Examining the "Family Effect" on Firm Performance 探讨“家庭效应”对企业绩效的影响
W. Gibb Dyer, Jr. W. 吉布·戴尔， Jr.
Abstract 摘要
The purpose of this article is to provide an explanation for the contradictory evidence in the literature regarding the performance of family-owned firms. The article suggests that most of the research fails to clearly describe the “family effect” on organizational performance. The “family effect,” based on agency theory and the resource-based view of the firm, is described and propositions are generated that examine the relationship between families and organizational performance. Implications for theory and research are also discussed. 本文旨在对文献中关于家族企业绩效的矛盾证据进行解释。文章指出，大多数研究未能清晰描述“家族效应”对组织绩效的影响。基于代理理论和资源基础视角，本文对“家族效应”进行了阐述，并提出了探讨家族与组织绩效之间关系的假设。此外，还讨论了对理论和研究的启示。
How might a family that owns and manages an enterprise affect its performance? To answer this question, a number of scholars have attempted to compare the performance of family firms with firms having no family ties, but the results of such studies have led to mixed results and conflicting opinions regarding the impact of family control (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze,Lubatkin,Dino,&Buchholtz,2001;Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). For example, Daily and Dollinger, in their study comparing the performance of family versus nonfamily firms, write: 一个拥有并管理企业的家庭会如何影响其绩效？为解答这一问题，众多学者尝试对比家族企业与非家族企业的绩效表现，但此类研究结果存在分歧，对家族控制的影响也存在不同观点（Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001;Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003）。例如，Daily 和 Dollinger 在其比较家族企业与非家族企业绩效的研究中写道：
family-run firms do appear to achieve performance advantages… whether performance is measured in terms of financially oriented growth rates or perceived measures of performance. (1992, p. 132) 家族企业似乎确实能够取得绩效优势……无论绩效是以财务导向的增长率还是以绩效感知指标来衡量。（1992，第 132 页）
More recently, Anderson and Reeb also found that family firms outperformed nonfamily firms in the S&P 500, noting that “family firms are significantly better performers than nonfamily firms” (2003, p. 1324). 最近，安德森和里布也发现，家族企业在标准普尔 500 指数中的表现优于非家族企业，指出“家族企业的表现显著优于非家族企业”（2003 年，第 1324 页）。
In contrast to these findings, Perrow concludes that the family firm is inherently inefficient: 与这些发现相反，佩罗得出结论认为，家族企业本质上是低效的：
Particularism means that irrelevant criteria (e.g., only relatives of the boss have a chance at top posi- 特殊主义意味着使用与目标无关的标准（例如，只有老板的亲属才有机会获得高职位）。
tions), in contrast to universalistic criteria (competence is all that counts), are employed in choosing employees . . . efficiency is foregone if recruitment or access is decided on grounds that are not related to the members’ performance . . . More serious, the particularistic criteria are likely to be negatively related to performance-the more these particularistic criteria are used, the poorer the performance. (1972, pp. 8-10) 与普遍性标准（能力是唯一标准）相比，特殊性标准（如个人背景、关系等）在选择员工时被采用……如果招聘或晋升的决定基于与员工表现无关的因素，效率将被牺牲……更严重的是，特殊性标准很可能与绩效呈负相关——特殊性标准使用得越多，绩效越差。（1972，第 8-10 页）
Work by Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) has also noted that family firms are relatively poor performers due to conflicts that arise as a family attempts to manage an enterprise. Those who see the family firm as an inefficient organizational form typically argue that the best course for any family firm is to move as quickly as possible to replace family members in the firm’s leadership positions with professional managers who can function with more objectivity and skill (Levinson, 1971). 法奇奥、朗和杨（2001）的研究也指出，家族企业由于在家族成员试图管理企业时产生的冲突，表现相对较差。那些认为家族企业是一种低效组织形式的人通常认为，家族企业最好的出路是尽可能快地用专业经理人取代家族成员在企业领导岗位上的职位，这些经理人能够以更客观和专业的态度和技能开展工作（Levinson，1971）。
The purpose of this article is to address these puzzling findings in the literature by analyzing the “family effect” on firm performance. First, I will discuss how the current theorizing and research on this subject fails to clearly differentiate the family effect from other variables that may influence firm performance. Some of the important 本文旨在通过分析“家庭效应”对企业绩效的影响，来解决文献中存在的这些令人费解的发现。首先，我将讨论当前关于这一主题的理论探讨和研究如何未能明确区分家庭效应与其他可能影响企业绩效的变量。其中一些重要的
studies that focus on family firm performance will be reviewed and the possible explanations for the conflicting results discussed. Second, the “family effect” on firm performance will be explored using agency theory and the resource-based view of the firm to describe the impact that a family might have on a firm. Several propositions will be presented regarding family firm performance, suggesting that the family effect can be either positive or negative depending on the circumstances. Finally, implications of the family effect for theory development will be discussed. 本研究将回顾聚焦于家族企业绩效的研究，并探讨矛盾结果的可能解释。其次，将运用代理理论和资源基础视角，探讨家族对企业绩效的影响，以描述家族可能对企业产生的影响。本文将提出若干关于家族企业绩效的假设，指出家族效应可能因具体情境而呈现正向或负向影响。最后，将讨论家族效应对于理论发展的启示。
Determinants of Firm Performance 企业绩效的决定因素
As mentioned previously, most studies that have attempted to ascertain the impact of the family on firm performance have compared the performance of family and nonfamily firms. Table 1 lists nine studies comparing the performance of family firms with nonfamily firms. ^(1){ }^{1} 如前所述，大多数试图确定家庭对企业绩效影响的研究都比较了家族企业和非家族企业的绩效。表 1 列出了 9 项比较家族企业和非家族企业绩效的研究。 ^(1){ }^{1}
Table 1 contains the definitions used in the studies, the performance measures, the samples, the criteria used to select the samples, and the findings. Of the nine studies, four reported that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms based on the performance criteria used by the researchers; three studies found that nonfamily firms had superior performance; two studies had mixed results. Upon closer inspection of these studies, there appear to be several possible reasons for the divergent conclusions. First, the different methodological approaches employed across the studies might account for the contradictory findings. For example, the definitions of what constitutes a family firm varied widely across studies. Some scholars defined a firm as being a “family firm” rather subjectively, basing 表 1 列出了研究中使用的定义、绩效指标、样本、样本选择标准以及研究结果。在九项研究中，有四项研究基于研究者使用的绩效指标指出家族企业表现优于非家族企业；三项研究发现非家族企业表现更优；两项研究结果不一。对这些研究进行深入分析后，似乎存在多种可能原因导致结论不一致。首先，不同研究中采用的方法论差异可能导致矛盾的发现。例如，不同研究中对“家族企业”的定义存在显著差异。部分学者较为主观地将企业定义为“家族企业”，其依据主要基于...
firm classification on whether the respondent believed the firm was a “family firm,” while other researchers based their definition on more objective criteria such the percentage of family ownership or the number of family members occupying management or board positions. Thus, some studies likely included firms in their “family firm” sample that would not have been included in other studies’ samples and this mixing of “apples and oranges” might account for the ambiguous findings. Moreover, sample size, type of firm, and performance measures also varied widely between studies. Some studies primarily compared “founder-led” family firms with nonfamily firms while other samples were composed of family firms that had moved into succeeding generations of family leadership. 研究者对受访者是否认为企业属于“家族企业”的分类存在差异。部分研究者基于受访者的主观判断进行分类，而其他研究者则采用更客观的标准，如家族成员持股比例或家族成员在管理层或董事会中的任职人数。因此，部分研究可能将某些企业纳入“家族企业”样本，而这些企业可能不会被其他研究纳入样本。这种“混淆不同类型企业”的情况可能导致研究结果存在模糊性。此外，样本规模、企业类型及绩效指标在不同研究中也存在显著差异。部分研究主要比较“创始人领导型”家族企业与非家族企业，而其他样本则由已进入家族领导层后续世代的家族企业组成。
These methodological problems suggest that researchers need to unravel the impact of the various factors-including the family-that affect firm performance (Scott, 1992). Figure 1 outlines the typical factors that scholars have argued are the determinants of firm performance: (1) industry, (2) governance, (3) firm characteristics (e.g., social capital, strategy), and (4) management-particularly, in the case of newer firms, the impact of the entrepreneur or founder. What most scholars leave out or fail to clearly articulate, however, is the possible “family effect” on firm performance as described in Figure 2. Figure 2 suggests that a family might influence firm governance, its basic characteristics, the quality of its management, and possibly even an industry (Dyer, 2003; Morck & Yeung, 2003, 2004). It is also possible that a family may have a direct effect on a firm’s performance that is not mediated through the other four variables. 这些方法论问题表明，研究人员需要厘清影响企业绩效的各种因素（包括家庭因素）的具体作用（Scott, 1992）。图 1 概述了学者们认为决定企业绩效的典型因素：（1）行业，（2）治理，（3）企业特征（如社会资本、战略），以及（4）管理——特别是对于新成立的企业，创始人或创业者的影响。然而，大多数学者忽略或未明确阐述的是，家庭对企业绩效的潜在“家庭效应”，如图 2 所示。图 2 表明，家庭可能影响企业治理、基本特征、管理质量，甚至可能影响整个行业（Dyer, 2003；Morck & Yeung, 2003, 2004）。此外，家庭也可能通过其他四个变量之外的直接途径影响企业绩效。
The studies cited in Table 1 leave open the question as to whether these studies have sufficiently controlled for the effects of the various variables to truly isolate the “family effect” on firm performance. For example, Gallo, Tapies, and Cappuyns (2000) note that in their study, family businesses tend to be found in industries that are more “seasonal” in their sales and are less capital intensive, and the Anderson and Reeb (2003) study describes similar differences. Although some of 表 1 中引用的研究并未明确回答这些研究是否已充分控制了各种变量的影响，从而真正孤立出“家庭效应”对企业绩效的影响。例如，Gallo、Tapies 和 Cappuyns（2000）指出，在他们的研究中，家族企业倾向于出现在销售具有“季节性”特征且资本密集度较低的行业中，而 Anderson 和 Reeb（2003）的研究也描述了类似的差异。尽管其中一些
Table 1 Family Versus Nonfamily Firm Performance Comparisons 表 1 家族企业与非家族企业绩效比较
Citation 引用
Definition of Family Firm 家族企业定义
Performance Measures 绩效指标
Samples 样本
Sample Criteria 示例标准
Findings 调查结果
Anderson and Reeb (2003) 安德森和里布（2003）
Family firm criteria: (1) the family continues to have an equity ownership stake in firm; (2) family possesses board seats; (3) founding CEO is still the acting CEO or descendent of CEO is acting CEO. 家族企业标准： (1) 家族继续持有企业股权； (2) 家族成员在董事会中占据席位； (3) 创始人仍担任首席执行官，或其后裔担任首席执行官。
1. 托宾的 qq .2. 资产回报率。 3. 权益回报率。
1. Tobin's qq.
2. Return on assets.
3. Return on equity.
1. Tobin's q.
2. Return on assets.
3. Return on equity.| 1. Tobin's $q$. |
| :--- |
| 2. Return on assets. |
| 3. Return on equity. |
403 firms taken from S&P 500. Firms from 1992-1999. 从标准普尔 500 指数中选取的 403 家企业。这些企业成立于 1992 年至 1999 年。
S&P 500 firms, excluding banks and public utilities. 标普 500 指数成分股公司，不包括银行和公用事业公司。
Family firms have higher Tobin's qq and return on assets. 家族企业具有更高的托宾 qq 比率和资产回报率。
Beehr, Drexler, and Faulkner (1997) 比尔、德雷克勒和福克纳（1997）
A family business is one in which the owner and at least one other family member work. 家族企业是指由企业主及其至少一名家庭成员共同经营的企业。
1. Conflict: work-family conflict/interpersonal conflict.
2. Expectations and advantages: family expectations/personal advantage.
3. Individual outcomes: job satisfaction/career satisfaction/psychological strain.
4. Organizational outcomes: organizational commitment/turnover intention.
5. Family outcome: family harmony.| 1. Conflict: work-family conflict/interpersonal conflict. |
| :--- |
| 2. Expectations and advantages: family expectations/personal advantage. |
| 3. Individual outcomes: job satisfaction/career satisfaction/psychological strain. |
| 4. Organizational outcomes: organizational commitment/turnover intention. |
| 5. Family outcome: family harmony. |
45 businesses. (37 paired family and nonfamily in Maine; 4 family and 7 nonfamily in Michigan). Individual sample: 235. 45 家企业。（其中缅因州有 37 对家庭企业与非家庭企业配对；密歇根州有 4 家家庭企业与 7 家非家庭企业。）个体样本：235。
Small family-owned establishments in Maine were matched with nonfamily-owned establishments (predominantly from the retail industry). Michigan businesses were selected from machining and light metal manufacturing industry. 缅因州的小型家庭经营企业与非家庭经营企业（主要来自零售业）进行了匹配。密歇根州的企业则选自机械加工和轻金属制造业。
Family firms generally perform better on the 5 performance dimensions. 家族企业通常在五个绩效维度上表现更佳。
Daily and Dollinger (1992) 戴利和多林格（1992）
If there were key managers related to the owner working in the business the firm is considered a family firm. 如果企业中有与所有者相关的关键管理人员在企业中工作，则该企业被视为家族企业。
Manufacturing firms maintaining no more than 500 employees with standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 20-39. 员工人数不超过 500 人的制造企业，且其标准工业分类（SIC）代码为 20-39。
Family firms perform better along the several dimensions. 家族企业在多个维度上表现更优。
McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) 麦康纳希、马修斯和菲亚尔科（2001）
Public corporations whose CEOs are either the founder or a member of the founder's family. 上市公司中，首席执行官（CEO）为公司创始人或创始人家族成员的。
219 firms identified from "The BusinessWeek CEO 1000." 从《商业周刊》“CEO 1000 强”榜单中筛选出 219 家企业。
Firms with CEOs included in the article, "The BusinessWeek CEO 1000," who fit the criteria of being either the founder or a member of the founder's family. 本文所提及的《商业周刊》“CEO 1000”榜单中，其首席执行官（CEO）符合以下任一条件的上市公司：该 CEO 为公司创始人，或为创始人家族成员。
Family firms perform better along the 3 dimensions. 家族企业在三个维度上表现更佳。
Gallo, Tapies, and Cappuyns (2000) 加洛、塔皮埃斯和卡普恩斯（2000）
Designation of family firm left to the judgment of the person answering the questionnaire. 家族企业的认定由填写问卷的人自行判断。
Growth, debt, and other financial measures. 增长、债务及其他财务指标。
204 nonfamily businesses and 101 family businesses. 204 家非家族企业及 101 家家族企业。
Spanish businesses that had sales of over 3 billion pesetas in 1995 and more than 150 employees. 1995 年营业额超过 30 亿比塞塔且员工人数超过 150 人的西班牙企业。
Nonfamily firms had superior growth. 非家族企业表现出更优异的增长。
Citation Definition of Family Firm Performance Measures Samples Sample Criteria Findings
Anderson and Reeb (2003) Family firm criteria: (1) the family continues to have an equity ownership stake in firm; (2) family possesses board seats; (3) founding CEO is still the acting CEO or descendent of CEO is acting CEO. "1. Tobin's q.
2. Return on assets.
3. Return on equity." 403 firms taken from S&P 500. Firms from 1992-1999. S&P 500 firms, excluding banks and public utilities. Family firms have higher Tobin's q and return on assets.
Beehr, Drexler, and Faulkner (1997) A family business is one in which the owner and at least one other family member work. "1. Conflict: work-family conflict/interpersonal conflict.
2. Expectations and advantages: family expectations/personal advantage.
3. Individual outcomes: job satisfaction/career satisfaction/psychological strain.
4. Organizational outcomes: organizational commitment/turnover intention.
5. Family outcome: family harmony." 45 businesses. (37 paired family and nonfamily in Maine; 4 family and 7 nonfamily in Michigan). Individual sample: 235. Small family-owned establishments in Maine were matched with nonfamily-owned establishments (predominantly from the retail industry). Michigan businesses were selected from machining and light metal manufacturing industry. Family firms generally perform better on the 5 performance dimensions.
Daily and Dollinger (1992) If there were key managers related to the owner working in the business the firm is considered a family firm. "1. Size.
2. Growth.
3. Margins.
4. Perceived performance." 186 manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms maintaining no more than 500 employees with standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 20-39. Family firms perform better along the several dimensions.
McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) Public corporations whose CEOs are either the founder or a member of the founder's family. "1. Efficiency.
2. Capital structure.
3. Value." 219 firms identified from "The BusinessWeek CEO 1000." Firms with CEOs included in the article, "The BusinessWeek CEO 1000," who fit the criteria of being either the founder or a member of the founder's family. Family firms perform better along the 3 dimensions.
Gallo, Tapies, and Cappuyns (2000) Designation of family firm left to the judgment of the person answering the questionnaire. Growth, debt, and other financial measures. 204 nonfamily businesses and 101 family businesses. Spanish businesses that had sales of over 3 billion pesetas in 1995 and more than 150 employees. Nonfamily firms had superior growth.| Citation | Definition of Family Firm | Performance Measures | Samples | Sample Criteria | Findings |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Anderson and Reeb (2003) | Family firm criteria: (1) the family continues to have an equity ownership stake in firm; (2) family possesses board seats; (3) founding CEO is still the acting CEO or descendent of CEO is acting CEO. | 1. Tobin's $q$. <br> 2. Return on assets. <br> 3. Return on equity. | 403 firms taken from S&P 500. Firms from 1992-1999. | S&P 500 firms, excluding banks and public utilities. | Family firms have higher Tobin's $q$ and return on assets. |
| Beehr, Drexler, and Faulkner (1997) | A family business is one in which the owner and at least one other family member work. | 1. Conflict: work-family conflict/interpersonal conflict. <br> 2. Expectations and advantages: family expectations/personal advantage. <br> 3. Individual outcomes: job satisfaction/career satisfaction/psychological strain. <br> 4. Organizational outcomes: organizational commitment/turnover intention. <br> 5. Family outcome: family harmony. | 45 businesses. (37 paired family and nonfamily in Maine; 4 family and 7 nonfamily in Michigan). Individual sample: 235. | Small family-owned establishments in Maine were matched with nonfamily-owned establishments (predominantly from the retail industry). Michigan businesses were selected from machining and light metal manufacturing industry. | Family firms generally perform better on the 5 performance dimensions. |
| Daily and Dollinger (1992) | If there were key managers related to the owner working in the business the firm is considered a family firm. | 1. Size. <br> 2. Growth. <br> 3. Margins. <br> 4. Perceived performance. | 186 manufacturing firms. | Manufacturing firms maintaining no more than 500 employees with standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 20-39. | Family firms perform better along the several dimensions. |
| McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) | Public corporations whose CEOs are either the founder or a member of the founder's family. | 1. Efficiency. <br> 2. Capital structure. <br> 3. Value. | 219 firms identified from "The BusinessWeek CEO 1000." | Firms with CEOs included in the article, "The BusinessWeek CEO 1000," who fit the criteria of being either the founder or a member of the founder's family. | Family firms perform better along the 3 dimensions. |
| Gallo, Tapies, and Cappuyns (2000) | Designation of family firm left to the judgment of the person answering the questionnaire. | Growth, debt, and other financial measures. | 204 nonfamily businesses and 101 family businesses. | Spanish businesses that had sales of over 3 billion pesetas in 1995 and more than 150 employees. | Nonfamily firms had superior growth. |
Table 1 (continued) 表 1（续）
Citation 引用
Definition of Family Firm 家族企业定义
Performance Measures 绩效指标
Samples 样本
Sample Criteria 示例标准
Findings 调查结果
Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) 戈麦斯-梅希亚、努涅斯-尼克尔和古铁雷斯（2001）
Determined by the relationship between the owners, the CEO, and editor. The CEO had the last name of the owner(s) or in the case of the editor, family status was confirmed if the CEO and the editor had the same last name. 由所有者、首席执行官（CEO）与编辑之间的关系决定。若首席执行官（CEO）的姓氏与所有者（们）相同，则其身份被认定为所有者；若为编辑，且首席执行官（CEO）与编辑的姓氏相同，则通过确认家庭关系来确定其身份。
Newspaper circulation. 报纸发行量。
276 Spanish newspapers. 276 份西班牙报纸。
Spanish newspapers that existed between 1966-1993. 1966 年至 1993 年间存在的西班牙报纸。
Nonfamily firms monitor CEOs better. 非家族企业对 CEO 的监督更为严格。
Villalonga and Amit (2004) 维拉隆加和阿米特（2004）
The founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or a stockholder. 创始人或其直系亲属（包括配偶）是公司的高级管理人员、董事或股东。
Tobin's qq. 托宾的 qq .
Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000. 1994 年至 2000 年的《财富》500 强企业。
Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000. 1994 年至 2000 年的《财富》500 强企业。
Second-generation family leaders destroy firm value. 第二代家族领导者破坏企业价值。
Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2004) 克里斯曼、蔡和利茨（2004）
Percentage of ownership, number of family members in management, and family successor chosen. 股权比例、家族成员在管理层中的数量以及家族继承人的选择。
Sales growth. 销售增长。
1,141 firms. 1,141 家企业。
These firms were selected from the Small Business Development Center program in the United States. Each firm had at least 5 or more hours of counseling assistance from the SBDC in 1998. They were also required to have at least 5 full-time employees. 这些企业是从美国小企业发展中心（SBDC）的项目中选出的。每家企业在 1998 年至少接受了 SBDC 提供的 5 小时或以上的咨询服务。此外，这些企业还必须至少拥有 5 名全职员工。
Mixed: little difference between family and nonfamily firms. 混合型：家庭企业与非家庭企业之间差异不大。
Tanewski, Prajogo, and Sohal (2003) 塔内夫斯基、普拉乔戈和索哈尔（2003）
Owners decide whether or not they are a family firm and these criteria must exist: 50% or more of ownership held by a single family; a single family group is effectively controlling and managing the business. 企业所有者自行决定是否属于家族企业，且必须满足以下条件：50%或以上的股权由单一家族持有；单一家族集团对企业具有实际控制权并负责管理。
2,000 small and medium-sized family and nonfamily owned businesses in manufacturing and service industry sectors in Australia. 澳大利亚制造业和服务业领域中，共有 2,000 家小型和中型家族企业及非家族企业。
1,000 family-owned firms that had less than 100 employees (manufacturers) or less than 20 employees (service industries). 1,000 家员工人数不足 100 人的家族企业（制造业）或员工人数不足 20 人的家族企业（服务业）。
Mixed: family firms less innovative but have greater prospecting orientation. 混合型：家族企业创新能力较弱，但具有更强的市场开拓导向。
Citation Definition of Family Firm Performance Measures Samples Sample Criteria Findings
Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) Determined by the relationship between the owners, the CEO, and editor. The CEO had the last name of the owner(s) or in the case of the editor, family status was confirmed if the CEO and the editor had the same last name. Newspaper circulation. 276 Spanish newspapers. Spanish newspapers that existed between 1966-1993. Nonfamily firms monitor CEOs better.
Villalonga and Amit (2004) The founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or a stockholder. Tobin's q. Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000. Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000. Second-generation family leaders destroy firm value.
Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2004) Percentage of ownership, number of family members in management, and family successor chosen. Sales growth. 1,141 firms. These firms were selected from the Small Business Development Center program in the United States. Each firm had at least 5 or more hours of counseling assistance from the SBDC in 1998. They were also required to have at least 5 full-time employees. Mixed: little difference between family and nonfamily firms.
Tanewski, Prajogo, and Sohal (2003) Owners decide whether or not they are a family firm and these criteria must exist: 50% or more of ownership held by a single family; a single family group is effectively controlling and managing the business. "1. Product innovation.
2. Process innovation.
3. Structure.
4. Prospector strategy.
5. Leader strategy." 2,000 small and medium-sized family and nonfamily owned businesses in manufacturing and service industry sectors in Australia. 1,000 family-owned firms that had less than 100 employees (manufacturers) or less than 20 employees (service industries). Mixed: family firms less innovative but have greater prospecting orientation.| Citation | Definition of Family Firm | Performance Measures | Samples | Sample Criteria | Findings |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) | Determined by the relationship between the owners, the CEO, and editor. The CEO had the last name of the owner(s) or in the case of the editor, family status was confirmed if the CEO and the editor had the same last name. | Newspaper circulation. | 276 Spanish newspapers. | Spanish newspapers that existed between 1966-1993. | Nonfamily firms monitor CEOs better. |
| Villalonga and Amit (2004) | The founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or a stockholder. | Tobin's $q$. | Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000. | Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000. | Second-generation family leaders destroy firm value. |
| Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2004) | Percentage of ownership, number of family members in management, and family successor chosen. | Sales growth. | 1,141 firms. | These firms were selected from the Small Business Development Center program in the United States. Each firm had at least 5 or more hours of counseling assistance from the SBDC in 1998. They were also required to have at least 5 full-time employees. | Mixed: little difference between family and nonfamily firms. |
| Tanewski, Prajogo, and Sohal (2003) | Owners decide whether or not they are a family firm and these criteria must exist: 50% or more of ownership held by a single family; a single family group is effectively controlling and managing the business. | 1. Product innovation. <br> 2. Process innovation. <br> 3. Structure. <br> 4. Prospector strategy. <br> 5. Leader strategy. | 2,000 small and medium-sized family and nonfamily owned businesses in manufacturing and service industry sectors in Australia. | 1,000 family-owned firms that had less than 100 employees (manufacturers) or less than 20 employees (service industries). | Mixed: family firms less innovative but have greater prospecting orientation. |
Figure 1 Common Variables Affecting Firm Performance. 图 1 影响企业绩效的常见变量。
Figure 2 The Family Effect on Firm Performance. 图 2 家庭对企业绩效的影响。
these studies do attempt to control for industry, the fact that families find certain industries more attractive for launching an enterprise calls into question whether performance differences are solely a function of family ownership and management or are, in fact, related to the industry where these firms are embedded. 这些研究确实试图控制行业因素，但家庭更倾向于在某些行业启动企业这一事实，使得人们质疑绩效差异是否仅由家庭所有权和管理决定，还是实际上与这些企业所处的行业相关。
Family governance is highlighted as making the difference in firm performance by Chrisman, 克里斯曼指出，家庭治理是决定企业绩效的关键因素。
Chua, and Litz (2004), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001), and more recently has been discussed in a treatise by Carney (2005). However, these authors all argue that the agency benefits accrued by family firms are a function of unified governance-the owners are also the firm’s managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). But unified governance and its agency benefits are not unique to family businesses. Owners 蔡（Chua）和利茨（Litz，2004），安德森（Anderson）和里布（Reeb，2003），以及麦康纳希（McConaughy）、马修斯（Matthews）和菲亚尔科（Fialko，2001）等学者，近期在卡尼（Carney，2005）的专著中也有进一步讨论。然而，这些作者均认为，家族企业获得的代理人收益取决于统一治理结构——所有者同时担任企业管理者（詹森与梅克林，1976）。但统一治理及其代理人收益并非家族企业所独有。所有者
who are not related to one another may also manage their businesses, and hence obtain the benefits of owner management. What these studies fail to demonstrate is the unique impact of family governance on firm performance. 彼此之间没有亲属关系的个人也可以经营自己的企业，从而享受所有者管理的优势。然而，这些研究未能证明家庭治理对企业绩效的独特影响。
The Anderson and Reeb (2003) study also presents another possible confounding variable, the “firm effect.” Most studies that use comparative samples assume, ceteris paribus, that all the firm characteristics are held constant except for the variables under investigation. The Anderson and Reeb study compared founder-led family firms in the S&P 500 with firms that were not led by founders, and noted that the “newer” firms (less than 50 years old) performed better than the older firms. The organization life-cycle literature suggests that most firms go through four general stages: founding, growth, maturity, and decline (Greiner, 1972; Kimberly, 1980). Founder-led firms that are in the S&P 500 would have had to have been growing very rapidly to achieve such a size during the founder’s tenure. If we were to compare founder-led firms that are likely to be in the growth stage of their life cycle with firms without founders that would likely be older, more mature, and growing slower or even declining (as in the case of nonfounder-led S&P 500 firms), then the differences in performance may be a function of the firm and its stage of development and not of the firm’s relationship to a family. Furthermore, the studies by Beehr, Drexler, and Faulkner (1997) and Daily and Dollinger (1992) noted that certain firm characteristics such its strategy, structure, and human-resource systems differed somewhat between family and nonfamily firms, and therefore the inference was made that such differences were the result of family involvement. What is not clear from these studies, however, is the relationship between these firm characteristics and the owning families. Did, indeed, the family foster such differences in firm characteristics, or did they arise from some other driving force? This question is not fully answered by these studies. 安德森和里布（2003）的研究还提出了一个可能的混杂变量，即“企业效应”。大多数使用比较样本的研究在其他条件不变的情况下，假设所有企业特征保持不变，仅研究变量发生变化。安德森和里布的研究比较了标普 500 指数中由创始人领导的家族企业与非创始人领导的企业，并指出“较年轻”的企业（成立不足 50 年）表现优于老牌企业。组织生命周期理论指出，大多数企业会经历四个基本阶段：创立期、成长期、成熟期和衰退期（Greiner, 1972; Kimberly, 1980）。列入标普 500 指数的创始人领导企业，必须在创始人任内实现非常快速的增长才能达到如此规模。若将处于生命周期增长阶段的创始人领导企业与无创始人、可能更年长、更成熟且增长较慢甚至衰退的企业（如非创始人领导的标普 500 指数企业）进行比较，绩效差异可能源于企业本身及其发展阶段，而非企业与家族的关系。此外，Behr、Drexler 和 Faulkner（1997）以及 Daily 和 Dollinger（1992）的研究指出，家族企业与非家族企业在某些企业特征上存在差异，如战略、结构和人力资源系统，因此推断这些差异源于家族的参与。然而，这些研究并未明确揭示这些企业特征与所有者家庭之间的关系。究竟是家庭培育了这些企业特征的差异，还是这些差异源于其他驱动因素？ 这些研究并未完全回答这个问题。
A final potential confounding factor in these studies is the “management” or “founder” effect. Schumpeter (1934) argued that one of the most valuable commodities for any firm is the entrepre- 这些研究中最后一个潜在的混杂因素是“管理”或“创始人”效应。舒姆佩特（1934）认为，对任何企业而言，最宝贵的资源之一就是企业家精神。
neur whose vision, innovation, and ability to see opportunities causes “creative destruction” in the marketplace and enables the firm to capture extraordinary profits (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Although research does suggest that not all entrepreneurs bring with them a skill set that leads to high firm performance (e.g., Dyer, 1992; Kets de Vries, 1985), the success of new ventures is often attributed to the founder’s unique skills and characteristics (Bird, 1989). In the case of the “founder-led family firm,” it is difficult to determine whether the founder is primarily responsible for superior firm performance or whether the family is responsible. The studies found in Table 1 indicate that founder-led family firms generally perform better than those firms without founders. This was particularly evident in the Villalonga and Amit (2004) study that noted that founder-led family firms performed significantly better than second-generation-led family firms. Thus the studies comparing the performance of founderled family firms with nonfamily firms may actually be demonstrating the “founder effect” and not the “family effect” on the firm. For example, the study by Anderson and Reeb (2003) includes firms such as Microsoft in their sample of “founder-led family firms.” Although the impact of Bill Gates on the firm is undeniable, it is unclear what effect, if any, the Gates family has had on Microsoft’s performance. 企业家（neur）的远见、创新精神以及发现机会的能力会在市场上引发“创造性破坏”，从而使企业能够获得超额利润（Morck、Shleifer & Vishny，1988）。尽管研究表明，并非所有企业家都具备能够带来高企业绩效的技能（例如，Dyer，1992；Kets de Vries，1985），但新创企业的成功往往归因于创始人的独特技能和特质（Bird，1989）。在“创始人领导的家族企业”中，难以确定创始人是否是企业优异绩效的主要责任者，还是家族本身发挥了作用。表 1 所列研究表明，创始人领导的家族企业通常表现优于无创始人企业。这一现象在 Villalonga 和 Amit（2004）的研究中尤为明显，该研究指出创始人领导的家族企业显著优于第二代领导的家族企业。因此，比较创始人领导的家族企业与非家族企业绩效的研究，可能实际上揭示了“创始人效应”而非“家族效应”对企业的影响。例如，Anderson 和 Reeb（2003）的研究将微软纳入其“创始人领导的家族企业”样本中。尽管比尔·盖茨对企业的影响无可否认，但盖茨家族对微软绩效的影响尚不明确。
In summary, the research comparing the performance of family firms to nonfamily firms leaves us with many unanswered questions, the chief one being: How might a family affect the performance of a firm? 综上所述，关于家族企业与非家族企业绩效比较的研究留下了许多未解之谜，其中最核心的问题是：家族因素如何影响企业的绩效？
The "Family Effect" on Firm Performance “家庭效应”对企业绩效的影响
The previous discussion has suggested that research noting differences in performance between family and nonfamily firms has not been particularly enlightening regarding the impact of a family on firm performance. We will now explore the “family effect” on performance, in other words, those attributes that a family brings to a firm that might affect its perfor- 前面的讨论表明，关于家庭企业与非家庭企业在绩效上的差异的研究并未对家庭对企业绩效的影响提供特别有启发性的见解。我们将现在探讨“家庭效应”对绩效的影响，换句话说，即家庭为企业带来的那些可能影响其绩效的属性。
Family Factors Contributing to High Performance 家庭因素对高绩效的影响
Family Factors Contributing to Low Performance 家庭因素对低绩效的影响
Agency Benefits 代理商福利
Agency Costs 代理成本
Lower agency costs due to the alignment of principal-agent goals 由于委托人与代理人目标的一致性，代理成本降低。
Higher agency costs due to conflicting goals in the family 由于家庭成员目标冲突导致的代理成本上升
Lower agency costs due to high trust and shared values among family members 由于家庭成员之间高度信任和共同价值观，代理成本降低。
Higher agency costs from opportunism, shirking, and adverse selection because of altruism (i.e., family members fail to monitor each other) 由于利他主义（即家庭成员未能相互监督）导致的机会主义、怠工和逆向选择，使得代理成本上升。
Family Assets 家庭资产
Family Liabilities 家庭负债
Human capital: the family has unique training, skills, flexibility, and motivation 人力资本：家庭拥有独特的培训、技能、灵活性和动力。
Family lacks necessary skills and abilities due to small labor pool, lack of talent, or inadequate training 家庭缺乏必要的技能和能力，原因包括劳动力池过小、人才匮乏或培训不足。
Social capital: the family develops relationships outside the family with employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders that generate goodwill 社会资本：家庭在家庭之外与员工、客户、供应商及其他利益相关者建立关系，从而产生良好声誉。
Family fails to develop social capital with key stakeholders due to distrust of outsiders (i.e., "amoral familism") 家庭因对外部人员缺乏信任（即“非道德家族主义”）而未能与关键利益相关者建立社会资本。
Family "branding" of the firm or of the firm's goods and services may generate goodwill and a positive image with stakeholders 公司或其产品及服务的“家族品牌”建设可能为公司及其产品及服务带来良好声誉和正面形象，从而赢得利益相关者的信任与支持。
Family relationships lead to complex conflicts among family that may undermine image and goodwill with stakeholders 家庭关系可能导致家庭内部出现复杂冲突，这些冲突可能损害与利益相关者之间的形象和良好关系。
Physical/financial capital: the family may have physical or financial assets that can be used to support the firm 实物/金融资本：家庭可能拥有可用于支持企业的实物或金融资产。
Family uses firm assets for personal use, thus draining the firm of financial and other resources 家庭成员利用公司资产用于个人用途，从而耗尽公司的财务及其他资源。
Family Factors Contributing to High Performance Family Factors Contributing to Low Performance
Agency Benefits Agency Costs
Lower agency costs due to the alignment of principal-agent goals Higher agency costs due to conflicting goals in the family
Lower agency costs due to high trust and shared values among family members Higher agency costs from opportunism, shirking, and adverse selection because of altruism (i.e., family members fail to monitor each other)
Family Assets Family Liabilities
Human capital: the family has unique training, skills, flexibility, and motivation Family lacks necessary skills and abilities due to small labor pool, lack of talent, or inadequate training
Social capital: the family develops relationships outside the family with employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders that generate goodwill Family fails to develop social capital with key stakeholders due to distrust of outsiders (i.e., "amoral familism")
Family "branding" of the firm or of the firm's goods and services may generate goodwill and a positive image with stakeholders Family relationships lead to complex conflicts among family that may undermine image and goodwill with stakeholders
Physical/financial capital: the family may have physical or financial assets that can be used to support the firm Family uses firm assets for personal use, thus draining the firm of financial and other resources| Family Factors Contributing to High Performance | Family Factors Contributing to Low Performance |
| :--- | :--- |
| Agency Benefits | Agency Costs |
| Lower agency costs due to the alignment of principal-agent goals | Higher agency costs due to conflicting goals in the family |
| Lower agency costs due to high trust and shared values among family members | Higher agency costs from opportunism, shirking, and adverse selection because of altruism (i.e., family members fail to monitor each other) |
| Family Assets | Family Liabilities |
| Human capital: the family has unique training, skills, flexibility, and motivation | Family lacks necessary skills and abilities due to small labor pool, lack of talent, or inadequate training |
| Social capital: the family develops relationships outside the family with employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders that generate goodwill | Family fails to develop social capital with key stakeholders due to distrust of outsiders (i.e., "amoral familism") |
| Family "branding" of the firm or of the firm's goods and services may generate goodwill and a positive image with stakeholders | Family relationships lead to complex conflicts among family that may undermine image and goodwill with stakeholders |
| Physical/financial capital: the family may have physical or financial assets that can be used to support the firm | Family uses firm assets for personal use, thus draining the firm of financial and other resources |
mance. Performance, broadly defined, refers to efficiencies in terms of utilization of resources as well as the accomplishment of organizational goals (Steers, 1982). Families are thought to influence firm performance primarily through family goals and relationships and family resources or assets (Dyer, 2003; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Steier, 2001). To develop theory regarding how family goals, relationships, and resources affect firm performance, agency theory and the resource-based view of the firm seem to be the most promising (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Agency theory and the resourcebased view suggest that certain “family factors” can lead to various agency benefits and important assets, while other family factors impose costs and are liabilities to firm performance. These factors are listed in Table 2. 绩效。广义上讲，绩效指的是资源利用效率以及组织目标的实现程度（Steers, 1982）。家庭被认为主要通过家庭目标与关系以及家庭资源或资产影响企业绩效（Dyer, 2003；Habbershon & Williams, 1999；Steier, 2001）。为了发展关于家庭目标、关系和资源如何影响企业绩效的理论，代理理论和资源基础视角似乎是最有前景的（Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003）。代理理论和资源基础视角指出，某些“家庭因素”可能带来各种代理收益和重要资产，而其他家庭因素则会产生成本并成为企业绩效的负债。这些因素如表 2 所示。
The following discussion provides more detailed arguments regarding the impact of family goals, relationships, and resources on firm governance, firm characteristics, and a firm’s management. (The potential impact of families on 以下讨论将更详细地阐述家庭目标、家庭关系及家庭资源对公司治理、公司特征以及公司管理的影响。（家庭对公司治理、公司特征及公司管理的影响潜力）
industries and even entire economies has been discussed previously by Morck and Yeung (2003, 2004) so it will not be discussed in detail here.) Several propositions are posited that are designed to more clearly articulate the “family effect” on organizational performance. 关于“家庭效应”对行业乃至整个经济的影响，Morck 和 Yeung（2003，2004）已在此前进行过讨论，因此在此不再赘述。本文提出若干命题，旨在更清晰地阐述“家庭效应”对组织绩效的影响。
Governance and the Performance of Family Firms 公司治理与家族企业绩效
Agency theory has often been used to argue that family firm governance is more efficient than that of nonfamily enterprises (Morck et al., 1988). Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that family firms are likely to incur fewer agency costs because the goals of a firm’s principals (owners) are aligned with its agents (managers) since they are typically one and the same. Because of this alignment of goals, agency costs will not be borne by the owners since they will not have to spend time and resources to monitor the behavior of their agents. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, in their review of agency theory and its application to family firms (2001, p. 99), discuss 代理理论常被用于论证家族企业治理比非家族企业更高效（Morck 等，1988）。Jensen 和 Meckling（1976）指出，家族企业可能产生较少的代理成本，因为企业的原则性决策者（所有者）与代理人（管理者）的目标通常一致，因为他们通常是同一人。由于目标一致，代理成本不会由所有者承担，因为他们无需花费时间和资源来监督代理人的行为。Schulze、Lubatkin、Dino 和 Buchholtz 在对代理理论及其在家族企业中的应用进行综述时（2001，第 99 页）讨论了这一观点。
the advantages of the alignment of principalagent goals and, in particular, the advantages of owner management: 委托代理目标一致性的优势，特别是所有者管理优势：
owner management should reduce agency costs because it naturally aligns the owner-managers’ interests about growth opportunities and risk. This alignment reduces their incentive to be opportunistic, sparing firms the need to maintain “costly mechanisms for separating the management and control of decisions.” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a p. 332, quoted in Schulz et al.) 所有者管理应能降低代理成本，因为它自然使所有者与经理在增长机会和风险方面的利益保持一致。这种一致性减少了他们追求机会主义行为的动机，从而使企业无需维持“分离管理与决策控制的昂贵机制”。（Fama & Jensen, 1983a, p. 332，引自 Schulz 等）
As noted previously, however, owner management is not unique to the family firm. Nonfamily owners can also manage their enterprises and therefore receive the same agency benefits as family owner managers. Thus owner management is not a “family effect” on firm performance. 如前所述，然而，所有者管理并非家族企业的专属特征。非家族所有者同样可以管理其企业，并因此获得与家族所有者管理者相同的代理收益。因此，所有者管理并非对企业绩效的“家族效应”。
It may be true, however, that familial relationships between owners and those managers who are their agents provide an additional benefit to reduce agency costs. Owners, who may have their sons, daughters, brothers, or other family members as their agents, need not incur the expense of monitoring agents they distrust. Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest this idea when they note that “family members…therefore have advantages in monitoring and disciplining related decision agents” (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 306). More recently,Ensley and Pearson (2005) have shown that top-management teams in family firms are more cohesive than those in nonfamily enterprises. To the extent that a family brings to the firm common goals, high trust, and shared values in addition to unified governance, cumbersome and costly monitoring mechanisms can be avoided. 然而，所有者与作为其代理人的经理人之间的家庭关系可能确实能带来额外好处，从而降低代理成本。所有者若将自己的子女、兄弟或其他家庭成员作为代理人，便无需承担监控不信任代理人的成本。法玛和詹森（1983b）在指出“家庭成员……因此在监控和约束相关决策代理人方面具有优势”时，提出了这一观点（Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 306）。最近，Ensley 和 Pearson（2005）发现，家族企业的高管团队比非家族企业的高管团队更加凝聚。在家族为企业带来共同目标、高度信任和共同价值观的同时，如果治理结构也统一，就可以避免繁琐和昂贵的监控机制。
Some research findings appear to support this view that family firms experience reduced agency costs. For example, McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, and Mishra (1998) present evidence that family monitoring of family managers encourages high performance and reduces conflicts between shareholders and managers. In another study, McConaughy (2000) compared family firms that had family CEOs with family firms that had nonfamily CEOs-specifically, compensation of family versus nonfamily CEOs. McConaughy concludes that: 一些研究结果似乎支持这一观点，即家族企业面临较低的代理成本。例如，麦康奈利、沃克、亨德森和米什拉（1998）指出，家族对家族经理的监督有助于提升绩效并减少股东与经理之间的冲突。在另一项研究中，麦康奈希（2000）比较了拥有家族 CEO 的家族企业与拥有非家族 CEO 的家族企业——具体而言，是家族 CEO 与非家族 CEO 的薪酬。麦康奈希得出结论：
family CEOs possess superior incentives and have less need to receive additional incentives through their compensation from the firm. It shows that founding-family CEOs are paid less [on average $534,900\$ 534,900 less] and that their pay is less sensitive to performance. Alternatively, the results can be taken to suggest that family controlled firms have to pay nonfamily CEOs more to get what a family CEO would do. (2000, p. 130) 家族企业 CEO 拥有更强的内在激励，因此无需通过公司薪酬获得额外激励。这表明，家族企业创始人 CEO 的薪酬水平较低[平均而言 $534,900\$ 534,900 较低]，且其薪酬对绩效的敏感度较低。 Alternatively，研究结果也可解释为：家族控制的企业需要向非家族 CEO 支付更高薪酬，才能获得与家族 CEO 相同的绩效表现。（2000，第 130 页）
A more recent study on CEO compensation comparing family and nonfamily firms by GomezMejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) also noted that professional CEOs are paid significantly more than family CEOs. Families who control related managers through what Etzioni (1961) calls “normative control” (shared values) will likely incur fewer costs than those owners/ principals who must provide financial incentives to their agents to get comparable performance. Thus, these studies indicate that having family involvement in firm ownership and management may significantly reduce certain costs, potentially enhancing firm performance. 戈麦斯-梅希亚（Gomez-Mejia）、拉扎-金塔纳（Larraza-Kintana）和马克里（Makri）于 2003 年进行的一项关于家族企业与非家族企业 CEO 薪酬的最新研究也指出，职业 CEO 的薪酬显著高于家族 CEO。通过埃茨尼（Etzioni，1961）所称的“规范控制”（共享价值观）来控制相关管理者的家族，其成本可能低于那些必须通过提供财务激励来使代理人达到类似绩效的业主/负责人。因此，这些研究表明，家族在企业所有权和管理中的参与可能显著降低某些成本，从而潜在提升企业绩效。
Why Reduced Agency Costs May Not Be Realized in Family Firms 为什么在家族企业中降低代理成本可能无法实现
In contrast to the view that family firms are more efficient due to reduced agency costs through relationships that align the goals and incentives of family owners and managers, is the alternative perspective that family firms are breeding grounds for relationships fraught with conflict (Dyer, 1986; Kaye, 1991; Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 1987). Indeed, family members may have competing goals and values, which may spring from complex conflicts and family dynamics that arise from a family’s psychosocial history (HilburtDavis & Dyer, 2003). From biblical times, stories about families, whether they be about Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau, or Joseph and his brothers, are filled with conflict, treachery, and deceit, rather than family harmony. In the context of a family business, differing views within a family about the distribution of ownership, compensation, risk, roles, and responsibilities may make the family firm a battleground where family members 与认为家族企业因家族成员与管理者之间目标和激励一致的关系而降低代理成本、从而更高效的观点相反，另一种观点认为家族企业是充满冲突关系的温床（Dyer, 1986; Kaye, 1991; Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 1987）。事实上，家族成员可能存在相互冲突的目标和价值观，这些冲突可能源于家族的心理社会历史中产生的复杂矛盾和家族动态（HilburtDavis & Dyer, 2003）。自圣经时代以来，关于家族的故事，无论是关于该隐与亚伯、雅各与以扫，还是约瑟与他的兄弟们，都充斥着冲突、背叛和欺骗，而非家族和谐。在家族企业背景下，家庭成员对所有权分配、补偿、风险、角色和责任的不同看法，可能使家族企业成为家庭成员之间争夺的战场。
compete with one another. Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino argue that “the dispersion of ownership in family-held firms drives a wedge between the interests of those who lead a firm-and often own a controlling interest-and other family owners” (2003, p. 181). Since there is typically no equity market for minority family owners to “cash out” and go their own way, Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino suggest that the minority owners have “incentives to free ride on the controlling owner’s equity” (2003, p. 184) by shirking, exorbitant compensation, or accumulating perquisites. Under such conditions, family members are not equally yoked in pulling the firm and family forward, but are fighting for their own interests. From this perspective, the family firm may, in fact, incur significant agency costs due to the conflicts that accompany family involvement. 相互竞争。舒尔茨、卢巴金和迪诺认为，“家族企业中所有权的分散会在企业领导者（通常持有控制权）与其他家族股东之间制造利益冲突”（2003，第 181 页）。由于少数家族股东通常缺乏股权市场来“套现”并另谋出路，舒尔茨、卢巴金和迪诺建议，少数股东存在“搭便车于控股股东股权”的激励（2003，第 184 页），表现为怠工、索取过高报酬或积累特权。在这种情况下，家族成员并非在推动企业与家族共同发展中承担平等责任，而是为自身利益而斗争。从这一角度看，家族企业实际上可能因家族参与带来的冲突而产生显著的代理成本。
Another reason that is often posited for family firms not realizing reduced agency costs is the idea that altruism (or particularism) makes it difficult, if not impossible, for families to effectively monitor family members who work in the firm. Altruism, treating people for who they are rather than what they do, is often seen as the cornerstone value in family firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson, and Johnson, in their extensive study of family firm dynamics, quote a senior family manager who articulates why family members may be monitored differently than nonfamily employees. 另一个常被提出的理由是，利他主义（或特殊主义）使得家族企业难以有效监督在企业中工作的家族成员，从而无法实现代理成本的降低。利他主义，即根据一个人的本质而非其行为来对待他人，常被视为家族企业核心价值观（Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001）。Rosenblatt、de Mik、Anderson 和 Johnson 在对家族企业动态的深入研究中，引用了一位资深家族经理的观点，解释了为何家族成员与非家族员工的监督方式可能存在差异。
“If my sons or my wife make mistakes, I let it go, because it’s not worth fighting over. You have to live with your family. A nonfamily member, you can fire him.” (1985, p. 112) “如果我的儿子或妻子犯了错，我会宽容他们，因为这不值得争吵。你必须与家人一起生活。对于非家庭成员，你可以解雇他。”（1985，第 112 页）
Almost a century ago, Max Weber presented his “rational-legal” model of bureaucracy as an alternative to nepotism, the outcome of altruism (Weber, 1946). Weber noted that nepotism leads to adverse selection and ineffective (or nonexistent) monitoring and evaluation of employees, which can lead to shirking and opportunism on the part of family members. Perrow excoriates nepotism when he writes: “Much inefficiency in organizations and much annoyance shown by members …stem[s] from nepotism” (1972, p. 13). He even 近一个世纪前，马克斯·韦伯提出了“理性-法律”官僚制模型，作为裙带关系的替代方案，后者被视为利他主义的产物（韦伯，1946）。韦伯指出，裙带关系会导致不良选拔，以及对员工的无效（或不存在）监督和评估，这可能导致家庭成员逃避责任和投机行为。佩罗在批评裙带关系时写道：“组织中的许多低效现象和成员表现出的许多不满……源于裙带关系”（1972，第 13 页）。他甚至
suggests that nepotism is self-serving to those in control: “To some extent, nepotism undoubtedly does stem from the belief that one’s own incompetence can be better protected if one offers positions to nephews, sons, uncles, and other relatives of the owners” (1972, p. 14). Perrow believes that nepotism makes it difficult, if not impossible, for family members to monitor each other effectively and that nepotism protects family members from such monitoring. 指出裙带关系对掌权者具有自我服务性质：“在一定程度上，裙带关系无疑源于这样一种信念：如果将职位授予侄子、儿子、叔叔等所有者亲属，就能更好地掩盖自身无能”（1972，第 14 页）。佩罗认为，裙带关系使得家庭成员之间难以有效监督彼此，甚至可能完全无法监督，而裙带关系则保护家庭成员免受此类监督。
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001) and Gomez-Mejia,Nuñez-Nickel et al.(2001) present empirical evidence that such altruism may indeed lead to poor performance. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001), in their study of 1,376 family firms, reported that those family firms that had developed some formal governance mechanisms (which presumably mitigate against altruism) performed more effectively than those firms without such formal arrangements. GomezMejia, Nuñez-Nickel et al. (2001) found that the Spanish family firms they studied were much more reluctant to fire a family CEO than were nonfamily firms, but when the family CEO was replaced, the firm performed significantly better after the transition than those nonfamily firms that also replaced their CEOs. The implication is that family owners, as a result of altruism, are unwilling to monitor and discipline their CEOs; hence the family CEOs became entrenched. As a result, the family waits too long (until performance falls precipitously) to make a leadership change. Nonfamily firms, on the other hand, monitor their CEOs more carefully and are not hamstrung by altruism; hence they are more willing and able to replace a CEO when the CEO’s performance is deemed unacceptable. 舒尔茨、卢巴金、迪诺和布赫霍尔茨（2001）以及戈麦斯-梅希亚、努涅斯-尼克尔等（2001）提供了实证证据，表明此类利他主义行为确实可能导致绩效不佳。舒尔茨、卢巴金、迪诺和布赫霍尔茨（2001 年）在对 1,376 家家族企业的研究中发现，那些建立了一些正式治理机制（这些机制可能缓解利他主义）的家族企业比没有此类正式安排的企业表现更佳。戈麦斯-梅希亚、努涅斯-尼克尔等（2001 年）（2001）发现，他们研究的西班牙家族企业解雇家族 CEO 的意愿远低于非家族企业，但当家族 CEO 被替换后，该家族企业的绩效在过渡期后显著优于同样更换 CEO 的非家族企业。这表明，家族所有者因利他主义而不愿监督和惩戒 CEO，从而导致家族 CEO 固化。因此，家族企业往往等待过久（直至业绩急剧下滑）才进行领导层更迭。而非家族企业则对 CEO 进行更严格的监督，且不受利他主义束缚；因此，当 CEO 表现被认定为不可接受时，它们更愿意且更有能力更换 CEO。
In summary, if familial ties encourage principals and their agents to have common goals and values, such a “family effect” should lead to reduced agency costs. However, others have suggested that the family firm is not an inherently efficient organizational form, incurring significant agency costs due to the fact that family members may have different goals for the firm and family, creating incentives for minority family shareholders to free ride. Moreover, because the value of 综上所述，如果家庭纽带促使校长及其代理人拥有共同的目标和价值观，这种“家庭效应”应导致代理成本降低。然而，其他人认为，家族企业并非一种本质上高效的组织形式，由于家庭成员可能对企业与家庭拥有不同目标，这会产生显著的代理成本，并为少数家族股东创造搭便车的激励。此外，由于家族企业的价值
altruism pervades most families, family members are reluctant to monitor, evaluate, or discipline each other. Such a value system can lead to adverse selection, shirking, and opportunism, thus undermining firm performance. Two propositions related to firm governance stemming from these arguments are: 利他主义在绝大多数家庭中普遍存在，家庭成员往往不愿相互监督、评估或进行纪律约束。这种价值体系可能导致逆向选择、逃避责任和机会主义行为，从而削弱企业绩效。基于上述论点，与企业治理相关的两个命题是：
Proposition 1. Firms with principals and agents that have familial ties will have lower agency costs (due to more congruent goals and values) than those firms with principals and agents who are not related. 命题 1. 具有亲属关系的委托人与代理人的企业将比那些委托人与代理人之间没有亲属关系的企业具有更低的代理成本（由于目标和价值观更加一致）。
Proposition 2. Firms that have family relationships based on altruism will have higher agency costs than those firms whose relationships are based on universalistic criteria. 命题 2. 基于利他主义的家庭关系的企业将比基于普遍主义标准的企业具有更高的代理成本。
Family Assets and Firm Performance 家庭资产与企业绩效
The resource-based view of the firm has been another popular approach for critiquing the performance of family firms (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The resourcebased view suggests that firms with assets that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable may be able to create a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959). From the resource-based view, the question arises: Do families bring with them unique assets to a firm that will give it a competitive advantage? Three types of capital (or assets) have been associated with the performance of family firms: (1) human capital, (2) social capital, and (3) physical/financial capital. There are arguments-both pro and con-regarding whether or not families can indeed develop and take advantage of these assets. 基于资源的视角是另一种广受欢迎的分析方法，用于批判家族企业的绩效（Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003）。资源基础观认为，拥有具有价值、稀缺、不可模仿且不可替代的资产的企业可能能够创造可持续的竞争优势（Barney，1991；Penrose，1959）。从资源基础视角出发，一个问题随之产生：家族是否会为企业带来独特的资产，从而赋予其竞争优势？与家族企业绩效相关的三种资本（或资产）被识别出来：（1）人力资本，（2）社会资本，（3）物理/金融资本。关于家族是否能够真正发展并利用这些资产，存在着正反两方面的论点。
Human Capital 人力资本
One resource that can give a firm a competitive advantage is human capital-the skills, abilities, attitudes, and work ethic of those employed by the firm. There have been several ideas posited concerning why family firms may have unique human capital. First, because the family name is “on the building,” family members will naturally be more 企业获得竞争优势的一个重要资源是人力资本——即企业雇员所具备的技能、能力、态度和工作伦理。关于家族企业为何可能拥有独特的人力资本，人们提出了几种观点。首先，由于家族名称“与企业紧密相连”，家族成员自然会更加
motivated and committed to the business (Rosenblatt et al., 1985; Ward, 1988). Such family connections inspire loyalty and family members are therefore willing to work long hours-often without compensation-and be highly flexible in their work roles and assignments in order to help the firm succeed (Rosenblatt et al., 1985). Second, family members have often been socialized at a very early age to understand the nature of the business, its customers, and its competitors, and have received hands-on training from family leaders who are knowledgeable and highly skilled (Dyer, 1986, 1992). Such a process of socialization can prove to be a significant source of competitive advantage by creating a highly knowledgeable and skilled cadre of family employees who are highly motivated and willing to sacrifice much to see the firm succeed. Few nonfamily firms can boast of a workforce with such assets. 积极投入并致力于企业（Rosenblatt 等，1985；Ward，1988）。这种家庭纽带激发了忠诚感，因此家庭成员愿意加班加点工作——往往不计报酬——并在工作角色和任务分配上表现出高度灵活性，以助力企业成功（Rosenblatt 等，1985）。其次，家庭成员通常在很小的时候就接受了社会化教育，了解企业的性质、客户和竞争对手，并从知识渊博、技能娴熟的家庭领导者那里接受了实践培训（Dyer，1986，1992）。这种社会化过程可以成为企业竞争优势的重要来源，因为它培养了一支知识丰富、技能娴熟、高度积极且愿意为企业成功做出巨大牺牲的家族员工队伍。很少有非家族企业能够拥有如此优势的员工队伍。
On the other hand, family firms have a limited pool of potential recruits. Thus, the family may not be able to supply the firm with enough talented employees to manage the key operations. This is particularly true in firms that require highly specialized knowledge of technology and markets (e.g., bioengineering firms) or firms that are sufficiently large and complex enough to require sophisticated knowledge of management systems and processes. The restricted nature of the human resource pool supplied by the family means the family may not have enough qualified personnel to operate a business successfully unless they recruit nonfamily employees to fill key positions. Moreover, Dyer (1989) has documented the difficulty in integrating nonfamily managers into the family firm; thus merely going outside the family for management talent may not be a panacea for family firms needing outside assistance. If nepotism is the accepted norm (see Proposition 2), family members who are incompetent may be placed in key positions, thus jeopardizing firm performance. Thus family connections may inhibit a firm from developing and utilizing the best management talent, putting it at a competitive disadvantage in terms of human capital. In summary, propositions related to human capital are: 另一方面，家族企业的人才储备较为有限。因此，家族可能无法为企业提供足够的优秀员工来管理关键业务。这一问题在需要高度专业化技术知识（如生物工程企业）或规模足够大且复杂到需要掌握复杂管理流程和系统知识的企业中尤为突出。家族提供的员工资源池的局限性意味着，除非家族企业招聘非家族成员来担任关键职位，否则家族可能无法拥有足够的合格人员来成功运营企业。此外，Dyer（1989）已记录了将非家族经理融入家族企业所面临的困难；因此，仅仅从家族外部招聘管理人才可能并非家族企业寻求外部援助的万能良方。如果裙带关系是普遍接受的规范（见命题 2），缺乏能力的家族成员可能被安排在关键岗位，从而危及企业绩效。因此，家族关系可能阻碍企业开发和利用最佳管理人才，使其在人力资本方面处于竞争劣势。综上所述，与人力资本相关的命题包括：
Proposition 3. Firms with family employees will have greater human capital than firms with employees without family ties, given that family employees are better trained, more flexible, and more motivated than nonfamily employees. 命题 3. 拥有家族员工的企业将比没有家族员工的企业拥有更高的人力资本，因为家族员工比非家族员工更受过良好培训、更具灵活性且更具工作动力。
Proposition 4. Firms relying solely on family employees to fill key positions in the firm will have poorer human capital than those firms that may also select nonfamily employees for key positions. 命题 4. 仅依赖家族成员担任关键职位的企业，其人力资本将不如那些在关键职位上也可能选拔非家族成员的企业。
Social Capital 社会资本
Social capital is a complex phenomenon, but simply stated, it is “the goodwill that is engendered by the fabric of social relations and that can be mobilized to facilitate action” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 17). Social capital is an important asset inasmuch as it allows the firm to gain access to other forms of capital (e.g., intellectual, human, financial capital) that are needed for a firm to survive (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Steier, 2001). Families may have some unique advantages in developing social capital between the family and firm stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers, employees), given that they typically have the ability to cultivate and nurture long-standing relationships across generations, and firm stakeholders may be more likely to develop personal attachments to a family that owns and operates a business, rather than to an amorphous, impersonal firm. Commitments made by a family, which are often based on altruism, are likely to be more enduring (and more trusted) than commitments by individuals, since familial obligations are generally shared within the immediate family, and may even extend to extended family members. Therefore, the enduring nature of family connections and commitments may give families certain advantages in developing and maintaining social capital. 社会资本是一种复杂的现象，但简而言之，它是指“由社会关系网络所产生的善意，并且能够被调动以促进行动”（Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 17）。社会资本是一项重要资产，因为它使企业能够获取其他形式的资本（如知识资本、人力资本、金融资本），而这些资本对于企业的生存至关重要（Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Steier, 2001）。家庭在构建家庭与企业利益相关者（如客户、供应商、员工）之间的社会资本方面可能具有独特优势，因为家庭通常具备跨代培养和维系长期关系的能力，且企业利益相关者更可能对拥有并经营企业的家庭产生个人情感依附，而非对一个无形且缺乏人情味的企业产生此类情感。家庭做出的承诺通常基于利他主义，因此比个人承诺更持久（且更值得信赖），因为家庭义务通常在直系家庭成员中共享，甚至可能延伸至 extended family 成员。因此，家庭联系和承诺的持久性可能使家庭在发展和维护社会资本方面具有一定优势。
A unique status is also often ascribed to family members who are connected with the ownership of an enterprise, and such status facilitates the cultivation of important relationships that may benefit the family and the business (Steier, 2001). Indeed, employees, customers, suppliers, bankers, and other company stakeholders often prefer to talk to members of the owning family about their 家庭成员因与企业所有权相关联，常被赋予特殊地位，这种地位有助于培养对家庭和企业均有益的重要关系（Steier, 2001）。事实上，员工、客户、供应商、银行家及其他公司利益相关者往往更倾向于与企业所有者家庭成员讨论其
issues and concerns rather than communicating with some lower-status nonfamily manager or employee (Meek, Woodworth, & Dyer, 1988). This is due, in large part, to the perception that family members have the power and ability to reciprocate financially and otherwise in any exchange. Moreover, there is an incentive for building relationships with members of an enterprise-owning family, since one’s own status in the community may be enhanced by such relationships. Thus, an individual’s or family’s status in a community brings with it certain social benefits that are not available to others (Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000; Stuart, Ha, & Hybels, 1999). Wong, McReynolds, and Wong further note how Chinese families have been adept at using social capital to develop their businesses. 问题和关切，而不是与一些地位较低的非家庭经理或员工沟通（Meek、Woodworth 和 Dyer，1988）。这在很大程度上是因为人们认为家庭成员在任何交换中都有能力进行财务或其他形式的回报。此外，与企业所有者家庭成员建立关系存在激励，因为此类关系可能提升个人在社区中的地位。因此，个人或家庭在社区中的地位会带来某些他人无法获得的社会福利（Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000; Stuart, Ha, & Hybels, 1999）。Wong、McReynolds 和 Wong 进一步指出，中国家庭善于利用社会资本来发展业务。
In capital formation and investment, the supply of labor, and the motivation to work hard and cooperatively, ethnicity and the support of family members are the key to the survival of many immigrant businesses. Among Chinese, kinship often serves as both a catalyst and a facilitator of business enterprise. (1992, p. 355) 在资本形成与投资、劳动力供给以及努力工作和合作意愿方面，民族因素与家庭成员的支持是许多移民企业生存的关键。在中国人中，血缘关系常常既是商业活动的催化剂，也是其促进因素。（1992，第 355 页）
Other writers suggest that family businesses may have certain advantages in attracting customers and providing quality service because of the goodwill and trustworthiness generated by the family name and the commitment over time to customer service (Dollinger, 1995; Lyman, 1991). One family business capitalizing on its family connection, the Longaberger Company of Dresden, Ohio, markets its handicrafts by proclaiming that the company is selling products “From our family to your family” (Dollinger, 1995, p. 391). The message is that you can trust their productsafter all, they’re family. Indeed, the social capital attached to one’s family name-to the extent it positively influences customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders-may prove to be a unique, inimitable resource that can be used by a firm to gain a competitive advantage. Creating and protecting the “family brand name” may prove to be particularly important in service industries or in cultures where reputation is critical for success. 其他学者认为，家族企业可能在吸引客户和提供优质服务方面具有一定优势，这得益于家族名称所带来的良好声誉和可信度，以及长期以来对客户服务的承诺（Dollinger, 1995; Lyman, 1991）。一家充分利用家族关系的家族企业——俄亥俄州德累斯顿的朗格伯格公司（Longaberger Company）——通过宣称“我们的产品是从我们的家庭到你的家庭”来推广其手工艺品（Dollinger, 1995, p. 391）。这一信息传达的是：您可以信赖他们的产品，毕竟他们是家人。事实上，家族姓氏所附带的社会资本——在积极影响客户、供应商及其他利益相关者方面——可能成为企业独一无二、无法复制的资源，助力其获得竞争优势。在服务行业或以声誉为成功关键的文化环境中，打造并保护“家族品牌名称”可能尤为重要。
Another form of social capital that may prove advantageous to a family firm is the extension of 另一种可能对家族企业有利的社会资本形式是
goodwill beyond the family to nonfamily employees. For example, Meek et al., in their study of strikes in Jamestown, New York, reported that locally owned companies, most with family connections, had significantly fewer strikes and strikes of shorter duration than firms owned by “absentee owners” (Meek et al., 1988). Meek et al. conclude that one of the primary reasons for the greater unrest in the absentee-owned firms was because “the managers of the absentee companies were less influenced by local norms governing labor relations” (Meek et al., 1988, p. 74). Families who both own and manage an enterprise may be able to generate greater social capital and trust with their employees as compared to those firms operated by disinterested owners and managers who are not in tune with employee values and concerns. In summary, to the extent that familial social capital provides access to resources, generates “goodwill” on the part of customers and other key stakeholders, and fosters strong ties between the family and its workforce, family firms may have some unique resources to create a competitive advantage. 对非家庭成员员工的善意。例如，米克等人（Meek et al.）在对纽约州詹姆斯敦罢工的研究中发现，本地拥有的公司（其中大多数与家庭有关联）的罢工次数显著少于由“缺席业主”拥有的公司，且罢工持续时间也更短（Meek et al., 1988）。米克等人得出结论，缺席所有者企业中劳资关系更加紧张的主要原因之一是“缺席所有者企业的管理者受当地劳资关系规范的影响较小”（Meek et al., 1988, p. 74）。同时拥有并管理企业的家庭可能比那些由对员工价值观和关切缺乏共鸣的无利害关系所有者和管理者运营的企业，更能与员工建立更强的社会资本和信任。简而言之，只要家庭社会资本能为企业提供资源、在客户和其他关键利益相关者中产生“善意”，并强化家庭与员工之间的紧密联系，家族企业可能拥有一些独特的资源来创造竞争优势。
Despite the advantages derived from social capital, the presence of strong familial bonds also has disadvantages. Edward Banfield, in his classic work The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, describes families from southern Italy exhibiting what he calls “amoral familism.” According to Banfield, amoral familists “maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; [and] assume that all others will do likewise” (1958, p. 83). Thus, those outside one’s family are not to be trusted and may be seen as potential competitors, even enemies. Families who create a tight social network that bars outsiders from entry may be unable to secure needed resources to develop their businesses. Amoral familists are unable to generate “spontaneous sociability,” which Fukuyama indicates is essential to organization building. 尽管社会资本带来了诸多优势，但强大的家庭纽带也存在一定弊端。爱德华·班菲尔德在其经典著作《落后社会的道德基础》中，描述了意大利南部家庭所展现的“非道德家庭主义”现象。根据班菲尔德的观点，无道德家庭主义者“最大限度地追求核心家庭的物质短期利益；并假设他人也会如此行事”（1958 年，第 83 页）。因此，家庭以外的人不值得信任，甚至可能被视为潜在竞争对手或敌人。那些建立紧密社会网络以阻止外人进入的家庭可能无法获得发展业务所需的资源。无道德家族主义者无法产生福山所指的“自发性社会性”，而这被认为是组织建设的基本要素。
The most useful kind of social capital is often not the ability to work under the authority of a traditional community or group, but the capacity to form new associations and to cooperate within the terms of reference they establish. (1995, p. 27) 最有用的社会资本往往不是在传统社区或群体权威下工作的能力，而是形成新协会并在其制定的规则范围内合作的能力。（1995，第 27 页）
Case studies have illustrated the fact that certain families employ amoral familism in their relationships with their employees (Christensen, 2002). Nonfamily employees are treated as “second-class citizens” and are exploited by the family. Such an adversarial relationship between an owning family and nonfamily employees often results in low employee morale and low productivity. Propositions related to a family’s influence on a firm’s social capital are as follows: 案例研究表明，某些家庭在其与员工的关系中采用无道德的家族主义（Christensen, 2002）。非家庭成员的员工被视为“二等公民”并遭到家族的剥削。这种所有者家庭与非家庭成员员工之间的对立关系往往导致员工士气低落和生产效率低下。关于家庭对企业社会资本影响的相关命题如下：
Proposition 5. Firms with family owners/managers have greater social capital between themselves and other stakeholders than firms without family ties. 命题 5. 拥有家族所有者/管理者的企业与其他利益相关者之间的社会资本比没有家族关联的企业更高。
Proposition 6. Firms with family owners/managers are more insular and self-interested (i.e., amoral familism) than firms without family ties. 命题 6. 由家族成员拥有或管理的 firms 比没有家族背景的 firms 更具封闭性和自我利益导向（即无道德的家族主义）。
Physical and Financial Capital 实物资本与金融资本
The last forms of capital to be considered are physical and financial capital. Families may bring with them significant physical and financial assets that can be used by the firm. Sirmon and Hitt believe that family firms with “survivability capital,” which represents the pooled financial resources of the family, can provide the firm with a competitive advantage compared to those firms without access to such resources. As they note, “survivability capital can help sustain the business during poor economic times or, for example, after an unsuccessful extension or new market venture. This safety net is less likely to occur in nonfamily firms due to the lack of loyalty, strong ties, or long-term commitments on the part of employees” (2003, p. 343). Not only do families use their financial resources to protect their firms against business downturns, but they may also turn to extended family to generate capital to launch new ventures. This pooling of capital by families has been particularly successful in fostering the proliferation and growth of Chinese family businesses (Fukuyama, 1995). 最后要考虑的资本形式是实物资本和金融资本。家庭可能带来可供企业使用的显著实物和金融资产。西尔蒙和希特认为，拥有“生存资本”（即家庭的共同金融资源）的家族企业相较于缺乏此类资源的企业，能够为企业提供竞争优势。如他们所指出的，“生存资本可在经济低迷时期或例如扩展业务失败后维持企业运营。由于员工缺乏忠诚度、紧密联系或长期承诺，非家族企业中这种安全网较少出现”（2003，第 343 页）。家族不仅利用财务资源保护企业免受业务衰退的影响，还可能借助扩展家族网络筹集资本以启动新业务。家族资本的这种整合在促进中国家族企业的发展和扩张方面特别成功（福山，1995）。
Family members can use their personal assets to strengthen the firm; however, families are also known for taking assets out of the businesses they own, thereby undermining the firm’s stability. 家庭成员可以利用个人资产来增强企业实力；然而，家庭也以将资产从所拥有的企业中转移出去而闻名，从而削弱企业的稳定性。
Haynes, Walker, Rowe, and Hong (1999) surveyed 673 family businesses, asking the owners to describe whether family funds were used to support the business or if business assets were used to finance family needs, such as securing personal loans or covering shortfalls in the family’s monthly budget. They concluded that families are much more likely to draw on firm resources to meet family needs than they are to use family resources for the benefit of the firm. Therefore, family demands on firm resources may put the firm at risk. Intermingling of business and family funds also makes accountability difficult, making opportunism on the part of the family members more likely. Thus, families can have a direct effect on a firm by either providing or expropriating resources. 海恩斯、沃克、罗和洪（1999）对 673 家家族企业进行了调查，要求企业主描述家族资金是否用于支持企业运营，或是企业资产是否被用于满足家族需求，例如获取个人贷款或弥补家族每月预算缺口。他们得出结论：家族更倾向于动用企业资源满足家族需求，而非利用家族资源为企业谋利。因此，家庭对企业资源的需求可能使企业面临风险。家庭资金与企业资金的混用也使得责任划分困难，从而增加家庭成员机会主义行为的可能性。因此，家庭可以通过提供或剥夺资源的方式，对企业产生直接影响。
Proposition 7. Family owners/managers are more likely to use personal resources to benefit the firm than are owners/managers without family ties. 命题 7. 家族所有者/管理者比没有家族关系的拥有者/管理者更倾向于使用个人资源来促进企业利益。
Proposition 8. Family owners/managers are more likely to expropriate firm resources for personal benefit than are owners/managers without family ties. 命题 8. 家族所有者/管理者比没有家族关系的拥有者/管理者更倾向于将企业资源用于个人利益。
The "Family Effect" Within the Population of Family Firms 家族企业群体中的“家族效应”
The previous discussion suggests that not all family firms are alike because of the assortment of dynamics found in the families that own and manage them. Due to a particular set of family goals, relationships, and assets, some family firms are likely to have high agency costs and significant family liabilities (e.g., poor human, social, and financial capital), while other family firms may have characteristics that provide them with lower agency costs and abundant resources. Figure 3 presents three dimensions-“agency costs,” “family assets,” and “family liabilities”-ranging from “high” to “low,” which we might use to begin to distinguish between various “types” of family firms. 前文讨论表明，由于拥有和管理家族企业的家庭所呈现的动态特征各不相同，并非所有家族企业都具有相同的特性。由于特定的家族目标、关系和资产结构，部分家族企业可能面临较高的代理成本和显著的家族负债（例如人力、社会和财务资本不足），而其他家族企业则可能具备降低代理成本并拥有丰富资源的特征。图 3 展示了三个维度——“代理成本”、“家族资产”和“家族负债”——从“高”到“低”的范围，我们可以利用这些维度开始区分不同“类型”的家族企业。
There have been a few attempts to create typologies of family firms. For example, Dyer (1986) developed a typology of “business,” “board,” and “family” cultures that predicts suc- 关于家族企业的分类尝试已有一些研究。例如，Dyer（1986）提出了一种基于“企业文化”、“董事会文化”和“家族文化”的分类框架，该框架被认为能够预测家族企业的成功。
cessful leadership succession. Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg (1997) and Lansberg (1999) categorize family firms in terms of ownership structure, noting that they often evolve from “controlling owners” to “sibling partnerships” and eventually to “cousin consortiums,” with each type facing different issues and dynamics. Birley (2001) types family firms on the basis of family involvement in the firm as measured by owner-managers’ responses to a 20 -item questionnaire. For “Family In” firms, the owning family’s needs and concerns influence firm behavior. “Family Out” firms have little family involvement, and thus family issues are generally not considered when making decisions. “Juggler” firms are those organizations where the owner-managers attempt to balance the needs of their families with the needs of the firm; neither family nor firm is deemed preeminent for “Jugglers.” 成功的领导层更替。Gersick、Davis、Hampton 和 Lansberg（1997）以及 Lansberg（1999）根据所有权结构对家族企业进行分类，指出它们通常会从“控制型所有者”演变为“兄弟合伙制”，最终发展为“表亲联盟”，每种类型都会面临不同的问题和动态。Birley（2001）根据家族成员对企业参与程度的测量（通过所有者经理对 20 项问卷的回答），将家族企业分为两类。对于“家族内”企业，家族所有者的需求和关切会影响企业行为；而“家族外”企业则家族参与度较低，因此在决策时通常不考虑家族问题。“杂耍者”企业是指那些试图在家庭需求与企业需求之间寻求平衡的组织；对于“杂耍者”而言，家庭与企业均不被视为优先考虑的对象。
Typologies can prove useful in articulating the differences in organizational forms and the outcomes derived from those forms, despite the fact that they frequently gloss over the fine-grained differences (or commonalities) one might find through a close examination of each type. With this in mind, a typology will be presented that will provide the foundation for theorizing regarding family firm performance. The dimensions presented in Figure 3 create four quadrants suggesting four types of family firms: (I) the clan family firm, (II) the professional family firm, (III) the mom & pop family firm, and (IV) the selfinterested family firm. There are certain agency costs and familial assets or familial liabilities associated with each type. Each type will now be briefly described. 类型学在阐明组织形式之间的差异及其所产生的结果方面具有一定价值，尽管它们常常忽略通过对每种类型的细致分析所能发现的细微差异（或共同点）。基于此，本文将提出一种类型学，为探讨家族企业绩效提供理论基础。图 3 所示的维度划分出四个象限，对应四种家族企业类型：（I）氏族型家族企业、（II）专业型家族企业、（III）夫妻店型家族企业，以及（IV）自我利益型家族企业。每种类型均伴随特定的代理成本以及家族资产或家族负债。以下将对每种类型进行简要描述。
Quadrant I-Low Agency Costs, High Family Assets: The Clan Family Firm 第一象限——低代理成本，高家庭资产：宗族企业
In the clan family firm, the goals of family owners and family managers are one and the same, leading to low agency costs. In this type of firm, the long-term family and firm goals are isomorphic, with the family attempting to meet both firm and family needs (similar to Birley’s “Juggler” 在家族企业中，家族所有者与家族经理的目标完全一致，从而导致代理成本较低。在此类企业中，家族的长期目标与企业的长期目标具有同构性，家族在努力满足企业需求的同时，也致力于满足家族需求（类似于 Birley 的“杂耍者”模型）。
FAMILY ASSETS 家庭资产
Figure 3 Typology of Family Firms. 图 3 家族企业类型分类。
firms). This type of family firm gets its name from the fact that it receives the benefits of low agency and transactions costs due to “clan control”: behavior is regulated and made predictable by the group’s shared goals, norms, and values (Ouchi, 1980; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983; Williamson, 1981). Such clans have a high degree of trust that reduces transactions costs while enhancing communication and coordination within the family and creating goodwill with firm stakeholders (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Significant human capital is found in these firms since family members bring with them the skills and commitment needed for firm survival and success and social capital is developed by such families to acquire needed resources. Family resources are also used to support the firm during difficult times 家族企业。此类家族企业得名于其通过“家族控制”获得的低代理成本和交易成本优势：行为受群体共同目标、规范和价值观的约束，从而变得可预测（Ouchi, 1980; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983; Williamson, 1981）。此类家族具有高度信任，这不仅降低了交易成本，还增强了家族内部的沟通与协调，并为企业利益相关者创造了良好声誉（Habbershon & Williams, 1999）。这些企业中存在大量人力资本，因为家族成员带来了企业生存与成功所需的技能和承诺，而家族通过这种方式发展了社会资本以获取所需资源。家族资源也在企业面临困难时期被用于支持企业。
(Wong et al., 1992). In summary, in this type of firm, family relationships not only reduce agency costs, but enhance the firm’s ability to leverage the owning family’s human, social, and financial capital. Small, first-generation family firms that are owned and managed by family members highly committed to both the success of firm and family may be the stereotypical clan family firm. （黄等，1992）。简而言之，在此类企业中，家族关系不仅能降低代理成本，还能提升企业利用家族所有者的人力、社会及财务资本的能力。由家族成员高度致力于企业与家族双重成功所拥有并管理的中小型第一代家族企业，可能正是典型的宗族家族企业。
Quadrant II-High Agency Costs, High Family Assets: The Professional Family Firm 第二象限——高代理成本，高家庭资产：专业家族企业
Relationships and governance in the professional family firm are based on professional codes of conduct. These firms have what Dyer (1986) describes as a “professional culture” and appear to 专业家族企业在专业领域内的关系与治理基于专业行为准则。这类企业具备 Dyer（1986）所描述的“专业文化”，并表现出
have some of the characteristics of Birley’s (2001) “Family Out” firms that strive to implement professional values. Agency costs are higher in this type of firm as compared with the clan family firm, inasmuch as costs are borne in the attempt to formalize control systems and monitor management. However, to the extent that a family implements formal monitoring mechanisms, it also avoids the problems of opportunism and nepotism that afflict many family businesses. Thus, the professional control system helps ensure that the firm’s resources are not squandered by the family. Family assets are therefore protected and can be developed in the professional family firm, much like the clan family firm. Large family firms such as the Marriott Corporation or WalMart, where the family maintains significant ownership but relies on professional managers to run the enterprise, are examples of professional family firms (Dyer, 1986, 1989). 具有 Birley（2001）所描述的“家庭外”企业的一些特征，这类企业致力于践行专业价值观。与宗族企业相比，此类企业的代理成本更高，因为在尝试建立正式控制体系和监督管理过程中会产生额外成本。然而，家庭在实施正式监督机制的程度上，也能避免许多家族企业面临的机会主义和任人唯亲问题。因此，专业控制体系有助于确保企业资源不被家族成员浪费。在专业家族企业中，家族资产得以保护并得以发展，这与宗族家族企业相似。像万豪集团（Marriott Corporation）或沃尔玛（WalMart）这样的大型家族企业，虽然家族仍持有大量股权，但依赖专业经理人运营企业，便是专业家族企业的典型例子（Dyer, 1986, 1989）。
Quadrant III-Low Agency Costs, High Family Liabilities-The Mom & Pop Family Firm 第三象限——低代理成本，高家庭负债——家庭作坊式企业
In Quadrant III we find family firms that have low agency costs, but also certain liabilities stemming from family ownership. Such firms have the agency advantages of the clan family firm, inasmuch as the family does not have conflicting goals and behavior is monitored largely through close familial ties. However, families operating this type of firm fail to develop familial assets. Family values may encourage nepotism, so family managers may not be trained or have the expertise needed to grow the business. Family social capital may not be leveraged with customers and suppliers. Moreover, the family’s physical or financial assets may not be utilized effectively to benefit the business. Thus, while this type of firm derives efficiencies from its low agency costs, its growth and performance may be stymied by family liabilities. This type of family firm is likely to be represented by small “mom & pop” enterprises such as familyowned restaurants or family farms, which may have been operated by a family for generations, 在第三象限中，我们发现了一些家族企业，这些企业虽然代理成本较低，但同时也面临着家族所有权带来的某些负债。这类企业具备宗族家族企业的代理优势，因为家族成员之间没有冲突的目标，且行为主要通过紧密的家族关系进行监督。然而，经营此类企业的家族未能发展家族资产。家族价值观可能鼓励任人唯亲，因此家族管理者可能缺乏必要的培训或专业知识来推动业务增长。家族社会资本可能无法有效利用于客户和供应商。此外，家族的实物或财务资产可能未被有效利用以惠及企业。因此，尽管此类企业因低代理成本而获得效率优势，但其增长和绩效可能受家族负债制约。此类家族企业很可能以小型“家庭作坊式”企业为代表，如家族经营的餐馆或农场，这些企业可能由家族经营数代。
but the owning family has not made an effort to cultivate family assets to help the firm grow. 但拥有该企业的家族并未积极努力培育家族资产以助力企业成长。
Quadrant IV-High Agency Costs, High Family Liabilities-The Self-Interested Family Firm 第四象限——高代理成本、高家庭负债——自利型家族企业
Self-interested family firms are based on utilitarian and altruistic relationships (Etzioni, 1961). Family members advance their self-interest at the expense of the firm and, often, other family members. These firms are similar to Birley’s “Family In” firms, where nepotism is the norm. Particularistic criteria are used in employee selection, evaluation, and promotion to benefit the family and individual family members. Moreover, the family may display characteristics of “amoral familism” as family members look after their own and the family’s self-interest as opposed to the well-being of the firm, and promote altruistic family relationships to avoid the monitoring of their activities by others. Thus family assets may be squandered through opportunism, shirking, and adverse selection, all of which are made possible by the lack of formal monitoring systems and the self-interested nature of the family. Family ownership in the self-interested firm may become widely dispersed among family members, with some family members interested in the growth of the business while others are more interested in reaping the rewards of ownership (Gersick et al., 1997; Lansberg, 1999). Such differences in goals for the firm stimulate conflicts and self-interested behaviors to the detriment of firm performance (Kaye, 1991). Gersick et al.'s (1997) “cousin consortium” family firms comprised of multiple generations of family members that are often highly conflicted or Banfield’s insular family firms of southern Italy seem to be examples of selfinterested family firms. 以自我利益为导向的家族企业建立在功利主义和利他主义关系的基础上（Etzioni，1961）。家族成员为了自身利益而损害企业利益，往往也损害其他家族成员的利益。这类企业与 Birley 的“家族内部”企业相似，其中裙带关系是常态。在员工选拔、评估和晋升过程中，采用特殊标准以谋取家族及家族成员的利益。此外，家族可能表现出“非道德家族主义”特征，即家族成员优先考虑自身及家族利益而非企业福祉，并通过强调利他主义的家族关系来规避他人对其行为的监督。因此，家族资产可能因机会主义、逃避责任和逆向选择而被浪费，这些行为均因缺乏正式监控体系及家族的自利本性而得以实现。在以自我利益为导向的企业中，家族所有权可能在家族成员中广泛分散，部分成员关注企业增长，而另一些成员更关注所有权带来的回报（Gersick 等，1997；Lansberg，1999）。这种对企业目标的差异刺激了冲突和自我利益行为，损害了企业绩效（Kaye，1991）。Gersick 等人（1997）提出的“表亲联盟”家族企业，由多代家庭成员组成且往往存在高度冲突，以及 Banfield 在意大利南部研究的封闭式家族企业，似乎是自我利益驱动的家族企业的典型案例。
Firm Type and Performance 企业类型与绩效
Our typology presents us with four general types of family firms that we can now critique and compare as to their performance. The following propositions are based on the “ceteris paribus” 我们的分类体系为我们呈现了四种典型的家族企业类型，我们可以对它们的绩效进行分析和比较。以下论点基于“其他条件不变”的假设。
assumption, that the family effect on performance can be clearly delineated only by assuming that all other firm factors are held constant (e.g., industry, firm characteristics). Based on our discussion of the resource-based view and agency theory, we can postulate that clan family firms, ceteris paribus, will have the highest performance. Such firms have significant family assets and low agency costs. Professional family firms also have certain family assets, but bear the costs associated with the imposition of professional rules and monitoring, with such monitoring helping the firm avoid adverse selection, shirking, and opportunism. However, it may be that the relationship between monitoring and performance is curvilinear-too little monitoring fails to control opportunism, which leads to poor performance. However, too many bureaucratic controls may eliminate family assets, stifle innovation, and incur significant agency costs (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). The mom & pop family firm has the advantage of low agency costs but also has some family liabilities, while the selfinterested family firm may incur liabilities due to incompetent management, amoral familism, complex conflicts, the siphoning of resources from the firm for use by the owning family, and so forth. The lack of effective monitoring may contribute to the creation of these liabilities. Thus, self-interested family firms may have difficulty surviving since they have significant familial liabilities coupled with high agency costs. Given these conditions, the self-interested family firms would be at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis clan family firms and professional family firms. In summary, the typology in Figure 3 suggests the following propositions. 假设，家庭对绩效的影响只能在假设所有其他公司因素保持不变（例如行业、公司特征）的情况下明确界定。基于我们对资源基础视角和代理理论的讨论，我们可以假设，在其他条件不变的情况下，宗族家族企业将具有最高的绩效。此类企业拥有显著的家族资产和较低的代理成本。专业化家族企业也拥有一定家族资产，但需承担专业规则实施及监控带来的成本，而此类监控有助于企业避免逆向选择、怠工和机会主义行为。然而，监控与绩效之间的关系可能是曲线形的——监控不足无法有效控制机会主义，导致绩效不佳。然而，过多的官僚控制可能消除家族资产，抑制创新，并产生显著的代理成本（Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001）。家庭企业具有代理成本低的优势，但也存在一些家庭负债，而自利型家庭企业可能因管理不善、缺乏道德的家族主义、复杂的利益冲突、将企业资源转移给所有者家庭等原因而产生负债。缺乏有效的监督可能导致这些负债的产生。因此，自利型家族企业可能难以生存，因为它们同时面临显著的家族负债和高昂的代理成本。在这种情况下，自利型家族企业相对于宗族型家族企业和专业化家族企业将处于竞争劣势。综上所述，图 3 的分类框架提出以下命题。
Proposition 10. Ceteris paribus, clan family firms will perform better than the other three types of family firms. 命题 10. 在其他条件相同的情况下，氏族家族企业将比其他三种类型的家族企业表现更好。
Proposition 11. Ceteris paribus, professional family firms will have higher performance than self-interested family firms. 命题 11. 在其他条件相同的情况下，专业化家族企业比以自我利益为导向的家族企业表现更优。
Predicting which firm-the mom & pop family firm or the professional family firm-has the performance advantage is more difficult. Although 预测哪家企业——是家庭作坊式企业还是专业化家庭企业——具有绩效优势更为困难。尽管
the mom & pop firm has an advantage due to lower agency costs, it also has liabilities. The professional family firm may have significant agency costs, but it also has a pool of family resources. Ceteris paribus, if the agency costs and familial assets of the professional family firm “outweigh” the agency costs and liabilities of the mom & pop firm, then the professional family firm would have the advantage (and vice versa). 家庭作坊式企业由于代理成本较低而具有优势，但也存在相应劣势。专业化家庭企业可能面临较高的代理成本，但同时拥有家族资源池。在其他条件相同的情况下，如果专业化家庭企业的代理成本与家族资产之和超过家庭作坊式企业的代理成本与负债之和，则专业化家庭企业将具备优势（反之亦然）。
Given the three dimensions of the typology just presented, one might feel that the propositions stemming from the typology are self-evident: firms with low agency costs and high resources will perform better than those with high agency costs and family liabilities. However, to the extent that the typology helps us to explicitly identify those factors that lead to lower or higher agency costs, as well as those factors that generate family resources or liabilities, we can more clearly identify sources of competitive advantage (or disadvantage) for family firms and therefore be better able predict their performance. Moreover, the typology encourages us to investigate the possible interaction effects of the dimensions. (e.g., How do various forms of governance affect family assets and liabilities?) Such an approach to theory building will help us better understand the determinants of family firm performance rather than merely assert that family firms are better or worse off than those firms without family connections. 基于刚刚介绍的类型学的三个维度，人们可能会认为该类型学所衍生出的命题是显而易见的：代理成本低且资源丰富的 firms 将比代理成本高且存在家庭负债的 firms 表现更优。然而，只要该分类法能帮助我们明确识别导致代理成本高低或家族资源与负债的因素，我们就能更清晰地识别家族企业的竞争优势（或劣势）来源，从而更好地预测其绩效。此外，该分类法鼓励我们探讨各维度之间的可能交互作用。（例如：不同治理形式如何影响家族资产与负债？）这种理论构建方法将帮助我们更好地理解家族企业绩效的决定因素，而非仅仅断言家族企业比无家族背景的企业表现更好或更差。
Comparing the Performance of Family and Nonfamily Firms 家庭企业与非家庭企业的绩效比较
Nonfamily firms, ceteris paribus, would be expected to perform more poorly than clan family firms since they lack family resources and have higher monitoring costs (given that nonfamily firms typically use professional controls). Nonfamily firms would also be at a disadvantage compared to professional family firms since they have no familial resources and incur similar agency costs. However, nonfamily firms may fare much better compared to self-interested family firms, which have significant agency costs and family liabilities. This leads us to the following two propositions. 在其他条件相同的情况下，非家族企业预计会比家族企业表现更差，因为它们缺乏家族资源且监控成本更高（考虑到非家族企业通常采用专业化管理）。非家族企业相较于专业家族企业也处于劣势，因为它们没有家族资源且面临类似的代理成本。然而，非家族企业可能比自利型家族企业表现好得多，后者面临显著的代理成本和家族负债。这使我们得出以下两个命题。
Proposition 12. Ceteris paribus, clan family firms and professional family firms will have higher performance than nonfamily firms. 命题 12. 在其他条件相同的情况下，氏族家族企业与专业家族企业的绩效将高于非家族企业。
Proposition 13. Ceteris paribus, nonfamily firms will have higher performance than self-interested family firms. 命题 13. 在其他条件相同的情况下，非家族企业将比以自我利益为导向的家族企业表现更优。
In the case of the mom & pop family firm, its advantage (or disadvantage) compared with the nonfamily firm would be a function of the comparative agency costs between the two, in addition to the family liabilities incurred by the mom & pop firm. 在家庭企业（mom & pop）与非家庭企业相比的情况下，其优势（或劣势）将取决于两者之间的相对代理成本，以及家庭企业所承担的家庭负债。
Testing these propositions may provide us with some additional insight concerning the reasons behind the contradictory findings in those studies that compared the performance of family and nonfamily firms. When studying family firm performance, researchers typically classify family firms using a 0 or a 1 -either the firm is a family firm or it is not-and then compare the performance of the sample of family firms with those firms that are designated as nonfamily. Such a classification scheme turns the family firm into a “black box,” since it fails to recognize and articulate which “family factors” lead to high performance and which may lead to poor performance. 对这些假设进行验证可能为我们提供一些额外见解，以解释那些比较家族企业和非家族企业绩效的研究中出现的矛盾结果。在研究家族企业绩效时，研究人员通常采用 0 或 1 的二元分类方法——即企业要么是家族企业，要么不是——然后将家族企业样本的绩效与被归类为非家族企业的企业进行比较。这种分类方案将家族企业视为一个“黑箱”，因为它未能识别并阐明哪些“家族因素”导致了高绩效，哪些可能导致低绩效。
Furthermore, when researchers compare a sample of family firms versus a sample of nonfamily firms, they are likely to obtain a cross-section of the various family firm types in the sample and gloss over the important differences we see in the population of family firms. To the extent that the family firm sample contains a disproportionate number of any particular type, the results may be misleading. For example, if a sample contained a disproportionate number of self-interested family firms, then the performance of the firms in that sample may fair poorly when compared to the nonfamily sample. Conversely, a sample containing a disproportionate number of clan family firms would likely perform better than a random sample of nonfamily firms. 此外，当研究人员将家族企业样本与非家族企业样本进行比较时，他们很可能获得一个包含各种家族企业类型的横截面样本，并忽视家族企业群体中存在的显著差异。如果家族企业样本中某一特定类型的企业数量不成比例，研究结果可能具有误导性。例如，如果一个样本中包含了过多以自我利益为导向的家族企业，那么该样本中的企业表现可能在与非家族企业样本的比较中表现不佳。相反，如果一个样本中包含了过多以家族血缘为纽带的家族企业，那么该样本中的企业表现可能优于随机选取的非家族企业样本。
Sampling bias provides us with a possible explanation for the contradictory findings in the literature; however, the major contribution of this framework lies in its ability to help us develop 采样偏差为文献中相互矛盾的发现提供了一种可能的解释；然而，该框架的主要贡献在于其能够帮助我们发展
better theory regarding the impact of a family on firm performance. The theory used in creating the typology provides a framework to develop testable hypotheses to generate more precise explanations regarding why we may see differences in performance when comparing family and nonfamily firms as well as differences in performance within the population of family firms. The 13 propositions presented here help us get inside the black box of the family firm and suggest various means by which a family may affect a firm’s performance. Thus, while researchers are typically asking the question: Do family firms perform better than nonfamily firms?, the appropriate question should be: What type of family firm leads to high performance? 关于家庭对企业绩效影响的更完善理论。用于构建该分类体系的理论框架，为提出可验证的假设提供了基础，从而能够更精准地解释为何在比较家族企业和非家族企业时会观察到绩效差异，以及在家族企业群体内部为何存在绩效差异。本文提出的 13 个命题帮助我们揭开家族企业的“黑箱”，并提出了家族可能影响企业绩效的多种途径。因此，尽管研究者通常会问：“家族企业是否比非家族企业表现更好？”，但更恰当的问题应是：“何种类型的家族企业能带来高绩效？”
Family "Types" and Firm Performance 家庭类型与企业绩效
The typology just presented suggests that certain family firms have higher performance because they have familial assets and lower agency costs than firms without those advantages. This then leads us to consider the question: What types of families or family patterns are conducive to high firm performance? Indeed, family dynamics are what give rise to the benefits or costs we see associated with family firm performance. Thus we need to develop better theories about why certain families embrace nepotism while others do not; why do some families co-mingle family and firm assets while others eschew such practices; and why do certain families share common goals, while others do not. To answer such questions, we need to focus on the underlying family dynamics. 刚才提到的分类表明，某些家族企业表现优异，是因为它们拥有家族资产且代理成本低于不具备这些优势的企业。这促使我们进一步思考：哪些类型的家族或家族模式有利于企业实现高绩效？事实上，家族动态正是产生与家族企业绩效相关益处或成本的根源。因此，我们需要建立更完善的理论框架，以解释为何某些家族倾向于实行裙带关系，而另一些家族则不然；为何部分家族会将家族资产与企业资产混同，而另一些家族则坚决避免此类做法；以及为何某些家族能够共享共同目标，而另一些家族则无法做到这一点。要回答这些问题，我们必须聚焦于家族动态的内在机制。
Previous work by scholars in the family sciences provides us with various models of family dynamics. For example, Constantine (1993) and Kantor and Lehr (1975) suggest four types of families: the closed paradigm family, in which the family relies on a hierarchy of authority to regulate family processes and make decisions, and the random paradigm, where the family values change and novelty. Such a family system is largely egalitarian and encourages independent thought and action on the part of family members. Collective needs are 家庭科学领域的学者们此前开展的研究为我们提供了多种家庭动态模型。例如，康斯坦丁（1993）和坎托尔与莱尔（1975）提出了四种家庭类型：封闭型家庭模式，其中家庭依赖于权威等级制度来调节家庭过程并做出决策；以及随机型家庭模式，该模式重视变化与新颖性。此类家庭体系总体上较为平等，鼓励家庭成员独立思考与行动。集体需求是
seen as being met through individual initiative. A third family pattern is the open paradigm. In this pattern, family members create a democratic model for action and decision making as the family attempts to integrate individual needs into the family’s collective goals and values. Such families attempt to synthesize the opposing values of hierarchy and independence found in the closed and random paradigms. A final pattern is the synchronous paradigm. Synchronous families rely on preexisting tacit agreements concerning shared values, goals, and ideas that regulate family processes. In such families, no one needs to be told what to do, for the family rules are internalized by all. Such families may be found more frequently in Asian societies rather than in Western cultures (Constantine, 1993). 被视为通过个人主动性来实现。第三种家庭模式是开放模式。在此模式中，家庭成员共同构建一个民主的行动与决策模型，以将个人需求融入家庭的集体目标与价值观。这类家庭试图调和封闭模式与随机模式中对立的等级与独立价值观。最后一种模式是同步模式。同步型家庭依赖于预先存在的默契协议，这些协议涉及共享的价值观、目标和理念，从而规范家庭运作。在这种家庭中，无需有人告诉成员该做什么，因为家庭规则已被所有成员内化。此类家庭在亚洲社会中比在西方文化中更为常见（Constantine, 1993）。
Such a typology of families (in addition to many others that have been developed) may help us understand why certain firms owned and managed by families are at a comparative advantage or disadvantage. The reader may note some of the possible connections between the family paradigms just described and the family firm typology presented earlier. For example, synchronous families that own and manage an enterprise may have fewer agency costs than families operating with the random paradigm, and such families may also have the ability to develop social capital more effectively than other family types. It may also be true that families operating under an open or random paradigm may be able to help a firm adapt, grow, and change, as compared with a family using a closed paradigm. My purpose in suggesting such linkages between family type and firm performance is to encourage more theory building and collaboration across the disciplines of family science and management to better understand the role of the family in firm performance. To truly understand the “family effect” on firm performance, we need better theorizing regarding the link between family patterns and the behavior and performance of the firm. We may also discover that certain family patterns or paradigms “morph” into new family patterns once the family begins working together. What once were harmonious (or acrimonious) relationships in a family may dramatically change as family 这种家庭类型学（除已有的其他类型学外）可能有助于我们理解为何某些由家庭拥有和管理的 firms 在比较优势或劣势方面存在差异。读者可能会注意到，本文中描述的家庭范式与之前提出的家庭 firms 类型学之间存在一些可能的关联。例如，同步型家族企业可能比采用随机型范式的家族企业拥有更低的代理成本，且此类家族可能比其他家族类型更有效地发展社会资本。此外，采用开放或随机型范式的家族可能比采用封闭型范式的家族更能帮助企业适应、成长和变革。我提出家庭类型与企业绩效之间这种关联的目的是，鼓励家庭科学与管理学等学科之间的理论构建与合作，以更好地理解家庭在企业绩效中的作用。要真正理解“家庭效应”对企业绩效的影响，我们需要对家庭模式与企业行为及绩效之间的关联进行更深入的理论探讨。我们还可能发现，某些家庭模式或范式在家庭开始共同工作后会“演变”为新的家庭模式。曾经在家庭中和谐（或紧张）的关系可能会随着家庭成员的互动而发生剧烈变化。
members interact day after day in the context of a business. 成员们在商业环境中每天互动。
Directions for Future Research 未来研究方向
The purpose of this article has been to explore the “family effect” on organizational performance. The theoretical framework and typology presented suggest that there are several different types of family firms, some of which have unique assets that allow them to compete successfully while others have governance practices that incur significant agency costs, which, in turn, may cause them to falter in the marketplace. The dimensions that spawn the typology will, hopefully, encourage organization scholars to see family firms through a more complex lens, recognizing that there are differential “family effects” and that classifying all family firms in one category may lead to misleading conclusions. Definitions of family firms based strictly on percentages of ownership and management control-those most often used in current studies-will likely not differentiate the various family effects, and thus will not accurately predict nor explain differences in firm performance (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Westhead & Cowling, 1998). Behavioral definitions, based on the dimensions suggested by the typology, will likely be more useful. 本文旨在探讨“家庭效应”对组织绩效的影响。文中提出的理论框架和分类体系表明，存在多种不同类型的家族企业，其中部分企业凭借独特资产成功竞争，而另一些企业则因治理实践导致显著的代理成本，进而可能在市场中陷入困境。形成该分类的维度有望促使组织学者以更复杂的视角审视家族企业，认识到“家庭效应”存在差异性，并将所有家族企业归入同一类别可能导致误导性结论。基于所有权比例和管理控制权比例的家族企业定义（当前研究中最常用的方法）可能无法区分不同的家族效应，因此无法准确预测或解释企业绩效差异（Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Westhead & Cowling, 1998）。基于分类维度提出的行为定义将更具实用性。
The typology presents a framework to better understand the family effect on firm performance, but it leaves us with a number of unanswered questions, such as the following. 该分类法为理解家庭对企业绩效的影响提供了一个框架，但仍留下了一些未解答的问题，例如以下几点。
How do we empirically determine the family firm types? How should we measure family resources and agency costs? 如何通过实证研究确定家族企业类型？如何衡量家族资源和代理成本？
How do families acquire and develop their resources? Are certain forms of familial capital (e.g., human, social, financial) more valuable than others? How do families lose their resources? 家庭是如何获得并发展其资源的？某些形式的家庭资本（如人力资本、社会资本、金融资本）是否比其他形式更具价值？家庭是如何失去其资源的？
Do certain governance mechanisms lead to greater or lesser agency costs in family firms? 某些治理机制是否会导致家族企业中代理成本的增加或减少？
What is the relationship between family ownership and management control and the four types of family firms? 家庭所有权与管理控制与四种类型家族企业之间的关系是什么？
Do families have a differential impact on different measures of firm performance? For 家庭对企业绩效的不同衡量指标是否具有差异化影响？对于
example, families might have a negative impact on human-resource outcomes (e.g., turnover), but a positive effective on financial outcomes (e.g., profits, revenues). 例如，家庭可能对人力资源结果产生负面影响（例如，员工流动率），但对财务结果产生积极影响（例如，利润、收入）。
Are there other types of family firms, or are there other dimensions that will create new typologies to examine? What are the fine-grained differences between the various types? 是否存在其他类型的家族企业，或者是否存在其他维度能够形成新的分类类型以供研究？各种类型之间存在哪些细微差异？
Do these types evolve in family firms in any particular pattern? For example, do we typically find clan family firms in the first generation and then find such firms evolving into either professional family firms or self-interested family firms as the firm grows and the family transitions into the next generation? 这些类型的家族企业是否在家族企业中以特定模式演变？例如，我们是否通常在第一代家族企业中发现宗族型家族企业，然后随着企业成长和家族向下一代过渡，这类企业演变为专业型家族企业或自利型家族企业？
As we answer these questions, we can begin to develop additional propositions to be tested that may unravel the complexities relating to the family effect and help us understand more fully the advantages and disadvantages of having families own and manage an enterprise. 在回答这些问题时，我们可以开始提出更多待验证的假设，这些假设可能揭示家庭效应的复杂性，并帮助我们更全面地理解家庭拥有和管理企业所带来的优势与劣势。
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I would like to thank Dave Whetten, Justin Dyer, William Schulze, John Ward, Jeffrey Dyer, Sabine Klein, Ludo Van der Heyden, Christine Blondel, Andrew Pettigrew, and members of the Marriott School OLS department for their helpful comments regarding the ideas in this article. 我要感谢戴夫·惠特恩（Dave Whetten）、贾斯汀·戴尔（Justin Dyer）、威廉·舒尔茨（William Schulze）、约翰·沃德（John Ward）、杰弗里·戴尔（Jeffrey Dyer）、萨宾·克莱因（Sabine Klein）、卢多·范德海登（Ludo Van der Heyden）、克里斯汀·布隆德尔（Christine Blondel）、安德鲁·佩蒂格鲁（Andrew Pettigrew）以及马里奥特商学院在线学习与教学（OLS）部门的各位成员，感谢你们对本文中提出的想法所给予的宝
^(1){ }^{1} These studies were gleaned from a review of journals known to publish studies comparing the performance of family and nonfamily firms, for example, Journal of Finance, Academy of Management Journal, Family Business Review, Journal of Small Business Management, and recent working papers on the subject. The list of studies in Table 1 is not exhaustive but clearly illustrates the fact that there are divergent findings regarding the performance of family firms. ^(1){ }^{1} 这些研究成果来源于对已知发表比较家族企业和非家族企业绩效研究的期刊的综述，例如《金融学杂志》、《管理学报》、《家族企业评论》、《小企业管理杂志》以及近期关于该主题的工作论文。表 1 中所列的研究并非穷尽所有，但清晰地表明了关于家族企业绩效存在不同研究结论的事实。
