzonden; Zöckler, Das Lehrstück von den sieben Hauptsünden. ...
108. Ed. note: See RD, 3:25-192 (chaps. 1-4). ...
109. DO: beginsel, reaalprincipe. ...
110. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck inserted, “Therefore, a phenomenology of sin” (Dus eene phaenomenologie der zonde), and added a reference to Scharling, Christliche Sittenlehre, 184. ...
111. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:248. ...
112. Ed. note: Institutes, II.viii.6-10. ...
113. Institutes, II.viii.8. ...
114. Institutes, II.viii.9. ...
115. Institutes, II.viii.10. ...
116. Ed. note: This material is covered in Book III, “Humanity after Conversion,” in RE, vol. 2, The Duties of the Christian Life. ...
117. Ed. note: Daneau, Ethices Christianae. ...
118. E.g., Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst. ...
119. Ed. note: Driessen, Oude en nieuwe mensch. ...
120. GrO: àvouía; cf. RD, 3:133-36. ...
121. GrO: vóuos

δ ε \overset{`}{ε} π α ρ ε ι σ \hat{η} λ θ ε ν

ïva

π λ ε o v α ́ σ n

tò

π α ρ α ́ π τ ω μ α

. ...
122. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:131-203; according to Cremer (Biblico-Theological Lexicon, 431, s.v. “Nóuoc”), Rom. 5:13-14 provides clear evidence that vóuos without the definite article can also refer to the Mosaic law. ...
123. GrO:

\hat{η}

μ α ρ τ i ́ α

;

α

vopía. ...
124. GrO: тદ́кva

φ

úoधl ojpyn̄s. ...
125. GrO: ópyń;

\dot{ε} λ λ o γ ε \hat{ı} τ α 1;

J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:102-5. ...
126. Ed. note: Bavinck adds that Weiss is thus correct in his critique of Meyer and Philippi. He is undoubtedly referring to Bernhard Weiss, who prepared a thorough revision of the famous H. A. W. Meyer commentary on Romans in 1881; cf. Weiss, Commentary, vol. 3. “Philippi” is a reference to the German original of Philippi, Commentary on Romans. ...
127. According to Weiss, Commentary, 3:45. ...
128. Ed. note: Auguste Comte (1795-1857) was a French philosopher of society and a founder of modern sociology who created a secular “religion of humanity,” complete with liturgy, sacraments, and holy days, all dedicated to the “New Supreme Great Being”-i.e., humanity. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auguste_Comte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_of_Humanity. 129. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:100. ...
130. LO: hoc volo, sic iubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas. Ed. note: This is a saying attributed to the Roman poet Juvenal (Decimus Iunius Juvenalis [ca. AD 55-140]). The citation is from Juvenal’s Satires VI.223; surprisingly, the context is not an imperial court but a household (lines 219-24; translation by George Gilbert Ramsay [1839-1921], a professor of humanities at the University of Glasgow; available online at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Satire_6). ...
131. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:95-96. ...
132. Ed. note: William of Ockham (1287-1347), Gabriel Biel (1420-95), and Pierre d’Ailly (1351-1420) were important figures in the nominalist movement or via moderna of late medievalism. René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher and mathematician and shaper of modern philosophy whose most famous philosophical statement is “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito ergo sum; French “Je pense, donc je suis”). Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-94) was a German jurist and philosopher who contributed significantly to modern discussions of natural law. See Seeberg, “Occam”; Tschackert, “Biel”; Tschackert, “Ailly”; Evans, “Descartes”; G. Frank, “Pufendorf,” all in Schaff-Herzog. ...
133. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:97-98. ...
134. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:100-107. Ed. note: Müller attributes this view to the German rationalist philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and cites (100n1) Wolff’s Vernünftige Gedanken, §20. ...
135. LO: merum arbitrium; mens divina. ...
136. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:108-10. ...
137. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:110. ...
138. Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck added: “Sin is not merely (a) ớ

τ η

, bewilderment, infatuation, confusion of the mind (Homer); (b) űßpıc, pride, transgressing of boundaries, indulgence (the Greeks); © ignorance (Socrates); (d) a negative moment in the development of the Good (pantheism, Hegel); (e) an independent act of the will (Pelagius); (f) sensuousness,

σ α ́ ρ ξ

(the Romans, Socinians, rationalists, Schleiermacher, Rothe, Scholten); or (g) ignorance (Ritschl) but active privation (actuosa privatio); sin is not a ‘substance,’ but it is reality.’ For a more thorough discussion of this point see

R D, 3 : 136 - 38

. ...
139. DO: oneerlijke bewegingen; J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:131-32. ...
140. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck added: "

φ ι λ α v τ

ía, not in an ethical sense only but in the broadest sense as ‘wanting to be God.’” Parenthetically within the text, after the word zelfzucht (egocentric, egocentricity), Bavinck alluded to the etymological similarity of the Dutch words zucht (sigh), zoeken (seeking), and ziekte (sickness) and the German words Seuche (epidemic) and Selbstsucht (selfishness, egotism). ...
141. The following posit egocentricity as the foundation of sin: Tholuck, Die Lehre von der Sünde, 18, 28; J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:136; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:129-42 (§11); Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 3:3-12; Lange, “Selbstsucht”; Luthardt, Kompendium der theologischen Ethik, §20; Scharling, Christliche Sittenlehre, 165. Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck added: Augustine, De civitate Dei XIV.14; Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia IIae q. 77 art. 4; IIa IIae q. 25 art. 7; Melanchthon, Buddeus, et al. Bavinck affords only a qualified endorsement of the view that egocentricity is the organizing principle of all sin, adding in the margins: ...

Identifying egocentricity as the organizing principle of sin is fine, but only if (a) it is taken in a very broad sense and includes the spiritual problems of haughtiness and unbelief, and (b) it is not understood as though all sins logically flow from this foundation. Egocentricity focuses on various things, places, everything-God, world, neighbor-in service to itself. The diverse forms of sin are determined by the many and diverse forms of the Good. Furthermore, © sin can develop in such a way as to become satanic, pure hatred against God, but then only because he obstructs us. ...
142. LO: superbia. ...
143. DO: reaalprincipe. ...
144. Ed. note: Bavinck added a marginal note (“Vacation, March 1902”) that provides a clue to his use of the manuscript for lecturing to his Kampen students. The spring and fall of 1902 were the last times Bavinck lectured on ethics. He left Kampen at the end of the year and began his professorate at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, where he did not lecture on ethics. See pp. xxxvi-xli of the introduction, on the de Jong manuscript. A slightly different classification, which includes many of the distinctions that follow, can be found in RD, 3:149-52. ...
145. LO: peccatum originale et actuale. ...
146. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 348; Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 1:355 (X.61); de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 3:313; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iv.3, §§10-35 [2:298-322]; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:221-33 (§18). ...
147. LO: ratione formae; per se; per accidens. ...
148. LO: cordis; oris; operis. ...
149. LO: spiritualia; carnalia; justitia divina and externa (justitia civilis). According to Groen van Prinsterer, Proeve, 42, spiritual sin and fleshly sins reflect the two different pulls of sinful desires in ...
humans-the former “heavenward,” the latter “toward the earth.” Consequently, all ethics outside of Christianity tends toward Stoicism or Epicureanism. ...
150. LO: infirmitatis; ignorantiae; malitiae. ...
151. LO: adjuncta; regnantia; non regnantia; adjacentia. ...
152. DO: zelfzucht; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:210-13. Ed. note: When the manuscript was opened for the first time, a folded piece of paper was discovered between pp. 98 and 99 that contained Bavinck’s notes on Vilmar as follows: ...

Classification of sins, Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:249-392. ...
[1.] Sins of the Flesh: ...
a. Sexual sins: impurity, incontinence, passion (

π α ́ θ o ζ

), unchastity (

π \circ ρ v ε i ́ α

), adultery (

μ o x ε_{i} α

), unnatural lust, filthy speech, emancipation of the flesh. ...
b. Sins of the belly: love of pleasure (

\dot{η} δ o v \dot{η}

), revelry, drunkenness, weakness, spaciousness. ...
c. Sins of inertia and sloth (acedie): laziness, drunkenness, lassitude. ...
2. Lusts of the Eye: ...
a. Love of possessions: love of money, greed, search for ill-gotten gain, theft, robbery. ...
b. Love of appearances (Gestaltenlust): self-love (

φ 1 λ α v τ i ́ α

), inconstancy, vacillation, curiosity, sentimentality, superficiality, conformity to the world, double-heartedness. ...
c. Love of knowledge: idle thoughts, hollow words, passion for science, art. ...
d. Lying: deception, false oaths, unfaithfulness, lies of necessity. ...
e. Tempting God: cursing, despairing, sorcery, superstition. ...
3. Sins of Haughtiness (Pride): ...
a. Against God: wickedness, pride, giving offense, suicide, blasphemy, the Blasphemy, the sin against the Holy Spirit. ...
b. Against people: haughtiness, ostentation, vainglory, ingratitude-spiritual pride: infallibility. ...
c. Mixed (against God and others): rioting, injury (Verletzung)—injustice, anger, hatred, envy, slander, strife, murder (war, etc.). ...

note: For the last of this threesome, in parentheses, Bavinck also provides a Dutch term, pralerij (from pralen, “to glory, to flaunt”), and a Latin term, superbia. ...
154. Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck added: “Luthardt, Kompendium der theologischen Ethik, §22 divides as follows: (1) unbelief: sins against God; (2) haughtiness/pride: laziness, jealousy, selfrighteousness, envy, despising, hate, etc.; and (3) love of the world, divided further into (a) desire for possessions = lust of the eyes, (b) love of pleasure = lust of the flesh, and © longing for power/ambition = the pride of life.” ...
155. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:210-16. ...
156. Ed. note: On one of the loose pages found between pp. 98 and 99, after referencing Müller’s discussion of obduracy, Bavinck wrote some notes critical of Vilmar. ...

Hardening (Verharding), J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 2:410-15 (Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, 2:583-87) ...
Against Vilmar: John does not intend this threefold division. ...

They overlap each other (egocentricity violates the First Commandment and, as covetousness, the Tenth Commandment). Here there are two foundational principles - subject and object. ...
a. The human person is the subject, but more in terms of his sensual or animal nature (sins of the flesh and animal-like sins). ...
b. Object can either be God, the neighbor, or a creature. ...
Sins involve a misuse of the creature. ...
Human beings are not fulfilled in themselves; they “fill in” themselves with the world, with creatures. ...
While the first note about hardening is clearly tied to Müller, the source for the rest of the notes in critique of Vilmar’s understanding of 1 John 2:16 is unclear; likely they are Bavinck’s own. Müller ...
discusses this passage in only one place (Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:165-66), and neither there nor in his treatment of “hardening” does he deal with Vilmar. ...
Ed. note: Cornelius à Lapide (1567-1637) was a Flemish Jesuit exegete whose commentary on 1 John 2:16 connects the three desires of this verse to specific sins against the Trinity: ...

This threefold desire is opposed to the Holy Trinity. Avarice to the Father, who is most liberal in communicating His essence and all His attributes to the Son and the Holy Spirit essentially, but to creatures only by way of participation. The lust of the flesh is opposed to the Son, who was begotten not carnally but spiritually from the mind of the Father, and who hates all carnal impurity. The pride of life is opposed to the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of humility and gentleness. Again, it is opposed to the three primary virtues, as lust of the flesh to continence, lust of the eyes to charity and kindness, pride of life to humility. (Great Biblical Commentary of Cornelius à Lapide, 6:381) ...
158. LO: libido sentiendi, sciendi, dominandi. Ed. note: In Pensées, no. 458, Pascal provides these three Latin phrases as explanatory commentary on 1 John 2:16. ...
159. DO: wereldliefde. ...
160. Ed. note: Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752) “was a Lutheran pietist clergyman and Greeklanguage scholar known for his edition of the Greek New Testament and his commentaries on it” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Albrecht_Bengel). Gottfried Christian Friedrich Lücke (17911855) was a German “mediating” theologian. For Lange, Bavinck does not cite a specific source but is likely referring to Johann Peter Lange, author of Christliche Dogmatik and numerous commentaries on books of the Bible, including the Gospel of John and the Epistle of James. With “Meyer,” Bavinck is likely referring to Heinrich August Meyer’s Kritisch exegetisches Handbuch über die drei Briefe des Johannes. ...
161. DO: zelfzucht. ...
162. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:149-51; cf. 189-91. ...
163. GrO:

ε ́ π 1 θ \cup μ

ía; LO: concupiscentia. ...
164. Ed. note: Bavinck carefully distinguishes “desire” (begeeren) from “coveting.” Since the Statenvertaling uses the same word in Exod. 20:15 (Gij zult niet begeeren), Bavinck doubles up with the phrase “egocentric desiring” (or “desire as egocentricity”; begeerlijkheid als zelfzucht). ...
165. Cf. Kuyper, Concise Works of the Holy Spirit, 98: “Although there was in that fallen nature [assumed by Christ] something to incite Him to desire, yet it never became desire.” In addition, “though the unbalanced powers of the soul which cause the darkening of the understanding, the blunting of the sensibilities, and the weakening of the will arouse the passions, yet even this could not result in sin if no personal ego were affected by this working. Hence sin puts its own mark upon this corruption only when the personal ego turns away from God, and in that disordered soul and diseased body stands condemned before Him.” ...
166. LO: peccata, carnalia et spiritualia. ...
167. Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §§461-68; for a dissent from this, see J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:146-49. ...
168. Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, 3:4. ...
169. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:160-62. ...
170. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:162-64. ...
171. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:169-77. ...
172. J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:172-75. ...
173. F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:598 (IX.4.ix). ...
174. LO: peccata mortifera/mortalia; peccata venialia. See de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 3:308; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iv.3, §22 [2:310]; Calvin rejects this distinction altogether in Institutes, III.iv.28. ...
175. Just imagine that it was possible to commit one sin without in principle committing all other sins; would this one sin then condemn someone to eternal damnation? ...
176. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iv.3, §§16-17 [2:300-305]. ...
177. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iv.3, §16 [2:300]. ...
178. See de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 3:305. Ed. note: Jovinian (d. ca. 405) was a former monk who turned against asceticism; he was condemned as a heretic in 390 . Information about him is primarily derived from Jerome’s Adversus Jovinianum (Healy, “Jovinianus”). Novatian (ca. 200-258) was a Carthaginian priest who became an antipope when Cornelius ascended to the chair of Peter in 251. He was declared a heretic because of his severe view about the restoration of those who had lapsed in the Decian persecutions that began in 250 (Chapman, “Novatian”). ...
179. See n. 13 above. ...
180. Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck added “casuistry; penance morality (Liguori).” This is undoubtedly a reference to St. Alphonsus Maria de’ Liguori (1696-1787), founder of the Redemptorist order (Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer) in 1732 and important moral theologian who opposed “sterile legalism” and Jansenist rigorism. ...
181. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:224. ...
182. LO: peccata spiritualia; peccata carnalia. ...

3 The Self against the Neighbor and God ...

In this chapter we are considering those sins of egoism in which people use the gifts of God’s creation to serve themselves. Our basic division is between sensual sins and spiritual sins. The former involve food and alcohol as well as sins of inertia in which we fail to accept God’s call to labor. Spiritual sins include love of money, abuse of language, and misuse of the neighbor’s authority, life, chastity, property, and good name. ...

Sensual sins have pleasure at their core and involve immoderate use and abuse of God’s good gifts. These sins are especially found among the rich and their feasts. Holy Scripture warns against gluttony and drunkenness, observing that these are pathways to poverty and ruin. Abuse of alcohol dulls our consciousness, which is the true mark of our humanity; that which is most noble in us is destroyed. ...

Sins of inertia are great dangers of riches and affluence. They not only harm our own souls but also lead to egocentric indifference to others: we eat, drink, and are merry while fires and floods destroy others. In addition to self-indulgence and hedonism, this sin also leads to complacency and, eventually, to complete apathy: “Why should we care about others when we ourselves have enough?” Such weariness with life and misanthropy has spread in our time and is even celebrated in literature. ...

Then there are also sins that take pleasure in form or appearance that is not based in reality. People are pleased with themselves, ...
their physical appearance or strength, and vainly flatter themselves; they are also often hypersensitive with an overblown sense of honor that is too easily offended. Such people go out of their way to avoid adversity and suffering, often under the rationalizing guise of “self-respect.” The other direction of these sins with respect to the form of things is instability, the dissatisfaction of creatures in their temporality, their transience. This is the great disease of our age-inconstancy, agitation, restlessness. We endlessly seek diversion and distraction in recreation, in entertainment, and even in speculative spiritualities such as spiritism. And, finally, we celebrate doubt and uncertainty as something good and noble. We have become individuals, naked and alone. ...

Unbelief is the root of all sin-failing to accept God as he is, not taking him at his word. Unbelief makes God out to be a liar, denying his truth and faithfulness. This unbelief can develop in either of two ways: making God equal to ourselves by bringing him down or by making ourselves equal to God by elevating ourselves. We do this in a sensual way when we misuse God for our own benefit, abusing his name, superstitiously playing with his providence, and misusing the Sabbath. Spiritual sins in this category are rooted in pride, in the desire to be like God rather than in surrendering to him and loving him. This is expressed in idolatry and blasphemy, especially the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. ...

There is an order and law in the development of sin, already reflected in the first sin in Paradise: opportunity for sin is followed by external temptation; then come gradual compliance, rationalization, inclination of the heart, and completion of the deed. All sin begins with suggestion, followed by meditation, delighting in it, and, finally, yielding and acquiescing to it. In this way, every sin gives birth to more sin as sins become habitual or customary and are passed on from generation to generation. Contrary to Rome, we teach that not only the deed but also the crooked inclination (concupiscence) is sinful. ...

§10. Sins of Ecoism in the Narrow Sense ...

Sins of egoism are those sins in which people use creation, God’s gifts, and the world 1 to serve themselves. They are especially (but not exclusively) those sins that were at one time called “sins against oneself.”

\underset{―}{\underset{―}{2}}

When people are not satisfied with themselves and are impoverished because of sin, they seek satisfaction in creatures, in God’s gifts. They surrender themselves to the world and take the world for themselves. Here we will differentiate between sensual sins and spiritual sins. ...

A. Sensual Sins ...

1. SINS INVOLVING FOOD $^{\underset{―}{3}}$ ...

These sins have pleasure (James 4:1) at their core. 4 People are “lovers of pleasure” (2 Tim. 3:4) who revel in physical satisfaction, in taste. 5 This sin of taste can be derived from food or from drink and is the sin peculiar to Germanic peoples-especially the sin of drunkenness.

\underset{―}{6}

(Eastern people engage more in sexual sins.) The Greeks and Romans were initially known ...
for moderation; carousing and drunkenness arose especially in the time of decline. The demand for bread and circuses and the hosting of expensive meals came in the period of the emperors. 7 ...
a. Preoccupation with food. 8 This sin occurs when people live in order to eat, when they find their purpose in eating. All attention is devoted to food, and the art of cooking becomes the most appealing skill. Eating can be elevated to life’s highest purpose in all kinds of ways: moving dinner to an earlier or later hour to lengthen the eating time, preparing exquisite meals in an exotic manner, thrilling and tickling the taste buds, etc. This sin can begin in small ways, with a preference for certain foods or a craving to participate in the good life. 9 And this sin can then lead to gluttony and carousing, to serving the belly: “For such persons do not serve our Lord Christ, but their own appetites” (Rom. 16:18). “Their end is destruction, their god is their belly, and they glory in their shame, with minds set on earthly things” (Phil. 3:19). People become slaves to their bellies, which determines their laws. They seek honor in their shame-that is, in having good taste, in developing their palates. People of this sort, such as Apicius,

\underset{―}{10}

the emperor Geta,

\underset{―}{11}

and Elagabalus,

\underset{―}{12}

were known as gourmands.

\underset{―}{13}

...

Holy Scripture warns against all this. The Old Testament’s food prohibitions and meal offerings provide a defense against the abuse of food. The book of Proverbs warns us, “Be not among drunkards / or among gluttonous eaters of meat, / for the drunkard and the glutton will come to poverty, / and slumber will clothe them with rags” (Prov. 23:20-21; cf. Sir. 31:21-22; 37:29-31; Prov. 28:7). Jesus, who warns against carousing (Luke 21:34; cf. Paul in Rom. 13:13; Gal. 5:21; and Peter in 1 Pet. 4:3), portrays a rich man “who was dressed in purple and fine linen and who feasted sumptuously every day” as being in hell (Luke 16:19). ...
b. Sins involving strong drink/alcohol. 14 These sins also begin in a small way, such as enjoying a glass of gin, for example, and can then progress to truly enjoying wine and strong drink, to needing a drink, to regular drinking, and then to drunkenness and carousing. Noah and Lot are biblical examples that serve as warnings to us. These sins were not unknown in Israel. On the contrary! Consider Isaiah 5:11 and 22: ...

till they are inflamed with wine. (Isa. 5:11 NIV) ...
Woe to those who are heroes at drinking wine and champions at mixing drinks. (Isa. 5:22 NIV) ...

Now the Hebrew word that is usually translated as “strong drink” [שֵׁכָר] was not strong drink in our sense (that is, compared to brandy or gin), but was made from roses, fruit, honey, and thistles. 15 The drink made from thistles was especially weak, but even that could cause a person to lose consciousness. And that is the appalling result of this sin: “Drunkenness is a small fury.” 16 It dulls consciousness, both at the time and afterward; it removes the most noble element-namely, what is human in us. It is an attack on, a destruction of, the image of God, because self-consciousness is the true mark of humanity. Drunkenness makes us like animals. In a drunken person the soul is buried and the animal comes to the surface (in the nature of a pig or lion or ape, etc.). ...

Holy Scripture warns against drunkenness: “Wine is a mocker, strong drink a brawler; whoever is led astray by it is not wise” (Prov. 20:1). A striking description occurs in Proverbs 23:29-35;

\underset{―}{17}

“It is not for kings to drink wine, / or for rulers to take strong drink” (Prov. 31:4); “Let us walk properly as in the daytime, not in orgies and drunkenness” (Rom. 13:13); “But now I am writing to you not to associate with anyone who bears the name of brother if he is guilty of sexual immorality or greed, or is an idolater, reviler, drunkard, or swindler-not even to eat with such a one” (1 Cor. 5:11; cf. 6:10). Among the works of the flesh are “envy, drunkenness, orgies, and things like these. I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God” (Gal. 5:21); “And do not get drunk with wine, for that is debauchery, but be filled with the Spirit” (Eph. 5:18); “Deacons likewise must be dignified, not double-tongued, not addicted to much wine, not greedy for dishonest gain” (1 Tim. 3:8); “For you have spent enough time in the past doing what pagans choose to do-living in debauchery, lust, drunkenness, orgies, carousing and detestable idolatry” (1 Pet. 4:3 NIV). In our day these sins of the belly have been made more terrible by the invention of strong drink, by alcoholism, and by opium, a milky fluid with strong narcotic content made from the unripe seedpod of the poppy and used particularly by the Chinese and Javanese.

\underset{―}{18}

...
c. Taken together, these two sins are found especially at banquets (Rom. 13:13; Gal. 5:21; 1 Pet. 4:3)

^{19}

and especially during the imperial times of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This also happened among our forefathers and is starting to happen again in honorary meals and dinners.

\underset{―}{20}

...

2. SINS OF INERTIA $^{\underset{―}{21}}$ ...

This sin is, in its origin, a physical slowness, a flinching from exertion and effort; it is “taking it easy” and forgetting that we, like God, are called to labor. It is an aversion to labor, spiritually as well as physically; it is when we do nothing, loiter about, a “pleasant idleness.”

\underset{―}{22}

This ideal is found today especially among Communists. Frequently this laziness results from or accompanies a soft lifestyle, springing from a luxurious upbringing, and with the sins associated with food. Paul, citing the Greek poet Epimenides, says that “Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons” (Titus 1:12). Laziness is thus a great danger of riches, of affluence, of a certain culture, as it existed in the time of the Roman emperors. ...

This sin also leads to egocentric indifference to the suffering of others; to egocentric self-satisfying; to eating, drinking, and enjoying oneself; to saying, “The flood comes after us.”

\underset{―}{23}

It leads to absolute eudaemonism, to sybaritic self-indulgence, such as was prevalent in the time of Roman emperors, in Europe before the Thirty Years’ War, and before the French Revolution. It also leads to dumb, superficial complacency and narrowness, limitation, and also to cruelty-that is, to people who are not concerned about the suffering of others but are satisfied if they themselves have enough, caring nothing about anything else. ...

Thus, finally, this sin leads to complete apathy and indifference;

\underset{―}{24}

to being sated, dissatisfied, tired of life; to a boredom, usually paired with deep sadness; to being tired of oneself or bitter about one’s lot in life. This may continue as hatred for all people, escape from the world, disgust with all creatures, doubt about everything and God, and, finally, suicide. This skeptical weariness with life has grown strong in our age and is being considered as a profound and more enlightened worldview rather than as a sickness and sin. This view is lauded and systemized in literature (Byron, Alfred de Musset, et al.); it is the melody of communist and socialist refrains. However, in its origin it is nothing but inertia of spirit and body, accompanied by pride that assumes that nothing is good enough for a person, that everything must serve them. ...

Holy Scripture warns against this sin: ...

Go to the ant, O sluggard; ...
consider her ways, and be wise! ...

How long will you lie there, O sluggard? ...
When will you arise from your sleep? ...
A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to rest, and poverty will come upon you like a robber, and want like an armed man. (Prov. 6:6, 9-11) ...

I passed by the field of a sluggard, by the vineyard of a man lacking sense, and behold, it was all overgrown with thorns; the ground was covered with nettles, and its stone wall was broken down. ...
Then I saw and considered it; I looked and received instruction. A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to rest, and poverty will come on you like a robber, and want like an armed man. (Prov. 24:30-34) ...

The New Testament provides similar wisdom: “Do not be slothful in zeal, be fervent in spirit, serve the Lord” (Rom. 12:11); “For even when we were with you, we would give you this command: If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat. For we hear that some among you walk in idleness, not busy at work, but busybodies. Now such persons we command and encourage in the Lord Jesus Christ to do their work quietly and to earn their own living” (2 Thess. 3:10-12). Paul’s instruction to Timothy not to “enroll younger widows” in the office of deacon includes this counsel: “Besides that, they learn to be idlers, going about from house to house, and not only idlers, but also gossips and busybodies, saying what they should not” (1 Tim. 5:13). And finally, the author of Hebrews: “We have much to say about this, but it is hard to make it clear to you because you no longer try to understand. . . . We do not want you to become lazy, but to imitate those who through faith and patience inherit what has been promised” (Heb. 5:11; 6:12 NIV). ...

3. SINS THAT TAKE PLEASURE IN FORM ...

These sins focus on the appearance of things apart from their reality. They are often not recognized as sins or are recognized as only minor sins. ...

There are two types. ...
a. Self-love.

\underset{―}{25}

People love and are pleased with themselves and, for that reason, love other things related to themselves. People are first of all pleased with their own physical beauty, physical strength, and psychological endowments (e.g., a quick wit). Being pleased with one’s own physical beauty occurs especially in women and leads to adorning of the body, flaunting oneself, using makeup (Isa. 3:16-24; 1 Tim. 2:9; 1 Pet. 3:3), to valuing everything according to external form. With men, it is more being pleased with strength, power, health of spirit, and body and expressed in sports and gymnastics. Both of these are sins of vanity. This sin leads also to wanting to please others; “pleasing oneself” (Rom. 15:1) leads to pleasing other people, to becoming a “people pleaser” (Gal. 1:10; Eph. 6:6; 1 Thess. 2:4).

\underset{―}{6}

With women this leads to teasing, flirting, and flattery; with men to gallantry and chivalry; and with both to flattery, to judging only with one’s eyes, to being a respecter of persons, and to partisanship (James 2:1; Jude 16; Rom. 2:1; Prov. 24:13; etc.). In more extreme forms this sin leads to being easily offended, having an overblown sense of honor, hypersensitivity, quickly looking to defend oneself, and seeking one’s own honor. Such people flee from the cross and from death (which may not be mentioned) and become preoccupied with saving and preserving their own lives and souls. In systems of morality, this principle is presented as “respect for oneself” and as maintaining the rights of humans-"O mortal, feel your worth!"27-and in this way leads to the terrible subjectivism of our age. ...
b. Instability/inconstancy.

\underset{―}{28}

The other direction of these sins with respect to the form of things is instability, the satisfaction of creatures in their temporality, their transience. Scripture often speaks about this: “But let him ask in faith, with no doubting, for the one who doubts is like a wave of the sea that is driven and tossed by the wind” (James 1:6); “He is a doubleminded man, unstable in all his ways” (James 1:8); “Draw near to God, and he will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners, and purify your hearts, you double-minded” (James 4:8). This instability, the result of a lack of steadfastness in oneself, consists generally of living by impressions, of being governed by feelings-which occurs especially in women, and also in religion—and is a weakness, lacking power. It is, most profoundly, a failure to believe in God’s constancy. ...

Inconstancy

\underset{―}{29}

is also the great disease of our age-agitation, restlessness. This is manifested in many forms, for example, in seeking distraction and diversion,

\underset{―}{30}

in chasing exciting pleasure, in pursuing recreation over solitude, in being bored with oneself (Pascal). It is also apparent in excessive curiosity,

\underset{―}{31}

especially about hidden things (Deut. 29:29). Contemporary examples are spiritism and generally favoring the frivolity and superficiality of quantity over quality,

\underset{―}{32}

and therefore in the leveling and homogenizing found in the pantheistic merging of all things, which avoids thorough investigation into the essence of anything. It is also manifested in the antihistorical sense-in the perpetual reconstruction of history that tears people from their own history, from tradition, from the inheritance of previous generations. The result is a loss of piety and a severing of the bonds of the past (revolution) in exchange for subjective, self-pleasing egocentricity and individualism. Finally, it occurs in the intentional doubting of everything, the banning of faith, with each person standing naked and alone. Doubt has been made the beginning and condition of knowledge.

\underset{―}{33}

...

B. Spiritual Sins ...

1. THE LOVE OF MONEY $^{34}$ ...

In 1 Timothy 6:10 the love of money is called the root of all evil.

\underset{―}{35}

Holy Scripture always warns against it: ...

If I have made gold my trust / or called fine gold my confidence, / if I have rejoiced because my wealth was abundant / or because my hand had found much . . . (Job 31:24-25) ...

And he said to them, “Take care, and be on your guard against all covetousness, for one’s life does not consist in the abundance of his possessions.” (Luke 12:15) ...

No servant can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and money. (Luke 16:13) ...

Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God. (Matt. 19:24) ...

Do not lay up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy and where thieves break in and steal. (Matt. 6:19) ...

But those who desire to be rich fall into temptation, into a snare, into many senseless and harmful desires that plunge people into ruin and destruction. (1 Tim. 6:9) ...

Keep your life free from love of money, and be content with what you have, for he has said, “I will never leave you nor forsake you.” (Heb. 13:5) ...
. . . not a drunkard, not violent but gentle, not quarrelsome, not a lover of money. (1 Tim. 3:3) ...
For people will be lovers of self, lovers of money, proud, arrogant, abusive, disobedient to their parents, ungrateful, unholy. (2 Tim. 3:2) ...

Put to death therefore what is earthly in you: sexual immorality, impurity, passion, evil desire, and covetousness, which is idolatry. (Col. 3:5) ...

For you may be sure of this, that everyone who is sexually immoral or impure, or who is covetous (that is, an idolater), has no inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and God. (Eph. 5:5) ...

This sin is universal, occurring among all nations and people, but especially in farmers

\underset{―}{36}

and businesspeople. The thirst for gold is general, occurring among all people, children and adults, increasing over time. The desire for money becomes a desire for the possession (not merely the use) of money, because money is the greatest power on earth-everything can be obtained with money. Money is thus truly Mammon on earth, Satan’s most powerful instrument of temptation.

\underset{―}{37}

Desire for money turns us away from God and toward the earth,

\underset{―}{38}

to its center, to the most noble that it affords. It is also incapable of being satisfied; everything eventually becomes nauseating, but the thirst for gold increases over time. The miser is tied to his gold, believing in its power, and gold is thus his god. Gold is not the only form of money; one can accumulate money also in property, a barn full of livestock, or a warehouse full of merchandise. Nor does the Greek word

φ ι λ α ρ γ \cup p i ́ α

refer only to “covetousness,” since it is also the root of squandering. For both, money is all that counts; one wants to accumulate it while the other wants to spend it. The one may be poor, and the other wealthy. (See the rich man in Luke 19:20-23; James 5:1; Matt. 19:22-24; Mark 10:22-27; Luke 18:22-27.) ...

The striving for money, miserliness-initially without dishonesty toward one’s neighbor-eventually becomes greed. 39 Greed is indifferent toward the means of obtaining money, and eventually this leads to pinching pennies, depriving people of their livings (James 5), usury, deceit, and illgotten gain (Titus 1:7-11; 1 Pet. 5:2). Finally it leads to theft and robberythat is, to sins against one’s neighbor. 40 ...

2. SINS INVOLVING ABUSE OF WORDS (LANGUAGE) ...

The root of these sins is the vanity or futility of the mind (Eph. 4:17), the result of being cut loose from life, from the Word, from God’s Logos. Thus words arise that are without content or vitality and ideas without reality. This is why Scripture speaks about “foolish talk” and “crude joking” (Eph. 5:4), “empty words” (Eph. 5:6), “gossips and busybodies” (1 Tim. 5:13), “irreverent babble” (1 Tim. 6:20), “empty talkers” (Titus 1:10), and “talking wicked nonsense” (3 John 10). And Jesus tells us that “on the day of judgment people will give account for every careless word they speak” (Matt. 12:36). By contrast, our “speech [should] always be gracious, seasoned with salt, so that you may know how you ought to answer each person” (Col. 4:6). ...

Such spewing of idle words comes to expression in daily interaction, in polite phrases with which we misuse language and empty words of their content. Talleyrand is correct when he says “language is created to conceal thoughts.”

\underset{―}{41}

Such phraseology leads to excessive talking, to self-deception, and to the deception of others. The word continues to have great power over people and betrays them by leading them astray, into error and heresy. All great events have been called into being by a word (such as “revolution,” “freedom,” etc.). This happens in learning and science as well. People seek and love scholarship for themselves (egoism) instead of for God. Using vain words, ideas without content, or words in which one has placed faulty content gives rise to knowledge that is “demonic” (James

3 : 15

), or to an “earthly wisdom” (2 Cor. 1:12), “to falsely called ‘knowledge’” (1 Tim. 6:20), or the “wisdom of this world” (1 Cor. 3:19).

^{42}

These result in a philosophy and a vain temptation that lead people astray with every “wind of doctrine” (Eph. 4:14). 43 Scholarship is no longer valued as a path to the truth because that is considered unattainable and is therefore reduced to desire, thirst, mere exercise. The same is true in art, the symbolized word. Art is reduced to form; it is no longer used to express the truth, to express the eternal, to express who we are. Its ideals and inspirations do not come from above, but from below. Only the figure, the form, and then, of course, the physical, the naked form, captivates-a coarse realism as in Zola, for example. 44 ...

§11. Sins against the Neighbor ...

Included in this category are all those sins in which one misuses for oneself the neighbor and all that belongs to the neighbor. One can abuse the neighbor’s chastity and property in a kind of carnal egocentricity; abusing the neighbor’s life, prestige, and good name is more demonic, spiritual. ...

1. The Neighbor's Chastity (Seventh Commandment) $^{45}$ ...

This involves sexual sins. 46 The first and most general form is “impurity” (Rom. 6:19; 2 Cor. 12:21; Gal. 5:19) and, even worse, “filthiness” (James 1:21). 47 In general, this uncleanness relates to all matters having to do with procreation, conception, and birth, all of which are mysterious. A boundary has been drawn around this mystery; it is shrouded, covered with a veil. It is to respect this mystery that shame is associated with this aspect of human life and is the reason for the purification laws of the Old Testament. Impurity comes from violating this mystery, from disrespecting it, from considering it as merely natural. This impurity begins with thoughts, but it also becomes a favored topic of discussion (among children, young men, and young women). It is fed and nurtured by the imagination, which turns abstract thought into images that are graphic, embodied, and living. The impure thought is expressed in words against which Scripture warns: “Do not let any unwholesome talk come out of your mouths” (Eph. 4:29 NIV); “You must also rid yourselves of all such things as these: anger, rage, malice, slander, and filthy language from your lips” (Col. 3:8 NIV); and “Bad company corrupts good character” (1 Cor. 15:33 NIV). ...

All this is aroused by words, by reading impure books, looking at images, and is expressed through indecent movements of the eyes, hands, gait, and the like. Scripture speaks directly to the manner in which we use and misuse our bodies. In protesting his innocence Job declares: “I have made a covenant with my eyes; / how then could I gaze at a virgin?” (Job 31:1). The psalmist prays: “Turn my eyes from looking at worthless things; / and give me life in your way” (Ps. 119:37). The wisdom literature of the Old Testament describes a wicked person this way: ...

A worthless person, a wicked man, goes about with crooked speech, ...
winks with his eyes, signals with his feet, points with his finger, ...
with perverted heart devises evil, continually sowing discord. (Prov. 6:12-14) ...

Scripture specifically also addresses women on this score: ...

The LORD says, ..."The women of Zion are haughty, ...walking along with outstretched necks, flirting with their eyes, strutting along with swaying hips, with ornaments jingling on their ankles." (Isa. 3:16 NIV; cf. 1 Tim. 2:9-10 for instruction to Christian women) ...

Nurtured in this way it becomes impurity (i.e., passion) 48 that yearns for satisfaction; this then turns a person into a slave, into an ox led to the slaughter (Prov. 7; Col. 3:5; 1 Thess. 4:5). This sinful lust was the cancer of the Roman Empire, and it continues even today. 49 It takes the form of fornication50-that is, sexual intercourse with unmarried women; here especially it becomes a sin against the neighbor. This sin also includes concubinage, which is a special form of fornication. ...

Holy Scripture contains serious warnings against this sin: “If there is a betrothed virgin, and a man meets her in the city and lies with her, then you shall bring them both out to the gate of that city, and you shall stone them to death with stones” (Deut. 22:23). Israelite men and women are forbidden to become cult prostitutes; cult prostitution is “an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deut. 23:17-18). The Old Testament prophets warn against this sin (Isa. 3; Hosea), as does the book of Proverbs (see chap. 7). The New Testament is equally clear and emphatic. The advice given to the gentile Christians by the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15) instructed them to “abstain from the things polluted by idols, and from sexual immorality, and from what has been strangled, and from blood” (v. 20, emphasis added). When Paul describes the “godless” and “wicked” in Romans 1, he observes that “God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonoring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen” (vv. 24-25). In consequence, “God gave them up to dishonorable passions” (v. 26) and “to a debased mind to do what ought not to be done” (v. 28). In 1 Corinthians, with astonishment, Paul chastises, “It is actually reported that there is sexual immorality among you, and of a kind that is not tolerated even among pagans, for a man has his father’s wife” (5:1). ...

Sexual sin is especially serious because it defiles the body of Christ: ...

Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never! Or do you not know that he who is joined to a prostitute becomes one body with her? For, as it is written, “The two will become one flesh.” But he who is joined to the Lord becomes one spirit with him. Flee from sexual immorality. Every other sin a person commits is outside the body, but the sexually immoral person sins against his own body. Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God? You are not your own, for you were bought with a price. So, glorify God in your body. (1 Cor. 6:15-20; cf. 1 Cor. 7:2; 10:7-8; 2 Cor. 12:21; Eph. 5:3; Col. 3:5; 1 Thess. 4:3; Heb. 12:16; 13:4; Rev. 21:8) ...

Fornication considers the neighbor an object and views one’s own body in a similar light, forgetting that both belong not to us but to God. As Paul noted, while other sins are “outside the body”-there the world enters ussexual sins are sins against our own bodies (1 Cor. 6:18) because the sin proceeds from the self, uses the body from the inside to the outside, and thus destroys the body with the body itself. ...

Adultery 51 is still worse. It is mentioned by itself in the Seventh Commandment because it is the apex of these sins. For this sin injures not only one’s own body and our neighbor, but in also attacking marriage and family life assaults all of God’s ordinances, overthrowing God’s order for social life. In principle, adultery is revolution and makes society impossible. In our Lord’s words: “Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard. But it was not this way from the beginning. I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another woman commits adultery” (Matt. 19:8-9 NIV; cf. Lev. 20:10-11; Deut. 22:22; Rom. 2:22; 1 Cor. 6:19; 7:2; Gal. 5:19; Eph. 5:5; James 4:4; 2 Pet. 2:14). This sin also includes polygamy (Gen. 2:23; Matt. 19:5; 1 Cor. 7:2; Eph. 5:31). ...

But even here sin does not stand still. Eventually it leads to unnatural sins such as practices associated with pedophilia and homosexuality

\underset{―}{52}

(Rom. 1:27; 1 Tim. 1:10), common especially in the Greek world, where they were not condemned, even by Socrates and Plato, and later also in Roman culture. Also included are the sins of sodomy (Lev. 20:15), incest (Gen. 19:36; 35:22; 38:18; 2 Sam. 13:14; 16:21-22; Matt. 14:4; Mark 6:18; 1 Cor. 5:1-2), and onanism along with various “unspeakable sins” that are shameful even to name (Gen. 19:5; 38:9; Exod. 22:19; Lev. 18:22-23). All these sins come to expression in today’s desired emancipation of the flesh, in publicly defended debauchery. ...

2. The Neighbor's Property (Eighth and Tenth Commandments) $^{53}$ ...

The most common form of this sin is covetousness, the longing to possess. This soon leads to the following: ...
a. Dishonesty,

\underset{―}{54}

which is often not considered a sin, allowing a person to commit it and remain respectable. This is a malady especially of the uppermiddle classes and includes such actions as not returning what was borrowed (for instance, books) or keeping it too long. “The wicked borrows but does not pay back, / but the righteous is generous and gives” (Ps. 37:21). God’s people are not to “withhold good from those to whom it is due, / when it is in your power to do it” (Prov. 3:27). This warning applies especially to those who provide loans to the poor; they must not charge interest, and “if ever you take your neighbor’s cloak in pledge, you shall return it to him before the sun goes down, for that is his only covering, and it is his cloak for his body; in what else shall he sleep? And if he cries to me, I will hear, for I am compassionate” (Exod. 22:25-27; cf. Ezek. 18:7). This is the sin of those who do not repay debts, sins committed by fraudulent bankers and unjust stewards who withhold the wages of hired servants (Lev. 19; Deut. 24:13; James 5:4). In addition, we must include not returning what was found (Deut. 22:1), begging, and earning money through dishonest practices. In general, these sins involve an abuse of power by those who are the strongest and the wealthiest. ...
b. Deceit, but under the guise of honesty.

\underset{―}{55}

Today especially this involves dealing falsely with food and merchandise, selling something defective in place of something good (Lev. 27:9-10; Prov. 11:26; Amos 8:5-6) or selling with deceitful coin and weights (Lev. 19:35; Deut. 25:13; Prov. 10:2; 20:17; Ezek. 45:9-11; Mic. 6:11). ...
c. This develops into swindling,

\underset{―}{56}

especially in the business world, committed through shortchanging in all kinds of ways. But it also happens in other areas: intellectual theft, plagiarism, pretending that something is ours when it is not or is not yet. It also includes stealing animals (Exod. 22:1). In extreme forms it involves depriving people of their rights and freedom, as in kidnapping, which is systematized in slavery (Exod. 21:16; Deut. 24:17; 1 Tim. 1:10). ...
d. Theft 57 is intentional misappropriation of the neighbor’s property. Cheating is more a matter of taking credit for someone else’s accomplishment, as expressed in Proudhon’s “property is theft!”

\underset{―}{58}

(Eph. ...

4:28; Rom. 2:21; 1 Cor. 6:10; 1 Pet. 4:15). This sin was permitted in Sparta. 59 ...
e. The worst form is robbery,

\underset{―}{60}

which is practiced even by nations (England, Prussia) and in war is virtually approved. Temple robbery

\underset{―}{61}

is a special form of this particular sin (Josh. 7; Acts 5). God also owns property that is given and consecrated to him; to assail that property is to attack God himself (2 Chron. 28:21; Mal. 3:8; Prov. 20:23). ...

3. The Neighbor's Reputation and Good Name (Ninth Commandment) ...

Our neighbor’s good name is more precious than great riches (Prov. 22:1) or fine perfume (Eccles. 7:1), and the Ninth Commandment protects it. The common basis of sins against the neighbor’s good name is the lie, which in essence is a sin against God and oneself as well as against the neighbor. Fundamentally, it is not human but devilish,

\underset{―}{62}

as Jesus told his opponents: “You are of your father the devil, and your will is to do your father’s desires. He was a murderer from the beginning, and does not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks out of his own character, for he is a liar and the father of lies” (John 8:44). The apostle John points to the same thing in his epistle: “I write to you, not because you do not know the truth, but because you know it, and because no lie is of the truth. Who is the liar but he who denies that Jesus is the Christ? This is the antichrist, he who denies the Father and the Son” (1 John 2:21-22). ...

In its essence, rather than accepting God’s reality in a receptive mode, this sin involves positing empty reality using words, creating another reality, a thought world divorced from that which is. People do this in order to create “realities” that deny and reject the things of God. Lying is a selfconscious hiding of sin under images made up of words. People try to create themselves as different from who they really are, construct a different image of themselves for public view. This is self-deception, living in the lie; our very being becomes a lie. Worse, people lie to God when they present themselves to God as different from what they are (e.g., Ananias, Acts 5:4). This is at the same time the greatest evil and the greatest folly; it is hypocrisy and Pharisaism.

\underset{―}{63}

Lying to others presumes that they are beneath us, members of a lower class, and therefore not in communion with us in any way.

\underset{―}{64}

...

Lies are classified into three categories: (a) crafty lies: simple lies, occurring merely out of desire for lying; (b) playful lies: “white” lies, in order to save oneself (e.g., Sarah, Gen. 18:15); and © emergency lies: lies of necessity to help another person or save someone from injury.

\underset{―}{65}

However, even when done for the sake of others, lying is still sin (Exod. 1:20-21). 66 “Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have put off the old self with its practices” (Col. 3:9). ...

Under lying as a general category, we can note particular sins such as suspecting others and thinking about them in a way that is contrary to the judgment of love:

\underset{―}{67}

“Judge not, that you be not judged” (Matt. 7:1); “[Love] does not dishonor others, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no record of wrongs” (1 Cor. 13:5 NIV). To lie is to construe a false image of the neighbor, as the priest Eli did of devout Hannah: “Hannah was praying in her heart, and her lips were moving but her voice was not heard. Eli thought she was drunk” (1 Sam. 1:13). It is to give evil testimony in court, as the false witnesses did against Naboth (1 Kings 21:8) and against Christ (Matt. 26:60; cf. Prov. 6:16-19; Deut. 19:16-19). It is twisting someone’s words, as the false witnesses 68 did at Jesus’s trial when they testified, “This man said, ‘I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to rebuild it in three days’” (Matt. 26:60-61; compare this with Jesus’s actual words in John 2:19-21). The false testimony against Stephen (Acts 6:13-14) was similar.

\underset{―}{69}

...

Deceit (Rom. 1:29; 3:13; 1 Pet. 2:1; 3:10; 2 Cor. 12:16) or cunning (2 Cor. 4:2; 12:16; Eph. 4:14) can occur in various forms and for various reasons.

\frac{70}{1}

Furthermore, hypocrisy occurs frequently in religion (1 Tim. 4:2; 1 Pet. 2:1; 2 Tim. 3:5). Unfaithfulness can escalate into treachery (2 Tim. 3:3-4; Rom. 1:31), as reflected in the kisses of Joab (2 Sam. 20:9) and Judas (Matt. 26:48-49). From a different perspective,

\underset{―}{71}

the lie is manifest in backbiting (public) and whisper campaigns (secret), in making public what must be kept private

\frac{72}{2}

or in simply speaking untruth about one’s neighbor. “Do not go about spreading slander among your people. Do not do anything that endangers your neighbor’s life. I am the Lord” (Lev. 19:16 NIV; cf. Pss. 15:1-3; 34:13; 64:3; 101:5). Scriptural examples include Doeg (1 Sam. 22:18-19) and Haman (Esther 3:8). ...

And then there is slander

\underset{―}{73}

(Rom. 1:30; 2 Cor. 12:20; James 4:11; 1 Pet. 2:1), which is already present when one gladly participates in talking about a neighbor’s fault, when one takes pleasure in someone else’s ruin or makes ...
someone appear ridiculous.

\underset{―}{74}

It is even worse to rail against someone: “You shall not revile God, nor curse a ruler of your people” (Exod. 22:28). Scriptural examples include Shimei, who cursed King David (2 Sam. 16:5), Ahab (1 Kings 18:17), and the Pharisees who called Jesus “demonpossessed” (John 8:48; cf. Acts 2:13; 17:6). The New Testament also describes abusive, slanderous speech with the word “reviling” (1 Cor. 5:11; 6:10), and even “blasphemy” (slander, abusive speech: Col. 3:8; 1 Tim. 1:13; Titus 3:2; Eph. 4:31). 75 In both cases, such speech attempts to turn the neighbor’s good into evil. Thanks to the civilizing influence of our age, berating occurs a lot less frequently in our day than in former times.

\frac{76}{6}

Pictet provides a threefold response to those who would defend such speech by appealing to the scriptural examples of John the Baptist, Jesus himself, and the apostle Paul, all of whom berated others (Matt. 3:7; 23:23; Gal. 3:1; Acts 13:10):

\frac{77}{(1)}

There is a great difference between us and Jesus, the apostles, and the prophets; they knew the people whom they berated in a way that is not accessible to us. (2) The Lord Jesus and the apostles were given power and authority not given to us. (3) The purpose and goal that Jesus and the apostles had in mind with their fierce denunciations differ greatly from what people generally have in mind when they berate others. ...

Finally, cursing one’s neighbor 78 is God’s prerogative alone and may be done by us only on God’s authority. Scripture provides many examples of maledictions (Gen. 9:24-25; 49:3-4; Judg. 5:23; Pss. 69; 79; 109; Jer. 10:25; Lam. 3:65-66; Matt. 23; Acts 8:20; 1 Cor. 16:22; Gal. 1:8-9; 5:12). ...

4. The Neighbor's Authority (Fifth Commandment) 79 ...

The root and general character of this sin is pride, grandiosity

\underset{―}{80}

( 1 John 2:16; 2 Tim. 3:2; James 4:16), the elevation of oneself above others, arrogance, the desire that everyone accommodate me and that nothing take priority over me. This sin has various forms: ...
a. Self-will, arrogance (Titus 1:7; 2 Pet. 2:10); always favoring one’s own opinion, always imposing it, and refusing to acknowledge any authority of rank, position, age, experience, or office; the immodesty that treats others as if they belonged to a lower class.

\underset{―}{81}

...
b. Haughtiness (Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2); being proud of rank, social position, wealth.

\underset{―}{82}

...
c. Lawlessness or licentiousness (2 Pet. 3:17); setting aside all discipline and thus arriving at fornication, seen especially in the “geniuses” (in 1770) who despised the world and its mores and considered themselves to be the norm.

\underset{―}{83}

It also comes to expression in cruel brutality (2 Tim. 3:3).

\underset{―}{84}

...
d. Boasting (1 Cor. 3:21; 4:7) and longing for fame or honor; vanity, conceit (Gal. 5:26; Phil. 2:3), especially in the case of heroes (Lamech, Odysseus) and with all pagans, which then became the origin of dueling and the like. 85 ...
e. Ingratitude (2 Tim. 3:2); refusing to acknowledge oneself as needy, as being in want; considering gratitude as a form of self-abasement. (For example, Satan, who received everything from God, is the most ungrateful and hates God.)

^{86}

...

These sins, then, rise to the level of disdain and contempt, of discarding the neighbor, of rejecting authority in the family, society, and state. This leads to revolution and rebellion, insurgency, and anarchy and, on the other hand, to despotism and tyranny (Rom. 13:2; Titus 1:6-10; Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2). This particular sin is a matter of discarding the law and pushing back against all limits while declaring human autonomy, rights, and freedom (2 Pet. 2:10; Jude 8-10).

\underset{―}{87}

...

5. The Neighbor's Life (Sixth Commandment) ...

In general, sins against this commandment deny that our neighbors have equal rights as image-bearers of God (Gen. 9:6) and see them as hindrances, as being beneath us. 88 The result is heartlessness-a loss of natural affection, lovelessness (Rom. 1:31); the lack of all compassion and mercy; harshness; viewing the stranger as an enemy, as a barbarian, as someone of a lower order, of different descent. 89 Beyond this, anger and dislike develop. Wrath as such is not wrong since God himself displays wrath. However, in humans, anger is usually associated with what the Greeks called

θ u μ o ́ ς

- that is, temper, agitation, and impetuosity-and Scripture warns against it (Job 36:18; Ps. 4:4; Prov. 29:22; Matt. 5:22; Eph. 4:26-31; Col. 3:8; James 1:19). ...

Jealousy is also attributed to God but without egocentric, personal, earthly admixtures. 90 Bitterness (Eph. 4:31; Heb. 3:8) is a kind of inner fury or wrath. 91 Envy (Prov. 14:30; Eccles. 4:4; Rom. 1:29; 1 Cor. 13:4; 2 Cor. ...

12:20; Gal. 5:20; Phil. 1:15; 1 Tim. 6:4; Titus 3:3; James 3:14; 4:5; 1 Pet. 2:1) is the desire to destroy the neighbor’s happiness. 92 Envy often leads to gloating (Prov. 24:17; 1 Cor. 13:6). 93 Hatred (Lev. 19:17; Prov. 15:17; Matt. 5:23-24; 24:10; 1 John 2:9-11; Titus 3:3) is the desire to destroy the person of the neighbor, God’s creature; it is to murder the neighbor in thought. 94 Thirst for revenge is forbidden because vengeance belongs to God (Prov. 25:21; Matt. 5:39; Rom. 12:17-19; 1 Pet. 3:9). Outward expressions of this sin, such as quarreling, wrangling, dissension, and strife95 (Rom. 1:29; 13:13; 1 Cor. 1:11; 3:3), are wrath turned into words and deeds; so too fighting, murder-destroying the image of God. Blood feuds and duels are also condemned by this commandment. ...

§12. Sins against God ...

The root and basic form of this sin is unbelief

\underset{―}{66}

-that is, not accepting God as he is, and not taking him at his word, rather than simply believing him as he has revealed himself. Unbelief is really a negation of God, making him out to be a liar; it is a denial of his truth and faithfulness-thus a denial of God himself. 97 This unbelief can develop in either of two ways: (a) we try to make God equal to ourselves by bringing him down, or (b) we make ourselves equal to God by elevating ourselves. ...

1. Sins of a More Sensual Nature ...

These are sins in which one misuses God for one’s own benefit-namely, careless use of his name (that is, using that name as an expletive for emphasis, to confirm one’s own speech) and thoughtless, careless speaking of that name (that is, toying with God or joking with God like children do with each other on the playground). This is the sin not only of those who curse but especially of church leaders who misuse God’s name in thoughtless prayer, special “sacred language” in preaching, praying, or pastoral calls. This sin escalates to testing God-that is, desiring that God reveal himself more clearly (Exod. 17:2-7; 1 Cor. 10:9), including desiring this from Christ (1 Cor. 10:9) and from the Holy Spirit (Acts 8:18-23; also see Num. 14:22; Deut. 6:16; Ps. 78:18-22; Mal. 3:15; Acts 15:10). This sin includes craving miracles (Matt. 16:1-4) and mighty deeds from God to ...
satisfy our amusement and curiosity. Trickery or deceit 98 (Eph. 4:14) is a step further, playing with God, speculating with him to bring him to our side or turn him toward us (see Balaam in Num. 22-24). We try to use God especially in gambling, 99 which is a misuse of God’s providence for one’s own benefit, one’s own purpose. ...

Here already we are on the path to superstition.

\underset{―}{100}

Superstition is the sum of a few remnants of an expired religion that continue alongside a new religion. In this case, we have pagan remnants among Christian people, such as belief in witches, ghosts, and werewolves. Modernists, that is to say, rationalists, explain Christianity, especially Israel’s religion, as superstition. 101 Such superstition is a slippery slope. Sorcery is the attempt to incline God to us through all kinds of actions, formulas, and incantations. 102 Examples from Scripture include Simon the sorcerer (Acts 8:9), Bar Jesus (Acts 13:6), and the seven sons of Sceva (Acts 19:13-16). The New Testament condemns sorcery (Gal. 5:20; Rev. 9:21) and bewitching (Gal. 3:1). These are not really a matter of tempting God but of apostasy from God, latching on to evil powers and praying to them to perform something or other. Sorcery assumes the reality of Satan and evil spirits (Exod. 22:18; Lev. 20:6, 27). Other forms of this sin are necromancy (1 Sam. 28:7) and fortune-telling-misusing God or evil spirits in order to know the future. The same is true for magic. 103 ...

To this we may add the misuse of the Sabbath-that is, in general, turning the service of God to one’s own use and benefit. 104 The most terrible among these is hypocrisy (1 Tim. 4:2; 1 Pet. 2:1; 2 Tim. 3:5).

\underset{―}{105}

These take on a “form of godliness” but do not have it. 106 This can come to expression in gross or more refined forms.

\underset{―}{107}

...

2. Sins That Are More Spiritual $^{108}$ ...

The root and basic form of this sin is especially pride, the desire to be like God (Sir. 10:12-13).

\underset{―}{109}

This sin resides in the spirit, is the opposite of surrender and love, and demands that everything be subject to it. The first form of this sin is idolatry 110 and is forbidden by the First Commandment (cf. Gal. 5:20; 1 Cor. 5:11; 6:9; 10:7; 1 Pet. 4:3). In itself it is a matter of indifference what one honors as God - whether it be a statue, one’s own ideas, thoughts, or genius, humanity (Comte), the belly, or many other things. It is all idolatry-to embellish or have something else in which to ...
place one’s trust instead of the true God revealed in Jesus Christ. 111 This pride was found especially in Cain, Lamech, the tower of Babel, and whoever places “man-as-god” on the throne. 112 And this idolatry of humanity leads gradually to idolatry in a more specific sense (worship of images and the like), to the adoration and worship of human handiworkthe creature. This worship of images (the Second Commandment) was the real sin of Jeroboam; it is self-willed religion 113 (Col. 2:23). It represents an attempt to seek salvation in ways other than those prescribed by God, such as through one’s one reason or virtue. This unbelief also is manifest in those who are “offended” by Christ (Isa. 8:14; Rom. 9:32; 11:9; 1 Pet. 2:7), which is unbelief in God’s revelation combined with reluctance and contempt (Matt. 11:6; 13:57; 26:31-33; Mark 6:3; 14:27, 29; John 6:61; 1 Cor. 1:23). 114 This sin presupposes that someone feels injured or insulted (because of wisdom or wealth) by Christ’s coming and action. This reaction is very common among intelligent, proud, rich people, and it often escalates to complaining, murmuring against God. Finally, it leads to hardened denial of God, to imagining that there is no God and acting that out. Sometimes this is ineffective, and then despondency arises, despair about God; often this may also be the result of past sins, which cannot be undone. This despair then frequently leads to suicide, as in the case of King Saul and Judas, as well as Ahithophel (2 Sam. 17:23) and Zimri (1 Kings 16:18). In the pagan world, suicide is thought to be permissible, sometimes even praised (Cato, Brutus). The most terrifying forms of this sin of pride are “blasphemy” (2 Tim. 3:2),

\underset{―}{115}

which is consciously, intentionally slandering and insulting God in Christ, and perjury (1 Tim. 1:10), which is tempting God by using God himself as a means to sin. 116 The worst of all these sins is blaspheming the Holy Spirit. 117 ...

Finally, we consider the development and history of sin, first, on the individual level,

\underset{―}{118}

which is shown already with the first sin in Paradise: ...

There is an opportunity for sinning, a possibility (posited by God objectively and subjectively through a probationary command and human free will). ...
There is external temptation which comes to us in three ways: (a) by Satan (Gen. 3:15; Job 1:7; Matt. 12:43-45; 13:19; Luke 22:31; John 8:44; 2 Cor. 2:11; Eph. 2:2; 1 Pet. 5:8; Rev. 12:9), who for that reason ...
is called the Tempter (Matt. 4:3; 1 Thess. 3:5); (b) by the world (John 15:19; 1 John 3:13); and © by our own flesh (Rom. 7:23; Gal. 5:17; James 1:14). 119 The means used include delusions of grandeur, treasures, favors, friendship, sensuality, and indications of potential oppression, persecution, and slander. ...
And then comes gradual compliance, rationalization, inclination of the heart, and completion of the deed. $\underset{―}{120}$ And from this flows forth every subsequent sin (James 1:15), but with a difference. There is now within us a desire that provides a point of contact with sin; this starting point that dwells within us facilitates the pull of Satan and the world. Satan’s playground in us is easier. All sin begins with suggestion (when sinful thoughts arise from within or without), followed by meditation (clinging to that thought and cherishing it in the imagination), delighting in it (enjoying it and being inclined toward it), and agreeing with it (yielding and acquiescing to it). $\underset{―}{121}$ ...

There is still more. Every sin paves the way for additional sins; sin gives birth to more sin. “The curse of the evil deed is that, propagating still, it must ever bring forth evil” (Schiller).

\underset{―}{122}

Sin is a slippery slope. There is a law of sin’s development. Every sin makes it easier for the next one to be committed. Every person is polluted by original sin, and thus (a) the possibility of all sins-that is, the root of all sins-lies in each one of us; and (b) thanks to our birth and the environment within which we are raised, the inclination to specific sins varies among people. Examples are a hereditary propensity to alcoholism or an environment filled with cursing. Our hereditary pollution develops in a certain direction, and when we walk in that direction we gradually pick up speed. This second inclination is a particular inheritance that must be distinguished from our general human inherited original sin, though they are connected. ...

The sins of drunkenness, lust, stealing, or other sins gradually become habit or custom. This is why we distinguish habit from deed and sinful nature or inclination from sinful deed. 123 Contrary to Rome’s teaching, which does not count unacquiesced concupiscence as sin, we consider that sinful inclination itself to be sinful. Not only the deed but also the crooked inclination is sinful. 124 Not only the positive transgression but also the negative deficiency, the lack of original justice, is sin. 125 When someone commits a particular sin, then this becomes a vice,

\underset{―}{126}

a constant inclination ...
to do evil, originating through continuing repetition of the sin. Passions must be controlled; they are not sinful in themselves. 127 Slander must be rooted out. Gradually seven sins came to be acknowledged as cardinal sins within Christian ethics: pride, greed, luxury, envy, gluttony, anger, and sloth. 128 Rome still acknowledges these seven. However, the most grievous sins, those against God, are not mentioned. The Reformers therefore enumerated differently: sins against God, against others, and against oneself. ...

There is also a history, a development in the sin of the human race: of family, clan, people, humanity. Every age, clan, family, people, calling (business/agriculture, soldiers, students, fishermen, sailors), social position, era, century, environment, and climate/soil has its own sins of sensuality and pleasure, ambition, pride, vanity, weakness, cruelty, indifference, anxiety, extravagance or miserliness, tribalism, socialism, and so forth. Eastern, western, southern, and northern nations, pagan and Christian nations all differ, as do youths and adults and the elderly, girls and women. This gives rise to sins of the family, of the clan, of the people, as well as of particular classes and professions. Scripture speaks of a world 129 that is in the hands of the Evil One, with Satan as its head as the god of this age (John 14:30; Gal. 6:14; 1 John 2:14-16; 5:19). And then these sins turn into what the Bible calls “sins that cry out to heaven”: murder (Gen. 4:10), sodomy (Gen. 18:20), oppression of the poor (widows and orphans, Exod. 22:22-24), and withholding wages (Exod. 3:7; Lev. 19:13; Deut. 24:14; James 5:4). 130 And this is the process that occurs in the lives of the nations: moral strength followed by decay. For example, the descendants of Cain, humanity before the flood, the Canaanites in Canaan, Greeks, Romans (see Paul in Rom. 1-2), Jews (accursed throughout the entire world). The same occurs in more recent times: Paris (which da Costa called “Sodom”), Vienna, London. And so it will continue until the antichrist (Matt. 24:12; 2 Thess. 2:6; Revelation). ...

In the situation of sin, people occupy different states.

\underset{―}{131}

...

The state of bondage: $\underset{―}{132}$ Here people live unconsciously under the yoke of the law (Rom. 7:7), following their natural instincts, but do not know that they are transgressors. ...
The state of security: 133 Acknowledging that we cannot save ourselves, people give up trying, but live at rest in Zion, comfortable ...
in their own acceptability as basically good and decent people. ...
The state of hypocrisy: $\underset{―}{134}$ Persistently resisting the work of God within and refusing to follow the divine stirrings of one’s heart by not breaking decisively with sin’s dominion leads one to hypocrisy (Matt. 23:23-33). In their hearts people do want to confess that their consciences accuse them, but they are unwilling to repent, wanting rather to continue in their egocentric ways, according to the foolish promptings of their hearts. What shows outwardly is a virtuous respectability and the appearance of a God-blessed life. Eventually it is too much, and they enter the state of hardening. ...
The state of hardening: 135 Caught up in a web of lies and deceit, people finally begin to believe their own lies and shut themselves irrevocably to the truth. The Bible illustrates this with the example of Pharaoh and the sin against the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12:32; Luke 12:10). Stubborn unbelief becomes a condition from which redemption is impossible, because the person defiantly refuses to be redeemed. ...

10. Ed. note: “Marcus Gavius Apicius is believed to have been a Roman gourmet and lover of luxury, who lived sometime in the 1st century AD, during the reign of Tiberius. The Roman cookbook Apicius is often attributed to him, though it’s impossible to prove the connection” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcus_Gavius_Apicius). ...
11. Ed. note: Publius Septimus Geta (AD 189-211) was a Roman emperor who ruled with his father Septimus Severus and his older brother Caracalla from 209 until his death. According to the late Roman collection of imperial biographies, the Historia Augusta, Geta was a man of intemperate desires: “As a youth, he was handsome, brusque in his manners though not disrespectful, incontinent in love, gluttonous, and a lover of food and of wine variously spiced.” “Life of Antonius Geta” 4.1 (Historia Augusta 2:39 [trans. Magie]). ...
12. Ed. note: Marcus Aurelius Antonius Augustus (commonly known as Elagabalus after the SyroRoman sun god whose cult statue he brought to Rome) was Roman emperor from AD 218 to 222 and had a reputation for sexual debauchery. According to historian Edward Gibbon, “Elagabalus abandoned himself to the grossest pleasure and ungoverned fury, and soon found disgust and satiety in the midst of his enjoyments” (Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1:187 [chap. 6]). ...
13. Ed. note: Bavinck includes in his list two other names for reasons not apparent to the editor: Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus Augustus (218-68, emperor from 253 to 268) and Mithridates. The latter name is clearly taken from the Persian deity Mithra, who was the inspiration for the Mithraic mysteries that became popular in the Roman Empire from the first to the fourth century AD. Bavinck may have intended a general reference to the cult, which was popular in the Roman army and therefore led to numerous Roman rulers naming themselves Mithridates. ...
14. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 642. ...
15. Gesenius, Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon, s.v. “שֵׁכָר.” ...
16. Ed. note: Bavinck cites the Greek proverb "

\hat{η}

uć

θ η

urkpò

μ α v i^{'} α

ćotív"; he is likely quoting Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:264. ...
17. Prov. 23:29-35 (NIV): ...

Who has woe? Who has sorrow? ...
Who has strife? Who has complaints? ...
Who has needless bruises? Who has bloodshot eyes? ...
Those who linger over wine, who go to sample bowls of mixed wine. ...
Do not gaze at wine when it is red, when it sparkles in the cup, when it goes down smoothly! ...
In the end it bites like a snake and poisons like a viper. ...
Your eyes will see strange sights, and your mind will imagine confusing things. ...
You will be like one sleeping on the high seas, lying on top of the rigging. ...
“They hit me,” you will say, “but I’m not hurt! ...
They beat me, but I don’t feel it! ...
When will I wake up so I can find another drink?” ...
18. Ed. note: Bavinck cites as support for this Abraham Kuyper’s antirevolutionary political platform, Ons Program (see esp. pp. 344, 899, 901, and 1016-23); ET: Our Program, 304, 318. ...
19. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 637. ...
20. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:261-67. ...
21. DO: traagheidszonden; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:268; Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 677-81; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.i. 11 [4:543]. ...
22. Italian original: dolce far niente. ...
23. FO: Après nous le déluge. Ed. note: In this form, the saying is attributed to the famous official mistress of Louis XV of France (1710-74), Madame de Pompadour (1721-64). In its more familiar form, “Après moi le déluge” (“After me comes the deluge”), it is usually attributed to the king himself. See Laguna, “Après moi.” ...
24. GrO: ákn

δ i_{α}

. ...
25. GrO:

φ 1 λ α v τ i ́ α

. ...

27. Ed. note: This is the first line of a hymn found in Evangelische Gezangen, no. 31, p. 59, to be sung to the melody of Ps. 65 (Peter Dathenus). Here is the entire first stanza (translated by John Bolt): ...

O sterveling! Gevoel uw waarde ...	O, mortal, feel your worth, ...
Wat u in’ t stof nog vleit, ...	What still flatters you as dust, ...
Uw hart is veel te groot voor d' aarde ...	Your heart is much too great for earth, ...
Gij leeft voor d’ eeuwigheid: ...	You live for eternity: ...
Bepaald uw grootheid niet; ...	By time that sinks everything; ...
Gij ziet voor uw volmaking blinken ...	You see an endless horizon ...
Een eindeloos verschiet. ...	Shining for your perfection. ...

The translation of the last four lines involves some rearrangement to satisfy English grammatical sense. ...
28. GrO: а́катабтабі́а; DO: onbestendigheid (“instability, unsettledness, inconstancy”). ...
29. DO: onbestendigheid. ...
30. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 661. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck added: “dancing, [card] playing, theater.” This famous trio also earned the ire of Abraham Kuyper, who in his Stone Lecture on “Calvinism and Religion” (lecture no. 2), after insisting that the world order with God’s creation ordinances is something that Calvinists, unlike Anabaptists, embrace rather than avoid (“Thus the fear of God is imparted to the whole of life as a reality-into the family, and into society, into science and art, into personal life, and into the political career”), makes the startling claim that “this admits of only one exception. . . . Not every intimate intercourse with the unconverted world is deemed lawful, by Calvinism, for it placed a barrier against the too unhallowed influence of this world by putting a distinct ‘veto’ upon three things, card playing, theatres, and dancing-three forms of amusement.” Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, 72-74. ...
31. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 739. ...
32. LO: multa; multum. Ed. note: Bavinck here reverses the classic Latin proverb non multa, sed multum (“not many, but much” or “not quantity, but quality”), attributed to Pliny the Younger (AD 61-ca. 113). ...
33. Ed. note: What Bavinck describes in this paragraph is uncannily similar to what is called “postmodernism” more than one hundred years later. The paragraph, and especially the last sentence, also expresses Bavinck’s skepticism and concern about the Cartesian model. ...
34. GrO:

φ 1 λ α ρ γ v ρ i ́ α

. ...
35. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck inserted “ramp” = “disaster, calamity.” ...
36. Ed. note: Bavinck’s comment about farmers needs to be understood in the context of late nineteenth-century Dutch class structure with its clear distinction between wealthy, land-owning “farmers” (boeren) and peasant farm laborers (arbeiders). ...
37. Kuyper, “Geldgierigheid is een wortel van alle kwaad” (“Love of Money Is a Root of All Evil”), a meditation on 1 Tim. 6:10; also see Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno, 4:222, 279. Ed. note: In the ...
margin Bavinck observes that faith in the power of money is reflected in men such as Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902), the British colonialist, businessman, mining magnate, and South African politician who founded the territory of Rhodesia and established the Rhodes Scholarship, and in trusts such as the Morgan. ...
38. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck added “stof” (“matter, dust”). ...
39. GrO:

π λ ε o v ε ξ

ía. ...
40. Covered in §11; cf. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 747-55. ...
41. FO: la langue est faite pour cacher les pensées. Ed. note: Charles Maurice de TalleyrandPérigord (1754-1838) was a career civil servant during France’s turbulent times from Louis XVI through King Louis Philippe. The saying is also given in another version and attributed to Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle [1783-1842]): “La parole a été donnée à l’homme pour cacher sa pensée” (http://www.linternaute.com/citation/4058/la-parole-a-ete-donnee-a-l-homme-pour-cacher-sa--stendhal/). ...

43. GrO: ávɛщос тทิৎ ઈıઠaoкa入íac. ...
44. Ed. note: Émile Édouard Charles Antoine Zola (1840-1902), French journalist, novelist, and playwright, was a leading exemplar of nineteenth-century literary naturalism, a movement that highlighted the dark side of life, human vice, and misery (Berg, “Zola”). ...
45. Ed. note: Bavinck included parenthetical references to specific commandments in the Decalogue only for no. 4 (the Fifth Commandment) and no. 5 (the Sixth Commandment) below. The explicit references to the Seventh Commandment (no. 1), the Eighth and Tenth Commandments (no. 2), and the Ninth Commandment (no. 3) were added by the editor. ...
46. Cf. the exposition of the Seventh Commandment in Calvin, Institutes, II.viii.41-44; Ursinus, Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 41; Daneau, Ethices Christianae, 2:208-32 (II.xiv); Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 639, 652-57; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.iii. 5 [4:650]; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:249. ...
47. GrO: áк

α θ α ρ σ i^{'} α

;

ρ

π α

pía. ...
48. GrO:

π α ́ θ o ζ

. ...
49. Ed. note: Bavinck added the abbreviated titles of two novels in parentheses at this point, Eugène de Mirecourt’s Eugène Sue (Paris, 1855) and Émile Zola’s Nana (Paris, 1880), as well as the title of an 1882 Dutch translation of Thomas Otway’s play Venice Preserv’d: Or, a Plot Discover’d (London, 1682). ...
50. GrO:

π o ρ v ε i ́ α

; LO: scortatio. ...
51. GrO: polxɛía; LO: adulterium. ...
52. GrO: àpoevoкоíтทs. ...
53. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 498; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.iii. 6 [4:656]. ...
54. DO: oneerlijkheid. ...
55. DO: bedrog, maar onder schijn van eerlijkheid. ...
56. DO: dieverij. ...
57. DO: diefstal. ...
58. GO: Erwerb; FO: la propriété, c’est le vol! Ed. note: Bavinck attributed this saying to François Marie Charles Fourier (1772-1837), but it is usually credited to the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), who wrote the following in his 1840 book What Is Property? Or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government: ...

If I were asked to answer the following question: What is slavery? and I should answer in one word, It is murder!, my meaning would be understood at once. No extended argument would be required to show that the power to remove a man’s mind, will, and personality, is the power of life and death, and that it makes a man a slave. It is murder. Why, then, to this other question: What is property? may I not likewise answer, It is robbery!, without the certainty of being ...
misunderstood；the second proposition being no other than a transformation of the first？（Proudhon，No Gods，No Masters，55－56） ...
The confusion is understandable since both men were radical French thinkers of the nineteenth century and were born in Besançon，France．Nonetheless，Fourier was a utopian socialist and Proudhon an anarchist． ...

59．Ed．note：In the margin Bavinck added：＂Great and small both steal，but the great steal the most．＂ ...

60．DO：roof；GrO：

λ

njotɛía． ...
61．GrO：ícpoov入ía． ...
62．Vilmar，Theologische Moral，1：311－21（§27）． ...
63．Pictet，De christelyke zedekunst，547．Christian Science considers all reality an illusion，as did the Libertines in an earlier age． ...

64．DO：levensgemeenschap． ...
65．LO：mendacium dolosum；mendacium jocosum；mendacium necessarium，officiosum．Ed．note： Bavinck adds to this list＂banter＂and，citing Eph．5：4，insists that this too is sin．How it fits in the catalogue of lies is not entirely clear．The classic threefold division that Bavinck uses here can be found in Aquinas，

S T

IIa IIae q． 110. ...

66．Ursinus，Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism，Lord＇s Day 44．Ed．note：Bavinck provides the story of the Hebrew midwives who lied to Pharoah（Exod．1：20－21）as proof here，but this may be difficult to square with the text of Exodus，because we are told that＂God dealt well with the midwives．And the people multiplied and grew very strong．And because the midwives feared God，he gave them families．＂Bavinck is here faithfully reproducing the thought of Ursinus，who says the following in his commentary on Lord＇s Day 44：＂Officious lies are often defended by bringing forward the Egyptian midwives，who lied to the king，and were nevertheless blessed of God；but God did not bless them because they had lied，but because they feared him and would not slay the children of Israel．＂While this may be technically correct（v． 17 points to their fear of God as the reason for not obeying the king＇s command），the narrator in Exod． 1 puts＂So God dealt well with the midwives ．．．＂immediately after the report of their lie． ...

67．Pictet，De christelyke zedekunst， 525. ...
68．GrO：ұɛv סоца́ртvрɛс． ...
69．Pictet，De christelyke zedekunst， 541. ...
70．GrO：ઈо́入ос；лаvoupүía． ...
71．Pictet，De christelyke zedekunst， 525. ...
72．Ed．note：Bavinck references 1 Pet．4：8 at this point for reasons that are not apparent． ...
73．DO：achterklap；GrO：к

α τ α λ α λ 1 α ́

. ...
74．Vilmar，Theologische Moral，1：383． ...
75．GrO：入оіборі́а；

β λ α σ φ η μ i^{'} α

． ...
76．Ed．note：Between the lines Bavinck added：＂Cf．Calvin，Molière．＂ ...
77．Pictet，De christelyke zedekunst，425．Ed．note：Bavinck omitted Pictet’s three responses that follow；they have been supplied here by the editor． ...

78．Pictet，De christelyke zedekunst，398．Ed．note：In the margin Bavinck added＂cursing out，in military service．On this，see debate in Second Chamber［of the Dutch Parliament］on the Military Code，May 1902．＂ ...

79．Vilmar，Theologische Moral，1：348． ...
80．Ed．note：In the margin Bavinck added＂every human being，an image of God．＂ ...
81．DO：eigenzinnigheid；GrO：aúӨа́бŋ૬． ...
82．DO：hoovaardigheid；GrO：útɛยрираvía． ...
83．DO：losbandigheid；GrO：

α a ε σ μ i^{'} α

．Ed．note：Bavinck is referring to the importance placed on ＂genius＂by the＂Storm and Stress＂（Sturm und Drang）movement in German literature and music primarily in the decade of the 1770s and represented by such figures as Goethe，Haman，Schiller， ...

Haydn, and Mozart, among others. Heroes in literary works of the movement are driven to violent action not by noble or rational motives but by subjective desires. Goethe’s introspective novel of hopeless love and eventual suicide, Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (The Sorrows of Young Werther, 1774), is one of the most famous exemplars of the movement. For recent discussion of this see Ehrich-Haefeli, “Die Kreativität de ‘Genies.’” Also see Nicholls, Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic. ...
84. DO: brutaliteit; wreed; GrO:

α

'vท́

μ ε ρ o ζ

. ...
85. DO: roemzucht; GrO: каvха́оцаı, каúхпна; кદvoбоңía; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:354. ...
86. DO: ondankbaarheid; GrO: а́xápıotoc. ...
87. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:368. ...
88. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:370. ...
89. GrO: áซtopyoc; LO: hostis, hospes. ...
90. GrO:

ζ \hat{η} λ o ζ;

Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 734. ...
91. GrO:

π

ıкрі́а; GO: Ingrimm; Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:378. ...
92. GrO:

φ

Өо́voc. ...
93. GO: Schadenfreude; Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 795. Ed. note: Between the lines Bavinck added: “La Rochefoucauld: in the misfortune of our best friends, etc.” This is a reference to the French author of countless maxims, François de La Rochefoucauld (1613-80). The specific maxim is “In the misfortunes of our best friends we always find something not altogether displeasing to us” (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/f/francoisde151034.html). ...
94. GrO:

μ \hat{ı} σ \circ ζ;

Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 728. ...
95. GrO: દ̌pıç; દ́pı日ɛía. ...
96. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.ii. 6 [4:571]. ...
97. Cf. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 140. ...
98. GrO: кußɛía; DO: bedriegerij. ...
99. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.ii. 11 [4:605]. ...
100. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:324; Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 151; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.ii. 13 [4:614]. ...
101. DO: bijgeloof; LO: superstitio. ...
102. Ed. note: Bavinck’s term here is “theurgy” (theurgia), from the Greek

θ ε o v ρ γ

ía (“sorcery”). But the texts he cites use

μ α

γ

о (“magician”) in the first two instances and

ε \bar{ε}

そоркıot

\hat{ω} v

(“exorcists”) in the last. In the immediately following sentence Bavinck uses two addition terms,

φ α ρ μ α κ ε i^{'} α

(“sorcery”) and

β α σ κ α i ́ v ω

(“bewitch”). ...
103. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:326. ...
104. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.ii. 15 [4:623]; Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 227. ...
105. GrO: úло́крютс; DO: huichelarij. ...
106. GrO:

μ

óp

φ ω σ ι v ε u^{v} σ ε β ε i ́ α ς

. ...
107. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:315; Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 154; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.i. 8 [4:536]. ...
108. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:327. ...
109. LO: superbia. ...
110. GrO:

ε i δ ω λ o λ α τ ρ i ́ α; DO : a f g o d e r i j

. ...
111. Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 34, Q&A 95: “Idolatry is having or inventing something in which one trusts in place of or alongside of the only true God, who has revealed himself in the Word.” ...
112. Ed. note: Bavinck indicates that this is “according to Steketee’s interpretation” (lezing); he likely has in mind Steketee, Babel. ...
113. GrO:

ε \dot{θ} θ λ

θ ρ η σ κ

ía. ...
114. GrO:

σ κ α v δ α λ i ́ ζ ε σ θ α u

. ...
115. Ed. note: Readers of modern English versions (e.g., ESV, NIV, NRSV) might never realize that Paul includes “blasphemers” in his list of “last day sinners,” because these versions translate

β λ α ́ σ φ η μ o l

as “abusive.” The KJV has “blasphemers.” ...
116. GrO:

β λ α ́ σ φ η μ ol

; દ́лเóркоıç. ...
117. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:343. ...
118. Cf. Luthardt, Kompendium der theologischen Ethik, 81-83 (§21: “Die Entwickelung der Sünde”). ...
119. Ed. note: Bavinck’s three sources of temptation are taken straight from the Heidelberg Catechism’s explanation of the sixth petition in the Lord’s Prayer (“Lead us not into temptation”), which speaks of the Christian’s three “sworn enemies, the devil, the world, and our own flesh . . . [who] never stop attacking us” (Lord’s Day 52, Q&A 127). ...
120. Ed. note: In the margin Bavinck provided an alternative progression: “doubt, unbeliefunderstanding, fascination, imagination, delighting, resolve of will, deed” (twijfel, ongeloofverstand, bekoring, verbeelding, delectatio, wilsbesluit, daad). ...
121. LO: suggestio; meditatio; imaginatio; delectatio; consensus. ...
122. GO: “Das eben ist der Fluch der bösen Tat, daß sie, fortzeugend, immer Böses muß gebären.” ...

Ed. note: An aphorism from Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), Wallenstein 2, Die Piccolomini, act 5, scene 1, spoken by Octavio Piccolomini. ...
123. LO: habitus; actus. ...
124. LO: actio; inclinatio prava. ...
125. LO: carentia justitiae (originalis). ...
126. DO: ondeugd; GO: Laster; LO: vitium. ...
127. DO: hartstochten; GO: Leidenschaften. ...
128. LO: superbia, avaritia, luxuria, invidia, gula, ira, acedia. ...
129. GrO: ко́оцос. ...
130. LO: clamitat ad coelum vox sanguinis et sodomorum, vox oppressorum, merces detenta laborum. Luthardt, Kompendium der theologischen Ethik, 84 (§22.5). ...
131. Ed. note: Bavinck simply listed the four states of sin; they are taken from Scharling, Christliche Sittenlehre, 184-88 (§15). ...
132. LO: status servitutis. ...
133. LO: status securitatis. ...
134. LO: status hypocriseos. ...
135. LO: status indurationis. ...

4 The Fallen Image of God ...

Sin seeks to destroy and annihilate everything. But God did not allow that to happen because he had a different and higher purpose for humanity-namely, a people to proclaim his praise. God maintains his creation and tempers the inclination to evil. He did not need to do it; that he does is a gift. All of life and all of humanity are under judgment and fall within the purview of patience, of God’s forbearance. Thanks to God’s forbearance we have the gift of life itself, the capacities of our bodies and souls, including understanding and will, our feelings and passions. ...

What is impaired but not lost is the soul’s mastery over the body; our bodies are often prisons for our souls and eventually our bodies completely fail our souls. What is lost completely is true knowledge in the mind and holiness in the will; we are spiritually dead and incapable of any spiritual good. Holy Scripture does not call the supernatural life that conforms to God “moral” but “holy,” using words like “righteousness,” “sanctification,” “godliness,” and expressions like “the fear of God.” The ability to do the good, the supernatural, God-pleasing, eternal-life-deserving good, is totally lost. ...

At the same time, not only do we retain natural goods like eating, drinking, sleeping, and walking; some relative moral good also remains. We agree with Augustine that there can be no virtue without righteousness and no righteousness without faith, that the virtues of the pagans are but “splendid vices.” Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge gradations in evil even when pagans seek virtue to entertain themselves, to fulfill their desires, to exalt ...
themselves in their own eyes. Acknowledging that certain pagan philosophers (Plato) said some sensible things about God and spiritual matters, Calvin judged that this only heightened their inexcusability; because they lacked faith they also lacked true knowledge and true virtue. ...

Furthermore, Reformed theologians believed that the moral virtues of the pagans came from the general operation of the Holy Spirit and did not arise from any innate ability of the human will. That is why some preferred to use the term “virtue” for pagan morality and reserve the term “good works” for Christian morality. The former is considered under philosophical ethics, and the latter under specifically Christian ethics. These two differ in their foundations, their norms, and their goals. ...

Human dominion over nature has been weakened and robbed of its spiritual character, but not eliminated; it has been impeded, but not destroyed. Science and scholarship bear witness to the human yearning for knowledge of earthly things. Philosophy and the natural sciences are gifts from God that must not be rejected or despised. Art in the broader sense of subjecting the earth and making it an instrument for the blessing of humanity is a power, like science, that can be used for or against God. Scripture, however, does point to progress in culture. ...

§13. The Image of God in Fallen Human Beings¹ ...

Sin is a corrupting and ravaging power. The principle and objective of sin do not permit sin to rest until it has totally and absolutely corrupted everything, all that exists. Sin would also destroy everything, since all that exists has substance as physical substratum, which is something good that God created and maintains. Sin is a destructive fury. It is nihilism!? The “no” exists only through the “yes,” but endeavors to destroy the “yes” and thus destroy itself. Sin devours everything else and itself.

\underset{―}{3}

Once sin had entered the human race, it would have totally corrupted and even destroyed and exterminated humanity if left to work undisturbed. But God did not ...
allow that to happen; he had a different and higher purpose for our race. He wanted to prepare for himself a people taken from the corrupt mass of humanity, 4 a people to proclaim his praise, a body for the Son, a temple for the Holy Spirit. For this reason, God often acts in history to counter this destructive fury.

\underset{―}{5}

He reins in and bridles the destructive power of sin through punishments, pestilences, judgments, and devastations by natural forces. In this way, he moves nations and individuals to righteousness, penitence, national conversion, and seriousness of life, and limits and restrains dissoluteness. This happened in the time of Noah and at the building of the tower of Babel, it happened to Sodom and to the Canaanites, and it is also happening at present. These are all particular acts of God in history. ...

But God also works with the entire human race more generally. Immediately after the fall, God delayed both eternal and temporal death. God also mitigated spiritual death in various ways. Spiritual death consists of the inability to do good and the inclination to evil, to live for sin and unto death. In many ways, God tempers this inclination to evil. From the fall onward, human life and humanity itself have come under the purview of common grace. 6 It is not self-evident that humanity should exist. That we do exist and enjoy blessings is not simply grounded in the order of creation, because our sin forfeits our right to exist as well as the content of our life. Nevertheless, as we distinguish the two spheres of creation and redemption, common grace belongs to the sphere of creation. This fruit of common grace-being allowed to retain something of what we by nature possessed in Adam-we must not forget, is a gift of grace; it is not ours by right or covenant. It is in this sense that we also speak of natural theology, natural morality, and natural law. Even though we retain them only as gifts, they are remnants, graciously left behind for us, of what we once possessed by nature. Leaving them for us and giving them to us is an act of grace, but the content of the giving, the gift itself, is not a superadded gift, but a natural gift. 7 It can be expressed more clearly this way: all of life and all of humanity fall within the purview of patience, of God’s forbearance. 8 This is better than seeing it under the purview of creation. The order of creation has been disturbed by sin and will never return. God’s way of dealing with humanity after sin (and before salvation in Christ) is different than it was before the fall. Natural humanity is outside Paradise and not yet in the kingdom of God, but also not yet in hell. Humanity thus lives in an ...
intermediate state, under the order of God’s patience. Moreover, God does not simply allow something of his image to remain in us, and does not act only indirectly, but also directly. The sin in which we are lying makes direct acts by God necessary (his judgments, for example). All of this is best summarized under the purview of God’s forbearance. But this should not be understood simply passively-that is, as forbearing, suffering, allowing, or permitting. It should also be understood actively, since patientia is related to potentia; in God everything is active, and God is actuality:

\underset{―}{9}

God causes us to exist, leads us, and directs us. ...

There is another insight here. This order of divine patience is an intermediate state between creation and re-creation, between the covenant of nature and the covenant of grace, and a state of preparation for the final state, as will soon be discussed. Paul views the entire pre-Christian period from this perspective. God put forward Jesus as a propitiation by his blood, “because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins” to “show his righteousness at the present time” (Rom. 3:25-26). If Paul is here speaking of Israel only (as Philippi thinks),

\underset{―}{10}

it would a fortiori be true of the pagan. We should view everything that follows in this chapter and in the next two chapters from this perspective. ...

We owe many things to this forbearance. ...

1. Life or Existence Itself ...

That we exist, that children are born, is not self-evident. Adam and Eve and all of us have deserved death at every moment. It is thanks to God’s forbearance that Adam and Eve, instead of closing their eyes in death, cast their eyes down in shame. What Eve cried out in amazement in Genesis 4:2 -“I have gotten a man with the help of the LORD”-can be said about every birth. Human life oscillates between God’s forbearance and his wrath.

\underset{―}{11}

Every birth proclaims God’s forbearance to us, and every death his wrath. The Spirit of God creates every new human life, pours life into the womb of death (Gen. 1:2; Job 33:4; Ps. 139; Zech. 12:1). “In him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). “The steadfast love of the Lord never ceases; his mercies never come to an end” (Lam. 3:22). 12 We have thus retained something of life, of the immortality bestowed upon Adam. ...

2. Soul and Body and Their Capacities ...

The substance of our being has totally remained; it has lost none of its strength, even though it has deteriorated. In this way, all its capacities have remained. 13 These include the following: ...
a. The intellect. That humans retain understanding is not something to be taken for granted. 14 This appears from the reality of mental illness. Although our power of thinking is weakened and, by living in sin, is dulled, enfeebled, and sometimes even suspended (in the mentally ill), it is not lost. We can still think, understand, evaluate, and make decisions. Even the intuitive, the prophetic, has not been totally lost, and shines brilliantly in the case of geniuses. Such differences between the mental powers of individuals prompt us to acknowledge them all as gifts. 15 All of this makes science possible, which is a great gift. ...
b. The will. The natural capacities of the will have also been affected by sin. 16 Just think of how a person can be either inflexible, stiff-necked, and willful or double-minded, indecisive, and unsettled. In one person, the will has become hardened, in another it has become enfeebled. Yet the will as a capacity has not been lost. We can freely and spontaneously, without compulsion, do what we do. We can even direct our will in accordance with our mind; that is, we can will only those things that the mind prescribes as good. This enables us to act rationally, reasonably, in accord with the voice of reason. And the original power of the will is occasionally present and is manifest in the heroic and vigorous energy of the great ones of our human race, such as reformers like the Buddha, world conquerors like Alexander, and scientists like Columbus and Galileo. ...
c. The feelings, the passions. These have also been affected by sin. They are excited by the wrong objects, express themselves too feebly or too strongly (when they become extreme, excessive, or unregulated), or are disharmonious and conflict with one another. Yet the emotive capacity has remained. We still have all the passions; love, admiration, compassion, hate, anger, and contempt are all still in us. They are substantively good, so long as they are directed in proper measure to the right goals. Even the glory of the passions has not been entirely lost. 17 Think of the power of a mother’s love, love for one’s fatherland, the artistic sense of awe (Plato), or noble inclinations. ...
d. The body as instrument of the soul. This, too, has suffered the influence of sin. The body has become independent; it absolutely refuses to be an instrument any longer. The flesh has become emancipated, and in ...
many different ways has come to oppose the spirit (also in our natural state) -think especially of sexual life, which has become a power opposed to our will. For this reason, Paul could call the entire human person “flesh,” 18 naming the whole after the part. The body often refuses to make one or more of its members subservient to the soul, for example the eyes (blindness), or the feet (lameness). At that point, the body, instead of serving as an instrument, becomes a hindrance, an obstacle, a prison for the soul (something that Plato taught correctly). People have identified twelve thousand illnesses in which the body denies its service to the soul. Eventually the body refuses to serve altogether, weakens, ages, and dies, and our soul lacks the vital power to preserve that body and to renew it. Nevertheless, the body is still an organ; it is a weakened instrument, but not a lost one. Our soul still sees by means of the eye, thinks by using the brain, perceives through the senses, walks with the feet, rules and manages by the hand. The human ability to subject the body and make it subservient to the soul can still be seen in the asceticism of the Stoics and monastics. ...

3. Knowledge in the Mind and Holiness in the Will ...

These gifts have been lost. It is usually expressed this way: human beings are completely dead with respect to what is spiritually good. That is, they are unable to do any, even the smallest, spiritual good (what is supernaturally good or “good works”). After all, good works must proceed from a true faith,

\underset{―}{19}

must conform to God’s law,

\underset{―}{20}

must be done for God’s glory alone,

\underset{―}{21}

and should not be based on our own opinions or on human traditions,

\underset{―}{22}

as the Heidelberg Catechism teaches.

\underset{―}{23}

Spiritual good is what spiritual people

\underset{―}{24}

perform, worked in them and through them by the Holy Spirit. ...

This good is called “supernatural” because it is not a fruit or goal of nature but of the supernatural life that the Holy Spirit has worked in us. God, or God’s law, is the norm and standard of what is good. Only what entirely and in all its parts agrees with that standard is good. Holy Scripture does not call this “moral” but “holy,” using words like “righteousness,” “sanctification,” and “godliness” and expressions like “the fear of God.” Spiritual good, then, is what satisfies both the spiritual and the external sense of the law of God; what agrees with it in principle, in direction, in purpose; what therefore satisfies God himself. The doing of this good grants ...
eternal life. But it is precisely the good in this sense that the natural person cannot fulfill, neither in its entirety nor even in stages by performing parts of it. The second of these options is impossible because the righteousness, the image of God-that is, total conformity to God’s law-is an unbreakable unity. We cannot over time get closer and closer to the image of God, nor can it be repaired in stages.

\underset{―}{25}

This principle is absolute; it tolerates no imperfection; virtue is one and indivisible. 26 The first of these options - to fulfill the law in its entirety -is even more impossible, as everybody will agree. Natural persons do not know, do not understand, and do not comprehend the true, spiritual good. ...

The spiritual meaning of the law-to do everything from God, in accord with God’s will, unto God—is hidden to natural persons. To know the spiritual good requires a heart provided by God: “I will give them a heart to know that I am the Lord, and they shall be my people and I will be their God, for they shall return to me with their whole heart” (Jer. 24:7); “I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people” (Jer. 31:33). God reveals himself to the little children: “Jesus declared, ‘I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to little children’” (Matt. 11:25); “To you it has been given to know the secrets of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has not been given” (Matt. 13:11); “Jesus answered him, ‘Truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born again he cannot see the kingdom of God’” (John 3:3). This is a work of God: “The Lord opened her [Lydia’s] heart to pay attention to what was said by Paul” (Acts 16:14; cf. 28:27-28). ...

The natural mind, governed by the flesh, not only does not understand God (Rom. 3:11), but is hostile to God (Rom. 8:7). The cross is foolishness to the world (1 Cor. 1:18-25) because the natural person cannot understand spiritual realities ( 1 Cor. 2:7-14) and lacks light (2 Cor. 3:5; Eph. 1:17; 4:17-18; 5:8). But beyond a failure of understanding, the natural person does not want to do the truly and spiritually good, either: ...

They say to God, “Depart from us! / We do not desire the knowledge of your ways.” (Job 21:14) ...
That which is born of the flesh is flesh. (John 3:6) ...
No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. (John 6:44) ...
You were dead in [your] trespasses and sins. (Eph. 2:1) ...

The natural person does not do spiritual good: ...
The evil person out of his evil treasure brings forth evil. (Matt. 12:35) ...
For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false witness, slander. (Matt. 15:19) ...

Everyone who practices sin is a slave to sin. (John 8:34) ...
Apart from me you can do nothing. (John 15:5) ...
None is righteous, / no, not one; / no one understands; / no one seeks for God . . . / no one does good. (Rom. 3:10-12) ...

The ability to do the good, the supernatural, God-pleasing, eternal-lifedeserving good, is totally lost. Indeed, even the believer accomplishes not a single perfectly good work. But the believer’s good work can be good in principle, because it derives from the Holy Spirit, from faith, and it takes God’s law as its standard, and it aims at God’s honor. Then whatever is still lacking is atoned for by Christ and supplemented by him. The fact remains, however, that the spiritual good remains lost. ...

4. Natural Good and Moral Good ...

Eating, drinking, sleeping, and walking are all natural goods. This, in contrast to natural evil27-when someone cannot eat, see, or hear, for instance. Considered on their own, these deeds, acts, and states are neither good nor evil and do not, considered as such, come under the rubric of the moral law but the law of nature. They can indeed become moral or immoral by the way in which a person performs them, whether from a sinful inclination or for a sinful goal. Included, for example, are natural acts done out of lust or laziness. But, considered by themselves, they are not morally significant acts. Such natural goods have not been lost through sin. We can still eat, drink, sleep, and walk, for example. Yet such deeds have become weakened, and performing them has become difficult and now demands the sweat of our brow. Sometimes, because of sickness, natural goods are taken away entirely. Sin has therefore thoroughly affected also this terrain. But if one pictures concentric circles, with the spiritual as the center point, the ...
moral as the next circle, and then the natural as the outermost circle, then sin has not destroyed the natural but only weakened it. ...

But moral good has also remained. We shall see later what this includes. For initial orientation on the topic one can consider the virtues of the pagans.

\underset{―}{28}

Some maintain that some pagans are saved.

\underset{―}{29}

The Pelagians thought that pagans had true and complete virtues. The Socinians and Curcellaeus 30 thought likewise, as did many Jesuits. The Christian church was less favorably inclined. Tertullian remarked that the pagans prohibit only external sins, but our law forbids also internal sins. And then he asks, “So then, where is there any likeness between the Christian and the philosopher? between the disciple of Greece and of heaven? between the man whose object is fame, and whose object is life? between the talker and the doer?”

\underset{―}{31}

Augustine says there can be no virtue without righteousness, and no righteousness without faith. 32 Nevertheless, Augustine acknowledges gradations of sin and virtue: “Fabricius will be punished less than Catiline, not because Fabricius was good, but because Catiline was more evil. Fabricius was less wicked than Catiline, not because he had true virtues, but because he did not deviate so much from the true virtues.” Fabricius receives a lighter punishment than Catiline not because he is a good man but because the other is even more of a scoundrel. Fabricius was less impious than Catiline, because, although he possessed no true virtues, he did not greatly deviate from them. 33 The true good is a fruit of grace in Christ; therefore the virtues of the pagans, even if they enjoy some praise in human society, are not true virtues. Their will is unfaithful and impious and therefore not good. 34 Augustine therefore calls the virtues of the pagans “splendid vices.”

\underset{―}{35}

Prosper said that, without serving the true God, whatever seems to be virtue is sin; none can please God without God. 36 Scholastics like Thomas connected the seven cardinal virtues with the three theological virtues. The Council of Trent anathematized anyone who taught that before regeneration no true virtues can be achieved. 37 Jansen taught something closer to Augustine: the pagans seek virtue to entertain themselves, to fulfill their desires, to exalt themselves in their own eyes.

\underset{―}{38}

And this stands to reason, because all who do not lift their eyes to God, to please God with their virtue, are seeking in virtue itself the end or purpose of the good, so that this is the desire they seek to fulfill. Virtue then becomes the purest ornament with which people adorn themselves. 39 The ...

Roman Catholics recognize virtues among the pagans. Bellarmine said that a person can fulfill certain moral virtues also without faith.

\underset{―}{40}

...

Protestants, more in line with Augustine, thought differently. Luther wrote that Aristotle can give rules for only the natural, temporary, perishable life. 41 Natural moral theory emphasizes works (from the outside to the inside, disposition acquired through deeds), 42 whereas Christian moral theory emphasizes the person (first the tree is good, then the fruit). Natural theory does not relate good works to God. The ultimate ground and highest purpose is not God, but humanity, society, the state, the political end. Regarding Zwingli, see my The Ethics of Ulrich Zwingli. 43 Calvin guarded against any mixture of philosophy and Christian ethics. 44 He thought very unfavorably of the pagans, especially the Cynics, but also of the Stoics and Aristotle, particularly because of Aristotle’s doctrine of free will. Only Plato, and occasionally Cicero, received a more favorable treatment. 45 In his Institutes Calvin distinguished between earthly, thisworldly things that concern the present life, and heavenly things that concern the knowledge of God, true righteousness, the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. 46 According to Calvin, the natural person is still partially capable of performing things that belong to the first group; to some extent they can still know and will them. 47 The natural person is unable to know heavenly things, however. In these we are blinder than moles. But Calvin acknowledged that even with respect to heavenly things, some philosophers said some sensible things about God. 48 They had a little taste of God, but their situation was like that of a wayfarer who sees flashes of lightning in the night. The lightning does not bring wayfarers to the right path, but only plunges them into deeper darkness. 49 Pagans also do not know the law, certainly not the first table, but not even the second. 50 Some of them have lived very honorably. The grace of God has not delivered them from the corruption of nature, but has reined in this corruption.

\underset{―}{51}

Virtues like those of Camillus are worth nothing to God;

\underset{―}{52}

they are impure through a lust for glory, for example, even if they should be ascribed to the restraining grace of God. According to Lobstein, Calvin thought that Plato had some idea of the truth, of God, of the good, but this only served to lessen Plato’s excusability; he lacked faith; he lacked true knowledge and true virtue; his knowledge and virtue were merely semblance and smoke.

\underset{―}{53}

Almost all the Reformed held to an essentially similar position. They fully acknowledged the virtues of pagans and affirmed their validity. They ...
thought very highly of men like Camillus, Scipio, Cato, Seneca, Plato, and Socrates and often quoted their writings and beautiful maxims. They acknowledged that their virtues were objectively good, were praiseworthy as external deeds, were “not sins per se (and as to substance of the work), but by accident (and as to the mode of operation) in the essential conditions (on account of the various defects mentioned before).”

\underset{―}{54}

They further held that many pagans were examples to Christians and surpassed them; indeed, many pagans were even more advanced in these moral virtues than many believers, so that pagans often stand higher morally than the regenerate. 55 They believed two things about these moral virtues: (1) they originated only through the general operation of the Holy Spirit, through restraining grace, and could not be fulfilled by the human free will, without God, as Plato and Cicero themselves acknowledged. 56 Therefore, these virtues of pagans were not true virtues. (2) Nonetheless, God did on occasion graciously reward them temporally, only for this life; this is what happened to Ahab (1 Kings 21:27-28) and Nineveh (Jon. 3:5; cf. Matt. 12:41).

\underset{―}{57}

...

But Reformed theologians did not go beyond this. The moral virtues of Plato and others resemble the true, spiritual virtues, in the same way that counterfeit pearls resemble genuine ones, or fake gold resembles real gold. 58 They cannot pass the test when assayed by the only true standard. Some have therefore preferred the term “virtue” when describing pagan morality and reserved the term “good works” for Christian morality.

\underset{―}{59}

The word “virtue” itself was not disapproved, because it is also used in Holy Scripture. 60 Paul asks us to “think about” whatever is true, honorable, just, pure, lovely, and commendable and summarizes all this with “if there is any excellence” (Phil. 4:8).61 Peter tells us to supplement our “faith” with “virtue” (2 Pet. 1:5), and even speaks of the virtues of God (“that you may proclaim the ‘excellencies’ of him who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light” (1 Pet. 2:9). 62 But in Christian circles many prefer to speak of “good works” rather than “virtues” because ...

the Latin word virtus (from vir = “man”) and the Greek ởpɛtท́ (from "Apnc?) $^{63}$ were pagan in origin and meaning; ...
Holy Scripture uses the term infrequently; and ...
doing so preserves a terminological distinction between nonChristian $\underset{―}{64}$ (philosophical) ethics and Christian ethics. ...

We distinguish four key differences between “virtues” and “good works,” between philosophical and specifically Christian ethics: ...
a. In its foundation:

\underset{―}{65}

The virtues are rooted in the tenuous remnants of the image of God, preeminently in human reason. Some have located virtue in the desires (Epicurus) or in the passions, but the best philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Kant, Hegel, and others) have located it in reason, as the capacity for higher ideas. 66 Calvin therefore said: All philosophers say that the “reason which abides in human understanding is a sufficient guide for right conduct; the will, being subject to it, is indeed incited by the senses to evil things; but since the will has free choice, it cannot be hindered from following reason as its leader in all things.”

\underset{―}{67}

Reason, they thought, is strengthened by good education and a study of philosophy, God’s guiding providence, and grace. But wherever the virtues are located, they have no higher source than (fallen) nature (Rom. 2:1415). 68 According to Calvin, the foundation of the philosophers’ morality is free will, reason, and (especially in Stoic thought) nature. 69 They know nothing about the fall, about the corruption of our nature, about the need for regeneration. All their ideas about virtue and duty are splendid, 70 but they lack the foundation; they are a body without a head. A natural person can do no good that pleases God. By contrast, good works have the Holy Spirit as their author and are rooted in supernatural grace, in the faith that purifies our hearts internally, that first makes the tree good so that it can then produce good fruit: “Without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6; cf. Rom. 14:23). ...
b. The norms of the virtues are different from those pertaining to good works.

\frac{71}{1}

Pagan philosophers sought them in nature, in right reason, or in the morality of the community. Currently, they are sought particularly in what is ordinary for people, in the essence of the human person, or in what has utilitarian value for society. Sometimes philosophers also spoke of God’s commandments (Epictetus and Seneca, for example, as explained by Witsius),

\underset{―}{72}

but they tried to derive these from nature, or reason, or the conscience, so that it was always a standard inherent in nature. Christian morality, however, has the perfect revealed law of God as its standard. No doubt some traces of this law remain in nature (see Rom. 2). Nonetheless, many parts of this law are entirely unknown, or only partially known (for example the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Commandments). In any case, the spiritual meaning of the law is not understood by the ...
unregenerate. But even if much more of God’s law were naturally knownlet us suppose that the whole moral law could be known by reason aloneeven then there would be inadequate human ability to keep the law. The unregenerate may know the law externally but cannot do it; they may well display a likeness of the matter, but do not really have the substance itself. Philosophical morality is motivated only by compelling reasons and admonitions, which are weak before the power of the passions, and anyway they, too, lead people astray. Philosophy is a magnificent gift from God. 73 But Christian morality speaks of the love of God in Christ, holds up this love as an example, and, in addition, provides power to fulfill the command of love. Christian morality is a doctrine of life, not merely a doctrine of language. God does not only command, he gives.

\underset{―}{74}

Further, while the pagans have only outstanding men and women as examples,

\underset{―}{75}

we have the patriarchs, the prophets, the apostles, the angels, yes, Christ himself. 76 ...
c. The goal of philosophical virtues is always situated within this life. When the purpose of this life is situated within this life itself, we are confronted with an antinomy. Life’s purpose must be located beyond this life, and philosophical morality does not know that. 77 Thus, virtue is always sought for its own sake, for the sake of utility and advantage, for the sake of the fame that virtue brings, for the rewards that virtue may involve, for the sake of neighbors, but always within this life.

\frac{78}{8}

In Cicero’s dialogue The Nature of the Gods, Cotta says that virtues are our own work, that we do not thank the gods for them. 79 By contrast, Christian ethics is not utilitarian, but directs everything to glorify God. It sees glorifying God as the goal of our lives.

\underset{―}{80}

...

In summary.

\underset{―}{81}

In spiritual, heavenly matters, knowledge, will, and ability have been entirely lost. In moral and civil matters, in temporal, earthly matters, knowledge, will, and ability have been weakened, but not entirely taken away. There is therefore a certain good, measured by an earthly, temporal standard-and by natural persons themselves-that acquires temporal rewards. In themselves those virtues are good. But evaluated by the measure of God’s holiness, the best virtues are splendid vices. They are completely wrong in their foundation, in the standard by which they are measured, and in their goal. This assessment of the philosophical virtues is severe but must be maintained on the basis of Holy Scripture and to hold high the exalted demand of the moral ideal. In the next chapter we will ...
consider what morality is, from which foundation it flows (reason or feeling, for example), and what its value is. ...

5. Human Dominion over Nature ...

Our dominion over nature has been weakened and robbed of its spiritual character, but it has not been eliminated. 82 Dominion has been impeded, not destroyed. Adam must now labor by the sweat of his brow against thorns and thistles, but he still wrests his food from the earth (Gen. 3). Human dominion now involves “fear and dread” of humans “upon every beast of the earth and upon every bird of the heavens, upon everything that creeps on the ground and all the fish of the sea” (Gen. 9:2). Animals and green plants have been given to us as food (Gen. 9:3). ...

Nonetheless, as Psalm 8 testifies, human royal dominion remains, together with wealth and culture, as part of God’s rich provision, given to us to enjoy (1 Tim. 6:17). Dominion gives rise to culture, and culture has two parts: ...
a. Science/scholarship. 83 Knowledge of earthly things is possible, and there is a yearning to find out the truth about them. This is the basis of science and scholarship (law, medicine, mathematics, literature, and the liberal arts). These are the natural sciences,

\underset{―}{84}

with philosophy as their crown. These gifts of the Spirit should not be rejected or despised, for that would be to despise God himself. 85 Pagans themselves admit that philosophy, the arts, sciences, and laws were gifts from the gods. We cannot read the writings of the ancients without great admiration. 86 If by the Lord’s will we can be helped by the activities of evil persons in the study of nature, in logic, in mathematics, let us then use these things. Zwingli said that whatever the pagans said that is good and beautiful, we accept and convert to the glory of our God. We decorate the temple of the true God with the spoils of the Egyptians. 87 ...
b. Art in the broader sense, the subjection of the earth, making the earth an instrument for humanity. The spiritual character of culture has been lost through sin. Culture itself has become a power, like science often becomes, a fire fanned by Satan and used against God. It arose in the generations of Cain. The children of this world “are more shrewd in dealing with their own generation than the sons of light” (Luke 16:8). But for the rest, culture itself has increased, and in this there is doubtless progress. In Paradise, Adam and ...

Abstract ...

Eve were still clothed with animal skins (Gen. 3:21). By the time of Cain and Abel, we read of agriculture and animal husbandry; Cain and Enoch built cities; Lamech developed weaponry and the laws of war; Jabal made tents and led a nomadic life; Jubal created music; Tubal-Cain worked with iron; and Noah produced wine. 88 According to Holy Scripture there is progress in culture. ...

Ed. note: In the margins Bavinck wrote “grote vakantie 1902” (big vacation 1902). This is another indicator that Bavinck used this manuscript for his final lectures to Kampen students in the spring and fall of 1902 before he moved to Amsterdam to take up his post at the Vrije Universiteit. See above, “Introduction to Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics,” section on de Jong manuscript (pp. xxxvi-xli). ...
DO: vernielingswoede (“destructive rage”). ...
J. Müller, Christian Doctrine of Sin, 1:293. ...
LO: massa corruptionis. ...
DO: vernietingswoede (“destructive rage”). Ed. note: This word is more intense than vernielingswoede, the term Bavinck used earlier. Vernielingswoede connotes ruin and degradation; vernietingswoede connotes annihilation, making into “nothing.” ...
Cocceius, Summa Doctrinae, IV.74, cited by Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 371: “Cocceius introduces his exposition of the doctrine of the covenant of grace (De foed. IV, 74), by declaring that of course God might at once have punished man with all evils. But the height of wisdom and power [sapientia et potestas summa] aided Him in His glorious plan for exercising mercy on man [suppeditabat gloriosam rationem excercendi cum homine misericordiam]. Accordingly, He resolved (1) to unfold his inexpressible mercy ‘in vessels of mercy’ [voluit tum illam ineffabilem misericordiam хара́ et хрпото́тпs], and (2) ‘to employ an ineffable kindness and longsuffering towards the entire human race’ [inerrabili quadam beneficentia et patientia uti erga totum genus humanum].” ...
LO: donum superadditum; donum naturale. ...
See Zahn, Die natürliche Moral, 114, 120, 147. ...
LO: actus. ...
Ed. note: Philippi, Commentary on Romans, 1:149: “But these were the sins of the people of Israel.” ...
Ed. note: Bavinck’s marginal note here reads, “Consider also the Macrobians” (Denk ook aan de Makrobiërs). The name is derived from the Greek Makpó $β ı o 1$ (“long-lived”) and refers to “a legendary tribe of Aethiopia and kingdom positioned in the farthest land towards the western sunset in ancient Libya (Africa). . . . Their name is due to their legendary longevity, an average person supposedly living to the age of 120.” Herodotus mentions them in his Histories 3.114; 4.197 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macrobians). ...
Zahn, Die natürliche Moral, 114, 115. ...
The Belgic Confession (art. 14) says that we have retained only “small traces” of our excellent gifts; cf. Canons of Dort, III/IV.16. ...
Bavinck’s marginal note: Calvin notes in Institutes, II.ii.12, that the human mind still has some desire to investigate truth, some natural love for the truth. One should also think here of traditional knowledge of God, which derives from Paradise. Knowledge and service of God long remained pure. 15. Institutes, II.ii.17. ...
Bavinck’s marginal note: Not the will but the health of the will has been lost (Institutes, II.iii.5). ...
GrO: દ́vӨоvஎlaouóc. ...
GrO: $σ α ́ ρ ξ$ ; LO: pars pro toto. ...
“Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23); “Without faith it is impossible to please him [God]” (Heb. 11:6). ...
Deut. 11:32; 12:32; Ezek. 20:18-19. ...
1 Cor. 10:31: “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God.” ...
Deut. 12:32; Isa. 29:13-14; Ezek. 20:18; Matt. 15:7-9. ...
Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 91. ...
GrO: $π v ε v μ α τ ι k o i ́$ . ...
Hoedemaker, De verhouding der ethiek tot de dogmatiek, 22: “Het beeld Gods wordt niet bij benadering bereikt, niet by trappen hersteld.” ...
LO: simplex et una. ...
LO: malum physicum. ...
Alting, Theologiae Problematica Nova, 452-54 (VIII.9-10); Maresius, Sylloge Disputationum, 2:123-35; de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 4:826-29; Pfanner, Systema Theologiae Gentilis Purioris, chap. 22, §33 (chap. 22 deals with the salvation of the gentiles); Trigland, Antapologia, chap. 17; F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:683-85 (X.5; Latin text: Theologiae Elenchticae, I.753-56); Vitringa, Doctrinae Christianae Religionis, “Theologiae Elenchticae,” IX.33-36; Vossius, Historiae de Controversiis, III.3; Vossius, Opera Omnia, 6:464-70; Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:20-22 (III.12.lii-lviii); Witsius, Twist des Heeren, 214-50 (chap. 19); Wittewrongel, Oeconomia Christiana, 1:288-89. ...
Pfanner, Systema Theologiae, 491-92. Ed. note: Pfanner cites Justin Martyr, 1 Apology XX (ANF 1:169-70); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VI (ANF 2:480-519); Tertullian, Answer to the Jews I (ANF 3:151-52); Hilary of Poitiers, Tractatus super Psalmos I (CSEL 20:354-544, on Ps. 118); and Epiphanius (bishop of Salamis, ca. 310-403). ...
Ed. note: Étienne de Courcelles (Stephanus Curcellaeus [1586-1629]) was an Arminian Greek scholar and translator (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Étienne_de_Courcelles). ...
Tertullian, Apologia XLV-XLVI (ANF 3:50-51). ...
Augustine, Against Julian IV.3.17 (FC 35:181). ...
Augustine, Against Julian IV.3.25 (FC 35:190). ...
Augustine, Against Julian IV.3.33 (FC 35:197-98). ...
Augustine, City of God XIX. 25 (NPNF1 2:418-19). ...
Prosper of Aquitaine, Call of All Nations I. 6 (ACW 14:31-33); see de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 4:828. ...
According to F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:683 (X.5: “Virtues of the Gentiles”). Ed. note: The sixth session of the Council of Trent, “On Justification,” canon 7, reads: “If anyone shall say that all works that are done before justification, in whatever manner they have been done, are truly sins or deserving the hatred of God, or that the more earnestly anyone strives to dispose himself for grace, so much more grievously does he sin: let him be anathema” (Denzinger, no. 817). ...
Jansen, Augustinus, 2:253-56 (IV.11: “De Statu Naturae Lapsu”). Ed. note: Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) was the Dutch Roman Catholic bishop of Ypres (Flanders) whose study of Augustine led him to emphasize predestination and grace, eventually leading to a condemnation of his views in a series of papal bulls (Tschackert, “Jansen”). ...
Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:28 (III.12.lxxiv). ...
See F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:683 (X.5); Bellarmine, Opera Omnia, IV (1), 391-98 (“De Gratia et Libero Abitrio,” V.9-10). ...
Luthardt, Die Ethik Luthers, 14-19. ...
LO: habitus; actus. ...
Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli, 20-33 (chap. 2). ...
See Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvins, 6-14. ...
Bavinck’s marginal note: Calvin acknowledges a certain operation of God’s Spirit in pagans. ...

See Schneckenburger, Vergleichende Darstellung, 1:231; also see Witsius, Twist des Heeren, 234-45. ...
46. Institutes, II.xiii. ...
47. Institutes, II.xiii.12-17. ...
48. Institutes, II.xiii.18. ...
49. Institutes, II.xiii.19. ...
50. Institutes, II.xiii.22; II.iii.3. ...
51. Institutes, II.iii.4. ...
52. Ed. note: Marcus Furius Camillus was a fourth- or fifth-century BC Roman statesman whose character was celebrated by Livy and Plutarch; see, e.g., Livy, History of Rome 6. ...
53. Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvins, 7. ...
54. F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:684 (X.5.vi). ...
55. See Witsius, Twist des Heeren, 214; cf. Wittewrongel, Oeconomia Christiana, 1:293-95. ...
56. F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:683-85 (X.5.ii, ix); according to Turretin, Plato and Cicero also acknowledged this; cf. Wittewrongel, Oeconomia Christiana, 1:289. ...
57. F. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:684 (X.5.viii). ...
58. Wittewrongel, Oeconomia Christiana, 1:295. ...
59. De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 4:817; Alting, Theologiae Problematica Nova, 733 (XVIII.4); Maresius, Collegium Theologicum, 295-96 (XII.9). ...
60. Ed. note: The Greek word

α

’

ρ ε τ η

', usually translated as “virtue,” is found in each of the passages that follow; readers of standard English translations other than the KJV or ASV might miss this, however, with translations of Phil. 4:8 such as “anything excellent” (NIV) or “any excellence” (ESV, NRSV). ...
61. GrO: દí тıs ảpɛтท́. ...
62. GrO: лíotıc; ápetท́;

τ

òç ảpɛtáç. ...
63. Ed. note: "Apn (Arēs) is the ancient Greek god of war (Latin: Mars). ...
64. DO: heidense (“pagan”). ...
65. DO: beginsel. ...
66. See Betz, Ervaringswijsbegeerte. ...
67. Institutes, II.ii.3. ...
68. Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:26 (III.12.1xviii). ...
69. Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvins, 8. ...
70. See Calvin’s comments on Rom. 12:1. ...
71. Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:30-38 (III.12.lxxx-ciii). ...
72. Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:31 (III.12.lxxxi-lxxxii). ...
73. Ed. note: Calvin’s clearest statement on this matter is found in a letter written to fellow reformer Martin Bucer: “Philosophy is, consequently, the noble gift of God, and those learned men who have striven hard after it in all ages have been incited thereto by God himself, that they might enlighten the world in the knowledge of the truth.” Calvin, Letters, 2:213 = Opera Omnia, IX.B [“Epistolae”], 50 (letter 236); cf. Institutes, II.ii.15. ...
74. Calvin’s teaching, according to Lobstein: Die Ethik Calvins, 1:10-12; cf. Institutes, I.xvii.4; III.vi.2-4. ...
75. Seneca, Moral Letters, letters 6, 11, 20, 53 (vol. 1), 94, 103, 104 (vol. 3). ...
76. See, e.g., Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:32 (III.12.lxxxvi). ...
77. Institutes, III.vii.1; III.vi.3; see Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvins, 10. ...
78. Witsius, Economy of the Covenants, 2:35-36 (III.12.xcvi). ...
79. Cicero, De natura deorum III.36. ...
80. 1 Cor. 10:31: “So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God.” Bavinck’s marginal note: See also Heidelberg Catechism, Q&A 91, on perfection, pleasing God, and merit. ...
81. See Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 364-70; Polyander et al., Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, 1:416-19 (disp. xvii.18-24). ...
82. Van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, I.iv.4, §14 [2:650]. Ed. note: For an explanation of the format we are using to cite this work, see the extended note in the introduction, §1, in the section “Reformed Churches” (pp. 8-9n48). The volume and page numbers come from the 1749-53 Dutch edition used by Bavinck. ...
83. Calvin, Institutes, II.ii.13-19. Ed. note: We have used the double term “science/scholarship” because Bavinck’s term wetenschap is broader than the English word “science,” which is usually taken to refer to the natural or physical sciences. ...
84. Ed. note: Here too Bavinck is not restricting the term “natural sciences” to the “physical sciences” (physics, chemistry, biology) but is using it of the world of science and scholarship more broadly. “Nature” includes human beings, their abilities, and their activities. ...
85. Calvin, Institutes, II.ii.15. See also Calvin’s commentary on Titus 1:12, in which he writes, “For since all truth is of God, if any ungodly man has said anything true, we should not reject it, for it also has come from God” (Calvin, 2 Corinthians, Timothy, Titus, Philemon, 364). ...
86. Calvin, Institutes, II.ii.16. ...
87. Bavinck, De ethiek van Ulrich Zwingli, 28. ...
88. Zöckler, Die Lehre vom Urstand, 79. ...

5 Human Conscience ...

Although fallen human beings are spiritually dead, the sagas and saga complexes of peoples point to traditions of religious and moral wisdom that are as old as humanity itself. Included are kernels of truth concerning God, the soul, and conscience, particularly found in philosophy and in the great thinkers, that point to something present in human beings themselves which connects them to God. Tradition directs us to conscience. ...

Conscience is a general human phenomenon. Greco-Roman reflection on conscience was minimal so long as law, justice, and morality coincided with the objective law of the polis. In this case, subjective conscience played very little or no role in governing individual morality. With the collapse of the Greek city-states, people were directed to themselves and had to find moral certitudes within themselves; in that context, Cicero could write: “There is no greater theater for virtue than conscience.” ...

The Old Testament has no specific word for conscience, but its “matter” is described by the important role given to the “heart.” There are also clear testimonies concerning conscience (Joseph’s brothers, David after the census, Solomon’s dedicatory temple prayer). The idea of conscience is also found in Jesus’s parable of the prodigal son and in the story of the woman caught in adultery. The apostle Paul frequently uses the Greek word for conscience and does so in a variety of ways. Gentile pagans and Jews as well as Christians are said to have a conscience; for none of them is the conscience an entirely reliable guide; our consciences are all darkened. ...

Christian reflection on conscience began in the early church (Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom, and especially, Jerome), flourished in the Middle Ages (notably with Thomas Aquinas), and was highlighted among the early Reformers, whose actions were driven by conscience. The orthodox Protestant theologians of the seventeenth century, and particularly the Puritan writers (Perkins, Ames), carefully analyzed the movements of the conscience in order to provide practical spiritual guidance to Christians. They created and used careful distinctions between such dimensions and activities of the human soul as the law of the syntérēsis, the witness of conscience, and judgment of the person. Modern thought, beginning with Kant, detached conscience from God and his law and placed it in the autonomous moral will. In modern philosophy, conscience is an enlightening, infallible, and undeceived star. Others (John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer) reduce conscience to social forces and see it as a product of nurture. Add into this mix the teachings of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, and our contemporary world is filled with questions about conscience, including questions about the origin of conscience, whether it is religious or moral, positive as well as negative, and infallible or erring, and whether we have freedom of conscience or not. ...

Etymologies can assist us in defining the notion of conscience. Included in the key terms are ideas of self-awareness, selfknowledge, and self-testimony about my conduct. Using our reason, we form judgments about our own conduct on the basis of God’s law, which lies in our heart. This law of the conscience is called the “syntérēsis.” It comes from God, to whom alone it is subject. To the degree that it is common to all people, it contains natural principles of religion, morality, and justice and is called a “natural conscience.” For those regenerated by the Holy Spirit, enlightened consciences are those bound to the Word of God. No person or human authority may bind the conscience; only he who created and knows the conscience can bind and punish it. ...

Conscience in its proper sense is that power or activity in a person’s understanding that, bound to the law of God in the ...
syntērēsis, judges the actions of a person observed by means of the consciousness, according to that law. It is we ourselves who do this judging; we accuse, convict and sentence, avenge and execute ourselves. Compelled to acknowledge God as God, we justify his judgment on us. This judgment is both religious and moral. The conscience judges everything about us, our actions, being, and thought. Nothing in us or done by us is outside God’s law. ...
Furthermore, conscience judges past acts, present acts, and future intended acts. The judgment is carried out as a practical syllogism where the syntērēsis (i.e., law or Word of God) provides the major premise and consciousness supplies the minor premise. The conscience draws the conclusion and renders judgment. This judgment accuses and condemns or exonerates and acquits. ...

Consciences may be distinguished in various ways: as natural (pagan) or Christian (enlightened), as good or bad, as upright or erring, as assured or doubting, as strong or weak, as broad or narrow (scrupulous), as sleeping or alert. We are under obligation to have our consciences cleansed by the blood of Christ and strengthened by the Word of God. Conscience is universal, and God’s moral law immutable and valid for all people. However, because our moral knowledge is darkened by sin, all of us have abnormal consciences. Conscience binds only the subject and no one else; we must respect each other’s conscience, and all earthly authority must honor it. No one should ever be compelled against their conscience. ...

§14. The Conscience ...

Introduction: Creation and Fall ...

The fall into sin did not formally remove from humans the substance of their knowledge of spiritual things-namely, of the knowledge and worship of God and of the moral law. They also retained the system of their ideas about the spiritual world, continuing to know who God was and what his law required. This knowledge and worship of God remained pure for a long ...
time. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the fall, Adam died spiritually so that the system of ideas about the spiritual world was severed from its root in his heart. Thus torn asunder, this became a loose set of unconnected ideas languishing in his consciousness and doomed to wither away unless God were to plant again a spiritual life and a life-principle, a life-root, in his heart. ...

Adam was therefore in the same condition as an unregenerate Christian, one who has an intellectual knowledge of God, his law, and his word, but no spiritual knowledge, one for whom this knowledge lies loosely in the brain. But that knowledge of God that Adam still retained he did pass on; it remained pure in a few families and was thus salvific since the promise of Genesis 3:15 was also passed on along with it. 1 In this way the pure worship of God continued in the families of Abel, Seth, Enoch, and so forth. Even Melchizedek and Job apparently drew their true knowledge of God from the well of tradition. Thus, of its own accord, a tradition came into being that undergirded and undergirds all searching for and knowledge of God. This tradition became more or less tainted, was sometimes completely debased (eventually giving rise to paganism), separating itself from the invisible world, sinking into nature and divinizing it. ...

Indeed, tradition is a significant power and of great value. Out of reaction against Roman Catholicism, Protestants have often undervalued it. Tradition is the bond that unites people spiritually into one, in spite of separation by distance and time, so that we do not live spiritually and morally as isolated individuals. Instead, we all stand in a spiritual solidarity that reflects numerous antecedents and connections with other people; it is the continuity of the spiritual and moral life.

\underset{―}{2}

Tradition is to the spiritual life what generation is to physical-biological life. It is manifest particularly in our religious life, which differs from our civic life, which is subject to countless changes. Religion creates community and pushes us toward unity and even uniformity. Thus we encounter the power of tradition in the sagas and their systems, which endure through the ages and are present in all peoples. These hark back to the primeval sagas,

^{3}

which were fashioned from what was received from the Adamic and Noahic traditions by the tribes that came from a primeval home. 4 Tradition, therefore, is a binding power, stronger than natural bonds, something that Rome has understood well.

\underset{―}{5}

We must certainly derive many kernels of truth from the pagans by way of that tradition. But often too much has been derived from it. Some ...

Christian apologists claim that all truth among pagans such as Plato was drawn from the Old Testament or the tradition that gave birth to the Old Testament. This is a mistake for two reasons: (1) those elements of truth concerning God, the soul, and conscience could not, any more than other spiritual knowledge, exist apart from a point of contact within the person, but are completely corrupted; and (2) those elements of truth we encounter most purely and clearly not in the sagas and religions of peoples but in their philosophy, among the thinkers, the people of reason. In this way, tradition itself directs us to conscience (and to reason). ...

Teachings about Conscience: A History $^{\underset{―}{6}}$ ...

GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY ...

Greeks used the terms syneidos and syneidēsis for conscience; the Romans, conscientia. We do not encounter these terms at all first in Greek and Roman literature; they did exist, however, as did the matter itself, but only in the popular mind. The existence of the terms is apparent from the proverbs of Bias-“Good (or “clear”) conscience”-and of Periander -“Freedom is a clear conscience.”

\underset{―}{7}

(At the same time, are these sayings genuine?) We do not find the word syneidēsis in Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle at all. It is found first in Chrysippus, but then in the broader sense of consciousness.

\underset{―}{8}

It began to be used in a philosophical sense near the start of the Christian era, especially among Romans such as Cicero and Seneca. Subsequently, it was used among Greek historians such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60 BC to 7 BC), Diodorus Siculus (first century BC), and Plutarch (AD 46 to 120) and then among the Hellenists. ...

This is an important observation. Why is there relatively little mention of the conscience among the Greeks and Romans when it is such a universal human phenomenon? And why did philosophy pay no attention to this important factor in its early days and deal with it only later? Kähler attributes this to two causes.9 (1) For Socrates and Plato, ancient ethics was characterized by its inner, indissoluble connection with the Greek polis.

\underset{―}{10}

Virtue was limited to this sphere, and to be a good person was to be a good citizen. For the Greek, the norms for morality, for the good, were objectively present in the laws of the polis and were not specified by the acting subject in their conscience. As the people thought, so thought the philosophical ethicists. In Plato’s dialogue Hippias Major, when Socrates is ...
asked, “What is good?,” he points to the polis: “That which is lawful is just.” 11 In other words, the law, justice, and morality coincide. Whoever observes the written and unwritten laws of the polis is perfectly righteous. Among the gods as well, justice and law are one; morality and politics coincide. It follows from this that human conduct was always tested not by one’s subjective conscience but by the law of the polis. Therefore, not the conscience but this law functioned to accuse or exonerate. (2) The Greek philosophical ethicists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, were intellectualists; this meant that they sought the starting point and standard for conduct in human reason rather than in the conscience. Proper thinking was extended and transposed into proper conduct. Thereby moral lapses became the result of intellectual error; knowing was and became virtue. Within this kind of ethic there was no place for conscience; reason was sovereign and the will had to follow. ...

All this changed with and through Alexander the Great. The life of the polis lost much of its significance, and objectivity became unstable. People were directed to themselves and had to find certitude, including moral certitude, within themselves. Individualism and cosmopolitanism gained the ascendency, and philosophy turned more and more to practical matters, coming down from its sovereign heights to answer questions of daily living (Stoicism, Epicureanism, etc.). Consequently, the conscience acquired a stronger voice in life and in philosophy. In Cicero’s words: “There is no greater theater for virtue than conscience.” 12 Especially with Cicero, conscience has a broad sense (consciousness) as well as a narrow sense (conscience). In his defense of his friend Titius Annius Milo, accused of murder (52 BC), Cicero appealed to conscience as overriding law: “The power of the conscience is great.” 13 In his treatise The Nature of the Gods,

\underset{―}{14}

Cicero points out that evildoers are not always punished in this life and then adds this reflection: ...

A Latin proverb declares: “Conscience is a thousand witnesses.” 16 Seneca and the Hellenists held similar views, especially Philo, who regards conscience primarily as punitive because our moral situation is especially imperfect. The most he will say is that it accuses.

\underset{―}{17}

...

CONSCIENCE IN SCRIPTURE ...

The Old Testament has no specific word for conscience, and the matter does not come up often. For Israel, the law fulfilled the task of the conscience; the focus of the conscience was not the acting subject, but God’s will; the norms and thus the judge of all conduct were to be found only in the law. According to Oehler, “the good was placed before [Adam] objectively, in the form of a command.” 18 And further, “by bringing man to a consciousness of the essential nature of a higher divine righteousness, the law roused the conscience from its slumber, taught men to recognize wickedness as sin, and so made the need of reconciliation with God to be felt.” 19 ...

Nonetheless, the matter of the conscience is present in the Old Testament and is attributed to the heart. As Oehler puts it, ...

The heart, as the central organ of the circulation of the blood, forms the focus of the life of the body. . . . But the heart is also the centre of all spiritual functions. Everything spiritual, whether belonging to the intellectual, moral, or pathological sphere, is appropriated and assimilated by man in the heart as a common meeting-place, and is again set in circulation from the heart. All vital motions of the soul proceed from the heart, and react upon it. $^{20}$ ...

The roots of our knowing, willing, and feeling spring forth from the heart and flow out to all life (Prov. 4:23). “In particular, the heart (Prov. xx :27) is the place in which the process of self-consciousness goes on, - in which the soul is at home with itself, and is conscious of all its doing and suffering as its own. The heart, therefore, is also the organ of the conscience, Job xxvii.6.”

^{1} 1

In Genesis 3 this is manifest in shame. According to Oehler, “When the woman, [Gen.] iii.2f., remembers the divine command, and knows that she is bound by it, and thus acknowledges its obligatory force, she has not yet sinned, and yet she shows that she has a conscience.”

\underset{―}{22}

However, the question remains whether this should already be called conscience. ...

In the Old Testament, we find clear testimony concerning conscience: Joseph’s brothers acknowledge their guilt with respect to their brother (Gen. 42:21); after cutting off a corner of Saul’s robe, “David’s heart struck him” ...
(1 Sam. 24:5). Abigail pleads with David to forgive her husband Nabal’s foolish actions so that David would “have no cause of grief, or pangs of conscience, for having shed blood without cause” (1 Sam. 25:31); and, after he sinned in taking a census of the people, “David’s heart struck him” (2 Sam. 24:10). In 1 Kings 2:44 Solomon tells Shimei, “You know in your own heart [i.e., you are conscious of] all the harm that you did to David my father.” In his prayer dedicating the temple, Solomon asks God to attend to pleas made by anyone or all the people, “each knowing the affliction of his own heart,” and forgive them (1 Kings 8:38). Similarly, the book of Job portrays the wicked as writhing in pain and filled with distress and anguish (Job 15:20-25); by contrast, Job clings to his integrity: “My lips will not speak falsehood, and my tongue will not utter deceit. Far be it from me to say that you are right; till I die I will not put away my integrity from me. I hold fast my righteousness and will not let it go; my heart does not reproach me for any of my days” (Job 27:4-6). This is a locus classicus. We also take note of those psalms in which the poet declares his innocence (Pss. 17:3; 18:32) and those in which he is profoundly aware of his guilt (6:2-7; 32:4; 51).

\underset{―}{23}

It is the heart that accuses: “Your heart knows that many times you yourself have cursed others” (Eccles. 7:22); “The sin of Judah is written with a pen of iron; with a point of diamond it is engraved on the tablet of their heart, and on the horns of their altars” (Jer. 17:1). The prophet Jeremiah cannot resist God’s call: “If I say, ‘I will not mention him, or speak any more in his name,’ there is in my heart as it were a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I am weary with holding it in, and I cannot” (Jer. 20:9). The same prophet signals a new covenant “with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people” (Jer. 31:33). Whether hearts are bold or timid is ascribed to guilty and unburdened consciences, respectively: “The wicked flee when no one pursues, but the righteous are bold as a lion” (Prov. 28:1). Luther even translated “heart” as “conscience” in Joshua 14:7 (“I was forty years old when Moses the servant of the Lord sent me from Kadesh-barnea to spy out the land, and I brought him word again as it was in my heart”) and in Job 27:6 (“I hold fast my righteousness and will not let it go; my heart does not reproach me for any of my days”).

\underset{―}{24}

...

In the New Testament, Jesus never speaks of the conscience, which is a great disappointment for the modernists. In Matthew 6:22-“The eye is the ...
lamp of the body”–Jesus is referring to the capacity for the human mind to know the eternal, to reason, to the human spirit, and to the light of nature (retained by humans after the fall).

\underset{―}{25}

The idea of conscience, however, can be found in the story of the prodigal son: "But when he came to himself . . ."26 (Luke 15:17). The word syneidēsis is found in some of the text traditions of the Gospel of John (8:9). After Jesus says about the woman caught in adultery, “Let him who is without sin among you be the first to throw a stone at her” (v. 7), and Jesus writes on the ground, this follows: "And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience [syneidēseōs], went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last: and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst."27 ...

It is the apostle Paul who more frequently uses the word syneidēsis: ...
And looking intently at the council, Paul said, “Brothers, I have lived my life before God in all good conscience up to this day.” (Acts 23:1) ...

So I always take pains to have a clear conscience toward both God and man. (Acts 24:16) ...
Therefore one must be in subjection, not only to avoid God’s wrath but also for the sake of conscience. (Rom. 13:5) ...

But some, through former association with idols, eat food as really offered to an idol, and their conscience, being weak, is defiled. (1 Cor. 8:7; cf. 8:12-9:27; 10:23-33; Rom. 14) ...

Paul defends his own conduct by appealing to his clear conscience (1 Cor. 4:4; 2 Cor. 1:12; 4:2; 5:11). In his charge to Timothy and his description of true faith and godly conduct, Paul repeatedly mentions conscience (1 Tim.

1 : 5, 19; 3 : 9; 4 : 2; 2

Tim. 1:3; Titus 1:15). In addition, we find the idea of conscience, as well as the word syneidēsis, in Hebrews 4:12; 5:14; 9:9, 14; 10:2, 22; and 13:18. The apostle Peter also uses it (1 Pet. 2:19; 3:16, 21).

\underset{―}{.8}

...

We will now sketch a summary of New Testament teaching on conscience. ...

We encounter the word syneidēsis first in the general sense of awareness or knowledge: “By the open statement of the truth we would commend ourselves to everyone’s conscience in the sight of God” (2 Cor. 4:2); “Therefore, knowing the fear of the Lord, we persuade others. But what we are is known to God, and I hope it is known also to your conscience” (2 Cor. 5:11). Beyond this it acquires the significance of a testimony present to my consciousness concerning my circumstances and relationships, a critical self-awareness, in other words: “I am speaking the truth in Christ-I ...
am not lying; my conscience bears me witness in the Holy Spirit” (Rom. 9:1); “For our boast is this, the testimony of our conscience, that we behaved in the world with simplicity and godly sincerity, not by earthly wisdom but by the grace of God, and supremely so toward you” (2 Cor.

1 : 12

). In the third place, conscience has the meaning of moral obligation, being bound in our conduct by a conformity to God’s law and will: “They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them” (Rom. 2:15). Conscience is therefore a religious designation, as Peter demonstrates when he gives thanks for those who endure grief and suffer wrongfully “for conscience toward God” (1 Pet. 2:19 KJV)-that is, a conscience that bears witness in relation to God. 29 Similarly, civil authorities are “servants of God” to whom we are subject, “not only to avoid God’s wrath, but also for the sake of conscience” (Rom. 13:5).

\underset{―}{30}

The inadequacy of the old covenant is described in terms of “gifts and sacrifices

\dots

that cannot perfect the conscience of the worshiper” (Heb. 9:9). Only “the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God,” is able to “purify our conscience from dead works to serve the living God” (Heb. 9:14; cf. 10:2). ...

Consequently, the conscience provides the judgment of human beings about themselves in their existing relationship to God, his law, and his will.

\underset{―}{31}

That law and will of God-in other words, God himself-in relation to which people consider themselves bound in their conscience and in terms of which they evaluate themselves in their conscience, is unchanging and remains eternally the same. But that law can change within the subject’s conscience itself, according to the subject’s level of development, moral nurture, and knowledge; that is to say, the conscience can interpret and impurely reflect that law, which itself is immutable. That results from the conscience itself being impure, corrupted by sin. The New Testament describes this unclean conscience in various ways: “weak conscience” (John 8:9; 1 Cor. 8:7; cf. v. 10; 2 Cor. 7:1); “whose consciences are seared” (1 Tim. 4:2); “their minds and their consciences are defiled” (Titus 1:15). In the light of the Holy Spirit’s work of applying Christ’s sacrifice, the contrast is palpable: “How much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, purify our conscience from dead works to serve the living God” (Heb. 9:14); “consciousness of ...
sin” (Heb. 10:2); “sprinkled clean from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure water” (Heb. 10:22). ...

This explains why consciences differ, also individually, among Jews, pagans, and Christians. We first consider the pagan gentiles. According to Romans 2:14-15, gentiles lack the positive revealed law (Torah) of Moses. Nonetheless, they “by nature do what the law requires.” Paul does not have in mind here the “doers of the law” of whom he spoke in verse 13, those who are justified. If that were the case, he would be saying that the pagan gentiles are saved (cf. v. 27). Pagans do not keep the law in its deep spiritual significance and fullness (Rom. 7:14), but they nonetheless externally obey the commandments in varying degrees. Therefore, they have the “works of the law” (Rom. 2:15) just as the Jews do, but nonetheless remain hearers rather than doers of the law. In this way pagans show that they are obligated by nature 32 to the law and thus become a law for themselves, giving them a positive law, the Mosaic law in the sense of individual, external commandments. This is identical, says Paul, to the way Jews consider the law of Moses, and for that reason the Jews with their law, as they understand it, are no better off than gentiles. In fact, pagans derive the law from themselves, showing that the “works of the law,” the individual commandments of the law, are written in their hearts (in contrast to being written on stone tablets, as with Israel). And with those external deeds, which show the existence of the law among pagans, their conscience agrees; that conscience also testifies accordingly in connection with the law (here what is meant is the “subsequent conscience”; the law in their heart is the “antecedent conscience”).

\underset{―}{33}

That personal conscience is manifest in the public conscience, in the thoughts that combine to accuse or exonerate them. In addition to personal conduct and personal conscience, this public conscience is, so to speak, a third testimony and proof for the law having been written in their heart. An important caution here: conscience is not identical with the law nor the seat of the law. Here too, among pagans, conscience can excuse, and then it is classified as “good conscience.” ...

The law is written in the heart, but the conscience is a being-bound to this law and its testimony. Among the Jews, conscience was a being-bound to the objectively delivered Mosaic law, and its functioning involved that law. Concurring with that law leads to a clear conscience, a good conscience (Acts 23:1; 24:14-16; 2 Tim. 1:3). Nevertheless, this could perhaps be understood as Paul referring to a Christian conscience. Pagans and Jews can ...
therefore have a “good” conscience-namely, one that does not condemn them-but this does not mean that it is pure. After all, the conscience can interpret the law falsely and give rise to a false security. The conscience, therefore, must be purified, and that has happened and is happening for believing Christians through the blood of Christ (Heb. 9:14). At that point, they receive a “purified conscience” (1 Tim. 3:9; 2 Tim. 1:3), a “good conscience” (Acts 23:1; 1 Tim. 1:5, 19; 1 Pet. 3:16, 21), a “clear conscience” (Acts 24:16). However, even among believers, the conscience is not immediately perfected or healthy. For many, the conscience remains weak ( 1 Cor. 8:7; 10:12; cf. 1 Cor. 10; Rom. 14) and must therefore be spared. It can still be bound to idols, to pagan laws and customs, from which it must gradually be set free to be bound solely and most strictly to God and his law. In other words, the activity of the conscience must be determined by the Holy Spirit alone (Rom. 9:1). The testimony of the conscience must be the witness of the Holy Spirit. Here we also need to appeal to 1 John 3:18-20, where the activity of the conscience is ascribed to the heart: “Whenever our heart condemns us, God is greater than our heart.” ...

CHURCH FATHERS AND SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS $^{\underset{―}{34}}$ ...

The church fathers provide very little about the conscience. In their opposition to pagans, they do not appeal to conscience but to objective revelation, to miracles and so forth. Tertullian’s “testimony of the soul naturally Christian”

\underset{―}{35}

acknowledges an inclination to morality just as the soul, though enslaved to the body and to false gods, when it awakes and “comes to itself,” spontaneously speaks of God, using such expressions as “God is great and good,” “which God may give,” “God sees,” “I commend myself to God,” and “God will repay me.”

\underset{―}{36}

At the same time, such ordinary human morality is not sufficient; it must be Christian. ...

Nonetheless, here and there, we do find references to the conscience, even if only occasioned by the exposition of Holy Scripture, therefore primarily in exegetical works. Thus, especially in Clement of Alexandria, a good conscience keeps the soul pure and preserves it from ignorance.

\underset{―}{37}

Even more so in Chrysostom, who says in a sermon on Genesis 27:42: “So let no one claim to be neglecting virtue through ignorance or through not having the way to it pointed out. In fact, we have an adequate instructor in our consciences, and it is not possible for anyone to be deprived of help from that source.” 38 “For nothing is more pleasurable than a sound ...
conscience, and a good hope.” 39 And, on the other side of the coin: “For what pray is so painful as a bad conscience? or what more pleasing than a good hope? For there is nothing, assuredly there is nothing, which is used to cut us so deep, and press so hard on us, as the expectation of evil: nothing that so keeps us up, and all but gives us wings, as a good conscience.”

\underset{―}{40}

The judgment of the conscience is not to be destroyed, because it is created within us by God. Conscience is an uncorrupted judge, from which we cannot escape. It cannot be bribed with money because it is divine, implanted within our souls by God himself. It is deaf to flattery, fear, or money. But, in addition to these general truths (found also among the pagans), Chrysostom believes that the conscience is an autonomous and autarchic source of moral insight, along with creation as the other original source of our knowledge of God. 41 With this, he points to a later motion, the so-called “antecedent” or “deontological”

\underset{―}{42}

conscience. In the West, preoccupied as it is with practice and anthropology, one might have expected more about the conscience. However, this is not the case. Augustine called the conscience an accuser, a witness to the depths of human depravity. A closer examination of conscience was made first by the medieval Scholastic theologians, especially after the publication of Alexander of Hales’s Summa Universae Theologiae. 43 ...

Now, human persons were understood to have two faculties: intellect and will. 44 The former is manifest in two ways: as theoretical intellect 45 and as practical intellect. 46 These are not two different capabilities or powers;

47

rather, the former is directed to the true and the latter to the good. The practical intellect was called synderesis (or syntērēsis; “maintaining, protecting, observing”), “a term that is not frequently found in Greek literature, also not in the Greek fathers or in later Christian literature.” 48 It was Jerome, in his exposition of Ezekiel, who is generally credited with introducing the term synderesis/syntērēsis into questions about morality.

\underset{―}{49}

With the interpreters of the early church, including Irenaeus and Augustine, Jerome takes the four creatures of Ezekiel 1:4-14 to be symbols of the four evangelists,

\underset{―}{50}

but also makes use of the creatures in a discussion of anthropology:

\underset{―}{51}

...

Most people interpret the man, the lion and the ox as the rational, emotional, and appetitive parts of the soul, following Plato’s division, who calls them logikon and thumikon and epithumētikon, locating reason in the brain, emotion in the gall-bladder and appetite in the liver.

\underset{―}{52}

...

What about Ezekiel’s fourth creature, the eagle? Jerome identifies this with the conscience, specifically the “spark of conscience, which [was] also in Adam’s breast [understood as the seat of the affections], after he was cast out of Paradise, which is not extinguished, and by which, [still] nourished by pleasures or anger, we sometimes perceive, in something like a rational moment, that we sin.”

^{53}

Jerome goes on to speak of this as “conscience itself.” 54 Jerome, therefore, understands syntērēsis simply as conscience. We do not know whether the word also had the meaning of maintaining or observing morality.

\underset{―}{55}

In fact, Cocceius denies this.

\underset{―}{56}

...

Some scholars have argued that the term syntērēsis in Jerome’s Ezekiel commentary is a textual mistake; it should be read as syneidēsis. 57 Erich Klostermann from the University of Kiel has recently discovered that three codices of Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel do read syneidēsis. 58 In any case, Scholastic theologians used the term synderesis/syntērēsis for either a capacity (power) of the soul or as a natural habit of concrete activity.

\underset{―}{59}

In his Summa theologiae, Thomas raises the question of “whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others.”

\underset{―}{60}

In his response, he argues that it is not a “power” but a “habit”:

\underset{―}{61}

...

Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. $\underset{―}{62}$ Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. $\underset{―}{63}$ Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called “the understanding of principles,” $\underset{―}{64}$ as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, $\frac{65}{}$ bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call “synderesis.” ...

In the same way, therefore, that we are born with the idea of true and false, so we are also born with the idea of good and evil. Simply as a habit, this synderesis is said to always incite one toward good and to oppose evil. Although it does not conduct specific activity, synderesis itself advances by protesting against that evil action. 66 The synderesis cannot sin; it cannot be extinguished, though it can be silenced. Even Satan retains it. ...

According to Thomas, the synderesis “is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human action.” 67 Scholastic theologians held firmly to this notion of synderesis, maintaining within it the human moral nature in the state of sin, and viewing it as the capacity to do good, in the same way that reason is the capacity to know the truth. Nevertheless, they did not for that reason deny the depth of sin, ...
because this synderesis is inclined to the good in general, but it neither discloses the genuinely good (which is meritorious) nor leads one to perform it fully. ...

Synderesis is sharply distinguished from conscientia, which applies the synderesis to the particular and the concrete. Conscience is not a habit but an act. 68 In terms of a syllogism, synderesis is the major premise, and reason the minor premise, of an argument for determining whether a particular act is a duty or is to be repudiated. The conscience is therefore the “practical syllogism in the intellect.”

\underset{―}{69}

From this, the conscience draws the conclusion-for example, this or that must be done or not. Those conclusions - that is, the functions of the conscience-are threefold: (1) to witness, whereby “we recognize that we have done or not done something,” thus, merely consciousness; (2) to bind, or to “judge that something should be done or not done”; (3) to incite, whereby “we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment.”

\underset{―}{70}

Conscience, therefore, is always a “concluding knowledge,” a derived, applied, subsequent knowing.

\underset{―}{11}

...

However, the conscience can frequently draw false conclusions (also because reason provides a false minor premise). In other words, the conscience can err, judging something to be evil when it is good or making wrong applications from premises or general principles that are good in themselves. This gives rise to consciences that are deceived, that doubt, that are overly scrupulous, perplexed, that are wrongly advised or are too accommodating. There is an ongoing, daily need for us to know with certainty how we should act. The medieval summaries of cases of conscience sought to meet that need. 72 These were manuals for the church’s “confessors,” which they could consult to find guidance from the collected writings of the church fathers. The confessors thus gained power of judgment over the consciences of their laity. They used painstakingly developed canon law to determine this. If the good that was required could not be determined, a person’s doubting conscience could be pacified by giving a probable opinion. 73 This is the source of the terrible notion of probabilism that was developed later by the Jesuits. Here synderesis disappears completely, the conscience is regarded as a bias, and probabilism (with the authority of this bias) determines everything. It was Pascal’s personal mission to oppose this. ...

The Scholastics, therefore, began by maintaining the moral human nature within the synderesis, but they separated and distinguished from it the conscience as something defective and erring. By means of that separation, the synderesis became inactive (a notion that contained a great truth). Meanwhile, the conscience, much too weak to stand on its own and be a guide, became subject to an alien authority. 74 ...

PROTESTANTS AND THE REFORMED TRADITION ...

The Protestant Reformation was an act of conscience, and in this way conscience is frequently discussed by Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin. Calvin defines conscience as a “sense of divine judgment,

\underset{―}{75}

as a witness joined to them [human beings], which does not allow them to hide their sins from being accused before the Judge’s tribunal.” He adds that it is “a certain mean between God and man, because it does not allow man to suppress within himself what he knows, but pursues him to the point of convicting him.”

\underset{―}{76}

Conscience provides “an awareness which hales man before God’s judgment” and “is a sort of guardian appointed for man to note and spy out all his secrets that nothing may remain buried in darkness.”

\underset{―}{77}

In the same way that “works have regard to men, so conscience refers to God.”

\underset{―}{78}

Although “sometimes . . . it is also extended to men . . . properly speaking, . . . it has respect to God alone.”

\underset{―}{79}

Calvin reiterates this in book IV of the Institutes in his discussion of church law: “For our consciences do not have to do with men but with God alone.”

\underset{―}{80}

He adds: “While the whole world was shrouded in the densest darkness of ignorance, this tiny little spark of light remained, that men recognized man’s conscience to be higher than all human judgments.” 81 Calvin teaches us the following: (a) conscience is a knowledge of our deeds in relation to God, his judgment; (b) only God can bind the conscience and not any human person; © conscience is a witness, a guardian of our deeds; and (d) conscience stands above all human judgments. Conscience provides us with some knowledge of the moral law, but it is an incomplete and imperfect knowledge. 82 ...

Amandus Polanus divides the faculties of the soul into three: vegetative, including the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative; sensitive (including sense perception and movement); and rational. 83 The last of these is divided into understanding and will, and the understanding is further divided into theoretical reason and practical reason, which is its proper work. 84 In addition, God created humans with an innate right reason ...
and a true understanding of his will and works. 85 The author of this reason is the Logos of John 1:9, and its two norms are the inborn notion of fundamental principles-theoretical and practical-and conscience. 86 Conscience is a “certain notion of the divine will and actions in agreement with it or contrary to it, indelibly implanted in the mind, approving good actions, disapproving evil ones.”

\underset{―}{87}

Peter Martyr Vermigli put it this way: first comes syntērēsis, the natural knowledge of things concerning our conduct,

\frac{88}{}

which provides the major premise (such as, fornication is sin). Conscience supplies the minor premise (what you want to do is fornication) and draws the conclusion: you should not do that. 89 ...

Conscience, however, is inadequate and needs to be enlightened by Holy Scripture and the Holy Spirit. Conscience can never make good that which in itself is sinful, even when someone acts with good conviction. Vermigli even speaks of “admirable powers of conscience.”

\underset{―}{90}

Conscience is not only a judgment, deed, or activity, but it specifies a part, a natural power, a capacity of practical reason that is present in all rational creatures, including angels and humans, but not in God.

\underset{―}{91}

Its function consists in providing a judgment about things that have already been done (distinct from providing an idea, knowledge, and caution). In other words, these judgments pertain to things done by the subjects themselves, to one’s own deeds (not the deeds of another-that is knowledge). Conscience is a co-knowing with God, who alone knows all that we do (unlike angels and other people). Conscience functions in a twofold manner: (1) bearing witness as to whether a deed has been performed or not (in Perkins’s words: “Conscience is knowledge, knowledge joined with other knowledge”; i.e., “I know that I know”); 92 and (2) judging whether evil or good has been done. 93 The conscience judges and must judge because it is bound; it stands under authority that drives it to that judging. ...

Only God and his word bind the conscience (Isa. 33:22; James 4:12).

\underset{―}{94}

Thus bound by God, the conscience in its own turn binds individual persons, while other people, authorities, the church and its laws can bind people only mediately and not truly. 95 The reasoning conscience functions in two ways: through the mind and through the memory. 96 The intellect makes use of ecclesiastical (canon) law and civil law. Memory arises from particular deeds, either accomplished or only imagined, which the conscience judges by the norms of the law. Here is the practical syllogism 97 by which the conscience pronounces sentence: ...

Major Premise: “All murderers are cursed,” says the intellect.

\underset{―}{98}

...
Minor Premise: “You are a murderer,” adds the conscience, assisted by memory. ...
Conclusion: “Therefore, you are cursed,” thus pronouncing judgment.

\underset{―}{99}

...
The conscience judges both past and future conduct. In the case of past deeds, conscience either accuses and condemns, or exonerates and absolves. 100 The conscience accuses in this manner: ...

Major premise: All murder is monstrous crime.

\underset{―}{101}

...
Minor premise: This deed you have done is murder. ...
Conclusion: This act of yours is a monstrous crime.

\underset{―}{102}

...
The next activity of the accusing conscience is condemnation, which it accomplishes in this way: ...

Major Premise: All murderers doubly deserve death.

\underset{―}{103}

...
Minor Premise: You are a murderer. ...
Conclusion: You doubly deserve death.

\underset{―}{104}

...
The accusing and condemning conscience excites diverse emotions and passions in human hearts, notably shame, sorrow, fear, despair, and consternation or restlessness (Isa. 57:20-21). 105 The final two emotions excited by the accusing and condemning conscience concerning deeds already done are exoneration and absolution. 106 The former is a judgment that something has been done well; the latter, that someone is free from the consequences and punishment of a misdeed and is judged and given immunity. 107 These two acts of the conscience produce (1) confidence and courage (Prov. 28:1) and (2) fame and joy. 108 Conscience also judges deeds that are still to be done, by a prior judgment, whether an act is good and pleasing to God. If so, the conscience gives a person permission to go ahead; this is the foundation of all “good works” (Rom. 14:23).

\underset{―}{109}

...

Perkins distinguishes a good conscience from a bad one. 110 He also discusses the kinds of conscience: the proper nature of the conscience is to exonerate; this was its function in Adam and has begun in the regenerate. 111 That it accuses is a defect in it, a consequence of the fall. 112 There is thus a good conscience and a bad conscience. ...

Buddeus says that conscience is “the argument of human beings concerning their own actions with respect to God’s law.” 113 It is not God, but we ourselves who judge our acts by our conscience, albeit in accord with God’s law. 114 It does not matter whether we call conscience an act, a disposition, or a capacity. 115 It is always a capacity but not always an act or disposition (sometimes it is asleep). 116 As a knowledge of principles 117 it is referred to as syntēēesis and is the rule, the norm, of conduct. As knowledge of the fact, conscience is and functions as a witness. 118 When the conscience assesses future acts, it is called the antecedent conscience; it persuades us of the good and dissuades us from the evil. 119 Buddeus also notes that, according to Peter Chauvin, this capacity of the conscience to persuade or dissuade is what Socrates called “genius.” 120 With respect to past deeds, we speak of a consequent conscience, supplying approbation of the good and reprobation of the evil. 121 Whether or not the conscience can err is a mere logomachy.

\underset{―}{122}

...

According to Ames, “The conscience of man (for I do not intend to treat of the conscience of angels) is a man’s judgment of himself, according to the judgment of God of him (Isa. 5:3).” 123 Conscience is not a “contemplative judgment, whereby truth is simply discerned from falsehood; but a practical judgment, by which that which a man knows is particularly applied to that which is either good or evil to him, to the end that it may be a rule within him to direct his will.” There is debate about whether, as a judgment, the conscience is a power/capacity or habit/disposition. Calling Perkins’s Treatise of Conscience “a peculiar work,” Ames disputes Perkins’s argument for thinking of conscience as “A natural power or faculty.” 124 Furthermore, conscience is not a habit, contrary to Scotus, Bonaventure, and Durand. 125 It is not a habit because the proper work of a habit is “to make one do a thing readily,” 126 and conscience has “other operations, which belong properly to it, as to accuse, comfort, etc.” Ames thus defines the conscience as “an act of practical judgment, proceeding from the understanding by the power or means of a habit.” An act of judgment occurs either through “simple apprehension” or through a “discourse.” Conscience “belongs to judgment discoursing because it cannot do its act of accusing, excusing, comforting, unless it be through the means of some third argument, whose force appears only in a syllogism, by that which is deduced and concluded out of it.” In sum: “Conscience in regard of the proposition is called a Light, and a Law; in ...
regard of the assumption and conclusion, a Witness; but in regard of the assumption it is most fitly termed an Index, or a Book, and in regard of the conclusion, most properly a Judge. That which dictates or gives the proposition is called Synteresis, by the Schoolmen Synderesis. The assumption especially and peculiarly is called Syneidësis, the conclusion is the Krisis, or Judgment.” There are numerous syllogisms relating to conscience, but only this practical syllogism127 “contains the whole nature of conscience. The proposition treats of the Law, the assumption of the fact or state, and the conclusion of the relation arising from the fact or state, in regard of the Law. The conclusion either pronounces one guilty, or gives spiritual peace and security.” 128 ...

As a habit, syntērēsis is “only the principle of conscience”; it does not “make up any part of conscience, but only as conscience is in its exercise.” 129 Syntērēsis is a natural habit to the degree that the “understanding of man is fitted to give assent to natural principles.” As a shared understanding of the human species that is eventually accessible to the natural ability of each person, it is called an acquired habit. Syntērēsis differs only “in respect or apprehension from the Law of Nature, or from the Law of God, which is naturally written in the hearts of all men, for the law is the object, and synteresis is the object apprehended.” While the “synteresis may for a time be hindered from acting, [it] cannot be utterly extinguished or lost. Hence it is that no man is so desperately depraved as to be void of all conscience.” The natural conscience-"which acknowledges for law the principles of nature, and the conclusions arising from them"needs to be distinguished from the enlightened conscience-which “in addition acknowledges what is prescribed in Scripture.” From all this, “it appears that the perfect and only rule of conscience is the revealed will of God, where a man’s duty is both shown and commanded.” In conclusion, only the law of God-“the revealed will of God”-may bind the conscience. This means that although we are conscience-bound to obey human laws “in due and just circumstances,” these laws do not bind our conscience. “The conscience is immediately subject to God, and his will, and therefore it cannot submit itself unto any creature without idolatry.” ...

Ames states that the “office” of the conscience is twofold with respect to “necessary things”: “to bind” and “to enforce to practice.” 130 Conscience is bound by God and his will. “Conscience binds according as it is informed of the will of God: for in itself it has the power of a will of God, and so ...
stands in the place of God himself.” This binding is so powerful “that the command of no creature can free a man from it.” This action of the conscience is a work of the antecedent conscience. 131 However, conscience can err. 132 Are we bound by an erring conscience? After making several subtle distinctions about the various kinds of errors that a conscience can make, Ames concludes the following about erring, overscrupulous consciences: “Conscience, though erroneous, binds always, so that he that goes

\underset{―}{133}

against it, sins. The reason is, because he that goes against conscience, goes against God’s will; though not materially and truly; yet formally, and by interpretation; because what the conscience declares, it declares as God’s will.” 134 Errors of conscience may be involuntary and thus blameless, or voluntary and blameworthy. In the case of the former, conscience still binds us. In cases where the conscience puts before us two conflicting, binding obligations-such as lying to save one’s own life or to fulfill the obligation of neighbor love-conscience still binds us, “but it does not bind us to do so.” In this instance, someone with a well-formed conscience ...

can neither lie nor abstain from lying without sin. He cannot lie, because this is simply unlawful. He cannot abstain from lying, with such a conscience, because such manner of forbearance is forbidden by God, though forbearing it be commanded: for God requires not only that we do good, and abstain from evil; but likewise that we perform both these with a good conscience and not a bad one. Such a conscience does not bind to do what it says. First because there is no obligation to unlawful things. Secondly because conscience bids not to do, but by virtue of some command of God; but such a conscience is not grounded upon any command; for the Law of God can neither incline nor bind any man to $\sin .^{\underset{―}{135}}$ ...

Van Mastricht provides us with a nice brief summary overview of the preceding: “Conscience is the judgment of humans about themselves, insofar as they are subject to God.” It belongs to practical reason and judges according to a syllogism: the major premise is the syntērēsis; the minor premise, the syneidèsis; the conclusion, the krisis. The first one is law, the second is witness, the third is judge.

\underset{―}{136}

...

MODERN RATIONALISM ...

In parallel with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment’s emancipation of the natural person, rationalists detach conscience from God, his law, his Word, and place it on its own. The law lies encapsulated within the syntērēsis, needing only to be developed, enlightened. And that law within the conscience was the true, the good. This led to talk of the moral ...
sentiment or sense, which needed to be detached from the emotions. This moral sentiment, once detached from God and his law, from all objective law, becomes purely moral and subjective. It was Rousseau who drew the consequence of this move and sought to return completely to nature. He regarded the natural human conscience, understood now as a moral sentiment, a feeling for the moral, as proof of an uncorrupted human nature. A superficial moralism was the result. Immanuel Kant brought about a change in this understanding by declaring the unconditional validity of duty. Kant considered the conscience as a courtroom drama between two persons: the accused and the judge. The individual consists of these two persons, whereby one is both personal lawgiver and personal judge (autonomy).

\underset{―}{137}

Thus, for Kant as well, conscience is detached from God and is only a moral instrument, not a religious one. Kant wants nothing to do with an erring conscience; the very notion must be banned. People can always be certain whether they have consulted their own conscience; this is the proper function of the conscience. Its material content may be wrong, but its formal operation cannot err. Conscience is for us an oracle of God and therefore absolute. Fichte defines conscience as “the immediate consciousness of that without which there can be no consciousness at all, the consciousness of our higher nature and absolute freedom,” a consciousness of our particular duty.

\underset{―}{138}

Fichte also rejects the notion of an erring conscience and elevates conscience to an even higher level than Kant did. In the newer philosophy, conscience became an enlightening, infallible, and undeceived star. All the emphasis is placed on the formal function of judging by the conscience, which function is glorified; no attention is paid to its content. ...

In the philosophy that followed, however, the autonomy of the moral person was more detached, and more emphasis was placed on the social. Herbart defines conscience as “the innate compulsion to have an ideal, and acknowledging it as judge over oneself.” 139 For Herbart, the ethical process is an aesthetic process.

\underset{―}{140}

Conscience applies not only to moral matters but is applied by Herbart to technical matters such as art and science. This generalizes and weakens the idea of the conscience. This is even stronger in Hegel’s thought, where the good is identified with the nature of the will, of the completely realized will and not of the empirical will. That will is realized through thinking, through the process of thought. ...

Individual persons cooperate toward this, and therefore should have within themselves a germ of the final outcome. That germ is the conscience -namely, the affinity of the individual with the good. But that germ is flawed; conscience is valid for individual morality, but its standard, its ideal, is found in social ethics. The community exists far above the individual conscience and therefore need not always honor it. Schopenhauer criticizes and mocks Kant’s theory of the conscience and calls it ridiculous;

\underset{―}{141}

the conscience does not deserve the deference Kant gives to it. It is not an infallibly commanding consciousness of duty, but only a “protocol of deeds”

\underset{―}{142}

that therefore follows the deed, and is empirical rather than intuitive and a priori. Whether the conscience approves or condemns depends on our sympathy or lack thereof. Since then, conscience is now understood by John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer as a product of nurture, a result of social instincts. 143 ...

The conscience plays an important role in Protestant theology, particularly in ethics. Schleiermacher did not pay specific attention to the conscience or give it a central place in his ethics. Those who came after him did discuss conscience frequently.

\underset{―}{144}

The main questions are these: (a) Is the conscience an original faculty, or is it produced by the environment, as Darwin suggested? Accompanying this question is another: does conscience have a general content or not? (b) Is conscience a religious faculty, or only a moral one? © Is conscience a negative faculty, or also a positive one; does it presuppose the fall into sin or not? Does conscience play an anticipatory role, or does it deal only with consequences? (d) Is it infallible, or can we also speak of an erring conscience? In general, what kinds of consciences are there? (e) What sort of freedom of conscience do humans enjoy? ...

Definition ...

1. ETYMOLOGY ...

According to Vilmar, the heart is the central midpoint of human being and living, and also the seat of self-consciousness.

\underset{―}{145}

The term ouveíSりの๘ (syneidēsis) comes from ơvvɛเઈéval દં

α u t \tilde{ω}

(“to be one’s own witness” or “one’s own consciousness coming forward as witness”). It does not come from ouvelઈéval tıvl (= “to know with someone”; i.e., to know something also known by someone else, or even to know something about someone because I am an ear- or eyewitness to a person’s guilt). In other words, ...
conscience (“to be one’s own witness”) refers to what I know about myself, that my deeds are spiritually present to me, my “own consciousness coming forward as witness.” 146 It has “primarily the same sense as tò

σ \cup v ε

เÓc, denoting a consciousness arising out of and qualified by the conduct, or a consciousness estimating the conduct.” “Next, however, it denotes an abiding consciousness, whose nature it is to bear witness to the subject regarding his own conduct, and that, too, in a moral sense.” Here we have “the beginnings of our idea of ‘conscience,’ though approaching, but not yet embracing, its full force.” 147 The use of syneidēsis in the sense that we speak of “conscience”-that is, as ethical consciousness-begins in the secular literature of the later Greek period. It was thus linked to conscientia (not only to know with someone, but to know about someone, because I was their witness). Conscius (conscious), therefore, means to be a witness, and also partner, in guilt. To continue, conscire sibi (to know oneself) is to be conscious because I am my own witness. Therefore, conscientia is simple consciousness and is still today the significance of the French conscience. ...

However, because our awareness of our being also pronounces a judgment over us, the consciousness that judges becomes our conscience; it becomes an ethical judgment. The words “consciousness” and “conscience” eventually merged together, were carried over into the ethical realm and restricted to it. Our notion of conscience (Dutch geweten) is not found in Ulfilas. 148 When the words now used in German and Dutch for conscience -Gewissen and geweten, respectively-evolved from Old High German to Middle High German, the root moved from a basic meaning of “inner consciousness” to the threefold significance of (1) knowledge; (2) knowing together, shared awareness; and (3) awareness of good and evil. 149 The general significance of knowledge remained with the word until the eighteenth century, but is now completely lost. Conscience is now something purely ethical. The prepositions syn- and con- (together, with) are a specific reference to “knowing together” with others, and then with oneself and not with God. 150 Conscience may in fact consist of a knowing-with-God, but that cannot be derived from the etymology of the word (contra Perkins).

\underset{―}{151}

It is a knowing-with-oneself; I am both the subject and the object in this knowing. 152 ...

2. CONSCIENCE AND INTELLECT ...

Conscience belongs to the knowing dimension of human life, to the sphere of the intellect. The words used (Latin: con-scientia; Dutch: geweten; German: Ge-wissen) already point to this. Conscience does not belong to the will, as Mosheim claimed: “Conscience is the will or the intent of the will that judges our relations to the world.” 153 Nor does it belong to the realm of feelings, as C. A. Crusius believed: conscience “is the feeling of moral goods and evils.” 154 It is possible to distinguish two directions in human knowing. The first is directed to knowledge of the truth as its goal (theoretical intellect or understanding, theoretical or speculative reason). 155 The second understands and engages in reasoning as an actnamely, it acts and effects that which it understands to be good; its goal is the act or effort (practical reason).

\underset{―}{156}

According to Thomas, “The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers,” because “what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power.” The speculative intellect “directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.” In addition, “Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible.” 157 The intellect handles both theoretical and practical knowledge, because it is implanted in us. There is therefore a knowing that is both theoretical and practical: “Right reason [therefore is] a true knowledge of the will and works of God and of the order of divine judgments.” 158 Furthermore, this right reason which is a “true knowledge” is then “the form and norm concerning natural principles” which are “common notions implanted by God in the very nature of the human mind so that they can govern life and generate the sciences and the disciplines.” 159 Thus there are two kinds of natural principles 160 implanted in the human mind: theoretical or speculative principles, which govern scientific work, and practical principles, which direct our moral life. According to Polanus, God’s law is therefore written in the practical reason, just as the laws for thought are found in the speculative reason. 161 Polanus agrees with Thomas that reason 162 is not a faculty distinct from the intellect, because “to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth; and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another.” Angels have perfect knowledge of intelligible truth apart from discursive reasoning, but “man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one ...
thing to another; and therefore, is called rational.” 163 Reasoning is the way humans come to understand. ...

Moreover, we still possess conscience, which supplies our judgment about ourselves in (connection with) our relationship to God, according to the law of God, according to the right practical reason 164 implanted in us at our creation. Therefore, the conscience does not encompass the law of God within itself, but forms a judgment in accordance with that law of God which lies elsewhere (in the heart). Because the conscience does not judge the true and the false as such, but judges about the good and evil of the person’s being, it belongs to the practical intellect. But now another question arises: Is conscience a distinct faculty within the practical intellect; is it a disposition/habit, a power/capacity, or an act? 165 Scotus, Bonaventure, and Durandus said that it was a disposition, a habit; for Perkins it is definitely a part of practical reason, a natural power, a capacity within it; and Schenkel considers it to be a separate faculty. 166 But, according to Thomas, “‘Synderesis’ is not a power but a habit [or disposition], bestowed on us by nature.” 167 Taken together, the speculative intellect and the practical intellect constitute what we called above, with Polanus, “right reason.” 168 Thomas goes on to say, “Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act,” a conclusion “evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience.” 169 Conscience, therefore, is not a testimony but a witness.

\underset{―}{170}

Conscience is not self-knowledge about ourselves, but God himself testifying within us. Sometimes we do not hear this very well; other times not at all. Conscience came only after sin.

\underset{―}{171}

...

Conscience is not, however, a distinct capacity alongside others, but “the intellect itself ordered to specific actions.” 172 Naturally, we always possess the faculty, the capacity, to evaluate our actions (otherwise we couldn’t); however, that is not a distinct capacity alongside others but belongs to the intellect itself.

\underset{―}{173}

Thus the conscience is an act, a deed, an activity, flowing forth, however, from a disposition or habit. 174 ...

3. THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE: SYNTEEREESIS ...

Syntērēsis is a natural habit of concrete activity that contains the principles of practice or practical reason. 175 The law of nature is the content by which the conscience evaluates our deeds.

\underset{―}{176}

Conscience needs a law to evaluate acts; the syntērēsis is that law. Perkins correctly observes that the ...
conscience uses two assistants to come to a conclusion, the understanding and memory.

\frac{177}{}

If we are to speak correctly, then, this syntērēsis does not belong to the conscience, but precedes it, is its necessary presupposition, without which the conscience cannot judge. To say that it is not itself part of the conscience 178 is to say that the law by which the conscience judges does not lie in the conscience itself but, as Romans 2:15 teaches, in the heart, in practical reason.

\underset{―}{179}

Strictly speaking, the conscience has no content; the lawbook by which it judges resides in the heart. Furthermore, the heart itself did not produce the law, is not itself the law, but is only the tablet for that law and is passive. This brings forth two questions: What is that law, and from whom does it come? ...

What is that law? There are those who say it is the law of nature,

\underset{―}{180}

which in its essence corresponds to the Ten Commandments. The biblical basis for this view is Romans 2:15, where Paul is speaking specifically of the law of Moses and claims that gentiles have “the work of the law” 181 written on their hearts. That is what the Christian church has always thought.

\underset{―}{182}

However, what has always been added is that this knowledge is incomplete and impure. Nonetheless, even then an additional objection arises. If the law of nature truly resides in us, albeit without clarity, why was it then revealed to Israel in such a ceremonious fashion? History provides us with an even greater objection. If the law of nature is indeed “natural” for all people, it should be the same everywhere. But what diversity! 183 In Pascal’s words: “A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.” 184 Geographical borders change the entire moral law. ...

The whole of the Decalogue is not known among the pagans. This is obviously true with respect to the first four commandments, but also relates to the remaining six. Stealing, killing, harlotry, false testimony, and covetousness (Rom. 7) were viewed as permissible by many nations. Antiquity actually recognized only two crimes: murder of one’s blood relatives and perjury.

\underset{―}{185}

There is no single moral command that all people considered obligatory. 186 This is the primary basis of Darwinism, which claims that conscience is entirely a product of circumstances, of the environment. Alternative circumstances would produce a different content. Nothing is necessarily good or evil a priori, but only becomes so through circumstances. All morality is a matter of convention; prostitution was permitted in Babylon, stealing in Sparta, assassination among Indians, ...
polygamy and human sacrifice or cannibalism among many pagans. The Jews considered lighting a fire on the Sabbath to be impermissible, and some may stroll on Sunday without a sense of guilt, but not others. Some people have narrow consciences, others broad ones. 187 We must acknowledge that a good deal of the law of our conscience is circumstantial, introduced from the outside. Many Christian theologians argue, therefore, that the conscience possesses no material content.

\underset{―}{188}

...

Vilmar argues that the ethical laws of the human world arise from the original revelation given to Adam and Eve, and that the basis of conscience was formed by the perspective or representation of the people, by the content and the course of ordinary human life.

\frac{189}{1}

Harless claims that there is no law that serves as the content of our conscience; instead, our own spirit is divine and must place and evaluate everything in relationship to God. 190 According to Harless, Paul does not say in Romans 2:15 that the law is written in the heart of the gentiles, but rather that “the work of the law” is.

\underset{―}{191}

This work, activity, or operation of the law involves judging and rendering a verdict. Thus, the gentiles, who are a law unto themselves, do not possess the positive law but do possess the work or activity of the positive law-namely, judging. 192 Others claim that the law of nature is only a very general rule without any specific application: “What you do not want others to do you. . . .” Here we need to observe the following: ...
a. That even if syntērēsis had absolutely no content, no specific commandments, Darwinism would still not gain anything. But our experience is that what is noble, lovely, etc., is universally regarded as such. Nowhere does conscience encourage debauchery, malice, and so forth. While there is great difference among people about what is good and what is evil, all people know that there is good. ...
b. Who alone can bind the conscience? 193 The conscience is not free but bound; it is morally obligated to something. This is the law of God within the syntērēsis. God himself stands above it, commands, presses the conscience to judge, either to accuse or exonerate. God and God alone is the one who in and through the syntērēsis binds the conscience, commands it, stands above it, possesses power and authority over it. The conscience is immediately and unconditionally subject only to God as its Lord. After all, he is its creator and continues to maintain and regulate it. Furthermore, he alone knows our conscience and sees through it with us, something no angel or other human can do. Only God has the power to punish and to destroy it. ...
“There is only one lawgiver and judge, he who is able to save and to destroy. But who are you to judge your neighbor?” (James 4:12). “For the Lord is our judge; the Lord is our lawgiver” (Isa. 33:22). In addition, for all people in all times, conscience has been bound first of all by the surviving natural principles of morality and justice and of natural religion, given to us at creation and left to us after the fall. 194 A conscience that has this natural knowledge

\underset{―}{195}

as content in the syntērēsis is called a “natural conscience.” ...

But second, among all people who know God’s Word, conscience is absolutely bound to that Word, and believing in the gospel, therefore, is the duty of everyone; unbelief is sin. Among those who do not know the Word, the conscience is equipped to be bound to it, but is not actually bound (John 15:22; Rom. 2:12).

\underset{―}{196}

The conscience that is bound to the Word of God is said to be enlightened. God binds the conscience in the syntērēsis, and the conscience in turn binds and obligates the person. Therefore, God alone binds the conscience. But there are also improper, indirect binders of the conscience. First, there are human laws made by ecclesiastical or civil governments, which papists claim bind the conscience just as properly as the law of God does. Furthermore, on the basis of a number of Scripture passages (Deut. 17:12; Matt. 16:18; Luke 10:16; John 20:21; 21:16; Acts 15:28-29; Rom. 13:2, 5), they contend that the church and worldly government may compel the conscience just as God does. 197 In opposition, the Reformed said that only the one who knows the conscience can bind and punish it. Other people can compel us, but no human being, prince, Satan, or angel can obligate us morally in the conscience; only God can. Nevertheless, human laws can bind us indirectly

\underset{―}{198}

by virtue of God’s commandment and to the extent that they correspond to God’s command. If they conflict with God’s law, then the conscience may consider itself not to be bound and is obligated to passive resistance; we must obey God rather than other people (Dan. 3:28; Acts 4:19). Second, oaths and promises also bind the conscience, unless they are a bond of unrighteousness.

\underset{―}{199}

...

4. CONSCIOUSNESS OF OBLIGATION AND JUDGMENT ...

Awareness of what one must do and of what one has done can also be called conscientia in a broad sense; Scholten even calls this the “conscience proper.” 200 Nevertheless, properly speaking, it does not belong to the conscience and is not part of it. But, just as with the syntērēsis, this ...
consciousness is used by the conscience (in the narrow sense) as an assistant so that it can come to a judgment. 201 To return once more to the example of murder that we used earlier, adding the notion of the syntērēsis, the major premise comes from the syntērēsis: “Every murderer is accursed”; the minor premise comes from our consciousness, our memory, our recollection: “You have committed murder.” This accusation is the silent witness of our being and doing. This consciousness of having to do something or of having done something was naturally present in Adam before the fall, just as the syntērēsis was. But sin had a significant effect on the syntērēsis and this consciousness. Now the syntērēsis reproduces the law of God obscurely and can include mistaken content (idols). In addition, our consciousness is weakened and narrowed in the sense that we do a great deal that does not enter at all into our consciousness.

\underset{―}{202}

...

5. THREE QUESTIONS OF JUDGMENT: WHO? WHAT? HOW? ...

Conscience in its proper sense is that power or activity in a person’s understanding that, bound to the law of God in the syntērēsis, judges the actions of a person observed by means of the consciousness, according to that law. We need to answer three questions: Who judges in the activity of the conscience? What does the conscience judge? And, how does the conscience judge? ...

Who Judges? ...

Who is the judging subject? Not God, although that is frequently the popular way of speaking, when conscience is described as the voice of God within us. There is a grain of truth here because conscience is God’s gatekeeper within us, his substitute and lesser judge; conscience is the highest judge on earth, under God, standing above earthly rulers and judges, kings, and emperors. An appeal to conscience is therefore an appeal from all lower earthly courts to the highest court under God, and therefore “puts an end to all argument” (Heb. 6:16).

\underset{―}{.03}

No one, neither an angel nor another person, may stand between God and someone’s conscience. In our consciences we are bound directly to God, whose existence is disclosed to us in the syntērēsis. Nonetheless, we are not bound directly to God himself but indirectly via the judging subject. To state it more clearly: it is we ourselves who are the subject that judges us. The conscience is a particular part of our self-consciousness in which we function as subject and as object. In our conscience, we ourselves are the judge and the accused defendant. ...

This was the understanding of all the Reformed thinkers like van Mastricht, Witsius, and Pictet: “Human beings judge themselves.”

\underset{―}{204}

Ames says that “conscience is a man’s judgment of himself, according to the judgment of God of him.”

\underset{―}{205}

Buddeus specifically contests the idea that “God resides in our mind when it speaks intimately,” but does say, “The mind of man, understanding and discerning the divine laws and judging his actions by them, has come to give this the name of conscience.”

\underset{―}{206}

Conscience is a knowing-with-God, a judging that is done before the face of God, in the name of God, at the tribunal of God. 207 The subjects of the judging, therefore, are people themselves.

\underset{―}{208}

How miraculous this all is! God has appointed us to be our own judge.

\underset{―}{209}

...

As judge 210 over ourselves when we sin, we serve as the accuser, the one who convicts and sentences us, the avenger and executioner. 211 We are obligated and bound by God to assess ourselves according to God’s law and, if we sin, to acquiesce with God’s judgment on us. In our conscience, we justify God contrary to our own will and desire; we are compelled to acknowledge God as God. It is as this judging subject that the conscience is called Judge: The conscience summons the guilty, listens to its witnesses, opens the lawbook (the syntērēsis), and judges and specifies the punishment accordingly. The conscience is a supreme court (Kant). This analysis now easily leads us to a question: Is the conscience a religious or a moral consciousness, or both? The syntērēsis as the direct consciousness of God, with God’s moral law as its content, is thus (religiously) specified by God and has as its content the religious (first table) and the moral (second table). The conscience is bound to that law, judges in accord with that law, and judges in God’s place, in God’s name, and before God’s face.

\underset{―}{212}

The syntērēsis is therefore entirely specified by God and is appropriately said to be “religious.” However, it judges about the moral quality of a person’s being and acting, and is therefore a moral consciousness. The human selfconsciousness in our conscience, bound by God to his law and appointed as judge in his place (therefore religiously oriented), judges and must judge us ourselves (that is the moral dimension). The conscience is therefore religiously oriented and, for that reason, precisely moral. ...

What Does the Conscience Judge? ...

First, the conscience renders judgment about everything in a person, about the entire person; not merely about our actions but also about our being and state and our thoughts.

\underset{―}{213}

In other words, we feel obligated by ...
our conscience to look at everything in relation to God and his law and to review it accordingly. Nothing within us or about us is excused or exempted from God and his law in any of our capacities, gifts, powers, words, or actions; in our whole person we always stand under the law. Nothing in us or done by us is outside the law.

\underset{―}{214}

...

But, second, here is a more important question: Does the conscience render judgment only about past, completed matters, or also about future ones? Stated differently, can we speak of an antecedent conscience as well as a consequential conscience? 215 According to Doedes, ...

Conscience does not make people aware of their duty on any particular issue before the moment when they become aware of a conflict between their willing (or acting) and their moral obligation. Consciousness of moral obligation does not precede that which must be done and, therefore, does not speak in advance, but only after a person has willed or acted in conflict with the moral duty. Nonetheless, if the conscience is awake and time is sufficient, the conscience may restrain a person from completing acts that conflict with moral obligation. With sufficient time, a person may even be led by the conscience to choose an alternative. However, in neither case does this happen before the moment we come into conflict with our moral obligations. $\underset{―}{216}$ ...

Now, to be sure, rendering a judgment about completed matters is surely the most important function of conscience 217 and is generally what people have in mind when they speak about conscience. Conscience is therefore primarily consequential. Nevertheless, the conscience is and becomes increasingly active before the act, before the conflict.

\underset{―}{218}

We imagine ahead of time how a future act will reflect in our moral consciousness, how our conscience will render judgment about it. That testimony of conscience precedes the act and provides warning or encouragement by forbidding or commanding me to do it. The antecedent conscience was therefore differentiated into suasion and dissuasion.

\underset{―}{219}

Many assigned the daimonion of Socrates

\underset{―}{220}

to this; however, most today consider it to be a refined personal sense of what he could and was permitted to do, a clear consciousness of the boundaries established by his personal individuality.

\underset{―}{221}

God has given us this prior knowing en route, to show us the course we must follow. And this prior knowing has great authority, for everything that is not from faith (even though in itself it may be good) is sin. One may never do something unless one knows it to be something good. (An Anabaptist who out of fear swears an oath to the government is sinning.) A good opinion or confidence is not enough; firm assurance in the conscience is needed. ...

How Does the Conscience Render Judgment? ...

The conscience renders judgment in the form of a syllogism. The conscience is the practical syllogism in the intellect in which the major premise is the law or Word of God, the minor premise is the truth of the matter, and the conclusion is the application of approbation or condemnation (Melanchthon).

\underset{―}{222}

The syntērēsis (i.e., the law or Word of God) provides the major premise, and consciousness 223 supplies the minor premise. The conscience draws the conclusion and renders judgment. This judgment either accuses or exonerates (Rom. 2:15).

\underset{―}{224}

...

First, accusing and condemning. 225 This function of conscience begins immediately after the action and consists in accusing-“You have done wrong”—and condemning-“You deserve punishment.” The results of that accusing function of conscience especially include shame,

\underset{―}{226}

an unpleasant feeling about a misdeed, sadness (regret, depression), fear (Prov. 28:1; Wis. 17:11-15), despair (doubt about salvation and forgiveness; e.g., Ahithophel and Judas). ...

Second, exonerating and acquitting. 227 This is followed by a quiet conscience, courage, and joy and raises the question whether conscience speaks only negatively in disapproval and accusation or also affirmatively in exoneration. According to Doedes, conscience speaks only negativelythat is, only when wrong is committed. Conscience says only no and does not say yes. When an act is good, the conscience is silent, remains at rest. This restful conscience can be viewed as a good testimony, and that it is; but then that good testimony is not provided by the conscience, but by the rest, by the silence of the conscience. This is true; 228 it can also be observed that the pleasant feelings of joy and courage that follow a good deed are seated in the emotions, not in the understanding or conscience. But Doedes says more than this. The statement “I am not aware of doing anything wrong” is preferable to “I am aware of having acted morally.” Why? Because one can think, be convinced, and can demonstrate that one has acted morally, but consciousness of duty tells us nothing. This claims too much. After someone has sinned, their conscience does not declare positively and loudly: “You have acted morally.” A completely clear consciousness of having acted rightly is always absent, is always more or less obscured, weakened. But apart from sin, moral action is properly accompanied by a firm consciousness of being moral, just as knowledge accompanies awareness thereof (I know that I know). And that brings us to ...

1. For the story in greater detail, see Dirk van Keulen and John Bolt, “Introduction to Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics,” the next section of this volume. ...
2. Usually, but mistakenly, taken as a reference to the death of King Richard III of England at the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485. ...
3. Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation. ...
4. For more information see the Bavinck Institute website at https://bavinckinstitute.org/. ...
5. They are, in chronological order, Hoekema, “Bavinck’s Doctrine of the Covenant”; Heideman, Relation of Revelation and Reason; Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus; Veenhof, Revelatie en ...
In dogmatics we are concerned with what God does for us and in us. In dogmatics God is everything. Dogmatics is a word from God to us, coming from outside of us, from above us; we are passive, listening, and opening ourselves to being directed by God. In ethics, we are interested in the question of what it is that God now expects of us when he does his work in us. What do we do for him? Here we are active, precisely because of and on the grounds of God’s deeds in us; we sing psalms in thanks and praise to God. In dogmatics, God descends to us; in ethics, we ascend to God. In dogmatics, he is ours; in ethics, we are his. In dogmatics, we know we shall see his face; in ethics, his name will be written on our foreheads [Rev. 22:4]. ...
1. Ed. note: The title of this chapter is taken from Bavinck’s marginal note: “onder de macht [heerschappij] der zonde.” The manuscript had “In the Situation of Sin” (In den toestand der zonde). ...
2. Ed. note: This heading reflects a combination of terms suggested by Bavinck. The manuscript itself reads simply “The Old Man” (De oude mensch); an interlinear insertion proposes “natural” (natuurlijke) for “old,” and a marginal note suggests a longer subject line: “The devastation of the image of God in humanity by sin. Or ‘fallen humanity’” (Den verwoesting van het beeld Gods in den mensch door de zonde. Of: de gevallen mensch). ...
3. Cf. RD, 3:25-192 (chaps. 1-4). ...
4. Cf. Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:119-392; Vilmar’s “Doctrine of Sin” (Lehre von der Sünde), which he also calls “A History of Illness” (Krankheitsgeschichte), is divided into two parts: §§9-16, “The Doctrine of Sin in General” (Lehre von der Sünde im Allgemeinen), and §§17-34, “The Doctrine of Sins in Their Appearance (about Sins)” (Lehre von der Sünde in der Erscheinung [von den Sünden]). The former is then further subdivided into sections on “The Fall into Sin” (Sündenfall), “Terms for Sin” (Namen der Sünde), “The Nature and Essence of Sin in General” (Begriff und Wesen der Sünde im Allgemeinen), “The Origin of Sin” (Ursprung der Sünde), “On Temptation” (Von der Versuchung), “The Consequences of Sin” (Folgen der Sünde), “Guilt” (Schuld), and “Original Sin” (Erbsünde). The second part is divided further into sections on “The Material Division of Sins: The Three Circles of Sins” (Materielle Einteilung der Sünden: Drie Sündenkreise), “Formal Division of Sins” (Formelle Einteilungen der Sünden), “On Sins of the Flesh” (Von den Fleischessünden), "On ...
Woe to those who rise early in the morning to run after their drinks, who stay up late at night ...
1. GrO: ко́бนос. ...
2. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, book 7; Stapfer, De zeden-leer, 3:301ff. (Sittenlehre, 3:104-812 [III.xi]). Ed. note: The title of Pictet’s book 7 is “On the Duties and Virtues of a Christian with Respect to Oneself” (“Van de pligten en deugden eens Christens met betrekking op zichzelven”). ...
3. DO: Keel-en buikzonden, gastronomie (“Throat and Stomach Sins, Gastronomy”). Ed. note: The classification comes from Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:261. Vilmar’s heading is “Bauchsünden (gula)” (gula = throat, gluttony). Much of the material that follows echoes ideas and phrases from Vilmar, though Bavinck’s treatment is his own. ...
4. GrO: ท̀ঠovท́. ...
5. GrO: $φ 1 λ \hat{n} δ o v o l ε \hat{i} v α l$ . ...
6. Ed. note: Bavinck takes this notion directly from Vilmar, Theologische Moral, 1:261-64. ...
7. LO: panem et circuses. ...
8. Pictet, De christelyke zedekunst, 639; van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, III.iv. 2 [4:782-88]. Ed. note: Bavinck’s reference is to “Vierde deel, Rotterdam/Utrecht, 1753, 557 (§ I.XVI)” (Theoretico-Practica Theologia, II.i.16), which seems incorrect. Van Mastricht deals with food sins in III.iv. 2 [4:782-88]: “Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Stomach” (LO: De alimentorum usu & abusu; DO: Van het gebruik en misbruik der dingen, die tot levens-onderhoudt geschicht zyn). For an explanation of the format we are using to cite van Mastricht’s TheoreticoPractica Theologia, see the extended note in the introduction, §1, in the section “Reformed Churches” (pp. 8-9n48). The volume and page numbers come from the 1749-53 Dutch edition used by Bavinck. ...
9. Ed. note: This is a paraphrase translation of Bavinck’s term pater gutleben. ...
It is with reluctance that I enlarge upon this topic, since you may think that my discourse lends authority to sin; and you would be justified in so thinking, were not an innocent or guilty conscience so powerful a force in itself, without the assumption of any divine design. Destroy this, and everything collapses; for just as a household or a state appears to lack all rational system and order if in it there are no rewards for right conduct and no punishments for transgression, so there is no such thing at all as the divine governance of the world if that governance makes no distinction between the good and the wicked. $^{15}$ ...

REFORMED ETHICS 개혁주의 윤리학

CREATED, FALLEN, AND CONVERTED HUMANITY창조, 타락, 회심한 인간

REFORMED ETHICS 개혁주의 윤리학

For Rimmer and † † †\dagger Ruth De Vries리머와 루스 드 브리즈에게

Contents 목차

Selected Scripture Index 528 ― 528 _ 528 _\underline{528} ...

Editor's Preface ...

Note to the Reader ...

Abbreviations ...

Introduction to Herman Bavinck's Reformed Ethics ...

The Professor and His Manuscripts ...

The Structure of Bavinck's Reformed Ethics ...

A Brief Overview of Book I ...

A Brief Overview of Book II ...

A Brief Overview of Book III ...

A Brief Overview of Book IV ...

Intermezzo: The Question of Publication ...

The de Jong Manuscript on Reformed Ethics ...

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Ethics, and Philosophical Ethics ...

Abstract ...

Introduction ...

§1. Historical Overview of Christian Ethics¹ ...

Antiquity ...

Middle Ages ...

The Reformation ...

Reformed Churches ...

The Spiritual Life: Casuistry and Ascetic Theology ...

Ethics in the Nineteenth Century ...

§2. Terminology 128 128 ^(128){ }^{128} ...

§3. Division and Organization of Ethics ...

§4. Foundation and Method of Ethics ...

the Heidelberg Catechism, Lord's Days 34-52 are completely ethical. ...

教 Book I ...

HUMANITY BEFORE CONVERSION ...

1

Essential Human Nature ...

§5. Human Beings, Created in God's Image ...

§6. The Content of Human Nature ...

§7. Human Relationships 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} ...

1. Our Relation to God ...

2. Our Relation to Other People ...

3. Our Relation to Nature ...

4. Religion and Morality 142 ― 142 _ 142 _\underline{142} ...

2

Humanity under the Power of Sin ...

§8. The Devastation of the Image of God in Humanity 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} ...

The First Sin and Its Consequences ...

Biblical Terms for Life under Sin ...

THE "OLD SELF" 21 ...

"FLESH" 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} ...

"NATURAL LIVING BEING" ...

1. life, breath, the life of a single living being, or 2. the living being itself as individual, as a person. ...

Scripture on "Natural" or Fallen Humanity ...

§9. The Organizing Principle and Classification of Sins 107 107 ^(107){ }^{107} ...

The Decalogue and Disobedience ...

Classification of Sins 144 ― 144 _ 144 _\underline{144} ...

Egocentricity and Sensual Sin ...

Egocentricity and Spiritual Sins ...

3

The Self against the Neighbor and God ...

§10. Sins of Ecoism in the Narrow Sense ...

A. Sensual Sins ...

1. SINS INVOLVING FOOD 3 ― 3 _ ^(3_){ }^{\underline{3}} ...

2. SINS OF INERTIA 21 ― 21 _ ^(21 _){ }^{\underline{21}} ...

3. SINS THAT TAKE PLEASURE IN FORM ...

B. Spiritual Sins ...

1. THE LOVE OF MONEY 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} ...

2. SINS INVOLVING ABUSE OF WORDS (LANGUAGE) ...

§11. Sins against the Neighbor ...

1. The Neighbor's Chastity (Seventh Commandment) 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} ...

2. The Neighbor's Property (Eighth and Tenth Commandments) 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} ...

3. The Neighbor's Reputation and Good Name (Ninth Commandment) ...

4. The Neighbor's Authority (Fifth Commandment) 79 ...

5. The Neighbor's Life (Sixth Commandment) ...

§12. Sins against God ...

1. Sins of a More Sensual Nature ...

2. Sins That Are More Spiritual 108 108 ^(108){ }^{108} ...

4

The Fallen Image of God ...

§13. The Image of God in Fallen Human Beings¹ ...

REFORMED
ETHICS 개혁주의 윤리학

CREATED, FALLEN, AND CONVERTED HUMANITY
창조, 타락, 회심한 인간

For Rimmer and $†$ Ruth De Vries
리머와 루스 드 브리즈에게

Selected Scripture Index $\underset{―}{528}$ ...

§2. Terminology $^{128}$ ...

§7. Human Relationships $^{68}$ ...

4. Religion and Morality $\underset{―}{142}$ ...

§8. The Devastation of the Image of God in Humanity $^{2}$ ...

"FLESH" $^{24}$ ...

1. life, breath, the life of a single living being, or
2. the living being itself as individual, as a person. ...

§9. The Organizing Principle and Classification of Sins $^{107}$ ...

Classification of Sins $\underset{―}{144}$ ...

1. SINS INVOLVING FOOD $^{\underset{―}{3}}$ ...

2. SINS OF INERTIA $^{\underset{―}{21}}$ ...

1. THE LOVE OF MONEY $^{34}$ ...

1. The Neighbor's Chastity (Seventh Commandment) $^{45}$ ...

2. The Neighbor's Property (Eighth and Tenth Commandments) $^{53}$ ...

2. Sins That Are More Spiritual $^{108}$ ...

Teachings about Conscience: A History $^{\underset{―}{6}}$ ...

CHURCH FATHERS AND SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS $^{\underset{―}{34}}$ ...