It is generally accepted that a family’s involvement in the business makes the family business unique; but the literature continues to have difficulty defining the family business. We argue for a distinction between theoretical and operational definitions. A theoretical definition must identify the esence that distingulshes the family business from other businesses. It is the standard against which operational definitions must be measured. We propose a theoretical definition based on behavior as the essence of a family business. Our conceptual analysis shows that most of the operational definitions based on the components of family involvement overlap with our theoretical definition. Our empirical results suggest, however, that the components of family involvement typically used in operational definitions are weak predictors of intentions and, therefore, are not always reliable for distinguishing family businesses from non-family ones.
一般认为，家庭对企业的参与使家族企业具有独特性；但文献中仍难以对家族企业进行准确定义。我们主张区分理论定义与操作性定义。理论定义必须识别出家族企业与其他企业本质上的差异，它是操作性定义的衡量标准。我们提出以行为为本质的家族企业理论定义。我们的概念分析表明，大多数基于家庭参与成分的操作性定义与我们的理论定义存在重叠。然而，我们的实证研究结果表明，操作性定义中通常使用的家庭参与成分对意图的预测能力较弱，因此并不总是可靠的区分家族企业和非家族企业的指标。

Intheir editorial note in the first issue of Family Business Review, Lansberg, Perrow, and Rogolsky (1988) asked: what is a family business? The question continues to be asked because definitions of family business abound in the literature (Desman & Brush, 1991) and definitional ambiguities persist (Upton, Vinton, Seaman, & Moore, 1993).
在《家庭企业评论》第一期的编者按中，兰斯伯格、佩罗和罗戈尔斯基（1988）提出了这样一个问题：什么是家庭企业？这个问题至今仍被反复探讨，因为文献中对家庭企业的定义层出不穷（Desman & Brush, 1991），且定义上的模糊性始终存在（Upton, Vinton, Seaman, & Moore, 1993）。

Researchers generally agree that family involvement in the business is what makes the family business different (Miller & Rice, 1967). Most researchers interpret family involvement as ownership and management (Handler, 1989). Churchill and Hatten (1987) prefer to add to this the existence of a family successor. One could interpret this to imply that the family-owned and operated ethnic restaurant or farm, where the next generation is being educated to become professionals rather than to continue in the restaurant or farm business, is not a family business. If we accept this, we would then have to exclude from the family business literature all empirical studies based on such firms.
研究人员普遍认为，家庭成员参与企业经营是家族企业与其他企业不同的关键因素（Miller & Rice, 1967）。大多数研究者将家庭参与解读为所有权和管理权的结合（Handler, 1989）。Churchill 和 Hatten（1987）更倾向于在此基础上加入“存在家族继任者”这一要素。这可以被解读为：如果家族拥有的民族餐厅或农场中，下一代正在接受专业教育而非继续从事餐厅或农场业务，那么这类企业不应被视为家族企业。如果接受这一观点，那么所有基于此类企业的实证研究都将被排除在家族企业研究文献之外。

Family firms themselves do not do better. In interviews we conducted with family business managers, the CEO of a firm with minority public shareholders and managed by a family for three generations denies that it is a family business while another with similar attributes declares itself to be one. Members of the same family who, together, fully own and manage the business vehemently argue that theirs is not because they believe that only a business fully owned by the family and without a single non-family worker is a family business. Meanwhile, siblings and in-laws who own and govern but do not manage another insist theirs is.
家族企业本身并不一定表现更好。在我们对家族企业经理的访谈中，一家由家族管理三代且拥有少数公众股东的企业首席执行官否认其为家族企业，而另一家具有类似特征的企业则明确表示自己是家族企业。同一家族中共同全资拥有并管理企业的成员坚决认为自己的企业不是家族企业，因为他们认为只有完全由家族拥有且没有一名非家族员工的企业才是家族企业。与此同时，拥有并治理但不参与管理的兄弟姐妹和姻亲则坚持认为自己的企业是家族企业。

No business can escape some family involvement because even the decisions of a widely held corporation’s CEO are influenced sometimes by the spouse and children. Definitions based on the components of family involvement-management, ownership, governance, and succession-are easy to operationalize. Unfortunately, they cannot
没有一家企业能够完全避免家庭成员的参与，因为即使是大型上市公司首席执行官的决策，有时也会受到配偶和子女的影响。基于家庭参与的四个组成部分——管理、所有权、治理和继任——所制定的定义容易操作。遗憾的是，这些定义无法
distinguish between two firms with the same level of family involvement when one considers itself a family business and the other does not. Therefore, there is a need to develop a definition that captures the essence of the family business and, as such, may be used to distinguish the family business, in theory, research, and practice, from the non-family business.
区分两家具有相同家族参与程度的企业，其中一家自认为是家族企业，而另一家则不认为自己是家族企业。因此，有必要制定一个能够捕捉家族企业本质的定义，从而在理论、研究和实践中将家族企业与非家族企业区分开来。

In this paper, we first review the literature on the definitions of a family business. We then propose a theoretical definition based on a firm’s intention and vision. We believe that this definition captures the essence of a family business.
本文首先回顾了关于家族企业定义的文献。随后，我们基于企业的意图和愿景提出了理论定义。我们认为，这一定义抓住了家族企业的本质。

We examine the operational definitions used in the literature against our theoretical definition both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, by identifying the overlaps and discrepancies, it appears that family businesses will be a subset of the populations identified by all except one of these operational definitions. The implication for empirical research is that data on a firm’s intentions and vision must be collected to properly identify which are the family businesses within a sample delineated by the components of family involvement.
我们从概念和实证两个层面，将文献中使用的操作性定义与我们的理论定义进行了对比分析。概念上，通过识别重叠和差异，可以发现家族企业将是除其中一个操作性定义外，所有其他定义所识别人群的子集。这对实证研究的启示是，必须收集企业意图和愿景的相关数据，才能在由家族参与度各维度界定的样本中准确识别出家族企业。

Empirically, we test how well the components of family involvement predict concerns with respect to succession and professionalization. The results show that family involvement variables explain only a very small portion of the variances in these concerns and exert completely different influences on different concerns. Therefore, they further strengthen our conclusion that although the components of family involvement may be used operationally to delineate a population for study, a further distinction must be made within the population between those that have the essence of a family business and those that do not. Without such a distinction, statistics and research findings on family business may be inconsistent, unreliable, and irreconcilable. As a result, there will be little scientific understanding, explanation, or prediction.
实证研究表明，我们测试了家庭参与的各个组成部分在预测与继任和专业化相关的问题时的预测效果。研究结果显示，家庭参与变量仅解释了这些问题方差中非常小的一部分，并且对不同问题的影响完全不同。因此，这些结果进一步强化了我们的结论：尽管家庭参与的各个组成部分可用于操作性地界定研究对象群体，但在该群体内部必须进一步区分具有家族企业本质特征的个体与不具备此特征的个体。若缺乏此类区分，关于家族企业的统计数据与研究发现可能存在不一致、不可靠或无法调和的情况。最终，这将导致对家族企业缺乏科学理解、解释或预测能力。

We reviewed over 250 papers in the family business literature. From these, we excluded those that did not define a family business explicitly, those wherein a definition had been repeated by the same author(s) in another paper, and those that did not attempt to differentiate family businesses from non-family ones. As an example of the last case, Beckhard and Dyer (1983) define a family business as the system that includes the business, the family, the founder, and such linking organizations as the board of directors. A list of 21 definitions that touch on the degree or nature of family involvement is presented in Table 1 below.
我们审查了家族企业文献中的 250 多篇论文。其中，我们排除了未明确界定家族企业、作者在其他论文中重复使用相同定义，以及未尝试区分家族企业与非家族企业的研究。以最后一种情况为例，Beckhard 和 Dyer（1983）将家族企业定义为包括企业、家族、创始人以及董事会等关联组织在内的系统。表 1 列出了 21 个涉及家族参与程度或性质的定义。

Several observations can be made about these definitions. First, with few exceptions, the definitions do not differentiate between governance and management. Second, some require controlling ownership or family management alone while others require both ownership and management. Thus, the definitions include three qualifying combinations of ownership and management.
关于这些定义，可以提出以下几点观察。首先，除少数例外情况外，这些定义并未区分治理与管理。其次，部分定义仅要求控制所有权或家族管理，而另一些则要求同时具备所有权和管理权。因此，这些定义涵盖了所有权与管理权的三种组合形式。
(A) family owned and family managed;
(A) 家族拥有并由家族管理；
(B) family owned but not family managed; and
(B) 家族所有但非家族经营；以及
© family managed but not family owned.
© 由家族管理，但非家族所有。

All of the definitions in Table 1 consider combination (A) to be a family business. There is disagreement, however, on the other two combinations, although most authors seem to prefer combination (B) over ©.
表 1 中的所有定义均将组合（A）视为家族企业。然而，对于其他两种组合，存在不同意见，尽管大多数作者似乎更倾向于组合（B）而非©。

Third, while some definitions do not require family ownership, those that do imply, explicitly or implicitly, controlling ownership, although they differ with respect to the acceptable patterns of controlling ownership. The list of controlling owners include:
第三，虽然有些定义并不要求家族所有权，但那些要求家族所有权的定义，无论是明示还是暗示，都意味着控制性所有权，尽管它们在可接受的控制性所有权模式方面存在差异。控制性所有者的列表包括：

Alcorn, 1982  阿尔科恩，1982

Babicky, 1987  巴比奇，1987

Barnes & Hershon, 1976  巴恩斯与赫尔肖恩，1976
Bernard, 1975  伯纳德，1975
Carsrud, 1994  卡斯鲁德，1994
Churchill & Hatten, 1993
丘吉尔与哈滕，1993

Davis, 1983  戴维斯，1983

Davis & Tagiuri, 1985  戴维斯与塔吉里，1985
Donckels & Frohlich, 1991
唐克尔斯与弗罗利希，1991
Donnelley, 1964  唐纳利，1964

Dreux, 1990  德鲁埃，1990

Gallo & Sveen, 1991  加洛与斯文，1991
Handler, 1989  处理器，1989
Holland & Oliver, 1992
霍兰德与奥利弗，1992
Lansberg, Perrow, Rogolsky (1988)
兰斯伯格、佩罗、罗戈尔斯基（1988）
Leach, et al (1990)
李奇等人（1990）

Lyman, 1991  莱曼，1991

Pratt & Davis, 1986
普拉特与戴维斯，1986

Rosenblatt, deMik, Anderson, & Johnson, 1985
罗森布拉特、德米克、安德森与约翰逊，1985

Stern, 1986  斯特恩，1986
Welsch, 1993  韦尔施，1993

a profit-making concern that is either a proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. . . . If part of the stock is publicly owned, the family must also operate the business (p. 230).
以营利为目的的经济实体，可以是个人独资企业、合伙企业或公司。……如果部分股份为公众所有，家庭必须继续经营该企业（第 230 页）。
is the kind of small business started by one or a few individuals who had an idea, worked hard to develop it, and achieved, usually with limited capital, growth while maintaining majority ownership of the enterprise (p. 25)
是指由一两个人或少数人创办的小型企业，他们拥有一个创意，通过努力将其发展壮大，通常在资金有限的情况下实现增长，同时保持对企业的多数所有权。（第 25 页）
Controlling ownership is rested in the hands of an individual or of the members of a single family (p. 106)
所有权的控制权掌握在个人或单一家庭的成员手中（第 106 页）
an enterprise which, in practice, is controlled by the members of a single family (p. 42)
在实际操作中，由单一家族成员控制的企业（第 42 页）
closely-held firm’s ownership and policy making are dominated by members of an “emotional kinship group” (p. 40)
紧密控制的企业所有权和决策权主要由一个“情感亲属群体”的成员掌控（第 40 页）。
what is usually meant by family business. . . . is either the occurrence or the anticipation that a younger family member has or will assume control of the business from the elder (p. 52)
通常所说的“家族企业”……指的是家族中较年轻成员已经或将要从年长成员手中接管企业控制权的情况（第 52 页）
are those whose policy and direction are subject to significant influence by one or more family units. This influence is exercised through ownership and sometimes through the participation of family members in management (p. 47)
是指那些政策和方向受到一个或多个家庭单位显著影响的实体。这种影响主要通过所有权实现，有时也通过家庭成员参与管理来实现。（第 47 页）
a business in which two or more extended family members influence the direction of the business (quoted in Rothstein, 1992)
由两个或更多扩展家庭成员影响企业经营方向的商业模式（引自 Rothstein, 1992）
if family members own at least 60 percent of the equity (p. 152)
如果家庭成员拥有至少 60%的股权（第 152 页）
when it has been closely identified with at least two generations of a family and when this link has had a mutual influence on company policy and on the interests and objectives of the family (p. 94)
当企业与至少两代家庭成员紧密相连，且这种联系对公司政策以及家庭的利益和目标产生相互影响时（第 94 页）
are economic enterprises that happen to be controlled by one or more families (that have) a degree of influence in organizational governance sufficient to substantially influence or compel action (p. 226)
是指由一个或多个家庭控制的经济企业，这些家庭在组织治理中拥有足够的影响力，能够实质性地影响或迫使企业采取行动。（第 226 页）
a business where a single family owns the majority of stock and has total control (p. 181)
由单一家族拥有大部分股份并拥有完全控制权的企业（第 181 页）
an organization whose major operating decisions and plans for leadership succession are influenced by family members serving in management or on the board (p. 262)
一个组织，其主要经营决策和领导层继任计划受到在管理层或董事会任职的家庭成员的影响（第 262 页）
any business in which decisions regarding its ownership or management are influenced by a relationship to a family or families (p. 27)
任何在决策过程中，其所有权或管理权受到与家庭或多个家庭关系影响的商业活动。（第 27 页）
a business in which members of a family have legal control over ownership (p. 2)
一种由家庭成员依法拥有所有权的商业组织（第 2 页）
a company in which more than 50 percent of the voting shares are controlled by one family, and/or a single family group effectively controls the firm, and/or a significant proportion of the firm’s senior management is members from the same family (quoted by Astrachan, 1993, pp. 341-342)
一家公司，其中超过 50%的投票权股份由一个家庭控制，和/或一个单一家庭集团实际上控制着该公司，和/或该公司高级管理层中有一部分成员来自同一个家庭（引自 Astrachan，1993，第 341-342 页）
the ownership had to reside completely with family members, at least one owner had to be employed in the business, and one other family member had either to be employed in the business or to help out on a regular basis even if not officially employed (p. 304)
所有权必须完全归属于家庭成员，至少一名所有者必须在该企业中就业，且另一名家庭成员必须在该企业中就业或以非正式方式定期协助工作（即使未正式雇佣）（第 304 页）
one in which two or more extended family members influence the direction of the business through the exercise of kinship ties, management roles, or ownership rights (chap. 3, p. 2)
一种由两个或更多 extended family members 通过行使亲属关系、管理角色或所有权来影响企业方向的模式（第 3 章，第 2 页）。
any business in which majority ownership or control lies within a single family and in which two or more family members are or at some time were directly involved in the business (pp, 4-5)
任何由单一家族拥有多数股权或控制权，且其中两名或两名以上家族成员目前或曾经直接参与该业务的商业实体。（第 4-5 页）
owned and run by the members of one or two families (p. xxi)
由一两个家庭的成员拥有并经营（第 xx 页）
one in which ownership is concentrated, and owners or relatives of owners are involved in the management process. (p. 40)
一种所有权高度集中的经济组织形式，其中所有者或所有者的亲属参与管理过程。（第 40 页）
(1) an individual;  (1) 个人；
(2) two persons, unrelated by blood or marriage;
(2) 两人，无血缘关系或婚姻关系；
(3) two persons, related by blood or marriage;
(3) 两人，具有血缘关系或婚姻关系；
(4) a nuclear family;
(4) 核心家庭；
(5) more than one nuclear family;
(5) 超过一个核心家庭；
(6) an extended family;
(6) 扩大家庭；
(7) more than one extended family; and
(7) 两个或两个以上的大家庭；以及
(8) the public.  (8) 公众。

Those definitions that are based on family ownership unanimously consider ownership by a nuclear family to be a qualifying ownership pattern. They disagree, however, about all the others, especially the last one, public ownership.
基于家庭所有权的定义一致认为，核心家庭的所有权是一种符合条件的拥有模式。然而，它们对其他所有权模式存在分歧，尤其是最后一种，即公有制。

In summary, there appears to be total agreement that a business owned and managed by a nuclear family is a family business. Once one deviates from that particular combination of ownership pattern and management involvement, however, researchers hold different opinions.
综上所述，似乎存在普遍共识，即由核心家庭拥有并管理的业务属于家族企业。然而，一旦偏离这种特定的所有权结构与管理参与模式的组合，研究者们则持有不同观点。

A definition of the family business must identify its uniqueness because it is the uniqueness (or our belief in the existence of this uniqueness) that makes business management a field worthy of differentiation and study. What is this uniqueness? It is not the fact that the members of a family own and/or manage a business, although those characteristics are certainly present and important. No, what makes a family business unique is that the pattern of ownership, governance, management, and succession materially influences the firm’s goals, strategies, structure, and the manner in which each is formulated, designed, and implemented. In other words, we study family businesses because researchers believe that the family component shapes the business in a way that the family members of executives in non-family firms do not and cannot (Lansberg, 1983).
对家族企业的定义必须明确其独特性，因为正是这种独特性（或我们对这种独特性存在的信念）使得企业管理成为一个值得区分和研究的领域。这种独特性是什么？它并非仅仅因为家族成员拥有和/或管理一家企业，尽管这些特征确实存在且重要。不，使家族企业独一无二的是，所有权、治理、管理和继任模式对企业的目标、战略、结构以及这些要素的制定、设计和实施方式产生实质性影响。换言之，我们研究家族企业是因为研究者认为，家族成分以一种非家族企业高管的家族成员无法做到的方式塑造了企业（Lansberg, 1983）。

To illustrate, take the central debate on family business definitions hinging on ownership and management and, sometimes, succession. Clearly, a business owned and managed by a nuclear family is a family business. By necessity, it will be operated with the intention to pursue a desired future for the family and in accordance with their values and preferences. Family dynamics will affect decisions/actions and those decisions/ actions will assuredly be different from firms with neither family ownership nor family management to influence them.
例如，以家族企业定义的核心争议为例，该争议主要围绕所有权与管理权，有时还涉及继承问题。显然，由核心家庭成员拥有并管理的业务即为家族企业。出于必然性，此类企业将以实现家族的未来愿景为目标，并遵循家族的价值观与偏好进行运营。家族内部动态将影响决策与行动，而这些决策与行动必然与那些既无家族所有权也无家族管理影响的企业存在显著差异。

How about firms that are family owned but not managed or family managed but not owned? Some of these firms will behave in a fashion that is markedly similar to that of a firm owned and managed by a nuclear family and some will not. As a consequence, one must conclude that some of these firms are family businesses and some are not. If we define family business as only those that are family owned and managed, we would be excluding many firms that are family businesses. On the other hand, if we include as family businesses all firms that are either family owned but not family managed or family managed but not family owned, we would be including many firms that do not belong.
对于那些由家族拥有但未由家族管理，或由家族管理但未由家族拥有的企业，情况如何？其中部分企业会表现出与由核心家族拥有并管理的家族企业极为相似的行为特征，而另一些则不会。因此，我们必须得出结论：其中部分企业属于家族企业，而另一些则不属于。如果我们将家族企业仅定义为那些由家族拥有且管理的，我们将排除许多实际上是家族企业的公司。另一方面，如果我们将所有那些由家族拥有但未由家族管理的，或由家族管理但未由家族拥有的公司都归类为家族企业，我们将包括许多不属于家族企业的公司。

How can we tell when ownership or management by a family makes a firm a family business? A firm wholly owned by a family may be treated as a passive portfolio investment. At the other end, a family-managed but not family-owned firm may be operated predominantly to pursue the aspirations of the family managing the firm with the corresponding benefits for that family or it may be operated for the benefit of unrelated shareholders. Making matters worse, there are no clear-cut demarcations on how much
如何判断一家企业因家族所有或家族管理而成为家族企业？一家完全由家族拥有的企业可能被视为被动投资组合。另一方面，一家由家族管理但非家族拥有的企业可能主要为了实现管理该企业的家族的愿景而运营，并相应地为该家族带来利益，也可能为了与家族无关的股东的利益而运营。更复杂的是，关于家族所有或家族管理在多大程度上构成家族企业，目前尚无明确的界定标准。
ownership or management is necessary to qualify the firm as a family business. Should it be complete ownership, majority ownership, or controlling ownership? The presence or absence of a successor offers no better solution to this difficulty.
所有权或管理权是认定企业为家族企业的必要条件。是完全所有权、多数所有权还是控制性所有权？继任者的存在与否也无法为这一难题提供更好的解决方案。

There must be a primary theoretical imperative that makes the study of family business as a unique type of organization worthwhile. Otherwise, there is no need for differentiation from the study of other types of business. Therefore, we argue that any attempt to define a family business must start at the theoretical level. For this purpose, we distinguish between two types of definitions: theoretical and operational.
研究家族企业作为一种独特组织形式的价值，必然存在一个主要的理论依据。否则，就没有必要将其与其他类型企业的研究区分开来。因此，我们认为，任何试图定义家族企业的尝试都必须从理论层面出发。为此，我们将定义分为两类：理论定义和操作定义。

A theoretical definition should distinguish one entity, object, or phenomenon from another based on a conceptual foundation of how the entity, object, or phenomenon is different and why the differences matter. An operational definition, on the other hand, merely identifies the observable and measurable characteristics that differentiate the entity, object, or phenomenon from others.
理论定义应基于概念基础，通过阐明某一实体、对象或现象与其他同类实体、对象或现象在性质上的差异及其差异的重要性，来区分这些实体、对象或现象。而操作性定义则仅通过识别某一实体、对象或现象与其他同类实体、对象或现象在可观察和可测量特征上的差异，来区分这些实体、对象或现象。

For example, in the field of strategic management, differences in firm strategy are theoretically defined as the varying characteristics of the match that each organization achieves or intends to achieve between its internal resources and environmental opportunities (Chrisman, Hofer, & Bolton, 1988), with the belief that the nature of this match affects organizational performance. Operationally, however, differences in organizational strategies are defined by using the components of strategy, such as competitive weapons and scope (Porter, 1980), investment intensity (Hofer & Schendel, 1978), growth vectors (Ansoff, 1965), segment differentiation (Abell, 1980), and functional policies (Hatten, 1974).
例如，在战略管理领域，企业战略的差异在理论上被定义为每个组织在内部资源与环境机会之间所实现或旨在实现的匹配特征的差异（Chrisman、Hofer & Bolton，1988），认为这种匹配的性质会影响组织绩效。然而，在操作层面，组织战略的差异则通过战略的组成部分来定义，例如竞争武器和范围（Porter，1980），投资强度（Hofer & Schendel，1978），增长向量（Ansoff，1965），市场细分（Abell，1980），以及职能政策（Hatten，1974）。

Both types of definition are needed to study family firms. The theoretical definition sets the paradigm for the field of study and the standard against which the efficacy of an operational one must be measured. Without a theoretical definition and the rationale for it, there is no standard for determining the validity of any operational definition used by researchers and such a definition becomes a matter of convenience. On the other hand, without an operational definition, the theoretical definition cannot be applied. Continuing the example, the vast literature in strategic management suggests that the components by which strategy has been operationalized are valid because they are reliable means for identifying essential differences in organizational strategies and they empirically explain why there are differences in organizational performance.
研究家族企业需要两种类型的定义。理论定义为该研究领域确立了研究范式，并为衡量操作性定义的有效性提供了标准。若缺乏理论定义及其合理性依据，研究者使用的任何操作性定义都缺乏判断其有效性的标准，此时该定义 merely 成为一种方便的工具。另一方面，没有操作性定义，理论定义就无法应用。以战略管理为例，该领域的大量文献表明，用于 operationalize 战略的组成部分是有效的，因为它们是识别组织战略本质差异的可靠手段，并且在经验上解释了组织绩效差异的原因。

With the widely varying opinions, we further believe that a theoretical definition should be biased toward being inclusive rather than exclusive for several reasons. First, it seems unreasonable to use a definition that excludes a large number of family businesses that insist they are so or that a significant group of scholars believe are so and include in their research samples. An exclusive definition would not only ensure continual disagreement but would also require the dismissal of a large portion of our knowledge base as irrelevant.
鉴于存在广泛分歧的观点，我们进一步认为，理论定义应倾向于包容而非排他，原因如下。首先，使用一个排除大量自认为是家族企业或被学者认为是家族企业并纳入研究样本的定义，似乎并不合理。排他性定义不仅会导致持续的争议，还会要求将我们知识体系中大量内容视为无关紧要而予以排除。

In empirical research, an inclusive definition will lead to a more thorough understanding of the family business. Using an inclusive definition requires the researcher to include these other combinations and groups in the database and to collect data on variables that may differentiate one combination or group from another. If a variable is later found to be an insignificant determinant of family involvement, family influence, or family business performance because it is invariant or random across groups, then it may be discarded. Meanwhile, our understanding and our confidence in the empirical results will be enhanced. Furthermore, it will lead to the discovery and classification of homogeneous populations of family firms about which generalizations can be made.
在实证研究中，一个包容性的定义将有助于更全面地理解家族企业。采用包容性定义要求研究者在数据库中纳入这些其他组合和群体，并收集可能区分不同组合或群体变量数据。如果某个变量后来被发现对家族参与度、家族影响力或家族企业绩效不具有显著影响，因为其在不同群体中不存在差异或随机分布，则可将其剔除。与此同时，我们对实证结果的理解和信心将得到增强。此外，这将有助于发现和分类具有共同特征的家族企业群体，从而能够对这些群体进行概括。

When researchers and practitioners define family business in different ways, it becomes difficult to determine whether the results of one study using a particular definition apply to family businesses excluded by that definition. Research results from different studies are difficult to reconcile because one study that defines a family busi-
当研究人员和实践者以不同方式定义家族企业时，就难以确定某项研究采用特定定义所得出的结果是否适用于被该定义排除的家族企业。不同研究的结果难以协调，因为一项研究中对家族企业的定义可能与另一项研究中使用的定义存在差异。
ness by its management and another by ownership will include a number of firms that are excluded from the other. As a result, the samples will not be homogeneous and it will be virtually impossible to partial out the impact on the findings of the non-overlapping firms in the samples. Therefore, we favor a very broad definition within which different types of family businesses can be identified, classified, and compared. This would permit the development of a hierarchical classification of family businesses. Identifying the common bonds among all types of family businesses, while acknowledging the factors that differentiate one type from another, will sharpen our ability to generalize the findings of research to the appropriate population and act as a convenient information storage and retrieval system (Chrisman et al., 1988).
由管理层控制的家族企业与由所有者控制的家族企业将包含一些被排除在另一类之外的企业。因此，样本将不具有同质性，几乎不可能将样本中不重叠的企业对研究结果的影响单独分离出来。因此，我们倾向于采用一个非常广泛的定义，以便识别、分类和比较不同类型的家族企业。这将使我们能够建立一个家族企业的分层分类体系。在承认不同类型家族企业之间差异因素的同时，识别所有类型家族企业之间的共同特征，将提升我们对研究结果进行泛化并应用于适当人群的能力，并作为便捷的信息存储与检索系统（Chrisman 等，1988）。

Our purpose here is to propose a theoretical definition. We believe that a theoretical definition of family business must help us distinguish it from other businesses. It is obvious from our previous discussion that once one deviates from the nuclear familyowned and managed business, there is considerable disagreement and ambiguity about which other combination still makes up a family business. Previous authors have tried to define the family business by its ownership and management but companies with the same level of family involvement in ownership and management may or may not consider themselves family businesses and, more importantly, may or may not behave as family businesses.
我们的目的是提出一个理论定义。我们认为，对家族企业的理论定义必须帮助我们将其与其他企业区分开来。从我们之前的讨论中可以明显看出，一旦偏离核心家庭所有和管理的业务，关于哪些其他组合仍构成家族企业，存在相当大的分歧和模糊性。先前学者曾试图通过所有权和管理权来定义家族企业，但拥有相同程度家族参与所有权和管理权的公司，可能并不认为自己是家族企业，更重要的是，它们可能并不以家族企业的方式运作。

A complete enumeration of the parts seldom gives us the essence of the whole. Surely, the nature of a family business must transcend its components in terms of family involvement in ownership and management. By this, we do not mean that the components are not needed in research. Instead, we simply insist that a theoretical definition must capture the essence differentiating family businesses from all other firms. The components merely make the essence possible. The existence of the components may be necessary but not sufficient; they must have been used to create the essence that makes the business distinct from non-family firms. The presence or absence of the essence is what allows researchers and the family firms themselves to classify firms with the same level of family involvement as family businesses or otherwise.
对组成部分的完整列举很少能揭示整体的本质。显然，家族企业的本质必然超越其组成部分，尤其体现在家族成员在所有权和管理中的参与程度。这并非意味着这些组成部分在研究中不重要。我们只是坚持认为，理论定义必须捕捉到区分家族企业与其他所有企业的本质特征。组成部分 merely 使这种本质成为可能。组成部分的存在可能是必要的，但并非充分条件；它们必须被用于创造使企业与非家族企业区分开来的本质。本质的存在或缺失，正是研究者和家族企业自身能够将具有相同家族参与程度的企业分类为家族企业或其他类型的依据。

We propose that a company is a family business because it behaves as one and that this behavior is distinct from that of non-family firms. This approach to defining a family business may appear tautological but it is not, as long as we define the distinct behavior that makes a business a family business.
我们提出，一家公司之所以被视为家族企业，是因为它表现得像一个家庭，而这种行为与非家族企业截然不同。这种定义家族企业的方法看似自相矛盾，但只要我们明确界定使一家企业成为家族企业的独特行为，这种定义便成立。

If a family business is a matter of behavior of the people who own and/or govern and/or manage the firm, then they must behave as they do to serve a purpose. We believe that this purpose is to shape and pursue the vision of one or a few families that control the dominant coalition in the firm. By vision, we simply mean a notion of a better future for the family, with the business operated as a vehicle to help achieve that desired future state. This concept of vision is akin to Freeman’s (1984) definition of “enterprise strategy” in that it deals with what the business stands for with respect to the family and its future involvement in the business. Thus, our definition of vision is not necessarily the technical one consisting of “core values, core purpose, big-hairy-audacious-goals, and vivid description” (Collins & Porras, 1996).
如果家族企业本质上是企业所有者、管理者或治理者行为的体现，那么他们的行为必须服务于特定目的。我们认为，这一目的在于塑造并追求控制企业主导联盟的一两个家族的愿景。我们所说的“愿景”仅仅指对家庭更美好未来的构想，而企业则作为实现这一理想未来状态的工具。这一愿景概念与弗里曼（Freeman，1984）对“企业战略”的定义相似，即关注企业对家庭及其未来参与企业事务的意义。因此，我们的愿景定义并非指由“核心价值观、核心使命、宏大目标和生动描述”组成的技术性定义（Collins & Porras, 1996）。

Dominant coalition is intended here to include the powerful actors in an organization who control the overall organizational agenda (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). With controlling ownership, the family’s endeavor to shape and pursue its vision may have a greater potential for continuity. But, even without controlling ownership, it may still last through generations as long as the owners allow the dominant coalition to continue.
主导联盟在此指组织中掌握整体组织议程的强大行为者（Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Mason, 1984）。通过控制所有权，家族塑造并追求其愿景的努力可能具有更大的延续潜力。然而，即使缺乏控制所有权，只要所有者允许主导联盟继续存在，家族企业仍可能代代相传。

To summarize, we believe that the essence of a family business consists of a vision developed by a dominant coalition controlled by one or a few families and the intention of that dominant condition to continue shaping and pursuing the vision in such a way that it is potentially sustainable across generations of the family. We use intention instead of ability because a financially failing family business does not cease to be a family business. To capture this and be inclusive of all other definitions in the literature, we propose the following definition:
综上所述，我们认为家族企业的本质在于由一个或几个家族控制的 dominant coalition 所制定的愿景，以及该 dominant coalition 持续塑造和追求该愿景的意图，以确保该愿景在家族世代更替中具有潜在的可持续性。我们使用“意图”而非“能力”，因为一个在财务上陷入困境的家族企业并不因此而停止成为家族企业。为了捕捉这一核心概念并包容文献中其他所有定义，我们提出以下定义：

The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families.
家族企业是指由同一家族成员或少数几个家族成员控制的 dominant coalition（主导联盟）以塑造和追求该企业愿景为目的，并以可能在家族或家族群体中代际延续的方式进行治理和/或管理的商业实体。

By this definition, a family business is one because its vision is shaped and pursued by a dominant coalition controlled by a family or a small number of families. Significantly, the definition does not specify the particular family members to whom the vision belongs, the owners or the managing group. Neither does it stipulate that this vision must serve only the interests of the family because the desired future may be partly concerned with society in general.
根据这一定义，家族企业之所以成为家族企业，是因为其愿景由一个由家族或少数家族控制的 dominant coalition 塑造并追求。值得注意的是，该定义并未明确指出愿景的具体归属对象是家族成员、所有者还是管理层。此外，它也没有规定该愿景必须仅服务于家族利益，因为所追求的未来可能部分涉及社会整体利益。

The definition subsumes family ownership and family management of business as parts that make pursuit of the vision possible. Therefore, it provides a rationale for the literature’s preoccupation with these involvements. Since it is sufficient that the family controls the dominant coalition, the family does not necessarily need ownership control. It incorporates all those definitions that emphasize the family’s influence on the strategic direction of the firm (e.g., Davis, 1983; Davis & Tagiuri, 1985; Donnelley, 1964; Handler, 1989; Pratt & Davis, 1986).
该定义将家族所有权和家族管理视为实现愿景的必要组成部分。因此，它为文献中对这些参与因素的关注提供了理论依据。由于只要家族控制主导联盟即可，家族并不一定需要拥有所有权控制。它涵盖了所有强调家族对企业战略方向影响的定义（例如，Davis, 1983；Davis & Tagiuri, 1985；Donnelley, 1964；Handler, 1989；Pratt & Davis, 1986）。

By requiring potential cross-generational sustainability the definition incorporates controlling ownership as the predominant means to maintain or continually shape the vision. Sustainability across generations includes those definitions that insist upon the availability of a family successor since such availability facilitates the sustained pursuit of a vision across generations. Because there only has to be the potential for crossgenerational sustainability, the definition accepts family businesses owned by couples with young or no children, or those that pursue a vision of the family business as a vehicle to educate the next generation for careers that exclude involvement in the business. Finally, because it is the potential sustainability of the vision that is important, our definition also permits the vision to change, although we would not anticipate the vision to change as frequently as business goals and strategies. Therefore, a firm that changes its vision does not cease to be a family business provided that two conditions are met: (1) that the dominant coalition instituting the change is controlled by members of the family, and (2) that the vision for the business continues to operate as a vehicle for achieving a desired future state of the family.
通过要求潜在的跨代可持续性，该定义将控制所有权作为维持或持续塑造愿景的主要手段。跨代可持续性包括那些坚持要求存在家族继任者的定义，因为这种存在有助于在代际之间持续追求愿景。由于只需存在跨代可持续性的潜力，该定义接受由夫妻（无论是否有子女）拥有且追求将家族企业作为培养下一代从事与企业无关职业的载体之家族企业。最后，由于重要的是愿景的潜在可持续性，我们的定义也允许愿景发生变化，尽管我们不预期愿景会像商业目标和战略那样频繁改变。因此，若满足以下两个条件，一家改变愿景的企业仍可被视为家族企业：（1）推动变革的主导联盟由家族成员控制；（2）企业愿景继续作为实现家族理想未来状态的载体发挥作用。

The definition includes those firms wherein family involvement takes the form of successive generations of management but not ownership; but it excludes, as it should, those situations where the powerful chief executive of a publicly held company manages during his or her lifetime to pursue his or her own vision, as long as the leadership does not have the potential of passing to the chief executive’s spouse, children, or sibling. And, if this does occur, then our definition would consider the business a family business as some of the definitions in Table 1 (e.g., Carsrud, 1994) imply, because the business will be operated with the intention to pursue across generations the vision of a dominant coalition controlled by a family.
该定义包括那些家族参与以管理层代际更替的形式存在但不涉及所有权的企業；但它应排除那些情况，即上市公司中拥有强大权力的首席执行官在其有生之年追求个人愿景，只要领导权没有可能转移给首席执行官的配偶、子女或兄弟姐妹。如果这种情况确实发生，那么根据表 1 中的一些定义（例如 Carsrud，1994），我们的定义将认为该企业为家族企业，因为该企业将以跨代追求由家族控制的 dominant coalition 的愿景为目的进行运营。

The definition does not imply that the vision is or should be shared by all, or even a majority of the members of the family group; nor should it since it is well known that
该定义并不意味着该愿景应由家庭群体中的所有成员或甚至大多数成员共享；也不应如此，因为众所周知，
families are often conflicted and factional (Dyer, 1986). Indeed, the concept of a dominant coalition suggests some amount of opposition. What is required, however, is the power on the part of the holders of the vision to put it into practice.
家庭往往充满矛盾和派系（戴尔，1986）。事实上，主导联盟的概念本身就暗示着一定程度的反对。然而，真正需要的却是那些掌握愿景的人具备将愿景付诸实践的权力。

At certain stages of its development, a family firm may be more preoccupied with shaping rather than pursuing a vision. During these times, it may appear that there are only factions but no dominant coalition. Our definition would accommodate this situation because the powerful actors in the organization who control the organizational agenda, upon whom we base our definition of a dominant coalition, will be engaged, collectively if not cooperatively, in shaping the desired future of the firm. Furthermore, on a daily basis, the firm will be maintaining a vision that was shaped previously by a dominant coalition controlled by the family.
在家族企业发展的某些阶段，企业可能更关注塑造而非追求愿景。在此期间，企业内部可能看似只有派系而无主导联盟。我们的定义能够涵盖这种情况，因为组织中掌握组织议程的强大行为者——即我们定义主导联盟的基础——将以集体方式（即使不是合作方式）参与塑造企业未来愿景。此外，在日常运营中，企业将维持由家族控制的主导联盟此前塑造的愿景。

Table 2 shows that this theoretical definition does not exclude any of the previously mentioned combinations of family involvement or patterns of controlling ownership used in the literature to define a family business. If the business is family owned then the family most likely will have developed the vision being pursued or acceded to it. If the family-owned business is also family managed, then the potential for the next generation to be involved in both ownership and management exists. If the family-owned business is not family managed, there is always the potential for the next generation to continue pursuing the same vision or even re-assume management control if so desired.
表 2 表明，这一理论定义并未排除文献中用于定义家族企业时所提及的任何家族参与形式或控制所有权模式的组合。如果企业为家族所有，那么家族很可能已经制定了所追求的愿景，或已接受该愿景。如果家族企业同时由家族管理，那么下一代参与所有权和管理层的可能性存在。如果家族企业并非由家族管理，那么下一代继续追求同一愿景或甚至重新获得管理控制权的可能性始终存在。

Of the combinations of family involvement, many researchers have the most problem classifying the family-managed but not family-owned firm as a family business. Of the patterns of ownership, that of a publicly held company is least acceptable. Both can be accommodated under our definition. The requirements are that: the managing family must control the dominant coalition that developed the vision for the firm and one or more members of the managing family must be able, willing, and approved by the dominant coalition to take over and continue pursuing the vision.
在家庭参与的各种组合中，许多研究者在将“家庭管理但非家庭所有”的企业归类为家族企业时遇到了最大困难。在所有权模式中，上市公司是最难以接受的。这两种情况均可纳入我们的定义范围。具体要求为：管理家族必须控制制定企业愿景的 dominant coalition，且管理家族中至少有一名成员具备能力、意愿并获得 dominant coalition 批准，能够接任并继续追求该愿景。

It is obvious from the above that all family-owned and family-managed firms are family businesses according to our theoretical definition. While the definition does not exclude the possibility of firms fitting any of the other previously mentioned combinations of family involvement or patterns of controlling ownership, firms with acceptable combinations of family involvement and patterns of controlling ownership do not necessarily qualify as family businesses under the definition; it depends on their vision. Simply stated, if: (1) a family-controlled dominant coalition has shaped the vision that is being pursued or intends to shape and pursue a new vision and (2) the intention or behavior is potentially sustainable across generations, the business is a family business. If either of these conditions is not met, the business is not a family business.
从上述内容可以明显看出，根据我们的理论定义，所有家族拥有和家族管理的 firms 都是家族企业。虽然该定义并未排除 firms 符合之前提到的其他任何家族参与组合或控制所有权模式的可能性，但符合家族参与和控制所有权模式的可接受组合的 firms 并不一定符合家族企业的定义；这取决于其愿景。简而言之，如果：（1）一个由家族控制的 dominant coalition 已经塑造了正在追求的愿景，或者有意塑造并追求新的愿景，并且（2）这种意图或行为在代际之间具有潜在的可持续性，那么该企业就是家族企业。如果这两个条件中任一条件不满足，该企业就不是家族企业。

To reiterate, the components of family involvement-ownership, management, governance, and succession-are the most convenient observable and measurable means for segregating the population of study, but firms having acceptable combinations of family involvement may, nevertheless, not qualify or not consider themselves to be family businesses. Therefore, the definition does require that any empirical study of family business collect data on the firm’s vision (in particular, how the business and the family are related to one another) and who shaped or developed it in order to ensure the firms classified as family business are indeed so. As a result, it suggests a direction of research that has not been actively pursued in the literature.
再次强调，家庭参与的四个组成部分——所有权、管理、治理和继任——是区分研究对象群体最方便、可观察且可量化的手段。然而，即使某些企业具备家庭参与的合理组合，它们仍可能不符合家庭企业的定义，或不自认为是家庭企业。因此，该定义要求任何对家族企业进行实证研究时，必须收集有关企业愿景（特别是企业与家族之间如何相互关联）以及谁塑造或发展了该愿景的数据，以确保被归类为家族企业的企业确实符合该定义。这表明，文献中尚未积极探索的研究方向。

The definition proposes that research on family business should start with understanding the vision pursued by these firms. Specific questions related to this include: What is the vision? Who develops the vision in family businesses? How are their visions
该定义提出，对家族企业研究应从理解这些企业所追求的愿景开始。与此相关的一些具体问题包括：什么是愿景？在家族企业中，谁来制定愿景？他们的愿景是如何形成的？

developed? Are the visions clear, formally articulated, and communicated or are they implicit in the minds of the senior member or members of the family? Do the visions of family firms change and adapt as frequently as those of non-family firms? Is there continuity in the vision pursued by managers across generations? What effects do these visions have on the measurable objectives, strategies, and structures of family firms? How are these different from non-family firms? Do these differences have significant impacts on the financial and market performances of family firms?
这些愿景是否已经明确？是否以正式的形式表达并传达出来，还是仅仅存在于家族高层成员的脑海中？家族企业的愿景是否与非家族企业一样频繁地发生变化和适应？不同代际的经理人在追求愿景时是否存在连续性？这些愿景对家族企业的可量化目标、战略和结构有何影响？这些与非家族企业有何不同？这些差异是否对家族企业的财务和市场表现产生显著影响？

According to our theoretical definition, a family business is distinguished from others, not on the basis of the components of family involvement, but by how these components are used to pursue the family’s vision. Put differently, the vision provides
根据我们的理论定义，家族企业与其他企业之间的区别并不在于家族成员参与的具体形式，而在于这些形式如何被用于实现家族的愿景。换句话说，愿景提供了
the context, meaning, and reason for family involvement just as a strategy provides the context for the functional policy decisions of the firm. To complete the analogy, functional policies should help us infer a strategy but they are not, taken together, the strategy, just as ownership, management, governance, and succession permit inferences about the vision (and whether a firm is or is not a family business) but their mere summation does not necessarily equal the vision.
家庭参与的背景、意义和原因，正如战略为企业的功能性政策决策提供背景一样。为了完成这个类比，功能性政策应帮助我们推断出战略，但它们本身并非战略。同样，所有权、管理、治理和继任安排允许我们推断出企业的愿景（以及企业是否为家族企业），但它们的简单总和并不一定等于愿景。

One of the ways one can determine if the manner in which a construct is operationalized provides a fair interpretation of that underlying construct is to assess whether or not the operationalized variables provide consistent prediction of other decisions that are theoretically related to the construct. In this section, we report the results of such an exercise using the components of family involvement.
判断一个构念的操作化方式是否能对该构念提供公平解释的一种方法，是评估操作化变量是否能对与该构念在理论上相关的其他决策提供一致的预测。在本节中，我们报告了使用家庭参与的组成部分进行此类分析的结果。

Conceptually, we discussed in the previous section that the population of family businesses is likely to be a subset of the population identified through the components of family involvement. However, the components of family involvement may still form a sound basis for delineating the population for empirical research if they are reliable predictors of intentions. To examine this possibility, we analyzed how the components of family involvement influence a sample of family firms with respect to their concerns over succession and professionalization, two of the most important strategic decisions facing a family business. This approach assumes that the higher the level of concern, the stronger the intention.
从概念上讲，我们在前一节中讨论过，家族企业的总体样本很可能只是通过家族参与的各个组成部分所识别出的总体样本的一个子集。然而，如果家庭参与的组成部分是意图的可靠预测变量，它们仍可作为划分实证研究样本的合理基础。为验证这一可能性，我们分析了家庭参与的组成部分如何影响一家家族企业样本在继任问题和专业化问题上的关注程度，这两者是家族企业面临的最重要的战略决策之一。这一方法假设关注程度越高，意图越强。

There are no national statistics on family business; maybe because there is no uniformly accepted definition of a family business. Therefore, empirical research on family business has had to rely on convenience samples such as the membership lists of professional associations or the mailing lists of family business consultants. This study is no exception and uses both.
目前没有关于家族企业的全国性统计数据；这可能是因为家族企业尚无一个被普遍接受的定义。因此，关于家族企业的实证研究不得不依赖于便利样本，例如专业协会的会员名单或家族企业顾问的邮件列表。本研究也不例外，同时采用了这两种方法。

Following the first approach, we used the mailing list of the Canadian Association of Family Enterprises (CAFE). CAFE is the largest national association of Canadian family firms, with a membership of 585 (approximately $10\mathrm{\%}$$10\mathrm{\%}$10%10 \% family business consultants and bankers) at the time of data collection (fall, 1994). Included in their mailing list are approximately 1,000 non-member family firms.
采用第一种方法，我们使用了加拿大家族企业协会（CAFE）的邮件列表。CAFE 是加拿大最大的全国性家族企业协会，在数据收集时（1994 年秋季），其会员人数为 585 人（其中约有 $10\mathrm{\%}$$10\mathrm{\%}$10%10 \% 名家族企业顾问和银行家）。其邮件列表中还包含约 1,000 家非会员家族企业。

We also selected a random sample of 500 family firms from the more than 4,000 names on the mailing list of Deloitte and Touche (Canada). After eliminating names that were obviously not family firms (e.g., account managers in banks, lawyers in large law firms, etc.) and duplications, questionnaires were sent to 1,725 family firms. This included 483 CAFE members and 1,242 non-CAFE firms.
我们还从德勤（加拿大）的邮件列表中超过 4,000 个企业名称中随机选取了 500 家家族企业。在剔除明显不属于家族企业的名称（如银行的账户经理、大型律师事务所的律师等）及重复记录后，向 1,725 家家族企业发送了问卷。其中包括 483 家 CAFE 会员企业及 1,242 家非 CAFE 会员企业。

Two mailings of the questionnaire were sent to the sample. 211 questionnaires from CAFE members and 274 from non-CAFE members were returned. This yielded a response rate of $44\mathrm{\%}$$44\mathrm{\%}$44%44 \% for CAFE members, $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% for non-members, and $28\mathrm{\%}$$28\mathrm{\%}$28%28 \% overall.
调查问卷分两次寄送给样本群体。共收到 211 份来自 CAFE 成员的问卷和 274 份来自非 CAFE 成员的问卷。这使得 CAFE 成员的回复率为 $44\mathrm{\%}$$44\mathrm{\%}$44%44 \% ，非成员的回复率为 $22\mathrm{\%}$$22\mathrm{\%}$22%22 \% ，总体回复率为 $28\mathrm{\%}$$28\mathrm{\%}$28%28 \% 。

To decrease the possibility that respondents were in fact not family firms, respondents were asked to return the questionnaire if they did not consider themselves a family business. Still, this would not have ensured that the respondents qualify as family firms according to our theoretical definition. Not having collected any data on visions, because the survey was conducted before our development of a theoretical definition for the family business, we further screened the sample and retained only those firms that submitted data indicating that they were family owned and family managed. This left us with a sample of 453 firms.
为了降低受访者实际上并非家族企业的可能性，我们要求受访者若不认为自己的企业属于家族企业，则需退回问卷。然而，这并不能确保受访者符合我们理论定义中的家族企业标准。由于调查开展时我们尚未制定家族企业的理论定义，因此未收集任何关于愿景的数据。为此，我们进一步筛选了样本，仅保留了提交数据表明其为家族所有且家族管理的 firms。最终，我们得到了一个包含 453 家 firms 的样本。

The questionnaire included two parts pertinent to this study: the importance of each
问卷包含与本研究相关的两个部分：每个因素的重要性。
family business issue and information about the business. Relevant pages from the survey questionnaire used to collect the data are shown in Appendix A. In the issue section, respondents were asked to rate the importance of 26 attributes on a seven-point Likert scale. One end, scored as " 0 ", was described as ‘not important’ and the other, scored as " 6 ", as ‘critically important.’
家庭企业问题及企业相关信息。用于收集数据的调查问卷中相关页面见附录 A。在问题部分，受访者被要求对 26 个属性按七点李克特量表进行重要性评分。一端评分为“0”，描述为“不重要”，另一端评分为“6”，描述为“至关重要”。

The business information section asked the respondent about the age of the business, its industry sector (retail, service, wholesale, manufacturing, natural resources, construction), legal form, size (geographical distribution, number of locations, and full-time employees), gross revenues and profitability, number of family and non-family managers in the business, the family’s share of ownership, likelihood of the current president retiring in the next 10 years, generation running the business, the number of family and non-family members on the board of directors, and the number of male and female potential family member successors.
商业信息部分询问了受访者关于企业成立年限、所属行业（零售、服务、批发、制造、自然资源、建筑），法律形式、规模（地理分布、营业地点数量及全职员工人数）、营业收入及盈利情况、企业中家庭成员与非家庭成员管理人员数量、家庭成员的股权比例、现任总裁在未来 10 年内退休的可能性、企业由哪一代人经营、董事会中家庭成员与非家庭成员的数量，以及潜在家庭成员继任者的性别比例。

The average age of the responding CAFE member firms is 42 years, while that of non-member firms is 34 years. Member firms employ an average of 146 employees as opposed to 89 by non-CAFE member firms. Member firms’ median gross revenues is $\mathrm{\$}5.3$$\mathrm{\$}5.3$$5.3\$ 5.3 million and that of non-member firms is $\mathrm{\$}2.1$$\mathrm{\$}2.1$$2.1\$ 2.1 million. Only $29\mathrm{\%}$$29\mathrm{\%}$29%29 \% of member firms are run by first-generation family members, whereas more than half ( $52\mathrm{\%}$$52\mathrm{\%}$52%52 \% ) of nonmember firms are run by the founders. Ninety-seven percent of members and $98\mathrm{\%}$$98\mathrm{\%}$98%98 \% of non-members are privately held. This indicates that member firms are generally larger and older than non-member firms.
CAFE 会员企业的平均年龄为 42 岁，而非会员企业的平均年龄为 34 岁。会员企业平均雇佣 146 名员工，而非 CAFE 会员企业平均雇佣 89 名员工。会员企业的中位数营业收入为 $\mathrm{\$}5.3$$\mathrm{\$}5.3$$5.3\$ 5.3 百万，而非会员企业的中位数营业收入为 $\mathrm{\$}2.1$$\mathrm{\$}2.1$$2.1\$ 2.1 百万。仅有 $29\mathrm{\%}$$29\mathrm{\%}$29%29 \% %的会员企业由第一代家族成员经营，而非会员企业中超过半数（ $52\mathrm{\%}$$52\mathrm{\%}$52%52 \% ）由创始人经营。97%的会员企业和 $98\mathrm{\%}$$98\mathrm{\%}$98%98 \% 的非会员企业为私人所有。这表明会员企业通常规模更大、历史更悠久。

First, we tested for non-response bias. For this, the responses were divided into five batches according to when they were received. ANOVA and MANOVA tests indicate no statistically significant differences between the early and late responses. Second, we tested for homogeneity in the responses from different provinces. Again, tests indicated no statistically significant differences.
首先，我们对无响应偏倚进行了检验。为此，根据响应的接收时间，将响应分为五组。方差分析（ANOVA）和多变量方差分析（MANOVA）结果表明，早期响应与晚期响应之间不存在统计学上的显著差异。其次，我们对不同省份的响应进行了同质性检验。同样，检验结果表明不存在统计学上的显著差异。

To reiterate, the primary purpose of these empirical tests is to determine whether, in differentiating family from non-family businesses, the frequently used components of family involvement in the business-ownership, management, governance, and existence of successors-may, in combination, serve as a substitute for our requirement that the vision be developed and pursued by a dominant coalition controlled by the family. A necessary condition for this to be true is that the components of family involvement be predictors of the intentions of the family. In particular, we test here whether the components of family involvement can be used to predict a family business’s concerns about succession and professionalization. We do this because succession and professionalization are both critical decisions that will be profoundly influenced by vision as desired futures of the family.
再次强调，这些实证测试的主要目的是确定，在区分家族企业与非家族企业时，常用的家族参与要素（包括家族对企业所有权的参与、管理、治理以及继任者的存在）是否能够在组合使用时，替代我们关于“愿景必须由家族控制的 dominant coalition 制定并追求”的要求。这一结论成立的必要条件是，家庭参与的各组成部分能够预测家庭的意图。具体而言，我们在此测试家庭参与的各组成部分是否能够用于预测家族企业对继任和专业化的关注程度。我们这样做是因为继任和专业化都是至关重要的决策，将受到作为家庭理想未来愿景的愿景的深刻影响。

As pointed out earlier, because it is difficult to measure intentions, these empirical tests use concerns as proxies for intentions. The logic used is as follows. The stronger and more consistent the relationship between the components of family involvement and concerns about both succession and professionalization, the stronger the linkage between the operational measures of family involvement and the theoretical construct of vision
如前所述，由于难以直接测量意图，这些实证研究使用关切作为意图的代理变量。其逻辑如下：家庭参与的各个组成部分与对继任和专业化关切之间的关系越强且越一致，家庭参与的操作性测量指标与愿景这一理论构念之间的关联性就越强。
as a distinguishing factor between family and non-family businesses. If this is true, then the operational definitions of family business based on the components of family involvement may be used with confidence because they effectively tap the underlying rationale of our theoretical definition.
作为区分家族企业和非家族企业的关键因素。如果这一观点成立，那么基于家族参与度各组成部分构建的家族企业操作性定义即可被可靠地采用，因为这些定义有效地抓住了我们理论定义背后的核心逻辑。

The two structural equation models we tested are shown in Figures 1 and 2. As shown in Figure 1, we hypothesize that Concerns about Succession (CON_S) is a function of ownership, management, successors, governance, age of the business, complexity of the business, financial performance, and imminence of succession. Inclusion of the variables other than components of family involvement is an attempt to “close the system” in the sense defined by Simon (1954). The model for Concerns about Professionalization (CON_P), shown in Figure 2, has an identical list of independent variables.
我们测试的两个结构方程模型如图 1 和图 2 所示。如图 1 所示，我们假设对继任的担忧（CON_S）是所有权、管理、继任者、治理、企业年龄、企业复杂性、财务表现以及继任迫切性的函数。纳入除家庭参与成分以外的变量，旨在按照西蒙（1954）所定义的意义“封闭系统”。如图 2 所示，专业化担忧（CON_P）的模型具有相同的自变量列表。

Both dependent variables are modelled as latent variables with reflective indicators. CON_S is measured by a firm’s importance ratings for the following issues: maintaining family ownership, maintaining family control, selecting the successor, finding a place in the business for incompetent family members, resolving conflicts among family members, and compensating family members. CON_P is measured by the importance ratings of: involving non-family members in strategic decisions, appointing outside directors, changing to professional management, loyalty of non-family managers, and defining the role of the board. Indicators for the independent variables are shown in Table 3.
两个因变量均被建模为具有反射性指标的潜变量。CON_S 通过企业对以下问题的重视程度评分来衡量：维持家族所有权、维持家族控制权、选拔继任者、为无能力家族成员在企业中安排职位、解决家族成员间冲突，以及补偿家族成员。CON_P 通过以下重要性评分进行测量：非家族成员参与战略决策、任命外部董事、转变为专业管理、非家族经理的忠诚度，以及明确董事会角色。自变量的指标如表 3 所示。

Partial least squares (PLS) was used to validate the two models for several reasons. First, the structural models include latent variables with both reflective and formative indicators. Second, we have a mixture of data types and, of the methods for validating a structural model, PLS makes the fewest assumptions about data type. Third, PLS does
部分最小二乘法（PLS）被用于验证这两个模型，原因有以下几点。首先，结构模型包含具有反射性和形成性指标的潜变量。其次，我们面临多种数据类型，而在验证结构模型的各种方法中，PLS 对数据类型的假设最少。第三，PLS 能够

not require normal distributions. Standard errors were estimated using bootstrap samples of 100 .
不需要正态分布。标准误差是通过 100 个自助样本估计的。

As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the components of family involvement have different influences on the dependent variables. The multiple R-square for the CON_S model is
如表 4 和表 5 所示，家庭参与的各个组成部分对因变量的影响各不相同。CON_S 模型的多重决定系数为

0.25, while that for the CON_P model is 0.12 . Both R-squares are low, indicating that components of family involvement are unlikely to be reliable predictors of intentions.
0.25，而 CON_P 模型的 R 平方值为 0.12。两个 R 平方值均较低，表明家庭参与的各组成部分不太可能成为意图的可靠预测变量。

As estimates for the outer models in Tables 4 and 5 show, the loadings for the indicators of both dependent variables are fairly uniform. Those for CON_S are all greater than 14 times the standard errors, while those for CON_P are all greater than 10
如表 4 和表 5 中外部模型估计结果所示，两个因变量指标的系数分布较为均匀。CON_S 的系数均大于标准误的 14 倍，而 CON_P 的系数均大于标准误的 10 倍。

times the standard errors. This shows that our choices for the indicators are valid and that the measurements of both CON_S and CON_P are reliable.
标准误的倍数。这表明我们选择的指标是合理的，且 CON_S 和 CON_P 的测量结果均具有可靠性。

Regarding the inner models in Tables 4 and 5, it should first be noted that the ownership variable does not show any statistically significant influence on either dependent variables. This, however, is due to the nature of the data. Approximately $80\mathrm{\%}$$80\mathrm{\%}$80%80 \% of the firms in the sample were wholly owned by the family. Therefore, the set of
关于表 4 和表 5 中的内部模型，首先需要指出的是，所有权变量对两个因变量均未显示出统计学上的显著影响。然而，这主要是由于数据的性质所致。样本中约有 $80\mathrm{\%}$$80\mathrm{\%}$80%80 \% 的企业为家族全资所有。因此，所选的
ownership data does not appear to have enough variance to discriminate among the firms. Similarly, financial performance, concerning which a large proportion of firms did not report, does not have any statistically significant influence on either dependent variable.
所有权数据似乎缺乏足够的差异性来区分不同企业。同样，财务绩效（其中大量企业未报告相关数据）对两个因变量均不具有统计学意义上的显著影响。

Family involvement in management has a statistically significant ( $\mathrm{t}=4.8$$\mathrm{t}=4.8$t=4.8\mathrm{t}=4.8 ) direct relationship with CON_S but not with CON_P. Both indicators of family involvement have statistically significant loadings in the CON_S outer model, positive for the number of active family members and negative for the ratio of non-family member managers to active family members. We interpret these results as follows. The more members of the family involved, the more complicated the succession process may become, thus, heightening the family’s concern over succession. The existence or prevalence of non-family managers mitigates the concern beause it enhances the stability and continuity of the business during succession.
家庭参与管理与 CON_S 之间存在统计学上显著（ $\mathrm{t}=4.8$$\mathrm{t}=4.8$t=4.8\mathrm{t}=4.8 ）的直接关系，但与 CON_P 无关。家庭参与管理的两个指标在 CON_S 外层模型中均具有统计学上显著的负荷值，其中活跃家庭成员数量的负荷值为正，而非家庭成员经理与活跃家庭成员比例的负荷值为负。我们对这些结果的解释如下：家庭成员参与越多，继任过程可能越复杂，从而加剧家庭对继任的担忧。非家庭成员经理的存在或普遍存在缓解了这种担忧，因为它在继任过程中增强了企业的稳定性和连续性。

The latent variable successors, as measured by the number of male and female potential family member successors, and the dummy variable indicating the existence of at least one family member successor, has a statistically significant ( $\mathrm{t}=4.6$$\mathrm{t}=4.6$t=4.6\mathrm{t}=4.6 ) direct relationship with CON_S but, again, not with CON_P. This also confirms the intuition that the more potential successors there are the bigger the problem of choosing a successor, resolving family conflicts, etc. It is interesting to note that the number of male family members who are potential successors has a loading more than twice that for the number of females, indicating that Canadian family firms still do not relate to male and female potential successors similarly.
潜在变量继任者（通过男性和女性潜在家庭成员继任者的数量来衡量）以及指示至少存在一名家庭成员继任者的虚拟变量，与 CON_S 存在统计学上显著（ $\mathrm{t}=4.6$$\mathrm{t}=4.6$t=4.6\mathrm{t}=4.6 ）的直接关系，但与 CON_P 无关。这进一步证实了直觉：潜在继任者越多，选择继任者、解决家庭冲突等问题越突出。值得注意的是，男性家庭成员中潜在继任者的数量与女性的数量相比，其权重超过两倍，这表明加拿大家族企业仍未对男性和女性潜在继任者给予同等重视。

Imminence of succession and age of the business also raise the family firm’s CON_S but have no effect on CON_P. Obviously, if the family believes that the incumbent’s retirement is far away, it will not be as concerned about succession issues. The older the business, the more likely it will have knowledge about the difficulties of succession and the higher the probability that the succession would involve cousins rather than siblings, thus increasing concern.
继任迫近与企业年龄也会提升家族企业的 CON_S 指标，但对 CON_P 无影响。显然，若家族认为现任者退休尚远，则不会过分担忧继任问题。企业年龄越长，越可能积累继任困难的经验，且继任更可能涉及表亲而非兄弟姐妹，从而加剧担忧。

Governance, as measured by the percentage of outside directors on the board, has the opposite relationships. It has a statistically significant ( $\mathrm{t}=2.5$$\mathrm{t}=2.5$t=2.5\mathrm{t}=2.5 ) relationship with CON_P but not with CON_S. We have modelled the causality as going from Governance to CON_P, hypothesizing that the more outside directors, the more the firm is driven or committed to professionalization and the greater their concerns over the issues of professionalization. This relationship may also be reversed, since the more the firm is committed to professionalizing management the more likely it would have outside directors. We tested this variation and obtained a decreased R -square ( 0.10 ).
治理水平（以董事会中外部董事的比例衡量）与 CON_P 和 CON_S 呈现相反的关系。治理水平与 CON_P 存在统计显著（ $\mathrm{t}=2.5$$\mathrm{t}=2.5$t=2.5\mathrm{t}=2.5 ）的正相关关系，但与 CON_S 无关。我们假设治理水平对 CON_P 具有因果作用，即治理水平越高，企业越倾向于推动或致力于专业化，且对专业化相关问题越关注。这种关系也可能被逆转，因为企业越致力于管理专业化，越有可能拥有外部董事。我们测试了这种变异性，并得到了较低的 R²值（0.10）。

Complexity of the business, as measured by gross revenues, regional distribution of sales, number of business locations, and number of full-time employees, has no statistically significant relationship with CON_S but raises worries about professionalization. CON_P has the highest loading on loyalty of non-family managers and involving them in strategic decisions. Therefore, we believe the results suggest that the more complex the business, the larger the number of non-family managers upon which the family will have to rely, and the greater the concern with loyalty and involvement.
业务复杂性（以营业收入、销售区域分布、营业网点数量及全职员工数量为衡量指标）与 CON_S 之间不存在统计学上的显著关联，但引发了对专业化程度的担忧。CON_P 在非家族经理的忠诚度及参与战略决策方面具有最高负荷。因此，我们认为研究结果表明，业务越复杂，家族需要依赖的非家族经理人数越多，对忠诚度和参与度的关注也越高。

To summarize, these results are interesting in that they confirm intuition about how different family firm profile variables should affect a firm’s levels of concerns about succession and professionalization. The purpose here; however, is to test how well the components of family involvement predict family business intentions. The low Rsquares obtained for the structural models suggest the following. First, many firms with similar family involvement may have very different intentions. Second, the components of family involvement, while significantly correlated with intentions, are not particularly strong predictors of intentions. These findings suggest that ownership, management, succession, and governance are useful means for initial sample selection but are insuf-
综上所述，这些结果具有一定启示意义，因为它们验证了关于不同家族企业特征变量应如何影响企业对继任和专业化关注程度的直觉。然而，本研究的目的是测试家族参与的各个组成部分对家族企业意图的预测能力。结构模型中较低的 R²值表明以下几点。首先，许多家族参与程度相似的家族企业可能具有截然不同的意图。其次，尽管家族参与的各组成部分与意图显著相关，但它们并非意图的强有力预测变量。这些发现表明，所有权、管理、继任和治理是初始样本选择的有用手段，但不足以作为家族企业意图的预测变量。
ficient for a precise delineation between family and non-family firms. As a consequence, future studies should ensure that questions concerning the vision, intentions, and dominant coalition are included in the study to ensure that the businesses studied are indeed family businesses.
不足以对家族企业和非家族企业进行精确区分。因此，未来研究应确保将关于愿景、意图和主导联盟的问题纳入研究范围，以确保所研究的企业确实属于家族企业。

In addition, the results show that, even for the same sample of family firms, diverse family business management issues are affected by different sets of family involvement components frequently used to define the family business. This finding suggests that these components of family involvement cannot be assumed to delineate businesses with homogeneous intentions without further testing. In other words, family involvement in a business is not necessarily an indication that the family or the business will behave in a fashion consistent with the notion of a family business. Therefore, the results strengthen our belief that the family business should be distinguished theoretically from other businesses by their visions and intentions.
此外，研究结果表明，即使对于同一组家族企业样本，家族企业管理中多样化的问题也常受不同家族参与成分的影响，而这些成分常被用于定义家族企业。这一发现表明，这些家族参与成分不能被视为划分具有同质意图企业的依据，除非经过进一步测试。换言之，家族对企业的参与并不必然意味着家族或企业会以符合家族企业概念的方式行事。因此，研究结果强化了我们的观点，即家族企业应在理论上通过其愿景和意图与其他企业区分开来。

Researchers in the field of family business agree that family involvement in the business makes it unique. This involvement has usually been categorized in terms of ownership and management. Outside of a firm owned and managed by a nuclear family, there appears to be extensive disagreement about what constitutes a family. We find that defining a family business by its components does not capture its essence, which consists of the vision held for the firm by a family or a small group of families and the intention of the dominant condition to shape and pursue this vision, potentially across generations of the same family or small group of families. Consequently, we propose a definition for family business based on these two points. We believe that this definition captures the essence of the family business and incorporates all of the popular variations of family involvement as components that make the essence possible. Its focus on the family firm’s intention to pursue a vision suggests a research direction that has not been actively pursued in the literature.
家族企业研究领域的学者一致认为，家族成员对企业的参与使其具有独特性。这种参与通常被归类为所有权和管理权的参与。在由核心家庭拥有并管理的家族企业之外，关于“家族”的定义似乎存在广泛分歧。我们发现，仅通过企业组成部分来定义家族企业无法捕捉其本质。家族企业的本质在于，一个家庭或少数几个家庭对企业所持有的愿景，以及主导力量塑造并追求这一愿景的意图，这种意图可能跨越同一家庭或少数几个家庭的世代。因此，我们基于这两个要点提出家族企业的定义。我们认为，这一定义抓住了家族企业的本质，并将其所有流行的家族参与形式作为构成本质的要素纳入其中。其对家族企业追求愿景的意图的强调，暗示了文献中尚未积极探索的研究方向。

Our empirical tests show that the components of family involvement are very weak predictors of family firms’ concerns over succession and professionalization. This suggests that family involvement variables are weak predictors of family firm behavior, implying that it is dangerous to delineate the population of study by the components of family involvement alone, as is frequently done in the literature, without theoretical guidance on the behaviors that differentiate family and non-family firms. Instead, the results strengthen our contention that vision, intentions, and behavior are what should be used to distinguish family business from all others. After all, understanding, predicting, and modifying behavior to help family businesses achieve their goals and improve their performance are the object of family business management research.
我们的实证研究表明，家庭参与的各个组成部分对家族企业对继任和专业化的担忧预测作用非常弱。这表明，家庭参与变量对家族企业行为的预测作用较弱，这意味着仅根据家庭参与的组成部分来划分研究对象是危险的，而文献中常采用这种方法，却缺乏理论指导来区分家族企业和非家族企业的行为差异。相反，研究结果强化了我们的观点，即愿景、意图和行为才是区分家族企业与其他企业的关键因素。毕竟，理解、预测并调整行为以帮助家族企业实现目标并提升绩效，正是家族企业管理研究的核心目标。

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Jess H. Chua is Professor of Finance at the University of Calgary.
杰西·H·蔡（Jess H. Chua）是卡尔加里大学金融学教授。
James J. Chrisman is Associate Dean (Research), Director of the PhD and MBA Thesis Programs, and Professor of Venture Development at the University of Calgary.
詹姆斯·J·克里斯曼（James J. Chrisman）是卡尔加里大学副教务长（研究），博士和 MBA 论文项目主任，以及创业发展教授。

Pramodita Sharma is Assistant Professor of Management at Dalhousie University.
普拉莫迪塔·夏尔马（Pramodita Sharma）是达尔豪斯大学（Dalhousie University）管理学副教授。

Please answer the following questions about your business by checking the response that most closely describes your business or by specifying the information requested.
请根据您的业务情况，选择最能描述您业务的选项，或提供所需的具体信息。

Year first sale made: $$$$qquad\qquad
首次销售年份： $$$$qquad\qquad

Geographic distribution of sales/revenues: (Please check the most descriptive one)
销售/收入的地理分布：（请选择最符合实际情况的选项）
$$$$qquad\qquad Local $$$$qquad\qquad Provincial $$$$qquad\qquad Regional $$$$qquad\qquad National $$$$qquad\qquad North America $$$$qquad\qquad Global
$$$$qquad\qquad 地方 $$$$qquad\qquad 省级 $$$$qquad\qquad 区域 $$$$qquad\qquad 国家 $$$$qquad\qquad 北美 $$$$qquad\qquad 全球

Return on assets for 1993: $$$$qquad\qquad Negative
1993 年资产回报率： $$$$qquad\qquad 负值
(Earnings before interest $$$$qquad\qquad Zero
（息前利润 $$$$qquad\qquad 零）
$$$$qquad\qquad 6% to 10% $$$$qquad\qquad 21% to 30% and taxes divided by $$$$qquad\qquad 1% to 5%
$$$$qquad\qquad 6% 至 10% $$$$qquad\qquad 21% 至 30% 以及税费占 $$$$qquad\qquad 1% 至 5%
$$$$qquad\qquad 11% to 15% $$$$qquad\qquad >30% total assets)
$$$$qquad\qquad 11% 至 15% $$$$qquad\qquad >30% 总资产)

Geographic locations of business operations (e.g., plants, sales offices, franchises, etc.):
业务运营的地理位置（例如：工厂、销售办事处、特许经营店等）：
$$$$qquad\qquad All at one location $$$$qquad\qquad 2 to 5 locations $$$$qquad\qquad 6 to 10 locations $$$$qquad\qquad >10
$$$$qquad\qquad 所有地点集中在一个位置 $$$$qquad\qquad 2 至 5 个地点 $$$$qquad\qquad 6 至 10 个地点 $$$$qquad\qquad 超过 10 个地点

Number of full time employees in 1993: $$$$qquad\qquad
1993 年全职员工人数： $$$$qquad\qquad

Number of family members (including you) active in the business: $$$$qquad\qquad
家庭成员（包括您在内）中参与业务的人数： $$$$qquad\qquad

Number of nonfamily managers in the business: $$$$qquad\qquad
企业中非家庭成员的管理人员数量： $$$$qquad\qquad

Family ownership of the business: $$$$qquad\qquad <50% $$$$qquad\qquad 50% to 99.9% $$$$qquad\qquad 100%
企业所有权归属： $$$$qquad\qquad <50% $$$$qquad\qquad 50% 至 99.9% $$$$qquad\qquad 100%

Is the current president likely to retire in the next ten years? $$$$qquad\qquad Yes $$$$qquad\qquad No
现任总统在未来十年内退休的可能性有多大？ $$$$qquad\qquad 是 $$$$qquad\qquad 否

Which generation of the family is operating the business today?
目前经营该企业的是家族的哪一代人？
$$$$qquad\qquad 1st $$$$qquad\qquad 2nd $$$$qquad\qquad 3rd $$$$qquad\qquad 4th $$$$qquad\qquad 5th $$$$qquad\qquad 6th $$$$qquad\qquad 7th $$$$qquad\qquad 8th
$$$$qquad\qquad 第 1 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 2 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 3 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 4 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 5 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 6 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 7 个 $$$$qquad\qquad 第 8 个

Membership of the board of directors: (please specify number)
董事会成员人数：（请注明具体人数）
Family members: $$$$qquad\qquad Nonfamily members: $$$$qquad\qquad
家庭成员： $$$$qquad\qquad 非家庭成员： $$$$qquad\qquad

Number of persons who have the potential to assume presidency in the next ten years:
未来十年内有潜力担任总统的人数：

Listed below are several issues found to be of concern to family enterprises. Please circle the response that most closely captures the importance of each of the issues to your business.
以下列出的是被认为对家族企业具有重要意义的几个问题。请在每个问题后圈出最能反映该问题对贵公司重要性的选项。