BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Operating earnings improved to $41.9 million in 1980 from $36.0 million in 1979, but return on beginning equity capital (with securities valued at cost) fell to 17.8% from 18.6%. We believe the latter yardstick to be the most appropriate measure of single-year managerial economic performance. Informed use of that yardstick, however, requires an understanding of many factors, including accounting policies, historical carrying values of assets, financial leverage, and industry conditions.
1980 年的运营收益从 1979 年的 3690 万美元提高到 4190 万美元，但期初股本回报率（证券按成本估值）从 18.6%下降到 17.8%。我们认为，后者是衡量单年度管理层经济表现的最合适标准。然而，要合理使用这一标准，需要理解许多因素，包括会计政策、资产的历史账面价值、财务杠杆和行业状况。
In your evaluation of our economic performance, we suggest that two factors should receive your special attention - one of a positive nature peculiar, to a large extent, to our own operation, and one of a negative nature applicable to corporate performance generally. Let’s look at the bright side first.
在您评估我们的经济表现时，我们建议您特别关注两个因素——一个本质上是积极的，在很大程度上是我们自身运营所特有的；另一个本质上是消极的，普遍适用于公司业绩。让我们先看看光明的一面。
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings
非控股权益收益
When one company owns part of another company, appropriate accounting procedures pertaining to that ownership interest must be selected from one of three major categories. The percentage of voting stock that is owned, in large part, determines which category of accounting principles should be utilized.
当一家公司拥有另一家公司的部分股权时，必须从三个主要类别中选择与该所有权权益相关的适当会计程序。所拥有的有表决权股份的百分比，在很大程度上决定了应采用哪一类会计原则。
Generally accepted accounting principles require (subject to exceptions, naturally, as with our former bank subsidiary) full consolidation of sales, expenses, taxes, and earnings of business holdings more than 50% owned. Blue Chip Stamps, 60% owned by Berkshire Hathaway Inc., falls into this category. Therefore, all Blue Chip income and expense items are included in full in Berkshire’s Consolidated Statement of Earnings, with the 40% ownership interest of others in Blue Chip’s net earnings reflected in the Statement as a deduction for “minority interest”.
公认会计原则要求（当然，与我们以前的银行子公司一样，也有例外）对持股超过 50% 的企业的销售额、费用、税收和收益进行全面合并。伯克希尔哈撒韦公司 (Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) 拥有 60% 股权的 Blue Chip Stamps 就属于这一类。因此，所有 Blue Chip 的收入和支出项目都全部包含在伯克希尔的合并收益表中，其他人在 Blue Chip 净收益中 40% 的所有权权益在报表中反映为“少数股东权益”的扣除额。
Full inclusion of underlying earnings from another class of holdings, companies owned 20% to 50% (usually called “investees”), also normally occurs. Earnings from such companies - for example, Wesco Financial, controlled by Berkshire but only 48% owned - are included via a one-line entry in the owner’s Statement of Earnings. Unlike the over-50% category, all items of revenue and expense are omitted; just the proportional share of net income is included. Thus, if Corporation A owns one-third of Corporation B, one-third of B’s earnings, whether or not distributed by B, will end up in A’s earnings. There are some modifications, both in this and the over-50% category, for intercorporate taxes and purchase price adjustments, the explanation of which we will save for a later day. (We know you can hardly wait.)
通常也会全面纳入另一类持股（拥有 20% 至 50% 股权的公司，通常称为“被投资公司”）的潜在收益。来自这些公司的收益——例如，由伯克希尔控制但仅拥有 48% 股权的 Wesco Financial——通过所有者收益表中的单行条目纳入。与超过 50% 的类别不同，所有收入和支出项目都被省略；仅包括净收入的比例份额。因此，如果 A 公司拥有 B 公司三分之一的股权，则 B 公司收益的三分之一（无论是否由 B 公司分配）最终都会计入 A 公司的收益中。在这个类别和超过 50% 的类别中，对于公司间税收和购买价格调整都有一些修改，我们将在以后解释。（我们知道您迫不及待了。）
Finally come holdings representing less than 20% ownership of another corporation’s voting securities. In these cases, accounting rules dictate that the owning companies include in their earnings only dividends received from such holdings. Undistributed earnings are ignored. Thus, should we own 10% of Corporation X with earnings of $10 million in 1980, we would report in our earnings (ignoring relatively minor taxes on intercorporate dividends) either (a) $1 million if X declared the full $10 million in dividends; (b) $500,000 if X paid out 50%, or $5 million, in dividends; or (c) zero if X reinvested all earnings.
最后是代表对另一家公司有投票权的证券的所有权低于 20%的股份。在这种情况下，会计准则规定，拥有这些股份的公司只能将从这些股份中获得的股息计入其收益。未分配的收益将被忽略。因此，如果我们在 1980 年拥有 X 公司 10%的股份，而 X 公司的收益为 1000 万美元，那么我们将在我们的收益中报告（忽略公司间股息的相对较小的税收）：（a）100 万美元（如果 X 公司宣布全部 1000 万美元的股息）；（b）50 万美元（如果 X 公司支付了 50%的股息，即 500 万美元）；或者（c）零（如果 X 公司将所有收益都进行了再投资）。
We impose this short - and over-simplified - course in accounting upon you because Berkshire’s concentration of resources in the insurance field produces a corresponding concentration of its assets in companies in that third (less than 20% owned) category. Many of these companies pay out relatively small proportions of their earnings in dividends. This means that only a small proportion of their current earning power is recorded in our own current operating earnings. But, while our reported operating earnings reflect only the dividends received from such companies, our economic well-being is determined by their earnings, not their dividends.
我们向您介绍这门简短且过度简化的会计课程，是因为伯克希尔公司在保险领域的资源集中导致其资产相应地集中在第三类（所有权低于 20%）公司中。这些公司中的许多公司以相对较小的比例支付其收益作为股息。这意味着只有一小部分当前的盈利能力被记录在我们当前的运营收益中。但是，虽然我们报告的运营收益仅反映了从这些公司收到的股息，但我们的经济状况是由它们的收益而不是股息决定的。
Our holdings in this third category of companies have increased dramatically in recent years as our insurance business has prospered and as securities markets have presented particularly attractive opportunities in the common stock area. The large increase in such holdings, plus the growth of earnings experienced by those partially-owned companies, has produced an unusual result; the part of “our” earnings that these companies retained last year (the part not paid to us in dividends) exceeded the total reported annual operating earnings of Berkshire Hathaway. Thus, conventional accounting only allows less than half of our earnings “iceberg” to appear above the surface, in plain view. Within the corporate world such a result is quite rare; in our case it is likely to be recurring.
近年来，随着我们的保险业务蓬勃发展，以及证券市场在普通股领域提供了特别有吸引力的机会，我们在第三类公司中的持股量急剧增加。此类持股的大幅增加，加上这些部分拥有的公司所经历的收益增长，产生了一个不寻常的结果；这些公司去年保留的“我们的”收益部分（未以股息形式支付给我们的部分）超过了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司报告的年度运营总收益。因此，传统的会计方法只允许我们收益“冰山”不到一半的部分出现在表面上，清晰可见。在企业界，这种结果非常罕见；在我们的案例中，这种情况很可能会再次发生。
Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it’s much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules. The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The “control” was theoretical. Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur. But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.
我们自己对盈利现实的分析与普遍接受的会计原则略有不同，尤其是在这些原则必须应用于高且不确定的通货膨胀率的世界时。（但批评远比改进此类会计规则容易得多。固有的问题是巨大的。）我们曾 100%拥有的企业的报告收益对我们来说并不值每美元 100 美分，即使在会计意义上，我们完全控制了它们的处置。（这种“控制”是理论上的。除非我们再投资所有收益，否则现有资产的价值将发生大规模恶化。但这些再投资的收益没有希望获得接近市场资本回报的收益。）我们还拥有具有非凡再投资可能性的小部分企业，其留存收益对我们来说具有远超每美元 100 美分的经济价值。
The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage. This is true whether we determine the usage, or whether managers we did not hire - but did elect to join - determine that usage. (It’s the act that counts, not the actors.) And the value is in no way affected by the inclusion or non-inclusion of those retained earnings in our own reported operating earnings. If a tree grows in a forest partially owned by us, but we don’t record the growth in our financial statements, we still own part of the tree.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司留存收益的价值并非 取决于我们拥有 100%、50%、20% 还是 1% 的 企业所在地的业务。相反，这些业务的价值 留存收益的多少取决于它们的使用方式 以及该使用方式所产生的后续收益水平。无论是由我们来决定使用方式，还是由我们没有聘用但选择加入的管理者来决定使用方式，情况都是如此。（重要的是行为，而不是行为者。）而且，这些留存收益是否包含在我们自己报告的运营收益中，对价值没有任何影响。如果一棵树生长在一片我们部分拥有的森林里，但我们没有在财务报表中记录这种增长，我们仍然拥有这棵树的一部分。
Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional. But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management - even if we are that management.
我们警告您，我们的观点是非传统的。但我们宁愿让一家我们拥有 10%股权的公司，由我们没有亲自聘用的管理层，将我们没有获得会计入账的收益得到良好利用，也不愿让另一家公司（即使是我们自己）的管理层，将我们已经获得入账的收益投入到潜力更加可疑的项目中。
(We can’t resist pausing here for a short commercial. One usage of retained earnings we often greet with special enthusiasm when practiced by companies in which we have an investment interest is repurchase of their own shares. The reasoning is simple: if a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full - frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security markets often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own businesses at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise.)
（我们忍不住在这里暂停一下，做一个简短的广告。当我们投资的公司回购自己的股票时，我们通常会特别热情地欢迎这种留存收益的使用方式。原因很简单：如果一家优秀的企业在市场上以远低于内在价值的价格出售，那么还有什么比以如此划算的价格大幅扩大所有所有者的利益更确定或更有利可图的资本利用方式呢？企业收购活动的竞争性几乎保证了在一家公司收购另一家企业的全部所有权时，支付全部价格——通常是高于全部价格。但证券市场的拍卖性质，往往让管理良好的公司有机会以低于通过谈判收购另一家企业获得相同盈利能力所需价格的 50%的价格，购买自己企业的部分股权。）
Long-Term Corporate Results
长期公司业绩
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value.
正如我们所指出的，我们通过比较经营收益与按成本估值的证券对应的股东权益来评估单年度的公司业绩。然而，我们长期业绩的衡量标准包括所有已实现或未实现的资本收益或损失。我们持续实现的长期股权回报率大大超过我们年度回报率的平均值。造成这一喜人结果的主要因素很简单：我们之前讨论的那些非控股权益的留存收益已经转化为市场价值的增长。
Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings.
当然，这种留存收益转化为市场价格升值的过程是非常不均衡的（有些年份会逆转），时间上不可预测，而且不太可能以精确的逐美元对应的方式实现。而且，以愚蠢的价格购买一家公司的股票可能会抵消该公司十年留存收益的影响。但是，当购买价格合理时，市场几乎肯定会对留存收益的积累产生某种长期认可。您甚至会定期收到一些锦上添花的东西，市场升值远远超过购买后的留存收益。
In the sixteen years since present management assumed responsibility for Berkshire, book value per share with insurance-held equities valued at market has increased from $19.46 to $400.80, or 20.5% compounded annually. (You’ve done better: the value of the mineral content in the human body compounded at 22% annually during the past decade.) It is encouraging, moreover, to realize that our record was achieved despite many mistakes. The list is too painful and lengthy to detail here. But it clearly shows that a reasonably competitive corporate batting average can be achieved in spite of a lot of managerial strikeouts.
自现任管理层负责伯克希尔公司以来的十六年里，以保险持有的股票按市场价值计算的每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增加到 400.80 美元，年复合增长率为 20.5%。（您的表现更好：过去十年中，人体内矿物质的价值以每年 22%的复合增长率增长。）更令人鼓舞的是，我们的记录是在犯了很多错误的情况下取得的。这个清单太痛苦和冗长，无法在此详述。但这清楚地表明，即使有很多管理上的三振出局，也能取得相当有竞争力的公司平均击球率。
Our insurance companies will continue to make large investments in well-run, favorably-situated, non-controlled companies that very often will pay out in dividends only small proportions of their earnings. Following this policy, we would expect our long-term returns to continue to exceed the returns derived annually from reported operating earnings. Our confidence in this belief can easily be quantified: if we were to sell the equities that we hold and replace them with long-term tax-free bonds, our reported operating earnings would rise immediately by over $30 million annually. Such a shift tempts us not at all.
我们的保险公司将继续对管理良好、地理位置优越的非控股公司进行大量投资，这些公司通常只会以股息的形式支付其收益的一小部分。遵循这一政策，我们预计我们的长期回报将继续超过每年报告的经营收益所产生的回报。我们对这一信念的信心很容易量化：如果我们出售我们持有的股票，并用长期免税债券取而代之，我们报告的经营收益将立即每年增加超过 3000 万美元。这样的转变一点也不诱人。
So much for the good news.
以上是好消息。
Results for Owners 所有者的回报
Unfortunately, earnings reported in corporate financial statements are no longer the dominant variable that determines whether there are any real earnings for you, the owner. For only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won’t eat richer.
遗憾的是，公司财务报表中报告的盈利已不再是决定您（所有者）是否有任何实际盈利的主要变量。因为只有购买力的增长才代表投资的实际收益。如果您 (a) 放弃购买十个汉堡包来购买一项投资；(b) 收到股息，税后可以购买两个汉堡包；并且 (c) 在出售您的股份后，收到税后收益可以购买八个汉堡包，那么 (d) 您的投资就没有实际收入，无论它在美元上增值多少。您可能会感觉更富有，但您不会吃得更富有。
High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years. The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.
高通货膨胀率会产生一种资本税，使得许多公司投资变得不明智——至少如果以所有者获得正的实际投资回报的标准来衡量的话。这个“最低回报率”——公司必须实现的股本回报率，才能为其个人所有者产生任何实际回报——近年来急剧增加。现在，缴纳平均税收的投资者正在运行一个向下的自动扶梯，其速度已经加快到他们的向上进展为零的地步。
For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for income tax; the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year - even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a combination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent.
例如，在 12% 的通货膨胀率的世界中，一家股本回报率为 20%（很少有公司能够始终如一地做到这一点）并将所有收益分配给 50% 税率的个人，实际上是在消耗他们的实际资本，而不是增加它。（20% 的一半将用于所得税；剩下的 10% 使企业所有者仅拥有他们在年初拥有的购买力的 98%——即使他们没有花费一分钱的“收益”）。在这种税率下的投资者实际上会因价格稳定和公司股本回报率仅为几个百分点的组合而受益。
Explicit income taxes alone, unaccompanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal income tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real income would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported income. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return - even if income taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.)
仅仅是显性的所得税，如果没有任何隐性的通货膨胀税相伴随，永远不会将一个正的企业回报转变为负的所有者回报。（即使股息和资本收益的个人所得税率高达 90%，在零通货膨胀率下，所有者仍然会剩余一些实际收入。）但是，通货膨胀税不受报告收入的限制。与最近经历的通货膨胀率相差不远的通货膨胀率，可以将大多数公司所达到的正回报水平转变为所有所有者的负回报，包括那些不需要支付显性税款的所有者。（例如，如果通货膨胀率达到 16%，那么美国公司中收益低于此回报率的 60% 以上的所有者将实现负的实际回报——即使股息和资本收益的所得税被取消。）
Of course, the two forms of taxation co-exist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, income. Thus you pay income taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars.
当然，这两种税收形式是共存和相互作用的，因为显性税是对名义收入而不是实际收入征收的。因此，如果以不变美元衡量股东的回报，您需要为本应是赤字的部分支付所得税。
At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from tax-free entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, etc.) should expect no real long-term return from the average American corporation, even though these individuals reinvest the entire after-tax proceeds from all dividends they receive. The average return on equity of corporations is fully offset by the combination of the implicit tax on capital levied by inflation and the explicit taxes levied both on dividends and gains in value produced by retained earnings.
按照目前的通货膨胀率，我们认为中等或高税收等级的个人所有者（与免税实体，如养老基金、慈善机构等不同）不应期望从美国公司的平均水平中获得任何实际的长期回报，即使这些个人将其收到的所有股息的全部税后收益进行再投资。公司的平均股权回报完全被通货膨胀征收的隐性资本税以及对股息和留存收益产生的价值增长征收的显性税所抵消。
As we said last year, Berkshire has no corporate solution to the problem. (We’ll say it again next year, too.) Inflation does not improve our return on equity.
正如我们去年所说，伯克希尔公司没有解决这个问题的企业方案。（明年我们还会再说一遍。）通货膨胀不会提高我们的股权回报率。
Indexing is the insulation that all seek against inflation. But the great bulk (although there are important exceptions) of corporate capital is not even partially indexed. Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are “saved” by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage “dividend”) and consistently add the other half (his “retained earnings”) to a savings account. Neither this high- saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed.
指数化是所有人寻求的对抗通货膨胀的屏障。但绝大部分（尽管存在重要的例外情况）公司资本甚至没有部分指数化。当然，如果公司“节省”了大量盈利，即再投资而不是作为股息支付，那么每股收益和股息通常会上涨。但即使没有通货膨胀，情况也是如此。同样，一个节俭的工薪阶层，即使从未获得加薪，也可以实现其总收入的定期年度增长——如果他愿意只拿一半的现金工资（他的工资“股息”），并始终将另一半（他的“留存收益”）添加到储蓄账户中。无论是这个高储蓄的工薪阶层，还是高储蓄公司的股东，其年度股息率上升而股本回报率保持不变，都不能算是真正的指数化。
For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital - employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don’t count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability. And Berkshire Hathaway isn’t one of them.
要使资本真正实现指数化，股本回报率必须上升，即企业盈利必须持续按与价格水平上涨成比例的速度增长，而无需 企业增加所使用的资本——包括营运资本。 （通过增加投资而产生的收益不算在内。）只有少数企业接近于表现出这种能力。而 Berkshire Hathaway 并不是其中之一。
We, of course, have a corporate policy of reinvesting earnings for growth, diversity and strength, which has the incidental effect of minimizing the current imposition of explicit taxes on our owners. However, on a day-by-day basis, you will be subjected to the implicit inflation tax, and when you wish to transfer your investment in Berkshire into another form of investment, or into consumption, you also will face explicit taxes.
当然，我们有一项公司政策，即将盈利再投资于增长、多元化和实力，这附带地减少了目前对我们所有者征收的显性税。然而，在日常生活中，您将受到隐性通货膨胀税的影响，当您希望将您在伯克希尔的投资转移到另一种投资形式或消费时，您也将面临显性税。
Sources of Earnings 盈利来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps, which in turn owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant capital gains and losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gains figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. Our calculation of operating earnings also excludes the gain from sale of Mutual’s branch offices. In this respect it differs from the presentation in our audited financial statements that includes this item in the calculation of “Earnings Before Realized Investment Gain”.
下表显示了伯克希尔公司报告的收益来源。伯克希尔拥有 Blue Chip Stamps 约 60% 的股份，而 Blue Chip Stamps 又拥有 Wesco Financial Corporation 80% 的股份。下表显示了各个业务实体的总收益，以及伯克希尔公司在这些收益中所占的份额。归属于任何业务实体的所有重大资本收益和损失都汇总在表底部的已实现证券收益数字中，不包括在运营收益中。我们对运营收益的计算也不包括出售 Mutual 分支机构的收益。在这方面，它与我们经审计的财务报表中的列报不同，后者将此项目包括在“已实现投资收益前的收益”的计算中。
Net Earnings Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax -------------------------------------- ------------------ Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ (in thousands of dollars) 1980 1979 1980 1979 1980 1979 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings - all entities $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== Earnings from Operations: Insurance Group: Underwriting ............ $ 6,738 $ 3,742 $ 6,737 $ 3,741 $ 3,637 $ 2,214 Net Investment Income ... 30,939 24,224 30,927 24,216 25,607 20,106 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (508) 1,723 (508) 1,723 202 848 Associated Retail Stores .. 2,440 2,775 2,440 2,775 1,169 1,280 See’s Candies ............. 15,031 12,785 8,958 7,598 4,212 3,448 Buffalo Evening News ...... (2,805) (4,617) (1,672) (2,744) (816) (1,333) Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 7,699 2,397 4,588 1,425 3,060 1,624 Illinois National Bank .... 5,324 5,747 5,200 5,614 4,731 5,027 Wesco Financial - Parent .. 2,916 2,413 1,392 1,098 1,044 937 Mutual Savings and Loan ... 5,814 10,447 2,775 4,751 1,974 3,261 Precision Steel ........... 2,833 3,254 1,352 1,480 656 723 Interest on Debt .......... (12,230) (8,248) (9,390) (5,860) (4,809) (2,900) Other ..................... 2,170 1,342 1,590 996 1,255 753 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings from Operations ........... $ 66,361 $ 57,984 $ 54,389 $ 46,813 $ 41,922 $ 35,988 Mutual Savings and Loan - sale of branches ....... 5,873 -- 2,803 -- 1,293 -- Realized Securities Gain .... 13,711 10,648 12,954 9,614 9,907 6,829 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings - all entities $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
净收益 税前利润 税后利润 -------------------------------------- ------------------ 总计 伯克希尔股份 伯克希尔股份 ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ （千美元） 1980 1979 1980 1979 1980 1979 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 所有实体总收益 $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 运营收益： 保险集团： 承保 ............ $ 6,738 $ 3,742 $ 6,737 $ 3,741 $ 3,637 $ 2,214 净投资收益 ... 30,939 24,224 30,927 24,216 25,607 20,106 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (508) 1,723 (508) 1,723 202 848 Associated Retail Stores .. 2,440 2,775 2,440 2,775 1,169 1,280 See’s Candies ............. 15,031 12,785 8,958 7,598 4,212 3,448 Buffalo Evening News ...... (2,805) (4,617) (1,672) (2,744) (816) (1,333) Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 7,699 2,397 4,588 1,425 3,060 1,624 Illinois National Bank .... 5,324 5,747 5,200 5,614 4,731 5,027 Wesco Financial - Parent .. 2,916 2,413 1,392 1,098 1,044 937 Mutual Savings and Loan ... 5,814 10,447 2,775 4,751 1,974 3,261 Precision Steel ........... 2,833 3,254 1,352 1,480 656 723 债务利息 .......... (12,230) (8,248) (9,390) (5,860) (4,809) (2,900) 其他 ..................... 2,170 1,342 1,590 996 1,255 753 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 运营总收益 ........... $ 66,361 $ 57,984 $ 54,389 $ 46,813 $ 41,922 $ 35,988 Mutual Savings and Loan - 分支机构出售 ....... 5,873 -- 2,803 -- 1,293 -- 已实现证券收益 .... 13,711 10,648 12,954 9,614 9,907 6,829 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 所有实体总收益 $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 40 to 53 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1980 operations. We recommend a careful reading, and suggest that you particularly note the superb job done by Louie Vincenti and Charlie Munger in repositioning Mutual Savings and Loan. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
蓝筹印花公司和 Wesco 公司都是上市公司，有各自的报告要求。在本报告的第 40 页至第 53 页，我们转载了两家公司主要负责人的叙述性报告，他们在报告中描述了 1980 年的运营情况。我们建议您仔细阅读，并特别注意 Louie Vincenti 和查理·芒格在重新定位 Mutual Savings and Loan 方面所做的出色工作。任何伯克希尔股东如需蓝筹印花公司或 Wesco 金融公司的完整年度报告副本，请分别致函 Mr. Robert H. Bird（地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040）或 Mrs. Bette Deckard（地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109）索取。
As indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income section of Insurance Group earnings.
如前所述，在我们不控制的公司中，未分配利润现在与前表中详述的已报告运营收益同样重要。当然，分配的部分主要通过保险集团收益的净投资收入部分进入该表。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our own earnings. No. of Shares Cost Market ------------- ---------- ---------- (000s omitted) 434,550 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ......... $ 2,821 $ 12,222 464,317 (a) Aluminum Company of America ........... 25,577 27,685 475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ......... 12,942 15,894 1,983,812 (b) General Foods, Inc. ................... 62,507 59,889 7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation ..................... 47,138 105,300 2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ........................ 21,825 58,435 711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .. 4,531 22,135 1,211,834 (a) Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ...... 20,629 27,569 282,500 (a) Media General ......................... 4,545 8,334 247,039 (b) National Detroit Corporation .......... 5,930 6,299 881,500 (a) National Student Marketing ............ 5,128 5,895 391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather Int’l. Inc. ........... 3,709 9,981 370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. ..................... 12,144 16,489 245,700 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries ............. 8,702 11,228 1,250,525 (b) SAFECO Corporation .................... 32,062 45,177 151,104 (b) The Times Mirror Company .............. 4,447 6,271 1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company ........... 10,628 42,277 667,124 (b) E W Woolworth Company ................. 13,583 16,511 ---------- ---------- $298,848 $497,591 All Other Common Stockholdings ........ 26,313 32,096 ---------- ---------- Total Common Stocks ................... $325,161 $529,687 ========== ==========
我们在下面列出了伯克希尔在那些非控股企业中的持股比例，这些企业的收益仅包括已分配收益（股息）。 股份数量 成本 市值 ------------- ---------- ---------- (单位：千) 434,550 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ......... $ 2,821 $ 12,222 464,317 (a) Aluminum Company of America ........... 25,577 27,685 475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ......... 12,942 15,894 1,983,812 (b) General Foods, Inc. ................... 62,507 59,889 7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation ..................... 47,138 105,300 2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ........................ 21,825 58,435 711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .. 4,531 22,135 1,211,834 (a) Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ...... 20,629 27,569 282,500 (a) Media General ......................... 4,545 8,334 247,039 (b) National Detroit Corporation .......... 5,930 6,299 881,500 (a) National Student Marketing ............ 5,128 5,895 391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather Int’l. Inc. ........... 3,709 9,981 370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. ..................... 12,144 16,489 245,700 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries ............. 8,702 11,228 1,250,525 (b) SAFECO Corporation .................... 32,062 45,177 151,104 (b) The Times Mirror Company .............. 4,447 6,271 1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company ........... 10,628 42,277 667,124 (b) E W Woolworth Company ................. 13,583 16,511 ---------- ---------- $298,848 $497,591 所有其他普通股持股........ 26,313 32,096 ---------- ---------- 普通股总计................... $325,161 $529,687 ========== ==========
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries. (b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All numbers represent Berkshire’s net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.
(a) 全部由伯克希尔或其保险子公司所有。(b) Blue Chip 和/或 Wesco 拥有这些公司的股份。所有数字代表伯克希尔在该集团较大总持股中的净权益。
From this table, you can see that our sources of underlying earning power are distributed far differently among industries than would superficially seem the case. For example, our insurance subsidiaries own approximately 3% of Kaiser Aluminum, and 1 1/4% of Alcoa. Our share of the 1980 earnings of those companies amounts to about $13 million. (If translated dollar for dollar into a combination of eventual market value gain and dividends, this figure would have to be reduced by a significant, but not precisely determinable, amount of tax; perhaps 25% would be a fair assumption.) Thus, we have a much larger economic interest in the aluminum business than in practically any of the operating businesses we control and on which we report in more detail. If we maintain our holdings, our long-term performance will be more affected by the future economics of the aluminum industry than it will by direct operating decisions we make concerning most companies over which we exercise managerial control.
从这张表中，你可以看到，我们潜在盈利能力的来源在行业中的分布与表面上看起来的情况大相径庭。例如，我们的保险子公司拥有大约 3%的 Kaiser Aluminum 和 1 1/4%的 Alcoa。我们从这些公司 1980 年的收益中所占的份额约为 1300 万美元。（如果将这些美元按一比一的比例转化为最终的市场价值增长和股息的组合，这个数字必须扣除一笔可观但无法精确确定的税款；也许 25%是一个合理的假设。）因此，我们在铝业中的经济利益比我们控制的几乎任何一家运营企业都要大得多，而我们对这些运营企业的报告更为详细。如果我们保持我们的持股，我们的长期业绩将更多地受到铝业未来经济状况的影响，而不是我们对我们行使管理控制权的大多数公司所做的直接运营决策的影响。
GEICO Corp.
Our largest non-controlled holding is 7.2 million shares of GEICO Corp., equal to about a 33% equity interest. Normally, an interest of this magnitude (over 20%) would qualify as an “investee” holding and would require us to reflect a proportionate share of GEICO’s earnings in our own. However, we purchased our GEICO stock pursuant to special orders of the District of Columbia and New York Insurance Departments, which required that the right to vote the stock be placed with an independent party. Absent the vote, our 33% interest does not qualify for investee treatment. (Pinkerton’s is a similar situation.)
我们最大的非控股权益是美国政府雇员保险公司（GEICO Corp.）的 720 万股股票，相当于约 33%的股权。通常，如此规模的权益（超过 20%）将符合“被投资”控股的资格，并将要求我们在自己的账目中反映 GEICO 的相应比例的收益。然而，我们购买 GEICO 的股票是根据哥伦比亚特区和纽约保险部门的特别命令进行的，该命令要求股票的投票权由独立方行使。由于没有投票权，我们 33%的权益不符合被投资待遇。（Pinkerton 的情况类似。）
Of course, whether or not the undistributed earnings of GEICO are picked up annually in our operating earnings figure has nothing to do with their economic value to us, or to you as owners of Berkshire. The value of these retained earnings will be determined by the skill with which they are put to use by GEICO management.
当然，GEICO 的未分配利润是否每年计入我们的运营收益数据，与它们对我们或您作为伯克希尔所有者的经济价值无关。这些留存收益的价值将取决于 GEICO 管理层运用它们的能力。
On this score, we simply couldn’t feel better. GEICO represents the best of all investment worlds - the coupling of a very important and very hard to duplicate business advantage with an extraordinary management whose skills in operations are matched by skills in capital allocation.
在这一点上，我们简直不能更满意了。GEICO 代表了所有投资领域中最好的情况——一个非常重要且难以复制的商业优势，加上一个非凡的管理团队，他们在运营方面的技能与在资本配置方面的技能相匹配。
As you can see, our holdings cost us $47 million, with about half of this amount invested in 1976 and most of the remainder invested in 1980. At the present dividend rate, our reported earnings from GEICO amount to a little over $3 million annually. But we estimate our share of its earning power is on the order of $20 million annually. Thus, undistributed earnings applicable to this holding alone may amount to 40% of total reported operating earnings of Berkshire.
正如您所看到的，我们的持股成本为 4700 万美元，其中约一半投资于 1976 年，其余大部分投资于 1980 年。按照目前的股息率，我们从 GEICO 获得的报告收益每年略高于 300 万美元。但我们估计我们所占的盈利能力约为每年 2000 万美元。因此，仅适用于该持股的未分配利润可能占伯克希尔报告的总运营收益的 40%。
We should emphasize that we feel as comfortable with GEICO management retaining an estimated $17 million of earnings applicable to our ownership as we would if that sum were in our own hands. In just the last two years GEICO, through repurchases of its own stock, has reduced the share equivalents it has outstanding from 34.2 million to 21.6 million, dramatically enhancing the interests of shareholders in a business that simply can’t be replicated. The owners could not have been better served.
我们想强调的是，我们认为，GEICO 管理层保留估计 1700 万美元的收益（归属于我们的所有权）与这笔钱掌握在我们自己手中一样令人安心。仅在过去两年中，GEICO 通过回购其自身股票，已将其流通的等效股份从 3420 万股减少至 2160 万股，从而大大增强了股东在一家根本无法复制的企业中的利益。所有者不可能得到更好的服务。
We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses. Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations. Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.
我们曾在过去的报告中写到，购买和运营“扭亏为盈”企业通常会令人失望。多年来，有人向我们描述了数十个行业中数百种扭亏为盈的可能性，并且无论是作为参与者还是观察者，我们都跟踪了业绩与预期之间的关系。我们的结论是，除了少数例外，当一位以才华着称的管理层着手处理一家以糟糕的基本经济状况而闻名的企业时，保持不变的仍然是该企业的声誉。
GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976. It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.
GEICO 可能看起来是一个例外，因为它在 1976 年从破产边缘扭转了局面。当然，它的复苏需要卓越的管理才能，而 Jack Byrne 在那一年到来时，充分提供了这种要素。
But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.
但同样真实的是，GEICO 曾经享有的根本性业务优势——这种优势以前曾带来惊人的成功——仍然完好无损地存在于公司内部，尽管它被淹没在金融和运营困境的海洋中。
GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation. Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself. For decades it had been run in just this manner. Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.
GEICO 的设计目标是在一个巨大的市场（汽车保险）中成为低成本运营者，这个市场主要由那些营销结构限制其适应能力的公司组成。如果按照设计运行，它可以在为客户提供非凡价值的同时，为自身赢得非凡的回报。几十年来，它一直以这种方式运营。它在 70 年代中期的困境并非源于这种基本经济优势的减弱或消失。
GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal. Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics. The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.
当时 GEICO 的问题使其处于类似于 1964 年美国运通在色拉油丑闻后的境地。两者都是独一无二的公司，暂时因财政打击的影响而步履蹒跚，但这并未摧毁其卓越的潜在经济状况。GEICO 和美国运通的情况，即具有局部可切除癌症（当然需要一位熟练的外科医生）的非凡商业特许经营权，应与真正的“扭亏为盈”情况区分开来，在后者中，管理人员期望 - 并且需要 - 完成企业版的皮格马利翁。
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company. A 100% interest of that kind gives the owner the options of leveraging the purchase, changing managements, directing cash flow, and selling the business. It may also provide some excitement around corporate headquarters (less frequently mentioned).
无论如何称呼，我们对我们持有的 GEICO 股份感到非常满意，如前所述，我们为此支付了 4700 万美元。如果必须通过谈判购买整个公司来实现，那么在一个具有一流经济特征和光明前景的企业中购买类似的 2000 万美元盈利能力，至少需要花费 2 亿美元（在某些行业中甚至更多）。这种 100% 的权益使所有者可以选择利用杠杆进行收购、更换管理层、指导现金流和出售业务。它也可能在公司总部周围提供一些刺激（较少被提及）。
We find it perfectly satisfying that the nature of our insurance business dictates we buy many minority portions of already well-run businesses (at prices far below our share of the total value of the entire business) that do not need management change, re-direction of cash flow, or sale. There aren’t many Jack Byrnes in the managerial world, or GEICOs in the business world. What could be better than buying into a partnership with both of them?
我们发现，我们的保险业务性质决定了我们购买许多已经运营良好的企业的少数股权（价格远低于我们所占整个企业总价值的份额），而这些企业不需要管理层变更、现金流重新导向或出售，这让我们非常满意。管理界没有多少 Jack Byrnes，商业界也没有多少 GEICO。有什么比与他们两者建立合作伙伴关系更好的呢？
Insurance Industry Conditions
保险业状况
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page 37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well- written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’s mailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
正如我们预期的那样，保险业的承保情况持续发展，综合成本率（参见第 37 页的定义）从 1979 年的 100.6 上升到 1980 年的估计 103.5。 几乎可以肯定的是，这种趋势将持续下去，并且 1981 年和 1982 年行业承保亏损将显著且逐步增加。 为了理解原因，我们建议您阅读 Chubb Corp.的 Barbara Stewart 在 1980 年 10 月的一篇论文中对财产-意外伤害竞争动态的出色分析。（Chubb 的年度报告始终如一地对行业状况进行最具洞察力、坦率和出色的讨论；您应该加入该公司的邮件列表。） Stewart 夫人的分析可能并不令人愉快，但我们认为它很可能是准确的。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
而且，不幸的是，一个在很大程度上未被报道但特别有害的问题很可能会延长和加剧即将到来的行业痛苦。 这不仅可能导致许多保险公司在承保亏损达到创纪录水平时争夺业务，而且还可能导致他们在这种时候加倍努力。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property- casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这个问题源于债券价格的下跌以及保险会计惯例，该惯例允许公司以摊余成本持有债券，而不管市场价值如何。 许多保险公司拥有长期债券，按摊余成本计算，相当于净资产的两到三倍。 当然，如果这个水平是三倍，那么债券价格从成本下降三分之一——如果要在账面上确认——将抹去净资产。 而且它们确实缩水了。 当债券持有量按市场价值计算时，一些最大和最著名的财产-意外伤害公司目前发现自己拥有名义上的，甚至是负的净资产。 当然，他们的债券价格可能会上涨，从而部分甚至完全恢复已公布净资产的完整性。 或者它们可能会进一步下跌。（我们认为对股票或债券价格的短期预测是无用的。 预测可能会告诉你很多关于预测者的信息；它们不会告诉你任何关于未来的信息。）
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
有些人可能会觉得奇怪，当一家保险公司的股票投资组合价格下跌到足以显著降低净资产时，其生存会受到威胁，但债券价格的更大跌幅却根本没有产生任何反应。 该行业会回应说，无论当前价格如何，债券将在到期时全额支付，从而最终消除任何期间价格下跌。 这种说法认为，可能需要二十年、三十年甚至四十年，但是，只要债券不必出售，最终它们都将值面值。 当然，如果它们被出售——即使它们被提供更好相对价值的类似债券所取代——损失必须立即入账。 并且，同样迅速地，已公布的净资产必须按损失金额向下调整。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses are in prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurers to shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，许多投资选择可能会消失，甚至几十年。例如，当预期会出现巨额承保亏损时，一些保险公司从免税债券转向应税债券可能在商业逻辑上是极好的。不愿承认重大债券损失可能是阻止这种明智之举的唯一因素。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policyholders and claimants (with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will if the volume of business declines significantly - assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if those assets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但是，大量未实现债券损失所产生的全部影响远比投资智慧的停滞更为严重。因为购买和 持有这些债券的资金来源是来自保单持有人和索赔人（面孔不断变化）的资金池——实际上，这笔钱是暂时存放在保险公司里的。只要这个资金池保持其规模，就不必出售债券。如果资金池萎缩——如果业务量大幅下降，资金池就会萎缩——则必须出售资产以偿还负债。如果这些资产由具有巨额未实现损失的债券组成，那么这些损失将迅速变为已实现损失，从而迅速削减净值。
Thus, an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced with inadequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
因此，一家债券市值缩水接近账面净值（现在有很多这样的公司），并且还面临着肯定会进一步恶化的不足费率水平的保险公司有两种选择。管理层的一种选择是告诉承销商继续根据所涉及的风险进行定价——“务必确保每花费一美元的费用成本加上预期的损失成本，就能获得一美元的保费”。
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be a lagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这项指令的后果是可以预见的：（a）由于大多数业务对价格敏感且每年续签，许多现有保单将在短期内流失给竞争对手；（b）随着保费收入大幅缩水，负债（未到期保费和应付赔款）将出现滞后但相应的减少；（c）必须出售资产（债券）以匹配负债的减少；以及（d）先前未确认的净资产消失将部分地在保险公司公布的财务报表中得到确认（取决于此类出售的程度）。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers - while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner in the long term.
这种令人沮丧的序列的变化会减少对已公布净资产的惩罚。一些公司在（c）的反应是出售已经按市场价值计价的股票，或者出售最近购买的损失较小的债券。这种鸵鸟式的行为——出售较好的资产，保留最大的亏损者——虽然在短期内痛苦较小，但长期来看不太可能成为赢家。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities - and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow” underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed “asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第二种选择要简单得多：只需继续承保业务，而不考虑费率水平和巨大的预期承保亏损，从而维持当前的保费、资产和负债水平——然后祈祷更好的日子，无论是承保还是债券价格。行业媒体对“现金流”承保有很多批评；即，不考虑预期的承保亏损而承保业务，以便获得资金以当前的高利率进行投资。第二种选择可以恰当地称为“资产维护”承保——接受糟糕的业务只是为了保留你现在拥有的资产。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a “sell-at-any-price” policy.
当然，你知道会选择哪个选项。而且也很清楚，只要许多大型保险公司觉得必须选择第二个选项，承保就不会有好日子。因为如果行业中的大部分公司觉得必须维持保费收入水平，而不考虑价格是否合理，那么所有保险公司都必须接近满足这些价格。仅次于自己出现财务问题，下一个最糟糕的困境是拥有一大群竞争对手，他们可以通过“不惜一切代价出售”的政策来推迟财务问题。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我们之前提到过，由于公众反应、机构自尊或保护既定净值等多种原因，不愿以迫使其确认重大损失的价格水平出售债券的公司，可能会发现自己被冻结在投资姿态中长达十年或更长时间。但是，正如所指出的，这只是问题的一半。对长期债券做出广泛承诺的公司 在相当长的一段时间内，可能不仅失去了许多 投资选择，而且失去了许多承销 选择。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)
就此而言，我们自身的情况令人满意。我们认为，以所有保险公司的债券按摊余成本估值计算，相对于保费收入而言，我们的净资产在所有大型财产意外险股东所有的集团中是最强的。如果债券按市场价值估值，我们的相对优势将更加显著。（但为了避免我们过于自满，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债到期日仍然比我们希望的更加不匹配，而且我们也因为你们的主席应该采取行动时却在说话，而在债券上损失了大量资金。）
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们充裕的资本和投资灵活性将使我们能够在预计的定价不足的延长时期内，做我们认为最有意义的任何事情。但行业的困境意味着我们的困境。我们的财务实力并不能使我们摆脱目前笼罩整个财产意外险行业的恶劣定价环境。它只是给了我们更多的持久力和更多的选择。
Insurance Operations 保险业务
The National Indemnity managers, led by Phil Liesche with the usual able assistance of Roland Miller and Bill Lyons, outdid themselves in 1980. While volume was flat, underwriting margins relative to the industry were at an all-time high. We expect decreased volume from this operation in 1981. But its managers will hear no complaints from corporate headquarters, nor will employment or salaries suffer. We enormously admire the National Indemnity underwriting discipline - embedded from origin by the founder, Jack Ringwalt - and know that this discipline, if suspended, probably could not be fully regained.
在 Roland Miller 和 Bill Lyons 一如既往的得力协助下，由 Phil Liesche 领导的 National Indemnity 经理们在 1980 年表现出色。虽然交易量持平，但相对于行业的承保利润率却达到了历史最高水平。我们预计 1981 年该业务的交易量将下降。但其经理们不会听到来自公司总部的任何抱怨，就业或薪资也不会受到影响。我们非常钦佩 National Indemnity 的承保纪律——由创始人 Jack Ringwalt 从一开始就确立的——并且知道这种纪律如果被暂停，可能无法完全恢复。
John Seward at Home and Auto continues to make good progress in replacing a diminishing number of auto policies with volume from less competitive lines, primarily small-premium general liability. Operations are being slowly expanded, both geographically and by product line, as warranted by underwriting results.
Home and Auto 的 John Seward 继续在以竞争较弱的险种（主要是小额保费一般责任险）的交易量取代数量不断减少的汽车保单方面取得良好进展。根据承保结果，业务正在缓慢扩张，包括地域和产品线。
The reinsurance business continues to reflect the excesses and problems of the primary writers. Worse yet, it has the potential for magnifying such excesses. Reinsurance is characterized by extreme ease of entry, large premium payments in advance, and much-delayed loss reports and loss payments. Initially, the morning mail brings lots of cash and few claims. This state of affairs can produce a blissful, almost euphoric, feeling akin to that experienced by an innocent upon receipt of his first credit card.
再保险业务继续反映了直接保险公司的过度行为和问题。更糟糕的是，它有可能放大这些过度行为。再保险的特点是极易进入、预先支付大量保费，以及延迟的损失报告和损失支付。最初，早上的邮件带来大量的现金和很少的索赔。这种状况会产生一种幸福的、几乎是欣快的感觉，类似于一个天真的人收到他的第一张信用卡时的感觉。
The magnetic lure of such cash-generating characteristics, currently enhanced by the presence of high interest rates, is transforming the reinsurance market into “amateur night”. Without a super catastrophe, industry underwriting will be poor in the next few years. If we experience such a catastrophe, there could be a bloodbath with some companies not able to live up to contractual commitments. George Young continues to do a first-class job for us in this business. Results, with investment income included, have been reasonably profitable. We will retain an active reinsurance presence but, for the foreseeable future, we expect no premium growth from this activity.
这种现金产生特性的磁性诱惑，目前因高利率的存在而得到加强，正在将再保险市场转变为“业余之夜”。如果没有超级灾难，未来几年行业的承保业绩将会很差。如果我们经历了这样的灾难，可能会出现一场血洗，一些公司将无法履行合同承诺。George Young 继续为我们在这项业务中做着一流的工作。包括投资收入在内，业绩一直相当盈利。我们将保持积极的再保险业务，但在可预见的未来，我们预计这项业务不会有保费增长。
We continue to have serious problems in the Homestate operation. Floyd Taylor in Kansas has done an outstanding job but our underwriting record elsewhere is considerably below average. Our poorest performer has been Insurance Company of Iowa, at which large losses have been sustained annually since its founding in 1973. Late in the fall we abandoned underwriting in that state, and have merged the company into Cornhusker Casualty. There is potential in the homestate concept, but much work needs to be done in order to realize it.
我们在 Homestate 的运营中仍然存在严重问题。堪萨斯州的 Floyd Taylor 做得非常出色，但我们在其他地方的承保记录远低于平均水平。我们表现最差的是 Iowa 保险公司，自 1973 年成立以来，该公司每年都遭受巨额损失。秋末，我们放弃了在该州的承保业务，并将该公司并入了 Cornhusker Casualty。Homestate 的概念具有潜力，但要实现这一目标还需要做很多工作。
Our Workers Compensation operation suffered a severe loss when Frank DeNardo died last year at 37. Frank instinctively thought like an underwriter. He was a superb technician and a fierce competitor; in short order he had straightened out major problems at the California Workers Compensation Division of National Indemnity. Dan Grossman, who originally brought Frank to us, stepped in immediately after Frank’s death to continue that operation, which now utilizes Redwood Fire and Casualty, another Berkshire subsidiary, as the insuring vehicle.
我们的 Workers Compensation 业务遭受了严重的损失，Frank DeNardo 去年去世，年仅 37 岁。Frank 本能地像一个承保人一样思考。他是一位出色的技术人员和一位激烈的竞争者；很快，他就解决了 National Indemnity 加州 Workers Compensation Division 的重大问题。最初将 Frank 带到我们这里的 Dan Grossman 在 Frank 去世后立即介入，继续运营该业务，该业务现在使用 Berkshire 的另一家子公司 Redwood Fire and Casualty 作为保险工具。
Our major Workers Compensation operation, Cypress Insurance Company, run by Milt Thornton, continues its outstanding record. Year after year Milt, like Phil Liesche, runs an underwriting operation that far outpaces his competition. In the industry he is admired and copied, but not matched.
我们主要的工人赔偿业务，由 Milt Thornton 管理的 Cypress Insurance Company，继续保持其卓越的记录。年复一年，Milt 像 Phil Liesche 一样，运营着一个远远超过竞争对手的承保业务。他在业内备受钦佩和模仿，但无人能及。
Overall, we look for a significant decline in insurance volume in 1981 along with a poorer underwriting result. We expect underwriting experience somewhat superior to that of the industry but, of course, so does most of the industry. There will be some disappointments.
总体而言，我们预计 1981 年的保险业务量将大幅下降，同时承保业绩也会变差。我们预计承保经验会略优于行业水平，但当然，大多数业内人士也这么认为。届时会有一些失望。
Textile and Retail Operations
纺织及零售业务
During the past year we have cut back the scope of our textile business. Operations at Waumbec Mills have been terminated, reluctantly but necessarily. Some equipment was transferred to New Bedford but most has been sold, or will be, along with real estate. Your Chairman made a costly mistake in not facing the realities of this situation sooner.
在过去的一年中，我们缩减了纺织业务的范围。Waumbec Mills 的运营已经终止，这是无奈但必要的。一些设备已转移到新贝德福德，但大部分设备以及房地产已经或将被出售。贵公司董事长犯了一个代价高昂的错误，没有早点面对这种情况的现实。
At New Bedford we have reduced the number of looms operated by about one-third, abandoning some high-volume lines in which product differentiation was insignificant. Even assuming everything went right - which it seldom did - these lines could not generate adequate returns related to investment. And, over a full industry cycle, losses were the most likely result.
在新贝德福德，我们将运营的织机数量减少了约三分之一，放弃了一些产品差异不显著的大批量生产线。即使假设一切顺利——这种情况很少发生——这些生产线也无法产生与投资相关的足够回报。而且，在一个完整的行业周期中，最可能的结果是亏损。
Our remaining textile operation, still sizable, has been divided into a manufacturing and a sales division, each free to do business independent of the other. Thus, distribution strengths and mill capabilities will not be wedded to each other. We have more than doubled capacity in our most profitable textile segment through a recent purchase of used 130-inch Saurer looms. Current conditions indicate another tough year in textiles, but with substantially less capital employed in the operation.
我们剩余的纺织业务规模仍然很大，已分为制造和销售部门，每个部门都可以独立开展业务。因此，分销优势和工厂产能不会相互捆绑。通过最近购买的二手 130 英寸 Saurer 织机，我们最具盈利能力的纺织品部门的产能增加了一倍以上。目前的状况表明，纺织品行业又将迎来艰难的一年，但该业务所使用的资本将大大减少。
Ben Rosner’s record at Associated Retail Stores continues to amaze us. In a poor retailing year, Associated’s earnings continued excellent - and those earnings all were translated into cash. On March 7, 1981 Associated will celebrate its 50th birthday. Ben has run the business (along with Leo Simon, his partner from 1931 to 1966) in each of those fifty years.
Ben Rosner 在 Associated Retail Stores 的业绩继续让我们感到惊讶。在零售业不景气的一年里，Associated 的盈利依然出色——而且所有这些盈利都转化为现金。1981 年 3 月 7 日，Associated 将庆祝其成立 50 周年。在这五十年里，Ben 一直在经营这家公司（与他的合伙人 Leo Simon 一起，从 1931 年到 1966 年）。
Disposition of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford
处置伊利诺伊州罗克福德国民银行及信托公司
On December 31, 1980 we completed the exchange of 41,086 shares of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (which owns 97.7% of Illinois National Bank) for a like number of shares of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
1980 年 12 月 31 日，我们完成了 41,086 股 Rockford Bancorp Inc.（拥有 Illinois National Bank 97.7% 的股份）与相同数量的 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 股份的交换。
Our method of exchange allowed all Berkshire shareholders to maintain their proportional interest in the Bank (except for me; I was permitted 80% of my proportional share). They were thus guaranteed an ownership position identical to that they would have attained had we followed a more conventional spinoff approach. Twenty-four shareholders (of our approximate 1300) chose this proportional exchange option.
我们的交换方法允许所有 Berkshire 股东保持其在银行中的比例权益（除了我；我被允许持有我比例份额的 80%）。因此，他们被保证获得与我们采用更传统的剥离方法所获得的相同的股权地位。大约 1300 名股东中的 24 名选择了这种比例交换方案。
We also allowed overexchanges, and thirty-nine additional shareholders accepted this option, thereby increasing their ownership in the Bank and decreasing their proportional ownership in Berkshire. All got the full amount of Bancorp stock they requested, since the total shares desired by these thirty-nine holders was just slightly less than the number left available by the remaining 1200-plus holders of Berkshire who elected not to part with any Berkshire shares at all. As the exchanger of last resort, I took the small balance (3% of Bancorp’s stock). These shares, added to shares I received from my basic exchange allotment (80% of normal), gave me a slightly reduced proportional interest in the Bank and a slightly enlarged proportional interest in Berkshire.
我们还允许了超额兑换，又有 39 位股东接受了这一选择，从而增加了他们在银行中的所有权，并减少了他们在伯克希尔中的比例所有权。所有人都获得了他们要求的全部 Bancorp 股票，因为这 39 位股东要求的股票总数略低于剩余的 1200 多位选择不放弃任何伯克希尔股票的股东所剩余的股票数量。作为最后的兑换人，我获得了少量余额（占 Bancorp 股票的 3%）。这些股票加上我从基本兑换配额中获得的股票（正常情况下的 80%），使我在银行中的比例权益略有减少，而在伯克希尔中的比例权益略有增加。
Management of the Bank is pleased with the outcome. Bancorp will operate as an inexpensive and uncomplicated holding company owned by 65 shareholders. And all of those shareholders will have become Bancorp owners through a conscious affirmative decision.
银行的管理层对结果感到满意。Bancorp 将作为一个由 65 位股东拥有的廉价且简单的控股公司运营。而且所有这些股东都将通过有意识的肯定性决定成为 Bancorp 的所有者。
Financing 融资
In August we sold $60 million of 12 3/4% notes due August 1, 2005, with a sinking fund to begin in 1991.
8 月份，我们出售了 6000 万美元的 12 3/4% 的票据，该票据将于 2005 年 8 月 1 日到期，偿债基金将于 1991 年开始。
The managing underwriters, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, represented by Bill Fisher, and Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc., represented by Charlie Heider, did an absolutely first-class job from start to finish of the financing.
主承销商 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation（由 Bill Fisher 代表）和 Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc.（由 Charlie Heider 代表）从融资的开始到结束都出色地完成了工作。
Unlike most businesses, Berkshire did not finance because of any specific immediate needs. Rather, we borrowed because we think that, over a period far shorter than the life of the loan, we will have many opportunities to put the money to good use. The most attractive opportunities may present themselves at a time when credit is extremely expensive - or even unavailable. At such a time we want to have plenty of financial firepower.
与大多数企业不同，伯克希尔的融资并非出于任何特定的直接需求。相反，我们借款是因为我们认为，在远短于贷款期限的时间内，我们将有很多机会可以很好地利用这笔资金。最具吸引力的机会可能会出现在信贷极其昂贵甚至无法获得的时候。在那个时候，我们希望拥有充足的财务实力。
Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage- like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.
我们的收购偏好倾向于产生现金的企业，而不是消耗现金的企业。随着通货膨胀加剧，越来越多的公司发现，它们必须花费所有内部产生的资金，才能维持其现有的实际业务量。这种运营具有某种海市蜃楼般的性质。无论盈利数字多么诱人，我们仍然对那些似乎永远无法将这些漂亮的数字转化为无附加条件的现金的企业持谨慎态度。
Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we’ll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire’s growth.
符合我们标准的企业并不容易找到。（每年我们都会读到数百起公司收购案；但只有少数会引起我们的兴趣。）而且，我们目前业务的合理扩张也不容易实施。但我们将继续利用这两种途径，努力进一步促进伯克希尔的增长。
Under all circumstances we plan to operate with plenty of liquidity, with debt that is moderate in size and properly structured, and with an abundance of capital strength. Our return on equity is penalized somewhat by this conservative approach, but it is the only one with which we feel comfortable.
在任何情况下，我们都计划以充足的流动性、适度规模且结构合理的债务以及充裕的资本实力来运营。由于这种保守的做法，我们的股本回报率受到了一定的影响，但这是我们唯一感到舒适的做法。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Gene Abegg, founder of our long-owned bank in Rockford, died on July 2, 1980 at the age of 82. As a friend, banker and citizen, he was unsurpassed.
我们长期持有的位于罗克福德的银行的创始人 Gene Abegg 于 1980 年 7 月 2 日去世，享年 82 岁。作为朋友、银行家和公民，他都是无与伦比的。
You learn a great deal about a person when you purchase a business from him and he then stays on to run it as an employee rather than as an owner. Before the purchase the seller knows the business intimately, whereas you start from scratch. The seller has dozens of opportunities to mislead the buyer - through omissions, ambiguities, and misdirection. After the check has changed hands, subtle (and not so subtle) changes of attitude can occur and implicit understandings can evaporate. As in the courtship-marriage sequence, disappointments are not infrequent.
当你从一个人那里购买一项业务，然后他作为雇员而不是所有者留下来经营时，你会对这个人了解很多。在购买之前，卖方非常了解这项业务，而你则从头开始。卖方有无数机会误导买方——通过遗漏、含糊不清和误导。支票兑现后，可能会发生微妙（和不那么微妙）的态度变化，并且隐含的理解可能会消失。就像求爱-结婚的顺序一样，失望并不少见。
From the time we first met, Gene shot straight 100% of the time - the only behavior pattern he had within him. At the outset of negotiations, he laid all negative factors face up on the table; on the other hand, for years after the transaction was completed he would tell me periodically of some previously undiscussed items of value that had come with our purchase.
从我们第一次见面开始，Gene 一直都是 100%坦诚的——这是他唯一的行为模式。在谈判开始时，他将所有负面因素都摆在桌面上；另一方面，在交易完成后多年，他会定期告诉我一些先前未讨论过的、随我们购买而来的有价值的物品。
Though he was already 71 years of age when he sold us the Bank, Gene subsequently worked harder for us than he had for himself. He never delayed reporting a problem for a minute, but problems were few with Gene. What else would you expect from a man who, at the time of the bank holiday in 1933, had enough cash on the premises to pay all depositors in full? Gene never forgot he was handling other people’s money. Though this fiduciary attitude was always dominant, his superb managerial skills enabled the Bank to regularly achieve the top position nationally in profitability.
虽然他在将银行卖给我们时已经 71 岁了，但 Gene 后来为我们工作比为自己工作更努力。他从不拖延报告问题，但 Gene 的问题很少。你还能期望从一个在 1933 年银行假日期间，有足够的现金在场所内全额支付所有储户的人那里得到什么呢？Gene 从未忘记他是在处理别人的钱。虽然这种信托态度始终占据主导地位，但他精湛的管理技能使银行在盈利能力方面定期在全国名列前茅。
Gene was in charge of the Illinois National for close to fifty years - almost one-quarter of the lifetime of our country. George Mead, a wealthy industrialist, brought him in from Chicago to open a new bank after a number of other banks in Rockford had failed. Mr. Mead put up the money and Gene ran the show. His talent for leadership soon put its stamp on virtually every major civic activity in Rockford.
Gene 掌管 Illinois National 近五十年——几乎占我们国家历史的四分之一。一位富有的实业家 George Mead 将他从芝加哥带到这里，在 Rockford 的多家银行倒闭后开设一家新银行。Mead 先生出资，Gene 负责运营。他卓越的领导才能很快就在 Rockford 的几乎所有主要社会活动中留下了印记。
Dozens of Rockford citizens have told me over the years of help Gene extended to them. In some cases this help was financial; in all cases it involved much wisdom, empathy and friendship. He always offered the same to me. Because of our respective ages and positions I was sometimes the junior partner, sometimes the senior. Whichever the relationship, it always was a special one, and I miss it.
多年来，许多 Rockford 市民都告诉过我 Gene 给予他们的帮助。在某些情况下，这种帮助是经济上的；但在所有情况下，都包含着智慧、同情和友谊。他总是以同样的方式对待我。由于我们各自的年龄和职位，我有时是 младший партнёр，有时是 старший партнёр。无论是什么关系，这始终是一种特殊的关系，我怀念它。
Warren E. Buffett February 27, 1981 Chairman of the Board
Warren E. Buffett 1981 年 2 月 27 日 董事会主席