BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Operating earnings improved to $41.9 million in 1980 from $36.0 million in 1979, but return on beginning equity capital (with securities valued at cost) fell to 17.8% from 18.6%. We believe the latter yardstick to be the most appropriate measure of single-year managerial economic performance. Informed use of that yardstick, however, requires an understanding of many factors, including accounting policies, historical carrying values of assets, financial leverage, and industry conditions.
营业利润由1979年的3600万美元增长至1980年的4190万美元，但以证券按成本计价的年初股本回报率从18.6%下降至17.8%。我们认为，后者是衡量单一年度管理层经济业绩最合适的标准。然而，合理使用这一标准需要理解许多因素，包括会计政策、资产的历史账面价值、财务杠杆以及行业状况。
In your evaluation of our economic performance, we suggest that two factors should receive your special attention - one of a positive nature peculiar, to a large extent, to our own operation, and one of a negative nature applicable to corporate performance generally. Let’s look at the bright side first.
在您评估我们的经济业绩时，我们建议您特别关注两个因素——其中一个是积极因素，在很大程度上是我们自身经营的特殊性，另一个是消极因素，普遍适用于企业业绩。让我们先看看积极的一面。
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings
非控股所有权收益
When one company owns part of another company, appropriate accounting procedures pertaining to that ownership interest must be selected from one of three major categories. The percentage of voting stock that is owned, in large part, determines which category of accounting principles should be utilized.
当一家公司持有另一家公司的部分股份时，关于该持股权益的适当会计处理方法必须从三大类中选择。所持有的有表决权股份的比例，在很大程度上决定了应采用哪一类会计原则。
Generally accepted accounting principles require (subject to exceptions, naturally, as with our former bank subsidiary) full consolidation of sales, expenses, taxes, and earnings of business holdings more than 50% owned. Blue Chip Stamps, 60% owned by Berkshire Hathaway Inc., falls into this category. Therefore, all Blue Chip income and expense items are included in full in Berkshire’s Consolidated Statement of Earnings, with the 40% ownership interest of others in Blue Chip’s net earnings reflected in the Statement as a deduction for “minority interest”.
公认会计准则要求（当然有例外情况，比如我们以前的银行子公司）对持股超过 50%的业务进行销售、费用、税收和收益的全面合并。Blue Chip Stamps，由伯克希尔哈撒韦公司持有 60%股份，属于这一类别。因此，Blue Chip 的所有收入和支出项目都被全部计入伯克希尔的合并收益表中，其他人对 Blue Chip 40%所有权的净收益部分则在收益表中以“少数股东权益”扣除的方式反映。
Full inclusion of underlying earnings from another class of holdings, companies owned 20% to 50% (usually called “investees”), also normally occurs. Earnings from such companies - for example, Wesco Financial, controlled by Berkshire but only 48% owned - are included via a one-line entry in the owner’s Statement of Earnings. Unlike the over-50% category, all items of revenue and expense are omitted; just the proportional share of net income is included. Thus, if Corporation A owns one-third of Corporation B, one-third of B’s earnings, whether or not distributed by B, will end up in A’s earnings. There are some modifications, both in this and the over-50% category, for intercorporate taxes and purchase price adjustments, the explanation of which we will save for a later day. (We know you can hardly wait.)
对另一类持股公司（持股比例为 20%至 50%，通常称为“被投资公司”）的基础收益也通常会被全部计入。例如，Wesco Financial 由伯克希尔控股但仅持有 48%股份，其收益会通过业主收益表中的一行条目计入。与持股超过 50%的类别不同，所有收入和支出项目都被省略；只计入按比例分配的净收益。因此，如果 A 公司持有 B 公司三分之一的股份，无论 B 公司是否分配收益，B 公司三分之一的收益最终都会计入 A 公司的收益。在这一类别和持股超过 50%的类别中，对于公司间税收和购买价格调整有一些修正，相关解释我们以后再详细说明。（我们知道你已经迫不及待了。）
Finally come holdings representing less than 20% ownership of another corporation’s voting securities. In these cases, accounting rules dictate that the owning companies include in their earnings only dividends received from such holdings. Undistributed earnings are ignored. Thus, should we own 10% of Corporation X with earnings of $10 million in 1980, we would report in our earnings (ignoring relatively minor taxes on intercorporate dividends) either (a) $1 million if X declared the full $10 million in dividends; (b) $500,000 if X paid out 50%, or $5 million, in dividends; or (c) zero if X reinvested all earnings.
最后是持有另一家公司投票权证券少于 20%的股份。在这种情况下，会计规则规定，持股公司只能将从这些持股中收到的股息计入其收益。未分配的收益则被忽略。因此，如果我们持有 X 公司 10%的股份，而 X 公司在 1980 年的收益为 1,000 万美元，我们在收益中报告的金额（忽略公司间股息的相对较小的税收）将是：（a）如果 X 公司将全部 1,000 万美元作为股息分配，我们报告 100 万美元；（b）如果 X 公司分配了 50%，即 500 万美元作为股息，我们报告 50 万美元；（c）如果 X 公司将全部收益再投资，我们报告为零。
We impose this short - and over-simplified - course in accounting upon you because Berkshire’s concentration of resources in the insurance field produces a corresponding concentration of its assets in companies in that third (less than 20% owned) category. Many of these companies pay out relatively small proportions of their earnings in dividends. This means that only a small proportion of their current earning power is recorded in our own current operating earnings. But, while our reported operating earnings reflect only the dividends received from such companies, our economic well-being is determined by their earnings, not their dividends.
我们之所以向您简要且过于简化地介绍会计知识，是因为伯克希尔将资源集中在保险领域，导致其资产也相应集中在第三类（持股比例低于20%）公司中。这些公司中有许多只将相对较小比例的利润以股息形式分配。这意味着，我们当前经营收益中只记录了它们当前盈利能力的一小部分。但虽然我们的报告经营收益只反映了从这些公司收到的股息，我们的经济状况却取决于它们的盈利能力，而不是它们的分红。
Our holdings in this third category of companies have increased dramatically in recent years as our insurance business has prospered and as securities markets have presented particularly attractive opportunities in the common stock area. The large increase in such holdings, plus the growth of earnings experienced by those partially-owned companies, has produced an unusual result; the part of “our” earnings that these companies retained last year (the part not paid to us in dividends) exceeded the total reported annual operating earnings of Berkshire Hathaway. Thus, conventional accounting only allows less than half of our earnings “iceberg” to appear above the surface, in plain view. Within the corporate world such a result is quite rare; in our case it is likely to be recurring.
近年来，随着我们的保险业务蒸蒸日上，以及证券市场在普通股领域提供了极具吸引力的机会，我们在第三类公司的持股大幅增加。这类持股的大幅增长，加上这些部分持股公司的盈利增长，带来了一个不同寻常的结果：去年这些公司为我们保留的“我们的”收益（即未以分红形式支付给我们的部分）超过了伯克希尔·哈撒韦报告的年度总经营收益。因此，传统会计只允许不到我们收益“冰山”一半的部分浮现在水面上，清晰可见。在企业界，这样的结果相当罕见；而对我们来说，这种情况很可能会持续出现。
Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it’s much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules. The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The “control” was theoretical. Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur. But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.
我们对收益实际情况的分析与公认会计准则有所不同，尤其是在必须将这些准则应用于高通胀和通胀不确定的环境下。（但批评这些会计规则远比改进它们要容易得多。其固有的问题极为巨大。）我们曾经全资拥有一些企业，虽然从会计角度看我们完全控制了它们的收益分配，但这些企业的报告收益对我们来说每一美元并不值一美元。（这种“控制”只是理论上的。除非我们将所有收益再投资，否则现有资产的价值会大幅缩水。但这些再投资的收益却远远达不到资本的市场回报率。）我们也曾持有一些具有极佳再投资机会的企业的小部分股份，这些企业的留存收益对我们来说，其经济价值远远超过每一美元一美元的账面价值。
The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside. Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage. This is true whether we determine the usage, or whether managers we did not hire - but did elect to join - determine that usage. (It’s the act that counts, not the actors.) And the value is in no way affected by the inclusion or non-inclusion of those retained earnings in our own reported operating earnings. If a tree grows in a forest partially owned by us, but we don’t record the growth in our financial statements, we still own part of the tree.
伯克希尔哈撒韦留存收益的价值并不是 取决于我们拥有该公司100%、50%、20%还是1%的股份 它们所处企业的价值。相反，这些 留存收益的价值取决于其被用于何种用途 以及该用途随后所产生的收益水平。 无论是我们决定如何使用，还是由我们没有雇佣但选择加入的管理者决定如何使用， 这一点都同样适用。 （重要的是行为本身，而不是行为者。）价值就在于 无论是否包含这些内容，都不会产生任何影响 将留存收益计入我们自身报告的营业收益中。如果一 一棵树在我们部分拥有的森林中生长，但我们并未记录 我们财务报表中的增长，实际上我们仍然拥有这棵 树的一部分。
Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional. But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management - even if we are that management.
我们要提醒你，我们的观点并不传统。但我们宁愿让那些没有在会计上获得确认的收益，由我们只持有10%股份、且并非我们亲自聘用的管理层善加利用，也不愿让那些已经获得会计确认的收益，被另一家管理层（即使那管理层是我们自己）投入到前景更为可疑的项目中。
(We can’t resist pausing here for a short commercial. One usage of retained earnings we often greet with special enthusiasm when practiced by companies in which we have an investment interest is repurchase of their own shares. The reasoning is simple: if a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full - frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security markets often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own businesses at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise.)
（我们忍不住要在这里插播一则简短的广告。当我们所投资的公司用留存收益回购自家股票时，我们常常会特别欢迎。原因很简单：如果一家优秀企业在市场上的股价远低于其内在价值，还有什么比以如此低廉的价格大幅提升所有股东权益更确定、更有利可图的资本运用方式呢？企业收购活动的竞争性几乎保证了在收购另一家企业全部所有权时需要支付全价——甚至常常是溢价。但证券市场的拍卖特性却常常让管理优良的公司有机会以不到通过协商收购另一企业同等盈利能力所需价格的一半，回购自家部分股份。）
Long-Term Corporate Results
长期公司业绩
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value.
正如我们所提到的，我们通过将营业收益与以成本计价的股东权益进行比较，来评估公司单一年度的业绩。然而，我们衡量长期业绩的标准则包括所有资本收益或损失，无论是已实现的还是未实现的。我们依然能够实现远高于我们年度平均回报的长期股本回报率。导致这一令人满意结果的主要因素很简单：我们之前提到的那些非控股投资的留存收益已经转化为市值的增长。
Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings.
当然，将留存收益转化为市价升值的过程是极不均衡的（有些年份甚至会出现相反的情况），其时机难以预测，也不太可能以一美元对一美元的精确比例实现。而且，如果以一个愚蠢的价格购买了一家公司的股票，即使该公司十年来持续留存收益，这种效果也可能被抵消。但当购买价格合理时，市场对留存收益积累的长期认可几乎肯定会发生。你甚至会周期性地获得一些“蛋糕上的糖霜”，即市价升值远远超过买入后期间的留存收益。
In the sixteen years since present management assumed responsibility for Berkshire, book value per share with insurance-held equities valued at market has increased from $19.46 to $400.80, or 20.5% compounded annually. (You’ve done better: the value of the mineral content in the human body compounded at 22% annually during the past decade.) It is encouraging, moreover, to realize that our record was achieved despite many mistakes. The list is too painful and lengthy to detail here. But it clearly shows that a reasonably competitive corporate batting average can be achieved in spite of a lot of managerial strikeouts.
自现任管理层接管伯克希尔以来的十六年间，每股账面价值（以保险持有的股票按市价计算）已从19.46美元增长到400.80美元，年复合增长率为20.5%。（你们的表现更好：过去十年里，人体内矿物质的价值年复合增长率为22%。）更令人鼓舞的是，我们的业绩是在犯下许多错误的情况下取得的。这个清单太痛苦也太长，无法在这里详细列举。但这清楚地表明，尽管管理层有很多失误，公司依然可以取得相当有竞争力的整体业绩。
Our insurance companies will continue to make large investments in well-run, favorably-situated, non-controlled companies that very often will pay out in dividends only small proportions of their earnings. Following this policy, we would expect our long-term returns to continue to exceed the returns derived annually from reported operating earnings. Our confidence in this belief can easily be quantified: if we were to sell the equities that we hold and replace them with long-term tax-free bonds, our reported operating earnings would rise immediately by over $30 million annually. Such a shift tempts us not at all.
我们的保险公司将继续对管理良好、处于有利地位且我们不控股的公司进行大量投资，这些公司通常只会将其盈利的一小部分以股息形式分配。遵循这一政策，我们预计我们的长期回报将继续超过每年报告的经营收益所带来的回报。我们对这一信念的信心可以很容易地量化：如果我们出售所持有的股票，并用长期免税债券替代，我们的报告经营收益每年将立即增加三千多万美元。这样的转变对我们毫无吸引力。
So much for the good news.
好消息就说到这里。
Results for Owners 股东回报
Unfortunately, earnings reported in corporate financial statements are no longer the dominant variable that determines whether there are any real earnings for you, the owner. For only gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forego ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars. You may feel richer, but you won’t eat richer.
不幸的是，公司财务报表中报告的收益已不再是决定你——作为所有者——是否真正获得收益的主导因素。只有购买力的增长才代表投资的实际收益。如果你（a）放弃了十个汉堡来购买一项投资；（b）收到的股息在扣税后只能买两个汉堡；（c）出售持有的投资后，扣税所得只能买八个汉堡；那么（d）无论你的投资在美元上升值了多少，你都没有从中获得实际收入。你可能感觉自己更富有了，但你的生活水平并没有提高。
High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners. This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years. The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.
高通胀率对资本形成了一种税收，使得许多公司投资变得不明智——至少如果以为所有者带来正实际投资回报为标准来衡量的话。近年来，这一“门槛收益率”——公司必须实现的股本回报率，才能为个人所有者带来任何实际回报——已经大幅上升。现在，普通纳税投资者正逆着加速上行的自动扶梯奔跑，结果是他的进步几乎为零。
For example, in a world of 12% inflation a business earning 20% on equity (which very few manage consistently to do) and distributing it all to individuals in the 50% bracket is chewing up their real capital, not enhancing it. (Half of the 20% will go for income tax; the remaining 10% leaves the owners of the business with only 98% of the purchasing power they possessed at the start of the year - even though they have not spent a penny of their “earnings”). The investors in this bracket would actually be better off with a combination of stable prices and corporate earnings on equity capital of only a few per cent.
例如，在一个通货膨胀率为12%的世界里，一家企业如果能在股本上获得20%的收益（实际上很少有企业能持续做到这一点），并将全部收益分配给处于50%税率档的个人，那么这些个人实际上是在消耗他们的实际资本，而不是增加它。（20%的收益中有一半要用于所得税；剩下的10%让企业所有者在年初时只剩下98%的购买力——即使他们一分钱“收益”都没花。）对于这个税率档的投资者来说，如果价格稳定、企业股本收益率只有几个百分点，他们的实际情况反而会更好。
Explicit income taxes alone, unaccompanied by any implicit inflation tax, never can turn a positive corporate return into a negative owner return. (Even if there were 90% personal income tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, some real income would be left for the owner at a zero inflation rate.) But the inflation tax is not limited by reported income. Inflation rates not far from those recently experienced can turn the level of positive returns achieved by a majority of corporations into negative returns for all owners, including those not required to pay explicit taxes. (For example, if inflation reached 16%, owners of the 60% plus of corporate America earning less than this rate of return would be realizing a negative real return - even if income taxes on dividends and capital gains were eliminated.)
仅有明确的所得税，而没有任何隐含的通胀税，永远无法将企业的正回报变为所有者的负回报。（即使对红利和资本利得征收90%的个人所得税，在零通胀率下，所有者仍会有一些实际收入。）但通胀税并不受报告收入的限制。不久前经历过的通胀率，就足以让大多数企业实现的正回报变成所有所有者的负回报，包括那些无需缴纳明确税收的人。（例如，如果通胀率达到16%，美国60%以上回报率低于这一水平的企业的所有者，即使取消了红利和资本利得的所得税，也会获得负的实际回报。）
Of course, the two forms of taxation co-exist and interact since explicit taxes are levied on nominal, not real, income. Thus you pay income taxes on what would be deficits if returns to stockholders were measured in constant dollars.
当然，这两种税收形式是共存并相互作用的，因为明确税收是针对名义收入而非实际收入征收的。因此，如果以不变币值衡量股东回报，你实际上是在为本应是赤字的部分缴纳所得税。
At present inflation rates, we believe individual owners in medium or high tax brackets (as distinguished from tax-free entities such as pension funds, eleemosynary institutions, etc.) should expect no real long-term return from the average American corporation, even though these individuals reinvest the entire after-tax proceeds from all dividends they receive. The average return on equity of corporations is fully offset by the combination of the implicit tax on capital levied by inflation and the explicit taxes levied both on dividends and gains in value produced by retained earnings.
以目前的通货膨胀率来看，我们认为处于中高税率等级的个人所有者（与免税实体如养老基金、慈善机构等不同）即使将其收到的所有股息税后收益全部再投资，也不应期望从普通美国公司获得任何实际的长期回报。企业的平均股本回报率完全被通货膨胀带来的隐性资本税，以及对股息和由留存收益产生的价值增长征收的显性税收所抵消。
As we said last year, Berkshire has no corporate solution to the problem. (We’ll say it again next year, too.) Inflation does not improve our return on equity.
正如我们去年所说，伯克希尔对此问题没有企业层面的解决方案。（明年我们还会再说一遍。）通货膨胀并不会提升我们的股本回报率。
Indexing is the insulation that all seek against inflation. But the great bulk (although there are important exceptions) of corporate capital is not even partially indexed. Of course, earnings and dividends per share usually will rise if significant earnings are “saved” by a corporation; i.e., reinvested instead of paid as dividends. But that would be true without inflation. A thrifty wage earner, likewise, could achieve regular annual increases in his total income without ever getting a pay increase - if he were willing to take only half of his paycheck in cash (his wage “dividend”) and consistently add the other half (his “retained earnings”) to a savings account. Neither this high- saving wage earner nor the stockholder in a high-saving corporation whose annual dividend rate increases while its rate of return on equity remains flat is truly indexed.
指数化是所有人都在寻求的对抗通胀的保护措施。但绝大多数（尽管有一些重要的例外）企业资本甚至没有实现部分指数化。当然，如果企业将大量收益“储存”下来，也就是将其再投资而不是作为股息发放，每股收益和股息通常会增加。但即使没有通胀，这种情况也会发生。同样，一个节俭的工薪阶层也可以在从未获得加薪的情况下，实现其总收入的定期年度增长—— 如果他愿意只拿一半工资作为现金（他的工资“股息”），并始终将另一半（他的“留存收益”）存入储蓄账户。无论是这种高储蓄的工薪阶层，还是年股息率上升但股本回报率保持不变的高储蓄企业的股东，都没有真正实现指数化。
For capital to be truly indexed, return on equity must rise, i.e., business earnings consistently must increase in proportion to the increase in the price level without any need for the business to add to capital - including working capital - employed. (Increased earnings produced by increased investment don’t count.) Only a few businesses come close to exhibiting this ability. And Berkshire Hathaway isn’t one of them.
要使资本真正实现指数化，股本回报率必须上升，也就是说，企业收益必须持续地与物价水平的增长成比例地增加， 而不需要 企业增加资本——包括营运资金—— 受雇。（由增加投资带来的收益增长不计在内。）只有少数企业能够接近展现这种能力。而伯克希尔·哈撒韦并不在其中。
We, of course, have a corporate policy of reinvesting earnings for growth, diversity and strength, which has the incidental effect of minimizing the current imposition of explicit taxes on our owners. However, on a day-by-day basis, you will be subjected to the implicit inflation tax, and when you wish to transfer your investment in Berkshire into another form of investment, or into consumption, you also will face explicit taxes.
当然，我们有一项公司政策，即将收益再投资以实现增长、多元化和增强实力，这也带来了一个附带效果，即最大限度地减少了我们股东当前所需缴纳的显性税收。然而，在日常生活中，你们仍然会受到隐性通胀税的影响；而当你们希望将对伯克希尔的投资转为其他形式的投资，或用于消费时，你们还将面临显性税收。
Sources of Earnings 收益来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps, which in turn owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant capital gains and losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gains figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. Our calculation of operating earnings also excludes the gain from sale of Mutual’s branch offices. In this respect it differs from the presentation in our audited financial statements that includes this item in the calculation of “Earnings Before Realized Investment Gain”.
下表显示了伯克希尔报告的收益来源。伯克希尔拥有蓝筹邮票公司约 60%的股份，而蓝筹邮票公司又拥有 Wesco 金融公司 80%的股份。该表显示了各个业务实体的总收益，以及伯克希尔在这些收益中的份额。所有归属于任何业务实体的重要资本收益和损失都被汇总在表格底部的已实现证券收益项目中，并未计入经营收益。我们对经营收益的计算也不包括出售 Mutual 分支机构所得的收益。在这方面，这一计算方式与我们经审计财务报表中的“已实现投资收益前利润”项目的呈现方式不同，后者将该项收益计入其中。
Net Earnings Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax -------------------------------------- ------------------ Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ (in thousands of dollars) 1980 1979 1980 1979 1980 1979 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings - all entities $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== Earnings from Operations: Insurance Group: Underwriting ............ $ 6,738 $ 3,742 $ 6,737 $ 3,741 $ 3,637 $ 2,214 Net Investment Income ... 30,939 24,224 30,927 24,216 25,607 20,106 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (508) 1,723 (508) 1,723 202 848 Associated Retail Stores .. 2,440 2,775 2,440 2,775 1,169 1,280 See’s Candies ............. 15,031 12,785 8,958 7,598 4,212 3,448 Buffalo Evening News ...... (2,805) (4,617) (1,672) (2,744) (816) (1,333) Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 7,699 2,397 4,588 1,425 3,060 1,624 Illinois National Bank .... 5,324 5,747 5,200 5,614 4,731 5,027 Wesco Financial - Parent .. 2,916 2,413 1,392 1,098 1,044 937 Mutual Savings and Loan ... 5,814 10,447 2,775 4,751 1,974 3,261 Precision Steel ........... 2,833 3,254 1,352 1,480 656 723 Interest on Debt .......... (12,230) (8,248) (9,390) (5,860) (4,809) (2,900) Other ..................... 2,170 1,342 1,590 996 1,255 753 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings from Operations ........... $ 66,361 $ 57,984 $ 54,389 $ 46,813 $ 41,922 $ 35,988 Mutual Savings and Loan - sale of branches ....... 5,873 -- 2,803 -- 1,293 -- Realized Securities Gain .... 13,711 10,648 12,954 9,614 9,907 6,829 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings - all entities $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
净收益 税前收益 税后收益 -------------------------------------- ------------------ 总计 伯克希尔份额 伯克希尔份额 ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ （以千美元计） 1980 1979 1980 1979 1980 1979 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 所有实体的总收益 $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 经营收益： 保险集团： 承保 ............ $ 6,738 $ 3,742 $ 6,737 $ 3,741 $ 3,637 $ 2,214 净投资收益 ... 30,939 24,224 30,927 24,216 25,607 20,106 Berkshire-Waumbec 纺织 (508) 1,723 (508) 1,723 202 848 Associated Retail Stores .. 2,440 2,775 2,440 2,775 1,169 1,280 See’s Candies ............. 15,031 12,785 8,958 7,598 4,212 3,448 Buffalo Evening News ...... (2,805) (4,617) (1,672) (2,744) (816) (1,333) Blue Chip Stamps - 母公司 7,699 2,397 4,588 1,425 3,060 1,624 Illinois National Bank .... 5,324 5,747 5,200 5,614 4,731 5,027 Wesco Financial - 母公司 .. 2,916 2,413 1,392 1,098 1,044 937 Mutual Savings and Loan ... 5,814 10,447 2,775 4,751 1,974 3,261 Precision Steel ........... 2,833 3,254 1,352 1,480 656 723 债务利息 .......... (12,230) (8,248) (9,390) (5,860) (4,809) (2,900) 其他 ..................... 2,170 1,342 1,590 996 1,255 753 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 经营总收益 ........... $ 66,361 $ 57,984 $ 54,389 $ 46,813 $ 41,922 $ 35,988 Mutual Savings and Loan - 分支机构出售 ....... 5,873 -- 2,803 -- 1,293 -- 已实现证券收益 .... 13,711 10,648 12,954 9,614 9,907 6,829 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 所有实体总收益 $ 85,945 $ 68,632 $ 70,146 $ 56,427 $ 53,122 $ 42,817 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 40 to 53 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1980 operations. We recommend a careful reading, and suggest that you particularly note the superb job done by Louie Vincenti and Charlie Munger in repositioning Mutual Savings and Loan. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
蓝筹邮票公司和 Wesco 都是上市公司，各自有独立的信息披露要求。在本报告第 40 至 53 页，我们转载了两家公司主要高管的叙述性报告，他们在报告中描述了 1980 年的经营情况。我们建议您认真阅读，并特别注意 Louie Vincenti 和 Charlie Munger 在重组 Mutual Savings and Loan 方面所做的出色工作。如有需要，伯克希尔的任何股东都可以向 Blue Chip Stamps 的 Robert H. Bird 先生（地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040）或 Wesco Financial Corporation 的 Bette Deckard 女士（地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109）索取任一公司的完整年度报告。
As indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income section of Insurance Group earnings.
如前所述，我们无法控制的公司中未分配的收益，现在与前表中列出的报告经营收益同等重要。当然，已分配的部分主要通过保险集团收益的净投资收入部分反映在表中。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our own earnings. No. of Shares Cost Market ------------- ---------- ---------- (000s omitted) 434,550 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ......... $ 2,821 $ 12,222 464,317 (a) Aluminum Company of America ........... 25,577 27,685 475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ......... 12,942 15,894 1,983,812 (b) General Foods, Inc. ................... 62,507 59,889 7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation ..................... 47,138 105,300 2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ........................ 21,825 58,435 711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .. 4,531 22,135 1,211,834 (a) Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ...... 20,629 27,569 282,500 (a) Media General ......................... 4,545 8,334 247,039 (b) National Detroit Corporation .......... 5,930 6,299 881,500 (a) National Student Marketing ............ 5,128 5,895 391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather Int’l. Inc. ........... 3,709 9,981 370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. ..................... 12,144 16,489 245,700 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries ............. 8,702 11,228 1,250,525 (b) SAFECO Corporation .................... 32,062 45,177 151,104 (b) The Times Mirror Company .............. 4,447 6,271 1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company ........... 10,628 42,277 667,124 (b) E W Woolworth Company ................. 13,583 16,511 ---------- ---------- $298,848 $497,591 All Other Common Stockholdings ........ 26,313 32,096 ---------- ---------- Total Common Stocks ................... $325,161 $529,687 ========== ==========
我们在下方列出了伯克希尔在这些 非控股企业中的比例持股，仅包括已分配收益的部分 （股息）已计入我们的收益中。 股票数量 成本 市值 ------------- ---------- ---------- （单位：千） 434,550 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ......... $ 2,821 $ 12,222 464,317 (a) Aluminum Company of America ........... 25,577 27,685 475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ......... 12,942 15,894 1,983,812 (b) General Foods, Inc. ................... 62,507 59,889 7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation ..................... 47,138 105,300 2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ........................ 21,825 58,435 711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .. 4,531 22,135 1,211,834 (a) Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ...... 20,629 27,569 282,500 (a) Media General ......................... 4,545 8,334 247,039 (b) National Detroit Corporation .......... 5,930 6,299 881,500 (a) National Student Marketing ............ 5,128 5,895 391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather Int’l. Inc. ........... 3,709 9,981 370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. ..................... 12,144 16,489 245,700 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries ............. 8,702 11,228 1,250,525 (b) SAFECO Corporation .................... 32,062 45,177 151,104 (b) The Times Mirror Company .............. 4,447 6,271 1,868,600 (a) 华盛顿邮报公司 ........... 10,628 42,277 667,124 (b) 五分硬币伍尔沃斯公司 ................. 13,583 16,511 ---------- ---------- $298,848 $497,591 所有其他普通股持有 ................ 26,313 32,096 ---------- ---------- 普通股总计 .......................... $325,161 $529,687 ========== ==========
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries. (b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All numbers represent Berkshire’s net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.
(a) 全部由伯克希尔或其保险子公司持有。(b) Blue Chip 和/或 Wesco 持有这些公司的股份。所有数字均代表伯克希尔在该集团更大总持股中的净权益。
From this table, you can see that our sources of underlying earning power are distributed far differently among industries than would superficially seem the case. For example, our insurance subsidiaries own approximately 3% of Kaiser Aluminum, and 1 1/4% of Alcoa. Our share of the 1980 earnings of those companies amounts to about $13 million. (If translated dollar for dollar into a combination of eventual market value gain and dividends, this figure would have to be reduced by a significant, but not precisely determinable, amount of tax; perhaps 25% would be a fair assumption.) Thus, we have a much larger economic interest in the aluminum business than in practically any of the operating businesses we control and on which we report in more detail. If we maintain our holdings, our long-term performance will be more affected by the future economics of the aluminum industry than it will by direct operating decisions we make concerning most companies over which we exercise managerial control.
从这张表中，你可以看到我们的实际盈利能力来源在各个行业中的分布，与表面上看起来的情况大不相同。例如，我们的保险子公司拥有 Kaiser Aluminum 约 3%的股份，以及 Alcoa 约 1 又 1/4%的股份。我们在 1980 年从这些公司的收益中分得大约 1300 万美元。（如果这些收益最终全部以市值增长和分红的形式实现，那么这个数字还需要扣除一笔可观但无法精确确定的税款；假设 25%可能是一个合理的估计。）因此，我们在铝业的经济利益远大于我们实际控制并详细报告的大多数运营企业。如果我们继续持有这些股份，我们的长期业绩将更多地受到铝行业未来经济状况的影响，而不是我们对大多数拥有管理控制权公司的直接经营决策所带来的影响。
GEICO Corp. GEICO 公司
Our largest non-controlled holding is 7.2 million shares of GEICO Corp., equal to about a 33% equity interest. Normally, an interest of this magnitude (over 20%) would qualify as an “investee” holding and would require us to reflect a proportionate share of GEICO’s earnings in our own. However, we purchased our GEICO stock pursuant to special orders of the District of Columbia and New York Insurance Departments, which required that the right to vote the stock be placed with an independent party. Absent the vote, our 33% interest does not qualify for investee treatment. (Pinkerton’s is a similar situation.)
我们最大的一项非控股投资是持有 GEICO 公司 720 万股股票，约占其 33%的股权。通常，这样规模的持股（超过 20%）会被认定为“被投资方”持股，我们需要在自己的财务报表中反映 GEICO 盈利的相应比例。然而，我们购买 GEICO 股票是根据哥伦比亚特区和纽约州保险部门的特别命令进行的，这些命令要求将该股票的投票权交由独立方行使。由于没有投票权，我们的 33%持股不符合被投资方会计处理。（Pinkerton's 的情况也类似。）
Of course, whether or not the undistributed earnings of GEICO are picked up annually in our operating earnings figure has nothing to do with their economic value to us, or to you as owners of Berkshire. The value of these retained earnings will be determined by the skill with which they are put to use by GEICO management.
当然，GEICO 未分配利润是否每年计入我们的经营收益，与这些利润对我们或你们作为伯克希尔股东的经济价值无关。这些留存收益的价值将取决于 GEICO 管理层运用这些资金的能力。
On this score, we simply couldn’t feel better. GEICO represents the best of all investment worlds - the coupling of a very important and very hard to duplicate business advantage with an extraordinary management whose skills in operations are matched by skills in capital allocation.
在这方面，我们简直不能再满意了。GEICO 代表了所有投资领域中最理想的情况——它将极其重要且难以复制的商业优势与卓越的管理团队结合在一起，这支团队在运营管理和资本配置方面都展现出了非凡的能力。
As you can see, our holdings cost us $47 million, with about half of this amount invested in 1976 and most of the remainder invested in 1980. At the present dividend rate, our reported earnings from GEICO amount to a little over $3 million annually. But we estimate our share of its earning power is on the order of $20 million annually. Thus, undistributed earnings applicable to this holding alone may amount to 40% of total reported operating earnings of Berkshire.
如你所见，我们持有的股份成本为 4700 万美元，其中大约一半是在 1976 年投资的，其余大部分是在 1980 年投资的。按目前的分红水平，我们从 GEICO 获得的账面收益每年略高于 300 万美元。但我们估算，我们所占的实际盈利能力每年大约为 2000 万美元。因此，仅这一项持股未分配的收益就可能占伯克希尔总报告经营收益的 40%。
We should emphasize that we feel as comfortable with GEICO management retaining an estimated $17 million of earnings applicable to our ownership as we would if that sum were in our own hands. In just the last two years GEICO, through repurchases of its own stock, has reduced the share equivalents it has outstanding from 34.2 million to 21.6 million, dramatically enhancing the interests of shareholders in a business that simply can’t be replicated. The owners could not have been better served.
我们要强调的是，我们对 GEICO 管理层保留约 1700 万美元归属于我们所有权的收益感到同样安心，就像这笔钱在我们自己手中一样。在过去两年里，GEICO 通过回购自家股票，将流通在外的等价股份从 3420 万股减少到 2160 万股，极大地提升了股东在这一无法复制的企业中的利益。所有者们得到了最好的回报。
We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses. Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations. Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.
我们在以往的报告中曾经写到，收购和经营“扭亏为盈”型企业通常会带来失望。多年来，数以百计、分布在几十个行业的扭亏为盈机会被介绍给我们，无论是作为参与者还是观察者，我们都跟踪了实际表现与预期的对比。我们的结论是，除极少数例外，当一位以才华著称的管理者接手一家以基本经济状况不佳著称的企业时，最终保留下来的，往往还是企业的声誉。
GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976. It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.
GEICO 似乎是一个例外，在 1976 年几乎濒临破产的边缘被扭转过来。毫无疑问，它的复苏确实需要卓越的管理才能，而 Jack Byrne 在那一年到来时，极大地提供了这一要素。
But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.
但同样真实的是，GEICO 曾经享有的根本性商业优势——这种优势曾带来惊人的成功——在公司内部依然存在，尽管被一片财务和运营困境所掩盖。
GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation. Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself. For decades it had been run in just this manner. Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.
GEICO 的设计初衷是在一个庞大的市场（汽车保险）中成为低成本运营者，而这个市场中的大多数公司由于营销结构的限制，难以适应变化。按照设计方式运营，它能够为客户提供非同寻常的价值，同时为自身带来不寻常的回报。几十年来，它一直以这种方式运营。它在 70 年代中期遇到的麻烦，并不是因为这种根本性的经济优势有所减弱或消失。
GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal. Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics. The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.
当时 GEICO 的问题使其处境类似于 1964 年沙拉油丑闻后的美国运通。这两家公司都是独一无二的企业，因一时的财务打击而暂时陷入困境，但并未摧毁其卓越的基本经济实力。GEICO 和美国运通的情况，是拥有局部可切除“癌症”的非凡商业特许经营权（当然需要一位高明的外科医生），应与真正的“扭亏为盈”情形区分开来，后者的管理者期望——也需要——实现企业的“皮格马利翁”式转变。
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company. A 100% interest of that kind gives the owner the options of leveraging the purchase, changing managements, directing cash flow, and selling the business. It may also provide some excitement around corporate headquarters (less frequently mentioned).
无论如何称呼，我们对持有 GEICO 股份感到非常高兴，正如前文所述，这部分股份花费了我们 4700 万美元。如果要通过协商收购一家整体公司，想要获得类似的 2000 万美元盈利能力，并且该企业具备一流的经济特性和光明前景，至少需要支付 2 亿美元（某些行业甚至更多）。拥有这类 100%股权，赋予所有者杠杆收购、变更管理层、主导现金流和出售企业的选择权。这也可能为公司总部带来一些“刺激”（这一点较少被提及）。
We find it perfectly satisfying that the nature of our insurance business dictates we buy many minority portions of already well-run businesses (at prices far below our share of the total value of the entire business) that do not need management change, re-direction of cash flow, or sale. There aren’t many Jack Byrnes in the managerial world, or GEICOs in the business world. What could be better than buying into a partnership with both of them?
我们感到非常满意的是，我们的保险业务性质决定了我们会以远低于我们所占全部企业总价值的价格，购买许多已经经营良好的企业的少数股权，这些企业无需更换管理层、调整现金流方向或出售。管理界像 Jack Byrnes 这样的人物、商业界像 GEICO 这样的公司都不多见。还有什么能比与他们两者合作更好呢？
Insurance Industry Conditions
保险业状况
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page 37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well- written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’s mailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
保险业的承保状况继续如我们预期般发展，综合比率（见第 37 页定义）从 1979 年的 100.6 上升到 1980 年估算的 103.5。几乎可以肯定，这一趋势将会持续，并且行业的承保亏损将在 1981 年和 1982 年显著且持续地增加。要理解原因，我们建议你阅读 Chubb 公司 Barbara Stewart 在 1980 年 10 月撰写的关于财产-意外险竞争动态的优秀分析。（Chubb 的年度报告一贯对行业状况有最深刻、坦率且文笔出色的讨论；你应该加入该公司的邮寄名单。）Stewart 女士的分析也许不令人愉快，但我们认为其准确性非常高。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
而且，不幸的是，一个几乎未被报道但极具危害性的问题，很可能会延长并加剧即将到来的行业痛苦。这不仅可能导致许多保险公司在承保亏损创下新高时仍在拼命争取业务——而且很可能会促使他们在那时加倍努力。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property- casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这个问题源于债券价格的下跌以及保险业会计惯例允许公司以摊余成本计价债券，而不考虑市场价值。许多保险公司持有的长期债券，其摊余成本相当于净资产的两到三倍。如果这个比例是三倍，那么债券价格从成本价缩水三分之一——如果这种缩水在账面上被确认——就会抹去全部净资产。而债券价格确实已经缩水。一些最大、最知名的财产与意外险公司，目前如果按市价计价其债券持有量，净资产名义上几乎为零，甚至为负。当然，他们的债券价格也可能上涨，从而部分甚至完全恢复账面净资产的完整性。也有可能进一步下跌。（我们认为，对股票或债券价格的短期预测毫无用处。这些预测或许能说明很多关于预测者本人的信息，但对未来却毫无说明。）
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
有些人可能会觉得奇怪，为什么当保险公司的股票投资组合价格大幅下跌，导致净资产大幅减少时，其生存会受到威胁，而即使债券价格跌幅更大，却完全没有反应。业内的解释是，无论当前价格如何，债券到期时都将全额偿付，从而最终消除任何暂时的价格下跌。这个观点认为，可能需要二十年、三十年，甚至四十年，但只要债券不被出售，最终它们都会按面值兑现。当然，如果债券被出售——即使是用更有相对价值的类似债券替换——损失也必须立即入账。同样，已公布的净资产也必须立刻按损失金额下调。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses are in prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurers to shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，许多投资选择会消失，可能会持续数十年。例如，当预计会有大额承保亏损时，对于某些保险公司来说，从免税债券转向应税债券可能是极为合理的商业决策。不愿意承认重大债券损失，可能是阻止这种明智举措的唯一因素。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policyholders and claimants (with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will if the volume of business declines significantly - assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if those assets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但由大规模未实现债券亏损所带来的全部影响，远比投资智慧的停滞更为严重。因为用于购买和 持有这些债券的资金来源，是一池由保单持有人和索赔人（人员不断更替）提供的资金——实际上，这些资金只是暂时存放在保险公司那里。只要这池资金的规模保持不变，就无需出售债券。如果这池资金缩水——而一旦业务量大幅下降就会发生这种情况——就必须出售资产以偿还负债。如果这些资产是存在巨大未实现亏损的债券，这些亏损就会迅速变为已实现亏损，从而大幅削减净资产。
Thus, an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced with inadequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
因此，一家债券市值缩水接近账面净资产（目前这样的公司有很多），同时还面临保费水平不足且必然进一步恶化的保险公司，只有两个选择。管理层的一个选择是要求承保人根据所承担的风险定价——“确保每一美元的费用成本加上可预期损失成本，都能收取一美元的保费”。
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be a lagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这一指令的后果是可以预见的：（a）由于大多数业务对价格敏感且每年可续保，许多目前在册的保单将在相当短的时间内被竞争对手夺走；（b）随着保费收入大幅缩减，负债（未赚保费和应付赔款）也会相应滞后减少；（c）必须出售资产（债券）以匹配负债的减少；（d）保险公司已被忽视的净值消失现象将在其公布的财务报表中部分得到确认（取决于出售的程度）。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers - while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner in the long term.
这种令人沮丧的连锁反应也有一些变体，对账面净值的惩罚较小。有些公司在（c）环节的反应是出售已经按市价计价的股票，或是最近购入、损失较小的债券。这种鸵鸟式的做法——卖掉较优质的资产，保留亏损最大的资产——虽然短期内不那么痛苦，但从长期来看不太可能取得成功。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities - and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow” underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed “asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第二种选择要简单得多：无论费率水平和巨额预期承保亏损如何，都继续承保业务，从而维持目前的保费、资产和负债水平——然后祈祷未来某一天承保或债券价格会好转。业内媒体对“现金流”承保有很多批评；也就是说，不顾未来承保亏损而承保业务，以便获得资金在当前高利率下进行投资。这第二种选择或许可以恰当地称为“资产维持型”承保——仅仅为了保住现有资产而接受糟糕的业务。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a “sell-at-any-price” policy.
当然，你知道会选择哪种方式。而且也很明显，只要许多大型保险公司觉得不得不选择第二种方式，承保业务就不会有好转的一天。因为如果行业中大部分公司都认为无论价格是否合理都必须维持保费规模，那么所有保险公司都不得不接近这些价格。除了自己遇到财务问题之外，最糟糕的处境莫过于有一大批竞争对手也有财务问题，但他们可以通过“无论什么价格都卖”的政策来拖延问题。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我们之前提到过，那些不愿意—— 由于多种原因，包括公众反应， 机构自豪感，或维护所声明的净资产——去出售 以迫使承认重大损失的价格水平出售债券 发现自己在投资立场上被冻结了十年或更长时间。 但如前所述，这只是问题的一半。 那些在长期债券上投入大量资金的公司 可能在相当长的一段时间内，不仅失去了许多 他们的投资选择，但也包括许多承保选择。 他们的承保选择也是如此。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)
在这方面，我们自身的状况是令人满意的。我们相信，按所有保险公司债券的摊余成本计算，我们的净资产在所有大型财产与意外险股东所有集团中，相对于保费收入的比例最为强劲。当债券按市价计值时，我们的相对实力则更加突出。（但为了避免自满，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债的到期期限仍然比我们希望的要错配得多，而且我们也因为董事长在该行动时还在说话而在债券上损失了重要金额。）
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们充足的资本和投资灵活性将使我们能够在未来保费定价不足的长期时期内，采取我们认为最合理的行动。但行业的困境也意味着我们的困境。我们的财务实力并不能让我们摆脱目前笼罩整个财产与意外险行业的恶劣定价环境。它只是让我们拥有更强的持久力和更多的选择。
Insurance Operations 保险业务
The National Indemnity managers, led by Phil Liesche with the usual able assistance of Roland Miller and Bill Lyons, outdid themselves in 1980. While volume was flat, underwriting margins relative to the industry were at an all-time high. We expect decreased volume from this operation in 1981. But its managers will hear no complaints from corporate headquarters, nor will employment or salaries suffer. We enormously admire the National Indemnity underwriting discipline - embedded from origin by the founder, Jack Ringwalt - and know that this discipline, if suspended, probably could not be fully regained.
由 Phil Liesche 领导、Roland Miller 和 Bill Lyons 一如既往地给予有力协助的 National Indemnity 管理团队在 1980 年表现得尤为出色。虽然业务量持平，但与行业相比，其承保利润率创下历史新高。我们预计该业务在 1981 年的业务量会有所下降。但公司总部不会因此对管理层提出任何抱怨，员工的就业和薪资也不会受到影响。我们非常钦佩 National Indemnity 自创始人 Jack Ringwalt 以来所坚持的承保纪律，并且深知这种纪律一旦松懈，可能就无法完全恢复。
John Seward at Home and Auto continues to make good progress in replacing a diminishing number of auto policies with volume from less competitive lines, primarily small-premium general liability. Operations are being slowly expanded, both geographically and by product line, as warranted by underwriting results.
John Seward 在 Home and Auto 继续取得良好进展，用来自竞争较小险种（主要是小额保费的一般责任险）的业务量，逐步取代数量日益减少的汽车保单。只要承保结果允许，业务正在按部就班地在地域和产品线两方面扩展。
The reinsurance business continues to reflect the excesses and problems of the primary writers. Worse yet, it has the potential for magnifying such excesses. Reinsurance is characterized by extreme ease of entry, large premium payments in advance, and much-delayed loss reports and loss payments. Initially, the morning mail brings lots of cash and few claims. This state of affairs can produce a blissful, almost euphoric, feeling akin to that experienced by an innocent upon receipt of his first credit card.
再保险业务依然反映了初级承保方的过度行为和问题。更糟糕的是，它还有放大这些过度行为的潜力。再保险的特点是进入极其容易，保费预付金额巨大，而损失报告和赔付却大大滞后。最初，早晨的邮件带来大量现金，却很少有理赔。这种状况会让人产生一种幸福、甚至近乎陶醉的感觉，就像一个天真无邪的人第一次收到信用卡时的体验。
The magnetic lure of such cash-generating characteristics, currently enhanced by the presence of high interest rates, is transforming the reinsurance market into “amateur night”. Without a super catastrophe, industry underwriting will be poor in the next few years. If we experience such a catastrophe, there could be a bloodbath with some companies not able to live up to contractual commitments. George Young continues to do a first-class job for us in this business. Results, with investment income included, have been reasonably profitable. We will retain an active reinsurance presence but, for the foreseeable future, we expect no premium growth from this activity.
这种现金流特性具有极大的吸引力，目前又因高利率的存在而进一步增强，正在把再保险市场变成“业余之夜”。如果没有超级灾难，未来几年行业的承保业绩将会很差。如果真的发生这样的灾难，可能会出现一场血腥风暴，一些公司甚至无法履行合同承诺。George Young 在这项业务中依然为我们做得非常出色。包括投资收益在内，业绩还算可观。我们将继续积极参与再保险业务，但在可预见的未来，我们预计这一业务不会有保费增长。
We continue to have serious problems in the Homestate operation. Floyd Taylor in Kansas has done an outstanding job but our underwriting record elsewhere is considerably below average. Our poorest performer has been Insurance Company of Iowa, at which large losses have been sustained annually since its founding in 1973. Late in the fall we abandoned underwriting in that state, and have merged the company into Cornhusker Casualty. There is potential in the homestate concept, but much work needs to be done in order to realize it.
我们在本州业务中依然面临严重问题。堪萨斯的 Floyd Taylor 表现出色，但我们在其他地方的承保记录却远低于平均水平。表现最差的是爱荷华保险公司，自 1973 年成立以来每年都遭受巨额亏损。去年秋末，我们放弃了在该州的承保业务，并将该公司并入了 Cornhusker Casualty。本州业务模式具有潜力，但要实现这一潜力还需要做大量工作。
Our Workers Compensation operation suffered a severe loss when Frank DeNardo died last year at 37. Frank instinctively thought like an underwriter. He was a superb technician and a fierce competitor; in short order he had straightened out major problems at the California Workers Compensation Division of National Indemnity. Dan Grossman, who originally brought Frank to us, stepped in immediately after Frank’s death to continue that operation, which now utilizes Redwood Fire and Casualty, another Berkshire subsidiary, as the insuring vehicle.
我们的工伤赔偿业务在 Frank DeNardo 去年 37 岁去世时遭受了重大损失。Frank 天生具有承保人的思维方式。他是一位出色的技术专家，也是一个强有力的竞争者；在很短的时间内，他就解决了 National Indemnity 加州工伤赔偿部门的重大问题。Dan Grossman 最初将 Frank 带到我们公司，在 Frank 去世后立即接手，继续运营该业务，目前该业务已采用 Berkshire 旗下的另一家子公司 Redwood Fire and Casualty 作为承保主体。
Our major Workers Compensation operation, Cypress Insurance Company, run by Milt Thornton, continues its outstanding record. Year after year Milt, like Phil Liesche, runs an underwriting operation that far outpaces his competition. In the industry he is admired and copied, but not matched.
我们的主要工伤赔偿业务——由米尔特·桑顿管理的赛普拉斯保险公司，继续保持着卓越的业绩。年复一年，米尔特像菲尔·利谢一样，经营着远超同行的承保业务。在业内，他备受尊敬并被模仿，但无人能及。
Overall, we look for a significant decline in insurance volume in 1981 along with a poorer underwriting result. We expect underwriting experience somewhat superior to that of the industry but, of course, so does most of the industry. There will be some disappointments.
总体而言，我们预计1981年保险业务量将大幅下降，承保结果也将变差。我们预期承保经验会略优于行业平均水平，但当然，大多数同行也都是这样预期的。难免会有一些令人失望的情况。
Textile and Retail Operations
纺织和零售业务
During the past year we have cut back the scope of our textile business. Operations at Waumbec Mills have been terminated, reluctantly but necessarily. Some equipment was transferred to New Bedford but most has been sold, or will be, along with real estate. Your Chairman made a costly mistake in not facing the realities of this situation sooner.
在过去一年里，我们缩减了纺织业务的规模。Waumbec Mills 的运营已经终止，虽然不情愿，但这是必要的。一些设备已转移到新贝德福德，但大部分设备和房地产已经或即将被出售。董事长在未能更早正视这一现实上犯了一个代价高昂的错误。
At New Bedford we have reduced the number of looms operated by about one-third, abandoning some high-volume lines in which product differentiation was insignificant. Even assuming everything went right - which it seldom did - these lines could not generate adequate returns related to investment. And, over a full industry cycle, losses were the most likely result.
在新贝德福德，我们将运营的织机数量减少了大约三分之一，放弃了一些产品差异化微乎其微的大批量生产线。即使一切顺利——而这种情况很少发生——这些生产线也无法带来与投资相称的合理回报。而且，从整个行业周期来看，亏损才是最有可能的结果。
Our remaining textile operation, still sizable, has been divided into a manufacturing and a sales division, each free to do business independent of the other. Thus, distribution strengths and mill capabilities will not be wedded to each other. We have more than doubled capacity in our most profitable textile segment through a recent purchase of used 130-inch Saurer looms. Current conditions indicate another tough year in textiles, but with substantially less capital employed in the operation.
我们剩下的纺织业务规模依然可观，现已分为制造和销售两个部门，每个部门都可以独立开展业务。因此，分销优势和工厂能力将不再捆绑在一起。通过最近购买二手 130 英寸 Saurer 织机，我们在最有利润的纺织领域产能增加了一倍多。目前的形势显示，纺织业又将迎来艰难的一年，但投入的资本大大减少了。
Ben Rosner’s record at Associated Retail Stores continues to amaze us. In a poor retailing year, Associated’s earnings continued excellent - and those earnings all were translated into cash. On March 7, 1981 Associated will celebrate its 50th birthday. Ben has run the business (along with Leo Simon, his partner from 1931 to 1966) in each of those fifty years.
本·罗斯纳在 Associated Retail Stores 的业绩依然让我们感到惊叹。在零售业表现不佳的一年里，Associated 的盈利依然出色——而且这些盈利全部转化为现金。1981 年 3 月 7 日，Associated 将迎来其成立 50 周年纪念日。在这五十年里，本一直经营着这家公司（1931 年至 1966 年间与他的合伙人利奥·西蒙一起）。
Disposition of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford
处置伊利诺伊州罗克福德国家银行与信托公司
On December 31, 1980 we completed the exchange of 41,086 shares of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (which owns 97.7% of Illinois National Bank) for a like number of shares of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
1980 年 12 月 31 日，我们完成了 41,086 股 Rockford Bancorp Inc.（该公司拥有 Illinois National Bank 97.7%的股份）与同等数量的 Berkshire Hathaway Inc.股份的交换。
Our method of exchange allowed all Berkshire shareholders to maintain their proportional interest in the Bank (except for me; I was permitted 80% of my proportional share). They were thus guaranteed an ownership position identical to that they would have attained had we followed a more conventional spinoff approach. Twenty-four shareholders (of our approximate 1300) chose this proportional exchange option.
我们的交换方式允许所有 Berkshire 股东保持他们在银行中的比例权益（除了我；我被允许获得我比例份额的 80%）。因此，他们被保证获得与我们采用更常规的分拆方式时相同的所有权地位。在我们大约 1300 名股东中，有 24 名选择了这种按比例交换的方式。
We also allowed overexchanges, and thirty-nine additional shareholders accepted this option, thereby increasing their ownership in the Bank and decreasing their proportional ownership in Berkshire. All got the full amount of Bancorp stock they requested, since the total shares desired by these thirty-nine holders was just slightly less than the number left available by the remaining 1200-plus holders of Berkshire who elected not to part with any Berkshire shares at all. As the exchanger of last resort, I took the small balance (3% of Bancorp’s stock). These shares, added to shares I received from my basic exchange allotment (80% of normal), gave me a slightly reduced proportional interest in the Bank and a slightly enlarged proportional interest in Berkshire.
我们还允许超额兑换，有三十九位额外的股东选择了这一选项，从而增加了他们在银行的持股比例，同时减少了他们在伯克希尔的相对持股比例。所有人都得到了他们所要求的全部 Bancorp 股票，因为这三十九位持有者所需的总股份数，刚好略少于剩下的 1200 多位选择完全不出售伯克希尔股份的持有者所留下的可用股份。作为最后的兑换者，我接受了剩余的小部分（占 Bancorp 股票的 3%）。这些股份，加上我从基本兑换分配中获得的股份（占正常分配的 80%），使我在银行的相对持股比例略有下降，而在伯克希尔的相对持股比例略有上升。
Management of the Bank is pleased with the outcome. Bancorp will operate as an inexpensive and uncomplicated holding company owned by 65 shareholders. And all of those shareholders will have become Bancorp owners through a conscious affirmative decision.
银行管理层对这一结果感到满意。Bancorp 将作为一家由 65 位股东拥有的低成本、结构简单的控股公司运营。而且所有这些股东都是通过有意识的积极决策成为 Bancorp 的所有者的。
Financing 融资
In August we sold $60 million of 12 3/4% notes due August 1, 2005, with a sinking fund to begin in 1991.
八月份，我们发行了6000万美元、票面利率为12又3/4%、到期日为2005年8月1日的票据，并将于1991年开始设立偿债基金。
The managing underwriters, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation, represented by Bill Fisher, and Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc., represented by Charlie Heider, did an absolutely first-class job from start to finish of the financing.
主承销商 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation（由 Bill Fisher 代表）和 Chiles, Heider & Company, Inc.（由 Charlie Heider 代表）从融资的开始到结束都做得非常出色，堪称一流。
Unlike most businesses, Berkshire did not finance because of any specific immediate needs. Rather, we borrowed because we think that, over a period far shorter than the life of the loan, we will have many opportunities to put the money to good use. The most attractive opportunities may present themselves at a time when credit is extremely expensive - or even unavailable. At such a time we want to have plenty of financial firepower.
与大多数企业不同，伯克希尔这次融资并不是因为有任何具体的迫切需求。相反，我们之所以借款，是因为我们认为，在远远短于贷款期限的时间内，我们会有许多机会将这笔资金用得其所。最有吸引力的机会可能会出现在信贷极其昂贵——甚至无法获得——的时候。在那样的时候，我们希望拥有充足的财务“火力”。
Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it. As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business. There is a certain mirage- like quality to such operations. However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.
我们偏好收购那些能够产生现金的企业，而不是消耗现金的企业。随着通胀加剧，越来越多的公司发现，他们必须将所有内部产生的资金都用于维持现有的业务规模。这类经营有某种海市蜃楼般的特质。无论账面利润多么诱人，我们始终对那些似乎永远无法将漂亮数字转化为无附加条件现金的企业保持警惕。
Businesses meeting our standards are not easy to find. (Each year we read of hundreds of corporate acquisitions; only a handful would have been of interest to us.) And logical expansion of our present operations is not easy to implement. But we’ll continue to utilize both avenues in our attempts to further Berkshire’s growth.
符合我们标准的企业并不容易找到。（每年我们都会看到数百起企业收购案例，但只有极少数会引起我们的兴趣。）而对我们现有业务的合理扩展也不容易实现。但我们将继续通过这两种途径，努力推动伯克希尔的增长。
Under all circumstances we plan to operate with plenty of liquidity, with debt that is moderate in size and properly structured, and with an abundance of capital strength. Our return on equity is penalized somewhat by this conservative approach, but it is the only one with which we feel comfortable.
在任何情况下，我们都计划保持充足的流动性，负债规模适中且结构合理，并拥有充足的资本实力。我们采取这种保守的做法，导致股本回报率受到一定影响，但这是我们唯一感到安心的方式。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Gene Abegg, founder of our long-owned bank in Rockford, died on July 2, 1980 at the age of 82. As a friend, banker and citizen, he was unsurpassed.
我们长期拥有的罗克福德银行创始人 Gene Abegg 于 1980 年 7 月 2 日去世，享年 82 岁。作为朋友、银行家和公民，他无与伦比。
You learn a great deal about a person when you purchase a business from him and he then stays on to run it as an employee rather than as an owner. Before the purchase the seller knows the business intimately, whereas you start from scratch. The seller has dozens of opportunities to mislead the buyer - through omissions, ambiguities, and misdirection. After the check has changed hands, subtle (and not so subtle) changes of attitude can occur and implicit understandings can evaporate. As in the courtship-marriage sequence, disappointments are not infrequent.
当你从某人手中收购一家企业，并让他作为雇员而非所有者继续经营时，你会对这个人有更深入的了解。在收购之前，卖方对企业了如指掌，而你则是一无所知。卖方有无数机会通过遗漏、模棱两可和误导来欺骗买方。在支票交割之后，态度可能会发生微妙（甚至明显）的变化，原本的默契也可能烟消云散。就像恋爱到婚姻的过程一样，失望并不少见。
From the time we first met, Gene shot straight 100% of the time - the only behavior pattern he had within him. At the outset of negotiations, he laid all negative factors face up on the table; on the other hand, for years after the transaction was completed he would tell me periodically of some previously undiscussed items of value that had come with our purchase.
自我们初次见面起，Gene 始终坦诚相待——这是他唯一的行为准则。在谈判之初，他把所有负面因素都摆在了桌面上；另一方面，在交易完成后的多年里，他还会不时告诉我一些我们收购时未曾讨论过的有价值事项。
Though he was already 71 years of age when he sold us the Bank, Gene subsequently worked harder for us than he had for himself. He never delayed reporting a problem for a minute, but problems were few with Gene. What else would you expect from a man who, at the time of the bank holiday in 1933, had enough cash on the premises to pay all depositors in full? Gene never forgot he was handling other people’s money. Though this fiduciary attitude was always dominant, his superb managerial skills enabled the Bank to regularly achieve the top position nationally in profitability.
尽管他在把银行卖给我们时已经 71 岁高龄，但 Gene 后来为我们工作的努力程度甚至超过了为自己工作的时候。他从不拖延哪怕一分钟报告问题，但在 Gene 手下，问题本就很少。你还能对这样一个人有什么别的期待呢？要知道，在 1933 年银行休业期间，他手头有足够的现金，可以全额支付所有储户。Gene 从未忘记自己是在管理别人的钱。虽然这种受托责任感始终占据主导地位，但他卓越的管理才能也让银行在盈利能力方面长期位居全国前列。
Gene was in charge of the Illinois National for close to fifty years - almost one-quarter of the lifetime of our country. George Mead, a wealthy industrialist, brought him in from Chicago to open a new bank after a number of other banks in Rockford had failed. Mr. Mead put up the money and Gene ran the show. His talent for leadership soon put its stamp on virtually every major civic activity in Rockford.
Gene 掌管伊利诺伊国民银行近五十年——几乎占据了我们国家历史的四分之一。富有的实业家 George Mead 把他从芝加哥请来，在罗克福德开设一家新银行，因为当地其他几家银行已经倒闭。Mead 先生出资，Gene 负责运营。他的领导才能很快在罗克福德几乎所有主要的社会活动中都留下了深刻的印记。
Dozens of Rockford citizens have told me over the years of help Gene extended to them. In some cases this help was financial; in all cases it involved much wisdom, empathy and friendship. He always offered the same to me. Because of our respective ages and positions I was sometimes the junior partner, sometimes the senior. Whichever the relationship, it always was a special one, and I miss it.
多年来，许多罗克福德市民都曾告诉我，吉恩曾给予他们的帮助。有些情况下，这种帮助是经济上的；但在所有情况下，都包含了他的智慧、同理心和友谊。他也总是同样地对待我。由于我们的年龄和职位不同，有时我是后辈，有时我是前辈。无论是哪种关系，这段情谊始终都很特别，我非常怀念。
Warren E. Buffett February 27, 1981 Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特 1981 年 2 月 27 日 董事会主席