Robert Bernasconi 罗伯特·贝尔纳斯科尼William L. McBride 威廉·L·麦克布莱德Rudolph Bernet J. N. Mohanty 鲁道夫·伯内特 J·N·莫汉蒂John D. Caputo Mary Rawlinson 约翰·D·卡普托 玛丽·罗林森David Carr 大卫·卡尔Tom Rockmore 汤姆·洛克莫尔Edward S. Casey 爱德华·S·凯西Calvin O. Schrag 卡尔文·O·施拉格Hubert Dreyfus 休伯特·德雷福斯†\dagger Reiner Schürmann †\dagger 赖纳·许尔曼Don Ihde 唐·伊德Charles E. Scott 查尔斯·E·斯科特David Farrell Krell 大卫·法雷尔·克雷尔Thomas Sheehan 托马斯·希恩Lenore Langsdorf 莱诺尔·兰斯多夫Robert Sokolowski 罗伯特·索科洛夫斯基Alphonso Lingis 阿方索·林吉斯Bruce W. Wilshire 布鲁斯·W·威尔希尔David Wood 大卫·伍德
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information 本出版物所用纸张符合美国国家信息标准的最低要求
Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. 科学-印刷图书馆材料的纸张耐久性标准，ANSI Z39.48-1984。
Manufactured in the United States of America 在美国制造
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 国会图书馆编目出版数据
Casey, Edward S., date 凯西，爱德华·S.，日期
Remembering : a phenomenological study / Edward S. Casey. —2nd ed. 《记忆：一项现象学研究》/ 爱德华·S.凯西 著.—第 2 版
p. cm. - (Studies in Continental thought) 厘米页.—（大陆思想研究丛书）
Includes bibliographical references and index. 含参考文献与索引。
ISBN 0-253-33789-5 (alk. paper) - ISBN 0-253-21412-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 0-253-33789-5（碱性纸）- ISBN 0-253-21412-2（平装本：碱性纸）
Memory (Philosophy) 2. Phenomenology. 记忆（哲学）2. 现象学。
I. Title. II. Series. I. 标题。II. 系列。
To The Memory of My Parents
Catherine J. Casey Marlin S. Casey 谨以此书纪念我的父母 凯瑟琳·J·凯西 马林·S·凯西
And in Remembrance of the Vanished World of My Grandparents 并缅怀祖父母消逝的世界Daisy Hoffman Johntz John Edward Johntz 黛西·霍夫曼·约翰茨 约翰·爱德华·约翰茨
This page intentionally left blank 本页留白
CONTENTS 目录
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION … ix 第二版序言……ix
PREFACE … xix 序言……xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS … xxiii 致谢 … xxiii
introduction Remembering Forgotten: 引言 被遗忘的回忆：
The Amnesia of Anamnesis … 1 回忆的遗忘：记忆缺失 … 1
Part One: Keeping Memory in Mind 第一部分 铭记于心
I First Forays … 20 I 初步探索…20
II Eidetic Features … 37 II 本质特征…37
III Remembering as Intentional: Act Phase … 48 III 作为意向行为的记忆：行动阶段…48
IV Remembering as Intentional: Object Phase … 65 IV 作为意向行为的记忆：对象阶段…65
Part Two: Mnemonic Modes 第二部分：记忆模式
Prologue … 88 序言……88
V Reminding … 90 第五章 提醒……90
VI Reminiscing … 104 第六章 追忆……104
VII Recognizing … 122 第七章 识别…122
Coda … 141 尾声…141
Part Three: Pursuing Memory beyond Mind 第三部分：超越心智的记忆追寻
Prologue … 144 序章…144
VIII Body Memory … 146 第八章 身体记忆……146
IX Place Memory … 181 第九章 场所记忆……181
X Commemoration … 216 第十章 纪念仪式……216
Coda … 258 终章……258
Part Four: Remembering Re-membered 第四部分：记忆的重构
XI The Thick Autonomy of Memory … 262 第十一章 记忆的厚重自主性…262
XII Freedom in Remembering … 288 第十二章 回忆中的自由…288
NOTES … 315 注释…315
INDEX … 358 索引 … 358
This page intentionally left blank 此页留白
Rethinking Remembering 重思记忆
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 第二版序言
From the start, I intended Remembering to be a companion volume to my earlier book Imagining, and it is gratifying to witness new editions of both books now appearing at the same time. This fortuitous event will underline what the two texts have in common: above all, a shared phenomenological orientation, a commitment to a close and detailed description of the various forms and directions taken by each act. The close comparison of imagining and remembering is hardly new; the two acts have been linked ever since Aristotle’s inaugural discussion of human mental activity. Hobbes, Hume, and Kant expressly yoked them together as alternative but complementary fates of perception-its epistemic extension vis-à-vis past episodes (memory) or future happenings (imagination). 从一开始，我就打算将《回忆》作为早期著作《想象》的姊妹篇，如今欣喜地看到两本书的新版同时面世。这个巧合将凸显两部作品的共同点：最重要的是一种共有的现象学取向，致力于对每种行为采取的各种形式与方向进行细致入微的描述。将想象与回忆进行细致比较并非新鲜事；自亚里士多德开创性地探讨人类心理活动以来，这两种行为就被联系在一起。霍布斯、休谟和康德明确将它们视为感知的两种替代性却又互补的命运——前者指向过去事件（记忆）的认知延伸，后者则面向未来可能（想象）。
Although it is plausible to pair the two acts in this and other ways, by 1977a year after the publication of Imagining and a decade before the appearance of Remembering-I had begun to discover basic differences between them that disallowed any claim (such as Hume’s) that they are both offshoots of perception, its direct or indirect “copy.” In an essay of that same year entitled “Imagining and Remembering” I maintained that despite their intimate collusion on many fronts (e.g., in the activity of the historian, in dreams, and in time-consciousness) they remain as distinct from each other as perception is from both. They differ from each other with regard to such fundamental things as the degree of familiarity they entail, their positing of content as existing or not, and their comparative corrigibility. ^(1){ }^{1} 尽管将这两种行为以这种方式或其他方式配对看似合理，但到了 1977 年——即《想象》出版一年后、《记忆》问世十年前——我已开始发现它们之间存在根本差异，这些差异否定了任何关于两者都是感知分支（如休谟所言）或其直接或间接"复制品"的主张。在同年的论文《想象与记忆》中，我坚持认为尽管二者在许多方面（如历史学家的活动、梦境及时间意识中）存在密切关联，但它们彼此间的差异就像感知与二者的区别一样显著。它们在熟悉程度、对内容存在与否的设定，以及相对可修正性等基本层面都存在差异。 ^(1){ }^{1}
This is not to deny that the two acts are also significantly similar. Not only is neither parasitic on perception, but each is at once free and autonomous. Both submit to what I call “intentional analysis,” according to which each exhibits certain comparable modes of operation (e.g., imagining or remembering that something is the case; imagining or remembering how to do something); and each features a “presentation” that has both a specific content and a spatiotemporal world-frame, along with a characteristic mode of givenness. Nevertheless, even at this bare beginning level, important differences emerge. The autonomy of imagining is “thin,” that of remembering “thick.” Where intentional analysis uncovers only three basic act-forms of imagining, it detects many more kinds of remembering: e.g., primary and secondary, remembering to-do something, remembering on-the-occasion-of some event, remembering-as (i.e., my friend as depressed), remembering-what (e.g., what Burlington is like), etcetera. Rather than the specific content of what we remember being simply surrounded by a mere “margin” of indeterminacy as in the case of imagining, an entire atmosphere permeates what we remember. In remembering, there is a tenuous but consistently felt “self-presence” of the rememberer that inheres in 这并非否认这两种行为也具有显著的相似性。不仅两者都不依赖于感知，而且各自都兼具自由与自主性。它们都服从于我所称的"意向性分析"——据此分析，二者都展现出某些可比较的运作模式（例如想象或记住某事的存在状态；想象或记住如何做某事）；且各自都具有一个既包含特定内容又具备时空世界框架的"呈现"，以及独特的被给予方式。然而即便在这个最基础的层面上，重要差异已然显现。想象的自主性是"单薄的"，而记忆的自主性则是"厚重的"。当意向性分析仅揭示出想象的三种基本行为形式时，却能识别出更多类型的记忆：例如初级与次级记忆、对执行某事的记忆、在特定事件场合下的记忆、作为性记忆（如我的朋友表现为抑郁状态）、对事物特性的记忆（如伯灵顿是什么样子）等等。与我们想象时特定内容仅被不确定性的"边缘"所环绕不同，记忆中的内容始终渗透着完整的氛围。 在回忆的过程中，存在着一种微妙却持续可感的"自我临现"——回忆者始终内在于
what is remembered-in contrast with imagining, in which the imaginer is often distant or absent from what is imagined. ^(2){ }^{2} And when it comes to “eidetic analysis,” there is the striking fact that, whereas describing the six essential features of imagining took up the major part of an entire book, the corresponding traits of remembering occupies only a short chapter of ten pages. 被回忆的内容之中。这与想象形成鲜明对比：在想象时，想象者往往与所想象的内容疏离或缺席。 ^(2){ }^{2} 当涉及"本质直观分析"时，一个引人注目的事实是：描述想象的六个本质特征曾占据整本书的主要篇幅，而关于回忆的相应特征却仅用短短十章就阐述完毕。
I
These various differences point to a larger truth: the mansions of memory are many. So polymorphic is remembering that no single set of intentional structures or eidetic features can capture the whole phenomenon. Primary traits (e.g., encapsulment/expansion) are continually complicated by secondary traits (e.g., schematicalness) which refuse to be reduced to the simplicity of any central description. No wonder Remembering is almost twice as long as Imagining; no wonder, either, that it took so long to write! I thought I could polish off this successor volume in several years; instead, it took a decade to write. Remembering itself proved me wrong. I had to face up to the paradox that imagining, often taken to be the quintessence of the quirky and the quixotic, showed itself to be more regular in its enactment and structure than remembering, usually assumed to be the more reliable and sober of the two acts. ^(3){ }^{3} 这些差异揭示了一个更深刻的真相：记忆的殿堂千姿百态。回忆现象如此多态化，以至于没有任何一组意向结构或本质特征能够完整捕捉这一现象。初级特征（如封闭性/扩展性）不断被次级特征（如图式性）复杂化，这些次级特征拒绝被简化为任何核心描述的单一性。难怪《回忆》的篇幅几乎是《想象》的两倍；也难怪这本书耗费了如此漫长的写作时间！我原以为几年就能完成这部续作，结果却用了整整十年。回忆本身证明了我的错误。我不得不面对这个悖论：通常被视为古怪荒谬之典型的想象，在其执行方式和结构上竟比回忆显得更为规律——而回忆行为通常被认为在这两者中更为可靠和清醒。
As I settled into a more complex project than I had bargained for, I came upon a veritable proliferation of anomalies. “Anomalies” not construed as ab-normalities-that is another matter, i.e., the pathology of memory, on which I shall touch below-but as departures from accepted norms. Whereas it had been assumed by memory theorists as astute as James and Husserl that remembering comes in just two basic forms (“primary” or “retentional” vs. “secondary” or “reproductive”), it became clear to me that there is an entire set of intermediate forms of remembering: intermediate between primary and secondary memory, as well as between mind and world. These included such familiar (yet rarely investigated) kinds of memory as recognizing X as Y , being reminded of B by A, and reminiscing. Despite important differences, ^(4){ }^{4} these “mnemonic modes” take us from the realm of mind to the larger reaches of the surrounding world-from the involuted concerns of mentation to the way the world shows itself to be filled with recognitory clues, effective reminders, and things that inspire reminiscence. Instead of memory being confined to mind alone-as its own root memor, “mindful,” signifies-it enters here into a continuing close collusion with the lifeworld of its experience. 当我着手于一个比预期更为复杂的项目时，我遭遇了名副其实的异常现象激增。这里的"异常"并非指病态异常——那是另一个议题，即记忆的病理学，我将在后文提及——而是指对公认规范的偏离。尽管如詹姆斯和胡塞尔这般敏锐的记忆理论家曾假定记忆仅存在两种基本形式（"初级"或"滞留性"记忆与"次级"或"再生性"记忆），但我逐渐意识到其间存在着完整的中间形态：介于初级与次级记忆之间，亦介于心灵与世界之间。这些形态包括诸如将 X 识别为 Y、因 A 而想起 B、以及追忆往事等常见（却鲜被研究的）记忆类型。尽管存在重要差异， ^(4){ }^{4} 这些"记忆模态"将我们从心灵领域引向周遭世界更广阔的疆域——从思维的内卷化关切，到世界如何自我显现为充满识别线索、有效提示物与激发怀旧之物的存在方式。 记忆不再局限于心灵本身——正如其词根 memor（意为"留心的"）所示——而是与经验的生活世界持续紧密地交织在一起。
In Part Three of Remembering I took a further and still more heterodox step. By then, it had become evident to me that mind, rather than being part of the solution to an adequate phenomenology of memory, was endemic to the problem. At least this is so if mind is conceived as a receptacle of representa-tions-as it has been since at least Descartes. In “Pursuing Memory Beyond Mind,” I argue that the privilege accorded to “recollection” (another name for secondary memory, i.e., long-term visualized recall of a previously experienced 在《记忆》第三部分中，我迈出了更为激进且非正统的一步。彼时我已清晰地认识到，心灵非但不能为现象学记忆研究提供解决方案，反而构成了问题本身。至少当心灵被视作表征的容器时便是如此——这种观念自笛卡尔以降便根深蒂固。在"超越心灵的记忆追寻"章节中，我指出所谓"回忆"（次级记忆的别称，即对过往经历的长时段视觉化再现）的特权地位，不过是另一种将心灵奉为表征之源与容器的思想体现。超越心灵探索记忆，就是要寻找那些不依附于回忆、因而也不以心灵为唯一载体的典范性记忆实例。
episode) is only another way of privileging mind itself as the source and container of representations. To pursue memory beyond mind is to seek exemplary instances of memory that are not tied to recollections and thus not to the mind as their unique vehicle. 事件片段）的特权地位，不过是另一种将心灵本身奉为表征之源与容器的思想体现。超越心灵探索记忆，就是要寻找那些不依附于回忆、因而也不以心灵为唯一载体的典范性记忆实例。
I found three such exemplars of remembering that are not exclusively mentalistic, representational, or recollective: body memory, place memory, and commemoration. Here the pivotal phenomenon is place memory, that is, the fact that concrete places retain the past in a way that can be reanimated by our remembering them: a powerful but often neglected form of memory. Body memories are not just memories of the body but instances of remembering places, events, and people with and in the lived body. In commemoration, body and place memory conspire with co-participating others in ritualized scenes of co-remembering. 我发现了三种非纯粹心理性、再现性或回忆性的记忆范例：身体记忆、场所记忆和纪念仪式。其中关键现象是场所记忆，即具体场所能以某种方式保存过去，而我们的记忆行为能重新激活这种保存：这是一种强大却常被忽视的记忆形式。身体记忆不仅是对身体的记忆，更是生活着的身体在场所、事件和人物中留下的记忆实例。在纪念仪式中，身体记忆与场所记忆协同作用，与其他参与者共同构成仪式化的共忆场景。
The discovery of this triad of non-representational and non-recollective rememberings meant the virtual explosion of the hegemony of older models of memory. This phase of my “memory-work” can be seen as deconstructive, since it questions the accepted paradigms of remembering as re-presencing in favor of a more polymorphic vision of the scope and limits of memory in which the return of the past in an explicitly visualized format-in “the mind’s eye”-is neither the aim nor the issue. The past can be fully and legitimately remembered without any such return in any such format. Both the realism and the representationalism of memory-brothers under the flesh-give way to a more nuanced model in which body and place, both ensconced in the life-world of the rememberer, assume an unaccustomed prominence. 发现这三种非再现性、非回忆性的记忆形式，几乎彻底颠覆了传统记忆模型的统治地位。这一阶段的"记忆研究"可被视为解构性的，因为它质疑了将记忆视为"重新在场"的主流范式，转而支持一种更具多态性的记忆范畴观——在这种视角下，过去以明确视觉化形式（在"心灵之眼"中）的回归既非目标亦非关键。即使没有任何形式的此类回归，过去仍能被完整且合理地铭记。记忆的现实主义与再现主义这对"血肉兄弟"，终将让位于一个更精微的模型——其中，记忆者生活世界中的身体与场所，获得了前所未有的重要地位。
II 第二章
This is only to say that memory must be pursued into its own othernessinto what is other than (and to) mind. Each of the exemplars at stake in Part Three others memory into something other than mind. Or let us say that in body, place, and commemoration, we witness the othering of mind into something other than itself. Remembering is in effect a progressive voyage into the othering of memory as traditionally conceived. 这仅仅表明，记忆必须被追寻至其自身的他异性——追寻至那不同于（且相对于）心灵的存在。本书第三部分探讨的每个范例，都将记忆转化为某种超越心灵的存在。或者说，在身体、场所与纪念仪式中，我们目睹了心灵如何被异化为非己的存在。记忆行为本质上是一场渐进的旅程，通往对传统记忆概念的异化过程。
Beyond what I undertook in Part Three of this book, still other directions might have been pursued, had the book not already been so long. Several of these other directions have been taken by others in the meanwhile. Contemporary philosophical work on memory, for example, has sought the otherness of memory in its intimate alliance with writing or with flesh. ^(5){ }^{5} By the same token, current psychological models of memory are enamored of the neurological basis of memory-with the Brain as the other of Mind. ^(6){ }^{6} 若非本书篇幅所限，除第三部分已探讨的内容外，本可追寻更多研究方向。其中若干方向已被其他学者率先探索。例如当代哲学关于记忆的研究，正致力于在记忆与书写或肉身的密切关联中探寻其他异性。 ^(5){ }^{5} 同样地，当前心理学记忆模型痴迷于记忆的神经学基础——将大脑视为心灵的他者。 ^(6){ }^{6}
My own predilections are quite different. Were I to expand the present book into a second volume-as I once projected-I would investigate forgetting as the primary other of memory. As it stands, what is forgotten in Remembering is forgetting itself. In fact, I composed a long chapter on forgetting which I in- 我个人的偏好则大不相同。倘若要将本书扩展为第二卷——正如我曾计划的那样——我会将遗忘作为记忆的主要对立面来研究。就目前而言，《记忆》中被遗忘的正是遗忘本身。事实上，我曾撰写过关于遗忘的长篇章节，后来...
tended to include in this book, but I mislaid it; it resurfaced too late to include in the final manuscript. I tried to make up for this lapsus memoriae by publishing an article, “Forgetting Remembered,” in 1992.^(7)1992 .{ }^{7} But all that this rambling piece establishes is the fact that forgetting itself is a vast terrain, with its own numerous types and subtypes. There is not just simple forgetting or forgettingwhat (i.e., what we want to recall) but forgetting-how: forgetting not only how to do something but forgetting how we forgot it in the first place. Closely related to this is what I call “double oblivion,” i.e., forgetting that we ever knew something (in contrast with remembering that we once knew something but cannot now recall what this something is). The ever-proliferating array of amnesiac modes includes Freud’s notion that we can forget that of which we were never conscious to begin with, along with Nietzsche’s recommendation of “active forgetfulness.” Sometimes I think that I should have written a companion volume simply entitled Forgetting, and perhaps someday I shall. 本想将这部分内容纳入本书，却因手稿遗失而未能如愿；待它重现时已错过最终定稿期限。为弥补这一记忆疏漏，我曾在《 1992.^(7)1992 .{ }^{7} 》上发表过《被遗忘的遗忘》一文。然而这篇散漫之作仅证明了遗忘本身是一片广袤疆域，拥有众多类型与亚型。不仅存在简单遗忘或遗忘对象（即我们试图回忆的内容），更存在遗忘方式：既遗忘如何行事，更遗忘最初如何将其遗忘。与此紧密相关的是我称之为"双重湮灭"的现象——即遗忘我们曾经知晓某事（区别于记得我们曾知晓某事却想不起具体内容）。不断衍生的遗忘形态还包括弗洛伊德提出的"对从未意识到之物的遗忘"，以及尼采倡导的"主动遗忘"。有时我觉得真该另著一卷题为《论遗忘》的姊妹篇，或许来日方长终将实现。
From forgetting as an affair of the individual who can will it actively, two great ways branch outward: in one direction toward collective forgetting and in the other toward traumatic and repressed memory. 从作为个体可以主动意愿的遗忘出发，延伸出两条重要路径：一条通向集体遗忘，另一条通向创伤与被压抑的记忆。
(1) Collective forgetting is the obliviferous obverse of collective remember-ing-not just its dark side, much less its mere lack, but constitutive of collective memory itself. About collective memory, too, I had written a discarded chapter for Remembering (as I did as well for such other topics as memory trace, narrational memory, and personal identity). A few other adventurous souls have set foot in this terra incognita: among them Halbwachs, Connerton, and Zerubavel. ^(8){ }^{8} But no one to my knowledge has looked into just how “social amnesia” enters into genuinely interpersonal memory: how, in order to remember together, we must first forget together. To commemorate a war such as the Civil War or Vietnam is at the same time not to remember its many horrors, its unspeakable and even unthinkable mutilations and agonies. For an individual to recall the horrors is to undermine participation in the public event of commemoration. （1）集体遗忘是集体记忆的遗忘面——不仅是其阴暗面，更非单纯的缺失，而是集体记忆本身的构成要素。关于集体记忆，我也曾为《记忆》一书撰写过废弃章节（如同我对记忆痕迹、叙事记忆和个人身份等主题的处理）。少数几位思想先驱已涉足这片未知领域：包括哈布瓦赫、康纳顿和泽鲁巴维尔。 ^(8){ }^{8} 但据我所知，尚未有人深入探究"社会遗忘"如何真正渗入人际记忆：为了共同记忆，我们必须先共同遗忘。纪念内战或越南战争这类事件的同时，必然伴随着对无数恐怖场景、那些难以言表甚至不可想象的肢体残缺与痛苦的集体遗忘。当个体执意回忆这些恐怖时，便动摇了参与公共纪念活动的基础。
But forgetting pervades even those cases in which we appear to have every reason to remember. Consider a funeral of a woman we know and love. Those who gather for this sad purpose are certainly honoring the deceased, and they may well recall for each other certain of her personal traits or various memorable events in which she took part. At the same time, however, the mourners are sanctioning each other to begin to forget the deceased-to “lay her to rest.” As if to underline this paradox, mourners in Gawa blacken themselves and live together for a prescribed period of time in a “house of forgetting.” ^(99){ }^{99} The blackening seems symbolic of the encroaching oblivion; the shared life in the long house, though encouraging mutual reminiscing about the departed, acts as a preparation for the dispersal of the mourners into the separate lives in which remembering the deceased will be increasingly rare. Similarly, Freud remarks that after someone close to us has died we bring up memories of that person and hypercathect them-only to decathect them shortly after: the intensification of active remembrance is precisely what allows for the de-intensification of forgetfulness. ^(10){ }^{10} 然而，遗忘却渗透在那些我们似乎有充分理由去铭记的时刻。试想一位我们熟识且深爱的女性葬礼。聚集于此哀悼的人们固然是在缅怀逝者，他们或许会彼此追忆她生前的个性特质或共同经历的难忘往事。但与此同时，吊唁者们也在默许彼此开始遗忘逝者——让她"安息"。仿佛为了凸显这种矛盾，加瓦岛的丧亲者会将身体涂黑，并在"遗忘之屋"中共同生活一段特定时日。 ^(99){ }^{99} 这种涂黑仪式似乎象征着逐渐蔓延的遗忘；长屋中的集体生活虽能促进对逝者的共同追忆，实则是为吊唁者们回归各自生活做准备——在那里，对逝者的记忆将日渐稀薄。弗洛伊德同样指出，当亲近之人离世后，我们会反复唤起关于此人的记忆并过度投注情感——却很快又撤回这种情感投注：积极回忆的强化恰恰为遗忘的弱化创造了条件。 ^(10){ }^{10}
In yet another kind of case, the collective remembrance of one thing entails the collective forgetting of something else. In video culture, for example, viewers are continually reminded of certain commonly held social constructs-e.g., highly conventional notions of family life-while being deprived, by their very viewing, of the active co-remembering (i.e., “communal-discursive reminiscing” in my terminology) which actual family life fostered before the advent of television and home video. Where Walter Benjamin would have considered this an instance of the loss of “aura,” I prefer to speak of “horizon-usurpation,” since here the horizon of direct reminiscing with others (e.g., on porches) is replaced by a monofocal and mostly nonverbal concentration on an all-consuming video event. 在另一种情况下，对某一事物的集体记忆必然伴随着对另一事物的集体遗忘。例如，在视频文化中，观众不断被提醒某些普遍认可的社会构造——例如对家庭生活的高度常规化观念——而与此同时，他们通过观看本身，被剥夺了实际家庭生活在电视和家庭录像出现之前所培养的积极共同回忆（即我所说的“共同话语式回忆”）。沃尔特·本雅明可能会将此视为“光晕”的丧失，但我更倾向于使用“地平线被夺走”这一概念，因为在此处，与他人直接回忆的“地平线”（例如在门廊上）被一种单焦点且主要非语言的对视频事件的沉浸式关注所取代。
In all three of the cases just considered, collective remembering hides the very forgetting which it nevertheless requires. In still other instances, collective remembering and collective forgetting enter into manifest collaboration. I think of compulsive acting out by masses of people-blind acts of repetition which are equally cases of remembering (what to do and how to do it) and forgetting (why one is doing it). At Nuremberg, tens of thousands of people participated in ritualized support of the Third Reich: everyone who was part of these fiendish demonstrations knew what to do yet had no clear sense of just why they were doing it, beyond paying mindless tribute to Hitler and the Third Reich. Remembering what and how to do something at one level is forgetting why one is doing it at another, deeper level. In a case such as this, the remembering is the forgetting and vice versa. We can agree with Gadamer that "forgetting is not merely an absence and a lack but . . . a condition of the life of the mind,"ll yet we must add that forgetting is also a condition of the life of an entire people and therefore of their collective remembering. 在上述三种情形中，集体记忆恰恰隐藏了它自身所依赖的遗忘。而在其他事例里，集体记忆与集体遗忘更呈现出显性的共谋关系。我想到民众的强迫性行为表现——那些盲目的重复举动，既是对行为内容与方式的记忆，又是对行为动机的遗忘。在纽伦堡集会上，数万人仪式化地支持第三帝国：参与这些恶魔般游行的人们都清楚该做什么，却对行为动机毫无清醒认知，除了对希特勒和第三帝国无意识地效忠。在某个层面记住做什么与如何做，意味着在更深层面遗忘为何而做。在此类情境中，记忆即遗忘，反之亦然。我们虽可赞同伽达默尔"遗忘不仅是缺失与空白……更是精神生活的条件"的论断，但必须补充：遗忘同样是整个民族生存的条件，因而也是其集体记忆的条件。
(2) Repressed traumatic memories are also subject to much the same intricate interplay of the remembered and the forgotten. Here, too, albeit at the level of the individual, we witness acting out that does not know itself as remembering or forgetting yet is somehow both at once. This is especially the case with repressed memories, which exhibit double oblivion in a conspicuous way: not only is what is repressed unavailable to consciousness (not to be confused with being merely inaccessible) but the very mechanism of repression is itself outside of conscious awareness (the what and the how are equally in oblivion). Moreover, the “return of the repressed” in symptoms and dreams is itself opaque in its significance; the why of their appearance is mysterious and hence calls for active interpretation. The highly encrypted character of what returns signifies that it is riddled with forgetting; the façade of the symptom or dream is oblivious of its own origins. (2) 被压抑的创伤记忆同样经历着记忆与遗忘之间错综复杂的相互作用。即便在个体层面，我们也能观察到某种既非记忆亦非遗忘、却又同时兼具二者的无意识行为表现。压抑记忆尤其如此，它们以显著方式呈现出双重遗忘状态：不仅被压抑的内容无法进入意识层面（不可与单纯难以获取混为一谈），连压抑机制本身也处于意识觉察范围之外（压抑对象与压抑方式同样湮没无痕）。更甚者，压抑内容通过症状与梦境的"回归"本身意义晦涩；这些表象为何显现始终成谜，因而需要主动诠释。回归之物高度加密的特征表明其已被遗忘彻底渗透——症状或梦境的表象对其自身源头茫然不觉。
When traumas return as such and unbidden-when they are not subject to repressive distortions-they have a terrifying reality: e.g., as hallucinatory reenactments of the trauma itself. This is what Freud noticed in the dreams of World War I veterans (and we see again in those of Vietnam veterans). Rather than being creatures of forgetfulness, such dreams are tantamount to suffering from too much remembering-too much for the dreaming subject to bear. By 当创伤以真实面目不请自来地重现——当它们未被压抑性扭曲所控制时——会带来令人恐惧的现实感：例如，作为创伤本身的幻觉式重演。这正是弗洛伊德在一战老兵梦境中观察到的现象（我们在越战老兵身上也再次见证）。这类梦境并非遗忘的产物，而等同于承受着过度的记忆——对做梦者而言难以承受的记忆。通过
this painful route we reach the perplexing phenomenon of the repetition of trauma which led Freud to posit the death instinct. To tolerate, perhaps even to wish for, such painfully conscious reinstatements of traumatic situations would seem to indicate that the subject is willing to live “beyond the pleasure principle.” As was the case with the celebrated Russian mnemonist “S,” who could recall virtually everything he had ever experienced, so the victim of recurrent traumatic memories is in the anomalous position of wanting to forget-but being unable to do so. ^(12){ }^{12} 这条痛苦路径，我们触及了创伤重复这一令人困惑的现象，正是这种现象促使弗洛伊德提出死亡本能理论。能够容忍、甚至可能渴望这种痛苦清醒的创伤情境重现，似乎表明主体愿意活在"超越快乐原则"的状态。就像那位著名的俄罗斯记忆大师"S"能记住几乎所有经历过的细节那样，反复遭受创伤记忆困扰的受害者处于一种反常境地：渴望遗忘——却无能为力。 ^(12){ }^{12}
The victim of repressed memories, in contrast, is often in the converse position of wanting to remember-but again being unable to do so. This is the predicament of wanting to remember what really happened in early childhood or at some later point, so as to be liberated from the burden of the repressed past by means of what Freud called “abreaction,” i.e., an adequate emotional reaction to a repressed trauma-though still being unable to lift the curtain of repression to reveal the indentured memory. Destitute of any further direct evidence, yet convinced that one’s suffering is related to the withheld memories, such a person is tempted to confabulate what happened. Or to seek suggestions that engender such confabulation. 相比之下，遭受压抑记忆困扰的受害者往往处于相反的境地——他们渴望回忆却依然无能为力。这种困境在于：人们想要记起童年早期或之后某个时刻真实发生的事，以期通过弗洛伊德所称的"宣泄"（即对被压抑创伤产生充分的情感反应）来摆脱压抑过往的重负，却始终无法掀开压抑的帷幕，揭示那些被禁锢的记忆。在缺乏直接证据的情况下，当事人仍坚信自己的痛苦与被封锁的记忆有关，于是容易虚构事件经过，或是寻求诱发这种虚构的暗示。
Taking this tempting path, one is quickly led to what has been termed the “false memory syndrome.” In the United States and Europe, this syndrome has focused on the supposed sexual abuse of children at the hands of depraved or “satanic” adults (typically parents but also siblings and teachers). This has generated an extensive literature that reached a crescendo in the mid-1990s, rejoining an emerging interest in the literary and philosophical dimensions of trauma. ^(13){ }^{13} Were Remembering to be rewritten, it would include a chapter on these vexing matters; in lieu of that, let the following remarks suffice. 沿着这条诱人的路径，人们很快会被引向所谓的"虚假记忆综合征"。在美国和欧洲，这种综合征主要聚焦于儿童遭受堕落或"撒旦崇拜"成年人（通常是父母，也包括兄弟姐妹和教师）的所谓性虐待。相关文献在 20 世纪 90 年代中期达到高潮，并与创伤的文学和哲学维度研究的新兴兴趣相呼应。 ^(13){ }^{13} 倘若《记忆》一书要重写，将会包含一章来探讨这些棘手问题；在此仅以以下论述权作补充。
The primary issue raised by repressed trauma is that of unclaimed experi-ence-to borrow a phrase from Cathy Caruth’s pioneering work. ^(14){ }^{14} To be unclaimed is to be forgotten in that the trauma waits in limbo until reclaimed. To reclaim a trauma is to remember it: it is to take away its lethic veil and to make it part of one’s accessible memorial repertoire. It is to reown it-to acknowledge it as something that happened to oneself, not to someone else (and not to another self of one’s own, as in multiple personality disorder, which is often considered to be a way of coping with unbearable early trauma, i.e., by ascribing the trauma to a split-off self). ^(15){ }^{15} 被压抑的创伤所引发的核心问题，借用凯西·卡鲁斯开创性著作中的表述，是关于"未被认领的经历"。所谓未被认领，即意味着被遗忘——创伤悬置在过渡状态中，直至被重新认领。重新认领创伤就是去铭记它：揭开其遗忘的面纱，使之成为个人可触及的记忆储备的一部分。这是一种重新占有的过程——承认这是发生在自己身上的事，而非他人（也非自己分裂出的另一个自我，如多重人格障碍中常见的情形，这常被视为应对难以承受的早期创伤的方式，即把创伤归咎于分裂出的自我）。
Despite the undeniable therapeutic gain to be had in reclaiming a trauma that has been seething for many years beneath the memorial threshold, there is a correlative danger: namely, reclaiming that which never happened in the first place-in short, endorsing a false memory, a pseudo-memory about a purported past that is no past at all. This is not the situation to which both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas point-i.e., “a past which has never been a present” ^(16){ }^{16} : this is a past which is benign and even arguably constitutive of human temporal experiencenor is it the past at stake in Freud’s later notion of “constructions in analysis,” whereby the analyst makes reasonable conjectures about what happened in the 尽管重新找回那些多年来在记忆阈限之下翻腾的创伤无疑具有治疗价值，但同时也存在相应的危险：即重新构建那些从未真实发生过的事情——简而言之，认可一个虚假的记忆，一个关于所谓过去的伪记忆，而这个过去根本不曾存在。这与梅洛-庞蒂和列维纳斯所指的情形不同——即"一个从未成为当下的过去" ^(16){ }^{16} ：那是一种良性的、甚至可以说是构成人类时间经验的过去；也不同于弗洛伊德后期提出的"分析中的建构"概念所涉及的过去，即分析师对患者早期经历进行合理推测时......
patient’s unremembered past. Rather, the past here at issue is the confabulated past, that is, a fable (fabula) that seems to cohere with (con-) a person’s present life circumstance. 患者未被记起的过往。此处所讨论的过往是被虚构的过往，即一个看似与（con-）个人当下生活境况相契合的寓言（fabula）。
The confabulation of trauma may arise in several ways: by a person’s desperate need to fix blame for current miseries on some particular event, even if there is no evidence whatsoever that this event ever took place; by a cultural contagion that amounts to demonizing certain figures (in this case, parents, especially fathers); above all, by a therapist’s fixed view of the aetiology of symptoms, such that only a (sexual) trauma could have given rise to these symptoms, whether the trauma is remembered or not. By means of suggestion (enhanced by putting the patient in a hypnotic state), the therapist intimates that an early sexual trauma occurred: “perhaps your father approached you sexually at this time. . . .” Given the painful and overwhelming character of the episode, it seems to be an obvious candidate for repression-indeed, for a double oblivion that would explain why there is no post-traumatic memory. Yet “repression” is here invoked in a highly dubious way: it is posited post hoc to account for not being able to remember a trauma when, in fact, there may be no trauma to remember. Remembering becomes an unfalsifiable notion that can be all too easily put into the service of a virtual witchhunt for traumatic origins. ^(17){ }^{17} 创伤的虚构可能以几种方式产生：一个人迫切地需要将当前的痛苦归咎于某个特定事件，即使没有任何证据表明该事件曾经发生过；通过一种文化传染，相当于妖魔化某些人物（在这种情况下是父母，尤其是父亲）；最重要的是，治疗师对症状病因的固定看法，认为只有（性）创伤才会导致这些症状，无论创伤是否被记住。通过暗示（通过将患者置于催眠状态来增强），治疗师暗示早期发生过性创伤：“也许你父亲在那时对你进行了性接近……”鉴于这一事件的痛苦和压倒性特征，它似乎明显适合被压抑——实际上，是一种双重遗忘，可以解释为什么没有创伤后的记忆。然而，“压抑”在这里以一种非常可疑的方式被援引：它是在事后假设的，以解释无法记住创伤，而实际上可能根本没有需要记住的创伤。 回忆成为一种无法证伪的概念，极易被用于针对创伤根源的虚拟猎巫行动。 ^(17){ }^{17}
We encounter here a remarkable situation in which the abuse may not be sexual but an abuse of memory itself. This occurs in the blatant manufacture of memories to suit certain ends, above all to find a single cause and to fix blame on particular perpetrators. As Elizabeth Loftus asserts, in many instances of socalled recovered memories, “the [false] memories had actually created the trauma.” ^(18){ }^{18} Instead of remembering traumas-for which there is a right time and place-there is only what James Hillman calls “remembering traumatically.” ^(19){ }^{19} 我们在此遭遇一种奇特现象——施虐行为可能无关性侵，而是对记忆本身的滥用。这表现为公然捏造记忆以适应特定目的，尤其是为寻找单一归因而将罪责固定于特定加害者身上。正如伊丽莎白·洛夫特斯所言，在许多所谓的恢复性记忆案例中，"（虚假的）记忆实际上制造了创伤"。 ^(18){ }^{18} 这并非在恰当的时空背景下回忆创伤，而正如詹姆斯·希尔曼所言，只是"创伤性地回忆"。 ^(19){ }^{19}
Both collective and traumatic memory extend the scope of forgetting beyond the usually recognized limits established by prevalent models (e.g., lapse, deterioration, distraction, interference, etc.). Each operates in individuals, as we see in the case of commemoration as well as in repressed memory; yet both take us beyond the individual in his or her autonomy and self-generated char-acter-toward the intersubjectivity so manifest in original circumstances of incest (real or imagined) and in the psychotherapy that deals with their aftermath, as well as in public events of many sorts. 集体记忆与创伤记忆将遗忘的范畴扩展至主流模型所设定的常规界限之外（如疏忽、衰退、分心、干扰等）。二者皆作用于个体——正如我们在纪念活动与被压抑记忆中所见；却又都将我们引向超越个体自主性与自我生成特性的领域，指向那种在乱伦（真实或想象）原始情境中、在处理其后续影响的心理治疗中、以及在各类公共事件中如此显著的交互主体性。
Most importantly, both kinds of forgetting take us beyond mind, which cannot encompass, much less explain, how collective oblivion occurs or why traumatic memories, actual or fabricated, have such devastating effects in their own distinctive forms of deep forgetfulness. These two types of forgetting take us even further beyond mind in its representational/recollective format than do body and place, those destabilizing epicenters of memory to which Remembering gestured so emphatically in its first edition of 1987. This was just before the renewed interest in collective memory arose (Halbwach’s On Collective Memory 最重要的是，这两种遗忘都将我们带离了心智的范畴。心智既无法涵盖集体遗忘如何发生，更难以解释为何真实或虚构的创伤记忆会以其独特的深度遗忘形式造成如此毁灭性影响。相较于身体与场所这两个记忆的不稳定震中——1987 年首版《记忆》曾着力强调的概念——这两类遗忘让我们在超越心智的表征/回忆模式上走得更远。这一洞见恰逢集体记忆研究热潮复兴前夕（哈布瓦赫《论集体记忆》
appeared in English in 1992; Zerubavel’s Social Memory was published in 1997), and also just before the intense debate surrounding the false memory syndrome reached its highest pitch in the period 1992-1995. 英文版于 1992 年问世；泽鲁巴维尔的《社会记忆》则出版于 1997 年），恰逢 1992 至 1995 年间关于虚假记忆综合征的激烈争论达到顶峰前夕。
In Remembering I had hinted at the significance of traumatic memories and at the role of collective memory in commemoration. ^(20){ }^{20} But the larger horizons of both were not explored, much less the ways in which each suggested the equiprimordiality of forgetting vis-à-vis remembering in general. If I point out these horizons now, it is only to indicate that much work remains to be donein particular, a detailed description of forgetting in all of its avatars and applications. Only by offering such a description will I be able to claim to provide a truly comprehensive account of memory in its many modes, enactments, and extensions. 在《记忆》一书中，我曾暗示过创伤性记忆的重要性以及集体记忆在纪念活动中的作用。 ^(20){ }^{20} 但这两者的更广阔视野尚未被探索，更遑论它们各自所暗示的遗忘与记忆在本质上的同源性。如果我现在指出这些视野，只是为了表明仍有大量工作有待完成——特别是对遗忘的各种形态和应用进行详细描述。唯有提供这样的描述，我才能宣称自己真正全面地阐述了记忆的多种模式、表现和延伸。
Edward S. Casey SUNY at Stony Brook 爱德华·S·凯西 纽约州立大学石溪分校January 2000 2000 年 1 月
Notes 注释
See “Imagining and Remembering,” reprinted from the Review of Metaphysics (December 1977) in Spirit and Soul: Essays in Philosophical Psychology (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1991), pp. 136-54. 参见《想象与记忆》，重印自《形而上学评论》（1977 年 12 月），收录于《精神与灵魂：哲学心理学论文集》（达拉斯：春天出版社，1991 年），第 136-154 页。
On the results of intentional analysis, see Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 38-61; Remembering: A Phenomenological Study (below), pp. 48-85. Concerning the respective senses of freedom and of “thin” and “thick” autonomy, see Imagining, chs. 8-9, and Remembering, chs. 11-12. 关于意向性分析的结果，参见《想象：现象学研究》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，2000 年），第 38-61 页；《记忆：现象学研究》（见下文），第 48-85 页。关于自由感及"单薄"与"厚重"自主性的相关论述，参见《想象》第 8-9 章与《记忆》第 11-12 章。
Or was the difference not in myself-my younger self more bent on taming the phenomenon, whatever its extravagancies, in contrast with my middle-aged self more resigned and more open to the complexities of phenomena? 抑或这种差异并非源于我自身——年轻时的我更执着于驯服现象（无论其多么离奇），而中年后的我则更顺应现象本身的复杂性？
The mnemonic modes differ among themselves with regard to such fundamental parameters as medium of presentation (i.e., perception vs. indicative sign vs. word) and form of temporality (recognition is bound to the present; reminiscing focuses on the past; reminders range over both past and present as well as the future). 各类记忆模式在基本参数上存在差异，例如呈现媒介（即感知 vs.指示性符号 vs.语言）与时间性形式（识别绑定于当下；回忆聚焦于过去；提示物则横跨过去、现在与未来）。
See David Krell, Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Charles Scott, The Memory of Time in the Light of Flesh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). 参见大卫·克雷尔《论记忆、回忆与书写》（布鲁明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1990）；查尔斯·斯科特《肉身之光中的时间记忆》（奥尔巴尼：纽约州立大学出版社，2000）。
The classic work in the field, published in the same year as Remembering, is Larry R. Squire, Memory and Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). For a more current approach, see Stephen M. Kosslyn, Image and Brain (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994). 该领域的经典著作是与《记忆》同年出版的拉里·R·斯夸尔《记忆与大脑》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1987）。更新近的研究可参阅斯蒂芬·M·科斯林《意象与大脑》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社，1994）。
“Forgetting Remembered,” Man and World (1992), 281-311. Bernhard Waldenfels discussed forgetting as the other of memory in a seminar given at SUNY, Stony Brook, October, 1999. 《被遗忘的记忆》，载《人与世界》（1992 年）第 281-311 页。伯恩哈德·瓦尔登费尔斯 1999 年 10 月在纽约州立大学石溪分校研讨会上将遗忘论述为记忆的他者。
See Maurice Halbwachs, La mémoire collective, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968); Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Memory: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 参见莫里斯·哈布瓦赫《集体记忆》第二版（巴黎：法国大学出版社，1968）、《记忆的社会框架》（巴黎：法国大学出版社，1952）；保罗·康纳顿《社会如何记忆》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1989）；埃维塔·泽鲁巴维尔《社会记忆：认知社会学导论》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1997）；詹姆斯·芬特雷斯与克里斯·威克姆《社会记忆》（牛津：布莱克威尔出版社，1992）。
Nancy Munn, The Fame of Gawa: A Symbolic Study of Value Transformations in a Massim (Papua New Guinea) Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 166-80; see my discussion of Munn’s account in “Forgetting Remembered,” pp. 297-98. 南希·芒恩，《加瓦的声誉：马西姆（巴布亚新几内亚）社会价值转变的符号学研究》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1986 年），尤见第 166-180 页；参见我在《被遗忘的记忆》第 297-298 页中对芒恩论述的讨论。
See Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” tr. J. Strachey, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), XIV, esp. the statement that “each one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the [deceased person] is brought up and hypercathected, and [thereby] detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect to [this person]” (p. 245). See my comments on Freud’s model of mourning below, pp. 239-45. 参见西格蒙德·弗洛伊德，《哀悼与忧郁症》，J·斯特雷奇译，《弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》（伦敦：霍加斯出版社，1958 年），第十四卷，特别是其中关于"力比多与被[逝者]绑定的每一个记忆和期待都被唤起并过度投注，[从而]完成力比多对[此人]的剥离"的论述（第 245 页）。我对弗洛伊德哀悼模型的评论见下文第 239-245 页。
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr. revised by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall (New York: Seabury, 1991), p. 16. 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔，《真理与方法》，J·魏因舍默与 D·G·马歇尔修订译本（纽约：西伯里出版社，1991 年），第 16 页。
I discuss " SS " below in the Preface, p. xx, with reference to A. R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist, tr. L. Solotaroff (Chicago: Regnery, 1976). Concerning the predicament of being unable to forget a trauma, see the discussion of “constant ruminative preoccupation with the [traumatic] experience” in Lawrence Wright, Remembering Satan (New York: Knopf, 1994), pp. 165 ff165 f f. 我在序言第 xx 页讨论" SS "时，参考了 A.R.卢里亚所著《记忆大师的思维》（L.索洛塔罗夫译，芝加哥：瑞格纳瑞出版社，1976 年）。关于无法遗忘创伤的困境，可参阅劳伦斯·赖特《记忆撒旦》（纽约：克诺夫出版社，1994 年）第 165 ff165 f f 页中对"持续沉溺于[创伤]经历的强迫性思考"的论述。
“False memory”-fausse reconnaissance in French-is equivalent to paramnesia, i.e., substituting a fabricated or would-be memory for a missing actual and accurate memory. On the false memory syndrome, see especially Wright, Remembering Satan; Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994); Mark Pendergrast, Victims of Memory: Incest Accusations and Shattered Lives (Hinesburg, Vt.: Upper Access, Inc., 1995). "虚假记忆"（法语 fausse reconnaissance）等同于记忆错构症，即以虚构或假设的记忆替代缺失的真实准确记忆。关于虚假记忆综合征，特别推荐参阅：赖特《记忆撒旦》；伊丽莎白·洛夫特斯与凯瑟琳·凯彻姆合著《压抑记忆的神话：虚假记忆与性侵指控》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1994 年）；马克·彭德格拉斯《记忆的受害者：乱伦指控与破碎人生》（佛蒙特州海恩斯堡：上通道出版公司，1995 年）。
See Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), and Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 参见凯西·卡鲁斯《未被认领的经历：创伤、叙事与历史》（巴尔的摩：约翰霍普金斯大学出版社，1996 年），以及凯西·卡鲁斯编《创伤：记忆中的探索》（巴尔的摩：约翰霍普金斯大学出版社，1995 年）。
On reowning, see Roy Schafer, A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Concerning multiple personality disorder (MPD), see Colin A. Ross, The Osiris Complex: Case-Studies in Multiple Personality Disorder (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). For an elegant philosophical analysis of MPD as well as the false memory syndrome, see Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 关于"重新拥有"的概念，可参阅罗伊·谢弗所著《精神分析新语言》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1980 年）。关于多重人格障碍（MPD）的研究，参见科林·A·罗斯《奥西里斯情结：多重人格障碍案例研究》（多伦多：多伦多大学出版社，1995 年）。对 MPD 及虚假记忆综合征的精妙哲学分析，详见伊恩·哈金《重写灵魂：多重人格与记忆科学》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1995 年）。
M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, tr. C. Smith et al. (New York: Humanities, 1982), p. 242. Levinas speaks similarly of "a past that was before the past"and thus never part of any present-in his Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, tr. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 170. Compare Freud’s claim: “something is ‘remembered’ which could never have been ‘forgotten’ because it was never at any time noticed-was never conscious” (“Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works [London: Hogarth, 1957], XII, 149). 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，C·史密斯等译（纽约：人文出版社，1982 年），第 242 页。列维纳斯在《总体与无限：论外在性》（A·林吉斯译，匹兹堡：杜肯大学出版社，1969 年）第 170 页中同样论述了"先于过去之过去"的概念，这种过去从未属于任何当下。可对比弗洛伊德的论断："被'记起'的某些内容其实从未被'遗忘'，因为它从未被注意过——从未进入意识层面"（《回忆、重复与修通》，载于《弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》[伦敦：霍加斯出版社，1957 年]，第十二卷，第 149 页）。
As Lawrence Wright says: “Whatever the value of repression as a scientific concept or a therapeutic tool, unquestioning belief in it has become as dangerous as the belief in witches” (Remembering Satan, p. 200). Concerning the analogy between false memory syndrome and the witchcraft trials of the seventeenth century, see Loftus and Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory, pp. 250-63 (with special reference to Arthur Miller’s “The Crucible”) and Pendergrast, Victims of Memory, ch. 12. 正如劳伦斯·怀特所言："无论压抑作为科学概念或治疗工具具有何种价值，对其不加质疑的信仰已变得如同相信巫术般危险"（《记忆撒旦》第 200 页）。关于虚假记忆综合征与十七世纪猎巫审判的类比，参见洛夫特斯与凯彻姆合著的《压抑记忆的神话》第 250-263 页（特别提及阿瑟·米勒的《萨勒姆的女巫》），以及彭德格拉斯特《记忆的受害者》第 12 章。
Loftus and Ketchum, The Myth of Repressed Memory, p. 18. Loftus has shown how easy it is to plant a memory in an innocent person’s mind and for that person to come to believe that it designates a real event: see her testimony about a false memory of her own that arose from a mere remark of a family member: Loftus and Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory, pp. 39-40. 洛夫特斯与凯彻姆《压抑记忆的神话》第 18 页。洛夫特斯证实了将记忆植入无辜者脑海并使其信以为真何其容易：参见她关于自身虚假记忆的证言——该记忆仅因家庭成员的一句评论而产生（《压抑记忆的神话》第 39-40 页）。
Cited by Loftus at ibid., p. 268. The full statement is: “I’m not saying that children aren’t molested or abused. They are molested, and they are abused, and in many cases it’s absolutely devastating. But therapy makes it even more devastating by the way it thinks about it. It isn’t just the trauma that does the damage, it’s remembering traumatically.” (Cited, with Hillman’s italics, from We’ve Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World’s Getting Worse [New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992], from pp. 187-99.) 引自洛夫特斯，同上书，第 268 页。完整陈述如下："我并非否认儿童遭受性侵或虐待的事实。他们确实遭受侵害，许多案例中这种伤害是毁灭性的。但治疗方式对事件的认知框架加剧了这种毁灭性。造成伤害的不仅是创伤本身，更是以创伤化的方式记忆。"（引用自《心理治疗百年：世界却每况愈下》[纽约：HarperSanFrancisco 出版社，1992 年]，第 187-199 页，希尔曼的斜体强调部分。）
See Remembering, pp. 154-57 (on traumatic memories) and chapter ten, esp. pp. 231-39, 247-55 (on the collective or “communal” aspect of commemoration). 参见《记忆》第 154-157 页（关于创伤记忆）及第十章，特别是第 231-239 页、247-255 页（关于纪念活动的集体性或"社群性"维度）。
PREFACE 前言
through spiral upon spiral of the shell of memory that yet connects us. . . . 穿过记忆贝壳层叠盘旋的纹路，那仍将我们相连的脉络……
-H.D., “The Flowering of the Rod” -H.D.，《权杖开花》
The fact is that we have almost no systematic knowledge about memory as it occurs in the course of ordinary life. 事实上，我们对于日常生活中记忆如何运作几乎缺乏系统性的认知。
-Ulrich Neisser, Cognition and Reality -乌尔里希·奈瑟，《认知与现实》
In the case of memory, we are always already in the thick of things. For this reason there can properly be no preface to remembering: no pre-facing the topic in a statement that would precede it and capture its essence or structure in advance. Memory itself is already in the advance position. Not only because remembering is at all times presupposed, but also because it is always at work: it is continually going on, often on several levels and in several ways at once. Although there are many moments of misremembering and of not successfully recollecting, there are few moments in which we are not steeped in memory; and this immersion includes each step we take, each thought we think, each word we utter. Indeed, every fiber of our bodies, every cell of our brains, holds memories-as does everything physical outside bodies and brains, even those inanimate objects that bear the marks of their past histories upon them in mute profusion. What is memory-laden exceeds the scope of the human: memory takes us into the environing world as well as into our individual lives. 就记忆而言，我们始终已然置身其中。正因如此，关于记忆的讨论本就不该有前言：无法用某种预先的陈述来面对这个主题，提前把握其本质或结构。记忆本身已然处于先行位置。这不仅因为记忆在任何时刻都被预先设定，更因为它始终在运作：它持续发生着，往往同时以多种层面和多种方式进行。尽管存在诸多误记与回忆失败的时刻，但我们鲜少不沉浸于记忆之中；这种沉浸涵盖了我们迈出的每一步、思考的每个念头、说出的每个词语。事实上，我们身体的每根纤维、大脑的每个细胞都承载着记忆——身体与大脑之外的一切物质存在亦是如此，就连那些镌刻着沉默历史痕迹的无生命物体也不例外。充满记忆的存在超越了人类范畴：记忆既将我们引入周遭世界，也带我们深入个体生命。
To acknowledge such a massive pre-presence of memory is to acknowledge how irreducibly important remembering is. If we need to be convinced of how much memory matters to us, we have only to ponder the fate of someone deprived of its effective use. Consider, for instance, the case of the unfortunate “M.K.,” a high school teacher who at age forty-three was suddenly struck by an acute episode of encephalitis. Within hours, he lost access to almost all memories formed during the previous five years. Worse still, he had virtually no memory of anything that happened to him afterwards: since the onset of the illness, “he has learned a few names over the years, a few major events, and can get around the hospital.” ^(1){ }^{1} This laconic summary, tragic in its very brevity, conveys the empty essence of a life rendered suddenly memoryless by a microscopic viral agent. Such a life is without aim or direction; it spins in the void of the forgotten, a void in which one cannot even be certain of one’s personal identity. Not only does it show that what most of us take for granted can be abolished with an incompre- 承认记忆如此庞大的先在性，就是承认回忆具有不可削减的重要性。若需确证记忆对我们的关键意义，只需设想被剥夺有效记忆之人的境遇。以不幸的"M.K."为例，这位高中教师四十三岁时突发急性脑炎，数小时内便丧失了近五年形成的几乎所有记忆。更可悲的是，他对病后发生的任何事几乎毫无印象：自发病以来，"这些年他只记住几个名字、几件大事，勉强能在医院里走动"。 ^(1){ }^{1} 这份简练到令人心碎的描述，道出了被微观病毒突然清空记忆的生命本质。这样的生活既无目标也无方向，在遗忘的虚空中徒然旋转——那是个连自我身份都无法确认的虚无之境。它不仅揭示了我们习以为常的能力可能被莫名剥夺
hensible rapidity; it also poses the problem of how anything that permeates our lives so deeply can be lost so irrevocably. 记忆以惊人的速度消逝；这也提出了一个问题：为何那些深深渗透进我们生活的事物，竟能如此彻底地消失无踪。
How much memory matters can also be seen in the quite different case of “S.,” a Russian mnemonist with an astonishing capacity to recall. When asked, as one of myriad tests, to repeat several stanzas of The Divine Comedy in Italian (a language he did not know) some fifteen years after having the stanzas read to him just once, he was able to recite them word for word and with perfect intonation. As A. R. Luria has observed, “the capacity of his memory had no distinct limits.” ^(2){ }^{2} Envious as we might be of such a capacity, it is noteworthy that S . suffered greatly from it; so overburdened by it was he that he had to devise techniques for forgetting what he would otherwise irrepressibly remember, no matter how trivial it was: “This is too much,” he lamented, “each word calls up images; they collide with one another, and the result is chaos.” ^(3){ }^{3} Where forgetting was M.K.'s curse, it was S.'s salvation. But in the end, it is not clear that S., with his gift, was any less oppressed than was M.K. in his afflicted state. 记忆的重要性在另一个截然不同的案例"谢列舍夫斯基"身上同样显现——这位俄罗斯记忆奇人拥有惊人的回忆能力。在一次测试中，当被要求复述十五年前仅听过一次的意大利语《神曲》诗节（他并不懂这种语言）时，他竟能逐字逐句用完美语调背诵出来。正如 A·R·鲁利亚所观察到的："他的记忆能力似乎没有明确界限。" ^(2){ }^{2} 虽然我们可能羡慕这种能力，但值得注意的是谢列舍夫斯基为此深受其苦；记忆的过度负荷迫使他必须发明遗忘技巧，否则任何琐事都会不受控制地浮现："这太过了，"他哀叹道，"每个词都唤起意象，它们相互碰撞，最终形成混沌。" ^(3){ }^{3} 遗忘对 M.K.而言是诅咒，对谢列舍夫斯基却是救赎。但最终，拥有天赋的谢列舍夫斯基所承受的压迫，似乎并不比受记忆困扰的 M.K.少半分。
These two figures are limiting cases of what the rest of us, as more or less normal rememberers, experience. On the one hand, each of us has undergone moments or even entire periods of acute amnesia. Whether such amnesia is contingent and occasion-bound (e.g., failing to recall the name of a friend or, more drastically, the circumstances immediately preceding a concussion) or systematic and symptomatic (as in forgetting dreams or incidents from early childhood), it is embarrassing and discomfiting and sometimes even disabling. On the other hand, it is a fact that eight percent of elementary school children possess practically perfect eidetic recall. ^(4){ }^{4} Moreover, many adults can recover deeply repressed memories in vivid detail even though they have never been recollected before; and, generally, our powers of hypermnesia (i.e., ultra-clear memory) are much more extensive than we usually suspect. ^(5){ }^{5} Just as we have no difficulty in grasping the devastating consequences of M.K.'s memory loss, so we connect immediately with S.'s prodigious feats of memory through certain of our own inherent, if distinctly more modest, capacities. 这两种情形代表了普通人作为记忆者所经历的极端案例。一方面，每个人都曾经历过短暂甚至长期的严重失忆。无论这种失忆是偶发情境性的（例如忘记朋友姓名，或更严重地遗忘脑震荡前的场景），还是系统症状性的（如遗忘梦境或童年早期事件），都令人尴尬不安，有时甚至造成功能障碍。另一方面，数据显示 8%的小学生拥有近乎完美的图像记忆能力 ^(4){ }^{4} 。此外，许多成年人能以惊人细节唤醒从未被忆起的深层压抑记忆；总体而言，人类超常记忆（即超清晰记忆）的能力远比通常想象的要强大 ^(5){ }^{5} 。正如我们不难理解 M.K.记忆丧失的毁灭性后果，我们也能通过自身固有（尽管明显逊色）的记忆能力，即刻与 S.惊人的记忆壮举产生共鸣。
Nevertheless, even if we do not find M.K. or S. utterly alien, most of the remembering that most of us do falls between the poles of hypomnesia and hypermnesia. Thus the question becomes: what can we say with confidence about our own remembering as it occurs spontaneously and on a daily basis? Short of total recall and yet beyond amnesic vacuity, how does human memory present itself? What basic forms does it assume? With what content is it concerned? How much is it a function of the human mind, how much of the human body? In short, what do we do when we remember? 然而，即便我们并不认为 M.K.或 S.的记忆状态完全陌生，大多数人的日常记忆活动仍处于记忆减退与记忆亢进这两个极端之间。于是问题就变成了：对于自发产生的日常记忆行为，我们能作出哪些确切的描述？在完全回忆与彻底遗忘之间，人类的记忆究竟如何呈现？它采取哪些基本形式？关注哪些内容？在多大程度上是心智的功能，又在多大程度上与身体相关？简言之，当我们回忆时，究竟发生了什么？
Remembering: A Phenomenological Study attempts to answer such questions as these by taking a resolutely descriptive look at memory as it arises in diverse commonplace settings. In these settings we rarely attend to what we are doing when we remember; we just let it happen (or fail to happen). How 《记忆：现象学研究》试图通过对日常情境中记忆现象进行坚决的描述性考察，来回答这类问题。在这些情境中，我们很少关注回忆时的心理活动；我们只是任其自然发生（或未能发生）。如何
can we begin to notice what we so much take for granted-except precisely when we hear of extraordinary cases such as those of M.K. and S.? This book undertakes to help us notice what has gone unnoticed or been noticed only marginally. In this respect the book is a work in phenomenology, an enterprise devoted to discerning and thematizing that which is indistinct or overlooked in everyday experience. 我们是否能够开始注意到那些我们习以为常的事物——除非当我们听说像 M.K.和 S.这样的特殊案例时？本书旨在帮助我们觉察那些未被注意或仅被边缘化关注的现象。从这个意义上说，这是一部现象学著作，致力于辨识并主题化日常生活中那些模糊或被忽视的体验。
Remembering represents a sequel to my earlier study of imagination. ^(6){ }^{6} But there is a critical difference between the two inquiries, which are otherwise closely affiliated. This difference follows directly from the multifarious incursions of memory into the life-world of the rememberer. These inroads are such as to resist complete capture in the structure of intentionality, which served as a guiding thread in Imagining. In remembering, there is an unresolvable “restance” ^(7){ }^{7}-resistance as well as remainder-which calls for a different approach. Intentional analysis remains valid for much of ordinary recollection (e.g., in visualized scenes), and I devote chapters 3 and 4 to the exploration of remembering insofar as it can be construed on the model of the mind’s intentionality. But once we realize how forcefully many phenomena of memory take us out of mind conceived as a container of ideas and representations, we can no longer rest content with intentionality as a leitmotif. ^(8){ }^{8} That is why in Part Two I consider various "mnemonic modes"i.e., recognizing, reminiscing, and reminding-each of which can be seen as contesting the self-enclosing character of strictly intentionalist paradigms. In Part Three I depart still further from the narrow basis established in Part One; I do so by describing body memory, place memory, and commemoration. In spite of their central position in human experience, these latter have been curiously neglected in previous accounts of memory. Their description leads me to discuss memory’s “thick autonomy” in Part Four: an autonomy which is to be contrasted with the equally characteristic “thin autonomy” of imagination. 《记忆》一书是我早期关于想象力研究的续篇。 ^(6){ }^{6} 但这两项紧密相关的研究存在一个关键差异。这一差异直接源于记忆对记忆者生活世界的多重渗透。这些渗透如此深入，以至于难以完全纳入意向性结构的框架——而意向性在《想象》中曾是核心线索。记忆活动中存在一种无法消解的"残余" ^(7){ }^{7} ——既是抗拒也是剩余——这要求我们采用不同的研究路径。意向分析对于大部分日常回忆（例如视觉化场景）仍然有效，我在第三章和第四章专门探讨了能够按照心灵意向性模式来理解的记忆现象。然而，一旦我们认识到众多记忆现象如何强烈地将我们带离"心灵作为观念容器"的传统认知，便不能再满足于以意向性作为主导主题了。 正因如此，在第二部分我探讨了多种"记忆模式"——即识别、追忆与提醒——每一种都可被视为对严格意向主义范式自我封闭特性的挑战。第三部分则更进一步突破第一部分奠定的狭窄基础，通过描述身体记忆、场所记忆与纪念仪式来实现。尽管这些形式在人类经验中占据核心地位，却在以往的记忆论述中遭到奇特的忽视。对这些记忆形态的阐述，最终引导我在第四部分探讨记忆的"厚重自主性"——这种自主性与想象力同样典型的"稀薄自主性"形成鲜明对比。
A descriptive account of remembering will help us to recognize that we remember in multiple ways: that the past need not come packaged in the prescribed format of representational recollections. To fail to remember in this format is not tantamount to failing to remember altogether. When one memorial channel to the past becomes closed off, others often open upindeed, are often already on hand and fully operative. I may not retain a lucid mental image of an acrimonious quarrel with a certain friend-I may have successfully repressed it-and yet the same scene may be lingering in an inarticulate but nonetheless powerful body memory. The point is not that there is a meaningful alternative in every case: the sad circumstance of M.K. warns us of dire limits. But plural modes of access to the remembered past are far more plentiful than philosophers and psychologists have managed to ascertain. ^(9){ }^{9} 对记忆的描述性阐述将帮助我们认识到，我们以多种方式记忆：过去并不需要以再现性回忆的规定形式打包呈现。未能以这种形式记忆，并不等同于完全丧失记忆。当一条通往过去的记忆通道关闭时，其他通道往往会打开——事实上，它们通常早已存在并完全运作着。我可能无法保留与某位朋友激烈争吵的清晰心理图像——我可能已成功压抑了它——然而同样的场景可能正以难以言表却依然强烈的身体记忆形式萦绕不去。关键并非每种情况都存在有意义的替代方案：M.K.的悲惨境遇警示着我们存在严峻的局限。但通往记忆过去的多元途径远比哲学家和心理学家们已确认的要多得多。 ^(9){ }^{9}
Remembering returns us to the very world lost sight of in the language of representations and of neural traces. Indeed, remembering reminds us that 记忆将我们带回到在表征语言和神经痕迹中被遗忘的那个世界。事实上，记忆提醒着我们
we have never left the life-world in the first place, that we are always within it, and that memory is itself the main life-line to it. For memory takes us into things-into the Sachen selbst which Husserl proclaimed to be the proper objects of phenomenological investigation. In remembering, we come back to the things that matter. 我们从未真正离开过生活世界，始终身处其中，而记忆正是连接这个世界的主要纽带。因为记忆将我们带入事物本身——带入胡塞尔宣称的现象学研究之正当对象。在回忆中，我们重返那些真正重要的事物。
But memory is not just something that sustains a status quo ante within human experience. It also makes a critical difference to this experience. The situation is such that remembering transforms one kind of experience into another: in being remembered, an experience becomes a different kind of experience. It becomes “a memory,” with all that this entails, not merely of the consistent, the enduring, the reliable, but also of the fragile, the errant, the confabulated. Each memory is unique; none is simple repetition or revival. The way that the past is relived in memory assures that it will be transfigured in subtle and significant ways. 但记忆不仅仅是维持人类经验中原有状态的存在。它还会对这种经验产生关键性的改变。实际情况是：回忆将一种经验转化为另一种经验——当被记住时，经验就变成了另一种不同的经验。它成为"一段记忆"，这意味着不仅包含连贯的、持久的、可靠的特质，也包含脆弱的、易错的、虚构的成分。每段记忆都是独特的；没有简单的重复或重现。过去在记忆中被重新体验的方式，确保了它将以微妙而深刻的方式被重塑。
If this is indeed the case-if memory matters in our experience by making a difference in the form our experience itself takes-then a detailed description of remembering is called for. Such a description will not only aid us in distinguishing remembering from kindred phenomena of imagining and perceiving, feeling and thinking; it will also lead us to realize that it was always misguided to propose that remembering could be regarded as a mere offshoot of mind or brain, fated to repeat what has already happened elsewhere. Remembering is itself essential to what is happening, part of every action, here as well as elsewhere: “remembrance is always now.” ^(10){ }^{10} It is also, thanks to its transformative force in the here and now, then and there. Not only is nothing human alien to memory; nothing in the world, including the world itself, is not memorial in nature or in status. And if this is so, it follows that “whatever we know exists in proportion to the memories we possess.” ^(11){ }^{11} Thus far reaches remembering: it stretches as far as we can know. 如果事实确实如此——如果记忆通过改变我们经验本身的形式而在我们的体验中发挥作用——那么就需要对记忆进行详细的描述。这种描述不仅有助于我们将记忆与想象、感知、感受和思维等类似现象区分开来，还将使我们认识到，将记忆视为心灵或大脑的单纯衍生物、注定重复已在他处发生之事的观点始终是错误的。记忆本身对正在发生之事至关重要，它是每个行动的组成部分，无论在此处还是彼处："记忆永远存在于当下。" ^(10){ }^{10} 正是由于记忆在此时此地、彼时彼处的转化力量，使得不仅人类的一切都与记忆息息相关，世间万物（包括世界本身）在本质上或状态上无不具有纪念性。若果真如此，便可推论出"我们所知的一切存在，都与我们所拥有的记忆成正比。" ^(11){ }^{11} 记忆的疆域如此广阔：它延伸至我们所能认知的极限。
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 致谢
To acknowledge adequately the help of so many colleagues, friends, and family members during the decade in which this book has come to birth would itself be a considerable feat of memory. Let me single out only those who offered the most important intellectual and personal resources during this protracted period of time-resources without which this book could not have been written. 要充分感谢这十年来众多同事、朋友及家人对本书诞生的帮助，本身就需要非凡的记忆力。在此我仅特别致谢那些在这漫长岁月里提供了最重要智力支持与精神力量的人们——若没有这些支持，本书便无法完成。
First of all, I would like to thank my colleagues and students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. They have provided a most congenial and exciting atmosphere in which to teach and write. A primary inspiration at Stony Brook has been Marcia K. Johnson, now in the Psychology Department at Princeton University. Together, we taught a graduate course on human memory in which I worked out a number of my fledgling ideas against the backdrop of current cognitive psychology; informally, we discussed many of the themes that appear in this book. In the Philosophy Department at Stony Brook I am especially grateful to Mary C. Rawlinson for her searching remarks on Proust and the subject of involuntary memory. Contributing in diverse ways have been Patrick Heelan, Donn Welton, Eva Kittay, Hugh Silverman, Antonio de Nicolas, and Don Ihde. In Religious Studies I owe much to Peter Manchester’s magisterial understanding of ancient Greek philosophy and its late Hellenistic heritage. His colleagues Robert Neville and Thomas J. J. Altizer have been guiding presences. With Janet Gyatso I have discussed to my great profit the semiological aspects of memory, especially the nature of reminders; she also commented valuably on several parts of the manuscript. 首先，我要感谢纽约州立大学石溪分校的同事和学生们。他们营造了一个极其融洽且充满活力的教学与写作环境。在石溪分校，马西娅·K·约翰逊（现任职于普林斯顿大学心理学系）给予了我最初的灵感。我们曾共同教授一门关于人类记忆的研究生课程，使我在当代认知心理学的背景下完善了许多初步构想；我们也非正式地探讨过本书涉及的诸多主题。在石溪分校哲学系，我特别感谢玛丽·C·罗林森对普鲁斯特与非自主记忆主题的深刻见解。帕特里克·希兰、唐·威尔顿、伊娃·基泰、休·西尔弗曼、安东尼奥·德尼古拉斯和唐·伊德以不同方式作出了贡献。在宗教研究领域，彼得·曼彻斯特对古希腊哲学及其希腊化晚期遗产的权威理解令我受益匪浅。他的同事罗伯特·内维尔和托马斯·J·J·阿尔蒂泽始终是引领方向的存在。 与珍妮特·嘉措的讨论让我受益匪浅，尤其是关于记忆符号学的层面以及提醒的本质；她还对手稿的多个部分提出了宝贵意见。
Every author should be so fortunate as to have a reader as mercilessly critical, and yet as imaginatively constructive, as J. Melvin Woody of Connecticut College. He saw through most of my rhetorical ruses and inept formulations and led me to rewrite virtually the whole book during a semester’s sabbatical leave. If the book as it stands has finally begun to approach coherence, it is very much thanks to my friend’s concerted scrutinies. 每位作者都该庆幸能遇到像康涅狄格学院 J·梅尔文·伍迪这样既毫不留情批评又富有建设性创见的读者。他识破了我大部分修辞伎俩和笨拙表述，促使我在一个学期的学术休假期间几乎重写了全书。若本书最终呈现出某种连贯性，那很大程度上要归功于这位友人的合力审读。
I am also indebted to Calvin Schrag for his meticulous reading of the entire manuscript at an early stage. His suggestions for reductions in a manuscript that was twice the present length have proven very useful. I also profited immensely from the close readings of Deborah Chaffin; her ideas for revisions have been taken into account in many places. Laura Jerabek was helpful in discussing several chapters of the evolving book. Indispensable to the completion of this project has been Catherine Keller. Not only has she commented on most of the text, she encouraged my recourse to Whitehead at a crucial juncture. Her extensive knowledge of mythology and her subtle sense of style have been gratefully received gifts during the time in which this book assumed its final shape. 我也要感谢卡尔文·施拉格（Calvin Schrag）在早期阶段对整部手稿的细致审读。他建议删减当时两倍于现稿篇幅的内容，这些建议被证明极为宝贵。黛博拉·查芬（Deborah Chaffin）的精细阅读也让我获益匪浅，她在多处提出的修改意见已被采纳。劳拉·杰拉贝克（Laura Jerabek）在讨论本书多个发展中的章节时提供了帮助。凯瑟琳·凯勒（Catherine Keller）对完成本项目不可或缺——她不仅对大部分文本作出评注，更在关键时刻鼓励我借鉴怀特海的思想。她对神话的广博知识及精妙的文体感知力，在本书定稿过程中如同珍贵的馈赠。
Of the numerous people who read determinate parts of the manuscript at various points I wish to mention here Drew Leder for his pertinent remarks 在诸多曾审阅过手稿特定章节的学者中，我要特别感谢德鲁·莱德（Drew Leder）提出的切中肯綮的见解。
on the neurophysiological aspects of memory and for his critical perusal of the chapter on body memory. Glen Mazis also contributed insightfully to my understanding of body memory and its ramifications. Charles Scott set me straight on basic features of place memory in a memorable talk in Perugia, Italy. The role of landscape in place memory was illuminated by David Strong in several discussions. I am especially indebted to Véronique Fóti for her expert guidance in grasping Descartes’s conception of memory as well as for talks in which we profitably explored assorted topics in the realm of remembering. Her rigorous standards of scholarship as well as her considerable critical acumen have been of inestimable value in the last nine years. 关于记忆的神经生理学方面，以及他对身体记忆章节的审慎批阅。格伦·马齐斯也对我理解身体记忆及其分支提供了富有洞见的贡献。查尔斯·斯科特在意大利佩鲁贾的一次难忘谈话中，为我厘清了场所记忆的基本特征。大卫·斯特朗通过多次讨论，阐明了景观在场所记忆中的作用。我特别要感谢维罗妮卡·福蒂，她以专业指导帮助我理解笛卡尔的记忆概念，并在我们探讨记忆领域各类话题的富有成效的对话中给予启发。过去九年间，她严谨的学术标准与卓越的批判思维对我具有不可估量的价值。
Friends in the field of psychology-which has devoted more attention to memory than has philosophy in this century-have been inspiring figures in the course of this book’s gestation. James Hillman and I have debated, in public and in private, the respective features and virtues of imagination and memory. He also generously provided a place of retreat several summers ago in Botorp, Sweden, where I was able to think out the second half of the book. For many years Stanley Leavy and I have engaged in virorous discussions on psychoanalysis and related matters. His seminal book, The Psychoanalytic Dialogue, has been of central significance in my efforts to bring psychoanalysis to bear on my own project. JoAnne Wallen contributed significant insights from the practice of psychotherapy and from her own remarkable psychological sagacity. I also learned much from Dan Reisberg’s scintillating lectures at the New School for Social Research on the status of current research on memory in cognitive psychology. Henry Tylbor provoked me to rethink aspects of remembering that I had taken for granted. 心理学界的朋友们——本世纪他们对记忆的关注远胜于哲学界——在本书孕育过程中给予我诸多启发。詹姆斯·希尔曼与我曾公开或私下辩论过想象与记忆各自的特质与价值。数年前在瑞典博托普的夏日里，他还慷慨提供了静修之所，使我得以构思本书后半部分。多年来斯坦利·利维与我围绕精神分析及相关议题展开激烈讨论，其开创性著作《精神分析对话》对我将精神分析融入自身研究具有核心意义。乔安妮·沃伦从心理治疗实践及其非凡的心理洞察力中贡献了重要见解。在社会科学研究新学院聆听丹·雷斯伯格关于认知心理学中记忆研究现状的精彩讲座亦使我获益良多。亨利·泰尔伯则促使我重新审视那些曾视为理所当然的记忆面向。
For their ongoing support in differing contexts I would like to express my deeply felt gratitude to William Earle, a continuing mentor and friend; Hans W. Loewald, steadfast and untiring in his invaluable assistance; Jan Larson, a most discerning Diotima for more than thirty years of friendship; and especially Brenda Casey, who created an ambiance in which writing could be pursued even into the latest hours. Eric and Erin Casey were movingly memorable presences in that same ambiance. My sister, Constance J. Casey, kept me in vivid touch with important childhood memories. Reed Hoffman, my esteemed cousin of Enterprise, Kansas, apprised me of details concerning the vanished world cited in the dedication to this book. 对于他们在不同情境下持续给予的支持，我要向以下人士表达由衷的感激：威廉·厄尔，这位始终如一的良师益友；汉斯·W·洛瓦尔德，他以坚定不倦的态度提供了无比珍贵的帮助；简·拉尔森，这位极具洞察力的狄奥提玛与我维系了三十余年的友谊；特别要感谢布伦达·凯西，她营造了一个让我能持续写作至深夜的氛围。埃里克和艾琳·凯西在那个同样的氛围中留下了令人动容的印记。我的姐姐康斯坦斯·J·凯西让我与重要的童年记忆保持着鲜活的联系。来自堪萨斯州恩特普莱斯镇的我尊敬的堂兄里德·霍夫曼，为我提供了本书献词中提及的那个消逝世界的细节信息。
Virginia Massaro typed several versions of chapters with grace and skill. Others who helped in the typing of the manuscript include Sally Moran, Mary Bruno, and above all Jean Edmunds in the final stages. I received excellent editorial assistance from Lila Freedman, who combined sensitivity concerning style with intelligent critique of content. Librarians at the Guildford Public Library aided me in numerous ways. 弗吉尼亚·马萨罗以优雅娴熟的技巧完成了多个章节版本的打字工作。其他参与手稿打字的人员包括莎莉·莫兰、玛丽·布鲁诺，尤其是在最后阶段全力以赴的琼·埃德蒙兹。莉拉·弗里德曼为我提供了出色的编辑协助，她既关注文风又对内容提出睿智的批评。吉尔福德公共图书馆的馆员们以多种方式给予了我帮助。
I wish finally to thank the American Council of Learned Societies for a fellowship that allowed me to write the first chapters of this book in the fall of 1977 and to the State University of New York at Stony Brook for granting me a year’s leave of absence in 1984-85, during which time the book was completed. 最后，我要感谢美国学术团体协会（American Council of Learned Societies）提供的奖学金，使我得以在 1977 年秋季撰写本书的前几章；同时感谢纽约州立大学石溪分校（State University of New York at Stony Brook）于 1984-85 学年准予我休假一年，使本书得以在此期间完成。
Remembering 记忆
This page intentionally left blank 此页 intentionally left blank
INTRODUCTION 导言
REMEMBERING FORGOTTEN THE AMNESIA OF ANAMNESIS 追忆被遗忘的：回忆的遗忘症
I come into the fields and spacious palaces of my memory, where are treasures of countless images of things of every manner. 我走进记忆的广阔原野与恢宏宫殿，那里珍藏着无数事物的影像宝藏。
-St. Augustine, Confessions ——圣奥古斯丁《忏悔录》
I convince myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my deceitful memory recalls to me. 我让自己确信，那些欺骗性的记忆所唤起的过往，其实从未真实存在过。
-Descartes, Meditations -笛卡尔，《沉思录》
We moderns have no memories at all. 我们现代人根本没有记忆。
-Frances Yates, The Art of Memory -弗朗西斯·叶芝，《记忆的艺术》
I
Nietzsche’s essay “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” first published in 1874, opens with the following fable: 尼采 1874 年首次发表的论文《历史对于人生的利弊》开篇讲述了这样一则寓言：
Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what is meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, and so from morn till night and from day to day, [are] fettered to the moment and its pleasure or displeasure. . . . A human being may well ask [such] an animal: “Why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and gaze at me?” The animal would like to answer, and say: “The reason is that I always forget what I was going to say”-but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent: so that the human being was left wondering. ^(1){ }^{1} 看看那些从你身边经过的牛群：它们不懂何为昨日与今日，只是蹦跳、吃草、休憩、反刍，再从早到晚日复一日，被束缚于当下片刻的欢愉或不适……人类或许会问这样的动物：“为何不向我诉说你的幸福，只是站着凝视我？”那动物本想回答：“原因是我总忘记要说什么”——但随即连这回答也忘了，于是沉默不语：留下人类独自困惑。
Not wholly unlike the bovine beings here described by Nietzsche, we have not only forgotten what it is to remember-and what remembering is-but we have forgotten our own forgetting. So deep is our oblivion of memory that we are not even aware of how alienated we are from its “treasures” and how distant we have become from its deliverances. Memory, itself preoccupied with the past, is practically passé-a topic of past concern. Despite its manifold importance in our lives, it is only in unusual circumstances that remembering remains an item of central concern on contemporary agendas. These circumstances themselves tend to be distinctly selfcontained and removed from ordinary life, whether they are found in psychoanalytic sessions, Eastern visualization techniques, or experiments in cognitive psychology. Philosophers have come to despair over finding a constructive approach to memory; they have discredited and discarded a number of existing theories, especially those that make representation of the past the basic function of remembering; yet they have rarely offered a positive account of memory to take the place of rejected theories. 与尼采笔下描述的牛类生物并非完全不同，我们不仅遗忘了何为记忆——以及记忆的本质——更遗忘了自身的遗忘。我们对记忆的漠然如此之深，甚至未曾察觉自己与其"珍宝"疏离到何种程度，距离其启示又有多么遥远。记忆本身执着于过去，却几乎成了过时的概念——一个昔日关注的话题。尽管记忆在生活中的重要性无可替代，但唯有在特殊情境下，它才会成为当代议题的核心。这些情境往往自成一体，与日常生活泾渭分明，无论是精神分析诊疗、东方冥想技法，还是认知心理学实验。哲学家们已对寻找建设性的记忆研究途径感到绝望；他们质疑并摒弃了诸多现有理论，尤其是那些将重现过去视为记忆基本功能的学说；然而他们极少提出积极的内存理论来取代被否定的观点。
The fact is that we have forgotten what memory is and can mean; and we make matters worse by repressing the fact of our own oblivion. No wonder Yates can claim that “we moderns have no memories at all.” Where once Mnemosyne was a venerated Goddess, we have turned over responsibility for remembering to the cult of the computers, which serve as our modern mnemonic idols. The force of the remembered word in oral traditions-as exemplified in feats of bardic recounting that survive only in the most isolated circumstances ^(2){ }^{2}-has given way to the inarticulate hum of the disk drive. Human memory has become self-externalized: projected outside the rememberer himself or herself and into non-human machines. These machines, however, cannot remember; what they can do is to record, store, and retrieve information-which is only part of what human beings do when they enter into a memorious state. The memory of things is no longer in ourselves, in our own discerning and interpreting, but in the calculative wizardry of computers. If computers are acclaimed as creations of our own devising, they remain-whatever their invaluable utility-most unsuitable citadels of memory, whose “fields and spacious palaces” (in St. Augustine’s phrase) they cannot begin to contain or to replicate. Although certain nonhuman things can indeed bear memories-as we shall see toward the close of this book-computers cannot. Computers can only collect and order the reduced residues, the artfully formatted traces, of what in the end must be reclaimed by human beings in order to count as human memories. In this respect, our memories are up to us. But for the most part and ever increasingly, we have come to disclaim responsibility for them. 事实是我们已经忘记了记忆的本质及其意义；更糟的是，我们压抑了自己处于遗忘状态的事实。难怪叶芝会断言"我们现代人根本毫无记忆"。当谟涅摩绪涅还是备受尊崇的女神时，我们已将记忆的责任移交给了计算机崇拜——这些机器成了我们现代的记忆图腾。口述传统中记忆之词的力量——仅存于最与世隔绝环境中的吟游诗人传颂技艺便是明证——已让位于磁盘驱动器含混的嗡鸣。人类记忆已自我外化：从记忆者自身投射到非人类的机器中。然而这些机器并不能真正记忆；它们只能记录、存储和检索信息——而这只是人类进入记忆状态时所做事情的一部分。事物的记忆不再存在于我们自身之中，不再存在于我们的洞察与诠释中，而是存在于计算机精于计算的魔法里。 尽管计算机被誉为人类智慧的创造物，但无论其功能如何宝贵，它们始终是最不适合承载记忆的堡垒——用圣奥古斯丁的话来说，它们根本无法容纳或复现记忆的"广阔田野与恢宏宫殿"。虽然某些非人类事物确实能够承载记忆（本书结尾部分将探讨这点），但计算机做不到。计算机只能收集和整理那些经过精心格式化的简化痕迹，而这些痕迹最终必须由人类重新获取才能成为真正的人类记忆。就此而言，记忆始终取决于我们自己。但可悲的是，在绝大多数情况下，我们却越来越倾向于推卸对记忆的责任。
In the same essay as that cited above, Nietzsche suggests one of the motives for our amnesia concerning memory: “Even a happy life is possible without remembrance, as the beast shows; but life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness.” ^(3){ }^{3} Nietzsche himself advocates 尼采在上述引用的同一篇文章中，揭示了我们对记忆健忘的动机之一："正如动物所展示的，没有回忆也可能拥有幸福生活；但若没有遗忘，任何真正意义上的生活都绝无可能。" ^(3){ }^{3} 尼采本人主张
the concerted practice of “active forgetfulness”-all the more imperative if his doctrine of eternal recurrence is ultimately true. For if everything recurs an endless number of times, we would be well advised to avoid remembering anything that has happened even (apparently) only once! To recall what has happened an infinite number of times-including our own acts of recol-lecting-would be to assume a crushing burden. As Milan Kundera has put the matter: "主动遗忘"的协同实践——倘若他关于永恒轮回的学说最终被证实为真，这一实践就显得更为必要。因为如果万事万物都会无限次重复发生，我们最好避免记住任何哪怕（表面上）只发生过一次的事情！若要回忆那些已发生无限次的事件——包括我们自身的回忆行为——将意味着承受难以负荷的重担。正如米兰·昆德拉所言：
If every second of our lives recurs an infinite number of times, we are nailed to eternity as Jesus Christ was nailed to the cross. It is a terrifying prospect. In the world of eternal return the weight of unbearable responsibility lies heavy on every move we make. That is why Nietzsche called the idea of eternal return the heaviest of burdens (das schwerste Gewicht). 倘若我们生命中的每一秒都无限次重复，我们就会被钉在永恒之上，如同耶稣被钉在十字架上。这是个骇人的前景。在永恒轮回的世界里，难以承受的责任之重会压垮我们的每一个举动。正因如此，尼采称永恒轮回的观念为最沉重的负担（das schwerste Gewicht）。
If eternal return is the heaviest of burdens, then our lives can stand out against it in all their splendid lightness. ^(4){ }^{4} 如果永恒轮回是最沉重的负担，那么我们的生命就能以绚烂的轻盈与之抗衡。 ^(4){ }^{4}
“Splendid lightness” is fostered by forgetting, an active forgetting of that which becomes intolerably heavy when remembered. Kundera continues: "绚烂的轻盈"由遗忘滋养，这种主动遗忘的对象一旦被记起就会变得不堪重负。昆德拉继续写道：
But is heaviness truly deplorable and lightness splendid? 但沉重真的可悲，轻盈就一定美好吗？
The heaviest of burdens crushes us, we sink beneath it, it pins us to the ground. But in the love poetry of every age, the woman longs to be weighed down by the man’s body. The heaviest of burdens is therefore simultaneously an image of life’s most intense fulfillment. The heavier the burden, the closer our lives come to the earth, the more real and truthful they become. ^(5){ }^{5} 最沉重的负担将我们压垮，令我们沉陷，把我们钉在地上。然而每个时代的爱情诗篇里，女人都渴望被爱人的身躯所压覆。因此，最沉重的负担恰恰是生命最饱满充实的象征。负担越沉重，我们的生命就越贴近大地，就越真实存在。 ^(5){ }^{5}
Could it be that in following the path of forgetting, we have indeed missed one fundamental form of “life’s most intense fulfillment”? Have we perhaps lost touch with the “earth” of memory itself, its dense loam? Is not the way of forgetting a way of obscuring, even of renouncing, the sustaining subsoil of remembering? As Kundera also remarks: “The absolute absence of a burden causes man to be lighter than air, to soar into the heights, take leave of the earth and his earthly body, and become only half real, his movements as free as they are insignificant.” ^(6){ }^{6} 当我们追随遗忘之路时，是否恰恰错过了这种"生命最饱满充实"的基本形式？我们是否已与记忆本身的"大地"——那片丰沃的壤土——失去了联系？遗忘之道难道不是对记忆滋养层的遮蔽，甚至背弃吗？正如昆德拉所言："绝对的失重会让人比空气更轻，飘向高处，告别大地与肉身，变得半真半假，行动虽自由却毫无意义。" ^(6){ }^{6}
The half-reality induced by forgetting, its oblivious half-life, tempts us to attribute the full reality of remembering to machines. As if by a rigid law of compensation, the logic seems to be: the less responsibility I have for my own remembering, the more I can forget-ultimately, the more I can forget my own forgetting. And the more I can forget, the more responsibility I can ascribe to other entities: most conveniently to computers, or to my own brain or mind regarded as computerlike. Thus my own alleviation exists in inverse ratio to their encumberment. As I become more like the happy unremembering beast, free from the “dark, invisible burden” ^(7){ }^{7} of remembering, machines or machinelike parts of my own being become burdened with the heavy tasks formerly assigned to my unassisted self. Like Nietzsche’s Last Man, I smile and blink in my memoryless contentment as I come to rely 遗忘所诱发的半真实状态，其令人浑然不觉的半衰期，诱使我们将记忆的全部真实性归功于机器。仿佛遵循某种严苛的补偿法则，其逻辑似乎是：我对自身记忆承担的责任越少，就越能遗忘——最终，连自己的遗忘都能彻底遗忘。而我遗忘得越多，就越能将责任转嫁给其他实体：最便捷的莫过于计算机，或是被视为类计算机的自身大脑与心智。于是我的轻松自在与它们的负重累累形成反比。当我愈发接近那头快乐的无记忆野兽，摆脱记忆那"幽暗无形的重负" ^(7){ }^{7} 时，机器或我自身中那些类机器的部分，就不得不背负起曾经由孤立无援的自我承担的重任。如同尼采笔下的末人，我带着无记忆的满足感微笑眨眼，转而依赖
on data banks and mass media to hold and transmit memories for me. Not only do I not do my own remembering, I have forgotten to remember. I no longer know how to remember effectively or even what I want to remember. In this state I am failing to remember remembering. 数据库与大众传媒来为我保存和传递记忆。我不仅不再亲自记忆，甚至已遗忘该如何记忆。我既不知道如何有效记忆，也不清楚自己究竟想记住什么。在这种状态下，我正在遗忘"记忆"本身。
What then shall we choose? Weight or lightness? ^(88){ }^{88} 那么，我们该选择什么？沉重还是轻盈？ ^(88){ }^{88}
For us moderns, Kundera’s question comes to this: what will we choosethe way of remembering or the way of forgetting? Perhaps it is already too late to answer this fateful question meaningfully. We may already have lost our anamnesic souls to the collective amnesia embodied in machinememory. Such a loss might be acceptable if eternal return were truly to obtain. If Nietzsche is correct, relief from the heaviest of burdens might well lie in the frivolity of forgetting, a frivolity that follows upon handing over responsibility for remembering to machines. 对我们现代人而言，昆德拉的问题可以转化为：我们将选择铭记之路还是遗忘之途？或许此刻要回答这个命运攸关的问题已为时太晚。我们的记忆灵魂可能早已被机器记忆所体现的集体失忆症吞噬。倘若永恒轮回真能实现，这种丧失或许尚可接受。如果尼采是对的，那么卸下最沉重负担的解药，很可能就藏在这份将记忆责任托付给机器后随之而来的轻浮遗忘之中。
But what if Nietzsche’s doctrine of die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichens is itself moot? What if it is (therefore) not too late to choose? What then? Might we then take seriously once more the genuine weight of memory instead of mindlessly opting for the spurious lightness of forgetting? Can we remember to remember? Can amnesia give way to anamnesis? 但倘若尼采"永恒轮回"学说本身就不成立呢？倘若（因此）现在选择还为时不晚呢？那又当如何？我们是否就能重新严肃对待记忆的真实重量，而非不假思索地选择虚假的遗忘之轻？我们能否记得要去铭记？失忆症能否让位给记忆复苏？
II 第二章
Before we can begin to answer such questions, we must undertake two tasks in the remainder of this Introduction. First, concrete evidence of memory’s decline in prestige needs to be adduced if the claims just made in section I are not to seem merely dogmatic or rhetorical. I will set forth such evidence in this section and in section III, while remarking upon certain counter-currents in section IV. Second, a look back to an earlier time, when memory was highly valued, is called for-not only as a foil to the modern plight but as itself an important part of the very background that we have forgotten. This backward look will occur in sections V to VII, which will consider the fate of memory from ancient Greece to the Enlightenment. 在着手解答这些问题之前，我们需在本导论剩余部分完成两项任务。首先，若要使第一节提出的主张不致沦为武断或修辞，就必须列举记忆声望衰落的实证依据。我将在本节及第三节呈现此类证据，并在第四节评述若干逆流现象。其次，回溯记忆备受尊崇的往昔不仅能为现代困境提供对照，其本身亦是我们已然遗忘的重要历史背景。这一回溯性考察将分布于第五至第七节，审视从古希腊至启蒙运动时期记忆的命运轨迹。
Given our defensiveness before the weight of the past-which, as a direct consequence, we tend to regard as something merely “fixed” and “dead”-it is not altogether surprising that we have turned in recent times to machines as repositories and models of memory. If the past can be reduced to a dead weight, then it can be deposited in machines as just one more item of information. Our most commonly employed current metaphors for memory betray this action of consignment along with a scarcely concealed denigration: “memory machine,” “machine memory,” “photographic memory,” “memory bank,” “storage system,” “save to disk,” “computer memory,” “memory file,” and so on. What is most noticeable in any such list of 鉴于我们对沉重过往的防御心理——这种心理直接导致我们倾向于将过去视为某种“固定”且“死亡”之物——近年来我们转向将机器作为记忆的储存库和模型也就不足为奇了。如果过去可以被简化为死寂的重负，那么它就能像其他信息条目一样被存入机器。我们当下最常用的记忆隐喻正暴露着这种托管行为，以及几乎不加掩饰的贬低：“记忆机器”、“机器记忆”、“照相式记忆”、“记忆银行”、“存储系统”、“保存到磁盘”、“计算机内存”、“记忆档案”等等。在任何此类列举中，最引人注目的是
descriptive terms is the way in which memory is construed by reference to an apparatus or procedure that is strictly mechanical and nonhuman in nature: above all, the computer with its extraordinary powers of compression and retention of discrete units of information. Indeed, the currently most influential models of memory in experimental psychology are those based on “information processing” as enacted and exemplified by computers. I shall not here debate the claims of advocates of “AI” that “natural” human intelligence can be successfully replicated and even improved upon by computers. ^(9){ }^{9} I wish only to call attention to how readily memory has become assimilated to a machine as paradigm-to its own disadvantage. Precisely because the machine in question is viewed as endless in its resources and all but miraculous in its operations, “merely” human memory comes to suffer by comparison: subject to more severe constraints in its quantitative capacity than a computer, such memory is also subject to more extensive errors in its functioning. No wonder that human memory is impugned, implicitly or explicitly, by being analogized to something that remembers more efficiently than do human beings themselves. 描述性术语将记忆理解为一种严格机械且非人性的装置或程序：尤其是计算机，其压缩和保留离散信息单元的非凡能力。事实上，实验心理学中最具影响力的记忆模型正是基于计算机所体现的"信息处理"机制。在此我不打算讨论"人工智能"支持者关于计算机能成功复制甚至超越"自然"人类智能的主张。 ^(9){ }^{9} 我只想指出记忆如何轻易地被同化为机器范式——这对记忆本身是不利的。正因为相关机器被视为资源无限且运作近乎神奇，"仅仅"人类的记忆相比之下就显得相形见绌：其量化容量比计算机受到更严格的限制，运作中也更容易出现更广泛的错误。 难怪人类记忆会遭到质疑——无论是含蓄还是直白地——因为它被类比为某种比人类自身记忆更高效的事物。
The problem lies not in computerization as such. Computers may well have superior memories-so long as they are dealing with expressly chunkable, bit(e)able information-and they deserve recognition on this score as enormously effective prototypes of how the form of remembering we call “memorizing” might operate. That is, if such remembering were itself mechanical, which it is not! The problem resides, rather, in the tacit undermining of the authority, scope, and value of human memory in its own domain-in its ongoing performances in everyday life. Just what these performances are and exactly how they take place, will represent the major preoccupation of the present book. “What is wanted,” as Freud remarks, “is precisely an elucidation of the commonest cases.” ^(10){ }^{10} It is ironic and revealing that to undertake a detailed description of just such cases is to accord to remembering a form of respect that is rarely granted in this age of artificial intelligence. 问题并不在于计算机化本身。计算机很可能拥有更优越的记忆能力——只要处理的是明确可分块、可量化的信息——在这方面它们理应被视为我们称之为"记忆"的这种记忆形式如何运作的极其有效的原型。也就是说，如果这种记忆本身是机械式的，但它并不是！问题实际上在于对人类记忆在其自身领域——即日常生活中的持续表现——的权威性、范围及价值的隐性贬低。这些表现究竟是什么，它们究竟如何发生，将成为本书主要探讨的内容。正如弗洛伊德所言："我们需要的正是对最常见案例的阐明。" ^(10){ }^{10} 具有讽刺意味且发人深省的是，对这些案例进行细致描述，恰恰是对记忆这种在人工智能时代鲜少获得尊重的形式致以敬意。
Concomitant with the current metaphorization of memory-the translatio or “transfer” of its basic sense or structure into the very different sense and structure of computing machines-we find the singularly striking fact that the lexicon of currently used terms for memory has dwindled considerably in the last two centuries. How many of the following words, all of them employed by writers of English in earlier times, do you recognize, much less use yourself? ^(11){ }^{11} 伴随着当前记忆的隐喻化——将其基本意义或结构"转移"（translatio）到计算机这种截然不同的意义和结构中——我们发现一个尤为显著的事实：近两个世纪以来，用于描述记忆的现行术语词汇已大幅缩减。以下这些曾被早期英语作家使用的词汇，你能认出几个？更遑论自己使用了？ ^(11){ }^{11}
-“memorous” (memorable) -"memorous"（值得纪念的）
-“memorious” (having a good memory; being mindful of) -“记忆超群者”（拥有良好记忆力；时刻保持觉察）
-“memoried” (having a memory of a specific kind) -“承载记忆者”（拥有特定类型的记忆）
-“memorist” (one who prompts the return of memories) -“记忆唤醒者”（促使记忆重现之人）
-“mnemotechny” (“mnemonics,” itself hardly a familiar word today) -"mnemotechny"（"记忆术"，这个词如今本身也已鲜为人知）
-“mnemonize” (to memorize) -"mnemonize"（记忆）
-“mnemonicon” (a device to aid the memory) -“助记器”（辅助记忆的装置）
The contemporary rarity of such terms, terms once familiar to ordinary speakers of English, should give us pause. Where have all the words for memory gone? The impoverishment of our vocabulary for (and about) remembering goes hand in hand with the general decline in esteem which memory has suffered in modern times and is, indeed, its first symptom. ^(12){ }^{12} Presaged in the replacement of orally transmitted memories by handwriting and (especially) printing, the disappearance of an earlier and richer vocabulary has left us with considerably diminished verbal resources. ^(13){ }^{13} 这些曾为英语日常使用者熟稔的术语在当代的罕见性，值得我们深思。所有关于记忆的词汇都去了哪里？我们记忆相关词汇的贫乏，与现代社会中记忆遭受的普遍贬损同步发生，事实上这正是其首要征兆。 ^(12){ }^{12} 随着手写（尤其是印刷）取代口传记忆，早期更丰富的词汇体系逐渐消失，使得我们的语言资源大幅萎缩。 ^(13){ }^{13}
III
Further evidence for memory’s declining prestige is found in several other areas that merit brief examination here. Memorizing, once a standard pedagogical tool in primary school, is no longer emphasized in the early years of education. True, children are still occasionally required to memorize a poem or a brief prose passage; but this serves more as gesture than as substance, reminding us of a period, only several decades past, when memorizing was a much more integral part of the curriculum. At that time, educators believed that students learned certain texts best by committing them to heart (i.e., “memoriter,” another word fallen into disuse) and that the very activity of memorizing, beyond furnishing a shared cultural tradition, was beneficial to a child’s mental development. We need not defend these practices, which were sometimes over-rigorously applied in an oppressive zeal for achieving the exact repetition of prescribed material. ^(14){ }^{14} The point is that such practices, however misapplied they may have been, are now conspicuously absent from contemporary curricula. ^(15){ }^{15} Their very absence reflects a general devaluation of memory. 记忆声望下降的进一步证据还体现在其他几个值得简要探讨的领域。背诵曾是小学校的标准教学手段，如今在基础教育阶段已不再受重视。诚然，孩子们偶尔仍会被要求背诵诗歌或短文段落；但这更多是象征性而非实质性的要求，让人想起仅几十年前那个背诵仍是课程重要组成部分的年代。当时教育者相信，学生通过熟记（即"memoriter"——另一个已弃用的词汇）能最好地掌握某些文本，且背诵活动本身除了提供共同文化传统外，对儿童心智发展大有裨益。我们无需为这些有时被过度严苛执行、甚至演变为强制精确复述教材的极端做法辩护。关键在于，无论这些实践曾被如何误用，它们在当代课程中的缺席已十分显著。这种缺席本身正反映了记忆功能的普遍贬值。
Consider in this connection the steadily decreasing interest in mnemotechnical devices and systems through which to improve one’s powers of memory. Although “mnemonics” retains a certain curiosity value-as is witnessed in the popularity of Lucas and Lorayne’s The Memory Book ^(16-it){ }^{16-i t} is no longer the object of assiduous study on the part of ordinary people. In the first half of the nineteenth century, thousands of New Yorkers flocked to hear such mnemotechnical experts as Fauvel-Gounod, Aimé Paris, and Dr. Pick, all of whom promised vastly improved memories to their handsomely paying auditors. By 1888, however, William Stokes could complain in the ninetieth edition of his popular tract Memory: “In spite of all that has been said and done [in the past], we may say comparatively-almost absolutelythat the art [of memorizing aided by technical devices] is a thing unknown!” ^(17){ }^{17} This lament rings still more true today, nearly one century later. 在此背景下，我们可以观察到人们对记忆术工具与体系的兴趣持续衰减——尽管这些方法本应能提升记忆力。虽然"记忆术"仍保留着某种猎奇价值（卢卡斯与洛雷恩合著的《记忆之书》的畅销便是明证），但它已不再是普通人勤学苦练的对象。十九世纪上半叶，成千上万纽约民众曾蜂拥聆听福维尔-古诺、艾梅·帕里斯和皮克博士等记忆术专家的讲座，这些专家都向支付了高昂费用的听众承诺能大幅提升记忆力。然而到了 1888 年，威廉·斯托克斯在其畅销手册《记忆》第九十版中已可哀叹："尽管[过去]人们言之凿凿且付诸实践，但我们或许可以说——几乎可以断言——[借助技术设备的]记忆艺术仍是一种未知之物！"这番慨叹在近一个世纪后的今天显得更为真切。
Not even the eloquent efforts of Frances Yates in The Art of Memory to reconstruct the early history of a distinctive mnemotechnical tradition and to indicate its now largely forgotten importance in the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance worlds is likely to revive a widespread interest in mnemotechnics per se. The author herself revealingly disowns any personal stake in the memory method she so lucidly recounts: “There is no doubt that this method will work for anyone who is prepared to labor seriously at these mnemonic gymnastics. I have never attempted to do so myself.” ^(18){ }^{18} The most eminent expositor of the ars memorativa tradition chooses not to use this art to improve her own memory. This choice is symptomatic not just of the decreasing employment of mnemotechnics but of a still more momentous loss of interest in cultivating memory for its own sake. 即便是弗朗西斯·耶茨在《记忆之术》中为重构独特记忆术传统的早期历史所做出的雄辩努力，以及她对记忆术在古代、中世纪和文艺复兴时期那已被世人淡忘的重要性的揭示，恐怕也难以重新唤起人们对记忆术本身的广泛兴趣。作者本人颇具启示性地否认了她所清晰阐述的记忆方法与其个人有何关联："毫无疑问，这套方法对任何愿意认真投入这些记忆体操训练的人都将奏效。但我本人从未尝试过。" ^(18){ }^{18} 这位记忆术传统最杰出的阐释者选择不使用这门技艺来提升自己的记忆力。这种选择不仅反映出记忆术应用的式微，更昭示着一种更为深刻的转变——人们已逐渐丧失为记忆本身而培养记忆力的兴趣。
Still another sign of the times is the regrettable fact that reminiscing as a central social practice has faded from style. By “reminiscing” I do not refer merely to a stray recounting of times past, but to those particular social situations in which older, more experienced persons recollected past events in the presence of younger auditors. These occasions endowed memory with a decisively communitarian dimension. Moreover, reminiscing was often the only way in which an otherwise unchronicled part of the past was reclaimed for others, especially if the person who did the retelling was the last surviving witness. In a more leisurely age-for instance, before World War I in the Middle West-reminiscing was a frequent feature of family gatherings and other social settings. It is now, by the late twentieth century, an increasingly uncommon phenomenon-doubtless due to the disintegration of the extended family structure and to a concomitant lack of veneration for the elderly in our culture. Whatever the exact causes, the clear result is that memory has been driven still further into retreat. 时代变迁的另一个标志，是回忆作为一种核心社交实践已不幸式微。此处"回忆"并非指对往事的零星追述，而是特指年长者与经验丰富者在年轻听众面前追忆往事的特定社交场景。这类场合赋予记忆鲜明的集体属性。更甚者，当讲述者成为某段未载史册往事的最后见证人时，这种回忆往往成为后人了解过去的唯一途径。在更为悠闲的年代——比如一战前的中西部地区——回忆曾是家庭聚会和其他社交场合的常见活动。而到二十世纪末，这已成为日渐稀罕的现象，无疑源于大家庭结构的瓦解，以及随之而来的对长者敬意的文化缺失。无论确切原因为何，明显的结果是记忆的疆域正加速萎缩。
One of the most telling evidences of the marked decline in the prestige of memory can be found in the notable fact that four of the leading theoretical treatments of memory undertaken in the last one hundred years have approached remembering through the counterphenomenon of forgetting. It is as if a more direct approach would be futile and question-begging: memory is best understood via its own deficient mode. Let us consider in cursory fashion the four cases in point. 记忆声望显著下降的最有力证据之一体现在一个引人注目的事实：过去一百年间关于记忆的四种主要理论探讨，都是通过遗忘这一反现象来切入记忆研究的。这仿佛暗示着更直接的探究方式将是徒劳且循环论证的：通过记忆自身的缺陷模式才能最好地理解它。让我们简要考察这四个典型案例。
NIETZSCHE 尼采
As we have seen in section I, Nietzsche stressed the virtues of “active forgetfulness,” that is, the capacity to forget not merely by lapsus but willfully and for a purpose-so as to erase, or at least to cover over, the scars which repeated remembering would only turn back into open wounds. Such willed forgetting is the counterpart of the enforced remembering which Nietzsche detects in societies anxious to ensure rigid conformity to law on the part of their members. ^(19){ }^{19} But, for the individual, forgetting is by far the more crucial of the two activities: the individual “wonders at himself, that he 正如我们在第一部分所见，尼采强调了"主动遗忘"的美德，即不仅因疏忽而遗忘，更是为了某种目的有意为之的能力——从而抹去，或至少掩盖那些因反复回忆只会重新裂开的伤痕。这种有意的遗忘，正是尼采所发现的社会强制记忆的对立面，那些社会急于确保其成员严格服从法律。 ^(19){ }^{19} 但对个体而言，遗忘在两种活动中远为关键：个体"会对自己感到惊奇，他
cannot learn to forget but clings relentlessly to the past; however far and fast he may run, this chain runs with him. . . . He says ‘I remember’ and envies the animal, who at once forgets and for whom every moment really dies.” ^(20){ }^{20} 无法学会遗忘，却执着地紧握过往；无论他跑得多远多快，这条锁链始终紧随......他念叨着"我记得"，并羡慕那即刻遗忘的动物——对它们而言，每一刻都真正死去。
FREUD 弗洛伊德
It is a fact worth pondering that psychoanalysis, so often regarded as a form of “memory therapy,” was originally much more concerned with forgetting. Although Breuer and Freud proclaimed the cure of symptoms by the abreactive or cathartic recall of traumatic experiences in their Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud himself backed away from this therapeutic optimism only two years later when he became persuaded that his patients’ apparent memories of seduction were actually fantasies disguised as memories. By 1899, he had become profoundly skeptical of the validity of any purported childhood memories, since such memories are likely to be “screened” in various ways; ^(21){ }^{21} and he came to believe in a generalized childhood amnesia which represents the involuntary (but still purposive) forgetting of large tracts of one’s early experience. ^(22){ }^{22} The aim of psychoanalysis became, accordingly, to “fill in the gaps in memory,” ^(23){ }^{23} to undo the baneful, pathogenic effects of forgetting wherever this is possible. In 1909, Freud could say almost cynically that “the weak spot in the security of our mental life [is] the untrustworthiness of our memory.” ^(24){ }^{24} More generally, what Freud called “the blindness of the seeing eye” ^(25){ }^{25} may be taken as referring to the forgetting that shows itself to reside actively in the heart of remembering like an insidious virus, ready to do its destructive work there-with the result that psychoanalysis can be said to consist in a continuous struggle against the forces of forgetfulness. 一个值得深思的事实是，常被视为"记忆疗法"的精神分析，最初却更关注遗忘现象。尽管布洛伊尔与弗洛伊德在《癔症研究》（1895）中宣称通过创伤经历的宣泄式回忆可治愈症状，但弗洛伊德本人仅在两年后就放弃了这种治疗乐观主义——当他确信患者所谓的诱奸记忆实则是伪装成记忆的幻想时。到 1899 年，他已对任何童年记忆的真实性深表怀疑，因为这些记忆很可能以各种方式被"屏蔽"； ^(21){ }^{21} 并逐渐相信普遍存在的童年失忆现象，这种遗忘虽属无意识（却仍具目的性），使人丧失大量早期经历。 ^(22){ }^{22} 精神分析的目标由此转变为"填补记忆空白"， ^(23){ }^{23} 尽可能消除遗忘带来的致病性影响。 1909 年，弗洛伊德几乎可以带着讥讽的口吻说："我们精神生活安全体系中的薄弱环节[在于]记忆的不可靠性。" ^(24){ }^{24} 更广泛地说，弗洛伊德所称的"明视之眼的盲目" ^(25){ }^{25} 可被理解为指代那种活跃潜藏在记忆核心的遗忘——它如同潜伏的病毒，随时准备进行破坏性活动。其结果是，精神分析可以说就是一场与遗忘力量持续不断的斗争。
HEIDEGGER 海德格尔
The inner dynamic of all of Heidegger’s philosophical work may be said to consist in a prolonged effort to deal with the forgetfulness of Being. This forgetfulness has afflicted the Western mind from Plato onwards and continues in the present in the form of an ontological blindness which Heidegger terms “subjective presence” in the wake of Descartes, and which reaches an apogee in the idolatrization of modern technology (including, as a paradigm case, computers). Thus, Being and Time, Heidegger’s magnum opus of 1927, opens with the plaint: “The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being. This question has today been forgotten.” ^(26){ }^{26} Later, in Being and Time, forgetfulness, even in its ordinary forms, is interpreted as more primordial than remembering: “In the ‘leaping-away’ of the Present, one also forgets increasingly. The fact that curiosity always holds by what is coming next, and has forgotten what has gone before, is not a result that ensues from curiosity, but is the ontological condition for curiosity itself.” ^(27){ }^{27} The many works which have followed Being and Time can be considered as sustained, if often oblique, attempts to overcome the forgetting of Being in 海德格尔全部哲学著作的内在动力，可以说在于他长期致力于应对存在之遗忘。这种遗忘自柏拉图以降便困扰着西方思想界，并在当今以本体论盲视的形式持续存在——海德格尔继笛卡尔之后称之为"主观在场性"，其极端表现便是对现代技术（包括作为典型范例的计算机）的盲目崇拜。因此，1927 年的巨著《存在与时间》开篇便发出慨叹："明确重提存在问题的必要性。如今这个问题已被遗忘。" ^(26){ }^{26} 后来在《存在与时间》中，遗忘——即便是其日常形式——也被诠释为比记忆更为本源："在当下的'跳脱'中，人们遗忘得愈发彻底。好奇总是紧盯着即将到来之物而遗忘已逝之物，这并非好奇导致的结果，而是好奇本身得以存在的本体论条件。" ^(27){ }^{27} 《存在与时间》之后的诸多著作，均可视为克服存在之遗忘的持续努力——尽管这些尝试往往显得迂回曲折。
order to induce an adequate remembrance of it which Heidegger comes to term Andenken, “commemorative thought.” ^(28){ }^{28} 为了充分唤起对它的记忆，海德格尔提出了"Andenken"（纪念性思考）这一概念。 ^(28){ }^{28}
EBBINGHAUS 艾宾浩斯
In 1885, Ebbinghaus inaugurated the experimental study of memory with the publication of Über das Gedächtnis. ^(29){ }^{29} This slim volume gave the results of numerous experiments involving rote remembering which Ebbinghaus performed upon himself in the early 1880s. The remembering was of nonsense syllables that were as free as possible from semantic ambiguities. Nevertheless, what emerges from a close reading of this seminal monograph is that Ebbinghaus was in fact measuring the rate at which he had forgotten a given group of nonsense syllables. As a consequence, the famous “Ebbinghaus curve of memory”-shaped roughly like this: nn\cap-is in fact a curve of forgetting, mapping out the precise amount of material that failed to be remembered at particular points in time. Thus, even within a fastidious laboratory setting that was the first of its kind in Western psychology, remembering ceded place to forgetting. 1885 年，艾宾浩斯通过出版《论记忆》开创了记忆实验研究的先河。 ^(29){ }^{29} 这本薄册子记录了他在 1880 年代初期以自身为对象进行的众多机械记忆实验成果。这些记忆材料是尽可能排除语义歧义的无意义音节。然而，细读这部开创性专著会发现，艾宾浩斯实际测量的是他对特定无意义音节组的遗忘速率。因此，著名的"艾宾浩斯记忆曲线"——大致呈如下形状： nn\cap ——实际上是一条遗忘曲线，它精确描绘了在特定时间节点未能被回忆起的材料数量。由此可见，即便在西方心理学史上首个严谨的实验室环境中，记忆研究也不可避免地让位于遗忘研究。
It is a striking coincidence that Ebbinghaus’s fateful study was published just three years before the final edition of Stokes’s Memory appeared. At the very moment when the demise of the art of memory was announced, the science of memory was born. What had been left to amateur teachers of memorizing, minstrels of memory and sometimes its sophists as well, was now to be given over to the quantitatively precise, experimentally expert hands of laboratory psychologists-psychologists very different in kind from those whom Freud was to inspire. In the aftermath of Ebbinghaus, the ranks of the experimentalists are now legion; their approaches to memory are widely disseminated and discussed in professional journals, where they are regarded as providing the most exact and reliable penetration into the mysteries of memory. What began as an isolated attempt to measure forgetting with a new precision has spawned an entire industry of research into the nature of remembering itself. 艾宾浩斯那项影响深远的研究发表时，距斯托克斯《记忆》最终版问世仅隔三年，这种巧合令人瞩目。就在记忆艺术宣告消亡之际，记忆科学应运而生。那些曾被业余记忆教师、吟游诗人和诡辩者把持的记忆领域，如今交到了实验室心理学家手中——这些擅长定量分析、实验操作的专家，与弗洛伊德日后影响的那类心理学家截然不同。自艾宾浩斯之后，实验心理学者的队伍已蔚为壮观；他们在专业期刊上广泛传播并探讨各种记忆研究法，这些方法被视为对记忆奥秘最精确可靠的探索。最初以新精度测量遗忘的孤立尝试，如今已催生出整个关于记忆本质的研究产业。
Despite the undeniable ingenuity of this research and its many methodological merits, it remains yet another symptom of a pervasive subsiding of interest in memory. What has faded from focus in the eyes of the common man has been scrutinized ever more minutely behind the closed doors of the psychological laboratory. ^(30){ }^{30} And concurrently with memory’s withdrawal from display as a standard method of public education and as an object of public exhibition by professional mnemonists, technology has supplied publicly available (but entirely mechanical) mnemotechnical aids that displace the burden of memory from individuals to machines. These machines, whether they be hand-held calculators or room-size computers, sound recorders or video playback devices, offer practically irresistible aid and comfort to the imperfect individual rememberer. Easily available, usable, 尽管这项研究具有不可否认的独创性和诸多方法论优势，但它仍是人们对记忆兴趣普遍消退的又一表征。在普通人视野中逐渐淡出焦点的事物，却在心理学实验室紧闭的门后受到愈发精细的审视。 ^(30){ }^{30} 与此同时，随着记忆作为公共教育标准方法和职业记忆术师公开展示对象的退场，技术提供了公开可用（但完全机械化）的记忆辅助工具，将记忆负担从个体转移至机器。这些机器——无论是手持计算器还是房间大小的计算机，录音设备还是视频播放装置——都为不完美的个体记忆者提供了几乎难以抗拒的辅助与慰藉。这些易于获取、使用、
storable, or disposable, these prosthetic memories have become indispensable instruments of modern living. 存储或丢弃的义肢式记忆，已成为现代生活中不可或缺的工具。
In the end, the scientific study of memory and the presence of elaborate electronic aides-mémoire are only the currently most manifest symptoms of the declining interest in “remembering in the old manner.” ^(31){ }^{31} Whatever the ultimate reasons for this decline, we must acknowledge it as an established fact, an intrinsic feature of ever-increasing proportions within Western culture. It has become such a deeply entrenched tendency at the level of praxis and theory alike that it would be Luddite-like to try to reverse, or even to lament, the trend. At the most, one can hope that a detailed, dispassionate description of human memory itself-one that neither subjects it to experimental treatment nor turns over primary responsibility to machines as models-will aid in restoring a long-neglected concern for remembering construed in its own terms and given regard for its own sake. In keeping with Husserl’s dictum “to the things themselves!” such an account is what the present study purports to offer. And in this admittedly nonscientific but nonetheless descriptively rigorous way we may begin the difficult process of remembering memory for what it is and can be. 最终，关于记忆的科学研究与精密电子助记设备的出现，只是当前对"旧式记忆方式"兴趣衰退最显著的表征。无论这种衰退的根本原因为何，我们必须承认它已成为既定事实，是西方文化中日益显著的内在特征。这种趋势在实践和理论层面都已根深蒂固，试图逆转或哀叹这一潮流无异于卢德主义。最多只能期待，对人类记忆本身进行细致冷静的描述——既不将其置于实验处理之下，也不将主要责任交给机器作为模型——将有助于恢复长期被忽视的对记忆本真状态的关注，即依照记忆自身特质并为其本身价值而重视它。遵循胡塞尔"回到事物本身！"的箴言，这正是本研究试图呈现的。通过这种虽非科学但描述严谨的方式，我们或许能开启重新认识记忆本质与潜能的艰难历程。
IV 第四章
In any effort to unforget our own forgetting, we need all the support we can find. Strangely enough, it can be found close at hand. Beneath the amnesiac flood tide of indifference toward remembering are distinct undercurrents of respect. This respect is observable in certain everyday attitudes toward memory. Notice, for example, our irritation at someone who continually repeats himself or herself: why doesn’t this person remember that he or she has told us the same thing before, indeed, just yesterday? Standing in contrast with this banal circumstance of disappointment-which nevertheless betrays definite expectations about the use of memory-is the amazement we experience upon reading such a book as Luria’s The Mind of a Mnemonist. ^(32){ }^{32} Whatever its untoward effects upon individuals who possess it, “photographic memory” remains in our spontaneous judgment an enviable and extraordinary gift. When such a memory-for-minutiae is combined with intelligence of the highest order, as in Homer or Seneca the Elder, Milton or Freud, the prospect of such genius redoubled strikes us as awesome. In yet a different way, there is a haunting sense that something abidingly important has been lost in the near-elimination of memorization from education, as is reflected in the often-heard complaint that our memories have become slovenly and unreliable in comparison with those possessed by our forebears only a few generations back. 在任何试图唤醒自身遗忘记忆的努力中，我们都需要所能获得的一切支持。奇妙的是，这种支持往往近在咫尺。在人们对记忆普遍漠视的遗忘洪流之下，潜藏着对记忆的独特敬意。这种敬意体现在某些日常对待记忆的态度中。例如，我们会对不断重复自我的人感到恼火：为何此人记不住他/她已向我们讲述过相同的事情，甚至就在昨天？与这种令人失望的平庸情境形成鲜明对比的——尽管它仍暴露了人们对记忆运用的明确期待——是我们阅读卢里亚《记忆大师的心灵》这类书籍时所体验到的震撼。 ^(32){ }^{32} 无论"照相式记忆"对其拥有者造成何种不良影响，在我们本能的判断中，它始终是一种令人艳羡的非凡天赋。当这种细节记忆能力与最高层次的智慧相结合时——如荷马或老塞内加、弥尔顿或弗洛伊德那般——这种双重天才的前景会让我们感到无比敬畏。 从另一个角度来看，当记忆训练几乎从教育体系中消失时，我们总有种挥之不去的感觉——某种永恒重要的东西正在消逝。这种感受体现在人们常抱怨的：与仅仅几代前的祖先相比，我们的记忆变得散漫而不可靠。
These various attitudes, pallid as they may appear in the face of the massive decline just described, nevertheless attest to a considerable linger- 尽管面对前文所述的大规模衰退，这些态度可能显得苍白无力，但它们依然证明了人们对记忆作用持久而深切的关注——无论是作为个体还是整体文明而言。
ing concern with the role of memory in ourselves as individuals and in our civilization generally. We do seem to care, at some level, about memory’s sinking fortune; its subsiding fate over the past century-indeed, since the Renaissance-does matter to us, even if we feel personally powerless to stem the tide toward diminution in esteem and enfeeblement in use. Stymied in the present and altogether uncertain of the future, we are naturally led to look back-not without envy or nostalgia-to a time when memory was deeply revered and rigorously trained, as it was in ancient Greece. 在某个层面上，我们确实在意记忆日渐衰微的命运；过去一个世纪——事实上自文艺复兴以来——记忆逐渐式微的境遇确实牵动人心，即便我们感到个人无力阻止这种记忆在威望和使用上的双重衰退。困顿于当下，对未来全然迷茫，我们自然会将目光投向过去——带着难以掩饰的羡慕与怀旧——回望那个记忆备受尊崇且严格训练的时代，比如古希腊时期。
V
Memory was a thematic, even an obsessive, concern of the early Greeks. The very survival of the rich oral culture of the Archaic Period (twelfth to eighth centuries b.c.), depended on concerted, disciplined remembering: “Language and thought for the early Greeks grew out of memory.” ^(33){ }^{33} Until the introduction of alphabetic writing-that “recipe not for memory, but for reminding,” as Plato says in the Phaedrus ^(34){ }^{34}-the Greeks were forced to rely on the memorial powers of individuals, especially on those who had received special training. ^(35){ }^{35} The mnemon, for example, was someone who kept track of proceedings in law courts without the benefit of written documents. In mythical representations, the mnemon was a servant of heroes who reminded them, at crucial moments, of divine injunctions. Thus Achilles was accompanied by a mnemon who was enjoined to warn him that if he were ever to kill a son of Apollo, he would be put to death. But this appointed reminder failed in his function and was himself put to death. ^(36){ }^{36} The bards who chanted the Iliad, in which this particular tale is recounted, were themselves mnemonic masters who had no written texts to aid their memories. They were almost certainly required to undergo memory training in which they learned to employ mnemotechnics of various sorts, including the use of systematic meters (e.g., hexameter) and internally varying epithets. Such artifices were sorely needed in view of the taxing tasks to which the bard’s memory was submitted. Many verses of the Iliad are little more than copious catalogues of names of warriors (including their place of origin and their exact form of military strength), the most important horses, names of servants, etc. The memorization of such verses was not intended merely to impress audiences with virtuoso performances. It was the sole means of keeping an entire body of collectively held lore alive. As Jean Pierre Vernant remarks, it was by the recitation of these seemingly unending compendia that: 记忆是早期希腊人一个主题性、甚至痴迷性的关注点。古风时期（公元前 12 至 8 世纪）丰富口头文化的存续，完全依赖于协同而有纪律的记忆行为："早期希腊人的语言与思想皆源自记忆。" ^(33){ }^{33} 在字母书写——柏拉图在《斐德罗篇》中称之为"不是记忆的配方，而是提醒的配方" ^(34){ }^{34} ——出现之前，希腊人不得不依赖个体的记忆能力，尤其是那些受过特殊训练之人。 ^(35){ }^{35} 例如，"记忆者"（mnemon）便是在没有书面文件辅助的情况下，负责记录法庭诉讼过程的人。在神话表述中，记忆者是英雄的随从，在关键时刻提醒他们神的诫命。因此阿喀琉斯身边就有一位记忆者，受命警告他若杀死阿波罗之子必将丧命。但这位指定的提醒者未能履行职责，自己反遭处死。 ^(36){ }^{36} 吟诵《伊利亚特》（其中就讲述了这个特定故事）的游吟诗人，本身就是不依靠文字文本辅助记忆的技艺大师。 他们几乎肯定需要接受记忆训练，学习运用各种记忆术，包括系统化的格律（如六音步）和内部变化的修饰语。考虑到吟游诗人记忆所承受的繁重任务，这些技巧显得尤为必要。《伊利亚特》的许多诗句几乎就是战士姓名（包括他们的出生地和具体军事力量）、最重要的战马、仆人名字等冗长名录。记忆这些诗句的目的不仅是为了用精湛表演打动听众，更是维系整个集体传承知识的唯一方式。正如让·皮埃尔·韦尔南所言，正是通过吟诵这些看似无穷无尽的汇编：
there was fixed and transmitted the repertory of knowledge which allows a social group to decipher its ‘past’. [Such recitations] constitute the equivalent of the archives of a society without writing: purely legendary, they correspond 固定并传承下来的是一套知识体系，使社会群体得以解读其"过去"。[这些诵记]相当于无文字社会的档案：纯粹口传的它们对应着
neither to administrative demands nor to an attempt to glorify royalty nor to a historical concern. ^(37){ }^{37} 既非出于行政要求，也非为了颂扬王权，更非源于历史考量。
Memorization in the Archaic Period was therefore more than a mere device for keeping facts straight-more than an efficient storage and retrieval system. It was a way of getting (and staying) in touch with a past that would otherwise be consigned to oblivion; it was a fateful fending off of forgetfulness. ^(38){ }^{38} 因此，在远古时期，记忆不仅仅是确保事实准确无误的工具——它超越了高效的存储与检索系统。这是一种与过去建立（并保持）联系的方式，否则那段过往将被彻底遗忘；这是对遗忘宿命般的顽强抵抗。
The past to which the bard transported his audience was more mythical than historical: “The ‘past’ is an integral part of the cosmos; to explore it [in epic poetry] is to discover what lies dissimulated in the depths of being.” ^(39){ }^{39} To be conveyed into this past is to be able to forget, however briefly, the anxieties of the present. Here forgetting and remembering work hand-inhand, each helping the other to realize an optimal form-in contrast with the conflictual relationship that we have witnessed in the thought of Freud and Nietzsche, Heidegger and Ebbinghaus. Indeed, for the early Greeks generally, forgetting and remembering form an indissociable pair; they are given explicit mythical representation in the coeval figures of Lesmosyne and Mnemosyne, who are conceived as equals requiring each other. ^(40){ }^{40} Or, more exactly, the two co-exist, but in this co-existence Mnemosyne, the pole of remembering, incorporates Lesmosyne, the pole of forgetting: 吟游诗人将听众带入的过去与其说是历史，不如说是神话："'过去'是宇宙不可分割的部分；在史诗中探索它，就是发现潜藏在存在深处的东西。" ^(39){ }^{39} 被传送到这个过去意味着能够暂时忘却当下的焦虑。在这里，遗忘与记忆携手并进，相互促成最佳形态的实现——这与我们在弗洛伊德、尼采、海德格尔和艾宾浩斯思想中看到的冲突关系形成鲜明对比。事实上，对早期希腊人而言，遗忘与记忆构成了不可分割的一体两面；它们通过同时代的勒忒与谟涅摩绪涅这对神话形象得到明确体现，二者被构想为彼此需要的平等存在。 ^(40){ }^{40} 或者更准确地说，二者共存，但在这种共存中，作为记忆极的谟涅摩绪涅包容了作为遗忘极的勒忒：
‘Lesmosyne’ derives from the same root as ‘Lethe’ and means exactly the same thing [i.e., forgetfulness]. The sphere of the Muses, which arises from the primordial Goddess Mnemosyne, also has the benefit of Lethe, who makes everything disappear that belongs to the dark side of human existence. It is only both the elements-giving illumination and letting disappear, Mnemosyne and her counter-pole, Lesmosyne-that make up the entire being of the Goddess, whose name comes solely from the positive side of her field of power. This [is a] union of the opposites under the dominion of the positive. ^(41){ }^{41} "Lesmosyne"与"Lethe"同源，其含义完全相同[即遗忘]。源自原始女神谟涅摩绪涅的缪斯领域，同样享有勒忒的恩惠——她使人性阴暗面的一切都消隐无踪。唯有这两种元素——赋予光明的记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅与其对立极遗忘女神勒斯谟绪涅——才构成这位女神的完整存在，而她的神名仅源自其力量领域的积极面向。这[是]对立面在积极力量统摄下的融合。 ^(41){ }^{41}
“Mnemosyne”: if this name is remembered at all today, it is as “the Mother of the Muses,” a formal (and formidable) figure who stiffly receives a sceptor from her daughters, the nine muses. Just as there is little that is inspired or inspiring in this traditional depiction, so we moderns are not inspired by this Goddess. We have forgotten, if we ever knew, that it is she who enthuses poets: "谟涅摩绪涅"：如今若还有人记得这个名字，多半只将其视为"缪斯之母"——一个僵硬地从九位缪斯女儿手中接过权杖的刻板（且威严）形象。正如这种传统描绘中缺乏令人振奋的灵感，我们现代人也难以从这位女神身上获得启迪。我们已然忘却（倘若曾经知晓的话），正是她赋予诗人以创作激情：
She first makes [poets] inspired, and then through these inspired ones others share in the enthusiasm, and a chain is formed; for the epic poets, all the good ones, have their excellence, not from art, but are inspired, possessed, and thus they utter all these admirable poems. So is it also with the good lyric poets. ^(42){ }^{42} 她首先让[诗人]获得灵感，继而通过这些被感召者将激情传递给他人，形成一条连锁；因为史诗诗人——所有优秀的史诗诗人——他们的卓越并非来自技艺，而是源于神启与附体，正因如此才能吟诵出这些令人赞叹的诗篇。抒情诗人中的佼佼者亦是如此。 ^(42){ }^{42}
As poets are thus enraptured by the instreaming of Mnemosyne, so their “rhapsodes” or recitants are likewise possessed or “held” ^(43){ }^{43}-and so too are 正如诗人因记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅的灵流灌注而狂喜，他们的"吟诵者"或朗诵者同样被神力攫住或"掌控" ^(43){ }^{43} ——
those who listen raptly to their impassioned readings. Altogether, three rings are suspended from the loadstone who is Mnemosyne and who, “through all the series, draws the spirit of men wherever [she] desires, transmitting the attractive force from one into another.” ^(44){ }^{44} 那些全神贯注聆听他们激情吟诵的听众也不例外。整个体系如同三枚铁环悬垂于磁石般的谟涅摩绪涅之下，她"通过整个序列牵引着人类的精神去往任意[她]向往之处，将吸引力从一环传递至另一环"。 ^(44){ }^{44}
Mnemosyne is a source not only of inspiration but of knowledge as well. It is due to her infusion from above that the poet is able to know how the mythic past really was: how things were in illud tempore (that former time). Mnemosyne possesses a sophia or wisdom that is in principle omniscient. This is why Hesiod can describe her as knowing “all that has been, all that is, all that will be.” ^(45){ }^{45} Hence the parallel between the poet who is informed by Mnemosyne and the prophet or seer who is guided by Apollo: both poet and prophet know more than they know, more in any case than they could know by their own unaided efforts. Whereas for the prophet this knowing is primarily of the future, for the poet it is mainly of the past-it is a knowing that is, in Heidegger’s word, a commemorative “thinking back”: 记忆女神不仅是灵感的源泉，也是知识的源泉。正是由于她自上而下的灌注，诗人才能知晓神话时代的真实面貌：知晓远古时期（illud tempure）的本来样貌。记忆女神拥有一种原则上全知的智慧（sophia）。这正是赫西俄德能将她描述为知晓"一切过去、现在与未来之事"的原因。 ^(45){ }^{45} 因此，受记忆女神启迪的诗人与受阿波罗指引的先知之间存在平行关系：诗人和先知都知道超越自身认知的事物，无论如何都超越了单凭己力所能知晓的范围。对先知而言，这种认知主要面向未来；对诗人而言，则主要面向过去——用海德格尔的话说，这是一种纪念性的"回溯之思"。
When it is the name of the Mother of the Muses [i.e., Mnemosyne], ‘memory’ does not mean just any thought of anything that can be thought. Memory is the gathering and convergence of thought upon what everywhere demands to be thought about first of all. Memory is the gathering of recollection, thinking back . . . Memory, Mother of the Muses-the thinking back to what is to be thought is the source and ground of poesy. ^(46){ }^{46} 当"记忆"作为缪斯之母[即谟涅摩绪涅]的名字时，它并非指代任何可被思考之物的随意念头。记忆是将思想汇聚于那些首要且无处不在、亟待被思考之物的集结。记忆是追忆的聚合，是回溯性的思考......作为缪斯之母的记忆——对应当思考之物的回溯，正是诗意的源泉与根基。 ^(46){ }^{46}
An echo of this view is detectable in the Romantic definition of poetry as “emotion recollected in tranquillity.” We need only substitute “knowledge” for “emotion” in this formula of Wordsworth’s to be in full accord with the ancient Greek vision of Mnemosyne’s unique gift of recollective knowing. It is a striking fact that Mnemosyne is the only deity in any Western pantheon whose name explicitly denotes memory; the Greeks’ general veneration of memory finds expression in her status as a Goddess, the highest honor it was within their collective means to bestow. ^(47){ }^{47} 这种观点在华兹华斯"平静中追忆的情感"的浪漫主义诗歌定义中可寻得回响。只需将"情感"替换为"认知"，我们便完全契合古希腊对谟涅摩绪涅所赐予的追忆性认知这一独特天赋的洞见。值得注意的是，谟涅摩绪涅是西方诸神谱系中唯一其名直指记忆的神祇；古希腊人对记忆的普遍尊崇，通过赋予她女神这一集体所能授予的最高尊荣得以彰显。 ^(47){ }^{47}
VI 第六章
The deification of Mnemosyne, and with her of an entire mythical past, could not survive the emergence of philosophy in its specifically Platonic form in the fifth century b.c. For Plato, recollection (anamnesis) is less of any particular past-personal or mythical ^(48){ }^{48}-than of eidetic knowledge previously acquired. The highly personified figure of Mnemosyne disappears; not named in the few myths which are allowed to survive in Platonic dialogues-where myths are designated “second-best” accounts-she is foreign to the austere dialectic that Plato proposes as the unique mode of access to philosophical knowledge. A premise of this dialectic is that the knowledge being sought is already possessed by the individual inquirer, who therefore 对记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅的神化，连同整个神话时代的崇拜，在公元前五世纪柏拉图哲学兴起后便难以为继。对柏拉图而言，回忆（anamnesis）与其说是对任何特定过往——无论是个人经历还是神话传说——的追忆，不如说是对先前获得的理念知识的唤醒。高度人格化的谟涅摩绪涅形象就此消隐；在柏拉图对话录中残存的少数神话里（这些神话被归为"次优叙述"）未见其名讳，她与柏拉图倡导的严苛辩证法格格不入——这种辩证法则被奉为获取哲学知识的唯一途径。该辩证法的前提在于：求索者本就拥有所探寻的知识，因此
requires no inspired infusions from a presiding Goddess. ^(49){ }^{49} Even the very highest level of knowledge, epistème proper, is to be gained, or rather regained, “from within” (ex hautou)-from within the individual’s already acquired cognitions. The fact that these cognitions have been forgotten makes the process of inquiry recollective in character; the remembering, however, is not undertaken for the sake of reviving past experiences per se-not even learning experiences-but only for the sake of bringing knowledge as such back to mind. 无需从主宰女神那里获得灵感启示。 ^(49){ }^{49} 即便是最高层次的知识——真正的 epistème（系统知识）——也要"从内部"（ex hautou）获取，或者说重新获取，即从个体已获得的认知中发掘。这些认知已被遗忘的事实，使得探究过程具有回忆的性质；然而，这种回忆行为的目的并非为了复活过去的经历本身——甚至不是为了重温学习经历——而仅仅是为了让知识本身重归意识。
Plato represents a critical moment of transition. The exaltation of memory and the attribution to it of divine powers give way to a view of it as an instrument of dialectical inquiry-an indispensable instrument but an instrument nonetheless. Granted, Platonic anamnesis does point beyond an individual’s finite existence in time; it helps him or her to cohere to a greater whole (namely, the universe of Forms). Nevertheless, the primary role of memory is to aid in bringing inquirers from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge. Or more exactly, memory itself becomes a function of knowledge: “Mnemosyne, supernatural power, has been interiorized so as to become in man the very faculty of knowing.” ^(50){ }^{50} Important as memory is in this capacity, it is difficult to avoid viewing its growing secularization in Plato’s hands as marking a first moment of the decline in its prestige in the early Greek world. 柏拉图代表了一个关键的转折时刻。对记忆的神化及其神圣力量的赋予，逐渐让位于将其视为辩证探究的工具——虽不可或缺，但终究只是工具。诚然，柏拉图的回忆说确实指向个体在时间中的有限存在之外；它帮助人们与更宏大的整体（即理型世界）相联结。然而，记忆的主要作用是协助探究者从无知状态进入认知状态。更准确地说，记忆本身成为认知功能的体现："超自然力量谟涅摩绪涅已被内化，成为人类自身的认知能力。" ^(50){ }^{50} 尽管记忆在此功能中至关重要，但很难不将柏拉图手中记忆日益世俗化的现象，视为希腊早期世界中记忆声望衰落的第一个标志。
By the very next generation the secularization of memory was complete, thanks to the diligent labors of Aristotle. This transformation was accomplished in three steps. First of all, Aristotle effectively undermines the transcendent aspects of memory-whether these be mythical or metaphysi-cal-by simply ignoring them. He distinguishes two forms of remembering, “memory” and “recollection,” ^(51){ }^{51} and in so doing he restricts memorial phenomena to a finite, sublunar realm. In this realm remembering yields no eternal verities about Gods or Forms, but only empirical truths about happenings within the compass of an individual’s life. Second, Aristotle’s account insists on the intimate link between memory and the personal past: “Memory,” he says laconically, “is of the past,” ^(52){ }^{52} where it is clear that he means a past which I have experienced or witnessed in propria persona. Not only am I constrained to revive this particular past, but I must do so by taking account of the “time-lapse” between its original occurrence and my present remembering; indeed, Aristotle offers a detailed discussion of just how this lapse of time is to be calculated. ^(53){ }^{53} Third, this time-bound, firstperson past comes contained in an image. Since images belong exclusively to the perceptual part of the soul, any attempt to link remembering and eidetic knowing in the manner of Plato is placed in question. At the same time, any residual claims concerning memory’s liberating influence are undercut, for images are conceived exclusively as copies of past experiences, internal replicas resulting from a mechanism of isomorphic imprinting in the soul. Memory, in short, is “the having of an image regarded as a copy of that of which it is an image.” ^(54){ }^{54} 到了下一代，由于亚里士多德的辛勤工作，记忆的世俗化彻底完成。这一转变通过三个步骤实现。首先，亚里士多德通过直接忽略记忆的超验维度——无论是神话的还是形而上学的——有效地消解了这些层面。他将回忆区分为"记忆"与"追忆"两种形式，借此将记忆现象限定在有限的尘世领域。在这个领域中，回忆既不能提供关于神祇或理念的永恒真理，只能呈现个体生命范围内的经验事实。其次，亚里士多德的论述强调记忆与个人过往的紧密联系："记忆"，他简洁地指出，"属于过去"，这里显然特指我亲身经历或见证的过去。我不仅必须复活这段特定过往，还需考量事件原初发生与当下回忆之间的"时间差"；事实上，亚里士多德对如何计算这种时间间隔进行了详细讨论。 第三，这种受时间限制的第一人称过往被包含在图像之中。由于图像专属于灵魂的感知部分，任何试图以柏拉图方式将记忆与理念认知联系起来的做法都值得商榷。与此同时，关于记忆解放性影响的所有残余主张都被削弱了，因为图像被纯粹视为过往经验的复制品，是灵魂中同构印记机制产生的内在复本。简言之，记忆就是"拥有一个被视为原物复本的图像"。
Image, perception, time: these had been the very things that remembering, in Plato’s vision, helped us to escape or overcome. Images are the lowest level of experience, belonging to the abject realm of reflections and shadows, eikasia; perception is linked with pistis, one level upwards in the epistemic ladder; and time is for Plato the “moving likeness of eternity,” ^(55){ }^{55} an eikon of what is cosmically ultimate. Therefore, in construing memory in terms of the imagistic, the perceptual, and the temporal, Aristotle is conceiving it unremittingly under the aspect of seculae seculorum; he is bringing it down to earth-down to the domain of the finitely rememberable. 形象、感知、时间：在柏拉图的视野中，这些正是记忆帮助我们逃离或克服的事物。形象是经验的最低层次，属于可悲的镜像与阴影领域——即"臆想"；感知则与"信念"相连，在认知阶梯上高出一级；而对柏拉图而言，时间是"永恒的动态摹本"，是宇宙终极真相的影像。因此，当亚里士多德从形象性、感知性和时间性来阐释记忆时，他始终将其置于世俗的维度下考量——将记忆降格至尘世，降格至有限可忆的领域。
VII 第七章
The finitizing of human memory so evident in Aristotle’s seminal treatise De Memoria et Reminiscentia-a work whose very brevity may be said to symbolize the diminishment to which memory is submitted in its pageshad for its outcome a dramatic splitting in future considerations of the phenomenon. On the one hand, in keeping with Aristotle’s own primary bias, there emerged an entire tradition of what may be called “passivism,” in which remembering is reduced to a passive process of registering and storing incoming impressions. The passivist paradigm is still very much with us, whether it takes the form of a naive empiricism or of a sophisticated model of information processing. In fact, since Aristotle’s position was first formulated, passivism has been the predominant, and typically the “official” (i.e., the most respected and respectable), view of memory. On the other hand, and as a consequence of this very fact, there has grown up a countervailing tradition of “activism,” according to which memory involves the creative transformation of experience rather than its internalized reduplication in images or traces construed as copies. Echoes of activism are detectable in Plato and Aristotle themselves, especially in the shared conviction that recollection takes place as a search ^(56){ }^{56}-a conviction still resounding in notions of “rehearsal” and “retrieval” as these have arisen in cognitive psychology. But it is not until recent times that full-fledged activist models of memory have been developed: e.g., in Janet’s idea of the retroactive transformation of memories by means of their narration; in Freud’s praxisoriented concepts of interpretation and construction in psychoanalysis; in Bartlett’s theory of the evolving character of memories as these are reconstructed by various memorial schemata; and in Piaget’s similar theory that memories directly reflect changing schemes of accommodation to and assimilation of experience. ^(57){ }^{57} 亚里士多德在其开创性论著《论记忆与回忆》中对人类记忆的有限化处理——这部作品的简短篇幅本身便可视为其篇章中对记忆贬抑的象征——导致后世对这一现象的研究产生了戏剧性的分裂。一方面，秉承亚里士多德本人的主要倾向，形成了可称为"被动主义"的完整传统，将记忆简化为被动接收和储存外来印象的过程。这种被动主义范式至今仍深刻影响着我们，无论是表现为朴素经验主义，还是精密的信息处理模型。事实上，自亚里士多德的观点首次形成以来，被动主义始终是记忆研究的主流观点，通常也是"正统"（即最受尊重且体面的）观点。另一方面，正是由于这一事实，逐渐发展出与之抗衡的"能动主义"传统，该传统认为记忆包含对经验的创造性转化，而非将其内化为图像或被视为副本的痕迹进行简单复制。 在柏拉图和亚里士多德本人的思想中，我们能够察觉到行动主义的回响，尤其体现在他们共有的信念中——回忆是一种追寻的过程 ^(56){ }^{56} 。这一信念至今仍在认知心理学中"复述"与"提取"的概念里产生共鸣。然而直到近代，成熟的记忆行动主义模型才真正形成：例如让内提出的通过叙述对记忆进行回溯性改造的理论；弗洛伊德在精神分析中强调实践的解释与建构概念；巴特利特关于记忆会随着不同记忆图式的重构而不断演化的理论；以及皮亚杰提出的类似观点，认为记忆直接反映了主体为适应和同化经验而不断变化的认知图式 ^(57){ }^{57} 。
The traditions of activism and passivism have remained remarkably independent of each other from Periclean Athens to the present day. Perhaps only in the case of Plato and Freud-those curious confrères in so many matters-do we witness a meaningful working alliance between the two traditions. Each thinker likens memory to imprinting (whether this be on a 从伯里克利时代的雅典至今，行动主义与被动主义这两大传统始终保持着惊人的独立性。或许只有在柏拉图和弗洛伊德——这两个在诸多问题上立场奇特的同行者——的学说中，我们才能看到这两种传统之间富有成效的思想联盟。两位思想家都将记忆比作印记过程（无论这种印记是刻在
wax tablet or within specifically “psychical” neurones in the brain); but each also comes to adopt a more activist position, evident in Plato’s metaphor of searching for memories in an “aviary” of the soul as well as in Freud’s stress on recollection in psychoanalysis as a process of active “working through.” ^(58){ }^{58} 蜡板或大脑中特定的"心理"神经元）；但两者也都采取了更为积极的态度，这体现在柏拉图将灵魂比作搜寻记忆的"鸟舍"的隐喻中，也体现在弗洛伊德强调精神分析中的回忆是一种积极"修通"的过程。
Short of these creative compromises, we are left with the extremes of passivism and activism, exemplified respectively by such antithetical figures as Aristotle and Piaget. In between, there is a history of the repression of memory’s potentially transformational role. This is not to deny that, along the way, various valiant efforts have been made to give back to memory some of its lost allure-most notably, in the magical and mystical uses of mnemotechnical systems in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. But Yates, who traces the rise and fall of these efforts so movingly, ends her study abruptly in the seventeenth century. After Leibniz, ^(59){ }^{59} the transformative powers of memory, when they were noticed at all, were accorded a distinctly marginal position. Much as Platonism survived at critical moments only in the form of a subterranean and subversive Neoplatonism, so the art of memory (itself the sole context in which memory was still venerated) continued only as a hermetic discipline. 若缺乏这些创造性的折中方案，我们便只能面对消极主义与积极主义的极端对立，其典型代表分别是亚里士多德与皮亚杰这类截然相反的人物。在这两极之间，潜藏着一段记忆变革潜能遭受压抑的历史。这并非否认历史上曾有过诸多勇敢尝试——尤其在中世纪与文艺复兴时期，记忆术体系被赋予魔法与神秘主义色彩，部分恢复了记忆消逝的魅力。但叶芝对这些尝试兴衰的动人追溯，却在十七世纪戛然而止。莱布尼茨之后，即便记忆的变革力量偶被察觉，也始终被置于明显边缘的地位。正如柏拉图主义仅以隐秘颠覆的新柏拉图主义形式存续于关键时期，记忆术（作为记忆仍受尊崇的唯一领域）也仅作为秘传学问得以延续。
When mnemotechnics was revived in the eighteenth century in a nonhermetic form it had become a merely pragmatic discipline, suitable only for aiding in the memorization of masses of facts-for instance, geographical facts of latitude and longitude, which became of special concern in the wake of the explorations of the world undertaken in preceding centuries. In this practical setting, as distant from Athens as could be imagined, memory was valued merely as a means of arranging and preserving facts efficiently. Even if some of the techniques employed in training memories (e.g., the system of places) were identical with those used by the ancients, they were no longer learned for the sake of sophia but only to render one’s memorial powers more capacious and retentive. The model of human memory as a computer was already beginning to take shape in dim outline, and it is telling that Leibniz was at once the last philosopher to take the art of memory seriously and the first to have envisaged the real possibility of computers in his search for a “universal calculus.” 当记忆术在十八世纪以非神秘主义形式复兴时，它已沦为纯粹的实用学科，仅适用于协助记忆海量事实——例如经度纬度等地理信息，这些数据在前几个世纪全球探索浪潮后变得尤为重要。在这个与雅典精神相去甚远的实用语境中，记忆仅仅被视为高效整理和保存事实的工具。即便训练记忆的某些技巧（如场所记忆法）与古人所用如出一辙，人们学习它们不再是为了追求智慧，而仅仅是为了增强记忆容量与保持力。人类记忆如同计算机的模型已开始隐约成形，值得注意的是，莱布尼茨既是最后一位认真对待记忆艺术的哲学家，也是在其"通用演算"探索中最早预见计算机真实可能性的先驱。
The mathematization of nature so prominent in Galileo and Newton as well as in Leibniz meant that memory, too, would eventually become mathematized, whether in “computer language” or in some other equally formalized symbolism. Before this began to happen in any thorough fashion (and it still has not occurred in a format that can pretend to general acceptance), memory’s fate was one of constant disparagement by philosophers. Descartes dismisses memory in the Meditations as one of the most dubitable of human capacities: “I convince myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my deceitful memory recalls to me.” ^(60){ }^{60} When the methodological doubt introduced in the first Meditation is lifted later in the text, Descartes does not even bother to restore his (and his reader’s) confidence in memory by 伽利略、牛顿以及莱布尼茨所推崇的自然数学化进程，意味着记忆终将同样被数学化——无论是通过"计算机语言"还是其他同等形式化的符号系统。在这种彻底转变全面发生之前（至今仍未形成公认的成熟范式），记忆在哲学领域长期遭受贬抑。笛卡尔在《沉思录》中将记忆斥为人类最不可靠的能力之一："我确信自己欺骗性的记忆所唤起的过往皆属虚妄。" ^(60){ }^{60} 当第一沉思中提出的方法论怀疑在后文被消解时，笛卡尔甚至懒得通过具体论证来重建他（及读者）对记忆的信任。
any specific argumentation. ^(61){ }^{61} In much the same spirit, Spinoza writes off memory in his Ethics with the derisive remark that it is “simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications (affectiones) of the human body.” ^(62){ }^{62} 斯宾诺莎在《伦理学》中以同样轻蔑的态度否定了记忆的价值，将其嘲讽为"仅仅是涉及人体外事物本质的特定观念联结，这种联结根据人体情状（affectiones）的次序与关联在心灵中形成。" ^(62){ }^{62}
Hume, arch-empiricist, echoes Spinoza, arch-rationalist, by emphasizing that “the chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position.” ^(63){ }^{63} “Order and association,” “order and position”: ^(64){ }^{64} these strikingly similar formulae reinforce a common point. If memory is constrained ^(65){ }^{65} to depict past events in the precise order in which they occurred, it is thereby compelled to mimic them, to offer an image or copy that is related to them by isomorphic representation of position or form. No less than in Aristotle, indeed even more vehemently in the agile hands of Hume, memory has become a copying machine, a mere replicator of experiences. ^(66){ }^{66} 休谟，这位经验主义的巨擘，竟与理性主义代表斯宾诺莎遥相呼应，他强调"记忆的主要功能不在于保存简单观念，而在于维系其序列与位次"。 ^(63){ }^{63} "序列与关联"、"秩序与位置"： ^(64){ }^{64} 这些惊人相似的表述强化了共同观点。若记忆被约束 ^(65){ }^{65} 于严格按事件原初序列来描绘过往，它便被迫模仿事件，通过位置或形式的同构再现来提供与之相关的影像或副本。在亚里士多德那里已然如此，而在思维敏捷的休谟笔下更显激烈——记忆已沦为复印机，不过是经验的复制器。 ^(66){ }^{66}
This resolutely passivist view of memory is in no way altered by the many epigoni of Hume who carried forward the enormously influential movement of associationism. ^(67){ }^{67} Nor is it overturned even by Kant, formidable critic of Hume in so many other respects. On this matter uncharacteristically timid and traditional, Kant treats memory in The Critique of Pure Reason only under the evasive heading of “reproductive imagination,” which is held to be strictly empirical in status and to operate by association alone. ^(68){ }^{68} With Kant, we reach the point at which memory has lost, not only its former attraction and power (“productivity” belongs to imagination alone), but also its own name, since the term “memory” does not occur once in the entire Critique. ^(69){ }^{69} Here, in extremis, is a deeply defensive denial of memory’s importance in human experience, constituting in effect a radical philosophical put-down. 这种坚决消极的记忆观并未因休谟众多追随者推动极具影响力的联想主义运动而有丝毫改变。 ^(67){ }^{67} 即便在其他诸多方面对休谟进行有力批判的康德，也未能颠覆这一观点。在这个问题上，康德一反常态地表现出怯懦与传统，在《纯粹理性批判》中仅以"再生想象力"这一回避性的标题讨论记忆，认为其本质上纯粹是经验性的，且仅通过联想运作。 ^(68){ }^{68} 至此，记忆不仅丧失了昔日的吸引力与力量（"生产性"仅属于想象力），甚至连其名称也不复存在——因为整部《批判》中从未出现过"记忆"一词。 ^(69){ }^{69} 这实质上是对记忆在人类经验中重要性的深度防御性否定，构成了一种彻底的哲学贬抑。
VIII 第八章
Despite the earnest efforts of Bergson and James at the end of the nineteenth century, of Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth century, and of cognitive psychologists in the last few decades, memory has not received anything like the recognition it was given in ancient Greece or in the Renaissance. It is altogether characteristic of the present situation that the most recent extended philosophical treatment of memory in English, Norman Malcolm’s Memory and Mind, ^(70){ }^{70} is almost entirely critical and polemical in nature. Malcolm’s book tells us very effectively what remembering is not, showing up the contradictions and inconsistencies in many current conceptions. It does not, however, tell us in any adequate way what memory is-what its consists in, how it operates, what its origins and limits are. Perhaps the time has come for a careful description of the positive features of remembering, its operation in everyday life and in natural con- 尽管柏格森和詹姆斯在十九世纪末、胡塞尔在二十世纪初以及认知心理学家们在过去几十年里都做出了诚挚的努力，但记忆这一主题仍未获得古希腊或文艺复兴时期那般高度的重视。当前境况的典型特征是：诺曼·马尔科姆以英文撰写的近期哲学专著《记忆与心灵》几乎完全采用批判与论战的基调。这部作品极其有效地揭示了记忆"不是什么"，暴露出诸多当代观念中的矛盾与漏洞，却未能充分阐明记忆的本质——其构成要素、运作机制、起源与边界。或许现在正是时候，该对记忆的积极特征、其在日常生活与自然语境中的运作展开细致描述了。
texts. Perhaps, too, on the basis of such a description, we can come to remember memory anew, recapturing some of the depth and vitality which early Greek poets and thinkers appreciated so fully and which we have just as fully forgotten. Such remembering-such re-viewing and re-valuingdoes not require a re-divinization of this elusive power; it is not a question of resurrecting Mnemosyne in person or in name. But it is a matter of reinspiring respect for what the Greeks called mnème and the Romans memoria. As memor means “mindful,” so we need to become re-minded, mindful again, of remembering described in its own structure and situated in its own realm-a realm neither mythical nor mechanical but at one with our ongoing existence and experience. Then memory might reassume its rightful place in the pantheon of essential powers of mind and body, self and other, psyche and world. 文本。或许，基于这样的描述，我们能够重新认识记忆，重新捕捉古希腊诗人和思想家们曾充分领悟、而我们却已全然遗忘的那种深度与活力。这种重识——这种重新审视与重新评估——并不需要将这种难以捉摸的力量再度神化；问题不在于以实体或名义复活谟涅摩绪涅。但确实需要重新唤起对希腊人称为"mnème"、罗马人称为"memoria"之物的敬意。正如"memor"意为"留心"，我们也需要重新留心，再度关注那以其自身结构被描述、居于其自身领域的记忆——这个领域既非神话也非机械，而是与我们持续的存在和体验融为一体。届时，记忆或许能重新占据它在心智与身体、自我与他者、心灵与世界等基本力量万神殿中应有的位置。
By attending patiently to memory’s many infrastructures and thereby respecting it as a phenomenon in its own right, we can begin to undo the self-forgetful forgetting that has led to such disrespect for its fields and spacious palaces. Rather than fleeing its dark embrace-its heaviness-and handing it over to machines, we can start to apprehend its intrinsic lightness, its own luminosity. Or more exactly, we may come to realize that its heaviness is not altogether “deplorable” nor its lightness simply “splendid.” We may even be able to choose both its lightness and its weight, its power to alleviate and illuminate as well as its capacity to embroil and bog down. 通过耐心关注记忆的诸多内在结构，从而将其视为一种独立现象予以尊重，我们便能开始消解那种导致对其广袤领域与恢宏殿堂如此轻慢的自我遗忘式遗忘。我们不必逃离记忆幽暗的怀抱——它的沉重——也不必将其交付机器，而可以开始领悟它内在的轻盈，它自身的光辉。更准确地说，我们或许会逐渐意识到：它的沉重并非全然"可叹"，它的轻盈也不仅是"辉煌"。我们甚至可能同时选择它的轻盈与沉重，既能缓解痛苦、照亮心灵，也甘愿陷入纠缠、承受阻滞。
If this is indeed a genuine option, we need not envy the beast in its bovine oblivion. Setting aside our own self-inflicted forgetting, we can look forward to remembering in the old manner-and in many new ways as well. 若这确是一种真实的选择，我们便无需羡慕兽类懵懂无知的混沌状态。摒弃自我施加的遗忘，我们有望以古老的方式——以及诸多崭新途径——重获记忆的能力。
Is there, then, a freedom in remembering, a freedom unknown to animals and machines alike? Perhaps. But we cannot possibly answer this last question until we know more about the character and course of human remembering itself. 那么，记忆之中是否存在一种自由？一种动物与机器皆无从知晓的自由？或许如此。但唯有当我们更深入理解人类记忆本身的特性与轨迹，才可能回答这终极之问。
Part One 第一部
Keeping Memory in Mind 将记忆铭记于心
II
FIRST FORAYS 初次探索
It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back. 找到开端是如此困难。或者说：从开端处开始是困难的。而且不要试图追溯得更远。
-Wittgenstein, On Certainty ——维特根斯坦《论确定性》
I
It is evident by now that if we are to question such an entrenched tradition of neglecting memory as has just been outlined in the Introduction, a more complete grasp of the phenomenon itself is required. Without this grasp, we run the risk of spinning in free space, speculating as to the right direction in which to move. Like Kant’s dove of metaphysics, we shall cleave the air in vain unless our random groping can succeed in finding a more certain way. Just as metaphysics for Kant must become a metaphysics of experience if it is to cease to soar in sheer speculation, so we likewise shall touch earth by following the “secure path” (sicheren Gang) provided by ordinary experiences of remembering. ^(1){ }^{1} It is only by the careful examination of such experiences that we shall be able to discern what is basic and distinctive about memory as we enact it unselfconsciously (and for the most part unwittingly) every day. 显然，若要质疑如导论所述那般根深蒂固的遗忘记忆传统，就必须更全面地把握记忆现象本身。缺乏这种把握，我们便如同在虚空中徒劳旋转，只能猜测前进的正确方向。正如康德笔下形而上学的鸽子，除非偶然摸索能找到更确定的路径，否则我们终将在空气中徒然劈斩。正如康德认为形而上学必须成为经验的形而上学才能避免纯粹思辨的翱翔，我们同样需要沿着日常记忆经验提供的"可靠路径"（sicheren Gang）才能脚踏实地。唯有通过细致考察这些经验，我们才能辨识出那些每日无意识（且大多不自知）践行记忆时，其根本与独特的本质所在。
Indeed, it is just because remembering is so ubiquitous in our lives-so pervasively present there-that we must make a special effort to excavate it from its deeply embedded position in human experience. It has been claimed by cognitive psychologists that “recent research has made it increasingly clear that there is almost no conscious awareness of perceptual and memorial processes” ^(2-at){ }^{2-a t} least in their everyday enactments. This conclusion is unduly pessimistic, especially if it is taken as implying that any effort to describe remembering as it occurs consciously is foredoomed to failure. Nevertheless, it does underscore the need for a cautious and detailed assessment of memory-just the sort of assessment which we do not trouble to make in the throes of daily demands. In these throes, we make use of memory unquestioningly, treating it as stock-in-trade, as something ready and reliable. So ready and reliable, indeed, that we do not pause to consider 确实，正因为记忆在我们的生活中无处不在——如此普遍地存在着——我们必须特别努力才能将其从人类经验中根深蒂固的位置挖掘出来。认知心理学家曾宣称："近期研究越来越清楚地表明，人们几乎无法意识到知觉和记忆过程" ^(2-at){ }^{2-a t} 至少在日常表现中如此。这一结论过于悲观，尤其是如果它暗示着任何有意识描述记忆过程的努力都注定失败的话。不过，它确实强调了我们需要对记忆进行谨慎而细致的评估——这正是我们在日常需求的漩涡中无暇顾及的那种评估。在这些漩涡中，我们毫不质疑地使用记忆，将其视为现成可用的工具，当作某种随时可用且可靠的东西。如此现成可靠，以至于我们甚至不曾停下来思考
what it is and how it performs-and usually it performs so well that we lose explicit awareness of its very operation within us. 它究竟是什么以及如何运作——而通常它运作得如此之好，以至于我们完全意识不到它在我们内部的运作过程。
Let us suspend the well-oiled mechanism of memory for a while, plunging into the midst of things so as to capture consciousness of what it is that we do when we remember. In this way we may begin to achieve that “conscious awareness” which psychologists have decried. I shall begin at the only place where one can effectively begin in trying to obtain a full account of the phenomenon-namely, with my own experiences. Since I have attempted to justify this reliance on first-person description elsewhere, ^(3){ }^{3} I will plunge into the task unabashedly here by citing several instances of my own remembering. These are not proffered as definitive, or even as strictly representative, of my own (much less of others’) experiences. They are exemplary only in the sense of providing preliminary samples of memory at work. Rather than a systematic conspectus of types of remembering, they constitute a loosely knit cluster of cases-but a revealing cluster nonetheless. 让我们暂且搁置那运转流畅的记忆机制，深入事物本质，以捕捉我们在回忆时的意识活动。通过这种方式，我们或许能开始实现心理学家们所诟病的"自觉意识"。我将从唯一有效的起点开始，试图对这一现象进行全面阐述——即从我自身的经验出发。由于我已在他处论证过这种依赖第一人称描述的合理性， ^(3){ }^{3} 在此我将毫不迟疑地引用几个自身回忆的实例展开论述。这些事例并非作为定论，甚至不能严格代表我个人（更遑论他人）的经验。它们仅具有示范意义，为运作中的记忆提供初步样本。这些案例并非系统化的回忆类型概览，而是构成一组松散关联却颇具启示性的集合。
II 第二章
Example #1 示例一
While putting together the above preparatory reflections, I found myself suddenly remembering a visit to Yosemite National Park which I made at the age of nine or ten in the company of my family. We had come over to Yosemite from San Francisco, and my expectations were very keen as we approached the park in our car. My first distinct recollection is of a breathtakingly panoramic vista of the park from a roadside viewing point. I can recall rushing from the car (a green Buick?) over very dry and dusty ground to look out at the valley below. (I also now recall a photograph of myself and my sister taken at precisely this point-a photograph displayed for a number of years afterward on my mother’s dressing table. It showed us two children eagerly occupying the foreground while Yosemite beckoned in the background through pine trees.) Concerning what followed this entry to the park, my memory is discontinuous and yields only several seemingly isolated episodes, presenting themselves in no definite order. First, there is a view from below of the “Dome” (is this the correct name?), accompanied by a feeling of awe at viewing the massive protuberance. (This memory is suddenly interspersed with a much more recent memory of hearing about a group of four or five mountain climbers who had scaled the face of the formation.) Second, there emerges a vague image of the cabin where we had spent the night (or nights-I do not recall how long we stayed in Yosemite). Even in the absence of definite images, I feel certain that the cabin itself was situated low in the valley, was surrounded by fir trees and near a stream, and was a place where bears might roam (this last thought mixing fascination with 在整理上述预备性思考时，我突然回忆起九岁或十岁时与家人同游优胜美地国家公园的经历。我们从旧金山驱车前往，随着车辆逐渐接近公园，我的期待之情愈发强烈。第一个清晰的记忆片段是从路边观景台俯瞰公园时令人屏息的壮丽全景。我记得自己急匆匆跳下那辆绿色别克车，跑过干燥多尘的地面，只为眺望下方的山谷。（此刻我还想起当时在此处为我和妹妹拍摄的一张照片——这张照片后来在母亲的梳妆台上摆放了多年。画面中我们两个孩童热切地占据前景，而松林掩映间优胜美地的风光在背景中召唤着游人。）关于入园后的经历，我的记忆已不连贯，只剩下几段看似孤立的片段，它们以不确定的顺序浮现。首先是仰望"穹顶山"（是这个名称吗？）的视角，凝视这座巨大凸起岩体时油然而生的敬畏感仍萦绕心头。 （这段记忆突然穿插进一个更近期的记忆，那是关于听说有四五个登山者曾攀爬过这座岩壁。）其次，脑海中浮现出我们过夜（或几夜——我不记得我们在优胜美地待了多久）的小木屋的模糊影像。即便没有清晰的画面，我仍确信那小木屋位于山谷低处，周围环绕着冷杉树，靠近一条溪流，是个可能有熊出没的地方（这最后的念头混杂着
fear). Third, I have a comparatively distinct recollection of approaching and viewing the great waterfall in the park-of running ahead of my parents and sister along the path of approach and suddenly being confronted by the cascading fall in all its breathtaking height and power. I recall being overwhelmed and standing staring at it for some time, until my family finally caught up with me. And that is all. Following this last scene there is a decided fading-out, and I can remember nothing more-not even the departure from Yosemite, a departure which I must have found difficult after such an exhilarating experience there. 恐惧与着迷）。第三，我相对清晰地记得走近并观赏公园里的大瀑布——我沿着小径跑在父母和妹妹前面，突然直面那飞流直下的瀑布，其令人屏息的高度与力量。我记得自己当时震撼不已，站在那里凝视了许久，直到家人终于赶上我。仅此而已。随着最后这个场景，记忆明显淡出，我再也想不起更多——甚至不记得离开优胜美地的情形，尽管在经历了如此振奋人心的体验后，那次离别想必令我难以释怀。
REMARKS 评注
(1) What stands out first of all is the contrast between the perspicuousness of a number of parts of this memory-e.g., the initial scene of first viewing Yosemite, the appearance of the “Dome,” the spectacle of the waterfall-and the equally striking indefiniteness of so much else in the same memory. This indefiniteness extends to at least four different parts of its content: place (e.g., the vaguely located and unspecified overnight resting place); time (how long the visit lasted; what my exact age was when it occurred); objects (the make and color of the family car; the clothes I wore); names (the proper name of the “Dome” or of the waterfall); and sounds (e.g., that of the crashing waterfall). 首先引人注目的，是这段记忆中若干部分的清晰性——例如初见优胜美地的场景、"穹顶"的样貌、瀑布的奇观——与同一记忆中其他内容同样惊人的模糊性形成的鲜明对比。这种模糊性至少体现在四个不同方面：地点（如位置模糊且未具体说明的过夜休息处）；时间（游览持续了多久；事件发生时我的确切年龄）；物品（家用汽车的品牌与颜色；我当时穿的衣服）；名称（"穹顶"或瀑布的专有名称）；以及声音（如轰鸣的瀑布声）。
(2) It is to be noticed that such indefinitenesses are not so radical as to vitiate the memory altogether; with the possible exception of the overnight site, they all possess some minimal determinacy. I was somewhere between nine and eleven years old, since I am certain that the trip took place in the period 1948-1950; and I am reasonably sure that the trip occurred in July or August, since my family always vacationed in one of these two months. Similarly, my guess that the family car was a green Buick is based on other memories of our having such a car at approximately that period of time. And I can safely conjecture that the visit to Yosemite was less than a week and more than a day in duration when I think of other comparable visits while on vacation. Notice that in each of these cases the probable range of indefiniteness is established by recourse to material not contained in the memory itself-most typically, to other memories from the same general period of my life-and to simple inductive and deductive modes of inference (inductive in the case of the probable length of the visit; deductive in the case of the year of the visit, since I know that it could not have occurred before 1948 or after 1950, when distinctly different vacations, explicitly remembered now, were undertaken). Of course, in the act of remembering itself I did not choose to employ these reasoning procedures, nor was I even aware of their operation. I simply remembered objects and events as being located at such a place and at such a time, and as having such and such a character-without yet considering the probability or verifiability of these claims. （2）值得注意的是，这些不确定性并未彻底破坏记忆的有效性；除过夜地点可能存在例外，它们都具备某种最低限度的确定性。我当时大约九到十一岁之间，因为我确信那次旅行发生在 1948 至 1950 年间；且有充分理由认定是在七八月份，因我家总在这两个月份度假。同样地，我猜测当时家用车是辆绿色别克，这基于其他关于我们在那段时间拥有该车型的记忆。当回想起其他类似的度假经历时，我可以有把握地推测优胜美地之游持续了不足一周但超过一天。 请注意，在上述每种情形中，不确定性的可能范围都是通过借助记忆本身不包含的材料——最常见的是借助我人生同一时期其他记忆——以及简单的归纳与演绎推理模式（在估算拜访时长时采用归纳法；在确定拜访年份时采用演绎法，因为我明确记得 1948 年之前和 1950 年之后都发生过特征迥异的度假活动）来确立的。当然，在实际回忆过程中，我并未刻意运用这些推理程序，甚至未曾意识到它们的运作。我只是单纯地记起某些对象和事件存在于特定地点、特定时间，并具有特定特征——当时尚未考虑这些陈述的可能性或可验证性。
(3) There was another, and this time wholly intrinsic, role of other memories within my remembering of the visit to Yosemite. At two points, a quite （3）在回忆约塞米蒂之旅时，其他记忆还发挥着另一种完全内在的作用。有两处细节，
differently based memory intervened: that of the photograph taken at the time of the visit and prominently displayed later, and that of hearing about a recent scaling of Half Dome (such is its correct name). Each of these intersecting memories played a distinctive, though mostly unnoticed, role in my primary act of remembering. The dramatic news story of the scaling underscored, at the moment of remembering, the precipitous and sheer structure of Half Dome which had so impressed me at the time of my first seeing it; I suspect it also linked up with a wish or fantasy of climbing it myself, which I may have had at the time, though I don’t remember that at present. The memory of the photograph, in contrast, had the effect of confirming and fixing the moment of approach to Yosemite and thus of underlining my excited anticipations. Indeed, one might venture that the photograph played a very special and complex role in my experience. Not only did it offer documentary proof of the historical fact of the particular moment in question, but it itself very likely contributed to the survival of my own recollection. Seeing the photograph on my mother’s dressing table in later years regularly reminded me of the episode photographed and thus of the visit as a whole. The photograph and its memory may have become emblematic of the trip to Yosemite, so much so that I can now recall relatively few other incidents that took place after the photographing of that first scene. 基于不同形式的记忆交织其中：一张在访问时拍摄并后来被显著展示的照片，以及听闻最近有人攀登半圆顶（这是其正确名称）的消息。这些相互交织的记忆在我主要的回忆行为中各自扮演了独特却常被忽视的角色。关于攀登的戏剧性新闻报道，在回忆的时刻强化了半圆顶那曾在我初见时便震撼我的险峻陡峭；我猜想这或许还与当时可能怀有的亲自攀登的愿望或幻想相连，尽管此刻我已不记得这一点。相比之下，照片的记忆则起到了确认并定格接近优胜美地那一刻的作用，从而突显了我当时的兴奋期待。事实上，可以说这张照片在我的体验中扮演了非常特殊而复杂的角色。它不仅为那个特定时刻的历史事实提供了文献证明，而且很可能对我自身记忆的留存起到了关键作用。 多年后，母亲梳妆台上那张照片总让我想起被定格的瞬间，进而忆起整段旅程。这张照片及其承载的记忆或许已成为优胜美地之行的象征，以至于如今我能回想起在那最初场景拍摄后发生的其他事件寥寥无几。
(4) The sense of myself in this recollection is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, I have a very clear sense of my own place and role, of being present and active in the first scene of the memory-of myself scrambling to get a view of the long-awaited valley. This sense of self-presence was perhaps again strengthened by the photograph’s having been taken at just this point, since the iconic image of myself in the photograph bespeaks the fact of my having been personally present at the initial scene. On the other hand, my felt presence in the other remembered scenes was considerably diminished in comparison. I was always there, somehow in the remembered scene, and never wholly absent from it; but I was there in a curiously diluted and dispersed form: faceless and almost bodiless, a mere onlooker who observes not himself but what is spread before him in nature. ^(4){ }^{4} (4) 在这段回忆中，我对自我的感知有些奇特。一方面，我对自己的位置和角色有着非常清晰的认知——在记忆的第一个场景中，我确实在场且积极参与，那个奋力张望期待已久山谷的自己。这种自我在场的感知或许因照片恰好拍摄于此刻而得到强化，因为照片中那个标志性的我，正诉说着亲身立于初始场景的事实。另一方面，与其他记忆场景中的存在感相比，我的感知明显减弱了。我始终以某种方式存在于那些被铭记的场景里，从未完全缺席；但我的存在却呈现出一种奇异的稀释与弥散状态：没有面容，几乎无形体，仅仅是个凝视着眼前自然景象而非自身的旁观者。 ^(4){ }^{4}
(5) My sense of other persons in such a memory is closely related to my sense of self-presence. My sister has a pronounced presence in the memory of the first scene-no doubt aided once more by the photograph. But after this she fades from focus almost entirely. So do my parents, although I have an attenuated sense of their co-presence with me and my sister in the same initial scene. They are implicated as our spectators or on-lookers, just as, in now remembering that unrepeatable moment, I look onto all four of us together. (5) 在这段记忆中，我对他人存在的感知与自我在场的感受紧密相连。我姐姐在第一幕记忆中的存在感尤为强烈——这无疑再次得益于那张照片。但此后她几乎完全淡出了记忆焦点。我的父母也是如此，尽管我能隐约感受到他们最初与我和姐姐共同在场的模糊印象。他们作为旁观者被牵连进这个场景，就像此刻回忆那个不可复制的瞬间时，我正凝视着我们四人同框的画面。
(6) “Looking” is the appropriate term here, since the memory in question presents itself in almost entirely visual terms. I do not “hear” again the talk that must have attended the taking of the photograph, the expressions of awe that I and the other members of my family probably emitted at various (6) "凝视"在此处是最贴切的表述，因为这段记忆几乎完全以视觉形式呈现。我无法再次"听见"拍摄照片时必然存在的交谈声，也无法重现我和家人们当时可能在不同时刻发出的惊叹声。
points during the visit, or even the deafening roar of the waterfall. All is silent-so silent as to be somewhat eery, otherworldly, a world apart. The visual imagery itself is discontinuous and inconsistent, sometimes bright (though not brilliant) and delineated (though not as fully delineated as objects in a comparably complicated perceived scene). But some of the images are very dim, to the point of lacking color, and shapeless, as if lacking contour and even depth. The overall effect is of a moving montage of visual contrasts. 在参观的某些时刻，甚至瀑布震耳欲聋的轰鸣声也消失了。万籁俱寂——静得有些诡异，超脱尘世，宛若异界。视觉意象本身是断续而不连贯的，时而明亮（虽不耀眼）且轮廓分明（虽不及同等复杂感知场景中物体的完整轮廓）。但有些影像极为暗淡，近乎无色无形，仿佛缺失了轮廓甚至纵深感。整体效果犹如一幅流动的视觉对比蒙太奇。
(7) The temporality of the recollection is also peculiar, and seems to consist of three quite diverse components. First, the memory exhibits an inbuilt successiveness as its scenes unfold with a certain rhythmic regularity. The regularity is pronounced enough for the same succession to appear on re-rememberings-and yet not strong enough for me to be certain that the order of succession in the memory exactly corresponds to the order in which the original events took place. Did I really gaze upon Half Dome before seeing the waterfall? Probably-since Half Dome is so prominent a feature of Yosemite valley. But all that I know for certain is that within my memory there is a self-regulated progression from the Dome scene to the waterfall scene. Second, while thus moving along in a quasi-linear fashion, the memory also seems to draw me in. I sense that I am, in some inexplicable way, re-entering the past, being taken up by it, even becoming, to some degree, at one with it: temporality here is not chronological or linear but a matter of absorption in a measureless depth. Third, I nevertheless retain a distinct sense of being still anchored in the present-precisely the present of the act of recollecting itself. I am now remembering this sequence of past scenes, and I do so from a temporal vantage point that does not belong to these scenes themselves. Here I sense the enormous gulf between the present moment of remembering and the scenes remembered: these latter almost seem to belong to another life and certainly to another part of my life. (7)回忆的时间性同样独特，似乎由三种截然不同的成分构成。首先，记忆展现出内在的连续性，其场景以某种节奏规律徐徐展开。这种规律性足够显著，使得相同的顺序会在多次回忆中重现——却又不够强烈，让我无法确定记忆中的先后顺序是否完全对应原始事件的发生次序。我当真是在看见瀑布前就凝视过半圆顶吗？很可能如此——毕竟半圆顶是优胜美地山谷如此突出的地标。但我唯一能确定的是，记忆中存在着从穹顶场景到瀑布场景的自我调节式推进。其次，当记忆以这种准线性方式流动时，它似乎也在将我吸入其中。我感觉到自己正以某种难以言喻的方式重新进入过去，被其裹挟，甚至在某种程度上与之融为一体：这里的时间性并非按年代顺序或线性排列，而是沉入无垠深度的沉浸体验。 第三，我仍清晰地感觉到自己依然锚定于当下——确切地说，是回忆行为本身的当下。此刻我正在忆起这一连串过往场景，而回忆的时空立足点并不属于这些场景本身。在此我感受到记忆的当下时刻与被忆场景间的巨大鸿沟：后者几乎像是属于另一种人生，无疑属于我生命的另一段历程。
(8) The emotional tonality of this memory deserves brief mention. Throughout the remembering there was a sense of muted exhilaration at having been in such a magnificent setting. This exhilaration modulated into awe when I was facing Half Dome and the waterfall in memory. Also felt was the mounting excitement of the first scene, an excitement fueled by expectations of what was to come as the park was entered. I notice that it is difficult to determine exactly where such emotion as originally experienced ends and where the same emotion as now felt-in-the-remembering begins, though I am convinced that the former is more acute in tenor and less worked through. On the other hand, a faint nostalgia, a subtle mixture of longing and pleasure, arises; it attaches itself less to the elapsed contents of the memory than to the present experience of remembering, lending it a poignant if subdued character. （8）这段记忆的情感基调值得简要提及。在整个回忆过程中，始终存在着一种置身于如此壮丽场景的克制性欣喜。当我在记忆中面对半圆顶山和瀑布时，这种欣喜又转变为敬畏。同时还能感受到最初场景中不断攀升的兴奋感，这种兴奋源于进入公园时期待即将看到景色的心情。我注意到，很难准确界定最初体验到的这种情绪在哪里结束，而此刻在回忆中感受到的相同情绪又从哪里开始——尽管我确信前者的情感强度更为剧烈且未经充分消化。另一方面，一种淡淡的怀旧感油然而生，那是渴望与愉悦的微妙混合；它与其说是依附于记忆中的过往内容，不如说是与当下回忆体验本身相连，为回忆赋予了一种虽 subdued 却令人心酸的特质。
(9) The nostalgia and poignancy no doubt reflect the origin of the memory in childhood and in a particularly pleasant moment of childhood at that. It is （9）这种怀旧与心酸无疑反映了记忆源自童年时期，且是童年特别愉快的时刻。
worth noting how spontaneously I reverted to this particular memory as a first example-as if to say “here is a paradigm for other memories, a memory of memories!” Despite the ambiguous and problematic nature of such a memory-as revealed, for instance, in its temporality and emotionality-it seems capable of assuming a privileged position among all the myriad memories accessible to me at a given moment. What is it about this portion of the past that makes it such a suitable and tempting subject for recollection? 值得注意的是，我多么自发地以这段特定记忆作为首个范例——仿佛在说"这就是其他记忆的范式，记忆中的记忆！"尽管这段记忆具有模糊性和问题性（例如体现在其时间性和情感性上），但在某一刻我能触及的无数记忆中，它似乎总能占据特权地位。这段过往究竟有何特质，使其成为如此适宜且诱人的回忆对象？
Example #2 示例二
A memory of a relatively recent event comes to mind. I recall going to the movie Small Change a few weeks ago-exactly when, I am not certain. After dinner nearby at Clark’s, my two young children, my wife, and I had walked briskly over to the Lincoln Theater, stopping briefly at a paperback bookstore on the way. Anticipating a large crowd, we arrived early and were among the first to purchase tickets. There ensued a wait that seemed much longer than the ten or fifteen minutes it actually was. The children were especially restive and had difficulty staying in the line that had formedErin attempting some gymnastic tricks on the guardrail by the entrance, Eric looking at the posted list of coming attractions. Finally the doors were flung open, and we entered at the head of what was, by then, a considerable line. Once inside, we sought seats approximately in the middle of the theater, settled there, and interchanged positions a couple of times to adjust to the height of those sitting in front of us. The lights dimmed, and Small Change began directly. (Or was there not a short feature first?-I cannot say for sure.) The film was in French, with English subtitles. I have only a vague recollection of the spoken words; in fact, I cannot remember any single word or phrase, though I certainly remember the characters as speaking. The same indefiniteness applies to the subtitles, at which I furtively glanced when unable to follow the French. Of the music in the film I have no memory at all-indeed, not just of what it was but whether there was any music at all. In contrast with this, I retain a very vivid visual image of the opening scene, in which a stream of school children are viewed rushing home, seemingly in a downhill direction all the way. Two other scenes also stand out in my present recollection: an infant’s fall from the window of a high-rise apartment (the twenty-nineth floor?) and the male teacher (whose name, along with all others in the film, I have forgotten) lecturing passionately to his class about child-abuse. Interspersed between these scenes is a medley of less vividly recalled episodes, ranging from fairly distinct (the actions of a child-abusing mother) to quite indistinct (e.g., children’s recitations in the classroom). While I am recollecting this uneven and incomplete sequence of filmic incidents, I find myself at the same time remembering my own children’s ongoing reactions to the film. I do not remember their 脑海中浮现出一段近期往事的记忆。我回想起几周前去看电影《小玩意》的情景——具体时间已不确定。在克拉克餐厅用完晚餐后，我和妻子带着两个年幼的孩子快步走向林肯剧院，途中还在家平装书店稍作停留。预料到观众会很多，我们提早到达，成为最早购票的一批人。随后的等待时间感觉远比实际的十到十五分钟漫长。孩子们尤其坐立不安，难以在排队队伍中保持安静——艾琳在入口处的护栏上尝试体操动作，埃里克则盯着张贴的即将上映影片列表。终于大门敞开，我们率先走进此时已排起长龙的队伍。入场后，我们在剧院中段区域找好座位，为适应前排观众的身高还调换了几次位置。灯光暗下，《小玩意》直接开演了。（或许前面还有部短片？我记不确切了。）影片是法语对白，配有英文字幕。 我对那些对白只有模糊的印象；事实上，我记不起任何具体的词句，虽然我确实记得角色们在说话。这种模糊感同样适用于字幕——当我跟不上法语对白时，会偷偷瞥上几眼。至于电影中的音乐，我完全没有记忆——甚至不确定是否有配乐存在。与此形成鲜明对比的是，我对开场画面保留着异常鲜活的视觉记忆：一群放学的孩子沿着下坡路奔跑回家的场景。另外两个片段也在我的回忆中格外突出：一个婴儿从高层公寓（二十九楼？）窗口坠落的画面，以及那位男教师（连同片中所有人物的名字我都已遗忘）在课堂上激昂地讲述儿童虐待问题的场景。穿插在这些鲜明记忆之间的，是一系列较为模糊的片段：从相对清晰的（虐待儿童的母亲的行为）到相当朦胧的（比如教室里孩子们的朗诵）。 当我回忆这段参差不齐且不完整的电影情节序列时，发现自己同时也在记起孩子们对这部电影持续不断的反应。我无法详细记起他们
behavior in detail but only as a kind of generalized response consisting of laughing, whispered questions, outright comments, and the like. These reactions are as intrinsic to the memory as is the unfolding of the film itself; so too is the mixture of pleasure and exasperation which I felt in being located, as it were, between children and film. Suddenly my memory of Small Change comes to an end: the lights go up, and we leave through a side exit near us, overhearing expressions of amusement and satisfaction from those around us as we walk out into the night. 的具体行为，只记得一种概括性的回应——包括笑声、低声的提问、直白的评论等等。这些反应与电影情节的展开一样，都是记忆的内在组成部分；同样内在的还有我当时那种介于愉悦与恼怒之间的复杂感受，仿佛自己正处在孩子与电影的夹缝中。突然间，我对《小玩意》的记忆戛然而止：灯光亮起，我们从附近的侧门离开，走入夜色时，耳边还萦绕着周围观众愉悦满足的交谈声。
REMARKS 备注
(1) Notice, to begin with, how this memory comes structured into several major episodes-meeting for dinner; waiting to get into the theater; watching the film (itself subdivided into a discontinuous series of scenes); leaving the theater. These episodes serve both as points of punctuation (as places of greatest interest or stress) and as interconnected components of the memory as a narratized whole. Nevertheless, the details remain indefinite in many respects, e.g., as to just when I saw the film, the role of music in it, the precise content of my children’s remarks, etc. 首先注意到，这段记忆如何被结构化为几个主要片段——共进晚餐；等待进入剧院；观看电影（其本身又细分为一系列不连续的场景）；离开剧院。这些片段既充当了记忆的标点符号（作为最引人注目或紧张的部分），又作为叙事整体的相互关联组成部分。然而，许多细节仍不明确，例如我具体何时观看这部电影、音乐在其中的作用、孩子们评论的确切内容等。
(2) It is evident that the nature of this indefiniteness differs significantly from that found in the Yosemite memory. Where in the latter instance, the exact year and month were in doubt, now it is the exact day that is in question: the recentness of the experience has narrowed the range of indefiniteness as to its date. Moreover, unlike the memory of Yosemite, in this new memory a number of intermediate incidents serve to bridge the gaps between the major events recalled and thus make what was remembered a more continuous whole. The effect of this increased continuity is that the main episodes are somewhat less dominant; the felt “surface” of the memory is smoother and gives rise to an account that, having fewer lacunae, is significantly closer to a continuous narration or retelling. In addition, the greater availability of detail in the Small Change memory manifests itself in an augmented describability of any given incident or episode. The dinner just before the movie, for example, could have been set forth in considerably more detail: what was eaten, in what order, what the subject of conversation was, which other customers were present, etc. Where the detail given in my actual description above is detail in extenso-drawing together diverse parts of the memory-the detail recalled in this description is detail in pleno, that is, detail that deepens the high points of cursory recollection. (2) 显然，这种不确定性的性质与优胜美地记忆中的情况截然不同。后者对具体年份和月份存疑，而如今存疑的则是具体日期：由于经历时间较近，日期不确定性的范围已大幅缩小。此外，与优胜美地记忆不同，在这段新记忆中，若干中间事件填补了主要回忆事件之间的空白，从而使记忆内容呈现出更强的连续性。这种增强的连续性带来的效果是，主要情节的支配性有所减弱；记忆的感知"表面"更为平滑，产生的叙述因缺失更少而更接近连续的故事讲述。另外，《零钱》记忆中细节的更高可及性，体现在对任何特定事件或情节的描述能力显著增强。例如，观影前的晚餐本可以被描述得更为详尽：吃了什么、上菜顺序、谈话主题、在场其他顾客等等。 在我上述实际描述中提供的细节是延伸性细节——将记忆的不同部分串联起来——而这一描述中回忆起的细节则是充实性细节，即深化了粗略回忆高潮点的细节。
(3) One of the most revealing features of this memorial experience is that of “memory-within-memory.” By this I mean that the memory as a whole includes a portion, i.e., that occupied by the movie, which could very well be remembered alone and in isolation from the rest of the experience. Frequently, in fact, we speak of “remembering a movie” in such a way as to mean a memory of the movie by itself, that is, what we perceived on the screen in isolation from associated experiences of viewing it, going to see it (3) 这种记忆体验最具启示性的特征之一是"记忆中的记忆"。我指的是，作为整体的记忆包含了一个部分（即电影占据的部分），这部分完全可以被单独记住，并与体验的其他部分分离。事实上，我们经常以"记住一部电影"的方式谈论，意思就是单独记住电影本身，即我们在屏幕上感知到的内容，与观看它、前往影院等关联体验相分离。
in the first place, etc. This strict memory of the movie itself is highly developed in film critics and film buffs, to the point that a mere mention of a title is capable of triggering a quite intact and accurate recollection of an entire sequence of scenes. (In my case, I fell far short of such full recollection.) Often, however, the memory of the movie (whether partial or full) will be embedded within a more encompassing memory that includes details not directly related to the movie itself. This occurs in the memory under examination-which exhibits the further feature of embedding a “movie-within-the-movie” within the memory as a whole. ^(5){ }^{5} Such compounding and double compounding of memory components presents no problem in principle, for it signifies only that within a given remembered experience there may be parts (and parts of parts) that can be recalled separately and without reference to the original experience in which they were situated. 首先，这种对电影本身的严格记忆在影评人和影迷中高度发达，以至于仅提及片名就能触发对整段场景相当完整且准确的回忆（就我而言，远未达到这种完整回忆）。然而，对电影的记忆（无论是部分还是全部）往往会被嵌入一个更广泛的记忆中，其中包含与电影本身无直接关联的细节。这种情况出现在被考察的记忆中——它展现出将"电影中的电影"作为嵌套结构融入整体记忆的更深层特征。 ^(5){ }^{5} 这种记忆成分的复合与双重复合原则上并不构成问题，因为它仅意味着在某个被记住的体验中，可能存在可以独立回忆的部分（以及部分的组成部分），而无需参照它们所处的原始体验。
(4) What is more problematic, however, is the fact that during the movie portion of my memory there was, in addition to a memory of the film as such and of my silent experiencing of it, a distinct memory of my children reacting to the movie by speech and gestures. The result is what we may call a “two-track” memory, a memory with two foci or epicenters. Does this mean that I have two different, but simultaneous, memories-or a single, but internally bifurcated, memory? In my original description I said that the two centers of attention arose “at the same time.” Nonetheless, I am not able to focus, with exactly equal concentration, on the two events in remembering them. Both are intrinsic and valid components of my recollection-to this extent we need not resort to two rememberings-yet one must be peripheral if the other is central to my attention and vice-versa. The two-track, and theoretically the n-track, character of remembering is therefore found in its capacity to be multiply, though unequally, focused within a given segment or part. 然而更成问题的是，在我这段电影记忆里，除了对电影本身的记忆以及我默然体验的记忆外，还鲜明地存在着孩子们通过言语和动作对电影作出反应的记忆。这就形成了我们可称之为"双轨记忆"的现象——一个具有两个焦点或震中的记忆。这是否意味着我拥有两个不同但同步的记忆，抑或是一个内部存在分叉的单一记忆？在最初的描述中，我提到这两个注意中心是"同时出现"的。但当我回忆时，却无法以完全同等的专注度聚焦于这两个事件。二者都是我记忆中固有且有效的组成部分——就此而言我们无需诉诸双重记忆——然而当其中一个成为我注意力的中心时，另一个必然处于边缘位置，反之亦然。因此记忆的双轨性（理论上可扩展为多轨性）特质，就体现在其能在特定记忆片段中实现多重却不均衡的聚焦。
(5) Another kind of multiplicity is also inherent in this instance of remembering. Such multiplicity derives from the fact that I have attended many movies in the same Lincoln Theater in which I viewed Small Change. It is difficult to believe that my previous viewings did not influence my present remembering in some fashion. In particular, they have so familiarized me with this theater and with viewing films in it that my remembering of a film seen recently there did not need to include any reference to the theater itself, its interior or exterior, or to the way it feels to be seated inside while watching a movie there. All of this circumambient detail was taken for granted; it is not un-remembered or forgotten, but rather so pervasively certain that it does not have to be explicitly represented in the manifest content of my present memory, thereby no doubt serving interests of economy and selectivity. (5) 这一记忆实例中还蕴含着另一种多重性。这种多重性源于我曾在观看《小玩意》的同一家林肯剧院观赏过许多电影。很难相信先前的观影经历不会以某种方式影响当前的记忆活动。特别是，这些经历使我对这家剧院及其观影体验如此熟悉，以至于回忆近期在此观看的某部电影时，已无需刻意提及剧院本身——无论是其内部装潢、外部建筑，还是置身其中观影时的感受。所有这些周边细节都被视为理所当然；它们并非未被记住或遗忘，而是因其无所不在的确定性，无需在当前记忆的显性内容中明确呈现，这无疑符合记忆的经济性与选择性原则。
(6) Finally, I want to consider a variation on the above-reported experience, namely, that I remembered this experience of remembering itself a day after the remembrance originally occurred. My recollection of going to (6) 最后，我想探讨上述经历的一个变体：在原初记忆发生一天后，我又回忆起了这段记忆活动本身。关于去往...
the movie occurred yesterday. Today, I can remember that experience of remembering. Not only is such remembering of remembering possible, but the result is curiously comparable to what was just termed the “two-track” effect of contrasting but concurrent features within a given memory. On the one hand, I find that I can indeed call back the original memory as suchthat is, the very same mnemonic content as I first described it-but that this content is now present to my mind in a considerably more condensed or schematic form. Only the primary episodes of the original experience come back to mind, e.g., standing in line, being seated in the theater, a few major scenes from the film. Even these episodes appear in such a scanty form that I am tempted to say that I am presenting myself with a digest of the memoryas if my mind were declaring: “no need to run through all of this memory in detail again; here is a convenient summary of the most crucial contents.” On the other hand, there is now, a day later, an entirely new phenomenon, namely, a memory specifically of my yesterday’s activity of remembering. This new memory does not force itself on me; it is an essential possibility, something that II can activate if II so wish. If II do, II suddenly have an image of myself at my desk, bent over a yellow legal pad on which I am writing in rapt absorption. This image, which does not develop, is accompanied by the half-articulate thought “myself-recounting-a-recent-memory.” There is something peremptory and programmatic about this last remembering. Moreover, I soon discover that I cannot effect the remembering proper and the re-remembering simultaneously: either I remember myself remembering yesterday or I remember the memory that I remembered at that time. 那部电影是昨天看的。今天，我还能回想起当时观影的记忆过程。这种对记忆行为的再记忆不仅可能实现，其效果还奇妙地类似于前文所说的"双轨效应"——即在特定记忆中共存却形成对比的特征。一方面，我发现确实能原原本本地召回初始记忆，即与我最初描述的完全相同的记忆内容，但这些内容如今以更为凝练或概要的形式呈现。只有原始经历的主要片段会浮现在脑海：排队等候、在影院入座、影片中的几个重要场景。即便是这些片段也显得如此简略，让我不禁觉得是在给自己呈现一份记忆摘要——仿佛大脑在宣告："没必要再详细重温整段记忆了，这里是最关键内容的便捷概要。"另一方面，时隔一日后出现了全新现象：即对昨日记忆活动的特异性记忆。 这段新记忆并非强行闯入我的意识；它是一种本质可能性，是 II 在 II 愿意时可以激活的存在。若 II 选择这么做， II 会突然浮现自己伏案疾书的画面——弓着背，全神贯注地在黄色法律便签上书写。这个静止不动的画面伴随着半成形的念头"正在复述近期记忆的自己"。最后的这次回忆带着某种专断和程式化的意味。此外，我很快发现无法同时完成原始记忆与二次回忆：要么回忆昨天正在回忆的自己，要么回忆当时所记起的内容。
Example #3 示例三
I am discussing with my neighbor the possibility of having a water softener installed in my house. Suddenly the single word “Culligan” comes to mind. I immediately realize that this is the brand name of the water softener that was situated in the basement of my childhood home. Along with this instantaneous recognition, and persisting for a few moments afterward, come very indistinct images of that basement and of a Culligan service truck. 我正在与邻居讨论安装家用软水机的可能性。突然"Culligan"这个词跃入脑海。我立刻意识到这是童年家中地下室那台软水机的品牌名称。伴随着这个瞬间的认知，随后几秒内持续浮现出那个地下室和 Culligan 服务卡车的模糊影像。
REMARKS 备注
The very brevity of this example lends itself to a thorough description of its structure, a structure which is at the same time quite lacunary. 这个例子的极简特性使其结构得以被完整描述，尽管该结构本身仍存在不少空白。
(1) Its mode of emergence is striking. The word “Culligan” and the memory-images associated with it arose not just spontaneously-i.e., without effort or rehearsal, as in the previous two instances-but suddenly. So suddenly in fact that it took me quite by surprise, finding me unprepared for this semi-startling event. Beyond the suddenness, what contributed to the sense of being startled was the fact that I had not consciously thought of the proper name “Culligan” or of the water softener in my boyhood home for a very long time-certainly not since the home was sold, which was some (1) 其浮现方式令人惊异。"Culligan"这个词及其相关记忆影像不仅自发浮现——即如之前两个例子般无需费力或复述——更是骤然涌现。事实上它来得如此突然，完全出乎我的意料，让我对这略带惊吓的事件毫无准备。除却突然性，另一个令人惊愕的因素在于：我已经很久没有主动想起"库利根"这个专有名词，或是童年家中那台软水机了——自从老宅售出后肯定再未想起，那已是约
twelve years ago. Here is a case of a memory that, deriving from a fairly distant past period, has lacked direct reinforcement or repetition in the interval between that period and the present. 十二年前的事了。这个案例中的记忆源自相当久远的时期，在过往岁月与当下之间的漫长间隔里，它既未得到直接强化，也未曾重复出现。
(2) Equally striking were the duration and development of this momentary memory itself. It was indeed so momentary that there was very little sense of its unfolding as such. The word “Culligan” seemed to disappear almost as soon as it appeared. Even the images that accompanied it persisted so briefly as to be virtually untrackable. In neither case was there any sense of sequence, of one incident or episode leading to another as in the first two memories above. In fact, there were no incidents or episodes at all, nor was there anything like the consecutiveness characterizing memories that have a quasi-narrative structure. (2) 同样引人注目的是这段瞬时记忆本身的持续与发展过程。它确实转瞬即逝，以至于几乎感受不到其展开的轨迹。"Culligan"这个词几乎刚一出现就消失了。就连伴随它的图像也仅持续了极短时间，几乎无法追踪。这两种情况都不存在任何序列感，没有像前两个记忆那样由一件事引出另一件事的连贯性。事实上，这里根本不存在任何事件或情节，也不具备那些具有准叙事结构的记忆所特有的连续性特征。
(3) Also missing altogether was any felt self-presence, any sense that I was myself somehow involved in the content of the memory. Of course, my presence was presupposed insofar as I must have perceived the water softener in my childhood home, doubtlessly on many occasions. But there was not the slightest vestige of myself-as-previous-perceiver in the memory’s consciously entertained content. Nor were other persons present in this content: they too had vanished, leaving an utterly personless presentation of the past. (3) 完全缺失的还有任何自我在场的感受，即那种我本人以某种方式参与记忆内容的感觉。当然，我的存在是被预设的——毕竟我肯定在童年家中多次见过那个软水器。但在记忆有意识呈现的内容中，丝毫没有作为先前感知者的"我"的痕迹。这个记忆内容中也不存在其他人：他们都已消失，留下的是完全无人称的过往呈现。
(4) What was present, dominating this content, was the word “Culligan.” This word stands out, especially in contrast with the mostly muted role of language in the previous examples. Now language predominates, and it does so in a highly specified form. The fact that “Culligan” is a proper name, the most particular and rigidly designating of noun forms, takes this specificity to its limit: there is (so far as one may reasonably guess) only one brand of water softener called “Culligan.” By the same token, to remember precisely this word is itself the most economical and direct way of referring to the object of this memory, namely, the actual water softener in my parents’ basement. For in remembering “Culligan,” I am remembering not only the word but what it stands for-or more exactly, the word-as-standing-in-for the very thing which it designates. The memory constituted by “Culligan” is a memory mainly composed of one word, one thing: one word-thing. ^(6){ }^{6} (4) 当时占据记忆内容核心的是"Culligan"这个词。这个词尤为突出，与先前案例中语言大多处于次要地位形成鲜明对比。此刻语言占据了主导地位，且以高度具体化的形式呈现。"Culligan"作为专有名词——名词形式中最具特殊性且指称最固定的类型——将这种具体性推向极致：就合理推测而言，世界上只存在一个名为"Culligan"的水软化器品牌。同理，准确记住这个词本身，就是指向这段记忆对象（即我父母地下室那台真实的水软化器）最经济直接的方式。因为当我记起"Culligan"时，我不仅记住了这个词语，更记住了它所代表的对象——更准确地说，是记住了这个作为指代符号的词语本身与其所指代的具体事物。由"Culligan"构成的记忆，本质上是由一个词语、一个物体共同组成的记忆：一个词物合一的存在。 ^(6){ }^{6}
(5) “Mainly,” but not entirely so composed. For my memory, one-worded and transitory as it was, also included an imagistic component. The imagery was visual-as indeed the word was too. ^(7){ }^{7} “Visual” seems almost too strong, since the two images were so radically indistinct. The first was identifiably of a basement, though I could not precisely identify any details within the basement because of its shadowy nature. The second was still more diffuse: so diffuse that I could not say for sure that it was of the “Culligan truck,” as I tended to suppose. It might also-with equal plausibility and in the absence of definitive evidence to the contrary-have been of the “Culligan man” who actually serviced the water softener. It is due to just such imprecision that both images were able to play a framing role; they provided a nebulous （5）"主要"，但并非完全如此构成。因为我的记忆虽然短暂且仅由一个词组成，却也包含了意象成分。这些意象是视觉性的——实际上那个词本身也是视觉性的。"视觉性"这个说法似乎有些过于强烈，因为这两个意象都极其模糊。第一个可辨识为地下室，但由于其阴暗特性，我无法准确辨认地下室的任何细节。第二个则更加朦胧：朦胧到我无法确定它是否如我倾向于认为的那样是"卡利根卡车"。它同样可能——在缺乏确凿反证的情况下具有同等可能性——是那个实际维护软水机的"卡利根服务人员"。正是这种不精确性，使得两个意象都能起到框架作用；它们提供了一个模糊的
setting within which the much more distinct word-thing “Culligan” could stand out. At the same time, I suspect that it is also due to their indistinctness that they seemed to linger slightly longer in my memory, as if calling for a scrutiny that might overcome their very vagueness. 背景，让更为清晰的词物"卡利根"得以凸显。同时我猜想，正是由于它们的模糊性，才使它们在我的记忆中停留得稍久一些，仿佛在呼唤某种能够克服其模糊本质的细致审视。
(6) There is a last noteworthy feature of this memory experience. This is its direct precipitation by the immediately surrounding situation-a situation that is much more intrinsically involved in the remembering than in the preceding two cases. Each of those arose from a largely indifferent contextin each instance idle musing at my desk. But in the present case I was in the midst of discussing water softeners when I so abruptly and swiftly recalled the water softener of my youth. Instead of unfolding before me on its own (an unfolding that may itself be a function of the very lack of specific context), ^(8){ }^{8} it seemed by its very condensed and cursory quality to be a mere response to the ongoing discussion-to be its momentary addendum or appendage, a kind of comment on it. Hence its wholly involuntary character and its suddenness. Hence too its lack of detailed content or continuous development as well as its conspicuous datelessness. It served more as an interjection, a precipitous exclamation, than as a revival or scanning of the past: if it was from the past, it did not seem to be of the past in any sustained or sustainable manner. （6）这一记忆体验还有最后一个值得注意的特征。它是由周遭情境直接触发的——这一情境与前两个案例相比，更本质地参与了记忆过程。前两次回忆都产生于近乎漠然的情境中，即每次伏案时的随意遐想。但此刻当我突然且迅速地忆起年少时的软水器时，我正在讨论软水设备的话题。它并非自主地在我面前徐徐展开（这种展开本身或许正是缺乏具体情境的体现）， ^(8){ }^{8} 其极度凝练和仓促的特质，使它更像是针对当下讨论的即时反应——成为话题的临时补充或附属品，一种对讨论的注解。因此它具有完全非自愿的特性和突发性。也因此它缺乏细节内容或连续性发展，并显著缺失时间标记。它更像是一句插话、一声急促的感叹，而非对往昔的复苏或检视：即便它来自过去，也似乎未能以任何持久或可持续的方式归属于过去。
Example #4 示例四
I was just-a moment ago-sipping a cup of tea and eating a piece of fruitbread. I now remember this event as if it were still present. The taste of the tea seems to be still in my mouth; it is slightly astringent and tempered only by the sugar I had put into it. Its smell simultaneously pervades my nose. Also, my very gulping-both the feel within my mouth and throat and the dim internal sound-is a distinctly lingering presence. The flavor of blackberries in the fruitbread and the bread’s familiar texture are just as present, though in a somewhat more muted form. At the same time, I am aware of the peculiar wailing sound of a garbage truck crushing its new load of garbage somewhere beneath my tower office. And a dim visual impression of my desk, the tea cup, and the fruitbread in a plastic bag stays on as I write these words. 方才——就在片刻之前——我正啜饮着一杯茶，吃着水果面包。此刻忆起这一幕，恍如仍在眼前。茶水的涩味似乎仍萦绕舌尖，仅凭我加入的方糖稍加调和；茶香同时弥漫在我的鼻息间。就连吞咽时的感受——口腔与喉咙的触感，以及体内隐约的声响——都化作挥之不去的鲜明存在。水果面包中黑莓的滋味与熟悉的面包质地同样真切可感，只是略显朦胧。与此同时，我觉察到垃圾车在塔楼办公室下方碾轧新装垃圾时发出的独特哀鸣。当我写下这些文字时，书桌、茶杯与装在塑料袋里的水果面包那模糊的视觉印象仍挥之不去。
REMARKS 备注
(1) This memory is still less of the past than was the case in the last example. Indeed, we may even wonder if its content stems from the past in any strict sense. The experience remembered was not only closely juxtaposed to my act of remembering (the lapse of time between the two was no more than one minute) but appeared to persist into the very act of remem-brance-into the present in which remembering was taking place. There was no sense of revival or retrieval, since the remembered content was already available to my apprehension. Or more exactly, still available, for the experi- (1) 这段记忆与先前例子相比更少属于过去。事实上，我们甚至怀疑其内容是否严格意义上源自过去。被回忆的体验不仅与我的回忆行为紧密相连（两者间隔不超过一分钟），更似乎持续延伸至回忆行为本身——延伸至回忆正在发生的当下。这里不存在复苏或检索的感受，因为记忆内容早已存在于我的感知之中。更准确地说，它依然存在着，因为这段经...
ence had never faded fully from view. If it was past, it was part of a past which was continuous with the new present of the activity of remembering: just as the latter was thereby deepened, so the former was correspondingly lengthened. 记忆从未完全从视野中消退。如果它已成为过去，那也是与当下记忆活动紧密相连的过去：正如后者因此得以深化，前者也相应地得以延伸。
(2) In contrast with all of the experiences so far reported, which have been predominately visual and secondarily verbal, this experience was genuinely synesthetic, involving all of the primary senses. Not only was there sight (of my desk and a few objects on it), but taste (of the tea and the fruitbread), touch (in relation to the texture of the bread and the feel of the tea in my mouth), smell (a faint aroma of the tea in my nostrils), and hearing (both internal and external: my gulping and the garbage truck). What is most striking in this pluri-sensorial situation is that all of these sensory modalities were operative together. Each had its own distinctiveness and clarity, and none was markedly subordinate to the others. Indeed, if any single modality was slightly subordinate, it was the visual one: I thought of the visual arrangement last, and it contained only a few barely sketched items. Thus the usual preeminence of vision in long-term memory-as exhibited in the way in which the euphonious word “Culligan” became almost entirely a visual phenomenon upon recollection-is supplanted and even reversed in this instance, where all sensory modalities are given expression. (2) 与之前报告的所有以视觉为主、言语为辅的体验不同，这次经历是真正的联觉体验，涉及所有基础感官。不仅有视觉（看到我的书桌和上面几件物品），还有味觉（茶水和水果面包的味道）、触觉（面包的质地与茶水在口腔中的感受）、嗅觉（鼻腔中淡淡的茶香）以及听觉（内外兼具：我的吞咽声和垃圾车的声响）。这种多重感官情境最显著的特征在于，所有感官模式都在同步运作。每种感官都具有独特的清晰度，没有哪一种明显从属于其他感官。事实上，若要说哪种感官略显次要，反倒是视觉：我最后才想起视觉场景，且其中只包含几样粗略勾勒的物品。因此，长期记忆中通常以视觉为主导的现象——正如回忆时"卡利根"这个悦耳词汇几乎完全转化为视觉现象所展示的那样——在此案例中被颠覆甚至逆转，所有感官模式都获得了平等表达。
(3) What we witness here, then, is a case of genuinely multi-modal remembering. Whereas previously, two sensory modes (i.e., visual and verbal) had presented themselves in a single memory and were not fully simultaneous, now, several are present at once. Moreover, at least three of these are experienced as strictly simultaneous with one another: the taste, smell, and touch sensations caused by the tea. These sensations do not form the content of separate memories but present themselves as components of one and the same memory. Within this memory, they are inseparable but distinguishable from each other. (3) 因此，我们在此见证的是一种真正多模态的记忆现象。此前，两种感官模式（即视觉与言语）虽曾出现在同一记忆中，却并未完全同步；而此刻，多种感官模式同时呈现。更值得注意的是，其中至少有三种感官体验被严格同步感知：茶饮引发的味觉、嗅觉与触觉。这些感受并非构成独立记忆的内容，而是作为同一记忆的组成部分呈现。在这段记忆中，它们既密不可分，又彼此泾渭分明。
(4) Notably absent from this experience are any of the emotions or moods that so frequently attach themselves to long-term remembering: nostalgia, remorse, or even the peculiar pleasure that characterized two of the examples described earlier. There was a certain sensation of pleasure which lingered from the agreeable taste of the tea and fruitbread, but this is not to be confused with the special pleasure of recalling this taste at a subsequent point. Pleasure at tasting is not at all the same pleasure as pleasure in remembering this tasting, even though the former can itself be remembered with pleasure. （4）值得注意的是，这种体验中完全缺失了那些常与长期记忆相伴的情绪或心境：怀旧、悔恨，乃至前文两个例子中特有的那种奇特愉悦感。茶点与水果面包带来的美妙滋味确实残留着某种愉悦感受，但这绝不能与事后回忆这种滋味时的特殊愉悦混为一谈。品尝时的愉悦与回忆这次品尝的愉悦截然不同——尽管前者本身也能被愉快地记起。
(5) It should be stressed that an example such as this would not normally be an object of attention or description; in fact, it might not even be considered a case of remembering at all! This experience occurs so frequently and yet so unobtrusively that we tend to pass it over as inconsequential or as the mere “rearward portion of the present space of time.” ^(9){ }^{9} But when we do attend to it, we realize that it is an essential and distinctive form of （5）必须强调的是，这类事例通常不会成为关注或描述的对象；事实上，人们甚至可能不认为这属于记忆范畴！此类体验发生得如此频繁却又如此不引人注目，以致我们往往将其视为无足轻重，或仅仅是"当下时间流中向后延伸的部分"。 ^(9){ }^{9} 但当我们真正关注它时，便会意识到这是一种本质独特
remembering-“primary memory,” as psychologists from James to contemporary researchers have called it. ^(10){ }^{10} We shall return to this point in more detail in chapter 3. For now it is sufficient to note that the mere fact that a description of the present example was possible-and that it included features not evident in previous descriptions-bears out the importance of regarding this kind of remembering as worthy of further study. 记忆——从詹姆斯到当代心理学家所称的"初级记忆"。 ^(10){ }^{10} 我们将在第三章更详细地讨论这一点。目前只需注意到，仅凭能够描述当前这个例子——且该描述包含先前描述中未显现的特征——就足以证明将此类记忆视为值得进一步研究的重要性。
Example #5 示例五
I have been talking on the telephone with an acquaintance. We agree to meet at my office before going to lunch together. He asks, “What is the number on your office door?” Without hesitation I answer “902.” 我正与一位熟人在电话中交谈。我们约定共进午餐前先在我的办公室碰面。他问道："你办公室门牌号是多少？"我不假思索地回答："902。"
REMARKS 评注
(1) This banal example, of which there are many equivalents in everyday life, nevertheless illustrates a fundamental form in which remembering often occurs. Every time we remember that 6xx8=486 \times 8=48, our home address, our ages, our social security numbers, and so on indefinitely, we enact such remembering of basic information. The acquisition of this information typically arises from sheer repetition, as in the rote memorizing of multiplication tables or the routine of providing our social security number. In the present instance, I learned my office number through simple habituation; I have resided there for five years and thus have perceived " 902 " innumerable times on entering; and I have given this same number to others on countless occasions. The effect of such repetition is to make “902” a quasi-permanent part of my empirical knowledge. Even should I leave this office, I suspect that I will not lose this item of information for quite some time. (1) 这个平凡的例子——日常生活中存在诸多类似情形——却揭示了一种记忆发生的基本形式。每当我们记起电话号码、家庭住址、年龄、社保号码等基础信息时，都在进行这种记忆行为。这类信息的获取通常源于纯粹重复，比如死记硬背乘法表或反复提供社保号码。就我而言，办公室号码是通过简单习惯获得的；我在此办公五年，进门时无数次看到"902"这个数字；也曾在无数场合向他人告知这个号码。这种重复效应使"902"成为我经验知识中近乎永恒的部分。即便日后离开这间办公室，我猜想这项信息仍会长存于记忆中。
(2) It is just because such an item has been so fully acquired and so thoroughly sedimented into my present stock of knowledge that I retrieve it so effortlessly and spontaneously. Like my own name, albeit to a lesser degree, it has become part of my memorial repertoire-so much a part that I need not search for it, or reflect upon it, when asked to specify it. The result is a peculiar emptiness in the experience of recalling it. When someone inquires about my office, I come up with the correct identification immediately: " 902 " springs to mind so unfailingly that there is no sense of residuum or unfulfillment. The number fills my mind so completely as to leave it blank in other regards, i.e., with respect to emotion, sense of suspense, etc. The very success of such a cut-and-dried case as this renders otiose various concomitant or contextual factors that might otherwise be prominently present-e.g., a certain melancholic mood I experience in remembering my boarding school days. (2)正因为这类信息已被充分掌握并彻底沉淀为我现有知识储备的一部分，我才能如此不费吹灰之力、自然而然地将其回想起来。它就像我的名字一样（尽管程度稍逊），已成为我记忆库中的固定组成部分——熟悉到在被要求具体说明时，我根本无需搜寻或思考。这导致回忆过程呈现出一种奇特的空洞感。当有人询问我的办公室号码时，我会立即给出正确答案："902"这个数字总是分毫不差地跃入脑海，没有残留感或未完成感。这个数字如此彻底地占据我的意识，以至于在其他方面——比如情绪或悬念感上——反而使思维呈现空白状态。这种板上钉钉的成功回忆案例，使得各种本可能显著存在的伴随因素或情境因素（例如回忆寄宿学校时光时体验到的某种忧郁情绪）变得毫无必要。
(3) If we compare the present example with the last two, we notice that all three arose instantaneously and in an unsolicited fashion. Moreover, in particular contrast with the first two examples, there was in the last instance no further development of the initial presentation-no sequel, however （3）若将当前案例与前两例相比较，我们会注意到三者都是瞬间且自发产生的。此外，与前两例形成鲜明对比的是，最后一个案例中最初的呈现并未进一步发展——没有任何后续演变
brief or inconsequential. But the instance of " 902 " is to be distinguished from that of “Culligan” and of my tea-tasting by the fact that, unlike these two, it has no particular point of anchorage in the past. My memory of tea-tasting was based on a particular experience of the moment before; and, although “Culligan” was acquired by repetition, that memory had a firm base in a fully determinate past period in my life which it even symbolized in part. “902” may someday gain the same status-perhaps by signifying my years of teaching in a particular place-but at present it has the very different status of being an item of information about my current environment, an environment which is not yet fixed and finished in the manner of my childhood years. Thus there is a peculiar lack of discrete referentiality to the past in the memory of “902,” which in this respect (though perhaps only in this respect) resembles the memory of a recurrent fantasy whose origin we cannot determine: both seem to float upon a sea of temporal indifference. 短暂或不重要。但"902"这个例子与"Culligan"以及我品茶的记忆不同，因为与前两者相比，它在过去没有特定的锚定点。我对品茶的记忆基于之前某个特定时刻的体验；而虽然"Culligan"是通过重复获得的记忆，但它牢固地根植于我生命中一段完全确定的过去时期，甚至部分象征着那段时期。"902"或许某天会获得同样的地位——可能通过象征我在特定地点任教的岁月——但目前它具有非常不同的状态：作为关于我当前环境的一条信息，这个环境尚未像我童年岁月那样固定和完结。因此"902"的记忆中存在一种特殊的、对过去离散指涉的缺失，在这方面（也许仅在这方面）它类似于我们对某个反复出现的幻想的记忆——那种我们无法确定起源的幻想：两者都仿佛漂浮在时间无差别性的海洋上。
Example #6 示例 6
For the first time in over a year I enter a pair of connecting rooms housing philosophy books. It is late in the evening; no one else is present. Suddenly I am overcome by memories of former visits to these rooms situated high in the stacks of Sterling Library and overlooking the university below. These memories are not wholly distinct from each other and they seem to gravitate around a central memory of having worked on an article in this very place in evenings several summers ago. I try to think of which article I was writing then and which summer it was. The latter is easily inferred from the fact that my evening vigils in the library took place during the only summer in which I lived in New Haven near the library itself: 1969. But it proves more difficult to determine which article I was working on, since I was writing several closely related essays at that time. By process of elimination this narrows the field to two or three candidates, and I have a strong suspicion, though no strong conviction, that the article in question was entitled “Man, Self, and Truth.” As if to confirm this hunch, a quite explicit memory of studying Brentano’s The True and the Evident-of sitting at a certain table in this very room and taking notes on Brentano’s book-comes suddenly to mind, and I feel reassured that my guess is correct. 时隔一年多，我再次踏入那两间相连的哲学藏书室。夜深人静，四下无人。突然，关于斯特林图书馆高层书库的记忆汹涌而来——那些俯瞰整座大学的房间，我曾多次造访。这些记忆彼此交融，仿佛都围绕着某个核心场景旋转：几年前某个夏夜，我正是在此处伏案撰写文章。我试图回忆当时所写的究竟是哪篇文章，又发生在哪个夏天。后者倒不难推断——1969 年，那是我唯一住在纽黑文图书馆附近的夏季，夜夜在此研读。但要确定当时所写的文章却颇为困难，因那时我同时在撰写数篇主题相近的论文。 通过排除法，这个范围缩小到两三个备选对象。我虽无十足把握，却强烈怀疑那篇文章的标题是《人、自我与真理》。仿佛为了印证这个直觉，一段关于研读布伦塔诺《真与明证》的清晰记忆——就坐在这间屋子某张桌前做笔记的画面——突然浮现在脑海，这让我确信自己的猜测是正确的。
REMARKS 备注
(1) This is a sample of what we might call a place memory. ^(11){ }^{11} It is very strictly tied to a particular place, and it emerged only when I returned to that very place. Thus it is at once a memory of a given place (as was the Yosemite memory) and a memory occurring in that place (which was not the case with the Yosemite memory). This place, in other words, evoked memories of itself-of one and the same place as frequented at various times. The result is a sense of stability and self-replication in the experience; the two rooms are somehow doubly present: present as perceived and (1) 这段记忆可称为场所记忆的典型样本。它严格绑定于特定场所，唯有重返该地时才被唤醒。因此它既是对某场所的记忆（如同约塞米蒂记忆），又是在该场所中发生的记忆（这点与约塞米蒂记忆不同）。换言之，这个场所唤起了关于其自身的记忆——关于同一空间在不同时段被使用的记忆。这种体验产生了某种稳定性与自我复现感：两个房间以双重方式在场——既作为被感知的场所呈现，
present as remembered, but in each case the selfsame rooms. Reinforcing this perduring character of the experience is the impression that by merely being back in these rooms I had gone halfway to meet memories of them. This is more than a matter of bare recognition, which could have been possible by simply looking at a photograph. It is rather a situation in which my actual revisiting of the physical rooms themselves was itself revisited by memories of previous visitings. The latter would not, I think, have made the impact they did unless I had been bodily present there. 作为记忆中的存在重现，但始终是那些相同的房间。强化这种体验持久性的是这样一种印象：仅仅回到这些房间，我就已经与关于它们的记忆相遇了一半。这不仅仅是简单的辨认——单凭一张照片也可能做到——而是一种情境：我对实体房间的实际重访本身，又被过往造访的记忆所重访。我认为，若非亲身在场，后者不会产生如此深刻的影响。
(2) A curious and yet characteristic feature of this experience is the arousal of a number of memories that were fused with one another in an amorphous mass. Since they did not present themselves as separate memories, it is convenient to think of them as “semi-memories.” I call them this merely on the basis that, while they do make reference to former experiences in the rooms in question, they do so only by conveying fragmentary details of these experiences (e.g., “once helping to shelve books here,” “being unable to find a copy of some journal here,” “being frustrated by the others who were talking here,” etc., none of which presents itself as a complete memory in itself). What is most striking about such semi-memories is not their occurrence as such but the way in which they merge to form an overall sense of having-been-in-these-rooms-before-on-many-occasions. Diffuse as it is, this is a genuine mnemonic experience. It is the sort of experience we have whenever we say that the past returns to haunt us in a certain place, pervading the present in a somewhat insidious and less than wholly definite form. （2）这种体验有一个奇特却又典型的特征：它会唤起许多相互交融、混作一团的记忆。由于这些记忆并非以独立形态呈现，不妨将其视为"半记忆"。我如此命名仅仅基于以下事实：虽然它们确实指向那些房间里曾经的经历，但仅通过传递这些经历的零碎片段来实现（例如"曾在这里帮忙整理过书架"、"在这里找不到某本期刊"、"被在此交谈的其他人惹恼"等等，没有哪段能自成完整记忆）。这类半记忆最引人注目的并非其存在本身，而是它们如何交融形成一种"曾多次到访这些房间"的整体感受。尽管模糊不清，这确是一种真实的记忆体验。每当我们说"过往在某个地方萦绕心头"，让当下弥漫着某种隐秘而不甚明确的形式时，体验到的正是这类感受。
(3) It was just such a pervasive, unpinpointed past that gave my remembering its nostalgic cast on this occasion. I was not simply remembering for the sake of remembering, much less for any utilitarian purpose. I was quite overcome, emotionally moved, by these revenants of a comparatively calm and productive period of my past. Their very return signified to me that this period no longer existed, and was not likely to be repeated in the future. Although I was indeed back in the same place, I could not work there again as I had once done-in carefree and yet committed abandon, heedless of the uncertain future ahead. My nostalgia reflected this implicit knowledge of unrepeatability, the conviction of not being able to recapture this portion of the past fully: the recognition that it can be represented, but not repeated. The very flooding back of these memories brings with it the tacit acknowledgment that the experiences they recapture are unique and not to be undergone again as such. Hence my nostalgia: it is just insofar as they are unrepeatable that these remembered times beckon so movingly and powerfully to me in the present. (3)正是这种无处不在却又难以名状的过往，为此刻的回忆蒙上了一层怀旧的色彩。我并非单纯为回忆而回忆，更非出于任何功利目的。那些来自相对平静而多产岁月的身影重现时，我完全被情绪淹没了。它们的归来本身就向我昭示：那段时光已不复存在，未来也难再重现。虽然我确实回到了原地，却无法像从前那样工作——那种无忧无虑又全情投入的恣意状态，全然不顾前方未卜的前途。这份怀旧情绪正折射出对不可复现性的潜在认知：我们确信无法完整重获这段过去，只能再现其形，不可复现其实。记忆洪流涌回的瞬间，就悄然承认了它们所唤起的体验具有独特性，无法原样重历。怀旧之情由此而生：正因为这些回忆中的时光不可复现，它们才在当下如此动人而有力地召唤着我。
(4) In contradistinction to the loose aura of miscellaneous semi-memories discussed just above was the much more distinct memory of having worked on a specific article in the library rooms. This latter memory emerged as a focus memorious around which the vaguer memories circulated. It seemed (4) 与上文讨论的混杂半记忆的松散氛围形成鲜明对比的，是我在图书馆阅览室撰写某篇具体文章的清晰记忆。这段记忆作为焦点记忆浮现，周围环绕着更为模糊的记忆片段。它似乎
at once the most important and the best organized of everything that I remembered, as if it were somehow the prototype of all my memories of these rooms. It possessed a significance and durability that the others lacked. It conveyed, in short, the single most memorable experience undergone in that particular place and, as such, was paradigmatic of my other experiences there. 既是我所有回忆中最重要的，也是组织得最完好的，仿佛在某种程度上成为了我对这些阅览室所有记忆的原型。它具备其他记忆所缺乏的意义和持久性。简言之，它传递了我在那个特定场所经历的最难忘体验，并因此成为我在该处其他经历的典范。
(5) Yet as I first received it, even this memory was by no means fully determinate in detail. I could discern only its general format, i.e., working-on-an-article-in-these-rooms. As a consequence, I had to search out further specification of it. At first, I resorted to inference: “it must have been in the summer of 1969 because”; and “it was certainly one of three or so articles which I was writing at that time.” Not only did these inferences seem valid in themselves, but they provided the setting for the sudden return of the confirming memory that I had studied Brentano’s The True and the Evident in these rooms at that time. This supported my hunch that I was working on “Man, Self, and Truth” because (and here was a final, seemingly certain inference) this latter article, in fact, discusses Brentano’s notion of truth. The result was that my central memory, thus filled out, became even more pivotal in my mind-so much so that as I reflect upon it now, several hours after the initial memory report was written, it still further obscures the peripheral memories. The very fact of my having searched for additional specification, and then having found it, acted to accentuate this particular memory, giving it a privileged position in relation to the other memories, which were vaguely specified to begin with and not further specified in the course of remembering. （5）然而，当我最初忆起时，即便是这段记忆也绝非细节分明。我只能辨认出它的基本轮廓，即"在这些房间里撰写文章"。因此，我不得不寻求更具体的细节。起初，我借助推理："那必定是 1969 年夏天，因为"；"肯定是当时正在撰写的三篇文章之一"。这些推论不仅本身看似合理，更为关键记忆的突然浮现提供了背景——当时我确实在这些房间研读过布伦塔诺的《真与明证》。这印证了我的直觉：我那时正在写《人、自我与真理》，因为（这是最后一个看似确凿的推论）该文实际上探讨了布伦塔诺的真理观。最终，这段经过充实的核心记忆在我脑海中变得愈发关键——以至于此刻，在最初记录记忆数小时后反思时，它仍使那些边缘记忆更加模糊难辨。 我寻找并最终获得更多细节这一事实，恰恰强化了这段特定记忆，使其相较于其他记忆获得了优先地位——那些记忆起初就定义模糊，且在回忆过程中也未被进一步明确。
The foregoing six samples of my recent remembering help us to appreciate at once the diversity and the mystery of memory. My mere “random groping” has not yet indicated anything like the “secure path” of reliable insight into the macrostructure of remembering. But it has revealed a phenomenon that proliferates before our very eyes, engendering many species with no single supreme genus. On close inspection, moreover, each of these species shows itself to have intrinsic peculiarities, microstructures that are paradoxical (e.g., memories-within-memories) or at least puzzling (e.g., semimemories). The mystery only deepens when we realize that we have few if any clues to the bodily basis of multisensory memories, or when we ponder the fact that the past need not be dated-or perhaps even be dateable-to be remembered. Clichés about “remembering the past” begin to sound hollow when we become aware that we can remember something even when the “past” remembered is not significantly separated from the present in which we are remembering; indeed, is immanent in it. In other words, the flora and fauna of remembering which we have encountered even in this cursory first engagement manifest themselves as quite exotic, despite the fact that they are drawn from the quotidian consciousness of one “approximately 上述六个关于我近期记忆的样本，让我们即刻领略到记忆的多样性与神秘性。我这种单纯的"随机摸索"尚未揭示出任何类似可靠洞察记忆宏观结构的"安全路径"。但它展现了一种在我们眼前不断增殖的现象，衍生出众多没有单一最高属类的物种。更细致观察时，这些物种中的每一个都显示出其内在特性——或是自相矛盾的微观结构（如记忆中的记忆），或至少令人困惑（如半记忆）。当我们意识到自己对多感官记忆的身体基础几乎毫无线索时，或是思索"过去无需被标注日期——甚至可能根本无法标注——却仍能被记住"这一事实时，这种神秘感只会愈发深邃。当我们发现即使所记的"过去"与进行回忆的"当下"并无显著时间间隔（实际上就内在于当下）时仍能记住某事，那些关于"记住过去"的陈词滥调便开始显得空洞。 换言之，即便我们在这初步的匆匆接触中所遇到的记忆动植物群，尽管它们源自某位"近似于
normal” ^(12){ }^{12} rememberer. There is no need to resort to the exceptional when the very memories that we are most familiar with and take most for granted involve an unsuspected complexity and, on this very basis, possess an uncommon interest. What more can we learn from such memories? To answer this question, we must move from a first immersion to an analysis of eidetic, structurally inherent, features. 正常的” ^(12){ }^{12} 记忆者。当我们最熟悉、最习以为常的记忆本身就蕴含着意想不到的复杂性，并因此具有非凡的意义时，就无需诉诸特例。从这些记忆中我们还能学到什么？要回答这个问题，我们必须从最初的沉浸转向对本质性、结构固有特征的分析。
II
EIDETIC FEATURES 本质特征
Let us consider which basic traits of remembering emerge from the brief tour of examples which we have just taken. I shall single out a series of these traits for mention and divide them into primary and secondary. Just as the examples themselves do not pretend to comprise anything like a comprehensive survey of remembering-crucial additions will be made in Parts Two and Three-so the traits discussed below are not intended to illuminate human memory in its entirety. They are designed instead to convey certain of its fundamental features as these arise in a first appreciation of its multiplex and sinuous structure. 让我们思考一下，从刚刚浏览的这些简短例子中，记忆呈现出哪些基本特征。我将挑选一系列特征进行阐述，并将其分为主要特征和次要特征。正如这些例子本身并不试图涵盖记忆现象的全貌（关键性补充将在第二和第三部分呈现），下文讨论的特征也并非旨在阐明人类记忆的全部面向。它们的设计初衷，是为了传达记忆在初次接触其复杂迂回结构时所显现的某些根本特性。
I
Primary Traits 主要特征
By this designation I mean those traits of certain forms of remembering that are either always in fact present or are at least potentially present on many occasions. For reasons that will become apparent as I proceed, I shall group these traits into pairs. 通过这个分类，我指的是某些记忆形式中那些要么始终实际存在、要么在许多场合下至少潜在地存在的特征。出于后文将阐明的原因，我将把这些特征成对分组。
SEARCH/DISPLAY 搜索/显示
“Search” refers to a number of allied moves or procedures which are employed in the effort to remember something better or just to remember it in the first place. As Aristotle says, “recollection is a search in something bodily for an image.” ^(1){ }^{1} Searching is closely correlated with forgetting, but the scope of the searched-for is broader than that of the forgotten. For we can search out experiences or aspects of experiences that we have not so much forgotten as simply allowed to become marginal-“out of thought but not out of mind.” A case in point was my failure to recall the musical soundtrack of Small Change. I searched my memory in vain, and yet I would not want to say that I had ever forgotten the music: I had never paid any special attention to it in the first place. ^(2){ }^{2} In other cases, however, there is genuine forgetting and the corresponding search is then more focused, more protracted, and more prone to rely on inference (as happened in my experience in the philosophy library). "搜索"指的是一系列相关的行动或步骤，旨在更好地回忆某事，或首先将其记起。正如亚里士多德所言："回忆是在身体中搜寻形象的过程。" ^(1){ }^{1} 搜索与遗忘密切相关，但搜索的范围比遗忘更广。因为我们能搜寻那些并非真正遗忘、只是任其边缘化的经历或经历片段——"虽不在思绪中，却仍在记忆里"。一个典型的例子是我未能回忆起《小变化》的电影配乐。我徒劳地搜索记忆，却不能说那些音乐曾被遗忘：因为我最初就未曾特别留意过它。 ^(2){ }^{2} 然而在其他情况下，确实存在真正的遗忘，相应的搜索便会更加集中、持久，且更倾向于依赖推理（正如我在哲学图书馆的经历所示）。
“Display” alludes to an actually recovered memory. It may occur at the end of a search, in its midst (as with the Brentano memory), or in the absence of any search at all. Several of my foregoing examples involved displays that arose of their own accord, without any specific solicitation. I think here of the quite sudden appearance of “Culligan” or of the equally sudden but less surprising emergence of “902.” Even such comparatively prolonged cases as those found in examples #1 and #2 displayed their content spontaneously and without bidding. “显现”指的是实际被唤起的记忆。它可能出现在搜寻的末尾、中途（如布伦塔诺记忆），或根本无需任何搜寻。前文提及的几个例子中，记忆内容都是自行显现的，未经任何特定诱发。我想到“卡利根”一词的突然浮现，以及同样突然却不太令人惊讶的“902”数字涌现。即便是例 1 和例 2 中那些相对持久的案例，其内容也是自发显现、未经召唤的。
It is important to stress that search and display may occur within the same mnemonic experience-as occurred in example #6, which arose unprompted, led to a search, and ended with a resolution of this search by the unexpected intervention of a pertinent display. It also needs emphasizing that the display itself does not have to be visual. It may be multisensory, as was evident in my tea-tasting memory. And it may even be nonsensory, as became clear in the case of remembering “902.” Indeed, it may be at once sensory and nonsensory-as in “Culligan,” which was both verbal and visual at once. The polymorphous character of mnemonic displays is something that we shall have to explore at greater length. ^(3){ }^{3} 需要强调的是，搜索与显现可能发生在同一次记忆体验中——正如案例 6 所示，该记忆未经提示自发浮现，引发搜索过程，最终通过相关记忆内容的意外显现而得以解决。同样必须着重指出的是，这种显现本身未必是视觉性的。它可能是多感官的，就像我品茶记忆中所展现的那样；甚至可能是非感官的，正如回忆"902"这个数字时所体现的。某些记忆显现还可能同时兼具感官与非感官特征——例如"Culligan"这个例子，就同时包含语言和视觉双重属性。记忆显现的这种多态性特征，正是我们需要深入探讨的课题。 ^(3){ }^{3}
ENCAPSULMENT/EXPANSION 封装/扩展
Whereas search and display tend to follow and replace one another in remembering-to be alternatives to each other-the members of this new pair of terms tend to complement and match each other. “Encapsulment” is the more striking of the two traits and is found in many forms, of which only four will be mentioned here. First, there is an intrascenic encapsulmentfor instance, when I remembered a movie within a movie in the case of Small Change. I remembered both films, and one precisely as belonging to the very content of the other. Such emboitement, however, is relatively rare in remembering; it depends on the presence of a self-representing medium such as film, which can convey versions of itself on its own terms. Second, an encapsulation by amorphous amassment of previous experiences of a similar kind was present by implication in the same memory (i.e., my former visits to the Lincoln Theater) and explicitly in the philosophy library memory (where I recalled fragments of earlier experiences). Third, and closely related to this last mode of encapsulment, is emblematic encapsulation, in which a single memory comes to stand surety for a series of other less well-defined memories. I have in mind here the way in which the verbalvisual display “Culligan” condensed a whole group of unretrieved (and yet in principle retrievable) memories of a water softener in my boyhood home. Finally, encapsulment may occur by re-remembering, as when I recalled the memory of seeing Small Change the day after first having it. Such remembering of a memory is reiterable several times over: we can remember ourselves remembering . . . ourselves remembering. This reiterability is not realizable so fully or so easily in other mental acts, and its strictly 在回忆过程中，搜索与呈现往往相互交替、彼此取代，而这组新术语的成员则倾向于相互补充与匹配。"封装性"是这对特征中更为显著的一个，它呈现为多种形式，此处仅列举其中四种。首先存在场景内封装——例如当我回忆《小玩意》这部电影时，记起了片中嵌套的另一部电影。我同时记起两部影片，且明确意识到其中一部正是另一部的内容组成部分。不过这种"套嵌式"记忆在回忆中相对罕见，它依赖于电影这类能自我呈现的媒介载体，后者能以自身方式传递其变体。其次，通过同类既往经验的无定形堆积形成的封装，既隐含于同一记忆（即我先前造访林肯影院的经历）之中，也显现在哲学图书馆的记忆里（当时我忆起了早期经历的片段）。第三种是与最后这种封装模式密切相关的象征性封装，即某个单一记忆为一系列较模糊的记忆提供担保。 我在此想到的是"可滤净"这个文字视觉展示如何浓缩了我童年家中一整个关于软水器的未被唤回(但原则上可唤回)的记忆群。最后，封装也可能通过再回忆发生，就像我回忆起首次观看《零用钱》后第二天的那段记忆。这种对记忆的回忆可以多次重复：我们能记得自己正在回忆...自己正在回忆。这种可重复性在其他心理活动中无法如此充分或轻易地实现，而其严格
self-enclosing character is the most encompassing encapsulation of which remembering is capable. 自我封闭的特性正是记忆所能达到的最全面的封装形式。
“Expansion” is a crucial, though often unnoticed, co-feature of remembering. The contractive power of encapsulment is matched only by the distending power of expansion. A first form of this latter is found in the way in which one memory so frequently branches out into other memories. Typically, the new memories will be continuous in content or format with the initial memory, e.g., in my sudden remembering of the photograph of myself and my sister at Yosemite Park in example #1. But this need not be so; in states of reverie, an entire sequence of disconnected memories can arise. ^(4){ }^{4} Whether continuous or not, the chain of memories thus formed constitutes a significant expansion of the delimited remembering from which it takes its departure. A second mode of expansion occurs not by the addition of new memories but by the dilation of an original memory, its filling out from within. This is frequently the product of search: of seeking for a more complete memory, as occurred in the course of example #6. (It is noteworthy here that the expansion of my initial memory by the intervention of the specific recollection of reading Brentano enabled the thus-clarified memory of working on a particular project to be more fully representative of still other memories. In this case expansion also served the interests of encapsulment.) Third, expansion can arise via the multimodal potential of remembering. The otherwise indifferent tea-drinking episode of example #4 was expanded in my immediate memory of it to include sensory features not explicitly noticed in the original experience itself. Fourth, a specifically temporal expansion is also evident in the same example: by remembering it as I did, and by describing it in the way I did, I was extending its half-life within the psyche. The same is true of my other acts of remembering, though less obviously so: whenever memory is viewed under the aspect of survival or revival, it is seen as playing an expansive role. ^(5){ }^{5} “扩展”是记忆过程中一个至关重要却常被忽视的伴随特征。封装机制的收缩力唯有扩展机制的膨胀力可与之匹敌。后者的第一种形式表现为：一段记忆常常会衍生出其他记忆。通常情况下，新记忆在内容或形式上会与初始记忆保持连续性，例如我突然想起示例#1 中自己和妹妹在优胜美地公园的合影。但并非必然如此；在遐想状态下，可能会涌现出一系列毫无关联的记忆片段。无论是否连续，由此形成的记忆链条都标志着从初始限定记忆出发的显著扩展。第二种扩展模式并非通过新增记忆实现，而是通过原始记忆的内在延展与自我充实。这通常是记忆搜寻的产物：正如示例#6 所示，当我们追寻更完整的记忆时，这种内在扩展便会发生。 （值得注意的是，此处通过引入阅读布伦塔诺的具体回忆，我最初的记忆得以扩展，这使得关于某个特定项目工作的记忆在澄清后，能够更充分地代表其他记忆。在这种情况下，扩展也服务于封装的目的。）第三，扩展可以通过记忆的多模态潜力产生。在例 4 中原本平淡无奇的喝茶场景，在我对它的即时记忆中扩展包含了原始体验中未明确注意到的感官特征。第四，同一例子中也明显存在时间维度的扩展：通过我这样的回忆方式以及这样的描述方式，我延长了这段记忆在心理中的半衰期。我的其他记忆行为也是如此，尽管不那么明显：每当从存续或复苏的角度看待记忆时，它都被视为发挥着扩展性作用。 ^(5){ }^{5}
PERSISTENCE/PASTNESS 持存性/过去性
This dual dimension of memory was implicit in the discussion just above. To speak of remembering as temporally expansive is already to invoke the pastness of the remembered experience as it extends into the present; and to talk of encapsulment is to refer, overtly or covertly, to the persistence of such an experience within an abbreviated form. But persistence and pastness are generic traits that call for specification on their own terms. “Persistence” is a matter of prolongation: prolongation of the past into the present. This is most directly and dramatically effected in primary memory, whose very raison d’être seems to consist in its conservator’s role. Through primary remembering of the kind evident in the immediate memory of tea-tasting, a just-elapsed experience is conserved in the present, allowed to persist there. But the past is permitted to persist in every other case of remembering as well, though differently so in each instance. It may persist, for example, by 记忆的双重维度在上述讨论中已隐含体现。将回忆描述为时间上的延展性，实则已暗指被忆经验之"过往性"正延伸至当下；而谈及"封装性"，则无论明示或暗示，都是指该经验以凝缩形式持续存在。但持续性与过往性作为普遍特征，仍需就其自身特性加以具体阐释。"持续性"关乎延宕：将过去延续至现在。这一过程在初级记忆中体现得最为直接而鲜明——其存在之根本似乎正源于这种保存功能。通过品茶即时记忆这类典型的初级回忆，刚消逝的经验得以在当前保存，获准持续存在。然而过去也得以在其他所有回忆形式中持续留存，尽管每种情况的表现形式各异。例如它可能通过
virtue of the rote learning that lay at the basis of my spontaneously recalled office number; “902,” learned through repeated routine encounters, endures in my present recollections as a piece of quasi-automatically remembered information. Its persistence is habitual in origin and in present operation. The persistence of “Culligan,” on the other hand, is anything but habitual. My initial exposures to this word may have been habitual in character, but since I had not thought of it in many years it had lost the habitual status which it may once have had. It is not remembered routinely, as is “902,” but unpredictably and sporadically. Yet it is remembered; and by being remembered even once, it persists. Persistence in this limiting case is just the fact of being recalled from “the bottomless abyss of oblivion” ^(6){ }^{6} on some occasion subsequent to its origin in time. In many other cases, e.g., in examples #1, #2, and #6, persistence consists in a tendency to be recalled on a number of subsequent occasions, often (as in #6) occasions of simply returning to the very place in which the remembered experience occurred. This place serves to remind us of what once occurred there, and our being reminded in this fashion is the vehicle of persistence. ^(7){ }^{7} 机械记忆的效力体现在我能够自发想起办公室号码"902"——这个通过日常重复接触习得的数字，如今作为一种近乎自动记忆的信息留存于我的回忆中。它的持久性源于习惯，也以习惯的方式持续运作。而"Culligan"这个词的持久性则与习惯截然不同。虽然最初接触这个词时可能带有习惯性质，但由于多年未曾想起，它已丧失了曾经可能拥有的习惯性地位。与"902"不同，它不会被常规地记起，而是以不可预测且零星的方式浮现。然而它确实被记住了；只要被记起哪怕一次，它就持续存在着。在这种极限案例中，持久性仅仅体现为：某个时间点诞生的事物，在日后某个时刻从"遗忘的无底深渊"中被重新唤起的这一事实。在其他许多案例中（如例#1、#2 和#6），持久性表现为在后续多个场合被回忆起的倾向性，这些场合往往（如例#6 所示）只是重返记忆体验最初发生的地点而已。 此处的作用在于提醒我们那里曾发生之事，而我们以这种方式被提醒，正是记忆延续的载体。 ^(7){ }^{7}
Persistence in memory is persistence into the present, but that which persists also derives from the past and is itself a persistence of the past. “Pastness” names that quality of what is remembered which places its origin and provenance in a period preceding the present. Without this origin and provenance, it could not be remembered in the first place: we cannot remember the present qua living present or the future qua yet-to-come future. Each of these latter has to become past in some sense and to some degree in order to be rememberable. And to become past is to be situated or situatable in a period of time now elapsed or elapsing, even though the time in question need not yet be entirely traversed. My tea-tasting was not wholly over with when I remembered its savors and sounds, tastes and touches, since these latter still lingered as fading sensations. But it was sufficiently elapsed to fall away from the central focus of my ongoing sensing and thus to be recapturable as just-having-been-experienced. It had acquired enough pastness to be remembered as such, that is, as an experience or a phase of an experience that was no longer coincidental with my consciousness of the present. In the other examples, the pastness was more well-established and pronounced, even if I could not locate the particular point in the past from which the memory derived. I do not know exactly when I first heard or saw the word “Culligan,” but I am certain that it was at some period of my childhood. To know this is to know the word as belonging definitively to my past; it is to acknowledge its inherent pastness. 记忆中的持续即是向当下的持续，但持续之物同时也源自过去，其本身就是过去的延续。"过去性"这一特质所指的，正是被记忆之物的起源与来处皆早于当下。若无此起源与来处，记忆便无从谈起：我们无法记忆作为鲜活当下的当下，亦无法记忆尚未到来的未来。后者必须先在某种程度和意义上成为过去，方可被记忆。而成为过去，意味着被定位于或可定位于已流逝或正在流逝的时间段落中——尽管相关时间未必已完全消逝。当我回味茶汤的滋味与声响、口感与触感时，品茶体验并未完全终结，因为这些感官印象仍作为渐褪的余韵萦绕。但它已充分流逝，脱离了我持续感知的核心焦点，因而能被重新捕捉为"刚刚经历的体验"。它已具备足够的过去性，得以被如此记忆——即作为不再与当下意识重合的体验或体验片段。 在其他例子中，那种过去性更为明确且显著，即便我无法确定记忆源自过去的哪个具体时间点。我记不清第一次听到或看到"Culligan"这个词的确切时间，但我确信那是在童年时期的某个阶段。意识到这一点，就是确认这个词明确属于我的过去；就是承认它内在的过去性。
Acknowledging pastness is also acknowledging another dimension of the remembered. What we remember not only has its origin in the past but is now completed, finished, or ended-or on its way to being so. Just how this is the case once again differs from instance to instance, from the dead-and-done-with to the still tingling. My Yosemite experience is now so remote, so 承认过去性也意味着承认记忆事物的另一维度。我们所记之事不仅源于过去，而且现在已然完成、终结或结束——或正在走向终结。这种情况的具体表现因事而异，从彻底消逝到余波犹存各不相同。我的约塞米蒂经历如今已如此遥远，如此
long since finished, that it is gappy and hazy at a number of points and has about it the sense of being almost out of reach. I am tempted to say that it is so complete as an experience that it is incomplete as a memory. But the other, less remote experiences we have examined are also expired or expiring experiences and rememberable as such. For unless an experience has become (or is becoming) genuinely an ex-perience, something standing out as lived through, it cannot begin to be remembered. The fact that it is remembered in the present, and thus persists into this present as its point of retrieval, in no way eliminates or even diminishes its pastness. Only that which is now past can per-sist, i.e., last through the vicissitudes of intervening time and be revived in the present. Thus pastness and persistence imply each other: the past alone truly persists, and only what persists is genuinely rememberable. 早已完成，它在多处存在空白和模糊，给人一种几乎遥不可及的感觉。我不禁想说，作为一个体验它如此完整，而作为记忆却如此不完整。但我们所考察的其他不那么久远的体验，同样也是已经结束或正在结束的体验，并因此而被记住。因为除非一个体验真正成为（或正在成为）一个"过往体验"，即作为被经历过的某种突出事物，它才能开始被记住。它在当下被记住，并因此延续至当下作为其检索点，这丝毫不会消除甚至减弱它的过往性。只有那些已成为过去的事物才能持续存在，即经受住时间变迁的考验并在当下被唤醒。因此，过往性与持久性相互蕴含：唯有过去才能真正持续，也只有持续存在的事物才是真正可被记住的。
ACTUALITY/VIRTUALITY 现实性/虚拟性
It is but a short step from pastness to actuality. For the past is populated with actualities-with what has actually been the case. We remember just this: former (and sometimes still surviving) actualities. Many of these actualities, whether objects or states of affairs, are observable and recordable in an objective manner, e.g., by a camera, as in the instance of the Yosemite photograph. But many others are not publicly presented events of this sort at all. They are feelings (e.g., of awe before Half Dome) or thoughts (e.g., of how distracting my neighbors were at my viewing of Small Change), and may not be evident, much less expressed, to others at all. Yet they are no less actual in status-i.e., actual as events-than the perceived positions and movements that can be objectively documented. Though not as easily locatable in space as are, say, Yosemite National Park and the Lincoln Theater, they may be quite locatable in time. My feeling of awe when confronting Half Dome is no less datable than my standing at its base and peering upward at it; indeed, in this case the date is the same. ^(8){ }^{8} 从过去性到现实性仅一步之遥。因为过去充斥着现实性——那些确曾存在的事实。我们记住的正是这些：曾经的（有时依然存续的）现实存在。其中许多现实性，无论是物体还是事态，都能以客观方式观察记录，例如通过相机拍摄优胜美地照片那样。但更多其他现实性根本不属于这类公开呈现的事件。它们是情感（如在半圆顶前感到的敬畏）或思绪（如观看《小玩意》时邻座多么令人分心），可能完全不为人察觉，更遑论被他人感知。然而这些体验在地位上与现实无异——作为事件的实际存在——丝毫不亚于那些可被客观记录的感知位置与动作。虽然它们不像优胜美地国家公园或林肯剧院那样容易空间定位，却能在时间轴上清晰锚定。我面对半圆顶时的敬畏感，与驻足其下仰望它的时刻同样可考；事实上，此时两者日期完全重合。 ^(8){ }^{8}
Beyond datability, actuality in memory involves the specific factor of “finishedness” as I should like to call it. What we recall is finished to the point of possessing a certain minimal coherence or intelligibility; otherwise, it is not identifiable as a memory, a memory of something in particular that has happened. The degree and kind of coherence varies from instance to instance; “902” serves as a valid memory in the context of being asked my office number, but would be quite incoherent if it arose in the midst of my Small Change memory. In fact, if it were to arise in the latter context, I would question whether it was a memory at all and not an interpolated fantasy. The actuality of the remembered therefore brings with it what Husserl calls “the unity of the remembered,” ^(9){ }^{9} that is, the sense that what is being remembered hangs or holds together as an experience or group of experiences ^(10){ }^{10}-as a single actuality or group of actualities. 除了可追溯性之外，记忆中的现实性还涉及一个我称之为"完结性"的特殊因素。我们所回忆的内容必须达到某种最低限度的连贯性或可理解性才算完结；否则它就无法被确认为记忆，即对某件具体发生之事的记忆。这种连贯性的程度和类型因情况而异：在被问及办公室号码时，"902"是一个有效的记忆，但若出现在我对《零钱》这部电影的回忆中就会显得极不协调。事实上，若是在后一种情境中出现，我甚至会质疑这究竟是否属于记忆，还是被插入的幻想。因此，被记忆之物的现实性带来了胡塞尔所称的"被记忆者的统一性"，即被记忆的内容作为单一体验或体验群组（作为单一现实或现实群组）具有内在关联性的感知。
A final facet of the actuality of what we remember has to do with self- 记忆现实性的最后一个面向与自我
presence. The actual is here not only a matter of the datability and finishedness of the remembered but concerns the role of the rememberer himself or herself: what is actual is what he or she undertook, learned, or witnessed in propria persona. The remembered calls for the presence of the rememberer at its original happening. This presence is first-person presence, the only kind of presence in which actuality is experienceable and hence rememberable. As James says: 在场。实际性不仅关乎记忆内容的可确定时间性与完成性，更涉及记忆者自身的作用：实际性即记忆者亲身经历、习得或见证的内容。被记忆之物要求记忆者亲临事件原初发生的现场。这种在场是第一人称的在场，唯有在此类在场中，实际性才能被经验并因此被记忆。正如詹姆斯所言：
Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be dated in mym y past. In other words, I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence. ^(11){ }^{11} 记忆不仅需要将事实定位于过去某时。它必须被定位在 mym y 过去。换言之，我必须认为我直接经历了该事件的发生。 ^(11){ }^{11}
We find a sense or trace of self-presence in almost all of our examples, whether in the form of active participation (as in #1, #2, and #6) or as a still lingering experience of passive participation (in the tea-tasting episode). In these cases, the present actuality of remembering-in which we are at one with our own activity-revives the past actuality of having been present at the scene remembered. Even if this scene reduces in some cases to a “scene of instruction” of which the remembered precipitate is a mute residue, it is no less essential that we were then present, however uninvolved we may have been in any personal way. For only as present at that time, or in a series of such times, are we in a position to become rememberers of what was then experienced. ^(12){ }^{12} 我们在几乎所有案例中都能发现自我在场的感知或痕迹，无论是表现为主动参与（如案例 1、2 和 6），还是作为被动参与的余韵（如品茶场景）。在这些情形中，当下进行时的记忆活动——我们与自身行为合而为一的状态——唤醒了往昔亲历记忆场景时的实存体验。即便某些场景最终退化为"教导场景"，留下的只是缄默的记忆残渣，我们当时的在场性依然至关重要，无论个人参与程度多么有限。因为唯有作为彼时的在场者，或一系列类似时刻的见证者，我们才能成为那段体验的记忆承载者。 ^(12){ }^{12}
“Virtuality” names quite another aspect of remembering. It designates, first of all, a readiness of former experiences to be reactivated in memory. In Ingarden’s term, it is a Parathaltung, a “holding ready” which corresponds to the neurophysiological notion of memory trace. ^(13){ }^{13} Descriptively considered, it refers to our frequent conviction that more, and often considerably more, could be recalled than what we have so far succeeded in recalling: there are things about a particular object or event that are held ready for remembering, though they are not actually being recalled at the time. Thus, although my Yosemite memory was extremely thin to begin with and although I could not then (or now) recall a single additional detail about that visit, I still felt that much more might be remembered, if only my memory were “jogged” in the right way. This was not just true of the memory as a whole, but of every incident in it, each of which presented itself as being further fathomable. I felt that such fathoming was also possible in my more proximate memories as well: much remained virtual even in my recollection of seeing a movie recently (e.g., details of the theater, of people around me, of the movie itself) and indeed in my immediate memory of tasting tea. Admittedly there are fewer virtualities to contend with in this last case, and the same holds for the “902” and “Culligan” memories. Yet even these latter carried with them a thin penumbra of virtuality: I could have plummeted more deeply into the diverse origins of what was actualized so distinctly in each case. "虚拟性"指代记忆的另一个截然不同的面向。它首先意味着过往经验在记忆中随时可被重新激活的预备状态。用英伽登的术语来说，这是一种"待命状态"（Parathaltung），即"保持就绪"的状态，与神经生理学中的记忆痕迹概念相呼应。从描述性角度来看，它对应着我们常有的确信：比起已经成功回忆起来的内容，还有更多（往往多得多）信息可以被记起——关于特定对象或事件的某些细节虽未被实际回忆，却始终处于待提取状态。因此，尽管我最初对约塞米蒂的记忆极为稀薄，尽管当时（或现在）都无法回忆起那次旅行的任何额外细节，我仍感觉只要记忆被"恰当触发"，就能想起更多内容。这不仅适用于整体记忆，其中的每个事件片段都呈现出可供进一步探索的深度。 我感觉到这种深度探索在我更近期的记忆中同样可能：即使是在回忆最近看过的电影时（例如影院的细节、周围的人群、电影本身的内容），甚至是在即时回忆品茶体验时，许多内容仍保持着潜在性。必须承认，在后一种情况中需要应对的潜在性较少，"902"和"Culligan"的记忆也是如此。然而即便是后者，也带着一层稀薄的潜在性光晕：我本可以更深入地探究那些在每个案例中如此清晰显现之物的多元起源。
Virtuality manifests itself in various kinds of inchoateness. For example, the surroundings of my remembered tea-tasting almost totally lacked definition; beyond my desk and a few objects on it, nothing stood out. But a very different lack of form invaded the memory of working in the philosophy library: here not only the background but the foreground itself of the remembered scene lacked definite detail, and the indefinite permeated not only space but time. In my recollection of Yosemite, in further contrast, the indefiniteness was situated between episodes as well as within them. And, of course, entire memories can be quite formless, as when I realize that I have only a very “hazy” recollection of my great aunt Leone, not being able to recall much of anything beyond her name and her approximate position in my family tree. 虚拟性以各种未完成状态显现。例如，我记忆中品茶时的环境几乎完全缺乏界定；除了我的书桌和桌上几件物品外，没有任何突出的事物。但哲学图书馆工作记忆中的形式缺失却截然不同：这里不仅背景，连记忆场景的前景本身都缺乏明确细节，模糊感不仅渗透空间更蔓延至时间维度。而与之形成鲜明对比的是，我对约塞米蒂的回忆中，模糊性既存在于事件片段之间，也存在于片段内部。当然，某些完整记忆可能完全无形无状，比如当我意识到对姑婆利昂妮只有非常"朦胧"的记忆时，除了她的名字和在家谱中的大致位置，几乎回想不起任何具体内容。
All such indefiniteness is not merely a necessary correlate of the selectivity inherent in any form of focused attention. ^(14){ }^{14} It is also, and more importantly for our purposes, a quite concrete way in which the virtuality of what we remember insinuates itself into remembering. Even if this virtuality is not experienced as such, its presence is made evident in the areas of the inchoate that pervade, riddle, or surround remembered content. Being less than crystalline in their clarity, these areas seem to solicit exploration: to beckon to us as virtually there. Much of what we experience as memory’s pervasiveness in the present-its mysterious infusion in all ongoing experience and thought (“there is no perception that is not full of memories,” said Bergson) ^(15){ }^{15}-is attributable to this aspect of the virtual. But the same aspect of virtuality also accounts for the vanishing quality of so many memories, their rapid retreat once scanned. The retreat is into still greater in-definiteness-into the state of being unremembered. Yet this state is characterizable not just negatively (as when we say that memories are “lost”) but positively as well: and precisely by that being-held-in-readiness which is the basis of memory’s virtuality. 所有这些不确定性不仅仅是任何形式的专注注意力中固有选择性的必然关联。 ^(14){ }^{14} 更重要的是，就我们的研究目的而言，它以一种非常具体的方式，让我们所记忆之物的虚拟性悄然渗入记忆行为本身。即便这种虚拟性并未被直接体验，它的存在仍通过那些弥漫、困扰或环绕着记忆内容的初始混沌区域显现出来。由于这些区域在清晰度上远非晶莹剔透，它们似乎总在召唤着我们去探索：如同在虚拟中向我们招手。我们当下所体验到的记忆之普遍性——它对所有进行中的经验和思想那种神秘的渗透（柏格森曾说"不存在不充满记忆的感知"） ^(15){ }^{15} ——很大程度上可归因于虚拟性的这一面向。但正是虚拟性的同一面向，也解释了诸多记忆那转瞬即逝的特质——它们在闪现后便迅速退却。这种退却通向更深的未确定性领域，通向未被记起的存在状态。 然而这种状态不仅可以从消极方面描述（比如我们说记忆"丢失"），也能从积极方面描述：正是那种"随时待命"的状态构成了记忆虚拟性的基础。
Secondary Traits 次要特征
These are traits that are only optionally present in any given experience of remembering. They may or may not characterize this experience, but if they do they can become important and not merely incidental features. There are several such traits, of which I shall single out three for discussion here. 这些特征在任何特定的记忆体验中都是可选的。它们可能成为该体验的特征，也可能不会；但如果确实出现，就可能成为重要而非偶然的特征。这里我将重点讨论其中三种此类特征。
QUASI-NARRATIVE STRUCTURE 准叙事结构
Many memories manifest themselves in a quasi-narrative form. They seem to constitute a story or part of a story. A tale of sorts is told. Such memories have an identifiable beginning point; a certain development of motifs or themes then takes place; and there may even be a decisive conclusion. One of my sample cases easily fits into this pattern. In remembering my viewing of Small Change, I began by recalling several preliminary events (dinner, stopping at the bookstore, waiting in line), then 许多记忆以准叙事的形式呈现。它们似乎构成了一个故事或故事的片段。某种类型的故事被讲述出来。这类记忆具有可辨识的起点；随后是某些主题或动机的发展；甚至可能出现决定性的结局。我的一个样本案例恰好符合这种模式。在回忆观看《零用钱》的经历时，我首先想起几个预备性事件（晚餐、在书店停留、排队等候），然后
described incidents that took place within the theater (mainly watching the film but also being distracted by others around me), and ended with a brief allusion to exiting from the theater. The result was a peculiarly well-rounded memory, one that closely approximates to a simple narrative account of the main events which occurred on that particular evening. 描述了发生在影院内的插曲（主要是观看电影，但也因周围人的干扰而分心），最后简要提及离开影院的情形。这段记忆形成了异常完整的闭环，几乎就是对那个特定夜晚主要事件展开的简单叙事。
A less exemplary version of the same basic narrative structure was evident in my memory of visiting Yosemite National Park. A distinct beginning (the initial viewing of the park) was followed by a series of incidents within the park. Despite sharing a common setting, however, these incidents had no genuine continuity with each other. They unfolded independently of one another. And there was no conclusive ending or rounding-off, just an abrupt cessation after I had recalled the waterfall scene. This truncated narrative structure was nevertheless much more complete than in any of the remaining examples. These latter were all predominately non-narrative. In the case of “Culligan” and “902” there were no distinct actions or episodes to remember as such, hence no basis for narration. The same holds true for the tea-tasting episode regarded as a primary memory. ^(16){ }^{16} But there were at least implicit narrative elements in my memory of working on a particular essay in the philosophy library, since it involved the central action of researching-and-writing-an action that naturally called for a narrative-like description. 同样的基本叙事结构在我对约塞米蒂国家公园的回忆中呈现出较不典型的版本。一个明确的起始点（初次目睹公园景象）之后，是园内发生的一系列事件。尽管这些事件共享同一场景，彼此间却缺乏真正的连续性。它们各自独立展开，没有决定性的结尾或收束，仅在我回忆起瀑布场景后戛然而止。这种截断的叙事结构仍比其余所有案例都更为完整——后者基本都呈现非叙事性特征。以"库利根"和"902"为例，这两段记忆中不存在可供回忆的明确行为或片段，因此缺乏叙事基础。作为主要记忆的品茶片段同样如此。 ^(16){ }^{16} 但在我于哲学图书馆撰写某篇论文的记忆里，至少隐含着叙事元素，因为它涉及"研究-写作"这一核心行为，这种行为天然需要叙事化的描述。
The “quasi” in “quasi-narrative” has two primary meanings. The first refers to the implicitly or possibly narrative form that a memory, or a portion of a memory, may possess even though the manifest form is non-narrative. The tacit hypothesis here is that if more detail could be recalled, then a narrative description would be appropriate. This is, however, only a hypothesis, for it does not always happen that when additional details are remembered they assume a narrative form: on the contrary, they may be so dispersed and disjointed as to resist this form. For this reason we cannot claim that all remembered content has even an implicit narrative structure. ^(17){ }^{17} "准叙事"中的"准"字主要有两层含义。第一层含义指的是记忆或记忆片段可能具备的隐性或潜在的叙事形式，尽管其显性形式是非叙事的。这里的隐含假设是：若能回忆起更多细节，便适合采用叙事性描述。然而这仅仅是个假设，因为当回忆起更多细节时，这些细节并不总会呈现叙事形态——相反，它们可能过于零散破碎而难以形成叙事结构。正因如此，我们不能断言所有被记忆的内容都具有隐性叙事结构。 ^(17){ }^{17}
In a second sense, “quasi” in “quasi-narrative” refers to the narrative-like, yet still not strictly narrative, nature of remembering. By this I mean that even in the most propitious cases such as the Small Change memory, there is something notably lacking when comparison is made with story-telling, which is the embodiment of full narration. What is lacking in memory is a proper narrative voice, the voice of an authoritative narrator who spins out the tale. Whether actually spoken or present in written form, this voice commands the course of the tale in story-telling, reflecting the fact that the narrator knows the entire story in advance. (“Narrate” and “know” are cognate in origin.) Nothing strictly comparable to such a voice is found in remembering. Not only does the rememberer not always know the entire course and content of a given memory, but even when he or she does (as in frequently repeated memories) there is no need for a commanding voice delineating and directing the memory and distinct from it. Not even the rememberer’s “inner voice”-i.e., the expression of a self-commenting in- 在第二种意义上，“准叙事”中的“准”指的是记忆所具有的类叙事性，却又并非严格意义上的叙事特质。我的意思是，即便在最有利的情况下（如“零钱记忆”这类案例），与作为完整叙事化身的讲故事相比，记忆仍存在显著缺失。记忆所缺失的是一种恰当的叙事声音——那种编织故事的权威叙述者的声音。这种声音无论是实际说出还是以书面形式呈现，都能在讲故事时掌控情节走向，反映出叙述者事先知晓整个故事的事实（“叙述”与“知晓”在词源上同根）。在记忆活动中，我们找不到严格可比的声音。记忆者不仅未必知晓某段记忆的全部过程和内容，即便知晓（如那些频繁重复的记忆），也无需存在一个与记忆本身分离、能对记忆进行描述和引导的支配性声音。甚至记忆者的“内心独白”——即自我评述的表达——
ternal agency-plays the requisite role. Memories are not narrated by anything like an authoritative voice; if anything, they tend to narrate themselves; for we possess them so intimately, so much from within our own life-histories, that there is no need for a separate source of articulation to recount them to us. 内在能动性——扮演着必要的角色。记忆并非由任何类似权威声音的叙述者讲述；相反，它们往往自我叙述；因为我们如此亲密地拥有它们，如此深植于自己的生命历程中，以至于不需要一个独立的表达来源来向我们复述。
Therefore, even though some memories have an explicitly narrative struc-ture-that is, a content which falls spontaneously into an ordered sequence of events (and prototypically into beginning, middle, and end)-they still lack a distinct narrative voice and are thus not fully narrational in nature. They are at best, and then not always, quasi-narrative in one of the two senses just discussed; and if this is so, Ryle is misguided in claiming that “being good at recalling . . . is a narrative skill.” ^(18){ }^{18} 因此，尽管某些记忆具有明确的叙事结构——即其内容自发形成有序事件序列（典型地呈现为开端、中段和结尾）——它们仍然缺乏独特的叙事声音，因而本质上并非完全叙事性的。它们充其量只是前文讨论的两种意义上的准叙事，且并非总是如此；若果真如此，赖尔声称"善于回忆……是一种叙事技能"便是误导性的。
SCHEMATICALNESS 图式性
By “schematical” I mean abbreviated in such a way as to be sketchy or blurred-not fully presented. It can be argued that all memories are schematized in that they embody affective or cognitive schemes of various sorts. ^(19){ }^{19} But not all memories are schematical in the sense of indistinct. Some come to us in utmost clarity: " 902 " arrived without ambiguity of any kind. It was not only the correct answer to the question “what is the number on your office door?” but it presented itself in a quite crystalline and transparent form. It was not just beyond the shadow of a doubt but lacking in internal shadow as well, sans ombre, and thus a strictly unschematical memory. At the other end of the spectrum were the shadowy images that accompanied “Culligan.” These were so schematical that I had difficulty identifying and describing them in any coherent way. And yet the fact that they appeared in the same memory as the clearly articulated element, “Culligan,” testifies to the compatability of the schematical and the unschematical within the same experience of remembering. A given experience need not exhibit exactly the same schematicalness throughout. I have, for instance, a very vivid recollection of coming into port in Bergen, Norway, along with a very sketchy remembrance of my visit to the home of Sibelius outside Bergen, and yet both scenes are part of the same overall memory that could be labeled “visit to Bergen, 1958.” 所谓"图式化"，我指的是以简略方式呈现，因而显得粗略或模糊——并非完整展现。可以说所有记忆都以某种方式被图式化了，因为它们承载着各类情感或认知模式。 ^(19){ }^{19} 但并非所有记忆在模糊意义上都是图式化的。有些记忆以极致清晰度呈现："902"这个数字出现时毫无歧义。它不仅是"你办公室门牌号是多少？"的正确答案，更以水晶般透明的方式自我呈现。这不仅超越了怀疑的阴影，其内部也不存在任何阴影（sans ombre），因此是严格意义上的非图式化记忆。光谱另一端则是伴随"Culligan"出现的朦胧影像。这些影像如此图式化，以至于我难以用连贯的方式辨识和描述它们。然而它们与清晰可辨的"Culligan"元素共存于同一记忆的事实，证明了图式化与非图式化在记忆体验中的兼容性。特定体验并不需要始终保持完全相同的图式化程度。 例如，我至今仍能生动地回忆起驶入挪威卑尔根港的情景，但对探访西贝柳斯位于卑尔根郊外故居的记忆却十分模糊——这两幅画面共同构成了可被标记为"1958 年卑尔根之行"的整体记忆。
Not only the degree but the kind of schematicalness can vary in a given instance. My memories of having worked in the philosophy library at different times had a condensed and loosely overlapping schematicalness which contrasted with the much more compressed and definite schematicalness of the particular memory of having worked on a certain essay in that same library. The result is a somewhat bewildering montage structuring one and the same memory sequence, a situation in which one sort of schematicalness is juxtaposed with another. Just as we were earlier forced to acknowledge various forms of the virtual within remembering, now we must admit the co-existence of different schematicalnesses. 不仅概略程度存在差异，其类型亦会随具体情境而变化。我对哲学图书馆不同时期工作经历的记忆呈现出一种浓缩且松散交叠的概略性，这与在同一图书馆撰写某篇论文时形成的更为紧凑明确的记忆概略形成鲜明对比。其结果是同一记忆序列中令人困惑的蒙太奇结构——不同类型的记忆概略在此并置共存。正如我们先前不得不承认记忆中存在多种虚拟形态，此刻我们必须接纳不同概略性共存的现实。
RUMINESCENCE 反刍记忆
To capture the special mood or emotional state that remembering may occasion I have coined the word “ruminescence,” which combines “reminiscence” with “rumination.” Remembering may give rise to a whole spectrum of emotions, ranging from exhilarating joy to despondent remorse. Poets have movingly described most of the feelings which thrust themselves on our awareness when we remember. But the peculiar phenomenon of ruminescence has been neglected. This neglect is all the more curious in view of the way it pervades so much of our remembering. What has impeded its full recognition is its ambiguous origin and its tendency to be present in such mild forms as often to be barely detectable. 为捕捉回忆可能引发的特殊情绪或心境，我创造了"回忆冥思"（ruminescence）一词，融合了"追忆"（reminiscence）与"沉思"（rumination）。回忆能唤起从狂喜到懊悔的复杂情感光谱。诗人们曾动人地描绘过那些在回忆时涌上心头的感受。但回忆冥思这一独特现象却长期被忽视。这种忽视尤为奇怪，因为它普遍存在于我们的回忆体验中。其模糊的起源以及往往以微弱形式存在、几乎难以察觉的特性，阻碍了人们对其充分认知。
Ruminescence ranges from active nostalgia to tepid wistfulness. I experienced the former in the philosophy library memory-indeed, I was overcome by it as I entered the library rooms high in the stacks of the enormous building in which they were housed. It is important to consider this nostalgia more closely, for it reveals itself to be more than a mere longing for “the good old days.” On the one hand, it was supported by rapidly returning reminiscences: the “semi-memories” that came flooding back as soon as I stepped into the room. Their vagueness did not detract from their considerable power to move me-and may even have contributed to this power by reinforcing their basic wistfulness. A reminiscence can dampen emotion as well as enliven it. In the present case, moreover, it was not merely the indistinctness of detail but the very indistinctness in the number of memories that helped to bring about the effect in question. Not knowing just how many memories I was dealing with, I was more moved than if I had known how many were in fact at stake. On the other hand, a quite different facet of this situation was my incompletely formulated thought that the experiences I was recalling were unrepeatable. This thought also contributed powerfully to my mood at the time, and it did so as a form of rumination. I was not so much entertaining this thought (much less expressing it overtly) as ruminating it, “chewing it over,” reflecting upon it, albeit inexplicitly and unselfconsciously. Such rumination helps to bring about the complex state of ruminescence. 回忆的强度从强烈的怀旧到温吞的感伤不等。我在哲学图书馆的记忆中体验到了前者——事实上，当我走进那座庞大建筑高层藏书室时，这种情绪完全淹没了我。有必要更仔细地审视这种怀旧情绪，因为它远非仅仅是对"美好旧时光"的渴望。一方面，它由迅速涌现的回忆所支撑：那些"半记忆"在我踏入房间的瞬间便奔涌而来。它们的模糊性非但没有削弱其打动人心的强大力量，反而可能通过强化那种根本的怅惘感增强了这种力量。回忆既能抑制情感，也能激活情感。此外，在当前情境下，不仅是记忆细节的模糊性，连记忆数量的不确定性也促成了这种特殊效果。正因为不知道究竟有多少记忆在翻涌，我比确切知晓记忆数量时更为动容。 另一方面，这一情境中截然不同的面向在于我尚未完全成形的念头——那些我正在回忆的经历是不可复现的。这个念头同样强烈地影响着当时的心绪，它以某种反刍般的形式持续发酵。与其说我是在思索这个念头（更遑论明确表达它），不如说我是在反复咀嚼它，不自觉地对其进行隐晦的反思。这种思维反刍有助于催生"回忆性反刍"的复杂心理状态。
Another factor is the special pleasure we take in the very combination of reminiscence and rumination. This pleasure arises more from the activity of reminiscing-cum-ruminating than from its content per se. The contemplation of the content, as such, can be quite painful, as when I think about the gruesome details of an accident I have just witnessed. But the ruminescent remembering of this same content is a very different matter. It may not ever become positively pleasurable, yet it can come to involve the subsidiary but distinct pleasure arising from the act of remembering in a ruminescent mood. As Virgil says in the Aeneid: 另一个因素在于我们特别享受回忆与反刍交织的过程。这种愉悦更多源自回忆兼反刍的活动本身，而非其具体内容。单纯对内容的沉思可能相当痛苦，比如当我回想刚目睹的事故血腥细节时。但以回忆性反刍的方式记取同样内容则截然不同——即便未必转化为积极愉悦，却能衍生出伴随回忆行为而来的附属而独特的快感，这种快感诞生于回忆性反刍的心境之中。正如维吉尔在《埃涅阿斯纪》中所言：
Someday, perhaps, it will be a joy to remember even these things. ^(20){ }^{20} 或许有一天，就连回忆这些往事也会成为乐事。 ^(20){ }^{20}
At stake here is the role of time in the peculiar pleasure taken in recollection: the more distant the event recalled, the more pleasure we tend to experience in remembering it. As Freud remarks, “It seems, moreover, as though the recollection of the remote past is in itself facilitated by some pleasurable motive.” ^(21){ }^{21} This motive stems, I believe, precisely from the way in which events of the remote past encourage a ruminescent attitude on the part of the rememberer. Just because these events are so distant and so un-demanding-and also because they frequently belong to (or suggest) an earlier period of life that we later regard as an uncontaminated mixture of innocence and spontaneity-we become ruminescent in reflecting on them. But, once again, the pleasure we gain in this way derives much more from our present activity of remembering than from the events themselves; indeed, these latter may be so dimly apprehended as not to be clearly discernible or even identifiable as such. ^(22){ }^{22} 这里的关键在于时间在回忆带来的特殊愉悦中所扮演的角色：被忆起的事件越久远，我们在回忆中体验到的愉悦往往就越强烈。正如弗洛伊德所言："此外，对遥远过去的回忆似乎本身就受到某种愉悦动机的推动。" ^(21){ }^{21} 我认为，这种动机恰恰源于久远往事会促使回忆者采取一种怀旧的态度。正因为这些事件如此遥远且毫无苛求——也因它们往往属于（或让人联想到）我们后来视为纯真与率性完美融合的生命早期阶段——我们在追忆时便陷入怀旧情绪。但必须再次强调，我们由此获得的愉悦更多源自当下回忆的行为本身，而非那些往事；事实上，那些往事可能已模糊到难以清晰辨认，甚至无法确认为具体事件。 ^(22){ }^{22}
It is a striking fact that the very first recollection that came to mind when I sought examples of memory in general was one from my remote childhood. In view of Freud’s remark and my gloss on it this fact cannot be regarded as wholly accidental. There is a special yield of pleasure in recalling such a memory-a pleasure that is tinged by a wistful quality. Wistfulness is hardly an intrusive mood; it is often so unobtrusive as not even to be expressly noticed by the rememberer: hence its absence from my explicit descriptions of the Culligan and Yosemite memories, both of which also stemmed from my childhood. It was not a prominent feature in either instance, being present more as a hazy emotional atmosphere than as a specific mood. Yet its presence was nonetheless detectable and gave to these rememberings an emotional flavoring lacking in most of the other examples cited. With the exception of the philosophy library memory, these latter were not wistful, much less nostalgic. They were experienced without any trace of ruminescence, indeed were uncolored by any precisely delineatable emotion or mood. Thus we are warned that ruminescence is not a constant or primary trait of remembering. It is inherent only in certain instances and then quite differently from case to case. However moving its presence may be on particular occasions, it remains optional in status and is thus, along with quasi-narrativity and schematicalness, a secondary trait of remembering. 当我试图寻找记忆的普遍例证时，脑海中浮现的第一个回忆竟来自遥远的童年，这个现象引人深思。考虑到弗洛伊德的评论及我的解读，这一事实绝非全然偶然。回忆此类记忆会带来一种特殊的愉悦——这种愉悦中夹杂着淡淡的惆怅。惆怅并非来势汹汹的情绪；它往往如此微妙，甚至不会被回忆者明确察觉：因此在我对卡利根和约塞米蒂记忆的明确描述中并未提及，尽管这两段记忆同样源自我的童年。在这两个案例中，惆怅都不是显著特征，更多是作为朦胧的情感氛围而非具体心绪存在。然而它的存在仍可被察觉，并为这些回忆赋予了其他大多数例证所缺乏的情感基调。除了哲学图书馆那段记忆外，其余回忆都不含惆怅意味，更谈不上怀旧。它们被体验时没有任何反刍的痕迹，事实上也未被任何可明确界定的情感或心绪所浸染。 因此我们被提醒，反刍性并非记忆的恒定或主要特征。它仅在某些特定情况下固有存在，且在不同案例中表现迥异。尽管它在特定场合下的出现可能令人动容，但其本质上仍属可选特质，与准叙事性和图式性一样，都是记忆的次要特征。
REMEMBERING AS INTENTIONAL 作为意向活动的记忆
ACT PHASE 行为阶段
Remembering, regarded as a mental act, is intentional in structure. It can therefore be analyzed into an act phase and an object phase-roughly, into how we remember and what we remember. Each experience of remembering is thus diphasic, but the two phases are simultaneous and not successive. ^(1){ }^{1} It is while we are engaged in the activity of remembering that what we remember presents itself, and conversely when something emerges in memorial form we are at that moment and to that exact extent involved in an act of remembering. The act and object phases thus call for one another and are strictly correlative: no activity of remembering lacks an object remembered, and vice versa. Each phase is equally essential, since an actless memory is as unthinkable as a contentless remembering. ^(2){ }^{2} 当我们将记忆视为心理行为时，其结构具有意向性。因此可将其分解为行为阶段和对象阶段——大致对应于"我们如何记忆"与"我们记忆什么"。每个记忆体验都具有双重性，但这两个阶段是同时而非相继发生的。 ^(1){ }^{1} 正是在我们进行记忆活动时，被记忆的内容才得以呈现；反之当某物以记忆形式浮现时，我们恰在那一刻、在相应程度上正参与着记忆行为。行为阶段与对象阶段因而相互依存、严格对应：不存在无对象的记忆行为，反之亦然。二者同等重要，因为无行为的记忆与无内容的记忆同样不可想象。 ^(2){ }^{2}
Despite the fact that the experience of remembering is always act and object at once, I shall treat these two phases in successive chapters. The two phases are inseparable in experience, but they may be distinguished at the level of intentional analysis. Such analysis views the mind as oriented in different basic ways-thanks to various act-forms-toward particular “contents” or immanent objects. Even if they are always in fact conjoined, acts and objects call for separate descriptions. 尽管记忆体验始终同时包含行为与对象这两个层面，我仍将在后续章节中对这两个阶段分别进行探讨。二者在经验中密不可分，但在意向性分析的层面上却可以区分开来。这种分析认为，心灵通过不同的行为形式，以各种基本方式朝向特定的"内容"或内在对象。即便行为与对象在现实中总是相互关联，它们仍需要各自独立的描述。
To analyze the act phase is to concern ourselves with the actual process of remembering, with how remembering is accomplished or realized on specific occasions. Such enactment can be distinguished from the capacity and from the disposition to remember, both of which pertain to “memory” construed as an inherent faculty or tendency rather than as an occurrence. ^(3){ }^{3} The capacitative and dispositional dimensions of remembering are of crucial import-of more importance, for example, than their counterparts in imagining. Individual acts of remembering not only exercise the capacity and disposition to remember at particular points in time and space but in so doing draw upon (and thus depend upon) what is contained or stored in memory. Such keeping or retaining-whether long-term or short-term in status ^(4){ }^{4}-would not be possible without the functioning of inbuilt memorial capacities and dispositions. 分析记忆行为阶段，就是关注回忆的实际过程，关注回忆如何在特定情境中被完成或实现。这种实施行为可与记忆能力和记忆倾向区分开来——后两者属于被理解为内在机能或倾向的"记忆"，而非具体发生的事件。 ^(3){ }^{3} 记忆的容量维度与倾向维度具有关键意义，其重要性甚至超过它们在想象活动中的对应部分。个体回忆行为不仅在特定时空节点上运用了记忆能力与倾向，更在此过程中调用（因而也依赖于）记忆中所储存的内容。若无内在记忆机能与倾向的运作，这种长期或短期的信息保存与留存 ^(4){ }^{4} 将无从实现。
There are problematic borderline cases in which the distinction between capacity or disposition on the one hand and occurrence on the other is difficult to discern: e.g., those unconscious or preconscious memories which are continually active and yet not currently remembered as such. ^(5){ }^{5} Such cases notwithstanding, an analysis of the act phase of remembering on its own terms remains both possible and desirable. It is possible insofar as the act itself and the capacity or disposition that makes it possible manifest themselves so differently: the former directly in our conscious experiences of remembering, the latter indirectly through a variety of instantiations, normal or pathological, ^(6){ }^{6} unconscious or conscious. It is desirable insofar as an ability or disposition to remember is fully actualized and known only by its particular occurrences. ^(7){ }^{7} In fact, we shall never learn anything significant about memory as capacity or disposition unless and until we begin with a study of how it actually arises in human experience. 在某些边界案例中，能力或倾向与具体发生之间的区别难以辨别：例如那些持续活跃却未被当下记起的无意识或前意识记忆。 ^(5){ }^{5} 尽管存在这些特例，对记忆行为阶段本身进行分析仍具有可能性和必要性。其可能性体现在记忆行为与使之成为可能的能力或倾向呈现方式截然不同：前者直接显现在我们有意识的记忆体验中，后者则通过各类或正常或病态的实例间接显现， ^(6){ }^{6} 无论这些实例属于无意识还是意识层面。其必要性则在于，记忆能力或倾向唯有通过具体发生才能得到充分实现和认知。 ^(7){ }^{7} 事实上，除非我们首先研究记忆如何在人类经验中实际产生，否则永远无法真正理解作为能力或倾向的记忆本质。
How then does remembering occur? What are the forms that human memory assumes in its enactment? These forms are multiple, exhibiting what I have elsewhere described as “the multiplicity of the mental.” ^(8){ }^{8} It is as if the very proliferation of act-forms in which remembering arises somehow compensates for its determinacy of content-compared, for instance, with imagining, which has relatively few act-forms but a quite indeterminate content. In view of this proliferation and for the sake of clarity, I shall divide my analysis of the act-forms of memory into three groups. 那么记忆是如何发生的？人类记忆在运作时呈现哪些形式？这些形式是多样的，展现了我曾在其他地方描述过的"心理的多元性"。 ^(8){ }^{8} 仿佛记忆行为形式的激增在某种程度上弥补了其内容确定性——例如与想象相比，后者行为形式相对较少但内容却相当不确定。鉴于这种多样性，为了清晰起见，我将把记忆行为形式的分析分为三组。
Primary and Secondary Remembering 初级记忆与次级记忆
These are generic forms of memory to which a number of other types of remembering may be assimilated, including certain of the basic types to be considered under what I shall call “Main Types of Remembering.” As primary and secondary memory have already received the lion’s share of attention from philosophers and psychologists alike, I shall be brief in my own treatment. Moreover, precisely because they are so broadly generic in status, they do not lend themselves to the detailed specificity at which I am aiming in this book. 这些是记忆的基本形式，其他多种记忆类型都可归入其中，包括我将称之为"主要记忆类型"下的某些基本类型。由于初级和次级记忆已获得哲学家和心理学家们的主要关注，我将简要论述。此外，正因为它们在地位上具有如此广泛的普遍性，并不适合我在本书中追求的细节特异性。
PRIMARY REMEMBERING 初级记忆
This is a form of remembering that occurs so continually and often so imperceptibly that we rarely notice it at all; and even when we do notice it, we are not inclined to consider it a form of remembering. ^(9){ }^{9} I refer to the way in which we remain aware of what has just appeared or happened in our experience. In my tea-tasting memory, for example, the event of tasting was no longer present as such-no longer occupied the central ‘now’ of my conscious attention. Yet it was still held in mind in the margins of my awareness. I say “held in mind” because primary memory cannot be identified with the actual, psycho-physical reverberations of the just-past experience. ^(10){ }^{10} It is a question of a momentary “retention” by the mind as this experience subsides or “sinks away” from explicit awareness. ^(11){ }^{11} Such an 这是一种持续不断且往往难以察觉的记忆形式，以至于我们很少注意到它；即便有所觉察，也不倾向于将其视为记忆。 ^(9){ }^{9} 我所指的是我们如何保持对经验中刚刚显现或发生之事的觉察。以我品茶时的记忆为例，品茶这一事件本身已不再当下呈现——不再占据我意识注意的"此刻"中心，但它仍存留于我意识的边缘地带。我说"存留于心"是因为初级记忆不能等同于刚逝去经验在身心层面的实际余响。 ^(10){ }^{10} 这关乎经验从显意识中消退或"沉没"时，心灵对其进行的短暂"持留"。 ^(11){ }^{11} 即便
experience is maintained in mind even as it vanishes from explicit consciousness. In this way, it forms a penumbra around any newly appearing or happening content of consciousness; in James’s striking formulation, it is “a vaguely vanishing backward fringe.” ^(12){ }^{12} 当经验从显意识中消失，它仍以这种方式存续于心智之中。由此，它在任何新出现的意识内容周围形成半影；用詹姆斯生动的表述来说，它是"逐渐模糊消逝的后缘微光"。 ^(12){ }^{12}
Primary remembering can be construed in either of two ways. On the one hand, it can be regarded as the prolongation, the “persistence” as we called it earlier, of a previously present moment of experience-its gradual, rather than precipitous, demise. The amount of prolongation varies from experience to experience and from person to person, but it appears to range from several milliseconds up to half a minute. ^(13){ }^{13} Whatever the exact duration, “primary memory” refers to the way in which what was just experienced (the “soeben gewesen,” as Husserl terms it) is drawn out and allowed to remain accessible. (My memory of tea-tasting is once again a case in point. The entire experience, with all of its synesthetic coherence, was describable immediately after its occurrence as still smoldering in my consciousness, though also as rapidly vanishing from it.) On the other hand, the fact of primary remembering-its omnipresent, though often unnoticed, op-eration-can be viewed as deepening the present present, the new present which has taken the place of the present of the experience now sinking back or down in mind. This latter experience forms what Husserl calls a “comet’s tail” trailing off from the nucleus of the ever-new “now-point.” ^(14){ }^{14} Seen in this perspective, primary remembering is a way of enriching present experience by adding the dimension of the soeben gewesen, the just-having-been, to an otherwise purely punctiform present. What has just been shadows what is now appearing or happening, thereby constituting what E. R. Clay named the “specious present” and Husserl the “living present.” ^(15){ }^{15} 初级记忆可以从两种角度来理解。一方面，它可以被视为先前体验时刻的延续——即我们早先所称的"持续"状态——这种消逝是渐进的，而非骤然的。这种延续时长因体验内容和个体差异而不同，但通常从几毫秒到半分钟不等。无论具体持续时间如何，"初级记忆"指涉的是刚刚经历的体验（胡塞尔称之为"soeben gewesen"）被延展并保持可触及性的方式。（我品茶记忆的案例再次佐证了这点。整个体验过程及其所有联觉协调性，在发生后仍能立即被描述为在我意识中余温未散，尽管也正快速消逝其中。）另一方面，初级记忆的存在——这种无处不在却常被忽视的运作——可被视为对当下此刻的深化，这个取代了正往意识深处沉降的体验当下的崭新此刻。 后一种体验构成了胡塞尔所谓的"彗星尾迹"，从不断更新的"此刻点"核心处拖曳而出。 ^(14){ }^{14} 从这个视角看，初级记忆是通过将"刚刚存在"(soeben gewesen)的维度添加到原本纯粹点状的当下，从而丰富当下体验的方式。刚刚逝去的影子笼罩着此刻显现或发生的事物，由此构成了 E.R.克莱所称的"似是而非的当下"以及胡塞尔所说的"活生生的当下"。 ^(15){ }^{15}
SECONDARY REMEMBERING 次级记忆
Except for the tea-tasting incident, all of the examples given in the first chapter were cases of secondary remembering, the remembering of experiences that had lapsed from my consciousness after their initial occurrence. As is the fate with all contents of primary memory, they had become immersed in the waters of Lethe and had to be remembered in a decisively different manner. In ordinary parlance, such remembering is termed “recall” or “recollection,” and its operation is conceived as that of rescuing former experiences from oblivion. These experiences require rescue insofar as they have run their course; they are entirely elapsed as events-in contrast with their partial lapsing as the content of primary remembering. James has described this salvaging operation in graphic terms: 除了品茶事件外，第一章列举的所有案例都属于次级记忆——即对那些最初经历后便从意识中消退的体验进行回忆。如同所有初级记忆内容的宿命，这些体验已沉入遗忘之河，必须以截然不同的方式重新记起。日常用语中，这类记忆行为被称为"回想"或"追忆"，其运作机制被视作将过往体验从遗忘深渊中拯救出来。这些体验之所以需要被拯救，是因为它们已完成了自身历程；作为事件它们已完全消逝——这与它们在初级记忆内容中的部分消退形成鲜明对比。詹姆斯曾用生动的语言描述这种打捞过程：
An object which is recollected, in the proper sense of that term, is one which has been absent from consciousness altogether, and now revives anew. It is brought back, fished up, so to speak, from a reservoir in which, with countless other objects, it lay buried and lost from view. ^(16){ }^{16} 严格意义上的回忆对象，是指那些完全脱离意识后又重新复苏的内容。可以说它是从某个储藏库中被找回、打捞上来的，那里埋葬着无数其他对象，它们长期隐匿不见踪影。 ^(16){ }^{16}
The “secondary” of secondary remembering, then, carries no connotation of being lesser in importance or status. Rather, it describes an act of remembering that is subsequent, that follows upon primary rememberingas is suggested by one of the main German words for recollection, “Wiedererinnerung,” literally a remembering again or re-remembering. 那么，"次级回忆"中的"次级"并不带有重要性或地位较低的含义。相反，它描述的是一种后续发生的回忆行为——正如德语中表示回忆的主要词汇"Wiedererinnerung"所暗示的那样，字面意思就是"再次回忆"或"重新回忆"。
The new activity of remembering is not, however, a mere repetition of its predecessor. It is a distinctively disparate activity, which psychological experimentation shows to differ from its forerunner in such ways as probability of recall, means of encoding content, effects of distraction or interference, and the internal relationship between the various materials being remembered. ^(17){ }^{17} This is just what we might expect, since secondary remembering does not draw upon essentially unchanged and still-conscious experiences, but upon no longer conscious experiences that have been held in long-term storage-and thus made vulnerable to transformations unknown to the rememberer himself or herself. 然而，这种新的回忆活动并非对前者的简单重复。心理学实验表明，这是一种截然不同的活动，它在回忆概率、内容编码方式、干扰效应以及被回忆材料间的内在联系等方面都与初级回忆存在差异。 ^(17){ }^{17} 这正是我们可能预期的结果，因为次级回忆并非基于本质上未改变且仍处于意识层面的经验，而是基于那些已进入长期存储、不再处于意识层面的经验——这使得它们容易受到连回忆者本人都无法察觉的变形影响。
Secondary remembering is a two-fold activity. First, it involves the retrieval of items not now in conscious mind; that is, the recapturing of experiences no longer extant in perception or in primary memory. As “stage analysis” in psychological treatments of memory suggests, retrieval is to be distinguished both from acquisition and from storage. Accuracy or ease of retrieval does not necessarily correlate with accuracy or ease of acquisition, and each of these stages must be distinguished from the distortings and forgettings that may occur during storage. In particular, we have to distinguish between the general availability of content previously acquired-andstored and its actual accessibility at a given point in time. ^(18){ }^{18} Whatever is available in principle-and a staggering amount normally is-it actually becomes accessible only in discrete, particular acts of secondary remembering by which we retrieve items from the long-term storage where they have been held in “death’s dateless night.” ^(19){ }^{19} The retrieval itself may be instantaneous (as when I was asked to recall my office number) or labored (as when I am asked to recall the name of my second grade teacher), but in every instance of successful retrieval we manage to recuperate something that has entered into a memorial limbo. In other words, accessibility entails availability but not vice versa. 次级回忆是一种双重活动。首先，它涉及检索当前不在意识中的内容，即重新捕捉那些已不存在于感知或初级记忆中的经验。正如心理学记忆研究中"阶段分析"所表明的，检索既不同于获取，也不同于存储。检索的准确性或难易程度未必与获取的准确性或难易程度相关，且这些阶段都必须与存储过程中可能发生的扭曲和遗忘区分开来。尤其需要区分先前获取并存储内容的总体可用性，与特定时间点上的实际可及性之间的差异。 ^(18){ }^{18} 原则上可获取的一切——通常数量惊人——实际上只有通过离散的、特定的次级回忆行为才能真正被获取，这些行为让我们从长期存储中提取信息，而那里曾是"死亡无期的黑夜"将它们封存之处。 ^(19){ }^{19} 提取过程本身可能瞬间完成（如被要求回忆办公室号码时），也可能费尽周折（如被要求回忆二年级老师姓名时），但在每次成功提取中，我们都设法挽回了已陷入记忆边缘的某些东西。换言之，可及性以可获得性为前提，但反之则不然。
A second aspect of the basic action of secondary remembering is found in revival. The retrieval of items vanished from view is not a merely mechanical procedure of “decoding” information that has been “encoded” upon being “placed in storage” (and sometimes recoded thereafter). ^(20){ }^{20} It is also a resuscitation of previously experienced objects, events, and circumstancesa re-experiencing of them, albeit in representational or symbolic form. The “re-” of secondary remembering takes on special significance in this activity of mnemonic re-enactment or re-presentation, ^(21){ }^{21} a significance lacking in primary remembering. Just as the latter involves no factor of retrieval (for the contents of primary memory have not been sufficiently forgotten to 次级记忆基本运作的第二个方面体现在复苏过程中。从视野中消失之物的重现，并非仅仅是机械式"解码"那些被"编码存储"（有时还会二次编码）的信息。 ^(20){ }^{20} 它更是对曾经体验过的对象、事件与情境的复苏——尽管以表征或象征形式实现的再体验。在这种记忆重演或再现活动中，次级记忆的"再"字获得了特殊意义， ^(21){ }^{21} 这种意义是初级记忆所不具备的。正如初级记忆不涉及提取因素（因其内容尚未被充分遗忘到需要......
require being retrieved), so it does not include revival either; its contents are still alive in consciousness, are still being experienced (however dimly), and hence have no need of being re-experienced: “An object of primary memory is not thus brought back; it never was lost; its date was never cut off in consciousness from that of the immediately present moment.” ^(22){ }^{22} But for that material whose date is cut off, the resuscitation effected in secondary remembering is required; and the resuscitation is of more than the date alone: at the limit, it is a revival of an entire experience, of our whole stance and attitude, the way we were in confronting and engaging the objects of our concern. To revive such an experience and these objects in secondary remembering is to give them a second chance, a second life. This second life is not the strict equivalent of the first, and Husserl is right to caution that “I can relive the present, but it can never be given again.” ^(23){ }^{23} But secondary remembering does make possible an after-life within the current epoch of the remembering mind. It is a main means by which the present and the non-immediate past rejoin each other in human experience. 需要被重新获取），因此也不包含复苏；其内容在意识中仍然鲜活，仍在被体验（无论多么模糊），因此无需被重新体验：“初级记忆的对象并非如此被带回；它从未丢失；在意识中，它的时间从未与当下时刻割裂。” ^(22){ }^{22} 但对于那些时间被割裂的材料，次级记忆中的复苏是必要的；这种复苏不仅仅是时间的重现：在极限情况下，它是对整个体验、我们完整姿态和态度的复苏，是我们面对和参与关切对象时的存在方式。在次级记忆中复苏这样的体验和这些对象，就是给予它们第二次机会、第二次生命。这第二次生命并非与第一次严格等同，胡塞尔提醒得对：“我可以重新经历当下，但它永远无法被再次给予。” ^(23){ }^{23} 但次级记忆确实让记忆心灵在当前时代中获得了一种来世。它是现在与非即时过去在人类体验中重新联结的主要方式。
Main Types of Remembering 记忆的主要类型
Granting the pervasiveness of primary and secondary remembering, can we make out more particular forms in which we remember? Such forms would not only subtend but cut across the generic forms. In describing them, I shall concentrate on those that are exemplified in long-term memory, but there are short-term counterparts to practically all of the phenomena discussed below. 在承认初级记忆与次级记忆普遍存在的前提下，我们能否辨识出更具体的记忆形式？这些形式不仅会支撑基础类型，更会贯穿其中。在描述这些形式时，我将重点探讨体现在长期记忆中的范例，但下文讨论的几乎所有现象都存在对应的短期记忆形式。
REMEMBERING SIMPLICITER 纯粹记忆
We can, and frequently do, remember single things in isolation from other things and events. Such “things” include mountains and mice, faces and flowers, houses and highways, while “events” vary from birthday celebrations to commencement exercises, from doing banal chores to moments of creativity, from being teased to teasing, from running to ruminating. In each instance, something is remembered in a more or less isolated state-as just this or just that. The “this” or “that” remembered need not be perceptual or public in status. I can very well remember simpliciter an itch or an idea, a feeling of chagrin or a sense of calamity, a fantasy or a formula known only to me. Take, for example, the bare remembering of a person, say, my friend Jan. I can remember her as such in a remarkable variety of ways. I begin by recalling her face as a whole, shift to a single feature such as her delicate chin, then to the characteristic expression of excitement which can illuminate her entire physiognomy. I remember, too, events in which Jan’s face figured and which it reflected revealingly. Beyond such concreta as the perceived face or these events, and beyond even the feelings and thoughts registered in this face or experienced in myself, there is the person “Jan,” whom I remember as a vivacious, brilliant, and endearing being. When I 我们能够且经常孤立地记住单个事物，与其他事物和事件无关。这些"事物"包括山川与老鼠、面容与花朵、房屋与公路；而"事件"则涵盖从生日庆典到毕业典礼，从处理琐碎杂务到灵光乍现的创作时刻，从被人戏弄到戏弄他人，从奔跑奔跑到沉思冥想。每种情况下，记忆都以某种相对孤立的状态存在——仅作为这个或那个被留存。被记住的"这个"或"那个"未必具有感知性或公开性。我完全可以单纯地记住一阵瘙痒或一个念头，一种懊恼的情绪或灾难的预感，一段幻想或只有我知道的公式。以单纯记住某个人为例，比如我的朋友简。我能以极其多样的方式记住她本身：最初回忆她完整的脸庞，转而聚焦某个特征比如精致的下巴，再到能点亮她整个面容的典型兴奋表情。同样记得那些有简的面容参与并生动映照的事件。 除了这张被感知的面孔或这些具体事件，甚至超越了记录在这张脸上的情感和思绪，以及我自己所经历的体验之外，还有"简"这个人——我记得她是一个活泼、聪慧而讨人喜欢的存在。当我
remember this person simpliciter, I remember her in her very uniqueness: as unreducible to any given set of qualities or events. 纯粹地忆起这个人时，我记住的是她不可复制的独特性：她无法被简化为任何特定的品质或事件的集合。
There are other objects of memory which, unlike my friend, are neither perceivable per se nor unique. These form a class that can be designated as “items of information”-where “item” denotes any piece of information that is not an episodic fact. Isolated numbers and words are the most prominent members of this class, and they were represented respectively by " 902 " and “Culligan” in my original examples. Groups of numbers or words taken as single sets can also be remembered simpliciter: “the even numbers,” “all words starting with re-,” etc. So also, concepts and laws (and their classes) are rememberable in their singularity, e.g., “the transcendental unity of apperception,” “the second law of thermodynamics,” “the equator,” etc. Such abstracta may make implicit allusion to complex facts or situations-as do " 1066 " or " E=Mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{Mc}^{2} “-but this does not prevent us from recalling them simpliciter, that is, in their strict singularity. Nor does their greater or lesser internal complexity preclude their being remembered in such straight-on fashion, for it is not this complexity that is being recalled. To recall " pi\pi " simpliciter may be equivalent to recollecting " 3.1415 . . .,” but it is not equivalent to recalling the mathematical operation by which I derive this transcendental number, much less any use to which it may be put. It is just to recall a symbol, or a number, as such and without additional complication. 还存在其他类型的记忆对象，它们与我的朋友不同，既非本身可感知也非独一无二。这些对象构成了一类可称为"信息条目"的集合——此处"条目"指代任何非情景事实的信息单元。孤立的数字与词语是这类对象中最典型的成员，在我最初的例子中分别以"902"和"Culligan"为代表。被视为单一集合的数字组或词语组同样能被纯粹地记忆："偶数"、"所有以 re-开头的词语"等。同理，概念与定律（及其类别）也能以其独特性被记忆，例如"统觉的先验统一"、"热力学第二定律"、"赤道"等。这类抽象物可能隐晦地指向复杂事实或情境——如同"1066"或" E=Mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{Mc}^{2} "——但这并不妨碍我们纯粹地回忆它们，即严格保持其独特性地回忆。它们内部或大或小的复杂性也不会阻碍这种直接记忆方式，因为被回忆的并非这种复杂性。纯粹地回忆" pi\pi "可能等同于回忆"3.1415..." 但回忆这个符号并不等同于回忆我推导出这个超越数的数学运算过程，更不等同于回忆它可能被赋予的任何用途。这只是单纯地回忆一个符号或数字本身，不涉及其他复杂因素。
Granting that what we remember simpliciter need not have been given to the senses originally, can the display in which the remembered term now appears be nonsensuous? It is often just this when we recall a particular bit of information, including certain objects and events, ^(24){ }^{24} in a rapid and unselfconscious manner-typically in the context of an activity that involves these remembered things only incidentally. ^(25){ }^{25} Nevertheless, there is a pronounced tendency for that which we remember simpliciter, however abstract in nature it may be qua number, word, concept, or law, to sediment itself into a sensuous format of presentation. Unless I am caught up in an analysis of the very sort I have been performing just above, I usually remember Jan by her face (or voice, or bodily movement), the word “Culligan” by an appropriately visualized word, " 902 " by a sensuous representation of these very numbers, " pi\pi " by the visualized symbol itself, " E=Mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{Mc}^{2} " by the visualized formula, ^(26){ }^{26} “the even numbers” by their internally pronounced or quasi-pronounced names or by a string of visualized numbers (" 2,4,6,dots2,4,6, \ldots "), and so on. In each case there is a definite proclivity to employ a self-presentified symbol or set of symbols as the vehicle of memory and thus to render the mnemonic display sensuous. 假设我们单纯记忆的内容最初未必是通过感官获得的，那么记忆项此刻呈现的方式能否是非感官性的？当我们快速且不假思索地回忆特定信息时——通常是在这些被记忆事物仅偶然涉及的活动中——往往正是如此，包括某些对象和事件。然而，无论我们单纯记忆的内容本质多么抽象（无论是数字、词语、概念还是法则），它们都存在一种显著倾向，即会沉淀为感官性的呈现形式。除非我正沉浸于上文所述的那类分析中，否则我通常通过面容（或声音、肢体动作）来记忆简，通过视觉化的恰当词语来记忆"卡利根"这个词，通过这些数字本身的感官再现来记忆"902"，通过视觉符号本身来记忆"@"，通过视觉化公式来记忆"∑"，通过内心默念或准默念的名称来记忆"偶数"，或通过一连串视觉化数字（"2,4,6,…"）等等。 在每种情况下，都存在一种明确的倾向，即采用自我呈现的符号或符号集作为记忆载体，从而使记忆展示变得可感知。
REMEMBERING-THAT 回忆-那个
In addition to objects and events, we remember states of affairs-whole circumstances in which subjects (or subject-terms) are implicated in actions 除了对象和事件，我们还记得事态——涉及主体（或主体术语）参与行动的完整情境
or endowed with qualities (active or attributive terms). The implication is the nodal point of such remembering. To remember that x did y or that x was a is to remember neither xx, nor yy, nor a in isolation; nor is it to remember their mere juxtaposition, which is still a matter of remembering simpliciter. It is to remember their very interaction, the way they are implicated in each other through a shared “predicational crease.” ^(27){ }^{27} The effect (or better, the expression) of such interaction is a state of affairs, that is, a situational structure in which the component terms are subordinated to the architectonic of the objective complex constituted by their interaction. What we remember is more the structure than the terms-or rather, the structure as manifested in and through the interinvolvement of the terms, the crease they conjointly constitute. 或是被赋予特质（主动或属性术语）。其隐含意义正是此类记忆的节点所在。记住 x 做了 y 或 x 曾是 a，既非单纯记住 xx ，也非孤立地记住 yy 或 a；更非仅记住它们的简单并置——那仍属于基础层面的记忆。真正要记住的是它们之间的相互作用，即通过共有的"谓述褶皱"彼此牵连的方式。 ^(27){ }^{27} 这种相互作用的效果（或更准确地说，表达）呈现为事态，即一种情境结构——其中组成要素都从属于由它们相互作用构成的客观复合体的建筑学体系。我们所记忆的更多是结构而非要素，或者说，是在要素相互交织中显现的结构，即它们共同构成的褶皱。
Much remembering occurs in this form. Whenever we recollect a scene in which something was happening or a process in which properties of various kinds were acquired, we are remembering-that. Such remembering is by no means restricted to recalling sequences of events possessing what I have called a “quasi-narrative” structure (e.g., my memory of viewing the movie Small Change). It extends to any remembering of any state of affairs, whether narrational or not. When I remember a single episode such as my VW suddenly crashing into the car in front of it-an episode so barren of complication or detail as to resist a narrative account-I am remembering that this incident happened: that it constituted a more or less coherent state of affairs, however momentary or fragmentary it may have been. Nor can this act of remembering-that be reduced to remembering simpliciter; in the present case, the latter would be the mere remembering of the event qua event (“the car crash”) and not of the event as entering into an objective complex (“my-VW-crashing-into-another-car-in-front-of-it”). It is evident that “crashing” is the crease of this complex, that around which subject- and object-terms revolve in the constitution of a single, but internally articulated, state of affairs. When we remember this state of affairs, we remember that it occurred. 许多记忆以这种形式出现。每当我们回想起某个正在发生事件的场景，或是某个获得各类属性的过程时，我们就是在进行"记得那件事"的记忆活动。这种记忆绝非仅限于回忆具有我称之为"准叙事"结构的事件序列（例如我对观看电影《小玩意》的记忆）。它延伸至对任何事态的记忆，无论是否具有叙事性。当我回忆起某个单一事件——比如我的大众汽车突然撞上前车这样缺乏复杂情节或细节、难以用叙事描述的事件时，我正是在记得这件事确实发生过：它构成了一个多少具有连贯性的事态，无论这个事态多么短暂或零碎。这种"记得那件事"的记忆行为也不能被简化为单纯的记忆；在当前案例中，后者仅是对事件本身的记忆（"车祸"），而非对事件作为客观复合体组成部分的记忆（"我的大众汽车撞上了前方另一辆车"）。 显然，"碰撞"构成了这一复合体的核心褶皱，主体与客体术语正是围绕它旋转，共同构成一个单一却内在分化的状态。当我们回忆这一状态时，我们记起它确实发生过。
Just as multiple episodes are not necessary for remembering-that something was the case, so what was the case need not be present to mind in a sensuous guise. The instances of remembering-that investigated in chapter 1 all possessed such a guise. But this need not have been so. I can very well remember-that nonsensuously. Here are some examples: remembering that Uncle Ralph retired from the family business in the 1930s; that the Popular Front came to power in France before World War II; that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. In none of these cases of “factual memory” ^(28){ }^{28} do II experience a sensuously specified mnemonic display. If such a display were to arise, upon analysis I would find it to be mainly of illustrative value, an adventitious fleshing-out of the bare fact being remembered. For in such cases I am remembering situations that I never witnessed myself. Since I did not 正如回忆某事曾发生并不需要多个事件片段，被回忆之事也无需以感官形式呈现于心。第一章研究的那些回忆实例虽都具有感官形式，但这并非必然。我完全可以非感官地回忆——例如：记得拉尔夫叔叔在 1930 年代从家族企业退休；记得人民阵线在二战前执掌法国政权；记得恺撒渡过卢比孔河。在这些"事实性记忆"案例中，我并未体验到具体感官化的记忆呈现。即便偶有此类呈现，经分析也会发现其主要是说明性质的，是对被记忆的赤裸事实的偶然性补充。因为这些情况下我所回忆的，都是自己从未亲历的情境。既然我未曾
witness them, i.e., was not present at their occurrence, I cannot remember how they happened in their sensuous specificity. ^(29){ }^{29} 我未能亲眼见证它们，即没有亲历其发生过程，就无法记住它们在感官具体性上是如何发生的。 ^(29){ }^{29}
We must be careful to distinguish this kind of nonsensuous rememberingthat from another quite different kind. ^(30){ }^{30} In this latter, I may very well have been present at the state of affairs being remembered, but the state of affairs was itself nonsensuous. When I remember that my grandfather doubted that human beings would ever reach the moon, I am remembering a state of affairs which I first grasped by listening to verbal utterances but which was not itself auditory or even quasi-auditory in status. “My-grandfather-doubting-that-man-would-ever-reach-the-moon” describes an objective complex that includes an opinion or thought yet is not intrinsically sensuous, even if it is normally expressed or represented in some perceptible form. Of course, I can also remember that I once heard my grandfather express his doubts on the subject. But “my-hearing-my-grandfather-express-his-doubts” is a very different state of affairs from that designated just above, and this is so even though my hearing of my grandfather or of someone else telling about my grandfather’s views (or my reading written accounts of his views) is a necessary condition for my being able to remember that he was skeptical concerning man’s capacity to land on the moon. Here the nonsensuousness of remembering-that is not so much predetermined as inherent. In the one case I cannot have been a witness of what I remember in this way; in the other, I must have been-yet to no avail. 我们必须谨慎区分这种非感官记忆与另一种截然不同的类型。 ^(30){ }^{30} 在后一种情况下，我可能确实亲历过所记忆的事态，但该事态本身是非感官性的。当我回忆起祖父曾怀疑人类永远无法登月时，我所记忆的事态最初是通过倾听言语表达而理解的，但该事态本身并非听觉性的，甚至不具备准听觉属性。"祖父怀疑人类永远无法登月"描述了一个包含观点或思想的客观复合体，其本质并非感官性的——尽管它通常以某种可感知的形式被表达或呈现。当然，我也可以记得自己曾亲耳听到祖父表达过这个怀疑。 但"我听见祖父表达他的疑虑"这一情形与前述情形截然不同，即便我通过聆听祖父或他人讲述祖父的观点（或阅读关于他观点的文字记录）是我能够记得他对人类登月能力持怀疑态度的必要条件。在此，陈述性记忆的非感知性与其说是预先决定的，不如说是内在固有的。前者情形中，我不可能亲历我所记忆的内容；后者情形中，我本应亲历却无济于事。
REMEMBERING-HOW 程序性记忆
Beyond remembering an object or event simpliciter and rememberingthat certain things were the case, we can remember how to effect a given movement. Although we may not have singled it out-or even recognized it as a separate species of our remembering-remembering-how is a distinctive and quite pervasive way in which we remember. As such, it cannot be reduced to other forms of remembering, or regarded as their mere extension. But it actively collaborates with these forms, making use of remembered objects, events, and states of affairs in its own actualizations. Thus I may remember how to do X where X itself is the event of, say, swinging a golf club correctly. Yet it remains a very different thing to remember how to swing such a club in the right way and to remember that I have once so swung it. As in the parallel case of knowing how versus knowing that, each is independent of the other. ^(31){ }^{31} I can remember how to perform the action in question without recalling any specific episodes of past swingings; conversely, I can recollect such episodes-even in considerable detail-and still not remember how to swing successfully in the present. No more than in the case of imagining-how and imagining-that can we assimilate one activity to the other. ^(32){ }^{32} 除了单纯记住某个对象或事件，以及记住某些情况曾经存在之外，我们还能记住如何完成特定动作。尽管我们可能未曾将其单独区分——甚至未曾意识到这是记忆的一种独特形式——但"记住如何做"确实是我们记忆活动中一种独特且普遍存在的方式。正因如此，它既不能被简化为其他记忆形式，也不应被视为这些形式的简单延伸。相反，它会积极与其他记忆形式协作，在自身实现过程中运用所记住的对象、事件和事态。例如，我可能记住如何完成 X 动作，而 X 本身可能就是正确挥动高尔夫球杆这个事件。然而，记住如何以正确方式挥动球杆，与记住自己曾经这样挥过球杆，仍是截然不同的两回事。正如"知道如何做"与"知道是什么"这对平行概念，二者彼此独立。 ^(31){ }^{31} 我可以记住如何完成相关动作，却回忆不起任何具体的过往挥杆场景；反之，我能够详细回忆起这些场景，却仍无法在当下成功记住挥杆的要领。 我们无法将一种活动同化为另一种，就像在想象如何和想象那样的情况下一样。 ^(32){ }^{32}
Remembering-how is not a single, simple act-form but exists in two primary modes. ^(33){ }^{33} Let us look at these in succession: 记住如何做并非单一简单的行为形式，而是以两种主要模式存在。 ^(33){ }^{33} 让我们依次来看：
Habituating/habituated remembering-how to do 习惯化/已习惯的记住如何做
By this I mean all the instances in which we remember how to do ^(34){ }^{34} something as they arise from the early stages of habituation. “Habituation” refers not only to repeated action (though this is usually required) but to becoming familiar with doing the action itself in appropriate circumstances. An example is remembering how to drive to a friend’s home after several previous visits. Although I may now have successfully learned how to get there, my remembering how to do so is not yet habitual. It has not reached the point where I could attain my destination mindlessly, “on automatic” as it were. Inasmuch as I am getting habituated or am freshly habituated, I must pay heed to various perceptual cues along the way-e.g., crucial corners, the lay of the land, a sense of how far I have come at certain points, etc.-and I may also have recourse to cues in my mind’s eye or ear. ^(35){ }^{35} Still, once I take advantage of these diverse points of reference, I do generally manage to reach my destination: I have remembered how to do so on the basis of habituation. Such remembering is equivalent to knowing how to get there, even if getting there has not yet become altogether habitual. This form of remembering-how is invaluable not just in situations of navigating and of becoming acclimatized or oriented to new environments but also in changing circumstances where it is a matter of “learning my way around” more adequately. 我指的是所有那些从习惯化早期阶段产生的、关于如何做某事的记忆实例。"习惯化"不仅指重复行动（尽管这通常是必要的），还包括在适当情境下熟悉执行该行动本身。例如，在多次造访后记住如何开车去朋友家。虽然我现在可能已成功学会如何到达那里，但记住如何做到这一点尚未成为习惯。它还没有达到我能不假思索、"自动"抵达目的地的程度。由于我正在习惯化或刚刚习惯化，我必须留意沿途的各种感知线索——比如关键拐角、地形特征、对已行驶距离的感知等——同时我也可能借助脑海中的视觉或听觉线索。尽管如此，一旦我利用这些不同的参照点，通常都能成功抵达目的地：我基于习惯化记住了如何做到这一点。这种记忆等同于知道如何到达那里，即使到达过程尚未完全成为习惯。 这种"如何记忆"的形式不仅对导航、适应新环境或确定方位等情境极为宝贵，在需要"熟悉路径"的变化环境中也同样重要。
Habitual remembering-how to do 习惯性动作记忆
By “habitual” I mean fully routinized-so much so that attending to or heeding my own remembered doing is no longer necessary. I just “do”; I act without having to think about acting. This does not mean, however, that such action is the direct or simple result of voluntary efforts. It may have come about by sheer immersion in my surroundings-as when, after months of living in a new house, I come to know my way around its interior “without a moment’s reflection.” Nor need it be strictly bodily in character: ^(36){ }^{36} I can slip, all too easily, into habitual patterns of thought or of feeling, indeed of remembering itself. Habitual remembering-how to do encompasses a vast portion of our lives, so vast that we may find it alarming to admit to ourselves as voluntary agents. And our disavowal is quite justifiable, since the saving in heedful reflection thereby achieved frees us for much in human experience that would not otherwise be possible, including the acquisition of new habitual actions! 所谓"习惯性"，我指的是完全程式化的行为——以至于不再需要刻意关注或留意自己记忆中的行为。我只是"去做"；无需思考行动本身就能完成动作。但这并不意味着此类行为是意志努力直接或简单的产物。它可能源于对周遭环境的彻底沉浸——就像在新居住了几个月后，我能够"不假思索"地在屋内自如活动。这种行为也不一定严格局限于身体层面： ^(36){ }^{36} 我们很容易陷入思维或情感的习惯模式，甚至是记忆本身的惯性。习惯性记忆——这种"如何做"的机制占据了我们生活的绝大部分，其比例之大甚至让我们不敢承认自己作为自主行为主体的身份。而这种否认完全合理，因为由此节省的注意力反思，让我们得以体验人类经验中许多原本不可能实现的事物，包括习得新的习惯性行为！
Habitual remembering-how to do has a correspondingly capacious range of actualizations, from facial grimaces to resolving equations in advanced algebra. It is most often found in the form of skilled actions. Once again, these latter need not be corporeal; but bodily skill tends to provide the most prominent paradigms for this sort of remembering-how to do: e.g., 习惯性记忆——如何行事具有相应广泛的实现方式，从面部表情到高等代数中的方程求解。它最常以熟练动作的形式呈现。同样地，这些动作未必是身体性的；但肢体技能往往为这类"如何做"的记忆提供了最显著的范例：例如，
remembering how to swim, how to ride a bicycle, how to swing a tennis racquet with the proper form. Since my original list of examples did not include a case of skilled action, let me cite an instance from recent experience. 记得如何游泳、如何骑自行车、如何以正确姿势挥动网球拍。由于我最初的例子清单未包含技能动作的案例，请允许我引用近期经历的一个实例。
I was returning to a house I had not visited in over a year. The key had been given to me by the owner without comment, even though he had once emphasized how difficult it was to open the front door with it. Nevertheless, and without any premeditation on my part, I inserted the key in the lock, made a full turn to the left and returned a half circle to the right-and the door opened immediately. 我重返一座逾年未访的房屋。房主递给我钥匙时未作说明，尽管他曾强调过用这把钥匙开启前门十分困难。然而，在我毫无预谋的情况下，我将钥匙插入锁孔，向左完整旋转一周后又向右回旋半圈——门当即应声而开。
The banality of this example should not mislead us. With the exception only of the highest-order skills, most instances of skillful remembering-how to do are humdrum in character; their value is found almost entirely in their practical usefulness-here, in entering the house where I was planning to do some writing during the next week. Hence our tendency to deride such skills as “merely mechanical,” along with the consequent temptation to locate them not just in bodily behavior but in those least developed reflex actions that we dismiss as mere “reactions.” However understandable this tendency may be when it is a question of “motor memories” wholly immanent in the body, it does not take into account the considerable interest to be found in many cases of the habitual remembering-how to do that informs skilled actions. Consider only the following three points: 这个例子的平凡性不应误导我们。除了最高阶的技能外，大多数关于"如何做"的熟练记忆实例本质上都是平淡无奇的；它们的价值几乎完全体现在实用性上——比如进入那栋我计划下周用来写作的房子。因此我们倾向于嘲笑这类技能"不过是机械性的"，并随之产生将其仅仅定位于身体行为、甚至那些被我们贬为纯粹"反应"的最低级反射动作的冲动。虽然当涉及完全内在于身体的"运动记忆"时，这种倾向情有可原，但它忽略了许多习惯性"如何做"记忆案例中蕴含的丰富意趣——正是这些记忆塑造了熟练动作。仅需思考以下三点：
Such remembering may be taken as behaviorly equivalent to not having to relearn the skill in question. Whereas I might need to be given directions again in order to find my way to my friend’s house even after I have become habituated to the right route there, this is not the case with genuinely habitual actions or movements, which have become so thoroughly learned (“sedimented”) as not to have to be relearned, or even to be thought about during their actual performance. This was precisely what happened when I performed the unlocking movements at my friend’s house: no relearning, or even rethinking, was required for this learned skill to be correctly re-performed. 这种记忆可被视为行为上等同于无需重新学习相关技能。尽管在前往朋友家的路上我已习惯正确路线，却仍可能需要再次获得指引才能找到方向；但真正的习惯性动作或运动则不然——它们已被彻底习得（"沉淀"），既无需重新学习，在实际执行时甚至无需思考。这正是我在朋友家执行开锁动作时的情形：这项习得技能无需重新学习或思考，就能被准确重现。
Involved in this kind of remembering is a sense of personal agency directed to an end or purpose that is attained by means of the skill in question. ^(37){ }^{37} This sense can be quite explicit, especially when I have just mastered a new skill (giving me an enhanced self-image, a feeling of new personal élan) or when I am blocked from enacting my skill (forcing me back upon my own resources). But it can also exist in an implicit form-e.g., as the basic conviction that this action or movement which I am remembering how to perform is my action or movement, my doing, even though I do it “mechanically” and with my mind wholly on the goal 参与这种记忆的是一种指向目的或意图的个人能动性意识，这种目的通过相关技能得以实现。 ^(37){ }^{37} 这种意识可以非常明确，尤其当我刚掌握一项新技能时（这会提升我的自我形象，带来新的个人活力感），或是当我无法施展技能时（迫使我回归自身资源）。但它也可能以隐晦形式存在——例如，作为这样一种基本信念：我所回忆的这项行动或动作是我自己的行动或动作，是我的所为，即使我"机械地"执行它，且心思完全放在动作的目标上。
of my movements. That was what happened in the above example: my thoughts were directed exclusively toward entering my friend’s house that night; yet I was aware, however dimly, that I was executing the skilled action that would make it possible for me to get there. 这正是上述例子中发生的情况：我的思绪完全专注于那晚进入朋友家这件事；然而我仍隐约意识到，我正在执行那个能让我到达那里的熟练动作。
Habitual remembering-how to do is not a matter of repeating an action or movement in every detail; it is a question of of re-enacting a pattern or structure of an action or movement. So long as one keeps within the large lines of this structure, considerable latitude is allowed-and sometimes even encouraged. In the case under discussion, the fact that I may have varied my hand movements somewhat from previous occasions did not undermine my remembering how to turn the key in the right way: where “right way” means precisely “in accordance with this particular key’s pattern of unlocking.” The same holds true for skilled movements in sports: I can remember how to perform the breast stroke in several ways provided only that my stroke conforms to a significant degree with the official version, the standard structure, of the stroke. 习惯性记忆——如何操作并非在于每个细节都重复相同的动作或运动；而在于重新演绎动作或运动的模式或结构。只要大体遵循这一结构框架，就允许——有时甚至鼓励——相当大的灵活度。以讨论中的案例而言，我手部动作与以往略有不同的事实，并未影响我记住正确转动钥匙的方式：这里的"正确方式"特指"符合这把钥匙特定的开锁模式"。体育中的技巧性动作同样如此：只要我的蛙泳动作在很大程度上符合官方规定的标准结构，我完全可以用多种方式记住如何完成这个泳姿。
As in the case of remembering-that, both modes of remembering-how to do can occur sensuously or nonsensuously. Whether as merely habituating/ habituated or as fully habitual, I can remember how to do things in engrossed sensory concreteness or in a quite abstract manner. Thus, I can remember how to do logarithms as well as how to swing a tennis racket. Moreover, variation is possible even within a single kind of action. Remembering how to drive to my friend’s home may be something I can effect only in the presence of particular perceptual cues en route; but I can also recall how to do so entirely “in my head” by rehearsing a series of turns (e.g., “three rights, one left, then a final right”), none of which is visualized, much less perceived. Similarly, I can remember how a habitual action such as doing the breast stroke goes by flailing my arms (in or out of water) in the proper sequence; or I can remember how to do the stroke by visualizing myself or someone else effecting it in my mind’s eye; or, at the limit, I can remember how the stroke goes in abstracto, as a set of directions that possess neither imaginal nor perceptual instantiation. 如同"记得某事"的情况一样，"记得如何做"的两种模式都可以以感官或非感官的方式发生。无论是作为单纯的习得/已习得行为，还是完全习惯性的行为，我都可以通过全神贯注的具体感官体验或以相当抽象的方式记住如何做事。因此，我既能记住如何计算对数，也能记住如何挥动网球拍。此外，即使在同一种行为内部也可能存在差异。记住如何开车去朋友家，可能只有在沿途特定感知线索出现时才能实现；但我也可以通过在心里排练一系列转弯动作（例如"右转三次，左转一次，最后再右转"）来完全"在脑海中"回忆路线，这些动作都没有被视觉化，更不用说被实际感知了。同样，我可以通过按正确顺序挥动手臂（在水中或水外）来记住蛙泳这样的习惯性动作；或者通过在大脑中想象自己或他人完成动作来记住如何游蛙泳；又或者，在极端情况下，我可以抽象地记住这个泳姿，就像记住一组既没有形象化也没有具体化的指令。
REMEMBERING-TO 记得去做
I want finally to take up a type of remembering rarely recognized by previous students of the subject. ^(38){ }^{38} Yet it is both distinctive and important. Its varieties include remembering to act, to reflect, to feel, to play, to work, etc., in certain ways and in certain circumstances. Consider the example of remembering to return books to the library on their due date. ^(39){ }^{39} Although I am somewhat notorious for not remembering to do this, when I do manage to remember, the following situation normally obtains. First, I already know the due date and now recall this date, even if it is specified as vaguely as “toward the end of this week.” Second, I may be actually in the process of 最后我想探讨一种先前研究者很少关注的记忆类型。 ^(38){ }^{38} 然而它既独特又重要。其表现形式包括记得以特定方式在特定情境下行动、思考、感受、娱乐、工作等。以记得在到期日归还图书馆书籍为例。 ^(39){ }^{39} 虽然我素来以健忘著称，但当我确实记得时，通常会出现以下情形：首先，我已知晓到期日并此刻回想起这个日期，即便它被模糊表述为"这周末左右"；其次，我可能正身处
returning the books (“You see, I am remembering to return these books”), on the verge of doing so, or may merely project their possible return. Third, what I remember to do is an action that I normally carry out myself, but that may be delegated to someone else-in which case the delegating then becomes the relevant remembering. Fourth, the action itself is delimited in duration and can be concluded, or at least terminated, by my own voluntary efforts. 归还书籍（"你看，我记得要还这些书"），即将付诸行动，或者仅仅是在设想可能的归还。第三，我所记得要做的事通常是我自己执行的行为，但也可能委托给他人——在这种情况下，委托行为本身就成为相关的记忆内容。第四，该行为本身在持续时间上是有限的，可以通过我的自主努力来完成，或至少终止。
These characteristics of the example indicate three basic aspects of re-membering-to. (1) As in remembering-how to do, previous learning is presupposed. In addition, however, there is a commitment or promise implicit in remembering-to, e.g., to return books I have checked out from a library. Moreover, this learning and this commitment are not idle, but exist to be acted on at a particular place (the library) and time (the due date). Thus, the spatio-temporal circumstances in which remembering-to is enacted are essential and not merely contingent: I can remember how to do sums in my head in almost any situation, but I cannot effectively remember to return books to the library in any way that is comparably oblivious to time and place. (2) The temporal dimension is especially crucial in remembering-to; it is also unique among basic types of remembering. For I remember to do, undertake, feel, think, etc., not in turning toward the past (the past is only presupposed as the period of learning and commitment) but in being directed toward the present or the future. On the one hand, I may remember to do just now, that is, simultaneously with my carrying out of what is thus remembered. (Sometimes we have already made the initial motions, e.g., started walking toward the library, when we suddenly “remember to do” what we are already in the process of doing. Here remembering-to precedes the conscious act of remembering, much as remembering how to do the backstroke may precede the act of explicitly remembering how one did it on former occasions.) On the other hand, what we remember to do may equally well lie in the future. Although this future is typically the near future (i.e., when a task or duty is expected to be performed), it can also be relatively remote (e.g., “I must remember to make mention of Sorabji’s study of Aristotle in my course on memory next year”). Such present- and futureoriented remembering is rarely found in other types of remembering, which tend to be resolutely retrospective. ^(40){ }^{40} (3) As with remembering-how to do, personal agency is an important feature of remembering-to. But this agency takes a more delimited and determinate form in the present instance. The action, duty, thought, etc., which I remember to carry out is indeed something that I alone am to do; but I do not explicitly (or even implicitly) think of myself as doing it. Nor do I necessarily envision myself doing so in the future. Even though I could not meaningfully deny that I am (or am to be) the active doer of what is thus remembered-to-be-done and not its mere witness (as in remembering-that something appeared in a certain way), I take myself to be more the vehicle of remembering-to than its agent. It is 这个例子的特征表明了"记得去做"的三个基本方面。(1) 如同"记得如何做"一样，"记得去做"预设了先前的学习。但除此之外，"记得去做"还隐含着某种承诺或保证，例如记得归还从图书馆借出的书籍。而且，这种学习和承诺并非闲置的，而是需要在特定地点（图书馆）和时间（到期日）付诸行动的。因此，"记得去做"得以实施的时空环境是本质性的，而非仅仅是偶然的：我几乎在任何情况下都能记得如何在脑中计算，但我无法以同样无视时间和地点的方式有效地记得去图书馆还书。(2) 时间维度在"记得去做"中尤为关键；这也是基本记忆类型中独一无二的。因为我记得去做、去承担、去感受、去思考等等，不是转向过去（过去仅作为学习和承诺的时期被预设），而是指向现在或未来。一方面，我可能记得现在就去做，也就是说，与我执行所记之事是同步的。 （有时我们已经做出了初始动作，例如正走向图书馆时，突然"记起要做"已经在进行的事。这里的"记得去做"先于有意识的回忆行为，就像记得如何仰泳可能先于明确回忆起以往具体做法的行为。）另一方面，我们记得要做的事同样可能存在于未来。尽管这个未来通常是近期（即某项任务或职责预期要完成时），但也可能相对遥远（例如"我必须记得明年在记忆课程中提及索拉布吉对亚里士多德的研究"）。这种面向当下和未来的记忆行为在其他类型的记忆中很少见，后者往往坚定地指向过去。 ^(40){ }^{40} （3）与"记得如何做"类似，个人能动性是"记得去做"的重要特征。但在当前情形下，这种能动性呈现出更为限定和确定的形式。我所记得要执行的动作、职责、想法等确实只有我自己来完成；但我并未明确（甚至隐含地）想到自己在执行它。 我也未必设想自己未来会这样做。尽管我无法有意义地否认自己正是（或将成为）那些被记起待办之事的主动执行者，而非仅仅是其见证者（如同记得某事曾以某种方式呈现那样），但我认为自己更像是"记得去做"的载体而非其主体。正是
through me that what I remember to do will get done. Every “through” indicates a “beyond,” and here that beyond refers to what I am to effect after remembering-to proper. The status of remembering-to is accordingly that of a pre-action or (if every human undertaking is to be viewed as an action) ^(41){ }^{41} of a preparatory action. In remembering-how to do, I help to effect the action-to-be-accomplished by the very memory of it: acting and remembering become contiguous with one another. Nevertheless, I remember to undertake an action that is not itself part of my remembering since I need not have witnessed what I am to do, or even have learned to carry it out. 通过我，那些我记起要做的事情才会得以完成。每个"通过"都指向一个"超越"，而此处的超越正是指"记得去做"这一行为之后我将实现的作为。因此，"记得去做"的状态属于前行动阶段，或（若将人类一切行为都视为行动）预备性行动的 ^(41){ }^{41} 状态。在"记得如何做"时，我通过对其的记忆本身来促成待完成之行动的实现：行动与记忆在此变得彼此接续。然而，我所记起要采取的行动本身并不构成记忆的一部分，因为我既无需见证过自己将要做的事，甚至也不必曾学过如何执行它。
Remembering-to rejoins the other main types of remembering in being enactable in either nonsensuous or sensuous form. When I remember to think certain thoughts or to feel in a particular way, I enter into a nonsensuous mode; but I am sensuously engaged when I remember to perceive something or to execute a concrete action such as returning books to a library. In this respect the range of remembering-to is commensurate with that of remembering simpliciter, remembering-that, and remember-ing-how. This is so despite the otherwise striking disparities we have found between these four major types of remembering. Moreover, we can remember to remember-just as we can equally well remember that or how we remembered on a previous occasion. The reiterability may extend yet further, so that we can remember to remember . . . to remember; or we can remember that we remembered that we remembered . . . that we remembered; or remember how we remembered . . . how we remembered. Only in remembering simpliciter does such self-expansion fail to exfoliate. 记得去做某事与其他主要记忆类型一样，既可以通过非感官形式也可以通过感官形式来实现。当我记得去思考某些想法或以特定方式感受时，我进入了非感官模式；但当我记得去感知某物或执行具体行动（比如把书归还图书馆）时，则处于感官参与状态。就此而言，"记得去做"的范围与简单记忆、事实记忆和技能记忆相当——尽管我们已发现这四种主要记忆类型之间存在显著差异。此外，我们可以"记得去记忆"，就像我们同样能"记得曾经如何记忆"或"记得当时记住了什么"那样。这种可重复性还能进一步延伸：我们可以"记得去记得...去记得"；或"记得我们曾记得...曾记得什么"；或"记得我们如何记得...如何记得"。唯有在简单记忆中，这种自我扩展无法层层展开。
Subsidiary Types of Remembering 记忆的附属类型
Besides the major types just explored, there are other act-forms in which we remember. They are “subsidiary” only in their comparative infrequency of occurrence, their relative rarity. But they are not necessarily less important than the kinds of remembering discussed above. I shall limit discussion to four instances: 除了上述主要类型外，我们还有其他形式的记忆行为。它们之所以被称为"附属"形式，仅因其发生频率相对较低、较为罕见。但这些记忆形式的重要性未必亚于前文讨论的类型。我将重点探讨以下四种情形：
REMEMBERING-AS 作为-记忆
On some occasions we say that we remember someone or something as exhibiting or having a certain attribute or quality. This attribute or quality may be regarded as residing in the thing remembered ("I remember my cousin ‘Topper’ as exuberant last summer’) or as having affected us or others in some way (“I remember that year abroad as having changed me profoundly”). In either case the as-structure serves as a nodal point for the act of remembering. It brings together the subject or topic of ascription and the ascribed property. What is remembered is the complex thus formed: ’ S -asP^(')\mathrm{P}^{\prime}. This is to be contrasted with the skeletal content of remembering simpliciter (’ S ', ’ P ', or ’ S-P\mathrm{S}-\mathrm{P} '), remembering-that ('that-S-was- P '), remember-ing-how (‘how-to-do-S’), and remembering-to ('to-carry-out-S at time tt and 有时我们会说，自己记得某人或某物"作为"具有某种特征或品质的存在。这种特征或品质既可被视为记忆对象本身的属性（"我记得表弟'托珀'去年夏天总是活力四射"），也可被视为对我们或他人产生的影响（"我记得那年海外经历深刻改变了我"）。无论哪种情况，"作为"结构都充当着记忆行为的枢纽，它将被描述的主体与所赋予的属性联结起来。被记忆的正是由此形成的复合体：'S-作为- P^(')\mathrm{P}^{\prime} '。这与简单记忆（'S'、'P'或' S-P\mathrm{S}-\mathrm{P} '）、事实记忆（'S 曾是 P'）、方法记忆（'如何做 S'）以及任务记忆（'在 tt 时间执行 S'）的骨架式内容形成对比。
place p '). It is clear that ’ S -as- P ’ most closely resembles 'that- S -was- P '. To remember my cousin as exuberant is very like remembering that my cousin acted in an exuberant way. In both cases emphasis is placed upon manifest action, looks, and the like. But there is a crucial point of difference. In remembering-that something was the case, the “I” of the rememberer is involved as the onlooker or witness of what is recalled: its essential mirror. In remembering-as, however, the rememberer’s self has no such welldefined role to play. It may play no particular role at all (as in the memory of my exuberant cousin); and it is not always conspicuous even when the as-structure consists in something’s being-affected rather than a property’s residing-in-for its effect can be upon others as well as upon myself. I can remember a year I spent abroad with someone else as influencing that person in certain ways, without taking note of any comparable changes in myself. The consequence of such a suspension of the remembering self is a correspondingly more emphatic focusing upon the character and quality of what is remembered via the as-structure itself. This is so even when what is remembered are the effects of this structure rather than the structure itself. Throughout, the stress is placed upon the “it” and not upon the “I.” To remember-as is to remember SS as P , where ’ P ', the property, is attached exclusively to ’ SS ', qualifying it primarily and my own experience of SS only secondarily. 显然，“S 作为 P”最接近于“S 曾是 P”。将我的表弟记作热情洋溢，与记得我的表弟曾以热情洋溢的方式行事非常相似。这两种情况都强调外在行为、神态等表现。但存在一个关键差异：在“记得某事曾是如此”时，记忆者的“我”作为回忆内容的旁观者或见证者参与其中——它本质上是面镜子。然而在“作为式记忆”中，记忆者的自我并不扮演如此明确的角色。它可能根本不扮演任何特定角色（如对我那位热情洋溢表弟的记忆）；即便当“作为结构”体现为某物被影响而非属性内嵌时，这个自我也未必显眼——因为影响可能作用于他人而非我自己。我能记得与某人在海外共度的一年以特定方式影响了对方，却未注意到自身发生任何类似变化。这种记忆自我悬置的后果，是通过“作为结构”本身对所记内容的特质与品质进行更为突出的聚焦。 即便所忆及的是这一结构产生的效应而非结构本身时，情况亦是如此。通篇强调的重点始终在于"它"而非"我"。所谓"忆及某物"，即是将属性'P'专属地附加于'某物'之上，使其首先限定该物本身，其次才间接关联到我对该物的体验。
REMEMBERING-WHAT 记忆-内容
When I remember what happened on last July 4 or what make of car I used to have, I am engaging in a form of remembering-that, since these two acts of remembering can be analyzed respectively as “I remember that X happened on the last 4th of July” and as “I remember that I used to have a Cricket.” Although the exact propositional content may be identical in the two kinds of remembering, there is a felt difference between them that answers to the “what” and the “that” forms of expression. To remember that, as we know, is to recall a state of affairs, a situation in which the members of an objective complex interact with, affect, and modify each other in an internally articulated fashion around a central predicational crease. To remember what, in contrast, is not to summon up an entire objective complex, but a summary version of it in the form of a whatstructure. This structure represents the nominalization of the complex, its subsumption under a description that is itself singular and without internal complication (e.g., “what happened,” “what make”). Thus, a step in the direction of remembering simpliciter is taken to the extent that we are now remembering a singularity. But the step is not complete; the what-structure remains linked intrinsically to a state of affairs, of which it is in fact a condensed surrogate. In remembering-what, we are remembering a state of affairs through its own abbreviated, nominalized core. 当我回忆去年 7 月 4 日发生的事或曾经拥有的汽车品牌时，我正进行着一种"回忆-那"（remembering-that）的形式，因为这两个回忆行为可以分别解析为"我记得去年 7 月 4 日发生了 X"和"我记得我曾有辆 Cricket"。虽然这两种回忆的确切命题内容可能相同，但二者之间存在可感知的差异，对应着"什么"与"那"这两种表达形式。如我们所知，"回忆-那"是唤回一种事态，即客观复合体的成员们围绕某个核心谓述褶皱，以内部清晰的方式相互作用、影响并改变彼此的情境。相比之下，"回忆-什么"并非召唤整个客观复合体，而是以"什么结构"的形式呈现其概要版本。这种结构代表着复合体的名词化，将其归入一个本身单一且无内部复杂性的描述之下（例如"发生了什么"，"什么品牌"）。因此，当我们现在回忆的是单一性时，就朝着纯粹回忆（remembering simpliciter）迈进了一步。 但这一步尚未完成；"何物结构"本质上仍与事态相关联，事实上它正是事态的凝缩替代物。在"记起何物"时，我们是通过事态自身被缩略的、名词化的核心来记起该事态的。
REMEMBERING ON-THE-OCCASION-OF 因机缘而记起
Remembering often arises on special occasions, especially recurrent ones such as holidays, anniversaries, and birthdays, though also when we are in particular places (e.g., my home town upon my return there). The act itself of remembering which occurs at such moments may not be exceptional; in fact, it is most typically a form of remembering simpliciter or rememberingthat: a childhood scene rises before me as I perceive the house in which I grew up, or a memory of a previous anniversary upon the occasion of a present anniversary. But, as with remembering-to, such remembering is strictly circumstance-bound, giving to the experience a particular savor. Whether its emotional tonality be nostalgic or painful, this savor is an expression of our sense of being back at a given point in space or time, of once more experiencing something (usually something especially meaningful). We have encountered an instance of such remembering in my philosophy library memory: on entering the library I was suddenly overcome by a nostalgic sense of having worked there on many previous occasions. Characteristic of this experience was the haziness of my actual recollections at this poignant moment. These recollections were not brought back to mind in detail, but as a vague series of amassed similar experiences, all tied to a particular place. Such remembering on-the-occasion-of is even more dimly present at other times. On Christmas day, for example, one may experience an atmosphere of “Christmas past” without being able to specify which Christmas, or group of Christmases, one is thus indistinctly recalling. It is as if the significance of the occasion precludes more explicit acts of remembering or at least renders them difficult, replacing them by a diffuse familiarity in which the past is present not in person but by insinuation only. ^(42){ }^{42} We should also notice, finally, the considerable commemorative power of remembering on-the-occasion-of. ^(43){ }^{43} Such remembering is not necessarily an express act of commemoration (e.g., as it might be on Memorial Day); but it often plays this role because of the very nature of the situation: to remember in this way, at this place and time, is ipso facto to commemorate past experiences that occurred in this same place at other times. 回忆往往在特殊场合涌现，尤其是那些周期性出现的时刻——节日、纪念日、生日，也包括当我们身处特定地点时（比如重返故乡之际）。这些时刻发生的回忆行为本身或许并不特殊；事实上，它最典型的表现形式就是单纯回忆或事实性回忆：当我看见童年故居时，某个儿时场景便浮现在眼前，或是在当前纪念日里想起往年的庆祝场景。但与"记得去做"类记忆类似，这类回忆严格受制于具体情境，为体验赋予独特的韵味。无论其情感基调是怀旧抑或痛苦，这种韵味都体现了我们对于重返时空某一点、再次经历某事（通常是特别有意义之事）的感知。在我的哲学图书馆回忆中，我们已遇到过此类案例：踏入图书馆的瞬间，我突然被一种曾在彼处多次工作的怀旧感所淹没。这个体验的典型特征，正是在那个尖锐时刻里，我实际回忆内容的模糊性。 这些回忆并非以细节形式重现，而是作为一系列模糊累积的相似体验，全都与某个特定场所相连。这种"逢场作景"式的记忆在其他时刻显得更为朦胧。例如在圣诞节当天，人们可能感受到一种"往昔圣诞"的氛围，却无法确定自己正在模糊追忆的是哪一个或哪几个圣诞节。仿佛这个场合的特殊意义阻断了更清晰的回忆行为，或至少使其变得困难，取而代之的是一种弥散的熟悉感——过去并非亲身在场，只是通过暗示隐约浮现。 ^(42){ }^{42} 我们最后还应注意，"逢场作景"式记忆具有可观的纪念力量。 ^(43){ }^{43} 这种记忆未必是刻意的纪念行为（如阵亡将士纪念日那般），但由于情境本身的特性，它常常扮演着纪念角色：在此情此境以这种方式追忆，本质上就是在纪念往昔在此地发生过的经历。
REMEMBERING THE FUTURE 记忆未来
At an antipode from such commemorative remembering is the very different act of remembering the future. In remembering-to, we have already encountered a case in which the future was explicitly at stake (e.g., as the time in which a duty is to be met). But there are other situations in which remembering relates to the future even more expressly. These occur when we remember a meeting, a trip, indeed any project that we have planned for the future: “I remember my dentist’s appointment tomorrow.” Notice that, as in the case of remembering-what, this statement is analyzable as “I remember that I have a dentist’s appointment tomorrow.” But the temporal modality differs radically from the normal instance of remembering-that, in 与这种纪念性回忆截然相反的是另一种行为——对未来的记忆。在"记得去做"（remembering-to）中，我们已经遇到一个明确涉及未来的案例（例如需要履行某项义务的时间点）。但还存在其他情境，其中记忆与未来的联系更为直接。这发生在我们记起某个会议、旅行计划，乃至任何为未来所做的规划时："我记得明天约了牙医"。值得注意的是，与"记得是什么"（remembering-what）类似，这句话可分析为"我记得我明天约了牙医"。但其时间模态与常规的"记得那件事"（remembering-that）存在根本差异，
which what we remember is unequivocally located in the past. We are now remembering a future situation not in its detail (this will not become possible until after we have experienced it, i.e., when it will have become the content of a normal case of remembering-that) but as something which we expect to happen, or to experience ourselves, at some subsequent point. ^(44){ }^{44} We have posited this point as existing sometime beyond the very moment in which we are right now remembering. As thus posited, it is futural; but as something that we must first recall in order to posit at all, it is tied to the past. The future is remembered in such a case, yet only as a projection from a past that is itself subject to remembering simpliciter or remembering-that. To remember my dentist’s appointment I must be able-in principle, if not in fact-to recall when I made this event this appointment in the first place. Only on this basis can I remember it as an event that is to take place at a time yet to come. ^(45){ }^{45}. 我们所记忆的内容明确地定位于过去。此刻我们正在记忆一个未来的情境，并非其细节（这要等到我们亲身经历后才会成为可能，即当它成为常规"记忆-那"的内容时），而是作为我们预期将在某个后续时刻发生或亲历的事物。 ^(44){ }^{44} 我们将这个时刻设定为存在于当下记忆行为之外的某个时间点。如此设定之下，它是未来性的；但作为必须首先被忆起才能进行设定的对象，它又与过去紧密相连。在这种情形下，未来被记忆着，却仅作为从过去投射而来的图景——而这个过去本身又受制于纯粹记忆或"记忆-那"。要记住我的牙医预约，我必须能够（至少在原则上，即便实际上未必）回想起最初预约这个事件的时间点。唯有在此基础上，我才能将其记忆为一个尚未到来的时刻即将发生的事件。 ^(45){ }^{45}
This completes the analysis of the act phase of remembering. I have not sought to be exhaustive but only to present several centrally important (and several other less important) forms of remembering, beginning with primary and secondary memory, extending through remembering simpliciter, re-membering-that, remembering-how, and remembering-to, and ending with a number of subsidiary modes. Incomplete as this intentional analysis is, it nonetheless provides vivid proof of the multiplicity of the mental. This multiplicity is such as to resist attempts to encapsulate remembering into just two main forms (as James, Husserl, and Bergson tried to do) or even three such forms (as has been essayed recently). ^(46){ }^{46} Rather than endeavoring to contain the act-forms within such strict limits, it is more salutary to remain open on the issue of the exact number of basic ways in which remembering realizes itself as an act. The fact that I have discerned four major and four minor forms of remembering in this chapter should not lead us to regard these forms as constituting anything like a dense series of species that, taken together, exhaust the genus of remembering qua act. They are simply salient sorts of remembering that emerge frequently in our ongoing experience. 至此，关于记忆行为阶段的分析告一段落。我并未试图穷尽所有形式，仅着力呈现若干核心要义（及若干次要形式）的记忆形态——从初级记忆与次级记忆发端，经由纯粹记忆、命题记忆、技能记忆与意向记忆，最终延伸至诸多衍生模式。尽管这项意向性分析尚不完整，却生动印证了心智活动的多元性。这种多元特质使得将记忆行为强行归约为两种主要形式（如詹姆斯、胡塞尔与柏格森曾尝试的）甚或三种形式（如近期某些论述所为）的努力终将徒劳。与其竭力将行为形式禁锢于严苛框架中，不如保持开放态度，直面记忆行为基本实现方式的确切数量问题。本章所辨析的四类主要与四类次要记忆形式，绝不应被视为构成了某种稠密的物种序列——仿佛这些形式的总和就能穷尽作为行为的记忆属类。 它们只是我们持续经验中频繁出现的显著记忆类型。
Nor should we suppose that each act-form is pristine and independent of the others. Just as (in Bergson’s classification) habit memories are often infused with recollective imagery while recollections themselves can become sedimented into habitual actions, ^(47){ }^{47} so we constantly encounter hybrid cases of primary memory seeping into secondary memory, of rememberingthat mixed with remembering-how, of remembering-to cum remembering simpliciter-and of the subsidiary forms merged with each of the foregoing. When it comes to matters of memory, we almost always have to do with commixture rather than with separation. And not surprisingly in view of the fact that remembering is a paramount, perhaps the paramount, connective power in our lives! Nevertheless, for purposes of analysis, especially intentional analysis, I have had to enter into a separative mode of discourse. 我们也不应假设每种记忆行为形式都是纯粹且彼此独立的。正如（柏格森的分类所示）习惯记忆常渗透着回忆意象，而回忆本身也可能沉淀为习惯性动作， ^(47){ }^{47} 我们不断遭遇着初级记忆渗入次级记忆的混合案例、记忆-内容与记忆-方式交织的案例、记忆-目的与纯粹记忆并存的案例——以及各类附属形式与上述各项相融合的案例。在记忆领域，我们几乎总需面对混杂而非分离的状态。鉴于记忆是我们生命中至关重要的联结力量（或许是最关键的联结力量），这种现象不足为奇！尽管如此，出于分析目的（尤其是意向性分析），我不得不采用分离式的论述方式。
The same thing will obtain in the next chapter, which will complete the intentional analysis of remembering. Throughout, I am driven to distinguish what remains unseparated, and often inseparable, in the experience of remembering itself. In this experience act-forms and object modes actively collaborate with each other-especially on those occasions when we are inclined to say that we have had a particularly rich or rewarding time in remembering something. 同样的情况也将在下一章出现，该章将完成对记忆的意向性分析。自始至终，我不得不区分那些在记忆体验本身中保持未分离状态——且往往不可分离——的要素。在这种体验中，行为形式与对象模式积极地相互协作，尤其当我们倾向于认为某次记忆体验特别丰富或收获颇丰时更是如此。
REMEMBERING AS INTENTIONAL
OBJECT PHASE 作为意向性对象阶段的记忆
The act of remembering is never entirely empty of content. To be remembering at all is to be directed, however deviously or indistinctly, toward that which we remember. This may seem so obviously true as to render redundant any claim that “we cannot remember without remembering something.” But we shall soon discover that this “something” is considerably more complex than may appear at first glance, consisting as it does of a number of different elements. ^(2){ }^{2} These elements in their interaction with each other constitute what we often simply term “a memory.” Experiencing a memory is equivalent to being conscious of what may be designated as the “object phase” of remembering. I prefer the latter term at this stage of analysis because it serves to remind us that to speak of what we remember, i.e., the total object, is to presuppose an act or activity by means of which we remember this object. There is no such object without an act by which we attain it, and, conversely, no such act without the compresence of some such object. This circularity of act and object phases is the very circularity of intentionality itself-of that which holds the mind together in its very self-transcendence and makes it into one self-cohering whole. But in becoming a whole it is built up from components that together constitute the full intentional correlate of remembering. Let us consider these components in succession by reflecting on the structure of this correlate. 记忆行为从来不会完全空洞无物。只要处于记忆状态，无论多么迂回或模糊，我们的意识总是指向所记忆的内容。这一观点看似不言自明，甚至让人觉得"我们不可能不记忆任何内容"的论断纯属多余。但我们将很快发现，这个"内容"远比初看时复杂得多，它由诸多不同要素构成。 ^(2){ }^{2} 这些要素的相互作用构成了我们通常简单称之为"一段记忆"的复合体。体验记忆等同于对所谓记忆"客体阶段"的觉察。在现阶段分析中，我更倾向于使用后者这个术语，因为它提醒我们：当谈论记忆内容（即整体客体）时，其实预设了使我们能够记忆该客体的行为或活动。没有获取客体的行为，客体便不存在；反之，若没有相应客体的共现，该行为也无从谈起。 这种行动与对象阶段的之间的循环性，正是意向性本身的循环性——它使心灵在自我超越中保持统一，并形成一个自我连贯的整体。但成为整体的过程是由各个组成部分构建而成的，这些部分共同构成了记忆的完整意向相关项。让我们通过反思这一相关项的结构，依次考察这些组成部分。
The Mnemonic Presentation 记忆呈现
The mnemonic presentation is all that we remember on a given occasion. I italicize “all that” to emphasize that I mean to include everything we then remember-everything save for the particular way in which what is remembered manifests itself (this will be treated under “Modes of Givenness” below). The mnemonic presentation is another way of describing the “total object” of remembering: all that we experience as presented to us, set before 记忆呈现是我们在特定场合下所记住的一切内容。我用斜体强调"一切"是为了表明，这包括我们当时记住的所有事物——除了被记忆内容显现自身的特定方式（这一点将在下文"被给予方式"部分讨论）。记忆呈现是对记忆"整体对象"的另一种描述：所有被我们体验为呈现于面前、置于我们意识之前的内容。
us, in a given case of remembering. This presentation may be divided into three importantly different elements: the specific content, the memoryframe, and the aura. Though distinguishable from each other in a descriptive account, these elements are often so intertwined in actual experiences of remembering as not to be noticed separately in their structural differences from one another. ^(3){ }^{3} 在某一特定记忆情境中呈现给我们的内容。这种呈现可分为三个重要相异的要素：具体内容、记忆框架和氛围。尽管在描述性分析中这些要素彼此可区分，但在实际的记忆体验中它们往往紧密交织，以致人们难以注意到它们彼此间的结构性差异。 ^(3){ }^{3}
SPECIFIC CONTENT 具体内容
It is upon this that attention normally fastens when we remember-often to such an extent that the aura and the memory-frame remain in the background of our awareness. Indeed, our focus on the specific content may be so intent that we also tend to lose track of the particular act-form through which we are attending to this content. My first-hand reports of various experiences as given in chapter 1 illustrate this tendency to favor and stress specific content at the expense of other basic aspects of remembering. These reports concentrated almost exclusively on the details of what was remembered: “my first distinct recollection is of a breathtakingly panoramic vista. . . .” Here the object of the “of”-a particular vista-as-recollected-is such as to restrict the description of the object phase to its specific content. Such a tendency is not deplorable; it may even be inevitable, since what we specifically recall is typically more conspicuous than how we recall it. Indeed, there is no reason why we should not employ the “what” as a fil conducteur in a phenomenological description of human experience. But we must not thereby take the part for the whole, and suppose that our descriptive work is done once we have delineated the specific content of what we remember. 通常当我们回忆时，注意力会牢牢锁定这一点——往往强烈到记忆的光晕与框架始终停留在意识背景中。事实上，我们对具体内容的关注可能如此专注，以至于也容易忽略我们正在关注这些内容时所采用的特殊行为形式。第一章中我对各种经历的第一手报告，正体现了这种倾向于以牺牲记忆其他基本要素为代价来突出具体内容的趋势。这些报告几乎完全聚焦于被回忆事物的细节："我第一个清晰的记忆是关于一片令人屏息的全景视野......"。此处"关于"的客体——即被回忆的特定视野——使得对客体阶段的描述被限制在其具体内容上。这种倾向并非可悲；它甚至可能是不可避免的，因为我们具体回忆的内容通常比回忆方式更为显著。事实上，在现象学描述人类经验时，我们没有理由不将"回忆内容"作为贯穿始终的线索。 但我们绝不能以偏概全，认为只要描绘出记忆的具体内容，描述工作就完成了。
But what is this specific content? It is anything and everything that can be remembered, only in its barest format-that is, shorn of all features that are not crucial in its description and/or identification. It is thus just what we remember and no more; it is what we would be inclined to give in the sparsest, most economical, account of an experience of remembering. That does not mean, however, that this account need be monosyllabic or even short-winded. It can be quite detailed indeed, most notably in the case of recent experiences such as my remembered viewing of Small Change. And there is even sometimes the sense that a given description could continue indefinitely, so complicated or many-leveled is the experience being recollected, as in the opening of Robbe-Grillet’s Le Voyeur. But in every instance, simple or complex, remote or recent, the specific content is precisely what is remembered, where “precisely” means with just that form and amount of detail with which what I remember presented itself to me. The exact degree of detail will therefore vary from case to case, but the necessity of being able to specify some detail holds constant throughout. If I cannot specify to myself or to others in any way whatsoever (including the use of admittedly indefinite descriptive predicates) what it is that I have remem- 但这一特定内容究竟是什么呢？它可以是任何能被记住的事物，仅以其最简形式呈现——即剥离了所有对描述和/或识别非关键的属性。因此，它仅仅是我们所记忆的内容，不多不少；它是我们倾向于以最精简、最经济的方式对记忆体验进行的描述。然而，这并不意味着这种描述必须单音节化或过于简略。实际上它可以相当详尽，尤其对于近期体验（如我所记得的观看《小零钱》的经历）而言。有时甚至会产生某种感觉：某个特定描述可以无限延续下去，因为被回忆的体验是如此复杂或多层次，正如罗伯-格里耶《窥视者》开篇所展现的那样。但无论简单或复杂、久远或新近，在所有案例中，特定内容恰恰就是被记住的内容，而"恰恰"意味着以我所记住的、向我呈现的那种形式和细节量呈现。因此，具体细节的精确程度会因情况而异，但必须能够明确某些细节这一要求始终不变。 如果我无法以任何方式（包括使用公认不确定的描述性谓词）向自己或他人说明我所记-
bered, then I cannot justifiably claim to have remembered at all. As Aristotle asserts, “Whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul . . . that he heard, or perceived, or thought this before.” ^(4){ }^{4} The “this” is the specific content, and as such it must be specifiable by some form of “saying,” whether this takes place in the soul or not. ^(5){ }^{5} 忆的内容，那么我就没有正当理由声称自己确实记得。正如亚里士多德所言："每当一个人积极进行回忆时，他总会在灵魂中说...他之前听过、感知过或思考过这个。" ^(4){ }^{4} 这里的"这个"就是具体内容，因此必须能够通过某种形式的"言说"来指明，无论这种言说是否发生在灵魂中。 ^(5){ }^{5}
Now that I have indicated what sort of thing the specific content of remembering is, the main kinds of such content can be considered. 既然我已经说明了记忆的具体内容是什么，接下来就可以考虑这类内容的主要类型了。
(1) First of all, we can discern “singular” objects and events, actions and persons. Here we remember particular things, things that are specifiably discrete: a particular face or gesture, a given gait or glimmer, a momentary mood or state of mind. It is a matter of what we remember simpliciter. The specific content of the “what” of remembering-what also belongs under this first heading. Even though such content is ultimately analyzable into an objective complex, as experienced it is singular in structure: it is just this particular thing or set of things. 首先，我们可以辨别出"单一"的物体、事件、行为和人物。这里我们记住的是特定的事物，那些可明确区分的个体：一张特定的面孔或某个手势，某种步态或微光，转瞬即逝的情绪或心境。这关乎我们纯粹记忆的内容。"记住什么"的具体内容也属于这第一类。尽管这些内容最终可被分析为客观复合体，但在体验中它们具有单一结构：就是这特定的事物或这组事物。
(2) States of affairs represent a second kind of specific content in remembering. Here we remember specifically that certain events took place-that certain circumstances obtained, or that certain happenings arose. Instead of remembering things in isolated singularity, we remember that certain things were the case; we remember not just the objective complex they form but their internal articulations within this complex. Putting it differently, we can say that the specific content consists in a “situation” or, more precisely, in the skeletal structure of a situation-in its pure “thatness.” I remember that such-and-such occurred and in so doing I remember the lineaments of this situation, the way in which certain qualities, relations, or actions irhered in it as its correlated constituents. （2）事态构成了回忆中第二种具体内容。在此我们具体记得某些事件曾发生——某些情境曾存在，或某些情况曾出现。我们并非以孤立单一的方式记忆事物，而是记得某些事物确曾如此；我们不仅记得它们构成的客观复合体，更记得这个复合体内部的结构关联。换言之，这种具体内容存在于某种"情境"中，更准确地说，存在于情境的骨架结构中——即其纯粹的"彼在性"中。我记得某某事件曾发生，通过这种记忆，我同时记得该情境的轮廓特征，记得某些性质、关联或行为如何作为其相关构成要素存在于其中。
(3) A third sort of specific content is that involved in experiences of remembering-how. Here I recall a habituated or habitual doing, as when I remember how to exercise a certain learned skill, such as rowing a boat. In this case, what I am remembering explicitly is not just the exercise of the skill, but how this performance impinged, and may still be impinging, upon myself as agent. The specific content is articulated around myself-therememberer as expressly re-enacting the skill, which (in contrast with the objects of remembering simpliciter and remembering-that) is not remembered for its own sake. (3)第三种具体内容涉及"如何记忆"的体验。此时我回忆的是一种习以为常或习惯性的行为，比如记得如何运用某项习得技能，例如划船。在这种情况下，我明确记忆的不仅是技能的运用，还包括这项表现如何影响——并可能仍在影响——作为行为主体的我。具体内容围绕着我这个记忆者明确重现技能的过程展开，这与单纯记忆和命题记忆的对象不同，此类记忆并非为了记忆本身。
(4) Finally, the content remembered may emerge in the form of actions to be carried out immediately or in the near future. These actions are often designated as duties-e.g., to feed the dog, to turn the light out, to talk in a louder voice, etc. Unlike many instances that fall under (3) above, however, they need not involve any particular skills in their enactment. For they are simply actions that we remember to undertake. Since as actions per se they can figure into various kinds of content, their specificity consists rather in the way they are bound by past commitments, promises, or vows. Thus, part of (4) 最后，被记起的内容可能以需要立即或近期执行的动作形式呈现。这些动作常被定义为职责——例如喂狗、关灯、提高音量说话等。但与前述第三类多数情况不同，它们的执行无需特定技能。因为这些只是我们记得要去完成的动作。作为动作本身，它们能融入各类内容，其特殊性更多体现在它们与过往承诺、誓言或誓约的绑定方式上。因此，
the specific content of remembering to speak in a louder voice may be my vow to make myself better understood. I need not remember this vow as a particular past experience in order to remember to act upon it in the present. 记得要大声说话这一具体内容的部分成因，可能源于我让自己表达更清晰的誓言。我无需将这个誓言作为特定过往经历来记忆，就能在当下记得依此行动。
Two brief remarks are in order here. First, the close correspondence between kinds of specific content and the major act-forms is not at all surprising but, indeed, just what we should expect in view of the strict correlativity of act and object phases. A particular kind of remembering will call for, and dovetail with, a particular kind of content; otherwise, the experience of remembering would fall into disarray instead of being the more or less cohesive whole that it presents itself as being. Second, each of the kinds of specific content discussed above can be presented in a sensuous or a nonsensuous guise, even though there is often a bias in favor of the former. 此处需要做两点简要说明。首先，特定内容类型与主要行为形式之间的紧密对应关系毫不令人惊讶，实际上，考虑到行为阶段与对象阶段的严格相关性，这正是我们预期的结果。某种特定类型的记忆会要求并契合某种特定类型的内容；否则，记忆体验就会陷入混乱，而非呈现为或多或少连贯的整体。其次，上述讨论的每种特定内容类型都能以感性或非感性的形式呈现，尽管通常更倾向于前者。
MEMORY-FRAME 记忆框架
Although we can thus single out the specific content of what we remember for description and discussion, on closer examination we find it to be embedded in a “memory frame,” that is, the setting within which specific content is presented to us. Such a setting is not of uniform appearance but varies from one experience of remembering to another. Indeed, it varies precisely in accordance with the character of the specific content itself, providing a unique ambiance for this content in each case. Moreover, we do not always apprehend the memory-frame with the same perspicuity. Sometimes it is only dimly manifest, and often it is not thematized. Nevertheless, it is always operative to some degree, as the main means by which specific content is situated. When we are not at all aware of any such frame, we may be led to doubt that we are remembering at all. This can happen in the memory of dreams. When I cannot “place” the content of a dream that flashes back into mind, I may very well apprehend this content as a present fantasy. But when I can say to myself, implicitly or explicitly, that “I dreamed that last night,” I have found a setting (a strictly temporal setting in this case) that helps me to identify the presentation as a memory rather than as a fantasy. ^(6){ }^{6} 尽管我们可以将记忆中的特定内容单独提取出来进行描述和讨论，但细究之下便会发现，这些内容其实嵌在某种"记忆框架"之中——即特定内容得以呈现给我们的情境。这种情境并非千篇一律，而是随着每次记忆体验的不同而变化。事实上，它的变化恰恰取决于特定内容本身的特性，在每种情况下都为这些内容营造出独特的氛围。此外，我们对记忆框架的把握也并非总是同样清晰。有时它只是隐约显现，往往未被主题化。但无论如何，它总在某种程度上运作着，作为安置特定内容的主要方式。当我们完全意识不到任何此类框架时，就可能怀疑自己是否真的在回忆。这种现象常出现在梦境回忆中——当闪回脑海的梦境内容无法被"定位"时，我很可能将其视为当下的幻想。 但当我能对自己说（无论是隐晦还是明确地）"我昨晚梦见了"，我就找到了一个情境（在此例中是一个严格的时间情境），这帮助我将呈现的内容识别为记忆而非幻想。 ^(6){ }^{6}
The primary function of the memory-frame is therefore evident: it serves as a setting by which the specific content of a memory may be situated and, as situated in a certain way, identified as mnemonic in character. The nature or inherent structure of the memory-frame is far from evident, howeverdue to its changeable appearance and to its equally changeable apprehension. Despite this variability, we can make out four basic factors in its composition. 因此记忆框架的主要功能显而易见：它作为一种情境，使记忆的具体内容得以定位，并通过这种特定方式的定位，被识别为具有记忆特征。然而，记忆框架的本质或内在结构却远非显而易见——这源于其多变的表现形式与同样多变的感知方式。尽管存在这种可变性，我们仍能辨别出其构成的四个基本要素。
Worldhood 世界性
This is not a constant or universal factor in the constitution of memoryframes. There is little, if any, sense of world present in the immediate recall 这并非记忆框架构成中恒定或普适的要素。在即时回忆中，几乎不存在（即便有也极少）对世界的感知
of items of information learned by rote, such as dates or historical facts. ^(7){ }^{7} But in many full-blown memories we do experience-or better, co-experiencethe embrace of an environing world. Even if it lacks the massive solidity and the unendingness that we find in the perceived world, the world of the remembered does exhibit consistency and persistence as part of a given memory-frame. It acts as an underlying field of presentation for the specific content remembered, and in this respect it is more fully worldlike than the momentary mini-worlds of imagination. ^(8){ }^{8} We may therefore speak of the “worldhood” ^(9){ }^{9} of the memory-frame-a worldhood which has two major components: scene and surroundings. The scene, taken in a strict sense, is the scene of action, that wherein a remembered object, event, state of affairs, performance, etc., appears or occurs. The scene may be spatial or temporal-or both at once. It forms the immediate setting for the specific content remembered. As such, it is this content’s place of presentation, the locus where it is given. ^(10){ }^{10} The surroundings, on the other hand, refer to the nonimmediate setting, the general vicinity that surrounds the scene. Just as the scene situates the specific content, so the surroundings situate the scene. They do so by providing an arena in which the scene and the specific content can emerge and unfold. This arena may itself be void (i.e., in the manner of an empty field) or filled with content of its own. Such content is made up of co-remembered (versus focally remembered) things-“contiguous associates” in James’s apt phrase ^(11){ }^{11}-which form with the specific content a loosely knit constellation. The contiguous associates are not normally singled out or even mentioned in a verbal description, since they remain at the edges of what we remember. ^(12){ }^{12} 通过死记硬背获取的信息条目，比如日期或历史事实。 ^(7){ }^{7} 但在许多完整的记忆中，我们确实体验——更准确地说，共同体验——到一个环绕世界的怀抱。即便它缺乏我们在感知世界中所发现的那种厚重的实在性与无休止性，记忆世界仍作为特定记忆框架的一部分，展现出连贯性与持久性。它为被记忆的具体内容提供了一个基础性的呈现场域，在这方面，它比想象中那些转瞬即逝的微型世界更具完整的世界性特征。 ^(8){ }^{8} 因此我们可以谈论记忆框架的"世界性" ^(9){ }^{9} ——这种世界性包含两大要素：场景与周遭环境。严格来说，场景是行动发生的场所，是被记忆的对象、事件、事态、表演等显现或发生的所在。场景可以是空间性的或时间性的——或者二者兼具。它构成了被记忆具体内容的直接背景。正因如此，它是这些内容得以呈现的场所，是其被给予的位置。 ^(10){ }^{10} 而周遭环境则指向非直接的背景，即环绕场景的总体邻近区域。 正如场景定位了具体内容，周遭环境也定位了场景本身。它们通过提供一个场域来实现这种定位——在这个场域中，场景与具体内容得以显现并展开。这个场域本身可能是空无的（即如同空白领域），也可能充盈着自身的内容。这些内容由"共忆之物"（与焦点记忆相对）构成——用詹姆斯贴切的表述就是"毗邻关联物" ^(11){ }^{11} ——它们与具体内容共同形成一个松散的记忆星座。这些毗邻关联物通常不会被单独挑出，甚至在语言描述中也不会被提及，因为它们始终徘徊在我们记忆的边缘地带。 ^(12){ }^{12}
Self-presence of the rememberer 记忆者的自我临现
Like worldhood, self-presence is not an inevitable concomitant of all remembering. Yet precisely where there is such worldhood within the memory-frame, the self-presence of the rememberer may become a noticeable component of the object phase of remembering. For the presence in question is that of the rememberer himself or herself at the scene remembered. In other words, we may recall not only the scene and its sur-roundings-and the specific content set within this scene-but also ourselves as present to all three of these constituents (and they to us). Then our own role in the experience or event recollected becomes integral to what we remember. We have internal evidence that we were there-there in the very midst of the remembered. 与世界性一样，自我在场也并非所有记忆活动的必然伴随物。然而恰恰在记忆框架内存在这种世界性时，记忆者的自我在场可能成为记忆对象阶段中一个显著组成部分。因为这里所说的在场，正是记忆者本人在被忆场景中的存在。换言之，我们回忆的不仅是场景及其环境——以及该场景中的具体内容——还包括我们自身与这三重要素（以及它们与我们）的共在关系。于是我们在被回忆经验或事件中的角色，便成为记忆内容不可分割的部分。我们拥有内在证据表明自己曾身临其境——就在被忆情境的核心处。
The exact way in which we remember ourselves as having been there can vary considerably. It may be a dominant part of remembering. This was clearly the case in my nostalgic remembering of having worked in a particular philosophy library: my working there formed the nearly exclusive focus of that set of related memories. Or one’s self-presence may be simply one item among others, as was evident in my Yosemite and Small Change mem- 我们忆及自身在场的确切方式可能千差万别。它可能构成记忆的主导部分，正如我对某哲学图书馆工作经历的怀旧式回忆：在那里工作的场景几乎完全占据了那组关联记忆的焦点。或者，自我在场可能只是众多记忆要素中的普通一项，这在我关于优胜美地和小额零钱的记忆中就表现得十分明显。
ories-where others were co-present and shared the remembered scene with me. Or, again, such self-presence can be quite muted, as in my very dim “Culligan” memory. 忆境中——他人与我共同在场，共享着记忆中的场景。又或者，这种自我在场感可能极为微弱，就像我那模糊不清的"卡利根"记忆。
In whichever way and to whatever degree self-presence is an ingredient in the memory-frame, it can be of cardinal importance in remembering. For it is mainly responsible for that special sense of familiarity-that cozy “warmth and intimacy” ^(13){ }^{13}-which pervades many of our returning memories. In contrast, no such familiarity figures prominently into most of our imaginings, which are often quite impersonal in comparison. ^(14){ }^{14} But it would be a mistake to make familiarity into an indispensable attribute of remembering-as Russell tried to do. ^(15){ }^{15} Not only are there extraordinary instances of remembering in which familiarity is not felt where it would otherwise be expected (e.g., in what are technically termed “jamais vu” memories), but many ordinary memories do not include any factor of self-presence. The latter is especially evident in nonsensuous remembering-that (i.e., when we remember facts that were never experienced by us in the first person) and in routinized remembering-how (i.e., when we recall skilled actions which are not accompanied by distinct recollections). ^(16){ }^{16} We may conclude that when it is an active ingredient in the memory-frame, self-presence bears importantly on the fate of remembering; but it need not be present at all for bona fide remembering to arise. 无论以何种方式、在何种程度上，自我在场成为记忆框架的组成部分，它都可能对回忆过程起到关键作用。因为正是这种自我在场，主要造就了那种特殊的熟悉感——那种令人安适的"温暖与亲密" ^(13){ }^{13} ——这种感受弥漫于我们许多重现的记忆中。相比之下，大多数想象活动并不具备这种显著的熟悉感，它们往往显得更为客观抽离 ^(14){ }^{14} 。但若将熟悉感视为回忆不可或缺的特征——如罗素曾试图论证的那样——则是一种谬误 ^(15){ }^{15} 。不仅存在某些特殊的回忆现象（例如专业术语所称的"似不相识"记忆）中本该出现的熟悉感却缺席的情况，许多普通记忆也根本不包含任何自我在场的要素。这种情况在非感官的"事实性回忆"（即回忆那些我们从未亲身经历的事实）以及程式化的"技能性回忆"（即回想那些不伴随具体记忆片段的熟练动作）中表现得尤为明显。 我们可以得出这样的结论：当自我在场成为记忆框架中的活跃要素时，它对记忆的命运具有重要影响；但即使没有自我在场，真实的记忆仍可能产生。
Remembered space 被记忆的空间
In actual experiences of remembering, the spatiality and temporality of the mnemonic presentation are often correlated to the point of becoming indissociable. The “when” and the “where” are inextricably linked-so that, for example, to remember a scene from my grandparents’ home is ipso facto to remember a scene that took place at a certain period of my childhood. Whenever such a scene is recalled, I know almost for certain that it comes from this period, despite the fact that I may have had other, later experiences at the same place. The converse situation can also obtain: a given period of one’s life may always, or most characteristically, be remembered in terms of a given location: a room, a building, a landscape. Such a strict correlation between one particular stretch of time and one equally particular location in space does not, of course, always occur. But even when it does not, we can discern specifically spatial and specifically temporal structures that are ingredient within what we remember. These structures are the primary means of situating specific content, anchoring it more or less securely. Without such anchorage, this content would be cast adrift; it would be worldless. 在实际的记忆体验中，记忆呈现的空间性与时间性往往相互关联，直至不可分割。"何时"与"何处"紧密交织——例如，回忆祖父母家中的场景，本质上就是在回忆童年某个特定时期发生的情景。每当这样的场景被唤起，我几乎可以确定它来自这一时期，尽管我可能在同一地点有过其他更晚的经历。反之亦然：人生的某个阶段可能总是——或最具特征性地——通过特定场所被记起：一个房间、一栋建筑、一片风景。当然，这种特定时间段与特定空间位置的严格对应并非总是发生。但即便没有这种对应，我们仍能辨识出记忆内容中特有的空间结构与时间结构。这些结构是定位具体内容的主要方式，或多或少稳固地锚定着记忆。 若无这种锚定，记忆内容将漂泊无依；它将失去世界根基。
The spatiality inherent in the mnemonic presentation appears in quite diverse forms, several of which I shall pick out here. (1) The most minimal space is that in which isolated items of experience or information appear: the 记忆呈现中固有的空间性以相当多样的形式显现，此处我将选取其中几种。(1)最微小的空间是孤立经验或信息项显现之处：这些记忆
face of my friend Jan, the visual symbols for “902,” or “Culligan.” Here there is neither scene nor surroundings-just a bare presentation in which the remembered item, and this item alone, figures. The presentational space lacks any articulation with an environing space; its only configuration or structuration is internal, e.g., among the various features of Jan’s face, the numbers of “902,” the letters of “Culligan.” This constricted space excludes all else, leaving just enough room for presenting the specific content recalled, as if to say: this and no more. (2) A somewhat more capacious space was evident in my short-term memory of tea-tasting. The multiple items in this memory brought with them a correspondingly variegated spatial presentation. Not only did this presentation appear as having a circumambient space (albeit only dimly specified) and as containing more complex internal relations, but the order of complexity was increased by the multisensory nature of the experience. The space remembered was not visual alone but also auditory, haptic, gustatory, etc. Each of these modalities of remembered space has special features: the readily penetrable character of soundspace, the billowy and fragile quality of olfactory space, the decidedly buccal location of gustatory space, etc. In spite of this complexity and multiplicitywhich reflect the complexity and multiplicity of the synesthetic experience itself-such a primary memory includes an effect of diminished involvement in the spatiality of the remembered content. (3) This sense of remove-of distance between myself as rememberer and what I remember-becomes more pronounced in relation to long-term memories of episodes from the distant past. Some such distance can be observed in almost all of one’s childhood memories. Even the most distinct and seemingly indubitable memories from this era are experienced in the present as if through a screen or sieve. Indeed, in just such cases there may be an actual Entfremdungseffekt as we are struck by such a vastly different earlier self of ours engaged in apparently innocent activities. Yet much the same alienation-effect may also arise in the remembering-that of events in which we played no part at all; here too we seem to remember through a glass darkly and at a considerable remove. (4) At other times, however, there may not be any sense of such distance but, on the contrary, a merging of the rememberer (i.e., of his or her self-presence) with the remembered. This occurs above all in cases of remembering-how to do, e.g., when we remember how to perform a certain tennis stroke. In such an instance, the spatiality is normally confined to that of our own skillfully moving body in its goal-directed and yet selfcircumscribed activity. 朋友简的面容、“902”的数字符号或“库力根”的字母组合。这里既无场景也无环境——只有赤裸的呈现，其中仅浮现被记忆的单一项目。这种呈现性空间与环境空间毫无关联；其唯一的结构形态是内在的，例如简面容的各个特征、“902”的数字排列、“库力根”的字母序列。这种紧缩的空间排斥一切他物，仅够容纳被唤起的特定内容，仿佛在宣告：仅此而已。（2）在品茶的短期记忆中，则显现出更为广阔的空间。这段记忆中的多重项目带来了相应多样化的空间呈现。该呈现不仅拥有环绕空间（尽管界定模糊），包含更复杂的内部关联，更因体验的多感官特性而提升了复杂程度。被记忆的空间不仅是视觉的，还涵盖听觉、触觉、味觉等维度。 这些记忆空间模式各有其独特特征：声音空间易于穿透的特性、嗅觉空间如波浪般起伏且脆弱的特质、味觉空间明确位于口腔的位置等等。尽管存在这种反映联觉体验本身复杂性与多样性的多重特性——此类初级记忆仍包含着对记忆内容空间性参与度减弱的效果。（3）这种疏离感——即作为记忆者的我与被记忆内容之间的距离——在涉及遥远过去事件的长期记忆时变得尤为显著。几乎所有人的童年记忆中都可见这种距离感。即使这个时期最清晰、看似确凿无疑的记忆，当下体验时也仿佛隔着一层纱网或筛子。事实上，恰恰在此类情形中可能存在真实的异化效果，当我们惊觉那个从事着看似天真活动的、与我们截然不同的早年自我时。 然而，同样的疏离效应也可能出现在那些我们完全未曾参与的事件回忆中；在此类情形下，我们的记忆仿佛隔着一层晦暗的玻璃，带着相当程度的隔阂感。(4) 但另一些时候，这种距离感可能完全不存在，相反地，记忆者（即其自我在场）会与记忆内容融为一体。这种现象尤其出现在对技能操作的记忆中，例如回忆如何完成某个网球击球动作时。在此类情况下，空间性通常仅限于我们自身熟练运动的身体范围内，体现为目标导向却又自我限定的活动中。
When we turn to the temporality of the remembered, we notice first of all a phenomenon reminiscent of that just discussed under the heading of spatiality. This is the presence of considerable indeterminacy in regard to location in time. We often specify this location by such locutions as “last year,” “in the past few weeks,” “in my early childhood,” etc. These locutions are often less than fully focused; instead of pinpointing the event or experience remembered, we posit (or better, retroject) a vaguely delimited framework within which we feel reasonably certain that the event or experience occurred. But we balk at tying down the precise moment of occurrence within this framework. Even when we are recalling something that happened as recently as “yesterday” or “this morning,” we use these inexact terms as temporal indices rather than the more precise designations of “10:01 p.m.” or (if a clock is not available) “when the shadow cast by the sun reached just this particular point.” Now this is not merely a matter of being slothfully unobservant. We might very well have tried to be much more exact-for instance, had we been cross-examined as a witness of an accident or a crime. But since we do not usually make this effort except on occasions when the precise time must be known for extrinsic reasons, one begins to suspect that the memory-frame resists full specification so as to allow for maximum temporal latitude. This is not just to cover up possible mistakes in our estimates as to when the remembered event took place but, more importantly, to suit the inherent temporality of remembered material it-self-especially its duration, which can be very difficult to determine with precision. Thus, even for those events about whose general time of occurrence we are quite certain (so that the possibility of error is not at issue), we still project a less than fully definite temporal setting. We say that the Battle of Hastings took place in 1066 instead of citing (unless we are historians of the subject) the very days in 1066 during which the battle lasted. ^(17){ }^{17} 当我们转向被记忆之物的时间性时，首先注意到一个与先前讨论空间性时相似的现象。这就是时间定位上存在相当大的不确定性。我们常用"去年"、"过去几周"、"我幼年时期"等表述来指称这种时间定位。这些表述往往缺乏精确聚焦；与其说我们精准定位了被记忆的事件或经历，不如说我们设定（或更准确地说，回溯投射）了一个模糊界定的框架——在这个框架内，我们有理由确信该事件或经历确实发生过。但我们抗拒在这个框架内锁定具体的发生时刻。即便回忆"昨天"或"今早"刚发生的事，我们仍使用这些不精确的术语作为时间标识，而非更精确的"晚上 10 点 01 分"或（若无钟表）"当太阳影子刚好到达这个特定位置"之类的指称。这绝非仅仅是出于懒惰的疏忽。倘若我们作为事故或犯罪目击者接受盘问，很可能就会竭力追求更高的精确度。 但由于我们通常不会费心去精确记忆时间——除非出于某些外在原因必须知道确切时间——人们开始怀疑，记忆框架抗拒完全精确的时间定位，是为了保持最大程度的时间弹性。这不仅是为了掩盖我们对记忆事件发生时间可能存在的估算错误，更重要的是为了适应记忆材料本身固有的时间性——尤其是其持续时间，这往往难以精确判定。因此，即使对那些我们相当确定大致发生时间的事件（此时错误可能性已非考量重点），我们仍会投射出一个不完全明确的时间背景。比如我们会说黑斯廷斯战役发生于 1066 年，而不会具体指出（除非是专业历史学者）这场战役在 1066 年持续的确切天数。 ^(17){ }^{17}
What we call the “date” of an event or happening is nevertheless the most precise format in which the temporal matrix of the memory-frame crystallizes itself. Despite the remarkable range which a given date may allow for-“1986,” “January 1986,” and “January 25, 1986” are all dates-it is still an effective way of demarcating one period of time from another. “1986,” however capacious it is qua date, still does exclude “1985” and “1987” on either side of its considerable extent. Indeed, a date affixed to a memory characteristically exhibits a basic ambivalence of being unspecific with regard to what lies within its limits but quite emphatic as to what is to be excluded as lying beyond these same limits. ^(18){ }^{18} 我们所谓事件的"日期"，实则是记忆框架中时间矩阵最精确的固化形式。尽管特定日期允许存在显著跨度——"1986 年"、"1986 年 1 月"和"1986 年 1 月 25 日"都可称为日期——它仍是划分不同时段的有效方式。"1986 年"作为日期无论多么宽泛，依然明确排除了其可观范围两侧的"1985 年"与"1987 年"。事实上，附着于记忆的日期典型地展现出一种根本矛盾性：对于其界限之内的事物显得模糊不清，却对超越这些界限的存在表现出斩钉截铁的排斥。 ^(18){ }^{18}
In fact, it is only in exceptional cases that we remember a past event or experience along with its date as a temporal marker. ^(19){ }^{19} For the most part, we are not aware of any appropriate, much less exact, date for what we remember but only of what James calls “a general feeling of the past direction in time.” ^(20){ }^{20} Such a feeling arises most conspicuously in the case of those 实际上，唯有在特殊情境下，我们才会将过往事件或经历与其作为时间标记的日期共同回忆。 ^(19){ }^{19} 大多数时候，我们对所记内容并无确切日期的意识，至多只有詹姆斯所称的"对时间过去向度的总体感受"。 ^(20){ }^{20} 这种感受在那些......
memories which emerge suddenly and which we cannot place at any particular period in the past-most notably in déjà vu, déjà faite, or déjà raconté experiences where we feel convinced that we have encountered their specific content before but cannot say where, not even within very large parameters. Even if we do not succeed in determining which precise part of the past they stem from-and thus which symbolic designation, which date, could be suitably affixed to them-we remain convinced that they originated somewhere in the past, at some prior point that has already occurred. Despite its vagueness, this conviction suffices for the purposes of the memory-frame, whose situating function is fulfilled in such instances by the very belief that what is remembered took place sometime in the past. The fact that this past is so dimly adumbrated-lacking even the liberal limits which a generic date such as “1986” would impose upon it-does not prevent it from acting as a framework for the specific content we remember. 那些突然浮现却又无法确定具体发生时期的记忆——最典型的莫过于似曾相识（déjà vu）、似曾经历（déjà faite）或似曾讲述（déjà raconté）的体验：我们确信曾遇见过这些特定内容，却无法指明具体情境，甚至连大致的时空范围都难以划定。即便我们无法追溯这些记忆究竟源自过去的哪个精确片段——因而也无法为其贴上合适的象征标签或日期——我们依然坚信它们必定源于某个已逝的过往时刻。这种确信虽然模糊，却足以支撑记忆框架的运作：在这些情境中，定位功能正是通过"所忆之事必属往昔"这一信念来实现的。纵使这个过去如此朦胧难辨——连"1986 年"这类宽泛日期所能提供的起码界限都不具备——它依然为我们所忆的具体内容提供了承载框架。
Beyond date and general past-directedness there is a third way in which what we remember becomes characterized in temporal terms. This is found in the relationship between the specific content remembered and other past objects or events. These latter, which can aid our return to the past considerably, may have occurred either at the same time as the specific content-as when I remember where I was at the time of John Kennedy’s assassinationor at some different time, as when I recall this assassination in association with that of Robert Kennedy. In the former case we have to do with simultaneous events that coincide or overlap in time with the focally recalled event. Such co-events or “contiguous associates” are particularly useful as forms of aide-mémoire, and we frequently rely on them as helpmates when we are searching for a particular memory or for a detail within a memory. ^(21){ }^{21} They constitute the proximal neighborhood-the temporal version of what I earlier called the “immediate setting”-of specific content that is remembered. In this capacity they serve to stretch out remembered time sidewise beyond the delimited moment in which the specific content per se is held to have arisen or to have lasted. 除了日期和普遍的过去指向性之外，我们记忆的内容在时间维度上还具有第三种特征。这体现在被记忆的具体内容与其他过往事物或事件之间的关系中。后者能极大帮助我们重返过去——它们可能与被记忆的具体内容发生在同一时期（比如我记得约翰·肯尼迪遇刺时自己所在的位置），也可能发生在不同时期（比如我将这起刺杀事件与罗伯特·肯尼迪遇刺事件关联回忆）。前一种情况涉及与焦点回忆事件在时间上重合或交叠的同步事件。这类"共时事件"或"邻近关联物"作为记忆辅助工具特别有效，当我们搜寻特定记忆或记忆中的细节时，常常会依赖这些帮手。它们构成了被记忆具体内容的"近端邻域"——即我先前所称"即时情境"的时间版本。 它们通过这种方式将记忆时间横向延展，超越那些被限定为特定内容本身产生或持续的具体时刻。
The nonsimultaneous objects or events which we recall in conjunction with focal content, on the other hand, have the function of situating this content in a larger context: e.g., “the tragic fate of the Kennedy family,” or “modern assassinations.” This function is realized thanks precisely to the lack of simultaneity-which leaves successiveness as the relevant ordering principle. An ordered series is set up, even if not deliberately; and the focally remembered event is placed in it in a before and/or after relation to the other events recollected. This can also serve as an effective mnemonic device, one that we may employ on purpose when we reconstruct an entire sequence of events so as to aid the remembering of a particular event located within this sequence: we find the particular event more readily because it has been nested in a series whose other successively arranged members act as alterna- 另一方面，我们与焦点内容共同回忆的非同时性对象或事件，其功能在于将这一内容置于更广阔的语境中：例如"肯尼迪家族的悲剧命运"或"现代刺杀事件"。这种功能正是通过非同时性得以实现——这使得先后顺序成为相关的组织原则。一个有序的序列由此建立，即便并非刻意为之；焦点记忆事件被置于其中，与其他回忆事件形成前后关联。这也可作为一种有效的记忆手段，当我们需要重构整个事件序列以帮助回忆其中某个特定事件时，可以有意运用这种方法：由于特定事件被嵌套在由其他按顺序排列的成员构成的系列中，我们能更轻易地找到它。
tive cues for its retrieval. A consequence of this strategy is to extend time in a linear, forward-and-backward, way. 记忆检索的主动线索。这种策略的后果是以线性、前后往复的方式延展时间。
The experienced quality of remembered time possesses much the same range as we have found to obtain in the case of remembered space. It varies from being apprehended in a sudden flash-as seemingly instantaneous and without any appreciable duration of its own (e.g., in my memories of “902” and “Culligan”)-to being experienced as quite protracted (e.g., my memory of viewing Small Change). In the latter case, as I noted, time often assumes a quasi-narrative form: it unfolds in the manner of a story that is being recounted. Incidents are “strung out” over time-a time that is not, however, homogeneous in its unfolding. 记忆时间的体验特质与我们在记忆空间中所发现的范围极为相似。它既可能以瞬间闪现的方式被把握——看似即时且自身不具明显持续时间（如我对"902"和"Culligan"的记忆），也可能被体验为相当漫长的过程（如我对观看《小零钱》的记忆）。在后一种情况下，正如我所指出的，时间常呈现准叙事形态：它以被讲述的故事方式展开。事件在时间上"串联展开"——但这个展开过程的时间并非均质。
The resulting heterogeneity is a basic feature of memories having a consecutive character. In parallel with the clustering phenomenon observed in the instance of remembered space, there is a tendency for memories whose content has the same or similar period of origin to knot themselves together in groups and to be remembered in relation to each other. We see this phenomenon at work whenever we speak of “memories of being a student at the University of X,” “memories of summers spent on Cape Cod,” or “memories of working late into the night.” ^(22){ }^{22} Along with such clustering goes compounding-that is, the tendency to compress a group of temporally related memories into a single composite memory or a single emblematic memory-as well as distending, the thinning out of the temporal intervals between nodal memories or groups of memories. ^(23){ }^{23} All this knotting, compounding, and distending is more extreme than in remembered space, with the consequence that the temporal matrix is more discontinuous and disjunctive than its spatial counterpart-as well as more concentrated and deep-going at critical points. Hence the frequent sense that spontaneously arising memories emerge from a more complex, manifold origin in time than in space. Our memories are typically rooted in comparatively few places but in many different times-more times than we could begin to recount. While places situate events and to this extent are characteristically isolated and few in number, times serve instead to connect remembered items and in this capacity tend to be more numerous. 这种异质性是具有连续特征的记忆的基本属性。与在空间记忆实例中观察到的聚类现象类似，那些内容源自相同或相似时期的记忆倾向于彼此交织成组，并在回忆时相互关联。当我们谈及"在 X 大学求学时的记忆"、"科德角度夏的回忆"或是"深夜工作的记忆"时，就能看到这种现象在起作用。 ^(22){ }^{22} 与这种聚类相伴而生的是复合现象——即把时间上相关联的记忆群压缩为单一复合记忆或标志性记忆的倾向——以及延展现象，即节点记忆或记忆群之间时间间隔的稀释。 ^(23){ }^{23} 所有这些交织、复合与延展都比空间记忆中的表现更为极端，其结果是时间矩阵比空间对应物更具间断性与断裂性——同时在关键节点上又更为集中与深入。 因此常有这样的感觉：自发涌现的记忆在时间维度上的起源比空间维度更为复杂多元。我们的记忆通常植根于相对较少的地点，却关联着众多不同的时刻——多到我们难以尽数。地点承载着事件的发生，因此往往孤立且数量有限；而时间则串联起记忆的片段，其数量自然更为繁多。
A different kind of heterogeneity arises from the contrast between the time of remembering and the time remembered. This contrast can be quite poignant. For we know that we shall never again experience the previous point or period in time in its aboriginal form-"I can relive the present, but it can never be given again [i.e., as present]"24-whereas I might well return to a perduring place: indeed, even if it has changed its character in certain ways, it will remain the same place. ^(25){ }^{25} Moreover, we are particularly prone to an alienation-effect when we become aware of a profound temporal gulf existing between the self who is presently remembering and the self being 另一种异质性源于记忆行为的时间与被记忆时间之间的对比。这种对比可能极为尖锐。因为我们深知，永远无法以原初形式重新体验过去的某个时点或时段——"我可以重温当下，但它再无法以当下之姿重现"24——然而我却很可能重返某个恒久的地点：即便它的某些特质已改变，它仍是同一个场所。 ^(25){ }^{25} 更值得注意的是，当我们意识到此刻正在记忆的自我与被记忆的自我之间存在着深邃的时间鸿沟时，尤其容易产生疏离效应。
remembered (albeit only indirectly or implicitly). The time in which the latter self existed has elapsed definitively and forever; it is a temps mort. Even if I am expressly remembering myself as, say, exercising a skill that I still possess, I experience the memory of myself-as-pristine-performer as estranged from this still-skilled but now-older self who is doing the remembering. 被记住的（尽管只是间接或隐晦地）。那个曾经的自我所处的时光已永远逝去；那是一段死寂的时间。即使我明确记得自己正在运用一项至今仍掌握的技能，记忆中那个作为纯粹执行者的自我，也会与此刻正在回忆的、技艺犹存但年岁已长的自我产生疏离感。
Underlining this difference is the basic fact that the period of time in which I do my remembering is subject to quite exact chronological measure-ment-I need only look down at my watch to pin down the moment of remembering-in contrast with the time being remembered, which we have seen to be resistant to any such measurement even when it possesses a date. This is not the difference between a punctiform present and a nonpunctiform past-none of experienced time is strictly punctiform ^(26){ }^{26}-but between a form of duration that allows, and even invites, interpretation in terms of the point, the instant, and the line and one that obstinately refuses any such interpretation. The difference-and the mystery of the difference-is nowhere better revealed than in the everyday circumstance of recalling what happened during a whole year, its major events at least, in a thrice-the thrice of time occupied by the act of remembering itself-whereas the recalled events themselves may contain and exhibit considerable temporal spread. 凸显这一差异的基本事实是：我进行回忆的时间段可以被精确计时——只需低头看表就能确定回忆发生的时刻——而被回忆的时间则抗拒任何此类测量，即便它具备明确日期。这并非点状当下与非点状过去的区别（所有经验时间都非严格点状），而是两种持续形式的差异：一种允许甚至欢迎以点、瞬间和线条来诠释，另一种则顽固拒绝任何此类诠释。这种差异——及其神秘性——在日常回忆场景中展现得最为淋漓尽致：我们能在回忆行为本身占据的瞬息之间，回想起整年发生之事（至少是重大事件），而被回忆事件本身却可能包含并呈现相当可观的时间跨度。
AURA 灵韵
In addition to specific content and the memory-frame, the mnemonic presentation contains a third component. This component, the aura, is much more difficult to describe than the content or frame because of its intrinsically diffuse nature. It is what Bergson would call a “zone of indetermination.” ^(27){ }^{27} Nevertheless, I shall attempt a brief description in order to acknowledge the important role of the aura in many memories and its presence to some degree in all memories. 除了具体内容和记忆框架之外，记忆呈现还包含第三个组成部分。这个被称为"氛围"的组成部分，由于其本质上具有弥散性，比内容或框架更难描述。正如柏格森所言，它属于一种"不确定地带"。尽管如此，我仍尝试进行简要描述，以确认氛围在许多记忆中的重要作用及其在所有记忆中某种程度的存在。
We may begin by noting that the aura characterizes the mnemonic presentation in two distinguishable forms, each of which deserves description at this point: 我们可以首先注意到，氛围以两种可区分的形式表征着记忆呈现，每种形式都值得在此进行描述：
(1) It appears first of all in the form of a blurred fringe or margin surrounding specific content and its memory-frame. It is the vanishing of these beyond the point of precise determinability in terms of time, space, worldhood, objecthood, eventhood, etc. As Minkowski claims, “Whatever the slice of the recalled past may be, whatever the depth of the recall that characterizes it, there is always a vast but obscure zone around it, from which it emerges and which serves as its support.” ^(28){ }^{28} Thus the aura is not just unthema-tized-as anything else in the presentation may be at a given moment-but unthematizable. It is radically inchoate, in contrast with, say, a date, which may always be made more definite, at least in principle. (That is, 它首先以一种模糊的边缘或边界形式出现，环绕着特定内容及其记忆框架。这种模糊性体现在这些要素在时间、空间、世界性、对象性、事件性等方面超越了精确可确定的界限。正如闵可夫斯基所言："无论回忆中的过去片段是什么，无论其回忆深度如何，周围总存在一个广阔而模糊的区域，记忆正是从中浮现并以此为依托。" ^(28){ }^{28} 因此，这种氛围不仅像呈现中的其他事物一样在特定时刻未被主题化——更是本质上无法被主题化的。它与日期等可被不断明确（至少在原则上）的事物形成鲜明对比，呈现出根本性的未完成状态。（也就是说，
we can always further specify a given date: from day to hour, from minute to second, etc.) Such a fringe factor is the equivalent of what I have elsewhere called the “imaginal margin.” ^(29){ }^{29} Both can be said to be resolutely nondes-cript-to be “an obscure perspective without horizons, without limits” ^(30){ }^{30} yet to represent the very way in which the specific content of imagining or remembering evanesces of its own accord by dispersing and disappearing within an act of apprehension. For what we imagine or remember does not simply present itself and then come to an altogether abrupt spatio-temporal end. It tends, rather, to fade out, to dissolve, and it does so even in a brief imagining of “Pegasus” or a peremptory remembering of the name of the street on which one once lived. But these highly abbreviated displays dissolve quite rapidly compared to the much slower dissolutions of quasinarrative imaginings and rememberings. ^(31){ }^{31} In every case, however, the aura or margin is that which the imagined or remembered content dissolves into, its terminus ad quem-albeit a terminus without determinate dimensions. 我们总能进一步细化一个给定的日期：从天到时，从分到秒，等等。）这种边缘因素等同于我在其他地方所称的“想象性边缘”。两者都可以说是坚决地非描述性的——是“一种没有地平线、没有界限的晦暗视角”，却又代表了想象或记忆的具体内容在感知行为中自行消散与消失的方式。因为我们想象或记忆的事物并非简单地呈现自身后便戛然而止于某个时空节点。它更倾向于逐渐淡出、溶解，即便是在短暂想象“珀伽索斯”或突然记起曾居住过的街道名称时也是如此。但与准叙事性想象和记忆更为缓慢的消解相比，这些高度简化的呈现消散得相当迅速。然而在所有情况下，光晕或边缘都是被想象或记忆内容最终消融其中的所在——尽管这个终点并无确定的维度。
The differences between the imaginal and rememorative margins-insofar as one can still speak meaningfully of differences between what is so indistinct to begin with-are of two general sorts. On the one hand, the marginal region of imaginative presentations is usually more noticeable than in the case of mnemonic presentations, where we tend to overlook marginal factors altogether. This difference reflects the fact that imaginative presentations are often experienced in considerable isolation from immediate surroundings-i.e., in their “context-independence” ^(32){ }^{32}-whereas what we remember is typically more continuous with its context. On the other hand, even when the margin is quite noticeable in both cases, it tends to assume a more pronounced form in what we imagine than in what we remember. Compare, for example, the visualization of a wholly imagined friend with the visualization of a remembered friend. The imagined friend will normally appear encircled by a prominent and even conspicuous margin of indefiniteness, while the remembered friend appears with a significantly less discernible margin. Why is this? It has to do with the differing ontic status possessed by the two kinds of content. Remembered content is actual in status; it is something that we assume has in fact appeared or occurred on some previous occasion (even if we cannot now recall the precise moment). Imagined content, in contrast, is purely possible in status; it is something that, at most, might have appeared or occurred previously or that might yet do so in the future. ^(33){ }^{33} Positing imagined content as only possible, I am not as engrossed in it as such; my attention wanders more freely beyond this content to its immediate environs and more particularly to its margin, where still other possibilities might emerge. When I posit remembered content as actual, however, I tend to remain riveted to it, and I am correspondingly less tempted to transcend it toward a marginal region that lacks such sturdy actuality. 想象边缘与记忆边缘之间的差异——在两者本就模糊难辨的情况下仍能言之成理地谈论差异——大致可分为两类。一方面，想象呈现的边缘区域通常比记忆呈现更为显著，后者往往让我们完全忽略边缘因素。这种差异反映出想象呈现往往脱离当下环境而被体验——即其"语境独立性" ^(32){ }^{32} ——而记忆内容通常与语境更具连续性。另一方面，即便两者边缘都相当明显，想象内容的边缘形态往往比记忆内容更为鲜明。试比较完全虚构的朋友形象与记忆中朋友的形象：虚构朋友通常会被显著甚至醒目的模糊边缘所环绕，而记忆中的朋友则带着难以察觉得多的边缘。原因何在？ 这与两种内容所具有的不同本体状态有关。记忆中的内容在状态上是实际存在的；我们假定它确实曾在某个先前场合出现或发生过（即便此刻我们无法回忆起确切时刻）。相比之下，想象的内容在状态上纯粹是可能性的；它至多是某种或许曾出现过或将来可能出现的事物。 ^(33){ }^{33} 将想象内容设定为仅具可能性时，我并不会如此全神贯注于它；我的注意力会更自由地游离于该内容之外，转向其直接周边环境，尤其是其边缘地带——那里可能涌现其他可能性。然而当我将记忆内容设定为实际存在时，我往往会牢牢聚焦于它，相应地也更少受到诱惑去超越它而投向缺乏这种坚实现实性的边缘区域。
(2) The second form in which the aura of the mnemonic presentation appears can be called its atmosphere. ^(34){ }^{34} Unlike the margin, which encircles the specific content and the memory-frame, the atmosphere is experienced as pervading the presentation itself. Where the former rings around what we remember, the latter is given as a presence felt throughout. Moreover, our present remembering self often becomes beguiled and caught up in the same atmosphere. ^(35){ }^{35} （2）记忆呈现的第二种光环形式可称之为氛围。 ^(34){ }^{34} 与环绕特定内容和记忆框架的边缘不同，氛围被体验为渗透于呈现本身之中。前者环绕着我们所记忆的内容，后者则作为一种弥漫性的在场被感知。此外，我们当下的记忆自我常常会被这种相同的氛围所迷惑和吸引。 ^(35){ }^{35}
In this way memory and desire merge, much as Plato described in the Philebus. ^(36){ }^{36} Desire is in turn linked to emotion as its most expressive and overt manifestation. The atmosphere pervading the mnemonic presentation and ourselves as rememberers is characterized by a particular emotion or group of emotions, lending to this atmosphere its dominant tonality. It is not accidental that we speak of memories as “sad” or “joyful,” “heartrending” or “exhilarating.” But when we do so, we are referring more to the atmosphere than to the specific content-or more exactly, to the atmosphere of and for this content. The character of such an atmosphere is emotional, and it is experienced in undisguisedly emotional terms: as rememberers, we tend to become sad or joyful in the act of our own remembering. ^(37){ }^{37} Yet just this infectious emotional assimilability between the rememberer and the remembered is what is most characteristic of the aura-as-atmosphere: it dissolves dualities and fuses otherwise disparate terms. 记忆与欲望就这样交融在一起，正如柏拉图在《斐莱布篇》中所描述的那样。欲望又作为情感最外显的表达与之相连。弥漫在记忆呈现中的氛围，以及作为记忆者的我们自身，都被某种特定情感或情感群所浸染，赋予这种氛围以主导性的基调。我们称记忆为"悲伤"或"欢欣"、"心碎"或"振奋"并非偶然。但当我们这样说时，所指的更多是氛围而非具体内容——更准确地说，是为这些内容所浸染的氛围。这种氛围的本质是情感性的，它以毫不掩饰的情感方式被体验：作为记忆者，我们往往在回忆的过程中变得悲伤或欢欣。然而，正是记忆者与被记忆之物之间这种极具感染力的情感同化性，构成了氛围作为灵光最显著的特征：它消解二元对立，熔铸原本分离的要素。
Although the aura thus takes two discernibly different forms within the mnemonic presentation, these forms combine and co-operate in the basic task of unifying this presentation. Without an aura as margin and as atmosphere, the presentation might risk becoming a mere congeries of dispersed parts-or else a bare monogram that is difficult to distinguish from a fantasy or image. ^(38){ }^{38} Since what we remember always presents itself as something more than a monogram and as something internally unified, it must contain a factor beyond what inheres in the specific content or even in the memoryframe. The frame unifies in terms of time, space, and world; but what holds the frame itself together and allows it to play its situating role is the aura. The latter unites the mnemonic presentation as a whole by its distinctive two-fold action of surrounding the presentation as its margin and permeating it as its atmosphere. The very diffuseness of the aura in both of its forms aids in this process. The result is the com-position of the mnemonic presentation as a coherent experiential unit: as aa presentation with its own identity and stability. 尽管在记忆呈现中，灵韵呈现出两种明显不同的形式，但这些形式在统一记忆呈现的基本任务中相互结合、协同作用。若缺乏作为边缘与氛围的灵韵，记忆呈现可能沦为散落部分的简单堆砌——抑或沦为难以与幻想或意象区分的空洞符号。 ^(38){ }^{38} 鉴于我们所记忆的事物总是以超越符号的形式呈现，且具有内在统一性，它必然包含超越具体内容甚至记忆框架的要素。框架通过时间、空间和世界实现统一；而将框架自身凝聚并使其发挥定位作用的，正是灵韵。灵韵通过其独特的双重作用——既作为边缘环绕呈现，又作为氛围渗透其中——将记忆呈现整体统一起来。灵韵两种形式所特有的弥散性恰恰促进了这一过程。最终形成的是作为连贯经验单元的记忆呈现之 aa 构型：具有自身同一性与稳定性的呈现。
Modes of Givenness 被给予性模式
The foregoing account of the object phase is not yet complete, however. In focusing on the constitution and unification of the mnemonic presenta- 然而，关于对象阶段的上述论述尚未完整。在聚焦于记忆呈现的构成与统一时——
tion, I have stressed the “what” at the expense of the “how”-how, namely, this presentation is given to us in remembering. It is given to us in many ways, not one only. One and the same rememberatum can be given to us differently at different times or in different circumstances. As Husserl says, “we can carry out remembering ‘more quickly’ or ‘more slowly’, clearly and explicitly or in a confused manner, quick as lightning at a stroke or in [a series of] articulated steps, and so on.” ^(39){ }^{39} Whether this variability proves the “freedom” of remembering as Husserl also claims is a question beyond our immediate concern. ^(40){ }^{40} How then is the mnemonic presentation given to us? In four major ways: 在论述中，我过于强调"什么"而忽略了"如何"——即这个呈现是如何在回忆中被给予我们的。它以多种方式而非单一形式被给予我们。同一个被记忆物在不同时间或不同情境下会以不同方式呈现给我们。正如胡塞尔所言："我们可以'更快'或'更慢'地进行回忆，清晰明确地或混乱模糊地，闪电般瞬间完成或通过[一系列]分步骤实现，诸如此类。" ^(39){ }^{39} 这种多变性是否如胡塞尔所声称的那样证明了回忆的"自由性"，这个问题超出了我们当前的讨论范围。 ^(40){ }^{40} 那么记忆性呈现是如何被给予我们的呢？主要有四种方式：
CLARITY 清晰
A particular presentation may offer itself to us with varying kinds of clarity. These are of two sorts. First, there is the steadily diminishing clarity with which an experience sinks back in primary memory; as it fades away in retentions, and in retentions of retentions, it becomes gradually dimmer (unless we focus upon it again expressly). ^(41){ }^{41} Second, there are variations of clarity that do not arise from such quasi-automatic fading-or even from the “veiling” to which so many secondary memories are prone ^(42){ }^{42}-but from the differential effects of various parts of the mnemonic presentation. The consequence of such effects is a series of instances differing mainly in degree. The sudden recollection of “902” was utterly distinct in presentation, appearing transparently and without any ambiguity in its mode of givenness. My “Culligan” memory displayed considerable distinctness too, though it was beclouded by the attendant images that accompanied it. The result was a hybrid clarity that was present in most of the other examples as well. In the Yosemite memory, the initial view of the park was given quite lucidly (aided, no doubt, by later perceptions of the photograph taken of this view); but the visual details of subsequent scenes were much more dimly given. Lack of clarity can also occur by omission, as happened in the philosophy library memory, in which the unclarity concerned less the particular details of remembered scenes than what exactly I had been doing there at certain previous points. In this instance, dimness of fact is more crucial than dimness of detail. The aura of a particular memory will often be of decisive importance in this regard, serving to obscure (as when an atmosphere of anger obfuscates what the anger was about) or to make luminous (as when the joyfulness of the atmosphere acts as a clue to the precise nature of what is remembered). But a basic variation in clarity may also be due to the memory-frame, especially with regard to the definiteness inhering in remembered time or space: despite the comparative clarity of “Culligan” as a visual display, it was highly ambiguous with respect to its temporal matrix. Indeed, the specific content itself may predetermine the clarity with which a presentation is given; I can remember a severe siege of sickness when I was a child; but since I was delirious at the time, the spe- 特定的呈现可能以不同程度的清晰度向我们展现。这可分为两类。首先，是经验沉入初级记忆时持续递减的清晰度；随着它在保持及保持的保持中逐渐消退，其明晰度会逐步减弱（除非我们再次明确聚焦于它）。其次，还存在并非源于这种准自动消退——甚至不是源于次级记忆常见的"遮蔽"现象——而是源于记忆呈现中不同部分差异效应所导致的清晰度变化。这类效应的结果是一系列主要在程度上存在差异的实例。"902"的突然回忆在呈现上极为鲜明，以其被给予的方式透明无歧地显现。我的"Culligan"记忆也展现出相当的鲜明度，尽管伴随它的相关图像使其蒙上阴影。这种混合的清晰度同样存在于大多数其他案例中。 在约塞米蒂的记忆中，公园最初的景象被描绘得相当清晰（这无疑得益于后来看到的该景色的照片）；但随后场景的视觉细节则模糊得多。记忆的模糊性也可能源于遗漏，正如哲学图书馆记忆中所发生的那样——那里的不清晰与其说是关于记忆场景的具体细节，不如说是关于我在某些先前时刻究竟在那里做了什么。在这种情况下，事实的模糊比细节的模糊更为关键。特定记忆的氛围在这方面往往具有决定性意义：它可能遮蔽真相（比如当愤怒的氛围掩盖了愤怒的缘由），也可能照亮记忆（比如当愉悦的氛围成为追溯记忆确切本质的线索）。但清晰度的根本差异也可能源于记忆框架，尤其是记忆中的时间或空间所固有的确定性：尽管"卡利根"作为视觉展示相对清晰，但其时间背景却极为模糊。 确实，具体内容本身可能预先决定了呈现的清晰度；我记得童年时曾遭受过一场重病；但由于当时神志不清，那特
cific content of this memory is exceedingly blurred in my recollection of it. 这段记忆的具体内容在我的回忆中已变得极其模糊。
DENSITY 密度
By “density” I mean the felt compactness or solidity of what we remember. Once again the range of variation is considerable. On the one hand, certain memories present themselves to us as intrinsically ephemeral-not just in the sense of being short-lived but as diaphanous, light, porous. What we term a “passing memory,” typically composed of a single image, often presents itself as having a low degree of density. Here the mnemonic presentation seems so thin, so depthless and floating, that it may even be difficult to distinguish it from a passing fancy, which has much the same ethereal character. On the other hand, some memories present themselves as high in density-as concentrated, heavy, solid-from the very beginning. Prominent here are memories of highly charged or quite solemn occasions. But density is not decided by specific content alone. It can also result from the telescoping of many memories into a central memory whose density is itself an expression of the extreme compression that has occurred. Also, the sheer fact of recency tends to increase the density of a memory-as in the case of my short-term memory of tea-tasting in which the taste of the tea, the look of the objects, sounds, etc., all were held in mind as dense presences having considerable sensuous solidity. Density can also reflect stationing in temporal and spatial frameworks: the more specific the date or the location of what we remember is, the denser its presentation is likely to be. It is around such spatial or temporal nodal points that other remembered material tends to gather and coalesce, increasing the density still further. A single pivotal date, which comes to stand for an epochal event, may gain a remarkable density over time: “1492,” “1776,” “1945.” So too may our date of birth or, for that matter, our home address or the number on our office door. Thus density is not dependent on the sensuousness of the mnemonic presentation, but can consist in the echoes or resonances-the influx of connoted material-which lend to something nonsensuous a characteristic weight, a consistency and impact which it would not otherwise possess. 所谓"密度"，我指的是记忆中事物所呈现的感知上的紧实度或坚固性。这种变化的范围同样相当广泛。一方面，某些记忆以本质上转瞬即逝的姿态呈现——不仅短暂易逝，更显得朦胧、轻盈、多孔。我们称之为"短暂记忆"的，通常由单一意象构成，往往呈现出较低的密度。这类记忆呈现如此稀薄、如此缺乏深度且飘忽不定，甚至难以与同样具有空灵特质的短暂幻想区分开来。另一方面，有些记忆从一开始就展现出高密度——浓缩、沉重、坚实。其中尤为显著的是那些充满强烈情感或极为庄重场合的记忆。但密度并非仅由特定内容决定。它也可能源于众多记忆向某个核心记忆的坍缩，该核心记忆的密度本身就是极端压缩发生的体现。 此外，记忆的新近性本身往往会增加其密度——就像我短期记忆中品茶时的体验：茶的味道、器物的外观、声响等，都以具有强烈感官实感的密集存在形式留存于心。密度也可能反映在时空框架中的定位：我们所记忆之事的日期或位置越具体，其呈现的密度往往就越高。正是围绕这些空间或时间的节点，其他记忆材料倾向于聚集融合，使密度进一步增加。一个标志性日期（如"1492"、"1776"、"1945"）随着时间推移可能获得惊人的密度，它代表着划时代的事件。我们的出生日期、家庭住址或办公室门牌号同样可能如此。因此密度并不依赖于记忆呈现的感官性，而可以存在于回声或共鸣中——即联想材料的涌入——它们赋予非感官事物以独特的重量、连贯性和影响力，这些特质原本并不具备。
TEXTURALITY 纹理性
This mode of givenness is closely related to density and is often correlated with it. But it is distinguishable from it by virtue of referring specifically to the way in which the surface of the mnemonic presentation is experienced as given. It is a question of the particular “feel” of this surface, its implicit palpability. Texturality may be such a prominent mode of what we remember that it comes to dominate its description-as was the case with the tea episode (an episode in which, moreover, there was a correlation between density and texturality). In other instances, it may be so faintly operative as hardly to merit mention, e.g., in the case of my remembering “Culligan” and “902.” Nevertheless, numbers and words are not entirely lacking in textural- 这种给予方式与密度密切相关，且常与之相互关联。但它通过特指记忆呈现表面被体验为给予的方式而与密度区分开来。这关乎该表面特有的"触感"，其隐含的可触知性。纹理性可能成为我们所记忆之物的显著模式，以至于主导了对其的描述——正如茶事件中的情形（在该事件中，密度与纹理性还存在关联）。在其他情况下，它可能微弱到几乎不值一提，例如当我记忆"Culligan"和"902"时。然而，数字和词语并非完全缺乏纹理性。
ity, as is sometimes dramatically evident in remembering lines of poetry: “Lilacs last in dooryard bloomed. . . .” The vast majority of cases, however, fall in between the two extremes just mentioned. In them, texturality plays a subdued but nonetheless distinctive role, being the way in which the various surfaces of remembered items are presented to us as coarse, uneven, smooth, silken, etc. Whenever we are inclined to use one of these latter words in our description of a memory, we are referring to texturality. ^(43){ }^{43} 正如有时在回忆诗句时戏剧性地显现的那样："门前的紫丁香最后绽放了......"。然而，绝大多数情况介于上述两个极端之间。在这些情况下，质地性扮演着一种低调但仍具特色的角色，它是被记忆物品的各种表面以粗糙、不平、光滑、丝滑等方式呈现给我们的途径。每当我们倾向于在记忆描述中使用这些词语时，我们指的就是质地性。 ^(43){ }^{43}
DIRECTNESS 直接性
Finally, and quite crucially, the directness with which a mnemonic presentation is given must be considered. The main kinds of directness, each with its own differences of degree, are as follows. First, there is the directness of personal participation in the action being remembered, that is, self-presence in the form of enactment. Such participation reaches an extreme point in cases of habitual remembering-how to do, in which the rememberer and the remembered become one with each other: II, who am now executing a skilled action, am at one with the very self who first learned how to perform this action, and former performings are strictly continuous with my present performing, which represents their remembering. Second, directness of presentation may occur in the guise of my having been the witness of an object, event, or state of affairs that is being remembered. These latter, as the specific contents of memories, are what is most focused upon. One’s own self-presence as witness is given along with them in a tandem mode, as co-present-as having been there too, albeit on the margins of the scene remembered. Third, a genuinely indirect givenness arises in instances in which facts are remembered of which one could not have been a witness: the signing of the Magna Carta, the outbreak of the FrancoPrussian War, etc. Although we may recall such facts with complete clarity, they are not remembered as directly given to us: I do not remember the scene itself, much less my witnessing of it, in which the Magna Carta was signed. I only remember that it was signed (and perhaps at a particular date), where the “that” signifies that the event itself is quite outside my personal experience-and hence must be remembered in the indirect form of a learned fact. Fourth, still another mode of indirectness is found in re-membering-by-proxy. I can remember the Oklahoma Land Rush as told to me by my grandfather, thus remember it through him as my stand-in. To the extent that I identify with my grandfather in his recounting of this event, I remember it “with his eyes.” But these eyes are only on loan; my memory remains vicarious and its full description cannot avoid reference to my grandfather as a mediating figure: “As my grandfather told it to me, 'no one could cross the line until. . . .” "The introductory clause underlines the indirectness, and what is put in single quotes is in effect my memory of my grandfather’s direct memory. My own role is necessarily that of preserver or transcriptor of my grandfather’s reminiscing, and my own recollection of this 最后，也是至关重要的，必须考虑记忆呈现的直接性。主要的直接性类型及其不同程度的差异如下。首先，存在对记忆行为亲身参与的直接性，即以践行形式呈现的自我在场。这种参与在习惯性"如何做"的记忆中达到极致，记忆者与被记忆者合而为一：此刻正在执行熟练动作的我，与最初学会该动作的自我完全同一，过去的执行与当下的执行严格连续，后者即前者的记忆。其次，呈现的直接性可能表现为我曾是记忆对象、事件或情境的见证者。这些作为记忆的具体内容，最受关注。见证者的自我在场以伴随模式呈现——作为共同在场者"也曾身临其境"，尽管处于记忆场景的边缘。 第三，当回忆起那些我们不可能亲历的事实时，会出现一种真正间接的给予性：比如《大宪章》的签署、普法战争的爆发等。尽管我们可能对这些事实记得一清二楚，但它们并非作为直接给予我们的内容被回忆：我不记得签署《大宪章》的场景本身，更不记得自己目睹该场景的经历。我只记得它被签署过（或许还记得具体日期），这里的"它"表明事件本身完全超出我的个人经验范围——因此必须以习得事实的间接形式被记忆。第四，还存在另一种间接性模式，即通过代理的再记忆。我可以通过祖父的讲述来记忆"俄克拉荷马土地争夺战"，从而将他作为我的替身来回忆此事。在我认同祖父对这件事的叙述时，我是在"用他的眼睛"记忆。但这些眼睛只是借来的；我的记忆仍是替代性的，其完整描述必然要提及作为中介者的祖父："正如祖父告诉我的那样，'在...之前谁都不能越过界线...'" "开篇的从句强调了这种间接性，而单引号内的内容实际上是我对祖父直接记忆的回忆。我的角色必然成为祖父追忆的保存者或转录者，而我自己对此的回忆"
reminiscing (e.g., in the form of perceiving how he looked when recounting the incident, etc.) is the only form of direct remembering of which I am capable in such a case. 回忆（例如通过感知他在叙述事件时的样貌等形式）是我在此类情况下能够进行的唯一直接记忆形式。
With this discussion of four major modes of givenness we have reached the end of our description of the object phase of remembering. This phase harbors considerable complexity-more complexity in any case than most of us care to pay attention to in the ordinary course of remembering. Remaining riveted to the specific content for the most part-many “memories” are described in terms of this content alone-we tend to overlook the other facets of the intentional correlate of remembering. So that we may keep the full picture more clearly in mind, it may be helpful to summarize the overall structure of the object phase in a formulaic and graphic way: 通过对四种主要给予模式的探讨，我们完成了对记忆客体阶段的描述。这一阶段蕴含着相当大的复杂性——其复杂程度远超大多数人在日常记忆过程中所关注的范畴。由于我们通常将注意力固着于具体内容（许多"记忆"仅凭这些内容就被描述），往往忽视了记忆意向相关项的其他面向。为使我们能更清晰地把握整体图景，不妨以公式化和图示化的方式对客体阶段的总体结构进行概括：
Object Phase, or Full Intentional Correlate of Remembering 对象阶段，或记忆的完整意向相关项
A. Mnemonic Presentation: what we remember A. 记忆呈现：我们所记住的内容
Specific Content: what we remember in particular and as such: objects, actions, persons, states of affairs, etc. 具体内容：我们特别记住的具体事物：物体、行为、人物、事态等
Memory-Frame: that which situates specific content 记忆框架：为具体内容提供情境的载体
a) Worldhood a) 世界性
b) Self-presence b) 自我在场
c) Remembered space c) 记忆空间
d) Remembered time d) 记忆时间
Aura: the indefinite setting of the presentation 灵韵：呈现的不确定情境
a) margin a) 边距
b) atmosphere b) 氛围
B. Modes of Givenness: how the mnemonic presentation is given B. 呈现模式：记忆表象如何被给予
Clarity 清晰度
Density 密度
Texturality 纹理性
Directness 直接性
The analyses undertaken in this chapter and in chapter 3 have attempted to discern the intentional structure of remembering. To the extent to which they have succeeded, these analyses have shown remembering to be an experience that exhibits the two closely intertwined dimensions that I have called “act phase” and “object phase.” The preceding chapter examined basic ways in which we carry out the act of remembering; it disclosed four major act-forms along with several subordinate modes of enactment. The present 本章及第三章的分析尝试辨明记忆的意向性结构。就这些分析的成功之处而言，它们表明记忆是一种展现出两个紧密交织维度的体验，我称之为"行为相位"与"对象相位"。前一章考察了我们实施记忆行为的基本方式；它揭示了四种主要行为形式及若干从属的实施模式。当前
chapter has picked out four main components of the object phase and has given a detailed description of each component. Although the act and object phases of remembering have been treated in separation from each other, I have pointed to a number of conjunctions and correlations between themfor instance, between a certain kind of specific content and a particular act-form. In this way the intentionality of remembering has emerged as a central feature of what we term generically “human memory.” Such memory reveals itself to be much more orderly in its internal structure than we usually take it to be in our unrehearsed and unreflective immersions in it. If the reader has become convinced of such an inner regularity of remembering, an important step toward a full assessment of remembering will have been taken. 本章节选取了对象阶段的四个主要组成部分，并对每个部分进行了详细描述。尽管记忆的行为阶段与对象阶段被分开讨论，但我已指出它们之间存在诸多关联与对应关系——例如某种特定内容与特定行为形式之间的联系。通过这种方式，记忆的意向性显现为我们统称为"人类记忆"的核心特征。这种记忆在其内部结构上展现出比我们日常未经排练、不加反思沉浸其中时所认为的更为有序的状态。若读者能确信记忆具有这种内在规律性，便已朝着全面评估记忆迈出了重要一步。
This step becomes still more decisive when we take into account the results obtained in chapter 2. There we singled out four pairs of traits that deserve to be designated “eidetic”: search/display, encapsulment/expansion, persistence/pastness, and actuality/virtuality. Each of these pairs designates a fundamental parameter of human memory. Moreover, such pairs bridge over the intentionalist bifurcation of remembering, since (with the exception of search/display) each can characterize both act and object phases. 当我们考虑到第二章所获得的结果时，这一步变得更为关键。在那里，我们筛选出了四组值得被称为"本质性"的特征对：搜寻/展现、封装/扩展、持存/过往性以及实存/虚存。每一组都标志着人类记忆的基本参数。此外，这些特征对跨越了记忆现象学中意向主义的二元分立，因为（除搜寻/展现外）每一组都能同时描述行为阶段与对象阶段。
As Part One draws to a close, we are left with a question of how to coordinate the eidetic analysis of chapter 2 with the intentional analysis of chapters 3 and 4 . One way of doing so is by means of the accompanying chart, which admittedly is highly schematic. It presents correlations only and these often with less than complete certainty. The correlations are between eight eidetic traits identified in chapter 2 and eight intentional structures that have been singled out in chapters 3 and 4 . Nevertheless, the chart helps to situate eidetic features of memory within an intentional framework. It also indicates, by its own multiplex character, the nonsimple nature of memory even at this early stage of analysis. Despite the diversity which it represents, however, the chart reveals certain definite patterns: search and display are seen as exclusive alternatives vis-à-vis act and object phases (and there is a symmetry in regard to whether these traits are conspicuous or muted within these phases); remembering simpliciter and remembering-that embody the other six eidetic traits in a steady, “normal” appearance, whereas remembering-how and remembering-to are internally divergent in this respect; and in the object phase, there is a pronounced tendency for seven of the eight traits to emerge either conspicuously or normally in the specific content or memory-frame, while the same traits are much more muted in the aura and in modes of givenness. 随着第一部分接近尾声，我们面临着一个问题：如何将第二章的本质分析与第三、四章的意向性分析协调起来。其中一种方法是通过随附的图表来实现——尽管该图表高度简化。它仅呈现对应关系，且这些对应往往缺乏十足的确定性。这些对应关系存在于第二章指出的八种本质特征与第三、四章提炼的八种意向性结构之间。不过，该图表仍有助于将记忆的本质特征置于意向性框架中定位。其自身的多重特性也表明，即便在分析的初始阶段，记忆也呈现出非单一的本质。 然而，尽管图表呈现了多样性，但它揭示出某些明确的模式：搜寻与显现被视为相对于行为阶段和对象阶段的排他性选项（且这些特征在这些阶段中是否显著或隐晦存在对称性）；单纯记忆与命题记忆以稳定、"常态"的形式体现其他六种本质特征，而技能记忆与待办记忆在这方面则存在内部差异；在对象阶段，八种特征中有七种表现出显著倾向——要么在具体内容或记忆框架中凸显，要么以常态显现，而这些特征在记忆氛围及所予样式中则显得更为隐晦。
However striking they may be, such patterns do not bespeak causal connections; the chart is strictly correlational in status and significance. Its very tenuousness-its sheerly diagrammatic character-reflects the limits of any purely phenomenological analysis that restricts itself to the eidetic and 尽管这些模式可能十分引人注目，但它们并不表明因果关系；该图表在性质和意义上严格属于相关性呈现。其极度脆弱性——纯粹的图示特征——反映出任何局限于本质结构与
Intentional Structures 意向性结构
Eidetic Traits 本质特征
Search 搜索
Display 显示
Encapsulment 封装
Expansion 扩展
Persistence 持存性
Pastness 过往性
Actuality 现时性
Virtuality 虚拟性
Act Phase 行动阶段
1. remembering simpliciter 1. 单纯记忆
c
n
n
n
n
n
n
2. remembering-that 2. 事实记忆
c
n
n
n
n
n
n
3. remembering-how 3. 方法记忆
m
c
c
c
m
c
m
4. remembering-to 4. 记忆指向
m
c
m
n
m
c
m
Object Phase 客体阶段
1. specific content 1. 具体内容
c
n
n
n
n
c
n
2. memory-frame 2. 记忆框架
c
c
m
c
c
c
n
3. aura 3. 灵韵
m
m
c
n
m
m
c
4. modes of givenness 4. 给予方式
m
n
n
m
m
c
m
Intentional Structures Eidetic Traits
Search Display Encapsulment Expansion Persistence Pastness Actuality Virtuality
Act Phase
1. remembering simpliciter c n n n n n n
2. remembering-that c n n n n n n
3. remembering-how m c c c m c m
4. remembering-to m c m n m c m
Object Phase
1. specific content c n n n n c n
2. memory-frame c c m c c c n
3. aura m m c n m m c
4. modes of givenness m n n m m c m| Intentional Structures | Eidetic Traits | | | | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| | Search | Display | Encapsulment | Expansion | Persistence | Pastness | Actuality | Virtuality |
| Act Phase | | | | | | | | |
| 1. remembering simpliciter | c | | n | n | n | n | n | n |
| 2. remembering-that | c | | n | n | n | n | n | n |
| 3. remembering-how | m | | c | c | c | m | c | m |
| 4. remembering-to | m | | c | m | n | m | c | m |
| Object Phase | | | | | | | | |
| 1. specific content | | c | n | n | n | n | c | n |
| 2. memory-frame | | c | c | m | c | c | c | n |
| 3. aura | | m | m | c | n | m | m | c |
| 4. modes of givenness | | m | n | n | m | m | c | m |
m=\mathrm{m}= mute appearance or occurrence m=\mathrm{m}= 静默显现或发生 n=\mathrm{n}= normal appearance or occurrence n=\mathrm{n}= 常规显现或发生
c = conspicuous appearance or occurrence c = 显著的外观或发生
intentional aspects of memory. A more complete analysis is called for, an expansion of the project beyond these initial and tentative steps. 记忆的意向性方面。我们需要一个更完整的分析，将这个项目扩展到这些初步和尝试性步骤之外。
For it must be emphasized that the journey undertaken in this book has only begun. Much remains to be done in Parts Two and Three. At this point, let me only note that we have thus far accomplished what a traditional phenomenological approach necessarily seeks to accomplish: to provide an investigation of a given phenomenon in its eidetic and intentional features. That this investigation is formal by its very nature cannot be denied. The formality is only reinforced in any mere listing of traits or in the drafting of a chart such as that presented above. But the same formality means that such an approach cannot claim full adequacy to the phenomenon under scrutiny. Beyond the form of memory there is its matter; beyond its surface, its depth. As a consequence, there is something undeniably and almost literally “superficial” about the descriptions given in the last four chapters. These chapters have largely confined themselves to conveying what Bachelard calls “sudden salience[s] on the surface of the psyche.” ^(44){ }^{44} As an effort at the pure description of such saliences, this Part has confined itself to conveying the results of a first look at memory’s surface structures. 必须强调的是，本书所展开的旅程才刚刚开始。第二部和第三部仍有大量工作有待完成。在此，我只想指出：迄今为止，我们已完成传统现象学方法必然追求的目标——对特定现象的本质特征和意向性特征进行探究。这种探究本质上具有形式化特征，这是无可否认的。当我们仅仅罗列特征或绘制如上文所示的图表时，这种形式化特征只会更加凸显。但正是这种形式化意味着，该方法无法宣称完全适用于所考察的现象。在记忆的形式之外，还有其质料；在其表层之下，还有其深度。因此，前四章给出的描述难免带有某种近乎字面意义上的"肤浅性"。这些章节主要局限于传达巴什拉所说的"心灵表面突然显现的突出特征"。 ^(44){ }^{44} 作为对这些显突特征的纯粹描述尝试，本部分仅限于呈现对记忆表层结构的初步观察结果。
Moreover, this first viewing has considered memory as an almost exclusively mental phenomenon: as “memory in mind,” in keeping with the origin of the word “memory” itself in the concept of mindfulness. It is only appropriate and expectable that in this enterprise an intentional analysis would assume prominence. According to Brentano’s archetypal credo, all mental phenomena, and only mental phenomena, are intentional. ^(45){ }^{45} Yet remembering is more than a matter of mind alone, and we must move beyond the surface of the psyche if we are to grasp memory in its full amplitude. We need to move beyond the narrow (if nonetheless useful) framework set forth in preceding chapters. If this takes us beyond the intentional, it will also take us more completely into the phenomenon of remembering itself-into the heart of our existence as rememberers. 此外，这第一视角将记忆视为几乎纯粹的心理现象：即"心智中的记忆"，这与"记忆"一词源自"觉知"的概念相吻合。在此探索中，意向性分析占据主导地位是恰当且可预见的。根据布伦塔诺的原型信条，所有且唯有心理现象才具有意向性。 ^(45){ }^{45} 然而记忆不仅仅是心智之事，若要全面把握记忆的丰富内涵，我们必须超越心理表层。我们需要突破前几章提出的狭窄（尽管有用）框架。若这将引领我们超越意向性，也将更彻底地进入记忆现象本身——深入我们作为记忆者的存在核心。
This page intentionally left blank 本页 intentionally left blank
Part Two Mnemonic Modes 第二部分 记忆模式
PROLOGUE 序言
I will make a suggestion as to how we should proceed. Imagine a rather short-sighted person told to read an inscription in small letters from some way off. He would think it a godsend if someone pointed out that the same inscription was written up elsewhere on a bigger scale, so that he could first read the larger characters and then make out whether the smaller ones were the same. 我来提议我们该如何推进。设想一个视力不佳的人被要求从远处辨认一行小字铭文。如果有人指出同样的铭文在别处以更大的字体呈现，让他能先看清大字再辨认小字是否相同，他定会视之为天赐良机。
-Plato, Republic, Book Two ——柏拉图《理想国》第二卷
With the investigations of Part One we have taken a decisive first step toward providing a comprehensive description of remembering. Moreover, we have done so in accordance with traditional phenomenological categories of “eidetic features” and “intentional structures,” achieving a certain closure in the process. But such closure can bring with it a foreclosure of neglected aspects. Just when we think we are becoming clear about the basic structure and forms of human memory, it still manages to elude us. Like the fabled statues of Daedalus, we need to keep tying memory down by describing it in ever more adequate terms that respect its multiple modes of appearing. 通过第一部分的探究，我们已为全面描述记忆现象迈出了关键的第一步。更重要的是，我们运用了现象学传统的"本质特征"与"意向结构"范畴，在此过程中实现了某种理论闭环。但这样的闭环也可能导致被忽视的维度遭到遮蔽。正当我们以为即将厘清人类记忆的基本结构与形态时，它却总能从我们指缝间溜走。就像代达罗斯传说中的雕像，我们需要通过不断完善的描述语言——那些尊重记忆多重显现方式的表述——来持续锚定记忆的本质。
At this turning point, foreclosure threatens in two closely related ways. First of all, an unexamined mentalism has been subtending almost all the analyses given in Part One. By “mentalism” I mean the view that human minds-or surrogates for these minds, most notably computers-furnish the ultimate locus as well as the primary limit of human experience. A critical consequence of this view is that all that we undergo must come to be represented in the container of the mind if it is to count as an “experience” at all. This is not the place to pursue the difficulties attendant upon mentalism, which has dominated Western epistemology from Descartes to the present. Ryle and Rorty have tried to lay its ghost to rest, ^(1){ }^{1} and I return to the issue myself in the Prologue to Part Three. What matters now is merely to notice how pervasively mentalistic my treatment of remembering has been thus far in this book. I have talked unabashedly of “acts” and “presentations” in ways that make sense only if these are understood as specifically mental acts and presentations. Even “objects” have been construed specifically as intentional objects: that is, as objects of and for the mind. It was only as an exception that I spoke of remembering-how as an activity that may require habitual and skilled actions of the body. Otherwise, the preceding four chapters have been written in mentalese and openly invite being read in this same idiom. 在这个转折点上，封闭以两种密切相关的方式构成威胁。首先，一种未经检验的心理主义一直支撑着第一部分几乎所有分析。所谓"心理主义"，我指的是将人类心智（或其替代物，尤其是计算机）视为人类经验的终极场域与主要界限的观点。这一观点的关键后果在于：我们经历的一切必须被纳入心智容器中表征，才能被称作"经验"。此处不宜探讨心理主义伴随的难题——这种思想自笛卡尔至今主导着西方认识论。赖尔与罗蒂曾试图驱散其幽灵， ^(1){ }^{1} 而我也将在第三部分序言中重提此议题。此刻重要的是注意到本书迄今对记忆的探讨如何彻底渗透着心理主义色彩。我毫无顾忌地谈论"行为"与"呈现"，这些表述唯有被理解为特定心智行为和心智呈现时才成立。甚至连"对象"都被明确解读为意向性对象——即心智的对象与为心智存在的对象。 我仅在例外情况下才将记忆方式（remembering-how）视为一种可能需要身体习惯性和熟练动作的活动。除此之外，前四章都是以"心理语言"写就，并明确期待读者以同样的思维模式来阅读。
The danger inherent in adopting such an idiom is not only that of subscribing to a model of remembering as strictly self-contained within the human 采用这种表达方式的危险不仅在于它认同了将记忆严格限定在人类
mind. It also consists in the fact that the mind itself is notoriously opaque in its own self-disclosure. It did not take Freud’s assiduous efforts to tell us how intricate and shadowy, indeed deceptive and misleading, the mind can be to itself and for other minds. In Book Two of the Republic, Plato remarks on the considerable difficulty of dealing with the inner psychology of justice. In the same spirit of honesty, we must acknowledge that the inner workings of memory are deeply veiled; they are as unknown to ourselves in the course of daily remembering as are the workings of our own spleen or pancreas. As Wittgenstein, an especially keen critic of mentalism, has remarked: “Memory, therefore, is certainly not the mental process which, at first sight, one would imagine.” ^(2){ }^{2} Despite the supposed lucidity of mental phenomena, it is precisely when it is construed as a “mental process” that memory shows itself to be something other than what one first takes it to be. 心灵本身在自我揭示时也以晦涩难懂著称。无需弗洛伊德的孜孜努力，我们便知道心灵对自身及其他心灵而言可以多么错综复杂、幽暗不明，甚至具有欺骗性和误导性。柏拉图在《理想国》第二卷中就处理正义的内在心理机制的巨大困难发表过评论。本着同样的诚实精神，我们必须承认记忆的内在运作深藏不露；在日常回忆过程中，我们对记忆运作的无知程度，就像对自己脾脏或胰腺运作的无知一样。正如对心灵主义特别敏锐的批评者维特根斯坦所言："因此，记忆显然不是人们乍看之下所想象的那种心理过程。" ^(2){ }^{2} 尽管心理现象被认为具有明晰性，但恰恰当记忆被理解为"心理过程"时，它显现出与人们最初认知截然不同的样貌。
What shall we do in this impasse? We cannot turn to the analysis of ordinary language, as so many philosophers have done in the wake of Wittgenstein and Austin. The language of memory is saturated with mentalistic biases: the word “remembering” itself is normally construed as a mental act in a wholly unclarified sense. Furthermore, as I pointed out in the Introduction, nuanced terms and expressions for memory have for the most part become archaic and obsolete in the English language. When dealing with the vocabulary of remembering, whether this vocabulary be mentalistic or not, we are skating on thin ice indeed. Although we can gain clues from existing taxonomies and especially from ancient etymologies, we are cast adrift on a virtual Sargasso Sea of linguistic confusion and oblivion when it comes to the exact description of human memory. Where then may we turn for clarification and inspiration? 我们该如何走出这一困境？我们无法像许多追随维特根斯坦和奥斯汀的哲学家那样求助于日常语言分析。记忆语言充斥着心灵主义的偏见："回忆"这个词本身通常被理解为一种完全未经澄清的心理行为。此外，正如我在导论中指出的，英语中关于记忆的微妙术语和表达大多已成为过时的陈词。当我们处理回忆的词汇时——无论这些词汇是否带有心灵主义色彩——实际上都如履薄冰。虽然我们可以从现有分类学尤其是古代词源学中获得线索，但在准确描述人类记忆时，我们仍漂浮在语言混乱与遗忘的虚拟马尾藻海上。那么，我们还能转向何处寻求澄清与灵感？
Here we may take a clue from Plato himself in the above epigraph. If human beings cannot reliably observe the internal structure of justice in the depths of the human psyche, he suggests that they look to where justice appears in “larger characters.” This is in effect what we shall do in Part Two by examining three distinctive mnemonic modes in which remembering is writ large. Each of these modes involves outstanding factors that cannot be contained within the meshes of mentalism: factors that are external to mind itself such as physical reminders, the concrete discourse of reminiscing, and other human beings as objects of perceptual recognition. 我们可以从上述柏拉图题词中获取线索。他提出，如果人类无法可靠地观察心灵深处正义的内在结构，就应该去观察正义以"更大字符"显现的领域。这正是我们将在第二部分通过检视三种显著的记忆模式所要做的——在这些模式中，记忆被放大呈现。每种模式都包含无法被心智主义网络容纳的突出因素：这些因素外在于心灵本身，诸如实体提醒物、具体的回忆话语，以及作为知觉识别对象的他人。
Mnemonic modes are therefore forms of remembering whose adequate description cannot be confined to an exclusively mentalistic analysis. By pursuing these modes, we will be taking a crucial first step beyond the mentalism that has underwritten so much of the preceding investigation. We will be engaging in a journey whose destination will not become fully apparent until considerably later in this book. 因此，记忆模式是这样一些记忆形式：对其充分描述不能仅限于纯粹心智主义的分析。通过探究这些模式，我们将迈出超越心智主义的关键第一步——此前大量研究都建立在这种心智主义基础上。我们将开启一段旅程，其目的地要到本书相当靠后的部分才会完全显现。
VV
REMINDING 提醒
There is an active and aktuall Knowledge in a man, of which these outward Objects are rather the re-minders than the first Begetters or Implanters. 人心中存有一种活跃而真实的知识，这些外在对象与其说是最初孕育者或植入者，不如说是记忆的提示者。
-Henry More, 1653 ——亨利·莫尔，1653 年
I
The very multiplicity of the mental that has been operative in Part One threatens us with a special form of forgetfulness. We have witnessed a proliferation of types and subtypes, of primary and secondary traits, which brings with it the distinct danger that the overall shape of remembering will become lost in the minute traces of detailed descriptions. In facing this danger of descriptive immersion, it is advantageous to consider a mnemonic mode that is concerned specifically with the limits of memory. Reminders are expressly designed to draw us back from the edge of oblivion by directing us to that which we might otherwise forget. As reminding by its very nature delimits forgetting by constraining and diverting the waters of Lethe, so our consideration of reminding itself may help to delimit the present inquiry and to rescue it from submersion in an ocean of descriptive detail. 第一部分中运作的多元心智活动，正使我们面临一种特殊的遗忘形式。我们目睹了各种类型与亚型、主要与次要特征的激增，这带来了一个显著危险：记忆的整体形态可能会湮没在细致描述的琐碎痕迹中。面对这种沉溺于描述的危险，考量一种专门关注记忆边界的助记模式大有裨益。提醒机制的设计初衷，正是通过引导我们关注可能被遗忘之事，将我们从遗忘深渊的边缘拉回。正如提醒行为本质上通过约束和转移遗忘之河的流水来划定遗忘的边界，我们对提醒本身的思考，或许也有助于界定当前研究的范围，使其免遭描述细节之海的淹没。
Reminders are also among the most dramatic instances of memory “writ large.” They exhibit a quite determinate structure, as we shall come to observe. Thanks to this very structure, reminders literally stand out in our lives. Indeed, we find ourselves in their midst at practically every turn, whether they appear as written or spoken warnings, as book reviews or grade lists, as recipes or train schedules. Precisely because we are at all times threatened by engulfment in forgetting, we have arranged about us an encompassing armamentarium of reminders. It is as if reminders constituted a gigantic exoskeleton of memory, serving to protect it from oblivion by their determinacy, their unique combination of noticeability and reliability. As an important sector of what Heidegger calls generically the “ready-to-hand,” ^(1){ }^{1} reminders surround and support our ongoing existence in countless manners. As such they give point and purpose to the often bewildering onrush of 提醒物也是记忆"放大呈现"中最引人注目的实例之一。我们将观察到，它们展现出一种相当确定的结构。正是由于这种结构，提醒物在我们的生活中显得格外突出。事实上，我们几乎每时每刻都置身于各种提醒物之中——无论是书面或口头的警示、书评或成绩单、食谱或列车时刻表。正因为我们时刻面临着被遗忘吞噬的威胁，我们便在周围布置了全方位的提醒装备。这些提醒物仿佛构成了记忆的巨型外骨骼，以其确定性、显著性与可靠性的独特组合，守护记忆免遭遗忘。作为海德格尔统称为"上手之物"的重要部分，提醒物以无数方式环绕并支撑着我们持续的存在。它们为生活中常常令人困惑的纷乱洪流指明了方向与意义，
our lives, signaling to us what we should remember to do or think as well as how we might remember more effectively. 向我们提示着应该记住的行动与思考，以及如何更有效地进行记忆。
II 第二章
As I sit at my desk writing these lines, I cannot help but notice an array of objects randomly disposed before me: 当我坐在书桌前写下这些文字时，眼前随意摆放的物件总不经意间攫取我的注意：
A post card from Athens: this acts as a double or triple reminder. Viewing its picture of the Parthenon, I am reminded of my visit to this building twelve years ago; I am also reminded of “the glory that was Greece,” a glory for which the Parthenon has become a standard symbol but which I cannot experience in the first person. On the other side of the card is a letter from a former student, of whose flamboyant face and uneven academic career I am suddenly reminded by his handwriting and his signature. It is not without interest that the first three sentences on the card run: 一张来自雅典的明信片：它承载着双重乃至三重的记忆。凝视帕特农神庙的图片，十二年前造访这座建筑的记忆便浮现眼前；同时它也令我想起"希腊昔日的荣光"——帕特农神庙虽已成为这种荣光的标准象征，我却无法亲身体验那份辉煌。明信片背面是一位往届学生的来信，那熟悉的笔迹与签名瞬间唤起了对他张扬面容与起伏学业生涯的回忆。尤为耐人寻味的是卡片开篇的三句话：
The origins of Western thought are indeed difficult to find in this extraordinary world of rubble and stone. But if we should forget the hidden nuances, alas, [nevertheless] such obvious reminders as the magnificent temples persist. How true that everything dates back to antiquity. (my italics) 在这片由碎石与岩石构成的非凡世界里，西方思想的源头确实难以寻觅。但倘若我们遗忘了那些隐秘的微妙之处，唉，[所幸]还有壮丽神庙这般显赫的提醒者始终存在。万物皆可追溯至远古——此言何其真切。（斜体为笔者所加）
Here the very word “reminders” is used to remind me (and no doubt my student himself) of that about which the building depicted on the post card’s opposite side reminds us wordlessly, demonstrating the interchangeability of the medium in which reminders may operate. 在这里，“提醒”这个词本身就被用来提醒我（无疑也提醒着我的学生自己），明信片背面描绘的建筑正无声地提醒着我们什么，这展示了提醒媒介的可互换性。
2. A single sheet of paper marked “Memorandum”: here a reminder announces, and literally underlines, its own function-in this case to remind absent-minded professors of their bounden duty to hand out course evaluation forms. Note that the heading of the memorandum is tripartite, each line specifying a different aspect of reminding: 2. 一张标有“备忘录”的纸页：这里的提醒直白地宣告并强调着自身功能——在这个案例中，是提醒心不在焉的教授们履行发放课程评估表的应尽义务。值得注意的是备忘录标题分为三部分，每行都指明了提醒的不同面向：
To: (“remindee”) 致：（“被提醒者”）
From: (remitter of the reminder) 自：（提醒的发出者）
Subject: (“remindand”) 主题：（“待办事项”）
This curt format could suffice by itself; but since the action in question is likely to be forgotten, the remitter adds a fairly lengthy prose statement in which reminding is done by way of pointing to an order: “This fall the departments have been directed to do their own evaluations in lieu of a university-wide evaluation” and then by a thinly veiled threat: "All 这种简略的格式本已足够；但由于相关行动很可能被遗忘，发件人又添加了一段相当冗长的文字说明，通过指示命令来进行提醒："今年秋季已要求各院系自行开展评估，以取代全校范围的评估"，随后又用近乎赤裸的威胁强调："所有
Ph.D. students and faculty seeking tenure or promotion are mandated to do this evaluation every year." Further reinforcing this memorandum are three words I have added at the top in pencil: “Bring to class”; these words act as a reminder to myself to carry out the request (i.e., the remindand) contained in the original reminder. 攻读博士学位的学生及申请终身教职或晋升的教师必须每年完成此项评估。"我在备忘录顶端用铅笔添加的"带到课堂"三个字进一步强化了这份文件，这些文字提醒我自己执行原始提醒中包含的要求（即待办事项）。
3. A small slip of cardboard on which is written: "Put rest of notes on “The Problem of Perception and Imagination’ here-then back in the folder below.” This is a message which I had hastily scribbled to myself in the midst of preparing a lecture for a course in the philosophy of perception. The notes, about whose proper place the message was to remind me, had been made a couple of years ago in connection with another course, one on perception and imagination. Thus, the proper place for storing the notes in question is in the folder for the course for which they had originally been prepared. 3. 一张小纸板上写着："将剩余关于'知觉与想象问题'的笔记放在此处——然后归入下方文件夹。"这是我在准备知觉哲学课程讲座时匆忙写给自己的一条备忘。纸条提醒我这些笔记的恰当存放位置，而这些笔记是几年前为另一门关于知觉与想象的课程所准备的。因此，这些笔记理应归入最初为其准备的课程文件夹中。
The imbrication of past and future is striking: the note was written as a reminder of a future action to take place at some point after my coming lecture, but the aim of this action was to return the notes to a place determined and established at a past point-a point to which I will no doubt continue to refer in subsequent uses of the same notes. Here one cannot help but wonder: how can there be such a thing as a reminder of the future? If reminding is not restricted to the past, can it be considered a mode of memory? 过去与未来的叠合令人惊异：这张便条是为提醒我在即将到来的讲座之后某个时间点要执行的动作，但这个动作的目的却是将笔记归位到过去某个时点确定的位置——毫无疑问，在后续使用这些相同笔记时，我仍会不断回溯这个时点。在此人们不禁要问：怎么可能存在对未来的提醒？如果提醒不仅限于过去，它能否被视为记忆的一种模式？
4. A slightly larger slip of paper: this represents information taken down during a recent telephone conversation bearing on plans for a summer institute in archetypal psychology to which I had been invited. Here is the sequence of things that were noted down: 4. 一张稍大的纸条：这记录了我最近一通电话中关于夏季原型心理学研究所计划的信息，我受邀参加该活动。以下是当时记下的内容序列：
All of these components of the reminder point to a future event whose status at the moment was only possible when I made the note. Neither the institute itself nor my coming to it was yet definite, in contrast with the future but definite action indicated by the previous reminder. The only reference to the past is indirect: I had attended a meeting of archetypal psychologists the year before. Writing their names down, I am reminded of the earlier meeting. Here a part of the total reminder serves to remind me of something disparate in time and structure from the event for which the rest of the reminder was expressly designed as a 这些提醒要素都指向一个未来事件，在我记录时其状态尚不确定。无论是研究所本身还是我的参与都未最终确定，与前一个提醒中未来但明确的行动形成对比。唯一与过去的关联是间接的：我前一年曾参加过原型心理学家们的会议。写下他们的名字时，我想起了那次早期聚会。在这里，整体提醒中的部分内容意外地让我回想起与当前提醒主体在时间和结构上都不同的事件——而其余内容本是专门为
reminder. And, once again, the future (even as indefinite) is seen to be just as implicated as the past in the full process of reminding: how can this be? 那个主要事件设计的提醒。这再次表明，在完整的提醒过程中，未来（即便是不确定的）与过去同样密不可分：这该如何理解？
With these examples before us, we must now ask: how does a reminder remind? What is its modus operandi? By what procedure does it do its work? Answers to these questions will be forthcoming if we first consider what its basic work is. This work, the work of reminding itself, is to induce the actual or potential remindee to do or think something that he or she might otherwise forget to do or think. At stake here is a considerable range of actionsfrom putting notes back in their proper place to handing out course evaluation forms, from receiving a possible remuneration to making certain telephone calls. The action indicated by the reminder is typically one step removed from the immediate present in which I apprehend the reminder itself. I am being reminded of a possible action which I may undertake very soon or eventually, though not precisely when and as I am perceiving the reminder. The action itself, ^(2){ }^{2} the remindand proper, is thus situated not in my present as such but in the future, whether this future be near-term or more distantly projected. 面对这些例子，我们现在必须追问：提醒物如何实现提醒？它的运作模式是什么？通过何种程序完成其功能？若先思考其基本功能，答案自会浮现。提醒的核心功能，即提醒行为本身，在于促使实际或潜在的被提醒者去完成或思考那些可能被遗忘之事。这里涉及的行为范围相当广泛——从将笔记归位到分发课程评价表，从领取可能的报酬到拨打特定电话。提醒所指示的行为通常与感知提醒物的当下存在一步之遥。它让我意识到某个可能即将或最终要采取的行动，但并非在我感知提醒物的确切时刻立即执行。这个被提醒的行动本身——即严格意义上的提醒事项——因而并非定位于我的当下，而是存在于未来，无论这个未来是近在咫尺还是遥不可及。
One might well ask at this point, where do the past and therefore memory enter into this picture? It is important to realize, first of all, that the very phrase “the past and therefore memory” is by no means unambiguous, since the two items thereby conjoined are not as indissolubly linked on all occasions as the “therefore” suggests. I can, as we have seen, remember that I have an appointment with my dentist tomorrow. It may be retorted that I must then remember that I made the dentist’s appointment at a particular moment in the past. Yet this is simply not so: I certainly did make the appointment, but I may not be able to remember how or when I did. To remember a future commitment is to presume, but not necessarily to recall, a past event of committal. In this way, the earlier act is implicated by the commitment even when it is not expressly recollected. When I am reminded of something to do-something I ought to do, may do, can do, will probably do, etc.-I am remembering to undertake a future action mandated or sanctioned by a past action which I may not recall as such but which I must nonetheless presuppose. The reminder is thus a point of connection between past and future, a Janus bifrons which is apprehended in a present moment situated between the past of engagement and the future of enactment. 此时人们很可能会问：过去以及记忆在这幅图景中处于什么位置？首先必须认识到，"过去以及记忆"这个表述本身绝非不言自明，因为这两个被并置的要素并非如"因此"一词所暗示的那样在所有场合都密不可分。正如我们所见，我可以记得明天与牙医的预约。或许有人会反驳说，那我必定记得自己曾在过去某个特定时刻预约了牙医。但事实并非如此：我确实进行过预约，但可能完全不记得当时是如何或何时预约的。记住未来的承诺是基于对过去承诺行为的推定，而非必然唤起对具体事件的回忆。如此一来，即便没有明确回忆，先前的行为也通过承诺被隐含其中。当被提醒要做某件事——某件我应该做、可以做、可能做或很可能要做的事时，我所记住的是去履行一项由过去行为授权或认可的未来行动，这个过去行为本身我或许无法具体回忆，却必须将其作为前提预设。 因此，提醒成为连接过去与未来的节点，犹如一尊双面神雅努斯，它被捕捉于当下这个介于"参与过往"与"践行未来"之间的时刻。
But there are also cases in which reminding engages the past more directly. We have posited that the work of reminding is “to induce the actual or potential remindee to do or think something that he or she might otherwise forget to do or think.” The thinking in question may take many forms: thinking of one’s duty, health, or family, thinking of mathematical or philosophical truths, or thinking of future actions to be undertaken. One of 但也存在提醒更直接关联过往的案例。我们曾假定提醒的功能在于"促使实际或潜在的被提醒者去做或思考那些可能被遗忘之事"。这种思考可能呈现多种形态：思考责任、健康或家庭，思考数学或哲学真理，抑或思考待实施的未来行动。然而其中最主要的形态之一
its primary forms, however, is thinking of the past. Remindful thinking of the past is itself a basic way in which we remember the past. ^(3){ }^{3} 正是对过往的思考。这种对过去的提醒式思考，本身就是我们忆往昔的基本方式。 ^(3){ }^{3}
When I am being reminded of the past by being led to think of it as such, the remindand is neither a future action nor the past moment of engagement implicated thereby, but a past event or state of affairs that I have witnessed or come to know from various sources. The picture postcard of the Parthenon reminded me of my own previous perceiving of this same building some twelve years ago. ^(4){ }^{4} The postcard provoked me to think of this perceiving in the format of certain determinate recollections. It also reminded me directly of my erstwhile student and of “the glory that was Greece.” 当我被引导着将过去视为过去而回忆时，被唤起记忆的对象既非未来的行动，也非由此涉及的过往参与时刻，而是我曾亲眼目睹或通过多种渠道了解的过去事件或事态。那张帕特农神庙的明信片让我想起大约十二年前自己亲眼目睹这座建筑的场景。 ^(4){ }^{4} 这张明信片促使我以某些确定的回忆形式来追想这段感知经历。它还直接让我忆起曾经的学生以及"希腊昔日的荣光"。
The above analysis of stray reminders on my desk helps us to appreciate the considerable range of reminding. It also serves to focus attention on the several components of reminders themselves. But it does not tell us anything substantive about the relationship between these components, especially in regard to the question: How does the reminder remind me of the remindand? 上述对书桌上零星记忆载体的分析，有助于我们理解记忆唤起机制的广泛性。同时也将注意力聚焦于记忆载体本身的若干构成要素。但关于这些要素之间的关系——尤其是"记忆载体如何唤起我对被记忆对象的回忆"这一核心问题——上述分析并未提供实质性解答。
III 第三章
In order to find our way to an answer to this last question, let us examine a classic and apparently simple example of reminding: a piece of string tied around a finger. Suppose that I tie a string around the little finger of my left hand early one evening to remind myself to turn down the heat in the living room later that evening: I regularly forget to turn down the heat when I go to bed. Such a failure of memory calls for instituting a reminder. Nevertheless, I frequently forget to establish one-even when I explicitly resolve to do so in advance. Once when I did set up such a reminder, I could not recall its purpose when I gazed at it later on! This time, however, let us assume that the reminder functions successfully. It does remind me to turn down the heat in the living room late one very cold night. How does this take place? The three components at work are readily identified: the reminder is the string tied around my finger (or more exactly the string as tied around my finger); the remindand, what it reminds me of, is the clear-cut but all too easily forgettable action of turning the heat down later that night; and I, the potential heat-reducer but also the potential forgetter of heat-reduction, am the remindee. As it happens, I am the one who sets up the reminder by tying the string around my finger, even though a friend might have tied it for me. The institution of the reminder on a given occasion must therefore be distinguished from the activity of reminding itself-as must any unintended effects of this activity (such as the frozen water pipes that might result if I turn the heat too far down). 为了找到最后一个问题的答案，让我们研究一个经典且看似简单的提醒案例：系在手指上的一根绳子。假设某个傍晚，我在左手小指上系了根绳子，提醒自己当晚稍晚时要调低客厅的暖气温度——我经常忘记睡前调低暖气。这种记忆失误需要建立提醒机制。然而，我常常连提醒措施都忘记设置——即便事先明确下过决心。有次当我确实设置了提醒，后来盯着它时却想不起用途！但这次，我们假设提醒机制成功运作。在一个寒冷的深夜，它确实提醒我调低了客厅暖气温度。这是如何发生的？ 运作中的三个要素显而易见：提醒物是系在我手指上的细绳（更准确地说，是系在手指上的细绳状态）；被提醒事项则是当晚稍后调低暖气这一明确却极易遗忘的动作；而作为潜在的暖气调节者兼潜在的遗忘者，我本人就是被提醒对象。实际上，系绳行为是由我亲自完成的——尽管朋友也可能代劳。因此必须将特定场合下提醒物的设置行为与提醒活动本身区分开来，正如必须区分该活动可能产生的非预期后果（例如若将暖气调得过低可能导致水管冻裂）。
One traditional model of reminding stems from Aristotle. In De Memoria et Reminiscentia Aristotle maintains that reminding takes place because (and 亚里士多德提出的传统提醒模型认为：在《论记忆与回忆》中，他主张提醒之所以发生是因为（且
to the extent that) the reminder (mnemoneuma) is construed not as a pure figure (zōon) but as a copy (eikon) of the remindand-where the remindand is not singled out for separate description but is conceived simply as that of which the figure is to be regarded as a copy. Aristotle goes on to assimilate memory to this model of the reminder as a copy: 当提醒物（mnemoneuma）被理解为被提醒对象（remindand）的复制品（eikon）而非纯粹形象（zōon）时——此处被提醒对象并未被单独描述，而是被简单地视为形象所复制的对象——亚里士多德进一步将记忆同化为这种"作为复制品的提醒物"模型：
For the figure drawn on a panel is both a figure and a copy, and while being one and the same, it is both, even though the being of the two is not the same. And one can contemplate it both as a figure and as a copy. In the same way one must also conceive the [memory] image to be something in its own right and to be of another thing. In so far, then, as it is something in its own right, it is an object of contemplation or an image [phantasma]. But insofar as it is of another thing, it is a sort of copy and a reminder . . . if one contemplates the image as being of another thing, and (just as in the case of the drawing) as a copy, and as of Corsicus, when one hasn’t seen Corsicus, then . . . [it] is a reminder. ^(5){ }^{5} 正如画板上的图形既是图形本身又是复制品，虽然二者是同一事物，却具有不同的存在方式。人们既可以将其视为独立图形，亦可视为复制品。同理，我们也应当如此理解[记忆]意象：它既是独立存在之物，又指向他者。就其独立存在而言，它是观想对象或心像[phantasma]；就其指向他者而言，它便成为某种复制品与提醒物......若某人将意象视为指向他者之物（如同绘画中的情形），视为科西库斯的复制品——即便此人从未见过科西库斯——那么......[它]便成为提醒物。 ^(5){ }^{5}
Aristotle’s account is not tenable as a general explanation of reminding. For not all reminders are icons or likenesses of their respective remindands. This is especially evident in the paradigm case at hand. What conceivable resemblance is there between a piece of string tied around my little finger and turning the heat down? There is no resemblance between the action of tying the string around my finger, or even seeing it tied there, and turning down the heat. Nor is there any similarity between the perceived or pictured contents of these actions. As the configuration of the knot does not resemble the posture of my body in adjusting the thermostat, it is clear that the form of the reminder need not bear any likeness to that of which it is the reminder. 亚里士多德对提醒现象的解释并不能作为普遍适用的理论。因为并非所有提醒物都是被提醒事项的象征或相似物。这一点在当前讨论的典型案例中尤为明显：系在小指上的细绳与调低暖气温度之间，究竟存在什么可想象的相似之处？无论是系绳的动作，还是看见手指上的绳结，都与调节暖气温度毫无相似性。这些行为在感知或想象层面也不存在任何共通点。既然绳结的形态与调节恒温器时身体姿态毫无相似，显然提醒物的形式不必与其所提醒的内容存在任何相似性。
Of course, some reminders do resemble their remindands; indeed, the likeness may be very exact, as in the case of the postcard depicting the Parthenon. The iconicity of such a reminder doubtless aids its effectiveness as a reminder, since on first perception I can hardly think of anything other than that of which it is the exact copy. Nevertheless, the isomorphism such reminders display in relation to their remindands is not indispensable to their role as reminders. Other, wholly non-pictographic reminders can put me in mind of the very same thing, as does the single word “Parthenon” printed on the reverse side of the same postcard. Though entirely lacking in pictographic resemblance to the ancient temple, this word brings my mind to my experience of this monument as expeditiously as does the photographic reproduction of the same building. Aristotle’s copy theory must be discarded, then, because reminders need not resemble their remindands in order to remind us of them. 当然，有些提示物确实与其所提示之物相似；这种相似性甚至可能极为精确，比如那张描绘帕特农神庙的明信片。这类提示物的图像性无疑增强了其作为提示物的有效性，因为在初次感知时，我几乎只能联想到它所精确复制的对象。然而，这种提示物与其所提示之物之间的同构性，对于它们发挥提示作用并非不可或缺。其他完全非象形的提示物同样能让我想起完全相同的事物，就像印在同一张明信片背面的"帕特农神庙"这个单词。尽管这个词语与古老神庙毫无象形上的相似之处，却能像建筑物的照片复制品一样，迅速将我的思绪引向对这座纪念碑的体验。因此，亚里士多德的摹仿论必须被摒弃——因为提示物不必与其所提示之物相似，就能让我们想起它们。
But if the relation between reminder and remindand is not that of resemblance, what is its essential nature? What is indispensable to it? One model that suggests itself is that of indication. The string around my finger is not a copy of an action, but it may be a sign that indicates a past or future 但如果提醒物与被提醒物之间的关系并非相似性，那么其本质属性是什么？什么是不可或缺的？一个自然浮现的模型是指示关系。我手指上的绳结并非对某个行为的复制，但它可以作为指示过去或未来
action. As an indicative sign, the string picks out such an action by signaling its actual or possible presence. Put in terms of our ongoing nomenclature, the string as reminder indicates to me as remindee a past or future action as remindand. This offers a more promising model than Aristotle’s, since we are not bound by any requirement of resemblance. Moreover, the role of the remindee, neglected in Aristotle’s treatment, is here brought explicitly into play. 行为的符号。作为指示性符号，这根绳子通过标记某个行为实际或可能的存在来指涉它。用我们现有的术语来说，作为提醒物的绳子向作为被提醒者的我指示着作为被提醒项的过去或未来行为。这比亚里士多德的模型更具前景，因为我们不受任何相似性要求的束缚。此外，在亚里士多德论述中被忽视的被提醒者角色，在此被明确纳入考量。
As if to confirm the correctness of this view, Husserl singles out reminders as leading instances of indicative signs (Anzeichen): “Signs to aid memory, such as the much-used knot in a handkerchief, memorials, etc., also have their place here. If suitable things, events, or their properties are deliberately produced to serve as such indications, one calls them [indicative] ‘signs’ whether they [successfully] exercise this function or not.” ^(6){ }^{6} Husserl also recognizes the essential role of the remindee: “a thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to some thinking being.” ^("7){ }^{" 7} Included in this latter statement are the equivalents of all three components of the reminding situation: reminder (“an indication”), remindand (the “something” which is indicated), and the remindee (“some thinking being”). Further, Husserl conceives of indication in such a way as to avoid any commitment to a copy theory of reminding. This is evident in his formal definition of the “common element” in all species of indication: 仿佛为了证实这一观点的正确性，胡塞尔特别指出提醒物是指示性符号（Anzeichen）的主要例子：“用于记忆的符号，如常用的手帕上的结、纪念物等，也属于此类。如果合适的事物、事件或其属性被有意生产出来以充当此类指示，无论它们是否成功地履行这一功能，都称为[指示性]‘符号’。” ^(6){ }^{6} 胡塞尔还承认被提醒者的本质作用：“只有当某物实际上被用来向某个思考者指示某物时，它才真正是指示。” ^("7){ }^{" 7} 这一表述包含了提示情境中所有三个组成部分的等价物：提示物（“指示物”）、被提示物（“被指示的某物”）和被提示者（“某个思维主体”）。此外，胡塞尔对指示的理解避免了对复制理论的承诺。这一点在他对所有指示种类中“共同要素”的正式定义中显而易见：
In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality (Bestand) someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality (Sein) of the one is experienced (though not at all [self-] evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other. ^(8){ }^{8} 在这些情形中，我们发现一个共同特征：当某人确实知晓某些对象或事态的真实性（Bestand）时，这些认知会向他揭示另一些对象或事态的真实性——具体表现为：他对前者实在性（Sein）的信念（虽非不言自明地）会促生对后者实在性的信念或推测。 ^(8){ }^{8}
Nevertheless, Husserl’s conception of the common element present in all indication ranges too broadly to enable us to isolate the specificity of reminders as a particular species of indication. In Husserl’s own reckoning, indicative signs include brands on slaves, Martian canals, fossil vertebrae, volcanic eruptions, chalk marks on blackboards, and much else besides. ^(9){ }^{9} We are not told what specific differences there may be between these various species, nor even where (or how) to start looking for them. On the other hand, the very same conception is too narrow. It excludes many cases of reminding, including our own exemplary case of tying a string around one’s finger. The constriction is due to Husserl’s emphasis upon the notion of “reality” in the above definition. Granted, the reminder itself is a reality of some sort, whether perceptual (as in string-tying) or cognitive (as in those cases in which a thought acts as a reminder: this thought has reality as an actual occurrent in the mind). And in many cases the remindand is also a reality-above all, when what we are reminded of is a past object or event, since this object or event is real by virtue of having already occurred. But 然而，胡塞尔关于所有指示行为中共通要素的概念界定过于宽泛，使我们无法从中分离出"提醒"作为一种特殊指示类型的独特性。按照胡塞尔自己的列举，指示性符号包括奴隶身上的烙印、火星运河、化石脊椎、火山爆发、黑板上的粉笔标记等等名目。 ^(9){ }^{9} 这些不同种类之间究竟存在何种具体差异，甚至该从何处（或如何）着手寻找这些差异，我们并未获得明确指引。另一方面，这一概念又显得过于狭隘。它排除了许多提醒的实例，包括我们前文讨论的经典案例——在手指上系绳的做法。这种局限源于胡塞尔在上述定义中对"实在性"概念的强调。诚然，提醒物本身确实是某种实在——无论是知觉性的（如系绳行为）还是认知性的（当某个念头充当提醒物时：这个念头作为心理实际发生项具有实在性）。而且在多数情况下，被提醒物同样具有实在性——尤其当我们被唤起的是过往对象或事件时，因为这些对象或事件凭借其既成事实而具备实在性。 但
what of those no less numerous cases, including our paradigm, in which the remindand proper ^(10){ }^{10} is a future object or state of affairs, one that has the status of being merely optional, would-be, should-be, etc.? How can we claim reality, however loosely construed, for that which is not yet in being? There are no future realities-the very phrase “future realities” being a blatant contradiction in terms-and yet many reminders evoke future actions, including that of lowering the heat on a wintry evening when I have not yet lowered it and need to be reminded to do so by placing a string on my little finger. I certainly do not actively believe in or presume the reality of such an action. If I did, I wouldn’t bother to put the string around my finger! From the standpoint of the present, what I am being reminded of is only possible-for I may not carry out the action in the end, even if the string successfully reminds me to do so. 那些同样常见的情况又该如何解释？包括我们的范例在内，被提醒物本身是未来的对象或事态，仅具有可选性、可能性或应然性等特征。我们怎能声称尚未存在之物具有现实性——无论这种现实性多么宽泛？"未来的现实"这个表述本身就是明显的矛盾修辞，然而许多提醒确实指向未来行动，比如在寒冬夜晚调低暖气温度这个动作——当我尚未执行且需要通过手指系绳来提醒自己时。我当然不会积极相信或预设这个动作的现实性。若真如此，何必多此一举在手指上系绳！从当下视角看，被提醒的只是可能性——因为即便系绳成功提醒了我，最终仍可能不执行该动作。
We must therefore reject Husserl’s conception of the indicative sign as a model for reminding. Although this conception is an improvement over Aristotle’s account, it is at once too broad and too narrow. As a result, we still do not have an adequate idea of how the string around my finger exercises its reminding function. I would suggest that we consider this function to reside in the figurative and schematical adumbration of an object, action, or state of affairs. 因此，我们必须拒绝胡塞尔将指示性符号作为回忆模型的构想。尽管这一构想相较于亚里士多德的解释有所改进，但它既过于宽泛又过于狭隘。如此一来，我们仍然无法充分理解绕在手指上的细绳如何发挥其提醒功能。我认为，应当将这种功能视为对物体、行为或事态的象征性与图式化的暗示。
The cursory formula I have just underlined calls for several comments: 我方才强调的简要表述需要几点说明：
(1) If I am reminded of an object or state of affairs, it is necessarily located in the past, in the future, or in a contemporaneous present that is not identical with my own present (e.g., I am reminded of my cousin’s bypass operation in Kansas City as I notice that it is now 10:00 a.m. in St. Louis). To be reminded of an action is to be put in mind of a doing or thinking that occurs at some point in the past, present, or future. Moreover, I can be reminded of actions or situations in which I am the initiating agent (e.g., turning down the heat, putting my notes away), in which I serve as observer or witness (my viewing of the Parthenon), or in which I seem to play no role at all (“the glory that was Greece,” of which I can be reminded only if I have once learned of this same glory, my agency as a learner here being presupposed). (1) 若我忆起某物或某情境，它必然存在于过去、未来，或与我的当下并不重合的共时性现在（例如当我注意到圣路易斯此刻是上午 10 点时，想起了表兄在堪萨斯城做的心脏搭桥手术）。被唤起对某个行为的记忆，就是让心灵重新触及过去、现在或未来某个时刻的作为或思考。此外，我可能被唤起的行为或情境包括：作为发起者的行动（如调低暖气温度、整理笔记）、作为观察者或见证者的经历（我参观帕特农神庙），或是看似与我毫无关联的事件（"希腊昔日的荣光"——唯有当我曾了解过这份荣光时才能被唤起，此处已预设了我作为学习者的能动性）。
(2) The term “figurative” in the above formula refers to the fact that, in order to function effectively, a reminder is normally presented to the remindee in a sensuous or quasi-sensuous format. This format is not to be confused with a strictly iconic representation since, as we have seen, reminders need not be structurally isomorphic with their remindands to remind us of them. Indeed, they need not represent them in any explicit or readily recognizable way at all. They may be pure figurations which convey only their own figurative structure, as in the case of most written reminders and of the piece of string tied around my finger. It is odd to speak of this piece of string, or of a group of reminding words, as representing, much less as iconically depicting, any specifiable action, object, or state of affairs. They (2) 上述公式中"具象化"这一术语指的是：为了有效发挥作用，提醒物通常需要以感官或类感官的形式呈现给被提醒者。这种呈现形式不应与严格的图像表征混为一谈，因为正如我们所见，提醒物无需与提醒对象保持结构同构性就能唤起我们的记忆。事实上，它们根本不需要以任何显性或易于识别的方式再现对象。它们可能是纯粹的具象形式，仅传递自身的象征结构——就像大多数书面提醒物和绑在手指上的细绳那样。若将这条细绳或一组提醒性文字说成是再现（更遑论图像化描绘）某个具体行为、对象或事态，会显得颇为怪异。它们
are sheer presentations, and as such they need not be given to our physical senses at all but may appear as mental images or words of inner speech. But such images and words still present themselves as quasi-sensuous; they are appearances-to the mind if not to the senses. 是纯粹的呈现形式，因此完全不必诉诸我们的物理感官，而可能以心理意象或内心独白的形式显现。但这类意象和语词仍以类感官的方式呈现自身；即便不作用于感官，它们也是向心智显现的表象。
(3) It is a striking fact that “appearance” is the original meaning of schèma in Greek. ^(11){ }^{11} If a schema is an appearance or shape-a “figure” ^(12){ }^{12} in the rich sense given to this latter term by Gestalt psychologists-then a reminder qua schema will be inherently figurative in status. But “schema” has also come to connote what is figurative in a specifically condensed or sparse form. Notice in this regard the structure of the string around my finger: the simplicity of this structure is distinctly schematical, and its very knottedness seems to symbolize the schematicalness of all reminders. ^(13){ }^{13} Indeed, think of almost any reminder-including the four cases with which I began this chapter-and a definite economy will become apparent. In part this is a practical consideration: who would devise reminders that are more elaborate than that which they remind us of? In part, however, the schematical aspect of reminders subserves their adumbrative dimension. （3）一个引人注目的事实是，“外观”在希腊语中正是“schema”的原初含义。 ^(11){ }^{11} 如果图式是一种外观或形状——即格式塔心理学家赋予“图形”这一术语的丰富含义 ^(12){ }^{12} ——那么作为图式的提醒物本质上就具有比喻性地位。但“图式”还逐渐特指以高度凝练或简约形式呈现的比喻性内容。不妨观察我手指上缠绕的细绳结构：这种结构的简洁性明显具有图式特征，而其打结状态似乎象征着所有提醒物的图式本质。 ^(13){ }^{13} 事实上，回想几乎任何提醒物——包括本章开头提及的四个案例——都能明显感受到某种精简特质。部分原因出于实用考量：谁会设计比被提醒事物本身更复杂的提醒物呢？但另一方面，提醒物的图式特征也服务于其暗示性维度。
(4) What, then, is adumbration? In the context of perception, adumbration (literally, “shadowing forth”) is a mode of manifestation in which the already perceived parts of an object suggest to the perceiver the presumptive character of those parts that have not yet been perceived. ^(14){ }^{14} Since a reminder need not be a perceived object, ^(15){ }^{15} however, its form of adumbration is not identical with this perceptual paradigm; it is more a type of relation than a mode of manifestation. What is shadowed forth in the adumbration of reminding is not some hitherto concealed part of the reminder taken as a singular object. What is adumbrated is no part at all of the reminder qua sensuous or quasi-sensuous object-which is to say, qua schematical fig-ure-but something else to which the reminder is itself related. This something else is, of course, the remindand. This, and this alone, is adumbrated by the reminder in the process of reminding. (4) 那么，什么是轮廓暗示？在感知的语境中，轮廓暗示（字面意为"投射阴影"）是一种显现模式，即物体已被感知的部分向感知者暗示那些尚未被感知部分的假定特征。 ^(14){ }^{14} 由于提醒物不必是被感知对象， ^(15){ }^{15} 其轮廓暗示形式便与这种感知范式不同；它更像是一种关系类型而非显现模式。在提醒的轮廓暗示中投射而出的，并非作为单一对象的提醒物某个迄今隐藏的部分。被暗示的完全不属于提醒物作为感性或准感性对象（即作为图式性形象）的任何部分，而是提醒物自身所关联的别样事物。这个别样事物，当然就是被提醒物。唯有这个，且仅此这个，才是提醒过程中被提醒物所暗示的内容。
It is important to underline that such an adumbrative relation is not indicative, much less iconic, in character and that it differs, therefore, from the models proposed by Husserl and Aristotle. Although reality and re-semblance-which characterize the respective models of these two think-ers-may play a role in reminding, we have found that neither trait is a necessary feature of reminders. Instead of copying the remindand or motivating a belief in its reality, reminders adumbrate what they remind us of. They shadow it forth or suggest it to us as remindees by any number of means (including iconic and indicative means themselves on occasion). The adumbrative relation thus set in action is best understood under the headings of “evocation” and “allusion.” 必须强调的是，这种暗示性关系并非指示性，更非图像性特征，因此与胡塞尔和亚里士多德提出的模型存在本质差异。尽管这两位思想家各自模型的核心特征——现实性与相似性——可能在回忆过程中发挥作用，但我们发现这两种特质都不是回忆行为的必要要素。回忆物并非通过复制被忆对象或激发对其真实性的信念来运作，而是以各种方式（偶尔也会借助图像或指示手段）对其进行暗示性呈现，向作为回忆主体的我们投射出朦胧轮廓或给予提示。这种动态运作的暗示关系，最适合用"唤起"与"暗指"这两个概念来理解。
(a) The evocation consists in a summoning-up of the remindand from a state of actual or potential forgetfulness. The reminder is established to combat such forgetfulness in the first place, and it does so by presenting to （a）"唤起"的本质在于将记忆对象从实际或潜在的遗忘状态中召唤出来。回忆机制最初就是为了对抗这种遗忘而建立的，其运作方式是通过向......
the remindee a sensuous or quasi-sensuous configuration conspicuous enough to draw attention to itself. I don’t usually tie a knot on my little finger: thanks to its more or less striking appearance, the knot stands out and distinguishes itself in my everyday environment. But I do not attend to it for its own sake; instead, when I apprehend it as a reminder I grasp it for the sake of what it evokes. This is true even of aesthetically appealing reminders such as the post card from Greece. I may admire the photograph of the Parthenon, and find myself lingering over its purely formal properties; as a reminder, however, it sends me beyond its own aesthetic surface by calling up in me experiences or objects not part of this surface. That which is evoked in such cases is the remindand, but it is crucial to stress that it is ee-voked: called forth from obscurity and often still partaking in some of the same dark Lethic indistinctness from which it arises. Indeed, it is this indistinctness that allows the remindand to possess the status of the possible, the hypothetical, the probable, etc. These modal characters, in their very indeterminacy, cannot be indicated in Husserl’s strict sense, and they often defy iconic representation as well. Yet they can be evoked, that is, summoned into mind in their very lack of existential determinacy, called up like shades momentarily escaping immersion in the waters of Lethe. 被提醒物是一种足以引人注目的感官或类感官形态。我通常不会在小指上打结：由于它或多或少引人注目的外观，这个结在日常生活中显得突出而独特。但我关注它并非为了其本身；相反，当我将其视为提醒物时，我抓住它是为了它所唤起的东西。即使是像希腊明信片这样具有美学吸引力的提醒物也是如此。我可能会欣赏帕特农神庙的照片，并发现自己流连于其纯粹的形式特性；然而作为提醒物，它通过唤起我内心不属于这一美学表面的经验或对象，将我带出其自身的美学表面。在这种情况下被唤起的就是被提醒内容，但必须强调的是，它是被唤起的：从晦暗中召唤出来，往往仍带有一些与生俱来的莱特式模糊不清。正是这种模糊性使得被提醒内容能够具有可能性、假设性、或然性等特质。 这些模态特征，在其不确定性中，无法以胡塞尔的严格意义被指认，也常常抗拒图像化的再现。然而它们可以被唤起，也就是说，尽管缺乏存在的确定性，仍能被召唤到心灵中，如同暂时逃离忘川之水的幽影般浮现。
(b) The remindand is not only evoked by the reminder; it is also referred to by it. This reference occurs by allusion, which must be distinguished from denotative designation. This latter is in fact a form of indication, since we can designate only that which exists, has existed, or (presumably) will exist. In the case of allusion, on the other hand, we may make reference to what does not exist and may never have existed, and we are not at all restricted to employing proper names as we are in the case of strict designation. We can allude to what is purely possible, to fictitious actions and characters, even to contradictory states of affairs. We are sanctioned to do so because of the indirect and somewhat indefinite nature of this mode of reference: its literally “allusive” quality. The echo of ludere (to play) is to be heard in the root word alludere; one of the earliest meanings of “allude” in English was to refer by way of play or fancy. In its most general contemporary sense, an allusion is a “covert or implied reference” (Oxford English Dictionary), and it is just such reference that occurs in much reminding, where the remindand is only allusively suggested by the reminder: obliquely suggested, as it were. The obliqueness itself arises from the fact that the reminder is an artifice established by convention. Whether the convention is idiosyncratic (e.g., my way of making notes to remind myself to put back other notes in their proper place) or publicly sanctioned (the string around the finger), the reminder is (i) arbitrarily related to the remindand (i.e., is not intrinsically associated with it by virture of relations of similarity or contiguity), and is nevertheless (ii) an essential third term standing between the mind of the remindee and the remindand. Arbitrary and intermediary, and thus doubly (b) 被忆起者不仅由提醒物所唤起，更被其所指涉。这种指涉通过暗示实现，必须与指称性命名区分开来。后者实质上是一种指示形式，因为我们只能命名那些存在、曾经存在或（推测）将存在之物。而暗示则不同，我们可以指涉那些不存在或可能从未存在之物，且完全不受限于必须使用专有名称的严格命名规范。我们能够暗示纯粹的可能性、虚构的行为与角色，甚至自相矛盾的事态。这种指涉方式的间接性与某种不确定性特质——其字面意义上的"暗示性"特征——赋予了我们这样做的正当性。在词源 alludere（拉丁语"暗示"）中可辨 ludere（"游戏"）的回响；英语"allude"最早的含义之一正是通过游戏或幻想进行指涉。 在当代最普遍的意义上，暗示是一种"隐蔽或含蓄的指涉"（《牛津英语词典》），而这正是许多提醒行为中发生的指涉方式——提醒物仅以暗示方式指向被提醒物：可以说是迂回地暗示。这种迂回性源于提醒物本身是由惯例建立的人为设计。无论这种惯例是个人化的（例如我用来提醒自己将其他笔记归位的便签方式），还是公众认可的（如绕在手指上的绳子），提醒物都具备双重特征：(i) 与被提醒物存在任意关联（即并非通过相似性或邻近性形成内在联系），同时(ii) 作为不可或缺的第三项，介于被提醒者的意识与被提醒物之间。这种既任意又居间的本质，使其结构本身具有双重
oblique in its very constitution, it refers to the remindand by allusion and hence indirection. ^(16){ }^{16} 的迂回性，通过暗示从而间接地指向被提醒物。 ^(16){ }^{16}
Both aspects of adumbration, evocation and allusion alike, must be acknowledged as constitutive elements of the operation by which the reminder accomplishes its function. When the adumbrative relation, thus constituted, conjoins with the reminder’s own figurative-schematical format, the work of reminding is made possible. 无论是唤起还是暗示，这两种预示的面向都必须被视为提醒功能得以实现的操作过程中的构成性要素。当如此构成的预示关系与提醒自身具象图式化的形式相结合时，提醒的工作才成为可能。
IV 第四章
In concluding this account of reminding, several additional points need to be made: 在结束关于提醒的讨论时，还需要补充几点：
(1) I am not claiming that the adumbrative model fits every case of reminding. It remains true that much reminding occurs by means of a strictly iconomorphic relation between reminder and remindand (e.g., between the photograph of the Parthenon and the building itself) or via an indexical relation (as when my memo to myself signifies a particular place in which to put my course notes). Nevertheless, many remindands are neither indicated as actual existents nor are they pictured; instead, they are evoked and alluded to. As a consequence, the adumbrative relation has a very wide application in the realm of reminders. Not only strings around fingers but any reminder that sets forth an action, object, or state of affairs which is intrinsically indeterminate as to date of appearance or performance, or as to setting, will be captured by the model that I have outlined. (1) 我并非主张轮廓模型适用于所有提醒情形。事实上，多数提醒仍通过严格图像关系（如帕特农神庙照片与建筑本身之间）或索引关系（如备忘纸条指向特定笔记存放位置）实现。然而，许多被提醒物既非实际存在的指示对象，也非具象呈现；它们是通过暗示与联想被唤起的。正因如此，轮廓关系在提醒领域具有极广的适用性。不仅指间缠绕的细绳，任何涉及行动、物体或事态的提醒——当这些要素在出现时间、执行情境等方面具有内在不确定性时——都将契合我所勾勒的模型。
Yet amnesia itself-against which I have constructed such a formidable array of admonitions-is not an external matter. It is II, this person or self, who forgets; it is my mind that goes blank or (in paramnesia) thinks of something else when I should be remembering a particular object or task. Hence it is not surprising that we also make use of an entire set of specifically internal reminders: thoughts, fantasies, even memories themselves. These psychical reminders are, as it were, the “deficient modes” (Heidegger), the soft underlining, of reminding-not because they are ineffective or without value, much less because they have a defective structure (they are as effective and as fully structured as the string on my finger), but because they are somewhat more difficult to establish as conventional practices. Only in mnemotechnics do we witness anything like a collective, conventionalized employment of mind-inherent reminders: e.g., the various prememorized loci that constitute the basic grid in the ancient ars memoria. Yet such purely psychical cues are not deficient as reminders, whatever their natural nonconventionality; and our study of reminders must acknowledge them as such. Mind, in short, remains a pertinent ground for reminding, which for all of its natural affinity with the external and public world of perception and language, cannot claim to transcend the mental sphere completely. 然而失忆本身——我已针对它构建了如此严密的警示体系——并非外在之事。正是 II ，这个个体或自我在遗忘；是我的心智变得空白，或（在记忆错乱时）当我本该忆起特定对象或任务时却想着别的事情。因此我们同样会动用整套内在提醒机制也就不足为奇：思绪、幻想、甚至记忆本身。这些心理层面的提醒者，可谓海德格尔所说的"缺陷模式"，是提醒行为的柔软下划线——并非因为它们无效或无价值，更非因其结构缺陷（它们与我手指上的绳结同样有效且结构完整），而是因为它们较难确立为常规实践。唯有在记忆术中，我们才能见到类似集体化、常规化的心智内在提醒运用：例如构成古代记忆术基础网格的各种预存记忆场所。但这类纯粹的心理线索作为提醒者并无缺陷，无论它们天然具备多少非惯例性；我们对提醒现象的研究必须承认其本质如此。 简言之，心灵仍是回忆活动的相关基础——尽管回忆与感知、语言的外部公共世界存在天然亲缘性，却无法宣称能完全超越精神领域。
It is only appropriate to end by reverting to Plato, who was unusually sensitive to the internal and external aspects of reminding. In fact his doctrine of recollection (anamnesis) makes the experience of being reminded (anamimnëskesthai) indispensable to gaining knowledge of the Forms. As Socrates says in the Phaedo: 最后回归柏拉图的思想是恰如其分的，这位哲人对回忆的内外维度有着异乎寻常的敏锐洞察。事实上，他的回忆学说（anamnesis）将使被回忆的体验（anamimnëskesthai）成为获得理型知识的必经之路。正如苏格拉底在《斐多篇》中所言：
I suppose that you find it hard to understand how what we call learning can be recollection? . . . I look at it in this way . . . if a person is to be reminded of anything, he must first know it at some time or other. . . . Are we also agreed in calling it recollection when knowledge comes in a particular way? I will explain what I mean. Suppose that a person on seeing or hearing or otherwise noticing one thing not only becomes conscious of that thing but also thinks of something else which is an object of a different sort of knowledge [i.e., properly eidetic knowledge]. Are we not justified in saying that he was reminded of the object which he thought of? ^(21){ }^{21} 我想你很难理解我们所说的学习为何能成为回忆？……我是这样看的……如果一个人要被提醒某件事，他必定在某个时间点已经知晓它……当知识以特定方式呈现时，我们是否也同意称之为回忆？我来解释我的意思。假设某人通过视觉、听觉或其他方式注意到某物时，不仅意识到该事物，还联想到另一件属于不同知识范畴的对象[即真正的理念知识]。我们难道不该说他想起了那个被联想到的对象吗？ ^(21){ }^{21}
Thus (in Socrates’s own example), equal things, sensuously perceived, remind one of absolute Equality. Reminding is here more than a mere analogy to the acquisition of eidetic knowledge: it is part and parcel of such acquisition, integral to it. Far from being subordinate to recollection, reminding is 因此（以苏格拉底自己的例子来说），通过感官感知的相等事物会让人想起绝对的"等"。这里的"提醒"远不止是对获取理念知识的简单类比：它本身就是这种知识获取过程的重要组成部分，与后者密不可分。提醒非但并非从属于回忆，反而......
critical to its very realization. This becomes evident when we reflect that in his account of knowledge-as-recollected Plato includes each of the basic ingredients of reminding: the reminder (primarily sensuous for Plato), ^(22){ }^{22} the adumbrative relation of this reminder to the remindand (this is twice termed “suggestion”), ^(23){ }^{23} the remindand (which is ultimately eidetic), and the remindee (who is any philosophically-minded learner). 这对实现回忆至关重要。当我们思考柏拉图关于知识即回忆的论述时，这一点变得显而易见——他的理论包含了提醒行为的全部基本要素：作为触发物的提醒者（对柏拉图而言主要是感官对象）、 ^(22){ }^{22} 提醒者与被提醒之物之间的暗示性关联（这被两次称为"暗示"）、 ^(23){ }^{23} 被提醒之物（最终指向理型）、以及接受提醒的主体（任何具备哲学思维的学习者）。
Moreover, on Plato’s account, what we are reminded of is something eidetic that has its seat within the soul: 更重要的是，根据柏拉图的阐述，我们所被提醒的乃是根植于灵魂之中的理型知识：
This knowledge will not come from teaching but from questioning. One will recover it for himself. . . . And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection. ^(24){ }^{24} 这种知识不会来自教导，而只能通过提问获得。人必须亲自重新发现它......这种对内在知识的自发唤醒就是回忆。 ^(24){ }^{24}
If reminding is most frequently precipitated by the perception of external objects, its end-state is nonetheless situated in the soul of the remindee. In being reminded of the Forms by perceiving particulars in one’s external environment, one comes to recover “from within” (ex hauto) a secure knowledge of the eidetic structures. 虽然提醒行为最常由对外部对象的感知所触发，但其终极状态却始终存在于接受提醒者的灵魂之中。当人通过感知外部环境中的具体事物而被提醒想起理型时，实际上是从自身内部（ex hauto）重新获得了关于理型结构的确定知识。
In beginning this Part, we were drawn to reminders in their externality because of a growing concern about having become engulfed in the shadowy reaches of mind in Part One. In making this step away from the sheerly mental, we cited Plato’s advice to look for things in “larger characters” before grasping them within our souls in their own proper stature. Now we are again following Plato: this time in returning from the external manifestness of perceived reminders to the tacit realm of recollection within the soul. For in being reminded we are drawn into ourselves by what is outside ourselves. 在开始这一部分时，我们被外在的提醒所吸引，因为越来越担忧在第一部分中陷入了心灵的幽暗深处。为了从纯粹的精神领域抽离，我们援引了柏拉图的建议：在灵魂中以事物本来的形态把握它们之前，先要在"更大的字符"中寻找它们。此刻我们再次追随柏拉图：这次是从感知到的提醒之外在显明性，返回到灵魂内部那个缄默的回忆领域。因为在被提醒的过程中，我们正是通过外在之物被引向内在自我。
But Plato also makes it clear that in the recollection made possible by reminding, we are drawn out of ourselves once more-though only because we have gone so fully into ourselves in the first place. We must pass by body (as the ground of perception) and mind (as the locus of philosophical dialectic) in order to know what is more than either. If reminding is mainly a matter of externality in its most efficacious public use, it needs to be in touch with the internality of mind if it is to lead eventually to objects that transcend any strict dichotomy of body and mind, of self and other-and of internality and externality themselves. 但柏拉图也明确指出，在由提醒所促成的回忆中，我们再次被抽离出自我——尽管这恰恰是因为我们最初已如此彻底地进入自我。我们必须穿越身体（作为感知的基础）与心灵（作为哲学辩证的场所），才能认知那超越二者的存在。如果说提醒在其最有效的公共运用中主要关乎外在性，那么它若要最终导向那些超越身心、自我与他者——乃至内在性与外在性本身——严格二分的事物，就必须与心灵的内在性保持联结。
In this way reminding, despite its dual origin, allows us to draw things together. It is a force of unusual unifying power. What Plato attributes to its role in philosophy we can discern in the midst of ordinary life. Reminding brings together and unifies the disjecta membra of human experience: past, present, and future, duty and desire, the forgotten and the remembered. 由此，提醒虽具双重起源，却能使我们统合万物。它是一种具有非凡统一力量的存在。柏拉图归因于其在哲学中作用的特质，我们在日常生活中亦可窥见。提醒将人类经验中支离破碎的片段——过去、现在与未来，责任与欲望，遗忘与铭记——重新聚合统一。
REMINISCING 追忆
Memory . . . at my time of life is gradually becoming one of her own reminiscences. 记忆……在我这个年纪，正逐渐成为她自身的追忆。
-James Russell Lowell, “Democracy” (1884) -詹姆斯·拉塞尔·洛威尔，《民主》(1884 年)
I
In Absalom, Absalom! we read: 在《押沙龙，押沙龙！》中我们读到：
It seems that this demon-his name was Sutpen-(Colonel Sutpen)-Colonel Sutpen. Who came out of nowhere and without warning upon the land with a band of strange niggers and built a plantation-(Tore violently a plantation, Miss Rosa Coldfield says)-tore violently. And married her sister Ellen and begot a son and a daughter which-(Without gentleness begot, Miss Rosa Coldfield says)-without gentleness. Which should have been the jewels of his pride and the shield and comfort of his old age, only-(Only they destroyed him or something or he destroyed them or something. And died)-and died. Without regret, Miss Rosa Coldfield says-(Save by her) Yes, save by her. (And by Quentin Compson) Yes. And by Quentin Compson. ^(1){ }^{1} 这个恶魔——他的名字叫萨德本——（萨德本上校）——萨德本上校。他带着一群陌生的黑鬼突然凭空出现在这片土地上，建起了一座种植园——（罗莎·科德菲尔德小姐说，是凶暴地撕扯出一座种植园）——凶暴地撕扯。然后娶了她姐姐埃伦，生下一儿一女——（罗莎·科德菲尔德小姐说，毫无温柔地生育）——毫无温柔。这本该成为他骄傲的珍宝与暮年的慰藉，可是——（可是他们毁了他或怎样，或是他毁了他们也未可知。然后死了）——然后死了。毫无悔意，罗莎·科德菲尔德小姐说——（除了她）是的，除了她。（还有昆丁·康普生）是的。还有昆丁·康普生。 ^(1){ }^{1}
Faulkner here presents a scene of remembering. But the remembering is notably different from anything that we have thus far encountered. To begin with, it is not a matter of recollecting-where this means remembering in visual images to and for oneself. Instead, two people, Rosa Coldfield and Quentin Compson, are remembering certain things together, and they are doing so in words, not in images. Something at once social and verbal is happening: and therefore something we have not yet considered explicitly and for its own sake. Nor does what is happening here involve any of the other forms of memory discussed in chapter 3: primary memory, remember-ing-how, remembering-as, remembering-on-the-occasion-of, etc. The two interlocutors are engaged in an activity so thoroughly conjoint that none of the models considered in Part One-each of which presumes enactment by a single, discrete rememberer-is applicable. As if to signal this fact, Faulkner alternates parenthetical thoughts and remarks in a complex interplay that echoes and intensifies the deeply dialogical character of the situation. 福克纳在此呈现了一个回忆的场景。但这种回忆与我们迄今所见的任何形式都截然不同。首先，它并非个人通过视觉意象进行的内心追忆。相反，罗莎·科德菲尔德和昆汀·康普生两人正通过语言而非意象共同回忆某些往事。这里发生的既是社会性的又是言语性的活动——这种我们尚未专门就其本质进行探讨的现象。此处的回忆也不涉及第三章讨论的任何其他记忆形式：初级记忆、程序性记忆、情境记忆、契机记忆等。两位对话者进行的活动具有如此彻底的协同性，以至于第一部分探讨的所有模式——每种模式都预设了独立个体的记忆行为——在此均不适用。仿佛为了突显这一特质，福克纳通过括号内的思绪与评论交替呈现，在复杂的互动中呼应并强化了场景深刻的对话本质。
At the same time, there is a noticeable absence of any trace of what we have come to call “mentalism” in the co-remembering realized by Quentin and Rosa. Whatever remembering occurs arises between them, not within their minds taken in isolation from each other. Memory enters in the form of what the German language designates as Zweisprache, literally “two-talk.” Rather than minds spinning and projecting recollections, remembering occurs in and as colloquy, common discourse; and this circumstance is further reinforced by its conveyance to us in the written format of Faulkner’s graphic two-person dialogue. 与此同时，在昆汀与罗莎共同实现的回忆中，我们明显看不到任何所谓"心灵主义"的痕迹。所有发生的记忆都产生于两人之间，而非彼此隔绝的个体心智内部。记忆以德语所称"Zweisprache"（字面意为"双向对话"）的形式介入。回忆并非通过心智的运转与投射产生，而是发生并呈现为对话——这种共同言说；而福克纳以书面形式呈现的两人生动对话，更进一步强化了这一特质。
No less than in the case of reminding, we here transcend a paradigm whose exclusive focus and vehicle is the human mind. As reminders move us resolutely into our professional and personal environs, so reminiscing takes place primarily in the interpersonal domain of concrete language. But in the case of reminders the extra-mental appears in and through iconic, indicative, and (especially) adumbrative signs that need not have any strict social basis-any foundation in consensus or convention. We have seen that reminders can be established and maintained entirely by individual remindees. Reminiscing, in contrast, is much more consistently social in origin and operation; it belongs to the realm of what Heidegger would term Mitsein (“being-with-others”). For in its central cases it arises as discourse in the company of others: Quentin with Rosa, you with me, and (as a limiting case) myself with myself. It is a matter, in short, of remembering with others. 与提醒的情形一样，我们在此超越了一种仅以人类心智为焦点和载体的范式。正如提醒将我们坚定地带入职业与个人环境，回忆也主要发生在具体语言的人际领域中。但就提醒而言，心外之物通过图符性、指示性及（尤其是）预示性符号显现，这些符号无需严格的社会基础——无需共识或惯例的根基。我们已经看到，提醒完全可以由个体被提醒者建立并维持。相比之下，回忆在起源和运作上更具社会性；它属于海德格尔所称的"共在"（Mitsein）领域。因为在核心案例中，回忆产生于与他人相伴的话语中：昆汀与罗莎，你与我，以及（作为极限案例的）我与我自己。简言之，这是与他人共同记忆的问题。
It is a striking fact that whereas the verbs “to remember” and “to recollect” both take a direct object, “to reminisce” does not. We do not reminisce something, we reminisce about it. In this regard, reminiscing is comparable to reminding: we are reminded of X or Y . But there remains a critical difference. In a circumstance of reminding, II am characteristically in a passive position, as is signified in such expressions as “I am reminded” or “that reminds me.” I am always dependent on a particular reminder, even if it is one of my own devising. In reminiscing, I assume a more active posture: II, or more typically we, reminisce about Z . I or we get in touch with the past actively, thanks to concerted efforts at talking about it, musing on it, and so on. Such a difference between reminding and reminiscing is not just a verbal matter. It reflects the fundamental difference between being thrust into a world of the ready-to-hand-where II am willy-nilly parasitic on the preexistence of given reminders arranged around me-and being a participant in an ongoing conversation in which I am responsible for articulating the past in quite particular ways. The difference is as basic and perspicuous as that between being put in mind of a trip I once made to the Parthenon by merely receiving a postcard from Athens and talking about this same trip with the person who accompanied me. As the former situation is instantaneous and involuntary-it emerges by virtue of my mere apprehension of the post-card-the latter is both diachronic and voluntary: it takes time and effort (at least the effort of speaking) and is ipso facto an activity or performance. 一个引人注目的事实是，动词"记忆"和"回忆"都可以直接接宾语，而"追忆"则不行。我们不会"追忆某物"，而是"追忆关于某物"。在这方面，追忆与提醒相似：我们被提醒想起 X 或 Y。但两者仍存在关键差异。在提醒的情境中，我通常处于被动位置，正如"我被提醒"或"那让我想起"这类表达所暗示的。我总是依赖于特定的提醒物，即便它是自己设计的。而在追忆时，我采取更主动的姿态：我，或更常见的是我们，追忆关于 Z 的事物。通过交谈、沉思等协同努力，我或我们得以主动接触过去。这种提醒与追忆的差异不仅是语言层面的，它反映了两种根本不同的存在状态：一种是被抛入现成之物的世界——在那里我不得不依附于预先存在的周遭提醒物；另一种是作为持续对话的参与者——在其中我有责任以特定方式阐明过去。 这种差异就如同以下两种情形之间的区别一样基本而明显：一种情形是仅仅收到一张来自雅典的明信片就让我想起曾经去帕特农神庙的旅行，另一种情形则是与当时同行的伙伴谈论这同一段旅程。前者是瞬间且不由自主的——它仅仅通过我对明信片的感知就自然浮现；而后者既是历时性的也是主动的：它需要时间和精力（至少需要说话的力气），因此本质上是一种活动或表现。
II 第二章
If reminiscing thus contrasts revealingly with reminding-as well as with recollecting and other fundamental forms of remembering-it is more difficult to distinguish from two activities with which it is quite often allied: recounting and telling a story. It is tempting to subsume reminiscing under recounting, itself a form of the still more generic activity of retelling, under which both recounting and reminiscing fall. To recount is to retell by giving an account of events and experiences in written or spoken words. Recounting almost always involves a regulative narrative form, a form that allows the original order to be preserved while permitting diversions along the way. ^(2){ }^{2} The narrative order is crucial; if no semblance of it persisted, the recounting would dissolve into a purely random relating. Reminiscing, however, need not be narrative in format, nor is it constrained to repeat the original order of events it sets forth. A reminiscer may pick out events in any order and does not have to retell them in the sequence of their actual occurrence. When we speak of “the springing up again of reminiscences,” we are pointing to this uneven, unconsecutive, and unpredictable dimension of reminiscing, a dimension which contrasts markedly with the regular reliability of recounting. 如果说回忆与提醒（以及追忆等其他基本记忆形式）形成鲜明对比，那么它与另外两种常与之相伴的活动——叙述和讲故事——则更难区分。人们很容易将回忆归入叙述的范畴，而叙述本身又属于更广泛的复述活动，回忆与叙述皆可纳入其中。所谓叙述，即通过书面或口头语言对事件和经历进行复述。叙述几乎总是遵循某种规范的叙事形式，这种形式既能保持事件原初的次序，又允许在叙述过程中有所偏离。 ^(2){ }^{2} 叙事顺序至关重要；若连基本脉络都无法维系，叙述就会沦为纯粹的随机关联。然而回忆未必需要叙事结构，也不必拘泥于事件原有的发生顺序。回忆者可以任意选取事件片段，无需按照实际发生的先后次序进行复述。 当我们谈及"回忆的突然涌现"时，指向的正是这种不均衡、不连贯且难以预测的回忆维度，这一维度与叙述所具有的规律可靠性形成鲜明对比。
Story-telling is itself a special form of recounting, but one that is not confined to the relating of actual incidents. Stories bear not only on the real but on the imaginary, which they help to create. Their verbal-cum-narrative format, which they share with all recounting, is correspondingly freer, particularly with respect to observance of chronological order. By means of such techniques as flashback or flashforward, they may upset this order, not only reversing it but confusing it to the point of unrecognizability-as Faulkner himself so masterfully demonstrates in the above passage. Nevertheless, within the story itself, an order is respected, however irregular it may appear to be when measured by continuous, chronometric world-time. Or more exactly, the manifest order narrated may be irregular, but the latent narrative order itself (i.e., beginning-development-end) remains intact and recognizable. ^(3){ }^{3} 讲故事本身是叙述的一种特殊形式，但它并不局限于对真实事件的讲述。故事不仅涉及现实，也涉及想象——它们甚至能帮助创造想象。与其他叙述形式共有的语言-叙事结构，使故事讲述更为自由，尤其在时间顺序的遵守方面。通过倒叙或预叙等手法，故事可以打破时间顺序，不仅将其逆转，更使其混乱到难以辨认的程度——正如福克纳在上述段落中展现的精湛技艺。然而在故事内部，无论其顺序在以连续计时为基准的世界时间中显得多么不规则，总存在着某种被遵循的秩序。更准确地说，被讲述的表层叙事顺序可能是不规则的，但潜在的叙事秩序本身（即开端-发展-结尾）始终保持完整且可辨识。 ^(3){ }^{3}
In reminiscing, there need be neither a manifest nor a latent narrative structure. For one thing, a given reminiscence may be too brief or too condensed to allow for anything like the distension required by narrative time. For another, even when there is considerable continuity in, and prolongation of, a given reminiscence, it can rarely be considered a matter of sheer development, that is, of steadily increasing insight, tension, or complication. Instead, when we reminisce, a certain laxity of direction or purpose abounds that disallows, or at least discourages, the kind of intensified build-up which is so characteristic of story-telling and which, under the designation of “drama,” is what produces and holds our interest as listeners or readers. A skilled storyteller relies on this build-up within the story line because of its gradually augmenting dramatic intensity, whereas a reminis- 在回忆中，既不需要显性的叙事结构，也不需要潜在的叙事框架。一方面，特定的回忆可能过于简短或浓缩，无法容纳叙事时间所要求的延展性。另一方面，即使某段回忆具有相当的连续性和持久性，也很少能被视为纯粹的发展过程——即那种洞察力、张力或复杂性持续增强的线性推进。相反，当我们回忆时，往往存在着某种方向或目的的松散性，这种特性排斥（或至少不鼓励）那种在讲故事时极为典型、并被冠以"戏剧性"之名的层层递进——正是这种递进作为听众或读者的我们产生并保持着兴趣。娴熟的讲故事者依赖于故事情节中这种逐步增强的戏剧张力，而回忆者则...
cer may adhere to his or her own reminiscing through motives as disparate as the simple joy of re-experiencing the past, the challenge of confronting the past as past, a specific need for catharsis, etc. ^(4){ }^{4} 个体可能出于种种迥异的动机而执着于自己的回忆：或是单纯享受重温往事的愉悦，或是直面过往的挑战，亦或是某种特定的情感宣泄需求等等。
This is not to deny the presence of deep affinities between story-telling and reminiscing. Indeed, the very telling of one’s reminiscences to others induces or encourages a storylike form, and few can resist the temptation to embroider storywise upon otherwise banal reminiscences. But the existence of the temptation or tendency does not establish the equivalence of the two activities. The truth of the matter is that everyone-even someone as concerned with story as Faulkner-can reminisce without telling stories and tell stories without reminiscing. 这并非否认叙事与回忆之间存在着深刻的亲缘关系。事实上，向他人讲述回忆本身就会诱发或促成一种故事化的形式，很少有人能抵抗这种诱惑——将原本平淡的回忆添枝加叶地编织成故事。但这种诱惑或倾向的存在，并不能证明两种活动是等同的。真相在于，每个人——即便是像福克纳这样痴迷于故事的作家——都可以在不讲故事的情况下回忆，也可以在不回忆的情况下讲故事。
III 第三章
It is one thing to say what reminiscing is not. It is quite another to determine what it is as a distinctive phenomenon in its own right, especially in the case of something so open-ended and even tenuous in its presentation. Let us single out four of its basic characteristics: reliving the past, reminiscentia, wistfulness, and its communal-discursive aspect. 说明回忆不是什么是一回事，而要确定它作为独特现象本身究竟是什么则完全是另一回事，尤其是对于如此开放甚至呈现方式脆弱的事物而言。让我们提炼出回忆的四个基本特征：重温过去、回忆性、怅惘感，以及其社群-话语维度。
Reliving the Past 重温往昔
To remember is to relive the past. But isn’t this true of all remembering? By no means! Some remembering is undertaken in order to recover information, either for its own sake or as an aid in various projects, e.g., those that involve relearning how to do something. But some remembering has no such utilitarian purpose; it just arises involuntarily and is savored as such: as sheer reliving of the past. Or if it is self-induced, it is undertaken for the simple joy of being able to recall something, quite apart from any given use or value: “I just like recalling those salad days, or that multiplication table,” etc. Reminiscing, whether involuntary or self-induced, is rarely undertaken for the sake of any particular concrete aim or gain. Insofar as it has any stateable aim at all, it is that of reliving the past. 回忆即重历往昔。但所有回忆皆如此吗？绝非如此！有些回忆旨在获取信息，或为信息本身，或为辅助各类事务，比如重新学习某项技能。但另一些回忆则毫无功利目的；它们只是不期而至，被纯粹地品味：作为对过去的纯粹重历。即便是有意为之，也只是为享受回忆本身的乐趣，与任何实用价值无关："我就是喜欢回想那些青葱岁月，或是那张乘法表"等等。无论自发还是主动，怀旧行为鲜少出于某个具体目标或收益。若非要为其赋予一个可表述的目的，那便是重历往昔。
To relive the past in reminiscence is not merely to re-present to ourselves certain experienced events or previously acquired items of information. Nor is it a question of searching for these things in memory or having them displayed there spontaneously. Rather, it is a matter of actively re-entering the “no longer living worlds” of that which is irrevocably past. In reliving the past, we try to re-enter such worlds not just as they were-which is, strictly speaking, impossible-but as they are now rememberable in and through reminiscence. That we do not aspire to their full reinstatement is indicated by the fact that adequate and satisfying reminiscing can occur without our having any explicit images of that which is reminisced about. 在回忆中重温过去，不仅仅是将某些经历的事件或先前获取的信息重新呈现给自己。这也不是在记忆中搜寻这些事物或让它们自发显现的问题。相反，这关乎我们如何主动重新进入那些不可逆转的过去之"不再鲜活的世界"。在重温过去时，我们试图重新进入这些世界，并非完全按照它们曾经的模样——严格来说这是不可能的——而是按照它们如今通过回忆可被记起的样子。我们并不追求对过去的完整复原，这一点体现在：即使没有任何关于被回忆事物的明确意象，充分而令人满足的回忆仍可能发生。
This happens especially when we reminisce by just talking about the past. But it can also arise mutely when we re-experience a certain ambiance, emotion, or mood for which there is no corresponding image. Moreover, we do not even need to re-feel the original affective elements per se. ^(6){ }^{6} Reminiscing can occur in the absence of exactly answering imagery or any corresponding emotion: 这种情况尤其发生在我们仅通过谈论过去来回忆时。但当我们重新体验某种没有对应意象的氛围、情感或心境时，这种回忆也可能以静默的方式产生。更进一步说，我们甚至不需要重新感受原始的情感要素本身。回忆可以在缺乏精确对应的意象或任何相应情感的情况下发生：
It may be said that two old soldiers are reliving the past when they are discussing and joking about some terrible events which they lived through. These old men may be having neither mental imagery of the events, nor may the original horror be, as it were, felt again. ^(7){ }^{7} 可以说，当两位老兵在谈论和调侃他们曾经历过的某些可怕事件时，他们正在重温往事。这些老人可能既没有在脑海中重现那些事件的画面，也没有重新感受到当初的恐惧。 ^(7){ }^{7}
It would be misleading to claim that reliving the past and reminiscing are two separate descriptions of such a case as this. Rather, the two comrades are reliving the past by reminiscing: it is their reminiscing together that allows them to relive the past as they do. In reminiscing about it, they are reliving it. 若声称重温往事与追忆是对这种情况的两种独立描述，那将产生误导。更准确地说，两位战友正是通过追忆来重温往事：正是他们共同的追忆行为，使他们能够如此这般地重温过去。在对往事的追忆中，他们正重新经历着那段历史。
Reliving the past by reminiscing is normally a highly selective affair. In any case it is not a matter of re-experiencing the whole past-not even the entirety of that part of the past, that world, upon which we are momentarily focusing in reminiscence. When two soldiers reminisce about their wartime experiences together, the war-world they relive is by no means the complete scene of which they were the witnesses. Not only has much been forgotten or repressed, but in no way is it requisite that the total scene return in reminiscing. Indeed, a given act of reminiscence may become all the more moving or poignant if it does not attempt to scan the whole of the original experience. Concentrating on just a few details may be quite effective enough: “Remember when the weather suddenly cleared?”; “Wasn’t it strange how quickly we reached that hill?”; “What a sodden mess that trench was after the initial barrage|” Since reminiscing does not attempt to recount the total action or experience, the existence of considerable gaps in the reminiscing, of glaring discontinuities in time and space, and even of significant inconsistencies in the retelling do not occasion the anxiety or concern they would arouse if the situation were one of straightforward reconstruc-tion-or even if it were a scene of sheer story-telling, which must retain a certain continuity of narration and consistency of detail in order to hold the attention of the storyteller’s audience. 通过回忆重温往事通常是一个高度选择性的过程。无论如何，这并非意味着要重新体验整个过去——甚至不是我们当下回忆所聚焦的那部分过往世界的全部。当两名士兵共同追忆他们的战时经历时，他们所重温的战争世界绝非他们曾见证过的完整场景。不仅许多细节已被遗忘或压抑，而且回忆也完全不需要重现整个场景。事实上，若某次回忆不试图扫描原始经历的全部，反而可能使其更动人或更深刻。 专注于少数细节可能已足够有效：“还记得天气突然放晴的那一刻吗？”；“我们这么快就爬上了那座山，是不是很奇怪？”；“第一轮炮击后那条战壕简直成了泥泞的沼泽！”由于回忆并不试图复述完整的行动或经历，回忆中存在的大量空白、时空上的明显断裂，甚至叙述中的重大矛盾，都不会引发焦虑或担忧——若换作是直接重构事件，或纯粹讲故事的情形则不然，后者必须保持叙述的连贯性与细节的一致性，才能抓住听众的注意力。
Reminiscence, then, can be very “spotty” and yet still count as full-fledged reliving of the past. This is so for the reason that the past is not being relived as it unfolded in strict succession but only as certain happenings stood out and were remarked at the time. Consequently there is usually a marked restriction to two classes of events: what befell me or us; or what I or we accomplished, or failed to accomplish, in certain circumstances. Hence the tendency to reminisce about calamities of various kinds on the one hand and about diverse moments of triumph on the other. In either case, reminiscing 回忆，即便非常零散，仍可算作对过去的完整重温。这是因为重温的并非严格按时间顺序展开的过往，而是那些在当时引人注目并被特别铭记的事件。因此回忆通常明显局限于两类事件：降临在我或我们身上的遭遇；或是我/我们在特定情境下达成或未达成的成就。这便形成了回忆的双重倾向——既倾向于追忆各类灾难，又热衷于重温各种胜利时刻。无论哪种情形，回忆
seems to involve a certain ingrained egocentrism, a tendency to recount only what concerns one’s own being, one’s own fate (even if this is a fate shared with others). 似乎都隐含着某种根深蒂固的自我中心主义，即只倾向于讲述与自身存在、自身命运相关的内容（即便这是与他人共有的命运）。
Such self-centeredness, far from being a defect, is in fact essential to reliving the past through reminiscing about it. For this reliving amounts to insinuating ourselves back into the past-re-experiencing a peculiar cul-desac, a pocket of time into which only one’s own self, accompanied or not by immediate companions, can possibly fit. Indeed, it is the very snugness of this fit between the present self and its past experiences that we at once need (as a precondition) and seek (so as to strengthen the bond between the two). In this light, reminiscing can be said to be a way, an essentially privileged and especially powerful way, of getting back inside our own past more intimately, of reliving it from within. 这种自我中心性非但不是缺陷，事实上恰恰是通过回忆重现往昔的必要条件。因为这种重现意味着我们将自我重新嵌入过去——重新体验某个独特的时空死角，一个唯有自身（无论有无同伴相随）才能恰好容纳的时间囊袋。的确，正是当下自我与过往经历之间这种严丝合缝的契合度，既是我们所需的先决条件，也是我们力求强化的联结纽带。由此观之，回忆可谓一种途径——一种本质上享有特权且尤为有力的途径——让我们能更亲密地重返自身过往，从内部重新活过那段时光。
This effort at infiltration is to be contrasted with ordinary recollection, in which we often seek merely to recall certain experiences, dates, or factswhere “recall” means quite literally to call back to mind again. In this re-collective activity of summoning something back into the state of consciousness, there is no concerted effort to enter more intimately into the specific content of what is remembered; we allow the mnemonic presentation to arise without feeling an urgent need to delve further into it. Reminiscing itself often employs recollected material, but instead of resting content with a contemplative mode of apprehension, it undertakes the very different tactic of revivifying a previous experience. In this way the reminiscer enters into a more active alliance with the remembered past. 这种渗透性的努力与普通的回忆形成鲜明对比——在普通回忆中，我们往往只是试图唤回某些经历、日期或事实，这里的"唤回"字面意思就是再次召唤到意识中。在这种将事物重新召唤至意识状态的回忆活动中，我们并不刻意深入探究记忆内容的具体细节；我们任由记忆表象自然浮现，而不感到迫切需要进一步挖掘。追忆行为本身常以回忆材料为基础，但它并非满足于静观式的把握方式，而是采取了截然不同的策略：让过往经验重新鲜活起来。通过这种方式，追忆者与记忆中的过去建立了更为积极的联结。
By “revivifying” I mean the way in which reliving the past in reminiscence is in fact realized. It consists of three distinguishable factors: 所谓"重新鲜活化"，我指的是追忆中重现过去的实际实现方式。它包含三个可区分的要素：
(1) Myself-as reminiscer: I enter into reminiscence in the expectation of being refreshed or rekindled by the experience, though I need not do this in any deliberate way. （1）作为追忆者的我：我进入追忆状态时，期待通过这种体验获得精神焕发或情感重燃，尽管这种期待未必是刻意为之的。
(2) The reminisced-about: This comes back to life (and not just to mind) in the activity of reminiscing, which revives remembered content in a peculiarly vivid way. （2）被忆起之物：在回忆活动中重获新生（而不仅仅是回到脑海），它以一种异常鲜活的方式使记忆内容复苏。
(3) Myself-in-relation-to-the-reminisced-about: When reminiscence is fulfilling or successful, there is a momentary merging of my mnemonic consciousness with that which is remembered, a sense of becoming one with what I remember. （3）我与被忆起之物的关系：当回忆圆满或成功时，我的记忆意识会与所记内容短暂交融，产生一种与记忆合而为一的体验。
When all three factors are in play and in animated interaction with each other, revivification occurs in its fullest format: each factor serves to validate the other two in the reminiscential reliving of the past. Thanks to this resuscitative action, I can more easily and spontaneously merge with my past in that intimate intro-involvement that is so characteristic of reminiscing. 当这三个要素共同作用并生动互动时，记忆便以最完整的形式复苏：在追忆往昔的过程中，每个要素都相互印证。得益于这种复苏作用，我能更轻松自发地沉浸于过去，实现回忆特有的那种亲密内在交融。
It is largely due to the work of revivification that any connection with the past in reminiscing is more than academic-more than “antiquarian” in Nietzsche’s term. ^(8){ }^{8} When we reminisce, we are not going back into the past to reconstitute it as an object of historiological inquiry. We return, rather, as persons whose present interests and needs are most fully met by reminiscing. I do the reminiscing not for the sake of the past as past but for the sake of myself: that is, for the pleasure of the good that it will effect in the present. Or more precisely, the revivifying of the past that occurs so prominently in reminiscing is at the same time a revitalizing of the present in which the reminiscing is taking place. ^(9){ }^{9} 很大程度上正是由于这种复苏作用，回忆中与过去的联系才超越了学术层面——用尼采的话说，超越了"古董式"的考据。 ^(8){ }^{8} 当我们回忆时，并非为了将过去重构为历史研究的对象而重返往昔。我们回归过去，实则是作为当下兴趣与需求能在回忆中获得最充分满足的个体。我回忆并非为了过去本身，而是为了当下的自己：即为了它能给此刻带来的美好愉悦。更准确地说，回忆中如此显著的过去复苏现象，同时正是对进行回忆的当下时刻的活力重注。 ^(9){ }^{9}
Reminiscentia 追忆录
It is a revealing fact about reminiscing that although it can take place wholly internally or psychically-as when we “just muse” about the past-it will sometimes be provoked by an external factor acting as a memorial support. Indeed, it may even seek out this support when it reaches an end of its own resources. An example will help to illustrate this point: 关于回忆有个发人深省的现象：尽管它可以完全在内心或精神层面发生——比如当我们"仅仅沉思"往事时——但有时也会被作为记忆载体的外部因素所触发。事实上，当回忆穷尽自身资源时，它甚至可能主动寻求这种外在支撑。以下事例有助于阐明这一点：
In sorting through some old family papers, I come upon several stacks of documents that bear on the death of my grandmother. Just perceiving a few items in these stacks sets in motion a train of reminiscences concerning circumstances at the time of her death. Seeming to have exhausted my reminiscential supply, I discover that I wish to delve into the documents more completely so as to foster further reminiscing-and this is exactly what happens as I look into the documents more carefully. 整理家族旧文件时，我偶然发现几叠与祖母去世相关的文档。仅仅瞥见其中几件物品，便引发了一连串关于她离世时情景的回忆。当自以为回忆已竭尽时，我却萌生了更深入查阅这些文件的念头，以期唤起更多记忆——而当我更仔细检视这些文档时，新的回忆果然源源涌现。
This example makes it clear that what can be called “reminiscentia” include anything that survives from the epoch reminisced about, including letters and photographs, relics and souvenirs of all kinds, indeed any object or trace of an object that remains and is presently available in perception. Each of these serves as an aide-mémoire of a particular kind. Rather than functioning strictly as reminders or as records of the past-that is, as directing us to take some action or as documentary evidence alone-they act as inducers of reminiscence. What counts here is not the accuracy with which they reproduce or suggest the past (as it would in the very different context of historical reconstruction); instead, it is their special aptitude for arousing a reminiscent state of mind that matters. 这个例子清楚地表明，所谓"回忆载体"可以包括任何从被追忆时代留存下来的事物——信件与照片、各类遗物与纪念品，乃至任何现存且当下可被感知的物品或其痕迹。它们各自都作为特定类型的记忆辅助物发挥作用。这些载体并非严格充当提醒物或过往记录（即仅指引我们采取某些行动或作为文献证据），而是作为回忆的诱发者。关键在于它们并非精确复制或暗示过去（如在历史重建这一截然不同的语境中那样），而在于其激发回忆心理状态的独特禀赋。
And in what does this aptitude consist? It consists in supplying just those cues that aid the reminiscer to relive the past in the manner described above. In particular, it is a question of providing details that augment revivification by increasing one’s sense of personal involvement with the period being reminisced about. In my example, this took quite specific forms, e.g., lists of names of those who had come to offer condolences upon my grandmother’s death. Perceiving these lists, I was not merely enabled 这种能力究竟体现在何处？它体现在提供恰能帮助回忆者以上述方式重新体验过去的线索。具体而言，关键在于提供能通过增强个人对所回忆时期的参与感来促进记忆复苏的细节。在我的例子中，这表现为非常具体的形式，比如列出祖母去世时前来吊唁者的名单。看到这些名单时，我不仅能够
but actively encouraged to reminisce in a quite definite way about those visitors. A “line” of reminiscence was thus opened up that might otherwise have remained closed off or been pursued much more dimly. 而且被积极引导着以非常明确的方式回忆那些访客。一条原本可能封闭或模糊得多的"回忆线索"就这样被打开了。
All pertinent cues, temporal or spatial, object-based or situational, deserve the appellation “reminiscentia” inasmuch as they offer appropriate supports for reminiscing. As such, they enlighten the present as mementos of things past. To come into more intimate contact with any of them is to be given material assistance in one’s reminiscential projects-projects which can be expanded, or at least clarified, with their aid. In this way, they supplement one’s already available, and normally quite intangible, resources, providing these resources with a touchstone in the spatiotemporally concrete. One caveat is in order, however. This is that such reminiscentia are rarely, if ever, necessary to reminiscing. Supplements, however valuable they may be as conducive cues, are not preconditions. ^(10){ }^{10} We can still reminisce, and reminisce quite satisfactorily, in the absence of their solicitation: 所有相关的线索，无论是时间性还是空间性的，基于对象还是情境的，都值得被称为"回忆媒介"，因为它们为回忆提供了恰当的支撑。作为过往事物的纪念品，它们照亮了当下。与其中任何线索建立更密切的联系，都能为个人的回忆工程提供实质性帮助——这些工程可以借助它们得以扩展，或至少得到澄清。如此一来，它们补充了个人已有的、通常相当无形的资源，为这些资源提供了时空具象化的试金石。但需要提醒的是：这类回忆媒介很少（甚至从未）成为回忆的必要条件。无论这些辅助性线索多么宝贵，它们都不是先决条件。 ^(10){ }^{10} 即使没有它们的诱发，我们依然能够回忆，并且进行相当令人满意的回忆：
A soap box covered with green cloth supported the dim little photographs in crumbling frames she liked to have near her couch. She did not really need them, for nothing had been lost. As a company of traveling players carry with them everywhere, while they still remember their lines, a windy beach, a misty castle, an enchanted island, so she had with her all that her soul had stored. ^(11){ }^{11} 一张铺着绿布的肥皂箱托着那些镶在破旧相框里的暗淡小照片，她喜欢把这些照片放在沙发旁。其实她并不真的需要它们，因为什么都不曾失去。就像一群巡回演出的演员随身携带着——只要他们还记得台词——一片风大的海滩、一座雾霭笼罩的城堡、一个被施了魔法的岛屿那样，她也随身携带着灵魂所储存的一切。 ^(11){ }^{11}
Thus even if we do not really have to have aides-mémoire in the form of concrete reminiscentia, it is nevertheless characteristically the case that, like the woman here described, we tend to surround ourselves with them and avail ourselves of their help whenever possible. 因此，即使我们并不真的需要以具体纪念物形式存在的记忆辅助工具，但典型的情况是，像这里描述的那位女性一样，我们倾向于用它们包围自己，并尽可能利用它们的帮助。
Recourse to reminiscentia has one further significance. We reach out, faute de mieux, for fragments surviving from the past as a response to knowing that what is now past has fled forever and thus cannot be recaptured intact in its pristine format. As Husserl says, “I can relive (nachleben) the present, but it [the present] can never be given again.” ^(12){ }^{12} If iti t, the foreverflown past moment, cannot last as such, then we will characteristically cling in compensation (or consolation) to what is extant, however superficial or trivial this may appear when compared to past presence itself. Seeking out and holding onto reminiscentia is admittedly like clutching at straws cast into the corrosive wind of time. Chaff as they may be, these straws at least signify the fact that there was that particular past world from which they stem, and we often treasure them even-and precisely-in this minimalist role. 诉诸回忆还有另一层意义。我们退而求其次地抓住那些从过去存留下来的碎片，以此回应一个认知：已然逝去的时光永远消逝了，因而无法以其原始形态完整重现。正如胡塞尔所言："我能重新体验（nachleben）当下，但[当下]永不可能再次被给予。" ^(12){ }^{12} 如果 iti t ——那个永远飘逝的过去时刻——无法以原貌存续，那么我们往往会补偿性地（或慰藉性地）紧握现存之物，即便与过去的在场本身相比，这些留存显得多么肤浅或琐碎。必须承认，寻找并抓住回忆的碎片，就像试图抓住被时间腐蚀之风吹散的稻草。尽管这些稻草可能只是谷壳，但它们至少标志着那个孕育它们的特定过去世界确实存在过，而我们常常珍视它们——恰恰是珍视它们这种最低限度的见证功能。
Wistfulness 怅惘
Another aspect of the same circumstance is the peculiar wistfulness it may inspire in us. We are rendered wistful by the nonretrievability of certain experiences, and our reminiscing about them at once expresses this mood 同一情境的另一个面向，是它可能在我们心中激起的特殊怅惘。某些体验的不可复得让我们陷入怅惘，而对它们的追忆正是这种心境的即时表达。
and represents an effort to deal with it constructively. One of the main meanings of “wistful” itself is “reminiscently evocative,” as in the phrase “deserted buildings above which wistful flags fly bravely.” ^(13){ }^{13} Like brave but ultimately futile flags, our reminiscences evoke the many deserted buildings of past worlds. The acute wistfulness they can occasion constitutes an acknowledgment of the ineluctable transience of human experience: a transience which we often cope with by engaging in reminiscence itself. 并试图以建设性的方式应对它。"wistful"一词的核心含义是"唤起回忆的"，正如那句"废弃建筑上空，怀旧的旗帜仍在勇敢飘扬"。 ^(13){ }^{13} 如同勇敢却徒劳的旗帜，我们的回忆唤起了过往世界中无数荒废的建筑。这种强烈的怀旧情绪，实则是对人类经验转瞬即逝本质的承认——而我们往往正是通过回忆本身来应对这种无常。
It is revealing in this connection to notice that “wistful” derives originally from “wishful.” The basic wish at stake is, per impossible, to fuse fully with the past we reminisce about. What we know we cannot accomplish in reality, we can still wish for; and this wishing, a wishing in the face of acknowledged impossibility, becomes quite naturally wistful in character. Hence the common meanings of wistful as “full of timorous longing or unfulfilled desire”; “melancholy yearning”; “musingly sad: pensive, mournful.” ^(14){ }^{14} Both sides of the circumstance of reminiscing are captured in these dictionary definitions. On the one hand, the sadness, mourning, and unfulfillment reflect the realization of the past’s very pastness, its being irrevocably over and done with. On the other hand, the longing, desire, and yearning point to the refractory presence of a wish to return to, and to be still present in, this now elapsed past. Such a wish, in such a situation, tends to be wistful indeed. If it is true that the present “can never be given again,” this is precisely because once it has been given once-once it has been lived through and has transpired-it has eo ipso become a past present. What occurs in any subsequent present can only be its revival in memory or its survival in traces, but it never revives or survives as the present, in the first-timeness of an aboriginal experience. Time may well be “the fluid cradle of events,” ^(15){ }^{15} but it takes away as much as it gives rise to. We respond to its two-sided action with that ambivalent admixture of despair and hope so characteristic of wistful reminiscing. 值得注意的是，"wistful"（怅惘）一词最初源自"wishful"（渴望的）。这种根本的渴望，虽然明知不可能实现，却仍希望与我们追忆的过去完全融合。我们深知现实中无法达成的事，依然可以心存希冀；而这种面对已知不可能性的渴望，自然就带上了怅惘的特质。因此词典通常将"wistful"解释为"充满怯懦的向往或未竟的欲望"、"忧郁的渴慕"、"沉思的哀伤：忧思的、悲戚的"。 ^(14){ }^{14} 这些定义捕捉了追忆情境的双重面向：一方面，哀伤、悲戚与未竟之感体现了对过去之"过去性"的认知——它已永远消逝，无法挽回；另一方面，向往、欲望与渴慕则指向一种顽固的愿望，渴望重返并仍存在于这个已然流逝的过去。在这样的情境下，这种愿望确实容易变得怅惘。如果说当下"永远无法重现"，这正是因为一旦它被给予过——一旦它被经历并成为事实——它 ipso facto（本身）就已变成过去的当下。 任何后续当下所能呈现的，都不过是记忆中的复苏或痕迹中的存续，但它永远不会以当下的姿态重生，无法再现原始经验初临时的鲜活。时间或许确是"事件流动的摇篮" ^(15){ }^{15} ，但它消弭的与催生的同样多。我们以忧郁回忆特有的那种绝望与希望交织的矛盾心境，回应着时间这种双重作用。
Confronted with time’s permanently “passifying” power, one can hardly help but be ambivalent: sad that certain experiences have ended, even if we are hopeful as to their sequelae. The ambivalence is such that we can be wistful even when reminiscing about difficult or painful events: “Some day, perhaps, it will be a joy to remember even these things.” ^(16){ }^{16} The pain inherent in “these things” is transmuted into the peculiar pleasure of reminiscing about them. Such pleasure, intrinsic to reminiscence, has little to do with hedonism. It is a peculiarly reflective or “ruminescent” pleasure that is composed equally of an acceptance of past pain and of a determination not to be overcome by it. Precisely the finality of the past itself-of the past qua past-comes to our aid as we realize that the pain, however excrutiating it was, is now over: now that we can reminisce about it in the present, taking pleasure in this very activity and perhaps gaining a sense of minor triumph as well. 面对时间那永远"流逝"的力量，人们难免会感到矛盾：既为某些经历已然结束而伤感，又对其后续发展怀有期待。这种矛盾心理如此强烈，以至于我们在回忆艰难或痛苦的往事时也会心生惆怅："也许有一天，就连想起这些事情也会感到快乐。" ^(16){ }^{16} "这些事情"中固有的痛苦，被转化为回忆它们时那种特殊的愉悦。这种内在于回忆的愉悦与享乐主义毫无关联，它是一种独特的反思性愉悦，或者说"反刍式"愉悦，既包含着对过往痛苦的接纳，也蕴含着不被其击垮的决心。正是过去本身的终结性——作为纯粹的过去——给予了我们慰藉，当我们意识到无论曾经多么撕心裂肺的痛苦如今都已结束：既然我们能在当下回忆它，并从中获得愉悦，或许还能感受到一丝微小的胜利。
On the basis of just such a realization, we often experience reminiscing as a “bittersweet” activity, one in which sadness, even fear and foreboding, is not unmixed with pleasure. Indeed, the melancholy tenor of some reminiscences, and the anxious or apprehensive character of others, is not only tolerated but may be actively sought. Moreover, the complex phenomenon we call “nostalgia” indulges in much the same ambivalent, bittersweet sentiment: the pain (algos) of being absent merging with the pleasure of returning home (nostos). ^(17){ }^{17} Bittersweetness pervades reminiscing of many kinds and lends body to its wistfulness. It is evident that the sweetness stems ultimately from the basic pleasure we take in recollecting things situated in the remote past-a past we can now afford to savor, thanks to its very distance from the present-while the bitterness bears on the fact of transience, on the past’s immutable closedness. It is also evident that in reminiscing wistfully, we combine the bitter with the sweet, cherishing or honoring a past we might otherwise regret or vilify. 正是基于这种认识，我们常将回忆体验为一种"苦乐参半"的活动——其中悲伤、甚至恐惧与不祥预感，往往与欢愉交织。事实上，某些回忆的忧郁基调，以及其他回忆中焦虑或不安的特质，不仅被我们容忍，有时甚至被主动追寻。更进一步说，我们称之为"怀旧"的复杂现象，同样沉溺于这种矛盾交织的苦乐情感：离家的痛苦（algos）与归乡的欢愉（nostos）相互交融。 ^(17){ }^{17} 苦乐参半的特质渗透于各类回忆之中，为惆怅之情赋予实质。显然，甜美的部分根本上源于我们从追忆遥远往事中获得的基本愉悦——正是由于那段过去与当下相距甚远，我们才得以从容品味；而苦涩的部分则关乎转瞬即逝的事实，关乎过去不可更改的封闭性。同样明显的是，在惆怅的回忆中，我们将苦与甜相结合，珍视或敬重那个本可能令我们懊悔或诋毁的往昔。
Communal-Discursive Aspect 社群-话语维度
We tend to think of remembering in general as a mainly introspective affair carried out in the privacy of the psyche. We often consider it to be a search for information stored in some intrapsychic retreat to which the individual rememberer has a privileged, perhaps even a unique, mode of access. Thinking this way, we take the verbalizing and sharing of memories to be an adventitious activity. Why should we bother to put into words and relate to others what we possess so securely from within, at a level of experience that is at once pre-linguistic and pre-social? And yet when we reminisce we find ourselves doing both of these supposedly otiose thingsand doing them spontaneously and unselfconsciously. Moreover, we do not feel ourselves to be merely “translating” private memories into public artifacts as if from some compunction to communicate. We sense ourselves to be fully engaged in an autonomous activity having its own formative, indeed transformative, power. 我们通常将记忆视为一种主要发生在心灵私密空间的内省活动。往往认为它是在某种心理密室中搜寻信息的过程，而记忆者拥有特权式的——甚至可能是独一无二的——访问权限。如此思考时，我们便把记忆的言语化与分享视作偶然行为。既然那些根植于前语言与前社会层面的体验已在内心安稳存在，何必费心将其诉诸言辞并与他人分享？然而当我们追忆往昔时，却发现自己自然而然地做着这两件看似多余的事。更值得注意的是，我们并非出于某种交流的愧疚感而将私人记忆"翻译"为公共产物，而是真切感受到自己正投入一项具有塑造力——甚至转化力——的自主活动。
The most immediate, as well as the most telling, clue we have as to the inherently communal-discursive aspect of reminiscing is the mere fact that it fluorishes in the company of others. Not only does it frequently occur in a specifically social setting, it is also actively solicited by such a setting. Not that any explicit request is then required-indeed, it would be distinctly odd to say “let’s reminisce together now”-but just being together suffices, as it also does in the case of story-telling. Unlike the situation of story-telling, however, it matters deeply just who is together in the scene of reminiscing. Whether those present be relatives or friends, or mere acquaintances or even strangers, they must all share to some degree the experiences being reminisced about. For what evokes and sustains reminiscence is the possess- 关于回忆行为本身具有社群-话语属性的最直接也最显著的线索，恰恰在于它总是在与他人共处时最为活跃。回忆不仅频繁发生在特定的社交场合中，更是被这种场合主动唤起的。倒不必有人明确提出请求——实际上，若有人说"我们现在一起回忆吧"反而显得古怪——只要共处一室就足够了，这与讲故事的情形类似。然而不同于讲故事的是，在回忆场景中共处者的身份至关重要。无论在场者是亲友熟人还是萍水相逢的陌路客，他们都必须在一定程度上共享被回忆的体验。因为激发并维系回忆的，正是对某些共同或相似经历的占有——
ing of certain common or like experiences. I say “common or like” in order to make clear that the reminiscer and those who are co-present with him or her need not have had literally the same experiences. In fact, we may distinguish between the following three circumstances: 我使用"共同或相似"的表述，是为了说明回忆者与其在场同伴未必需要字面意义上完全相同的经历。实际上，我们可以区分以下三种情形：
STRICT COMMONALITY OF PAST EXPERIENCES 过往经验的严格共同性
This is a condition, not of reminiscence in general but only of coreminiscence, in which conjointly experienced events form the very topic of the reminiscence; indeed, one is here quite frequently comparing common experiences, sometimes with the explicit aim of making corrections or modifications in the details of the reminiscence (“I seem to remember that Jeffrey was there”; “No, he wasn’t since I remember seeing him leaving the building earlier that evening”). Because close friends or family members have more experiences strictly in common, they will tend to co-reminisce more than other groups, although people hitherto unknown to each other may coreminisce about an event which they all happened to have experienced (“Woodstock,” or the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969). But even where experiences have been quite directly shared by members of a given group, it is not necessary that they all experienced precisely the same facts or features of the events in question. So long as all the co-reminiscers were present at the scene, the condition of sharing is met. What each person apprehended may vary considerably in exact detail, as may the memories that each person now recalls. One of the primary motives for co-reminiscing is no doubt that of checking out each other’s memories in view of differing experiential modes and perspectives. Furthermore, by reminiscing with others, we may construct a more complete tableau than we could ever effect in reminiscing while alone: “I remember him praising Locke’s Essay, whereas you recall his irony in doing so-now a fuller picture emerges.” 这是一种状态，并非泛指回忆本身，而是特指共同回忆——那些被共同经历的事件构成了回忆的核心主题；事实上，人们在此过程中经常比对共同经历，有时甚至明确旨在修正回忆细节中的偏差（"我好像记得杰弗里当时在场"；"不，他不在，因为我记得那天傍晚看见他离开了大楼"）。由于亲密友人或家庭成员拥有更多严格意义上的共同经历，他们往往比其他群体更频繁地进行共同回忆，尽管素不相识的人们也可能对某个恰巧共同经历的事件展开共同回忆（比如"伍德斯托克音乐节"，或是 1969 年圣巴巴拉漏油事件）。但即便某个群体的成员确实直接共享了某些经历，也并不意味着他们都精确体验了事件的相同事实或特征。只要所有共同回忆者当时都在现场，就满足了共享的基本条件。每个人所感知的具体细节可能存在显著差异，正如他们当下唤起的记忆也可能各不相同。 共同回忆的主要动机之一，无疑是为了通过不同的经验模式和视角来验证彼此的记忆。此外，与他人共同回忆时，我们能够构建出比独自回忆时更为完整的图景："我记得他称赞过洛克的《人类理解论》，而你则记得他这样做时的讽刺意味——现在更完整的画面浮现出来了。"
DIFFUSE COMMONALITY OF ERA AND AMBIANCE 时代与氛围的弥散共性
Instead of having been present together at precisely the same scene, co-reminiscers may share in a conjointly experienced era or epoch of their lives: “how it was to be a civilian at the time of the Vietnam War,” “the political climate in France under DeGaulle,” “growing up in Topeka in the 1950’s,” etc. In such cases there is a common participation not in particular events but in the ambiance or atmosphere attaching to the era in question. However diffuse it may be, this ambiance is at once the medium of the co-reminiscing and its explicit theme. For we are remembering together how it felt to imbibe a general atmosphere-to be present in its midst. Of course, this atmosphere is not independent of particular events, about which we can co-reminisce in the sense discussed above. But we can also recall together the atmosphere itself, the pervasive mood of the times. 共同回忆者未必曾身处完全相同的场景，他们可能共享生命中某个共同经历的时期或时代："越战时期作为平民的体验"、"戴高乐时期法国的政治氛围"、"1950 年代在托皮卡成长的岁月"等。这类情形下，人们共同参与的并非具体事件，而是与特定时代相连的整体氛围或环境。无论这种氛围多么难以捉摸，它既是共同回忆的媒介，也是其明确主题。因为我们共同追忆的是沉浸于某种普遍氛围中的感受——身处其中的体验。当然，这种氛围并非独立于具体事件，关于这些事件我们仍可进行前述意义上的共同回忆。但我们也能共同唤起氛围本身，那个时代弥漫的整体情调。
LACK OF STRICT OR DIFFUSE COMMONALITY 严格共性与弥散共性的缺失
Reminiscing, though not co-reminiscing, is possible in a group some of whose members were neither direct witnesses of an original scene nor participants in its overall ambiance. In this case, those who listen to the primary reminiscer must either actively liken the reminisced-about scene or atmosphere to something significantly similar in their own experience, or imagine the original scene or atmosphere vividly enough to feel that they might have been there, that they could very well have been there had circumstances conspired or permitted. Either way, the listener is drawn into the reminiscing, and assumes its specific content as if it were his or her own experience, though without coming to the point of actually believing that it was (as would be required in full-fledged co-reminiscing). An effective reminiscer is someone who can elicit such likening or imagining on the part of his or her listeners, even if these latter cannot be considered coreminiscers in any strict sense. 回忆虽无法共同进行，但在某些群体中仍可实现——即便部分成员既非原始场景的直接目击者，也未参与过整体氛围营造。这种情况下，倾听主要回忆者的成员必须主动将所述场景或氛围与自己经历中高度相似的事物进行类比，抑或通过生动想象原始场景，直至产生身临其境之感——仿佛当时若机缘巧合，自己本可亲历现场。无论采用何种方式，倾听者都会被引入回忆情境，并将这些具体内容视作自身经历来接纳，尽管他们并不会真正相信这就是自己的亲身经历（而这正是完整共同回忆的必要条件）。一个高效的回忆者，正是能够激发听众此类类比或想象能力的人——即使这些听众严格意义上并不能被称作共同回忆者。
Different as they are in their basic structure, all of the above three situations are interpersonal in nature. Each involves a minimal dyadic unit of reminiscer-cum-listener, and this unit is indefinitely expandable insofar as both reminiscer and listener may be plural in number. It is also modifiable by the substitution of co-reminiscer for listener-in which case, each party becomes at once reminiscer for and listener to the other, thereby realizing an intricate interplaying of roles as well as an equality of status. In the communal context, co-reminiscing may be considered something of an ideal type, perhaps even that toward which all reminiscing tends by its very nature. Reminiscers naturally seek partners in a common enterprise of reliving the past wistfully-partners who are not only listeners but themselves active contributors to the process of reminiscing. 尽管基本结构各异，上述三种情境本质上都具有人际互动特性。每种情境都至少包含"回忆者-倾听者"这一最小二元单元，且该单元具有无限扩展性——回忆者与倾听者的数量均可复数化。通过用"共同回忆者"替代"倾听者"，这一单元还能实现角色转换：此时双方既互为回忆者又互为倾听者，从而实现了角色间的精妙互动与地位上的平等。在群体语境中，共同回忆可被视为某种理想类型，甚至可能是所有回忆活动本质上趋向的形态。回忆者会自然而然地寻找共同追忆往事的伙伴——这些伙伴不仅是倾听者，更是回忆过程中积极的贡献者。
However obvious it may seem, this observation nevertheless serves to distinguish reminiscing quite decisively from other forms of remembering so far considered, none of which exhibits any such pronounced communitarian tendency. Some of these forms even eschew an interpersonal setting-for example, primary memory, communion with one’s personal past in recollection, and the remembering done in the course of dreaming. Other forms involve interlocutors in various phases of their operation, though not in a manner essential to their structure: thus skillful remembering-how may be done with, in the presence of, and even for the sake of others, while reminding can arise in an interpersonal nexus of relations (e.g., when others leave reminders for us or vice versa). But both remembering-how and reminding can also take place successfully on a strictly solitary basis without any sense of anomaly or loss. In contrast, the primary thrust in reminiscing is toward others: so much so that we may even say that co-reminiscing is normative for reminiscing as a whole. And if this is so, two corollaries follow immediately: 尽管这一观察看似显而易见，但它却足以将怀旧与我们迄今探讨的其他记忆形式截然区分开来——后者都不曾展现出如此显著的社群性倾向。其中某些记忆形式甚至回避人际交往的场合，例如初级记忆、回忆中与个人过往的对话，以及梦境中的记忆活动。另一些形式虽在其运作的不同阶段涉及对话者，但这种人际互动并非其结构核心：比如技能记忆（remembering-how）可以在他人陪伴下进行，甚至为他人而完成；提醒行为也可能产生于人际关系的网络中（例如他人为我们留下提示，或反之）。但技能记忆和提醒行为同样能完全独立地成功实现，不会产生任何异常感或缺失感。相比之下，怀旧的主要驱动力始终指向他人——其程度之深，我们甚至可以说共同怀旧构成了怀旧行为的规范模式。若此说成立，则立即衍生出两条推论：
COROLLARY #1: REMINISCING IS MAINLY ADDRESSED TO OTHERS 推论一：怀旧主要面向他人
As an engagement with other rememberers, whether undertaken with others in person or only with them in mind, reminiscences are addressedwith an important exception to be treated in section IV-to others. In the ideal case, these others are themselves present, and a circle of coreminiscers is constellated. But they may be implicated in other modes as well: 作为一种与其他记忆者的互动方式，无论亲身参与还是仅存于意念中，追忆行为总是面向他者展开——除第四节将讨论的重要例外情形。理想状态下，这些他者真实在场，共同构成追忆的核心圈层。但他们也可能以其他形式介入：
(1) as absent: when others are addressed as if present. This often occurs when those who figure into a particular reminiscence are absent from the actual scene of reminiscing but are nonetheless invoked as quasi-present during the reminiscing itself: “dear departed leader, be with us today as we remember your presence among us.” （1）缺席者：当他者被当作在场者来对话。常见于特定追忆对象虽未亲临回忆现场，却在追忆过程中被召唤为拟在场者："敬爱的逝去领袖，当我们追忆您与我们同在的时光，请今日与我们同在。"
(2) as fictitious: when others who make no claim to actuality even as absent are nonetheless potent presences as addressed in and by an author’s reminiscing. Such others may be generalized or typified (e.g., “anyone present at the [imagined] carnival”); or they may be depersonalized altogether (e.g., “a member of the Snopes family”); in these cases, the other may be addressed as judge, muse, or witness of one’s reminiscing as well as an equal or co-respondent. （2）虚构者：当那些甚至不具备现实缺席性的他者，仍能通过作者的追忆成为强有力的在场存在。这类他者可能被泛化或类型化（如"任何参加[虚构]嘉年华的人"）；也可能完全非人格化（如"斯诺普斯家族的某个成员"）；在此类情形中，他者可被视作追忆行为的审判者、缪斯或见证人，亦可作为平等的对话者。
The very diversity of others who can be addressed when we reminisce reinforces its status as an inherently interpersonal activity. 当我们追忆往事时，能够倾诉的对象如此多元，这更强化了回忆本质上是一种人际活动的特质。
corollary #2: reminiscing is most fully realized in language 推论二：回忆最完满的形态是通过语言实现的
Discourse, as Heidegger claims, is one of the “equiprimordial” structures of human existence and thus never entirely separable from it. ^(18){ }^{18} Indeed, it is the main way in which human beings convey their experiences to each other: “In discourse Being-with (Mitsein) becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated.” ^(19){ }^{19} Reminiscing, especially as co-reminiscing, involves resharing already shared experiences, and its discursive or verbal form aids in the full accomplishment of the resharing. It is possible to reminisce wordlessly-as when photographs of a shared-in scene are passed around among the original participants-but we naturally resort to language on most occasions. We do so for two major reasons. 正如海德格尔所言，话语是人类存在"同等原初"的结构之一，因而永远无法与之完全分离。 ^(18){ }^{18} 事实上，这是人类相互传递经验的主要方式："在话语中，共在（Mitsein）'明确地'成为共享状态；也就是说，它本已存在，但若未被把握和占有，就仍处于未共享状态。" ^(19){ }^{19} 回忆——尤其是共同回忆——涉及对已共享经验的再度分享，而其话语或言语形式有助于实现这种再分享的完整性。无言的回忆确实存在（比如当共同场景的照片在原参与者间传阅时），但在大多数情况下，我们自然诉诸语言。这么做主要出于两个原因。
On the one hand, words facilitate reminiscing by allowing it to become independent of particular material supports connected with the original scene-supports that can erode and vanish altogether. Words, in contrast, are much less perishable because they are not material entities in the first place. ^(20){ }^{20} As the most effective and enduring form of symbolism which human beings have devised, words provide a collective and massive framework for communication and expression at many levels. To have recourse to this framework is of inestimable advantage in conveying one’s reminiscences to others. 一方面，文字通过使回忆脱离与原始场景相连的特定物质载体——那些可能逐渐侵蚀并彻底消失的载体——从而促进了回忆的留存。相比之下，文字本身并非物质实体，因此更不易消亡。作为人类创造的最有效且持久的符号形式，文字为多层次交流与表达提供了集体性、规模化的框架。借助这一框架向他人传递个人记忆，具有无可估量的优势。
On the other hand, this same system makes possible a considerable refinement of expression: an exactitude of reference as well as a subtlety of insight unmatched by nonverbal systems of signification. If it is true that “to significations, words accrue,” ^(21){ }^{21} it is also the case that words delineate and develop significations far beyond the point at which other forms of semiosis leave them. Verbal language has an extraordinary capacity for clarifying and conjoining otherwise dim and disjointed meanings or thoughts. As such, it is an unmatched “articulation of intelligibility,” ^(22){ }^{22} and it is not surprising that reminiscing, in its zeal to convey itself to others in a maximally communicative manner, assumes a predominantly discursive-verbal format. For the most part, reminiscing is talking the past out; it is teasing the past into talk, reliving it in and by words. 另一方面，这一系统也使表达得以高度精炼：既能实现精确指涉，又具备非语言符号系统无法企及的微妙洞察力。如果说"意义会附着于词语之上"确有其事，那么词语对意义的勾勒与发展，也远远超越了其他符号形式所能达到的边界。言语具有非凡的能力，能够澄清并联结那些原本模糊破碎的意义或思想。正因如此，它堪称无与伦比的"可理解性之表达"，而回忆——当其热切地试图以最具交流性的方式向他人传递自身时——主要采取话语-言语的形式也就不足为奇了。在大多数情况下，回忆就是将过往诉诸言语；是让往事在言谈中浮现，通过词语重新体验。
There is a final aspect of this matter that deserves our attention. We reminisce not only to savor but to understand, or re-understand, the past more adequately-where “understand” retains something of its root meaning of “standing under,” gaining an intimate perspective not otherwise attainable. In reminiscing, we try to get back inside a given experience-to insinuate ourselves into it, as I have said-so as to come to know it better. Better, perhaps, than we knew it in its first flurry, which may well have been more disorienting than clarifying. The sudden onset of the experience-the “immediate rush of transition,” ^(23){ }^{23} as Whitehead called it-may have been such as to leave us breathless. And speechless! Without words to specify various parts and points of an experience, it tends to fuse with other experiences in a flux of indetermination. Thanks to its discursiveness, reminiscing transforms mere experiences into articulate and enduring wholes possessing sufficient integrity to be understood in memory. 这件事还有一个最终层面值得我们关注。我们回忆不仅是为了品味，更是为了更充分地理解或重新理解过去——这里的"理解"保留了其词根"立于其下"的原始意涵，获得其他方式无法企及的亲密视角。在回忆中，我们试图重新进入特定体验——如我所说，将自己悄然融入其中——从而更深入地认识它。这种认识或许比我们在最初纷乱时刻的认知更为清晰，那时体验很可能令人困惑而非明朗。体验的突然降临——怀特海称之为"过渡的即时奔涌"——可能让我们措手不及。甚至哑口无言！当缺乏语言来界定体验的各个部分和要点时，它往往会在不确定的流变中与其他体验融合。正是由于回忆的推理性，才将单纯的体验转化为清晰而持久的整体，使其具备足够的完整性，得以在记忆中被理解。
“Understanding and discourse,” said Plato, “are one and the same thing.” ^(24){ }^{24} However exaggerated this claim may be in certain respects, ^(25){ }^{25} it is a fitting description of what is accomplished in reminiscing. For our understanding of the past in and through reminiscing occurs mainly by means of its discursive ex-plication: its unfolding in fully articulated words. Such articulation is the primary way a past experience comes to be comprehended in reminiscing. The reminiscential return to the past is a return via dis-course-via the word, logos-and as such it is an understanding remembering of it. 柏拉图曾说："理解与言说本是一体。" ^(24){ }^{24} 尽管这一论断在某些方面可能言过其实， ^(25){ }^{25} 但它恰如其分地描述了回忆活动所达成的状态。因为我们在回忆中——并通过回忆——对往事的理解，主要是通过话语的展开实现的：即在充分组织的话语中呈现往事。这种语言表达是过往经验在回忆中被理解的主要方式。回忆性的重返过去，正是通过话语——通过词语（逻各斯）——实现的回归，因此它本身就是一种理解性的记忆。
IV 第四章
Just here you may find yourself asking: Can I not reminisce to myself? Granting that reminiscing as a discursive and wistful reliving of the past prospers in the company of others, may it not take place in private as well? What do we make of those situations in which I simply “muse” upon the past 此刻你或许会问：难道我不能独自回忆吗？即便承认回忆作为对往事的话语性追忆与感伤重演，在他人陪伴下更为丰盈，难道它就不能私下进行吗？当我们独自"沉思"往事时，又该如何理解这种情境？
by myself, pensively reliving it in a ruminescent mood? Would we wish to dismiss this as an inauthentic case of reminiscing? Surely not. Just as we have had to allow that reminiscing can occur between people who have not shared precisely the same experiences, so we must now admit that it can arise in the absence of any others at all. There is such a thing as reminiscing to myself, “auto-reminiscing.” 独自一人，在沉思中带着怀旧的情绪重温往事？我们会认为这是一种不真实的回忆吗？当然不会。正如我们必须承认，回忆可以发生在未曾完全共享相同经历的人之间，现在我们也必须接受，它也可能在没有任何他人在场的情况下发生。确实存在一种"自我回忆"的现象。
As with psychical reminders-with which it can in fact be closely allied on occasion-auto-reminiscing may be considered as a privative, but quite legitimate, form of reminiscing in general. This is evident when we realize that in reminiscing to ourselves we encounter versions of all four features that characterize more central instances of reminiscing and co-reminiscing. We relive the past wistfully in reflective moments of self-musing. Further, we are provoked to do so by various reminiscentia in the immediate environs, including our own memories acting as reminiscential cues: as is signified in the epigraph by Lowell cited at the beginning of this chapter. And there is even, perhaps contrary to our expectations, a communaldiscursive aspect of auto-reminiscing. When I reminisce to myself, I am treating myself as a reminiscential partner-as an other who listens to himself. Rimbaud’s dictum finds striking application here: "le je est un autre. " ^(26){ }^{26} Moreover, in self-engaged and self-engaging reminiscing, I am not falling short of language, whether I auto-reminisce in inner speech or out loud. If all thinking is a “dialogue of the soul with itself,” ^(27){ }^{27} auto-reminiscing can be considered a matter of proto-communal discourse. When I talk the past out to myself in auto-reminiscing, I establish an intra-dyadic community within my own soul. 如同心理层面的提醒——事实上在某些情况下它们可能紧密相连——自我回忆可被视为一种普遍回忆的缺失形式，但却是相当合理的形式。当我们意识到在自我回忆时，我们会遇到所有四种特征的变体，这些特征在更核心的回忆和共同回忆实例中尤为显著。我们在沉思自省的时刻，带着感伤重新体验过去。此外，周围环境中的各种回忆线索会激发我们这样做，包括我们自己的记忆充当回忆提示：正如本章开头引用的洛厄尔题词所暗示的那样。甚至可能出乎我们意料的是，自我回忆还具有一种公共话语的维度。当我对自己回忆时，我把自己当作一个回忆伙伴——一个倾听自己的他者。兰波的格言在此得到了惊人的印证："我即是他者。" ^(26){ }^{26} 此外，在自我沉浸和自我投入的回忆中，无论我是在内心独白还是大声自语，我都不会缺乏语言的表达。 如果一切思考都是"灵魂与自身的对话"，那么自我回忆可被视为一种原始共同体话语。当我在自我回忆中向自己诉说过去时，我就在自己灵魂内部建立了一个二元共同体。
The discursive dimension of auto-reminiscing is not limited to speech alone. As with other forms of reminiscing, it can also occur as writing. Indeed, writing may even be its optimal mode of realization. Let us consider several cases in point. Thanks to the essentially public status of writing as a graphic and thus fully visible medium-as a matter of tracing, of what Derrida calls “espacement” ^(28){ }^{28}-we shall see that each of these cases bursts the bounds of strict privacy and pursues, even if unwittingly or unwillingly, a communal telos. 自我回忆的话语维度不仅限于言语。与其他形式的回忆一样，它也可以通过写作实现。事实上，写作甚至可能是其最佳实现方式。让我们考察几个典型案例。由于写作本质上是一种图形化且完全可见的公共媒介——作为德里达所称"间距化"的痕迹——我们将看到每个案例都突破了严格私密的界限，即使是无意或勉强地，也追求着共同体的目的。
DIARIES AND JOURNALS 日记与日志
Whether destined for publication or not, diaries and journals are instances of auto-reminiscence in which the written form is essential. As written, they fix and stabilize an author’s understanding of his or her life, making it available not only to the author but to others as well. Diaries and journals are therefore always at least potentially communal, sometimes against the express intent of those who compose them. Being in principle open to inspection by friends, relatives, or future biographers, they represent a curious blend of pensées intimes and pensées ouvertes. They are intensely intimate insofar as they record ideas and impressions that would not normally be 无论是否打算公开发表，日记和日志都是书面形式至关重要的自我回忆实例。通过文字记录，它们固定并稳定了作者对自身生活的理解，使其不仅可供作者本人，也能为他人所了解。因此，日记和日志至少潜在地具有公共性，有时甚至违背撰写者的明确意图。由于原则上可能被朋友、亲属或未来的传记作者查阅，它们呈现出私密思想与开放思想的奇妙融合。当记录那些通常不会向他人透露的想法和印象时，它们展现出极强的私密性。
announced overtly to others, ^(29){ }^{29} and yet, precisely as written, they are something to which these same others ultimately have access. Hence the ambivalence with which many diary or journal entries are written down in the first place and in which one sees at once a desire to reveal and to conceal. Hence, too, a tendency to address the diary as if it were itself an interlocutor: “My diary. I have managed to confide all my thoughts freely to you; you are my best friend on this earth, the most faithful, the most sincere.” ^(30){ }^{30} In the auto-reminiscing of diaries and journals we can therefore detect, in the form of intrapersonal self-address, an essentially interpersonal tendency toward discourse-with-another, albeit another part of one’s own self. Such self-directed discourse is itself a form of reliving the past-reliving it by and in writing-and it differs from other reminiscential types of reliving only insofar as it usually bears on events of the immediate past, much as a dream will incorporate the day’s residues into its own manifest content. 公开向他人宣告的内容， ^(29){ }^{29} 然而恰恰因其书面形式，这些内容最终仍能被他人所触及。因此许多日记或日志在最初记录时便带有这种矛盾心态：人们既能立即觉察到倾诉的渴望，又能感受到隐藏的冲动。这也解释了为何人们常将日记视为对话对象："我的日记啊，我已能自由地向你倾诉所有思绪；你是这世间我最亲密的朋友，最忠诚、最真挚的伙伴。" ^(30){ }^{30} 在日记与日志的自我回忆中，我们由此发现——以自我对话的内在形式——本质上指向与他者交流的人际倾向，尽管这个"他者"只是自我的某个侧面。这种自我导向的言说本身就是重历过往的一种形式（通过书写并在书写中重历），它与其他回忆性重历方式的区别仅在于：它通常关联着最近发生的事件，就像梦境会将日间残迹融入其显性内容那般。
AUTOBIOGRAPHIES AND MEMOIRS 自传与回忆录
Although these two forms of writing are also self-focused-in each case one is giving an extensive account of one’s own life-one is now directing one’s discourse not to oneself but to others, i.e., those others who will read one’s account in print. The communalizing penchant which is tacit and self-enclosed in the auto-reminiscing of diaries and journals here becomes explicit, since “publication,” the public disclosure of one’s life, is now an express aim. This move into the overtly public domain brings about two corresponding modifications. On the one hand, as an entire life-time is often the subject matter of an autobiography or memoir, the time-scope of reminiscing is characteristically more distended. Hence whole chapters, covering whole years, decades, or epochs, replace the daily entries of diaries and journals; and an effort is usually made to touch upon each significant segment of a lifetime-if not in one volume, then in six or seven! ^(31){ }^{31} On the other hand, a concern for accuracy of detail often manifests itself in this more exposed form of self-revelation, open as it is to public scrutiny and criticism from the very first moment of publication. It is not at all surprising, then, to find that Vladimir Nabokov avidly sought out relatives and other close witnesses of his personal past before publishing his autobiography entitled Speak, Memory! ^(32){ }^{32} 尽管这两种写作形式同样以自我为中心——在每种情况下，作者都在详尽叙述自己的人生经历——但此时的言说对象已从自我转向他人，即那些将通过印刷品阅读其人生叙述的读者。日记与日志中那种含蓄而封闭的自我回忆所蕴含的社群化倾向，在此变得显豁，因为"出版"（即将个人生活公诸于众）已成为明确目标。这种向公开领域的迈进带来了两重相应变化。一方面，由于自传或回忆录常以整个人生为题材，回忆的时间跨度往往更为延展。因此取代日记日志每日记录的，是涵盖整年、十年乃至时代的完整章节；作者通常力图触及生命每个重要阶段——若一卷不能尽述，则分作六七卷亦无妨！另一方面，在这种更易受到公众审视与批评的自我暴露形式中，对细节准确性的关注往往更为凸显，从作品面世之初便面临公开检验。 因此，发现弗拉基米尔·纳博科夫在出版自传《说吧，记忆！》前狂热地寻找亲属和其他亲近的过往见证者，就一点也不令人惊讶了。 ^(32){ }^{32}
V
Despite the considerable interest and power inherent in written reminis-cences-and apart from their value in showing us how the communaldiscursive dimension emerges even in the most private forms of auto-reminiscing-it remains the case that reminiscing in the oral mode is most fully paradigmatic for the phenomenon as a whole. Such a claim is based on 尽管书面回忆录具有相当的内在趣味与力量——且不论它们在展示公共话语维度如何从最私密的自我回忆形式中浮现的价值——但就整体现象而言，口头模式的回忆仍是最完整的范式。这一论断基于
the straightforward observation that reminiscing in speech is the most thoroughly dialectical form of reminiscing. In full-blown co-reminiscing, the interlocutors can “trade” reminiscences more completely and more flexibly than in other reminiscential situations. They can do so more completely insofar as they can correct and augment each other, something that is difficult or impossible to achieve in silent or written auto-reminiscing; and this is done more flexibly because of the ebb and flow of the dialogue itself, allowing for more nuanced assessments. The understanding of the past attained in such dialectically structured co-reminiscing is a genuine counderstanding that cannot be accomplished in solitude or by proffering writing to an anonymous public. 一个直白的观察是，言语中的回忆是最具辩证性的回忆形式。在充分展开的共同回忆中，对话者能比其他回忆情境更完整、更灵活地"交换"回忆。之所以更完整，是因为他们可以相互修正和补充，而这在沉默或书面的自我回忆中难以实现；之所以更灵活，则源于对话本身的起伏流动，允许更细腻的评估。在这种辩证结构的共同回忆中所达成的对过去的理解，是一种真正的共同理解，既无法在独处时完成，也无法通过向匿名公众提供文字来实现。
The special virtue of reminiscing out loud is evident even in circumstances that lack any intersubjective reciprocity or dialogue. In eulogies, for example, the speaker will often employ reminiscences as a primary topic of his or her discourse. Such overtly unilateral reminiscing can be entirely appropriate and efficacious on the occasion, even though the person eulogized may be absent or dead and members of the audience are reduced to silence. The latter could doubtless co-reminisce, and may well do so before or after the formal ceremony; but they need not do so for the situation to be thoroughly reminiscential. Much the same one-sided circumstance obtains in psychoanalysis, in which the patient’s open reminiscing is often met with by silence on the part of the analyst. As in the eulogy, the reminiscing that is realized in this apparently inequitable setting is no less forceful or insightful for failing to achieve co-reminiscing in any strict sense. In both circumstances, the past is talked out in a closely-knit (if temporary) communitas composed of speaker and listener(s). Even in the absence of dialogical interchange, the reminiscing remains valid and effective. 公开回忆的特殊价值，即便在缺乏主体间互惠或对话的情境下也显而易见。例如在悼词中，演讲者常将回忆作为话语的核心主题。这种明显单向的追忆方式在特定场合可能完全恰当且有效——尽管被悼念者或许缺席或已逝去，听众们也保持着静默。他们无疑可以进行共同回忆，很可能在正式仪式前后便已如此；但要使情境充满回忆特质，这种共同回忆并非必要条件。类似单边情境也存在于精神分析中，患者坦率的回忆常遭遇分析师以沉默回应。正如悼词场景，在这种表面不对等环境中实现的回忆，虽未达成严格意义上的共同回忆，却丝毫不减其力量与洞见。两种情境中，过去都在由言说者与聆听者组成的紧密（即便是暂时的）共同体中被娓娓道来。即便没有对话性交流，回忆依然真实有效。
The psychoanalytic situation, considered as a scene of reminiscence, has yet another significance. It repeats, in considerable intensity and depth, experiences and processes that occur in the course of everyday life, especially in the setting of one’s family or close friends. These latter, our proximate associates, are often, perhaps always, reminiscential presences themselves. We reminisce not merely about them (in isolated autoreminiscence) and with them (in full co-reminiscence) but through them (when they present themselves to us as reminiscent of persons other than themselves). Aspects of all three options are in evidence in the dialogue between Rosa Coldfield and Quentin Compson with which this chapter opened. Any interpersonal situation may include or intimate complexity of this order. But psychoanalysis thrives on it. As in so many other ways as well-some of which will be explored later in this book ^(33){ }^{33}-the psychoanalytic situation represents a highly condensed, and highly revealing, version of extra-analytic experience. In particular, it is a prototype of reminiscential experience realized in the presence of intimates who not only reminisce together but reminisce in and beyond each other-in the presence and 精神分析情境作为回忆场景，还具有另一层深意。它以相当强烈的强度和深度，复现了日常生活中——尤其是在家庭或密友环境中——发生的体验与过程。这些亲近之人本身往往（或许总是）就是唤起回忆的存在。我们不仅会回忆他们（在孤立的自我回忆中）、与他们共同回忆（在完整的共同回忆中），还会通过他们进行回忆（当他们作为他人记忆的载体呈现时）。本章开篇罗莎·科德菲尔德与昆汀·康普生的对话中，这三种模式的要素均有显现。任何人际情境都可能包含或暗示这种层次的复杂性，但精神分析正以此见长。正如本书后续章节将探讨的诸多方面所示，精神分析情境以高度凝练且极具启示性的方式，再现了分析场域之外的经验。 具体而言，这是在亲密者共同在场时实现的追忆体验原型——他们不仅共同追忆，更在彼此之中并超越彼此地追忆——在相互的临在与人格中，超越单纯的意识认知与相互识别。
person of one another and beyond the merely conscious cognition and recognition of each by the other. （注：原文结尾处"in the presence and"存在不完整句式，中文翻译保持原文结构未补全）
Reminiscing in this extended sense is at once a transcending of the historical and perceptual limits of the immediate situation-the present discourse and its actual or virtual interlocutors-and a return to a past of which one has been forgetful up to this point. Such a past pre-exists the present, and yet it is resuscitable in reminiscence: in that communalized discourse which relives the past in question, often wistfully and just as often aided by reminiscentia of various kinds. As the slave in the Meno recovered knowledge he had so thoroughly forgotten that he never realized he possessed it in the first place-the recovery owing much to his dialectical cross-examination by Socrates and to reminiscentia in the shape of diagrams drawn in the sand-in psychoanalysis we recover an acquaintance with the past which we have long since repressed. Something similar occurs in the co-reminiscing we do with friends and family; and it also happens in intense auto-reminiscence. Through all these forms of reminiscing, we become reacquainted with the past, gaining an intimacy with it that we may not have experienced when we first encountered it. Retelling this past in discourse of several sorts-Platonic dialogues themselves combine spoken with written reminiscing-we articulate its structure and come to know it from within again. We come to know it better, more completely and more poignantly, than if we had left it unreminisced, un-unfolded in logos, un-explicated in “the dark backward and abysm of time.” ^(34){ }^{34} 在这种广义的回忆中，人们既超越了当下情境（即当前话语及其实际或潜在的对话者）的历史与感知局限，又回归到此前一直被遗忘的过往。这样的过去先于当下存在，却能在回忆中复苏：通过那种集体化的话语，人们往往带着惆怅之情，并借助各类回忆媒介，重新体验那段特定的过往。正如《美诺篇》中的奴隶，他彻底遗忘了自己最初拥有的知识，以至于从未意识到其存在——这种记忆的恢复很大程度上得益于苏格拉底的辩证盘问，以及沙地上绘制的图形这类回忆媒介——在精神分析中，我们重新认识了长久以来被压抑的过去。类似的场景也发生在我们与亲友的共同回忆中；在强烈的自我回忆里同样如此。通过这些不同形式的回忆，我们与过去重新建立联系，获得一种初次相遇时可能未曾体验的亲密感。 通过多种形式的言说来复述这段过往——柏拉图对话录本身就融合了口述与书写的回忆——我们得以阐明其结构，并再次从内在认知它。相较于任其沉沦于未被追忆、未在逻各斯中展开、未在"时间幽暗的深渊"里明晰的状态，此刻我们对其认知更为深刻、完整且锥心。 ^(34){ }^{34}
VII 第七章
RECOGNIZING 再认
What is the strange difference between an experience tasted for the first time and the same experience recognized as familiar, as having been enjoyed before, though we cannot name it or say where or when? 初次体验的滋味与再次遇见时那种熟悉感——明明知道曾享受过这般体验，却叫不出名目也说不出何时何地——这两者之间究竟存在着怎样奇异的差异？
-William James, The Principles of Psychology -威廉·詹姆斯，《心理学原理》
I
Abstract 摘要
I am arriving at the airport in South Bend, Indiana. A figure comes striding toward me, his hand extended. Is it Tom? I cannot recognize him at first, as a large straw hat is drawn down over his face. Then, suddenly, the hat is thrown off, and I just as suddenly recognize who it is: Charles! Although I have not seen Charles since last fall (it is now June), he is instantly rec-ognizable-and clearly distinguishable from Tom, who nevertheless resembles Charles in physique and whom I had expected to meet me on this occasion. 我正抵达印第安纳州南本德的机场。一个身影大步朝我走来，伸出手。是汤姆吗？起初我认不出来，因为一顶大草帽遮住了他的脸。突然，帽子被掀开，我立刻认出了是谁：查尔斯！虽然自去年秋天（现在是六月）以来我就没见过查尔斯，但瞬间就能认出他——而且明显能把他和汤姆区分开，尽管汤姆在体型上与查尔斯相似，而我原本以为这次会见到汤姆。
It is striking how much of this experience is present-oriented. One present moment-that of the quasi-recognition of Tom-gives way instantaneously to another present moment, that of actually recognizing Charles. Each moment is all-absorbing, and is occupied without remainder by an act of quasi- or real recognition. The act serves to punctuate the present-to give it its special content and its immediate limits. There is a definite fixation on the present, an anchoring of attention there, as well as a feit presentness of the experience itself as it gives itself to me in the moment of recognition. 令人惊讶的是，这段经历如此以当下为中心。一个当下时刻——对汤姆的疑似辨认——瞬间让位于另一个当下时刻，即真正认出查尔斯的时刻。每一刻都令人全神贯注，被疑似或真实的辨认行为完全占据。这个行为如同为当下画上标点——赋予它特殊内容和即时界限。注意力明确地固定在当下，锚定于此，同时体验本身在被辨认的瞬间呈现给我的那种鲜活的当下感也清晰可感。
The presentness is such that the experience here reported lacks an explicit orientation toward past or future. The past in particular is strangely absent from the conscious content of my experience: “strangely” because both Charles and Tom have been integral presences in my past. If they had not been such presences, I could not be said to recognize them at all: past 当下性使得此处记述的体验缺乏对过去或未来的明确指向。尤其令人费解的是，过去在我的意识体验内容中异常缺席——说"费解"，是因为查尔斯和汤姆都曾是我过往岁月中不可或缺的存在。倘若他们不曾如此存在过，我根本谈不上能认出他们：过去
experience of the recognized object is presupposed even if it is not manifest as such in the experience itself. It may be that it is just to the extent that this presupposition is at work in recognition that the past experience itself need not be elicited as anything distinct from the present experience of recognizing: and thus not as something to be recollected as such. 对被识别对象的体验是被预设的，即使这种体验本身并未明确显现。或许恰恰是由于这种预设作用于识别过程中，过去的体验本身无需作为与当下识别体验相区别的事物被唤起：因此也不必作为需要被回忆的内容而存在。
This is not to deny that we do recognize some things precisely as stemming from the past: when I judge that “I recognize him as a ghost of his former self” I do make an explicit reference to the past. But even here no specific recollection (much less a memory image) of this past needs to arise. Rather, the reference to the past is built right into the presentness of the ex-perience-is part of its very content and is not inferred or posited, much less experienced separately. In Heidegger’s terminology, the “as-structure” here is “existential-hermeneutical” and not apophantic in nature; it expresses an inherence of the past in the present rather than the reverse; and it does not effect any division into distinct regions of time. This imma-nence-in-the-present remains operative even when I recognize something as about to happen. The “about to” is an intrinsic feature of the recognized object itself-much as protentions of the immediate future form the forward fringe of the “living present” in Husserl’s analysis of timeconsciousness. ^(1){ }^{1} 这并非否认我们确实能识别某些事物源自过去：当我判断“我认出他是他过去的影子”时，确实明确指向了过往。但即便如此，也无需唤起关于这段过去的特定回忆（更不必说记忆图像）。相反，对过去的指涉就内嵌于当下体验之中——构成其内容本身，既非推断也非假定，更非独立体验。用海德格尔的术语来说，此处的"作为结构"本质上是"生存论-诠释学"的，而非命题性的；它表达的是过去内在于当下，而非相反；且不造成任何时间区域的划分。这种当下内在性即便在我识别某事"即将发生"时依然有效。"即将"是认知对象自身的内在特征——正如胡塞尔对时间意识的分析中，对临近未来的前摄构成了"活生生当下"的前缘。
There is still a further level of consideration. Acts of recognition such as occurred in the South Bend airport exhibit presentness not only in the sense of occurring in the present, dominating it, and making it prevail over the past and the future. They also aid in the constitution of the present itself. How is this so? They do so by contributing two basic factors to the present: “availability” and “consolidation.” 还有更深一层的考量。像在南本德机场发生的那种识别行为，不仅展现了当下性——即发生在当下、主导当下并使其凌驾于过去和未来之上——它们还参与构建了当下本身。何以如此？它们通过为当下贡献两个基本要素来实现这一点："可及性"和"巩固性"。
Availability 可及性
Availability names the way in which recognition serves to render items in our experience readily accessible to us-where “accessible” means not just nonproblematically present but positively identifiable, that is, having a distinct, and normally nameable, identity. A recognized face such as that of Charles affords a privileged access to a body that, before the moment of recognition, was an advancing physique posing a question for perception: “Whose body is this?” A flash of recognition resolved this ambiguous situation by making the identity of the owner of this body available to meavailable not just in the present but constitutive of it. In fact, we can trace a movement from “this-body-with-unknown-owner-advancing-toward-me” to “Tom-as-possible-owner-of-this-body-coming-toward-me” to “Charles-as-certain-owner-of-this-body.” This movement of increasing specificity is the work of recognition. At the same time, a distinct sense of “nearing” ^(2){ }^{2} accompanies availability and enhances it. Charles’s face, once revealed and recognized, no longer keeps the distance of something hidden under a straw 可用性描述了认知如何使经验中的事物变得易于获取——这里的“获取”不仅意味着毫无障碍地呈现，更指能够明确辨识，即拥有清晰且通常可命名的身份。例如查尔斯那张被认出的面孔，为身体提供了优先接触权；在认出那一刻之前，这个逼近的躯体对感知而言只是个疑问：“这是谁的身体？”认知的闪现化解了这种模糊状态，使我得以获知这具身体主人的身份——这种获知不仅存在于当下，更构成了当下本身。事实上，我们可以追溯从“这个-主人未知的-逼近我的-身体”到“可能是-汤姆的-这个-朝我走来的-身体”再到“确定是-查尔斯的-这个身体”的演变过程。这种不断具体化的运动正是认知的运作。与此同时，一种独特的“临近感”伴随着可用性并强化着它。一旦查尔斯的面容被揭露和识别，便不再保持稻草下隐藏之物那种疏离感。
hat but leaps forward toward me as a distinctly identified entity that constitutes the present as a scene of recognition. Thus, what remained distant in a state of unrecognized ambiguity draws near to my apprehension. It lets me have a still closer look, puts me on the inside of the phenomenon, and gives me the feeling of immediate access to it. 那模糊不清的远方之物此刻却向我跃现为一个清晰可辨的实体，将当下构筑成认知发生的场景。于是，原本处于未被识别之朦胧状态的远方，此刻向我逼近，成为可被理解的存在。它让我得以更近距离地观察，将我置于现象内部，赋予我直接触及它的感受。
Consolidation 巩固阶段
Consolidation is a second, somewhat less obvious, factor. Recognition contributes to the constitution of the present (and thus manifests its own presentness) by allowing the recognized object or event to come forth as itself-to gain its own identity and stability. Hence the unidentified and unstable head-with-straw-hat became the solidified head of Charles. Through recognition, what was evasive and shifting became intact and settled; the question as to the identity of this figure was resolved. The ambiguous head belonged to Charles and Charles alone, and it gained in felt density what it thereby lost in mystery. This density or consolidated character is by no means incompatible with the experience of nearing mentioned just above. The two even work closely together: it is just because Charles drew sufficiently close to me that he gained enough density to be recognized as himself. His nearing and his consolidation as an object of recognition went hand in hand. 巩固是第二个稍不明显的影响因素。通过让被识别的对象或事件以其本来面目呈现——获得自身的同一性与稳定性，识别行为参与了当下时刻的构成（从而彰显其当下性）。因此，那顶戴着草帽的模糊头颅便固化为查尔斯的清晰形象。经由识别，原本游移不定的存在变得完整而确定；关于这个身影身份的疑问就此消解。这具暧昧的头颅只属于且完全属于查尔斯，它在获得可感知密度的同时，也失去了神秘性。这种密度或巩固特性与前述临近体验毫不冲突。二者甚至密切配合：正因为查尔斯足够靠近我，他才获得足以被确认为自身的密度。他作为识别对象的临近过程与巩固过程是同步发生的。
We have been discussing what can be designated as the presentness of recognition: its orientation toward the present as well as its actual orientation of it. As a result of presentness, recognition helps to shape the very stretch of time in which it plays out its own drama. Availability and consolidation play a determinative role in this drama, since each contributes in an essential way to presentness. All this occurs in a curiously suspended state of temporal process. The past, though crucially presupposed, and the future, though undeniably portended, are not permitted to intrude themselves into the heart of recognition, composed as it is almost exclusively of present-making activities. 我们一直在探讨可称之为"识认当下性"的现象：它既指向当下，又实际构建着当下。由于这种当下性，识认行为塑造了其自身展开的时间场域。可得性与巩固性在这场时间戏剧中起着决定性作用，二者都以本质方式促成了当下性。这一切发生在某种奇特的时间悬置状态中——尽管过去作为关键前提被预设，未来也无可否认地隐现，但它们都不被允许侵入识认的核心领域，因为这个领域几乎完全由制造当下的活动构成。
Reinforcing this same emphasis on the present is the fact that recognition often occurs in the immediate context of perception, itself a deeply presentoriented activity. Where else does perception arise except in the present, and what does it offer to us but various contemporary items arranged and arrayed in the same present? In the South Bend airport, recognition occurred in the very midst of perception; it arose from it and was continuous with it; it was in perceiving Charles that I came to recognize him. More generally, to recognize what I see is to see it “as” something. Wittgenstein has deftly analyzed the fact that recognizing something is seeing it as a distinguishable and identifiable thing-as a determinable, and usually an already determined, x.^(3)x .{ }^{3} This basic act of seeing-as is perceptual in nature, though it is also sometimes interlaced with imaginings. ^(4){ }^{4} Even if it is not true that all recognizing is construable as seeing-as-a theme to which I shall 强化这种对当下的重视的另一个事实是，识别往往发生在感知的直接情境中，而感知本身就是一种高度以当下为导向的活动。感知除了在当下产生，还能在何处产生？它除了向我们呈现各种在当下排列组合的现时事物，还能提供什么？在南本德机场，识别就发生在感知的过程中；它源于感知并与感知相延续；正是在感知查尔斯的过程中，我逐渐认出了他。更普遍地说，识别我所见之物就是将其视为某物。维特根斯坦精妙地分析过这一事实：识别某物就是将其看作一个可区分、可辨认的实体——作为可确定的，通常是已被确定的 x.^(3)x .{ }^{3} 。这种"视为"的基本行为本质上是感知性的，尽管有时也交织着想象 ^(4){ }^{4} 。即使并非所有识别都可被理解为"视为"——这个主题我将在
return-that which is so construable presents itself as at once perceptual and present-bound: once I recognize him, I see that advancing figure as Charles now. 可被如此解读的事物同时呈现为感知性与当下性：一旦我认出他，便将那个前进的身影视为此刻的查尔斯。
II
Just as to be present-making is not necessarily to be limited to the present, to arise in the midst of perceiving and to occur in the form of seeing-as are not strictly present-confined. Despite the insistent focus on presentness that is so much a part of the experience of recognition, the past must play some role if recognizing is indeed a mode of memory. As Sartre queries: 正如"当下呈现"未必局限于当下时刻，"在感知中涌现"和"以视作形式发生"也并非严格限定于当下。尽管识别体验中强烈聚焦于当下性，但若识别确属记忆的一种模式，过去必然扮演着某种角色。正如萨特所质疑：
But if everything is present, how are we to explain . . . the fact that in its intention a consciousness which remembers transcends the present in order to aim at the event back there where it was? ^(5){ }^{5} 但如果一切都是当下，我们如何解释......记忆意识在其意向中超越当下、指向"事件当初所在之处"这个事实？ ^(5){ }^{5}
Even if recognizing does not aim expressly at a past event “back there where it was,” it must involve the past in some capacity if it is to count as remembering. This much we have already acknowledged. But how exactly are past and present related in recognizing? This question becomes acute precisely because presentness is so massively evident as a primary feature of recognition. 即便识别并非明确指向"当初所在之处"的过往事件，若要将其视为记忆行为，它必然以某种方式关联着过去。这一点我们已然承认。但过去与当下在识别中究竟如何关联？这个问题之所以尖锐，恰恰因为当下性作为识别的主要特征如此显著地凸显。
It is tempting to explain the role of the past in recognizing by positing a subterranean stratum at work beneath what is manifest in the experience itself. The past is then conceived as a suppressed undercurrent. As reported by William James, Höffding espouses such a view: 人们很容易通过假设在显性体验之下存在一个隐秘运作的底层结构，来解释过去在认知中的作用。于是过去被构想为一种被压抑的暗流。正如威廉·詹姆斯所报道的，霍夫丁就秉持这种观点：
His theory of what happens [in cases of instantaneous recognition] is that the object before us, A, comes with a sense of familiarity whenever it awakens aa slumbering image, a, of its own past self, whilst without this image it seems unfamiliar. ^(6){ }^{6} 他[对瞬时认知现象]的理论认为：当前对象 A 之所以能唤起熟悉感，是因为它唤醒了沉睡的自身过往形象 a；若缺乏这种形象，对象就会显得陌生。
But it is superfluous to posit the past in the form of a subliminal image lurking beneath an experience of recognition when this experience not only contains no conscious trace of such an image but does not need it in any adequate accounting. An act of recognizing is self-sufficing, especially in its instantaneous form. That which is recognized, the “recognitum” as we can call it, gives itself to us in transparent plenitude. This is an aspect of its very presentness. Thus it does not need the support, not even the subliminal support, supplied by a memory-image of its earlier occurrence. Even if it were to arise, such an image would be distinctly redundant. As James says in critique of Höffding: “[The experience of recognizing a face] is so intense as to banish from my mind all collateral circumstances, whether of the present or of former experiences.” ^(7){ }^{7} Collateral circumstances are banished-not be- 然而，当这种识别体验不仅不包含此类潜意识的意识痕迹，而且在任何充分的解释中都不需要它时，以潜藏于识别体验之下的潜意识意象形式来设定过去，就显得多余了。识别行为本身是自足的，尤其是在其瞬间形式中。被识别之物——我们可称之为"被识体"——以透明的完满性呈现给我们。这正是其当下性的一个方面。因此，它不需要记忆意象对其先前出现的支持，甚至不需要潜意识层面的支持。即使这样的意象出现，也显然是多余的。正如詹姆斯在批评霍夫丁时所说："[识别一张面孔的体验]如此强烈，以至于将我脑海中所有附带情境——无论是当下的还是过往体验中的——都驱逐殆尽。" ^(7){ }^{7} 附带情境被驱逐——而非被——
cause they are inappropriate, but because they are useless impedimenta in a situation in which everything essential is already furnished. 因为它们并非不合时宜，而是在一切要义俱已完备的情境下，这些不过是无用的累赘。
But this leaves unresolved how past and present are in fact related in situations of recognizing. Even if the past does not obtrude into the present overtly in these situations and even if it is otiose to invoke it as a covert factor, its presence is hard to deny: as is clear from the simple fact that we cannot recognize something we have not encountered before at some point and in some way. However difficult it may be to detect as such, there is resonance in the present from this encounter in the past. How is such resonance to be conceived? 但这仍未解决在识别情境中过去与现在究竟如何关联的问题。即便过去在这些情境中并未明显侵入当下，即便将其视为潜在因素显得多余，其存在仍难以否认——从我们无法识别从未以某种方式邂逅过的事物这一简单事实便可明了。无论这种关联多么难以察觉，当下的体验中始终回荡着过往相遇的余韵。我们该如何理解这种共鸣？
It will not help to invoke instances of the past/present relationship that were considered in previous chapters. In these instances, past and present remained easily distinguishable terms. In reminiscing, for example, the reminisced-about past is the very topic of the activity of reminiscing itself; it is even thematized as such: “Those were the days. . . .” In the case of reminding, an item apprehended in the present is related to something past (and sometimes to something future) via a distinctive iconic, indicative, or adumbrative relation; at every moment, past and present are discernibly different. The same holds true for ordinary recollection, which is premised on the distinguishability of the scene recollected from the act of recollection. In all of these cases-and in many others as well (e.g., in biographical or historical reconstruction)-past and present are conjoined in such a way that the very difference between the two terms is constitutive of their mode of relation to each other. 援引前几章探讨过的过去/现在关系实例并无助益。在这些实例中，过去与现在始终是泾渭分明的概念。以怀旧为例，被追忆的过去正是怀旧活动本身的核心主题，它甚至被明确主题化为"那些年……"这样的表达。就提醒而言，当下感知的某个元素通过独特的图像性、指示性或预示性关联与过去（有时也与未来）的事物相联系——在每一刻，过去与现在都清晰可辨。普通回忆同样如此，其前提正是被回忆的场景与回忆行为本身的可区分性。所有这些案例（包括传记重构、历史重建等其他诸多情形）中，过去与现在的联结方式恰恰以二者间的本质差异作为其相互关系模式的构成基础。
In recognition, by contrast, any such intrinsic difference is annulled or held in abeyance: the two temporal phases rejoin each other instead of being kept apart. They rejoin each other so thoroughly that they cannot even be said to adumbrate, much less to indicate or imitate, each other. At the most, we might say that one term expresses the other in the sense of “gives expression to,” “makes manifest,” or “reveals.” Thus the past could be said to be expressed in and by the present of recognition. But the idea of expression has a double disadvantage in the current context. On the one hand, it implies the idea of an unexpressed remainder-whereas what we recognize, being altogether manifest, carries with it no such residue. On the other hand, expression is naturally allied with verbal language-the paradigm of an expressive sign is a word ^(8){ }^{8}-while recognizing has no special affinity with linguistic contexts and modes of articulation. 相比之下，在再认过程中，任何此类内在差异都被消解或悬置：两个时间阶段重新结合而非彼此分离。它们如此彻底地重新结合，以至于甚至不能说它们彼此预示，更不用说指示或模仿对方了。最多我们可以说，一个项以"给予表达"、"使之显现"或"揭示"的方式表达另一个项。因此可以说过去是在再认的当下中被表达并通过它表达。但表达这个概念在当前语境中有双重缺陷。一方面，它暗示着未表达之残余物的概念——而我们再认的事物既然完全显现，就不带有这种残余。另一方面，表达天然与言语结盟——表达性符号的典范是词语——而再认与语言语境及表达方式并无特殊亲缘性。
The most adequate model for grasping the relation of past and present in recognition is that of suffusion. By “suffusion” I mean the situation in which what is otherwise distinct, or at least discriminable, combines and mixes to the point of indistinguishability. Such is precisely what happens with past and present in cases of recognizing. In particular, the past of the recognitum fuses with its present apprehension-so completely that we would be hard pressed to differentiate one from the other. Thus, when I recognized my 理解过去与现在在认知中关系的最恰当模型是"融合"。所谓"融合"，我指的是原本截然不同或至少可区分的事物结合混杂到无法辨识的程度。这正是认知过程中过去与现在发生的情形。具体而言，被认知物的过去会与其当下的感知完全交融——如此彻底以至于我们难以将二者区分开来。因此，当我认出我的
friend Charles, my past relationship to him was condensed or telescoped into the present of my perception of him as “Charles,” as just this person (and not, say, Tom or any number of other people who resemble him). Of course, this relationship itself had been built up from discrete episodes, some of which I could recollect separately, reminisce about, be reminded of, etc. But insofar as I was recognizing Charles, these episodes were not at stake; at most, they were contributing factors to the single Gestalt designatable as ‘Charles-as-recognized’. What was at stake was a circumstance in which the present of apprehending Charles was suffused with the past of my relationship with him. 我的朋友查尔斯，我与他过去的关系被浓缩或压缩成当下我对"查尔斯"这个人的感知——就是眼前这个特定的人（而不是汤姆或其他任何与他相似的人）。当然，这种关系本身是由离散的事件构建而成的，其中有些我可以单独回忆、追忆或被提醒。但就我认出查尔斯而言，这些具体事件并不重要；最多只是构成"被认出的查尔斯"这个完形整体的促成因素。关键在于当下感知查尔斯的时刻，已然浸透着我与他过往关系的全部历史。
It is not altogether accidental that the specific recognitum in this exemplary case was a human face. For both James and Hoffding, the face is a paradigm of recognizability. In the face-the naked face as fully recognized ^(9){ }^{9}-the suffusion of past and present is at its most complete. Once I recognized Charles’s face, the uncertainty of his identity, an identity at first confused with that of Tom as quasi-recognized, was immediately dispelled, leaving no unrecognized residue. The past pertinent to this experience was made one with the present in which recognition occurred. Indeed, the suffusion was such that not only past and present but the manifested and the manifestation, meaning and vehicle, identity and phenomenon-all merged in the decisive moment of recognition. The two members of each of these pairs of terms interfuse in the terminal point of recognition itself. Much as a finished painting possesses the quality of being finally and fully expressiveand expressive of itself, “auto-iconic” ^(10){ }^{10}-so a recognized face has the same intransitive and self-completing character, the sense of having-come-already-into-its own. 在这个典型案例中，被识别的特定对象是张人脸并非全然偶然。对于詹姆斯和霍夫丁而言，面容是可识别性的典范。在这张被完全识别的赤裸面容中——过去与现在的交融达到了最完满的状态。当我认出查尔斯面容的瞬间，关于他身份的所有犹疑（那个最初与汤姆身份产生混淆的准识别状态）立即烟消云散，未留下任何未被识别的残余。与这段体验相关的过去，已与识别发生的当下合而为一。这种交融如此彻底，不仅过去与现在，还包括显现者与显现过程、意义与载体、身份与现象——所有这些都在决定性的识别时刻融为一体。每对术语的两个组成部分，都在识别行为的终点彼此渗透。正如一幅完成的画作具有终极而完满的表现力，且这种表现力是自我指涉的"自足图像"——被识别的面容同样具备这种不及物且自我完成的特质，带着某种"已然自我实现"的意味。
The process of suffusion itself is complex and sinuous. I shall single out only two of its features for comment here. 渗透过程本身是复杂而曲折的。在此我只选取其中两个特征进行探讨。
Merging 融合
Merging in its most basic form brings together the perceived with the remembered. A simple example will demonstrate this. When I was working on a summer job many years ago in my hometown, my employer remarked to me one day that he recognized my father in me. When I asked him how this was so, he said that I had “my father’s walk”-his very gait, his style of walking. His perceiving of my walking was imbued with remembering; or rather, his perceiving me the way he did was his remembering-a remembering that did not require a separate recollection of my father’s walking in comparison with my own. The mere perception of my walking supplied both the occasion and the content of his recognitory act. 最基本的融合形式将感知与记忆相结合。一个简单例子可以说明这点：多年前我在家乡打暑期工时，雇主某天对我说从我身上认出了我父亲的影子。当我追问缘由时，他说我有着"父亲的步态"——那独特的行走节奏与姿态。他对我的观察浸透着记忆；或者说，他之所以如此感知我，正是通过记忆实现的——这种记忆无需特意回想对比父子二人的步态差异。仅凭对我行走的感知，就同时提供了他识别行为的契机与内容。
What is striking about this example, and many others like it in daily life, is the two-way action of the merging. Of such a case, it is equally true to say that the perceived unites with the remembered (my walk with my father’s 这个案例及其日常生活中诸多类似情形最引人注目的，在于融合的双向作用。就此而言，我们同样可以说：被感知者（我的步态）与被记忆者（父亲的
walk) and the converse (his walk with mine). It is not a matter merely of the remembered becoming immersed in the perceived-even if this remains most salient on many occasions. The perceived also loses itself in the remembered. At the moment of recognition, then, there is a thoroughly reciprocal fusing of the two factors. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for the past and the present, the manifested and the manifestation, identity and phenomenon, meaning and vehicle. 行走）与反向（他的行走与我的行走）。这不仅仅是记忆沉浸于感知之中——尽管在许多情况下这仍是最显著的现象。感知同样迷失于记忆之中。在识别的瞬间，这两个因素彻底地相互融合。同理，过去与现在、显现者与显现、同一性与现象、意义与载体之间也是如此。
Of course there are experiences of partial recognition in which the merging of such factors is far from complete: e.g., my quasi-recognizing Tom in place of Charles. The identification was very tentative (“Is it Tom?” I asked myself) because present perception and past experience merged with each other only imperfectly. The perceived figure (still shrouded by the straw hat as it was) did not fully coincide with any particular remembered figure, and the resulting discrepancy between the perceived and the remembered exhibited itself in a distinct hesitation on my part as well as a need to perceive more of the person advancing toward me so that an act of full recognition could occur. In other instances such hesitation can be even more prolonged. But this does not render the moment of merging any less important. Whether it proceeds gradually or suddenly, implicitly or explicitly, all recognition aims at this moment as at a natural culmination. For it is the moment when we can say that recognition has genuinely taken place. Not to experience such a moment is not to recognize fully-even if the moment itself represents the suspension of basic distinctions on which our lives otherwise depend. 当然也存在部分识别的体验，其中这些因素的融合远未完成：例如，我误将汤姆认作查尔斯。这种辨认非常试探性（"是汤姆吗？"我自问），因为当下的感知与过往经验仅实现了不完美的融合。那个被感知的身影（仍被草帽遮掩着）并未完全吻合任何特定的记忆形象，感知与记忆之间的差异表现为我明显的迟疑，以及需要更仔细地观察那个朝我走来的人，才能实现完整的识别。在其他情况下，这种迟疑可能持续更久。但这丝毫不减损融合时刻的重要性。无论这一过程是渐进还是突然，是隐晦还是明晰，所有识别行为都指向这个自然高潮的时刻。因为唯有此刻，我们才能断言真正的识别已然发生。 未能体验这样的时刻，就意味着未能充分认知——即便这个时刻本身代表着对我们生活所依赖的基本区分的悬置。
Clarification 澄明
Clarification names an effect of suffusion rather than part of the process itself; but it is a crucial effect nonetheless. To recognize something is to cast it in a new light-to illuminate it in a way that was lacking when it remained unrecognized in its bare perception. As that which is perceived becomes suffused with the past to produce a recognition in the present, the perception gains a luminosity that clarifies an otherwise ambiguous or attenuated situation: as when the actual recognition of Charles suddenly dissipated the mist of uncertainty that clung to the not-yet-identified person striding toward me in the South Bend airport. 澄明并非指涉弥漫过程本身，而是命名其产生的效果；然而这效果却至关重要。认知某物就是赋予其新的光芒——以某种在赤裸感知中未被识别时所缺乏的方式照亮它。当被感知之物与过去交融而在当下产生认知时，感知便获得了一种明晰性，能澄清原本模糊或弱化的情境：就像当我真正认出查尔斯时，瞬间驱散了萦绕在南本德机场那个朝我走来的未识别者身上的不确定迷雾。
The clarification achieved by recognition need not be so dramatic as this. When I gaze upon the house in which I grew up, I am not looking at an indifferent construction of bricks and boards with an utterly unknown interior. Instead, I am seeing a house known from within and recognized as such. The presently perceived house is clarified by my very recognition of it-quite apart from my having explicit memories of it. Particular memories may also arise, often in the very wake of recognition, but their illumination is of a different sort from that which is effected by recognition proper. In the “click” of recognition, my past experiences with a given perceived object are 通过识别获得的澄清不必如此戏剧化。当我凝视着长大的那栋房子时，我看到的不是一座由砖木构成的冷漠建筑，其内部完全陌生。相反，我看到的是一栋从内部熟知并被如此识别的房子。当前感知到的房子因我的识别而变得清晰——这与我是否拥有关于它的明确记忆无关。特定记忆也可能浮现，往往紧随识别之后，但它们带来的启示与纯粹识别所产生的效果不同。在识别的"咔嗒"瞬间，我与特定感知对象过往的种种经历
unleashed en bloc, as an amorphous mass. The illumination cast by connection with this experiential mass is necessarily diffuse; in place of spotlighting (as occurs so frequently in secondary memory, where what we remember enters “the brightly lit circle of perfect presentation”), ^(11){ }^{11} there is a suffusion of light-an indistinct but steady saturation of the object recognized. That this clarification results in something indistinct should not trouble us. Vague phenomena are still authentic objects of phenomenological description. As Husserl admonishes: 以无定形整体释放而出。与这一经验整体相连所产生的照亮必然是弥散的；它取代了聚光式的凸显（这种情形在次级记忆中极为常见，我们回忆的内容会进入"完美呈现的明亮光圈"）， ^(11){ }^{11} 取而代之的是光的弥漫——一种对认知对象模糊而持久的浸润。这种澄清导致某种模糊状态不应使我们困扰。含混现象仍是现象学描述的真正对象。正如胡塞尔所告诫：
We can always bring what is given nearer to us even in the zone of obscure apprehension. What is obscurely presented comes closer to us in its own peculiar way, eventually knocking at the door of intuition, though it need not for that reason pass over the threshold. ^(12){ }^{12} 即使在晦暗把握的领域，我们也总能将所予之物拉得更近。以自身独特方式晦暗呈现之物会逐渐靠近我们，最终叩击直觉之门，尽管它未必因此跨过那道门槛。 ^(12){ }^{12}
The very light cast by recognition also casts a shadow. This shadow inheres as much in its source (i.e., the amorphous mass of past experiences in which no particular memory or group of memories stands out) as in its present action of illumination, wherein it is difficult to say just how the nowrecognized object has been clarified. Description is here drawn into metaphor: “mass,” “mist,” “suffusion” itself. In fact there is no more exact description available to us, since suffusion proceeds as much by obscurity as by clarity, by shadow as by light. Nevertheless, the light that is at work in suffusion is quite adequate for the task of clarifying the recognitum, allowing it to be grasped as something recognized. 认知之光投射的同时也投下了阴影。这阴影既存在于其源头（即过去经验的无定形团块，其中没有任何特定记忆或记忆群显得突出），也存在于当下的照亮行为中——在此行为中，很难说清被认知的对象究竟如何被阐明。描述在此被引向隐喻："团块"、"迷雾"、"弥漫"本身。事实上我们无法获得更精确的描述，因为弥漫过程既通过明晰也通过晦暗进行，既借助光明也借助阴影。然而，在弥漫中运作的光线已完全足以完成阐明认知对象的任务，使其能够作为被识别之物被把握。
Presentness (with its two subtraits of availability and consolidation) and suffusion (characterized by merging and clarification) are the primary features of what we recognize. They complement one another in important ways. Presentness points to the insistence of the recognitum, its characteristic manner of insinuating itself into our ongoing experience and of serving as a magnetic pole for our attention. In their presentness, recognized objects become cynosures of our existence, “the stars of our life.” ^(13){ }^{13} In contrast, suffusion singles out another aspect of these same objects, i.e., their manner of combining divergent properties in a seamless whole having its own luminosity. What is accessible and consolidated from the perspective of presentness is by the same token diffuse and vaguely illumined from the standpoint of suffusion. The richness of recognition, the mystery of its working, is reflected in this very complementarity of features whereby what we recognize brings together what we might otherwise consider to be incompatible. No wonder, then, that recognizing so often presents itself as a borderline phenomenon-as located somewhere between memory and perception, past and present, myself and another. It negotiates this borderline state not by vacillating between such pairs of terms but by actively conjoining them in its presentness and suffusion. 在场性（包含可用性与巩固性两个子特征）与弥漫性（以融合与明晰化为特点）是我们认知事物的主要特征。二者以重要方式相互补充。在场性指向被认知物的执着性，它以其特有的方式渗透进我们持续进行的经验中，并成为我们注意力的磁极。凭借其在场性，被认知的客体成为我们存在的焦点，堪称"生命中的星辰"。 ^(13){ }^{13} 相比之下，弥漫性则凸显了这些客体的另一面向——它们将不同属性无缝融合为具有自身光晕的整体。从在场性视角看是清晰可及且稳固的事物，若从弥漫性角度观之则呈现出弥散而朦胧的光影。认知的丰富性及其运作的神秘性，正体现在这种特征的互补关系中：我们所认知的事物，将那些原本看似不相容的特质统合在了一起。 难怪认知常常表现为一种边界现象——介于记忆与感知、过去与现在、自我与他者之间的某个位置。它并非通过在这些对立项间摇摆不定来协商这种边界状态，而是通过在当下性与弥漫性中主动将它们联结起来。
III 第三章
We have proceeded thus far as if there were only one fundamental kind of recognizing-instantaneous in its happening and having its paradigm instance in the recognition of a human face. Although facial recognition is certainly an indispensable species of recognizing-its absence, “prosopagnosia,” is debilitating and leads to such anomalies as “the man who mistook his wife for a hat” ^(14){ }^{14}-it cannot be regarded as representative of other species. The fact is that recognizing comes in a number of very different shapes and forms, and it takes place in quite diverse settings. Not only can I recognize certain things much more gradually than I usually recognize faces, I can do so when I am in practically any state of mind or body, with corresponding effects on the act of recognition itself. Recognizing occurs in and through emotions as well as by means of perceptions: when I am depressed, recognition even of common objects may differ significantly from recognizing the same objects when I am elated. Just as the circumstances of recognizing vary considerably and may alter the character of the act, so the range of objects I am capable of recognizing is immense: from concrete faces to abstract numbers, from molecular configurations to spiral galaxies, from the style of Monet to that of Mozart. The distinctions between specific recognita are also considerable: a painter will recognize the difference between cadmium red deep and cadmium red medium, while a musician can discern differences between hearing a song in C minor and E flat major (even though the key signature is here the same). Anyone is able to tell the difference between a friendly and a not-so-friendly handshake, between the coolness of irony and the coolness of jest, or between the touch of guitar strings and the touch of the strings on a tennis racket. As our lives are generally surrounded by reminders and reminiscentia of many sorts, they are also immersed in many kinds of recognita. Living successfullyindeed, living at all-depends on our ability to apprehend myriad recognized items and to discriminate among them. 迄今为止，我们的讨论似乎只涉及一种基本的识别类型——那种瞬间发生、并以人脸识别为典型范例的认知行为。尽管面部识别无疑是识别行为中不可或缺的一类（其缺失被称为"面容失认症"，会导致诸如"把妻子错当成帽子的男人"等异常现象 ^(14){ }^{14} ），但它并不能代表其他类型的识别。事实上，识别行为呈现出多种截然不同的形态和方式，并发生在完全不同的情境中。我不仅可以比识别人脸更渐进地辨认某些事物，而且几乎在任何身心状态下都能进行识别——这对识别行为本身会产生相应影响。识别既通过感知发生，也经由情感产生：当我情绪低落时，即使对普通物体的识别，也可能与兴高采烈时的识别状态存在显著差异。 正如识别的场景千差万别且可能改变行为性质那样，我能识别的对象范围也极为广泛：从具体的面孔到抽象的数字，从分子构型到螺旋星系，从莫奈的风格到莫扎特的风格。特定识别对象之间的差异也相当显著：画家能分辨深镉红与中镉红的区别，音乐家则能辨别 C 小调与降 E 大调演奏同一首歌曲的差异（尽管调号在此相同）。任何人都能区分友好与不甚友好的握手，讽刺的冷峻与戏谑的冷峻，或是吉他琴弦的触感与网球拍网线的触感。由于我们的生活通常被各种提示物与回忆所环绕，我们也沉浸于多种识别对象之中。成功生活——确切而言，生存本身——取决于我们领会无数被识别项并加以区分的能力。
In this section I shall undertake a brief survey of several types of recognizing that deserve recognition in their own right. My intention is not to be exhaustive but merely to suggest the rich array of recognitory possibilities at our disposal. 在本节中，我将简要探讨几种值得被独立关注的认知类型。我的目的并非穷尽所有可能，而是试图展现我们掌握着的丰富认知可能性谱系。
Dim and Dawning Recognition 朦胧与初现的认知
Although many cases of recognition (especially facial recognition) are instantaneous in occurrence and perspicuous in content, it would be a mistake to claim that instantaneity and perspicuity are inherent features of all recognizing. Much recognizing occurs slowly and is murky from beginning to end. We can recognize through a glass darkly as well as with full transparency, and it is important to acknowledge this fact. In dim recogni- 尽管许多认知行为（尤其是面部识别）具有瞬时发生且内容明晰的特征，但若断言瞬时性与明晰性是所有认知行为的固有属性则大谬不然。大量认知过程进展缓慢且始终晦暗不明。我们既能透过模糊的镜面进行认知，亦可在完全澄明的状态下完成识别，承认这一事实至关重要。在朦胧的认
tion we have to do with those cases in which recognition never reaches a level of complete, or even partial, certainty: we are simply not sure that we have correctly recognized, or even begun to recognize, that which we apprehend. Many of these cases arise in fleeting circumstances, e.g., when we barely catch sight of someone who looks familiar driving past us on a highway. But there are also numerous instances where time is not lacking and yet recognition remains stultified. This happens whenever I encounter someone at a gathering whom I sense I know but whose identity I cannot quite specify: not only can I not recall his or her proper name, but I cannot remember when or where we first met. Even if I linger in the presence of such a person, and even if both of us try to explore the basis of the acquaintance, no further illumination may be forthcoming, leaving me with a recognition that is unremediably vague. 我们不得不处理那些永远无法达到完全或部分确定性的识别案例：我们根本不确定自己是否正确识别，甚至是否开始识别我们所感知的事物。许多这类情况发生在转瞬即逝的情境中，比如在高速公路上瞥见一个似曾相识的人驾车驶过。但也有大量实例中，时间并非不足，识别却依然受阻。每当我在聚会上遇到一个感觉认识却无法确切指明其身份的人时，这种情况就会发生：我不仅想不起他或她的名字，甚至记不起我们初次相遇的时间和地点。即使我在这样的人面前停留，即使双方都试图探究相识的缘由，可能依然得不到更多启示，留给我的只是一种无法补救的模糊认知。
In the case of dawning recognition, an incomplete recognition, rather than remaining in sheer suspension, evolves toward explicit recognition. Let me cite an example from recent experience: 在渐悟式识别的情况下，一种不完整的识别并非停留在纯粹的悬置状态，而是朝着明确的识别发展。让我举一个近期经历的例子：
Seating myself in a barroom filled with recent arrivals at a conference, I find myself opposite a figure whom I do not recognize at all at first. Gradually, as the evening wears on, it occurs to me that he may be someone I know-but just how I cannot say. Eventually, I realize that this person is probably the graduate student who once gave me a ride from the Dallas airport to the University of Dallas, where I had attended a meeting the year before. His name, “Randy,” which I had kept vaguely in mind since being introduced to him earlier this evening, suddenly seems just right, and I finally recognize him fully for who he is. 我坐在一间挤满会议新来者的酒吧里，对面坐着个起初完全认不出的身影。随着夜色渐深，我慢慢意识到这人可能是我认识的——却说不上来具体是谁。最终我恍然大悟，这大概就是去年载我从达拉斯机场去达拉斯大学参加研讨会的那位研究生。当"兰迪"这个名字——这个今晚早些时候被介绍时隐约记住的称呼——突然变得无比贴切时，我才算彻底认出了他。
In dawning recognition, then, I only gradually come to complete recognitive awareness-an awareness that may itself culminate in a definitive flash of insight. 在逐渐觉醒的辨认过程中，我缓慢抵达完整的认知状态——这种认知本身往往会在某个顿悟的瞬间达到顶峰。
What is the critical difference between merely dim and actually dawning recognition? The foregoing examples suggest that it may reside in the factor of context. When I merely pass someone by in a car or when I am caught up in the frustratingly vague recognition of a person II have run into at a casual party, an adequate recognitory context is lacking. If I proceed to seek out such a context, this is because I feel that, if found, it will offer a crucial clue for successful recognition. ^(15){ }^{15} In instances of dawning recognition, by contrast, an identifying context is present from the start. In the case reported just above, it is provided by the conference I was attending-a conference closely related in orientation and theme to the earlier meeting in Dallas for which the as yet unrecognized person in question had served as my escort. The collocation of these historically intertwined factors constituted a valuable recognitory matrix, one which supported my slowly growing recognition. This matrix supplied the context-a context furnishing immediate clues-for my full recognition. It helped to complete a search that began 仅仅模糊和真正开始认出的关键区别是什么？前面的例子表明，这种区别可能在于情境因素。当我只是开车路过某人，或者在一次随意的聚会上遇到某人时，对这个人的认出是模糊不清的，这时缺乏足够的认出情境。如果我继续寻找这样的情境，那是因为我认为，如果找到它，它将提供成功认知的关键线索。 ^(15){ }^{15} 相比之下，在逐渐认出的情况下，识别情境从一开始就存在。在上述案例中，该情境由我所参加的会议提供——该会议在方向和主题上与达拉斯会议密切相关，而那位尚未被认出的参与者曾担任我达拉斯会议的陪同人员。这些历史交织的因素的结合构成了一个有价值的识别矩阵，该矩阵支持了我逐渐增强的识别过程。该矩阵提供了识别所需的背景——一个提供即时线索的背景——从而使我最终完成了识别。它帮助完成了这一识别过程。
with an initially dim recognition. The “display” of my successfully dawned recognition carried out a task that was implicitly set in dim recognition; the two forms of recognizing coalesced as if they were two phases of one activity. 最初只是模糊的认知。我成功浮现的"显现"认知完成了隐含在模糊认知中的任务；这两种认知形式相互融合，仿佛是一项活动的两个阶段。
Recognizing-in 内在识别
This is a neglected but nevertheless important form of recognizing. It occurs whenever we recognize one thing in another: in its form or on its terms. Let me cite another example from my own experience: 这是一种被忽视却至关重要的认知形式。当我们通过某物的形式或特征来识别另一事物时，它就会出现。让我再举一个亲身经历的例子：
Every time I see a photograph of my great uncle Emmett, I see my mother’s face in his-in particular, in his dark eyes, expressive eyebrows, and high cheek bones. Others in my family claim that they see mem e in his face-as well as in his intellectual interests and activities. 每次看到曾叔公埃米特的照片，我都能从他脸上——特别是那双深邃的眼睛、富有表现力的眉毛和高颧骨中——看到母亲的影子。家族其他成员则声称能从他面容中看到 mem e 的痕迹，包括他的学术兴趣和日常活动。
It is not entirely accidental that this example involves a family resemblance. In the context of a family, recognizing one person in the aptitudes, features, moods, even the whole life, of another is an ordinary occurrence-indeed, for some families an absorbing pastime. Just as Galton’s celebrated composite family photographs bring out strikingly the facial traits shared in common by diverse family members, so cases of recognizing one relative in the habits or traits of another serve to pick out a commonality often unsuspected by the persons who are being juxtaposed. 这个例子涉及家族相似性并非完全偶然。在家庭环境中，从一个人的才能、特征、情绪乃至整个人生中辨认出另一个人的影子，实属寻常现象——对某些家庭而言，这甚至是令人着迷的消遣。正如高尔顿著名的家族复合照片鲜明地呈现出不同家族成员共有的面部特征，通过某位亲属的习惯或特质来识别另一位亲属的案例，往往能揭示出被并置者自己都未曾察觉的共同点。
But recognizing-in is by no means restricted to such family situations. It arises wherever a significant overlap between any two or more people, places, or things becomes evident to the recognizer. To name just a few such non-familial instances: teachers in pupils; analysts in analysands; owners in their pets; the sense of a certain kind of British countryside in regions of Connecticut; the style of one musician or painter in another musician or painter. Included here is the “influence” of one person on another: witness only certain of Wittgenstein’s immediate disciples, who were said to mimic him (often unconsciously) in clothing, gesture, wording, and even smoking habits! In a more mundane context, the two members of a married couple are frequently said to resemble each other increasingly as the years go by. Just as we recognize Wittgenstein in his disciples, so we recognize one marital partner in another. 然而，"认出其中"绝非仅限于家庭情境。当识别者察觉到任何两个或更多人、地点或事物之间存在显著重叠时，这种现象就会出现。仅举几个非家庭关系的例子：教师在学生身上认出自己；分析师在被分析者身上发现自我；主人在宠物身上看到自己的影子；康涅狄格州某些地区让人联想到英国乡村的特定风貌；一位音乐家或画家的风格在另一位艺术家作品中显现。这里还包括一个人对另一个人产生的"影响"：只需看看维特根斯坦某些亲传弟子就知道了——据说他们（常常是无意识地）模仿他的衣着、手势、措辞甚至吸烟习惯！在更平凡的语境中，人们常说已婚夫妇随着岁月流逝会变得越来越相似。正如我们在维特根斯坦弟子身上认出他本人，我们也能在配偶一方身上辨认出另一方的特质。
Is resemblance a requirement for recognizing-in? Doubtless it facilitates it-as is evident precisely in cases of family resemblance. But there are instances of recognizing-in in which no notable or even perceptible isomorphism is at play. For example, Picasso owned several early paintings by Matisse that were painted at the beginning of the century, before the emergence of a style that art critics and connoisseurs would come to label as recognizably “Matisse” in character. Yet Picasso insisted that he could readily recognize the mature Matisse-even the Matisse of 20 years later-in these juvenilia. Here is a judgment of recognizing-in that is not based on any 相似性是否是"识别于"的必要条件？毫无疑问它确实有助于识别——这在家族相似性的案例中尤为明显。但有些"识别于"的实例中并不存在显著甚至可感知的同构性。例如，毕加索收藏了几幅马蒂斯创作于世纪之初的早期画作，这些作品诞生于艺术评论家和鉴赏家后来认定为具有典型"马蒂斯"风格特征之前的时期。然而毕加索坚称，他能轻易地从这些早期习作中识别出成熟期的马蒂斯——甚至是 20 年后的马蒂斯。这就是一种不基于任何
overt resemblance-indeed, on its very absence, given the considerable evolution in Matisse’s style after these early works. Nor is the example as isolated as it may appear. Art historians often urge us to recognize the imprint of one artist or school of art in another-where before we had perceived only discontinuity and difference. 明显相似性的"识别于"判断——鉴于马蒂斯风格在这些早期作品之后的巨大演变，这种判断恰恰建立在相似性缺失的基础上。这个例子也并非如表面看来那般孤立。艺术史学家经常引导我们从某位艺术家或艺术流派中识别出另一位艺术家或流派的印记——而在此之前我们只察觉到断裂与差异。
Such recognizing-in has a distinctly different basis from resemblance proper, and may be described approximately as follows. In what we now apprehend, xx, we can recognize the presence of at least some of the significant features of yy-not because these latter literally resemble any of the features of x but because they inhabit the apprehended structure of x . They do so by a process of subtle ingression whereby they, or their representatives, have come to take up residence in x . Once they find a place there, they are not so much presented as “appresented” (in Husserl’s useful term). ^(16){ }^{16} To be appresented is not to be presented as such, in distinct self-identity (hence as enabling a judgment of resemblance, which exists between two separately identifiable terms), but to be indirectly presented. The indirection may assume various forms, including suggestion, allusion, expressiveness, and implicit references of many kinds. In the case of a pictorial-visual object, it often arises in a format in which yy, the appresented object (e.g., Matisse’s later work), is indirectly presented by the complex conglomerate structure of x\mathbf{x} (Matisse’s early work). Rather than the discrete features of x\mathbf{x}, it is the global structure of xx, its overall configuration, which allows one to recognize yy in it. Thus, it may not have been any particular features of Matisse’s early paint-ings-their colors, their brushstrokes, their subject-matter-that led Picasso to recognize the later work in them but instead a diffuse tendency which could not be readily analyzed into discrete elements. In Picasso’s perception, the later work resides in the early work-haunts it in advance, as it were-by inhabiting it in this indirect but nonetheless highly effective fashion. We might say that it is present there “by proxy”-the proxy provided precisely by the appresentational structure of the early paintings. This structure, far from being based on actual resemblance, may even be hindered by such resemblance inasmuch as it may induce the viewer to undertake a point-for-point comparison between the resembling terms. Not to be led to do so is to find oneself freer to engage in the more nuanced, more discerning recognizing-in to which Picasso testifies. Such recognizing-in is worth cultivating-not only in the realm of art but in other domains of human experience as well. 这种内在识别与纯粹的相似性有着截然不同的基础，其运作机制可大致描述如下：在我们当下感知的对象 xx 中，我们能辨识出 yy 的某些显著特征——并非因为这些特征与 x 的任何特质存在字面相似，而是因为它们栖居于 x 的感知结构之中。这种栖居通过微妙的渗透过程实现，使得这些特征或其表征得以在 x 中安驻。一旦它们在那里获得一席之地，便不再以"呈现"（presented）的方式存在，而是以"共现"（appresented，借用胡塞尔的有效术语）的形态显现 ^(16){ }^{16} 。共现并非以明确的自我同一性直接呈现（因而无法促成两个独立可识别项之间的相似性判断），而是以间接方式呈现。这种间接性可呈现为多种形式，包括暗示、影射、表现力以及各类隐性指涉。就图像-视觉对象而言，这种共现往往呈现为以下模式： yy （如马蒂斯的晚期作品）通过 x\mathbf{x} （马蒂斯的早期作品）的复杂聚合结构获得间接呈现。 与其说是 x\mathbf{x} 的离散特征，不如说是 xx 的整体结构——它的总体构型——让人能在其中辨认出 yy 。因此，毕加索或许并非通过马蒂斯早期画作中的任何具体特征（它们的色彩、笔触或题材）来辨识后期作品的影子，而是通过一种难以分解为独立元素的弥散性倾向。在毕加索的感知中，后期作品以这种间接却极为有效的方式栖居于早期作品内部——仿佛预先萦绕其间。我们或许可以说，后期作品是通过"代理"存在于早期作品中的，而这一代理恰恰由早期画作的共现结构所提供。这种结构绝非建立在实质相似性之上，甚至可能因相似性而受阻，因为它可能诱使观者在相似元素间进行逐点比对。避免这种倾向，才能更自由地投入毕加索所展现的那种更精微、更具洞察力的"内在辨识"过程。 这种"内化认知"值得培养——不仅在艺术领域，还包括人类经验的其他领域。
Recognizing-as 作为...的认知
Earlier I noted an affinity between much ordinary recognizing and seeingas. But I also warned that not all recognizing can be assimilated to such a strictly perceptual act as seeing-as. This even includes the phenomenon of recognizing-as. In seeing-as, I pick out certain features in a perceived object: 前文我曾指出普通认知与"视作..."之间存在亲缘性。但也强调并非所有认知都能等同于"视作..."这类严格知觉行为。这甚至包括"作为...的认知"现象本身。在"视作..."时，我从感知对象中提取某些特征：
I see this object as green and bulbous and heavy. These features are simultaneously present to me, and the perceptual task is typically to perceive as many as possible at a given moment. In recognizing-as, not only is there no restriction to perceived objects, but the features I recognize need not be simultaneously present. The shadow of the past makes itself felt in the form of a discrepancy between present and non-present constituents: a discrepancy notably absent in the situation of seeing-as. How this is so will become manifest as we consider the three main subtypes of recognizing-as. 我将此物视作绿色、球茎状且沉重。这些特征同时呈现于我，知觉任务通常是在特定时刻尽可能多地感知特征。而在"作为...的认知"中，不仅不受限于感知对象，所识别的特征也无需同时呈现。过去的阴影通过当下与非当下要素之间的差异显现——这种差异在"视作..."情境中明显不存在。当我们考察"作为...的认知"的三种主要子类型时，这一机制将变得清晰。
RECOGNIZING XX AS YY 识别 XX 为 YY
This occurs whenever something of indistinct, or even mistaken, identity comes to be recognized as other than it first presented itself as being; not just as having other features but as being another person or object altogether. This was what happened to me in the South Bend airport: there was a movement from the perception of an ambiguous xx (i.e., an as-not-yet identified person) through a transitional phase of quasi-recognition (i.e., of xx as possibly Tom) to the decisive insight that this xx was actually yy (i.e., Charles). A discrepancy between present and nonpresent arose in the very gradualness with which my process of recognition unfolded. Even though this process culminated rapidly with the certain identification of the figure as Charles, the moment of authentic recognition of xx as yy was preceded by a stage of coming to recognize that x was indeed y . This stage of coming-torecognize was nonpresent, already elapsed, in relation to the actual moment of recognizing-as. 当某个身份模糊甚至被误认的事物最终被确认为与其最初呈现的样子不同时，这种情况就会发生；不仅是具有其他特征，而是完全成为另一个人或物体。这就是我在南本德机场的经历：从感知一个模糊的 xx （即尚未确认身份的人），经过准识别阶段（即可能将 xx 认作汤姆），到最终明确意识到这个 xx 实际上是 yy （即查尔斯）。当前与非当前之间的差异，正是随着我识别过程的逐步展开而显现的。尽管这一过程以确定该身影为查尔斯而迅速完成，但在真正将 xx 识别为 yy 的那一刻之前，还存在一个逐渐确认 x 确实是 y 的阶段。这个"逐渐识别"的阶段相对于"识别为"的实际时刻而言，已成为非当前的、已经逝去的存在。
RECOGNIZING XX AS HAVING HAPPENED BEFORE 识别 XX 为曾经发生过
The nonpresent may figure into recognizing-as in a quite different manner: as its very content. For one way of recognizing something is to recognize, not its identity or special characteristics, but the sheer fact that it has arisen before in one’s experience. This “before” can be quite indeterminate; no exact dating or even recalling of the specific occasion of occurrence needs to be effected, tempted as we may be to do such things. All that is required is the conviction that the object or event presently encountered has entered one’s experience at some prior point, whatever its precise determination may be. ^(17){ }^{17} 非当前之物可能以一种截然不同的方式参与"识别为"的过程：作为其核心内容。因为识别某物的方式之一，并非确认其身份或独特特征，而是意识到它曾在自己经验中出现过这一纯粹事实。这个"曾经"可以相当模糊；我们虽可能试图追溯具体发生时间或情境，但实则无需精确界定日期甚至回忆具体场景。唯一需要的是确信当下遭遇的对象或事件曾在某个不确定的先前时刻进入过自己的经验场域。
Another example will help to bring this out. Upon entering a certain Midwestern bus station after an absence of many years, I have the immediate sense that all this has happened before: that I entered the same station in just the same way (i.e., by debarking from an incoming bus) and looked about in much the same manner, half-expectant that I would see someone familiar (my father); and that I found the same rather desolate arrangement of chairs, lockers, and a ticket counter. More than mere familiarity is involved in such an experience, since I can sometimes find a scene familiar even when nothing is being re-enacted in it. Beyond just being back in a familiar bus station, a place which I can grasp as such in an 另一个例子将有助于阐明这一点。时隔多年再次踏入中西部某个汽车站时，我立刻产生一种似曾相识的感觉：仿佛自己曾以完全相同的方式（即从到站巴士下车）进入过这个车站，并以极为相似的姿态环顾四周，隐隐期待着能遇见某个熟悉的身影（我父亲）；当时映入眼帘的同样是那些排列孤寂的座椅、储物柜和售票柜台。这种体验超越单纯的熟悉感，因为有时即使场景中没有任何重演的情节，我仍会感到熟悉。此刻的我不仅回到了一个熟悉的汽车站——这个我能通过简单识别就确认的场所，更将其识别为
act of simple recognition, I now recognize it as the scene of former action on my part, of an earlier enactment ^(18){ }^{18} which I take to be re-enacted as I re-enter the same setting. What I recognize is thus my current action of entering the bus station as having happened before. 自己过去行为的场景，一个我认为随着自己重返旧地正在重演的早期行为 ^(18){ }^{18} 的舞台。我所识别的，正是当下进入汽车站这个动作本身具有的"曾经发生过"的特质。
RECOGNIZING XX AS A FACT 将 XX 识别为事实
Here we move from acts of sheer acknowledgement to acts in which we claim truth. To recognize something as a fact is not merely to have the conviction that one is acquainted with its identity or earlier history but to claim to know that the item in question has the identity one takes it to have, or did indeed occur as one suspects it did. The usual idiomatic expression of this truth-claim is the simple assertion “I recognize the fact that . . .” (When one says “I recognize that times have changed,” one is acknowledging change only because one has observed that change has in fact taken place: the acknowledgment proceeds from the more fundamental act of recog-nizing-x-as-a-fact.) 我们在此从纯粹的确认行为转向主张真理的行为。将某事物认定为事实，不仅意味着确信自己了解其身份或过往历史，更在于宣称知晓该事物确实具有我们所认定的身份，或确实如我们所推测的那样发生过。表达这种真理主张的惯常用法，就是简单断言"我承认……这一事实"（当人们说"我承认时代已经改变"时，其确认变化的前提是已观察到变化确实发生：这种确认行为源于更基础的"将 x 认定为事实"的认知行为）。
One of the most striking characteristics of recognizing-x-as-a-fact lies in its considerable range of application. It extends from cases of quite general recognition-“I recognize [the fact] that he is getting older now,” where x equals “getting older” and remains largely unspecified as to just how or at what rate he is getting older-to very concrete instances: “I recognize [the fact] that she is 38 years old now,” where x equals “being 38 years old” and is precisely specified, at least in terms of chronology. What is common to all such cases and holds them together as a class is the act of recognizing that a certain state of affairs truly obtains. This act itself need not involve any dramatic sense of confirmation or discovery. Indeed, it can happen in a quite resigned state of mind, as if to say: “I cannot help but aver that xx is a fact” since II know that xx is a fact. Such resignation is not surprising in matters of truth, of which we need only be the witness in any given situation. 承认某事实最显著的特征之一在于其广泛的应用范围。它既涵盖相当笼统的认知情形——"我承认[这个事实]他现在年纪渐长"，此时 x 等于"年纪渐长"且对于具体如何变老或以何种速度变老基本未作说明；也包含非常具体的实例："我承认[这个事实]她现在 38 岁了"，此时 x 等于"38 岁"且至少在时间维度上被精确界定。所有这些案例的共同点，并将它们归为同一类别的关键，在于承认某种事态确实存在的行为。这种行为本身并不需要包含任何强烈的确认感或发现感。事实上，它可以发生在一种相当认命的心态中，仿佛在说："我不得不断言 xx 是事实"，因为 II 知道 xx 是事实。在涉及真相的问题上，这种认命态度并不令人惊讶——在特定情境中，我们只需充当真相的见证者。
We are witnesses of recognized facts as settled states of affairs, that is, as already being the case. Once more the discrepancy between the present and the nonpresent asserts itself. Not only is a fact already a fact when we recognize it, but this very attestation depends on the fact’s precedence of our present judgment. Thanks to its precedence, it can present itself as a fact to be recognized as such-as something there to be witnessed. As in other sorts of recognizing-as, such links to the past, however tacit they may be on a particular occasion, bestow on recognizing-as a peculiar temporal depth that contrasts both with the shallowness of presentness and the indistinctness of suffusion. 我们是被认可事实的见证者，这些事实作为既定事态存在——即已然如此。当下与非当下之间的差异再次凸显。不仅事实在被我们认可时已然是事实，而且这种认证本身依赖于事实先于我们当下判断的优先性。正是这种优先性，使得事实能够作为可被认可的存在呈现——作为有待见证的在场之物。与其他类型的"认可为"一样，这种与过去的联系（无论特定场合下多么隐晦）赋予了"认可为"一种独特的时间深度，既区别于当下性的浅薄，也不同于弥漫状态的模糊不清。
Recognizing the General 对普遍性的认知
A common experience is that of seeing familiar figures or shapes in the world about us: the “man in the moon,” a camel or other animal in a cloud, a figure in a crack in a wall, a leering face in the very midst of an abstract 一种常见体验是：我们在周遭世界中辨认出熟悉的形象或形状——"月亮上的人影"、云朵中的骆驼或其他动物、墙缝中的人形、抽象图案中央露出的狞笑面孔。
expressionist painting. These are cases of genuinely recognizing the objects or shapes in question and not of simply perceiving them; or more exactly, we are recognizing them as having these shapes or as appearing in the form of such objects. The “as” in these verbal formulations is neither the “as” of seeing-as-we are not seeing the cloud as a (real) camel or the moon as an (actual) man-nor the “as” of as-if, i.e., of an act of mere make-believe in which we would be merely pretending to recognize the object or shape. ^(19){ }^{19} Nor is it even the “as” of recognizing-as, since it is not a question of recognizing any object, event, or fact that has temporal depth as an intrinsic dimension. Instead, we have to do with an autonomous activity which is that of recognizing something general in its very generality. Rather than recognizing what is strictly singular-e.g., a given person or place in its very noncomparability with other persons and places-we recognize a general shape or form of objecthood such as ‘camel’, ‘man’, ‘leering face’ that can be exhibited elsewhere in a quite comparable form. By “general,” I mean such as to be shareable or transportable between experiences: as happens each time we see “the man in the moon” anew. It would be absurd to claim that we are recognizing the same man, much less a given particular man; but it is not at all absurd to say that on each such occasion we are recognizing the same, or a similar, shape and that this shape evokes the designation “the man in the moon.” 表现主义绘画。这些情形中，我们真正识别出了相关对象或形状，而非仅仅感知它们；更准确地说，我们是将它们识别为具有这些形状或以此类对象的形式呈现。这些表述中的"作为"既非"看作"之"作为"——我们并非将云朵看作（真实的）骆驼或将月亮看作（实际的）人——也非"仿佛"之"作为"，即那种纯属假装的认知行为，其中我们只是佯装识别对象或形状。它甚至也不是"识别为"之"作为"，因为这并非要识别任何具有时间深度作为内在维度的对象、事件或事实。相反，我们面对的是一种自主活动，即在普遍性中识别某种普遍之物。不同于识别严格单一的事物（例如某个因其与他人或地点不可比性而独特的人或地点），我们识别的是诸如"骆驼"、"人"、"狞笑面孔"这类能在其他处以相当可比形式展现的普遍形状或对象性形式。 所谓"普遍性"，我指的是能够在不同经验间共享或传递的特性：就像每次我们重新看到"月亮上的人影"时那样。若声称我们认出了同一个人（更遑论某个特定个体）是荒谬的；但说每次我们都辨认出相同或相似的轮廓，且这个轮廓引发了"月亮上的人影"的指称，则完全合理。
Recognition need not therefore be of particulars in their uniqueness (even though just this uniqueness is critical in the recognition of persons) but can be of generals as well, whether these generals occur as perceived shapes, states of affairs, patterns of thought, artistic styles, or in still other forms. Because it can grasp generals in this way, recognizing ranges over the gamut of human experience. Nothing belonging to that experience is foreign to it, since everything in this experience is subject to some degree of generalization. 因此，识别不必针对独特的具体事物（尽管这种独特性在人物识别中至关重要），也可以针对普遍性——无论这些普遍性表现为感知到的形状、事态、思维模式、艺术风格，还是其他形式。正因能如此把握普遍性，识别能力覆盖了人类经验的全部光谱。人类经验中的一切都不与之疏离，因为所有经验内容都具备某种程度的可概括性。
Self-Recognition 自我识别
Despite the widespread generality of recognita, many present themselves as stubbornly particular. This is above all true of myself as recognized by myself. Such self-recognition is perhaps the most spontaneous, the least rehearsed, form of recognition. We enact it so frequently and so unthinkingly that it hardly seems a form of recognition at all. The fact that we do not notice ourselves recognizing ourselves is linked to the absence of anything comparable to a flash of recognition: “Ahal that’s me!” is a very rare utterance. Nor is there normally anything like a dim or dawning recognition for which the flash would represent a resolution. For we do not misrecognize ourselves except in unusual circumstances-e.g., when one notices an apparent stranger at a distance in a mirror and then realizes with a start that the figure is in fact oneself. 尽管识别行为普遍存在，许多却呈现出顽固的特殊性。这一点尤其适用于自我对自我的认知。这种自我认知或许是最自发、最未经演练的识别形式。我们如此频繁且不假思索地践行它，以至于它几乎不像是某种识别行为。我们未曾察觉自我识别的事实，与缺乏类似"灵光一现"的体验相关："啊哈！那是我！"是极为罕见的表达。通常也不存在某种模糊或渐进的认知过程——那种需要"灵光一现"来最终确认的体验。因为我们很少会误认自己，除非在特殊情境下——例如当人们从镜中远处注意到一个看似陌生的人影，而后猛然意识到那其实就是自己时。
Recognizing oneself in a mirror is no merely contingent example. It is integral to the very process of self-recognition. Jacques Lacan even argues that the formation of one’s first sense of self-identity depends upon seeing oneself in a mirror early in life. According to this “mirror stage” theory, the child of eighteen to twenty-four months sees itself in a mirror and suddenly has the insight, thanks to the coordination of actual bodily movements and mirrored movements, that the onlooker and the looked-at are one and the same entity. Self-recognition is born at this moment-albeit in an idealized form. ^(20){ }^{20} By the time adulthood is reached, the self-as-mirrored has been so thoroughly interwoven into self-recognition that it has become a deeply immanent ingredient of one’s ongoing sense of self. At this later age, selfrecognition is at once highly diversified (since we recognize ourselves in innumerable ways, in habits and forms of thinking, in feelings and tendencies, and not only in visual images of our body) and radically internalized: it is no longer dependent on externally perceived cues but has become intrinsic to our entire personal being. 在镜中认出自己绝非偶然事例，而是自我认知过程中不可或缺的环节。雅克·拉康甚至主张，人类最初自我认同感的形成，正依赖于幼年时期在镜中看见自己的经历。根据这个"镜像阶段"理论，18 至 24 个月大的幼儿通过观察镜中影像，在真实身体动作与镜像动作的协调作用下，会突然领悟到观看者与被观看者实为同一实体。自我认知便诞生于这一刻——尽管是以理想化的形式存在。 ^(20){ }^{20} 待到成年时期，镜像自我已完全融入认知体系，成为持续自我感知中根深蒂固的内在组成部分。此时的自我认知既呈现高度多元化（我们通过无数方式认识自己：行为习惯与思维模式、情感倾向与心理特质，而不仅限于身体的视觉形象），又实现了彻底的内化：它不再依赖外部感知线索，而成为整个人格存在的本质属性。
In short, self-recognition proves to be crucial to self-identity. Were I not able to recognize myself in such diverse and internalized ways, I would lack an essential dimension of my very sense of self. Having a personal identity requires the ability to recognize myself as continually selfsame in whatever I do. We might even say that, paradoxically, self-recognizing by and large vanishes from the scene of manifest recognition so as to assume a suppressed position in the subterranean scene of self-identity. By no longer (or only rarely) being an issue in the daytime world of ordinary, overt recognizings, it has become free for covert operations of enormous scope-a scope which is co-extensive with that of the very self it helps to constitute. ^(21){ }^{21} 简言之，自我识别对自我认同至关重要。若我无法以如此多样化且内化的方式识别自我，我将丧失自我感知的核心维度。拥有个人身份认同，需要具备在一切行为中持续确认自我同一性的能力。甚至可以说吊诡的是，自我识别往往从显性识别场景中隐退，转而潜藏于自我认同的幽暗基底。当它不再（或极少）成为日常显性识别世界中的议题时，便得以在广阔无垠的隐秘领域自由运作——这个领域的边界，恰与它参与构建的自我本身同样辽阔。 ^(21){ }^{21}
IV 第四章
Four final observations are here in order. 最后需要提出四点观察结论。
(1) The description of types of recognizing could continue almost indefinitely. In the end it is difficult to tell what is not recognitory in human experience. Since recognizing of some sort can take place in virtually every context and with regard to any kind of object (including oneself), its typological variety is considerable. Indeed, the variety is such as to induce an almost literal con-fusion of recognition with other human experiences. For recognizing readily conjoins with practically any other activity, e.g., imagining and perceiving, thinking and feeling. In this respect, it is Hermetic in character, a creature of the borderlines. ^(22){ }^{22} The fate of recognizing is often to find itself precisely at the borderline: to be between other, more easily discernible phenomena. (1) 对识别类型的描述几乎可以无限延续。最终我们很难界定人类经验中哪些不属于识别范畴。由于某种形式的识别几乎能在任何情境中发生，且针对任何对象（包括自我本身），其类型学多样性相当可观。这种多样性甚至会导致识别与其他人类经验几乎字面意义上的混融——识别能轻易地与几乎所有其他活动结合，例如想象与感知、思考与感受。就此而言，识别具有赫尔墨斯式的特性，是边界地带的造物。识别的命运往往就是发现自己恰恰处于边界：游弋于其他更易辨别的现象之间。
The borderline standing of recognizing brings with it both an advantage and a risk. The advantage is that of enabling disparate experiences to become more continuous with each other. Recognizability bestows on these experiences the cement of the familiar. Even if recognizing cannot be reduced to merely cognizing what is familiar, ^(23){ }^{23} the general effect of recognition is to enhance the familiarization of the circumambient world: to make us feel more completely at home in it. The corresponding risk is that in its very domesticating-cum-mediating role recognizing may lose any distinct status of its own. This risk has been apparent throughout the present chapter. Even in my initial example of recognizing Charles, I was discussing a situation in which recognizing is difficult to distinguish from ordinary perception. Would we not say that I came to perceive Charles, having at first misperceived him as Tom? Indeed. And yet we would also rightly say that I came to recognize Charles, having first quasi-recognized him as Tom. The situation was at once perceptual and recognitory: both, though neither in isolation from the other. The same ambivalent logic-of being somehow both A and B and yet neither simply A nor simply B-can be detected when we think of recognizing in relation to imagining, thinking, feeling, and still other basic human activities. 辨认的边缘地位既带来优势也蕴含风险。其优势在于能使迥异的经验彼此间更具连续性。可辨认性为这些经验赋予了熟悉感的黏合剂。即便辨认不能简单等同于对熟悉事物的认知，但辨认的总体效果是增强周遭世界的熟悉化程度：让我们在其中感到更自在。相应的风险在于，辨认在其驯化与中介的双重作用中，可能丧失自身的独特地位。这一风险在本章中已显露无遗。即便在我最初辨认查尔斯的例子里，所讨论的情境中辨认与普通感知难以区分。难道我们不会说，我最终感知到了查尔斯，而最初却将他误认为汤姆吗？确实如此。但我们同样可以恰当地说，我最终辨认出了查尔斯，而最初是将其准辨认成了汤姆。这一情境同时具有感知性与辨认性：二者共存，却又彼此交融。 这种既属于 A 又属于 B、却又不单纯是 A 或 B 的矛盾逻辑，同样存在于我们对"识别"与想象、思考、感受以及其他基本人类活动之间关系的思考中。
So polymorphic is recognizing that it even attaches itself to other, nonrecognitory forms of remembering itself. On the one hand, I can recognize myself recollecting or reminiscing, remembering-how, or remembering-on-the-occasion-of. In such cases I recognize myself in the act of remembering. On the other hand, I can also recognize what I recollect (i.e., its specific content) as well as what I reminisce about, remember how to do, or recall on a certain occasion. I recognize in and by remembering-just as I remember in and by recognizing itself. 识别的形态如此多变，以至于它甚至能附着于记忆本身的其他非识别性形式上。一方面，我能在回忆、追忆、程序性记忆或情境记忆的过程中识别出正在记忆的自己；另一方面，我也能识别出我所回忆的具体内容、追忆的对象、记住的操作方法或在特定场合唤起的记忆。我在记忆过程中并通过记忆进行识别——正如我通过识别行为本身并在识别过程中进行记忆。
(2) It is a fact worth pondering that the only comparably polymorphic memorial activity is that of recollecting. Recollecting, too, has numerous types and subtypes, and their description led me to adverbial and prepositional designations as convoluted as those I have devised to fit recognizing. In their shared polyvalence of realization and expression, recognizing and recollecting are brothers under the flesh. Perhaps this helps to explain why these two forms of memory have been subjected to such intensive comparative scrutiny in experimental psychology: as if detecting their “objective” differences might stave off any threat of confusion with one another. In addition to these efforts-whose results are far from unified ^(24){ }^{24}-Piaget has attempted to argue that recognition and “evocative memory” (i.e., ordinary recollection) represent respectively the first and the last stages in the development of human memory. ^(25){ }^{25} (2) 值得深思的是，唯有回忆活动能与辨认活动在形态多样性上相提并论。回忆同样具有众多类型与子类型，对其描述使我不得不使用与描述辨认时同样繁复的副词性和介词性表述。在实现方式与表达形式的多重可能性上，辨认与回忆堪称血肉相连的兄弟。这或许能解释为何实验心理学对这两种记忆形式进行了如此密集的比较研究——仿佛找出它们之间的"客观"差异就能避免彼此混淆的威胁。除了这些远未达成统一结论的研究努力外，皮亚杰还试图论证：辨认与"唤起性记忆"（即普通回忆）分别代表了人类记忆发展过程中的最初与最终阶段。
Piaget also offers a working definition of the difference between recognition and recollection: “by ‘memory in the strict sense’, we shall refer to reactions associated with recognition (in the presence of the object) and 皮亚杰还对辨认与回忆的差异提出了一个实用定义："所谓'严格意义上的记忆'，我们指的是与辨认（在对象在场时）相关的反应"
recall (in the absence of the object).” ^(26){ }^{26} However pithy and practicable Piaget’s formulation may be, it overlooks critical cases in which the “presence of the object” is not explicitly or fully operative and yet full recognition nevertheless occurs. This happens precisely in certain combinations of recognition and recollection: 回忆（在对象缺席的情况下）。” ^(26){ }^{26} 尽管皮亚杰的表述简洁实用，但它忽略了某些关键情形——在这些情形中，“对象的在场”并未明确或完全发挥作用，但完整的再认仍然发生了。这恰恰发生在再认与回忆的某些组合中：
(a) Recognizing in recollecting. We would not consider ourselves to be genuinely recollecting at all unless we were able to recognize, to some significant degree, that which we are in the process of recollecting. Such recognizing not only bears on the act and content of recollecting, but may include a distinct sense that we have undertaken a comparable action of recollecting before. Moreover, we can recognize that we have recognized such an action. The interaction between recognizing and recollecting is such as to allow for continual reiteration. (a) 在回忆中再认。除非我们能在相当程度上识别出正在回忆的内容，否则我们根本不会认为自己是在真正地回忆。这种再认不仅涉及回忆的行为和内容，还可能包含一种明确的感受：我们之前曾进行过类似的回忆行为。此外，我们还能识别出自己曾对这种行为进行过再认。再认与回忆之间的相互作用使得这种循环往复成为可能。
(b) Recognizing by recollecting. A quite different avatar is that in which recognizing takes place by recollecting-by its aid or means. Rather than appearing in the very midst of recollection, recognizing here calls on the latter for the special help it can offer. This arises, for example, in situations of dim or dawning recognition when the presently proffered material (even if it is given in perception) is either highly ambiguous or simply insufficient. Recourse to the “absences” of recollection is then a way of elucidating or expanding such “present” material. I ask myself, “Where have I seen this object before?” “What part of the past does it stem from?” To recapture in recollection the same object in an earlier appearance helps to establish this object as genuinely recognized in the present. （b）通过回忆来识别。一种截然不同的表现形态是，识别通过回忆——借助或利用回忆——而发生。与在回忆过程中直接显现不同，这里的识别需要调用回忆所能提供的特殊帮助。这种情况常出现在模糊或初现的识别情境中，当当前呈现的材料（即使是通过感知给予的）高度模棱两可或根本不足时。诉诸回忆中的"缺席"就成为阐明或扩展此类"在场"材料的方式。我自问："我以前在哪里见过这个物体？""它源于过去的哪个部分？"在回忆中重新捕捉该物体早先的样貌，有助于确认当下对该物体的识别是真实有效的。
Given such possibilities of interchange, it is not altogether surprising to realize that recollecting and recognizing have in 'effect framed this book’s analysis thus far. What was inaugurated in Part One with recollection has now culminated in Part Two with recognition. Moreover, each form of remembering represents a borderline: in the former case, a borderline for conventionally conceived “remembering in the old manner,” ^(27){ }^{27} i.e., as a mentalistic activity; in the latter case, a borderline for less frequently acknowledged or researched mnemonic modes. As recollecting takes us decisively into the mental domain-being the very paradigm of “reproduction in the psychical field” ^(28){ }^{28}-so recognizing places us no less decisively on the margins of the same domain, a borderline that is contiguous with reminding and reminiscing, both of which exceed recapture in recollective terms alone. 鉴于这种相互转换的可能性，我们不难意识到回忆与辨认实际上构成了本书迄今为止的分析框架。第一部分以回忆开篇，如今在第二部分以辨认收尾。更重要的是，每种记忆形式都代表着一个边界：前者是传统观念中"旧式记忆"的边界，即作为一种心智活动；后者则是较少被承认或研究的记忆模式的边界。正如回忆将我们明确带入心理领域——堪称"心理场域中的再现"的典范——辨认则同样明确地将我们置于该领域的边缘，这个边界与提醒和追忆相邻，而这两种记忆形式都无法仅用回忆的术语来完全捕捉。
(3) It is becoming evident that recognition enjoys in many respects a distinctly intermediary position in matters of memory. As we have just seen, not only does it stand between various basic human experiences; it also insinuates itself between particular recollections. At the same time, it mediates between reminding and reminiscing, each of which regularly relies on （3）越来越明显的是，在记忆事务中，识别在许多方面占据着独特的中介位置。正如我们刚刚所见，它不仅处于各种基本人类经验之间；还悄然介入特定回忆之间。与此同时，它在提醒与追忆之间起着调解作用——这两者都常规性地依赖
recognizing for its own accomplishment. Both the reminder and the remindand must be recognized by us as aspects of an already constituted situation of reminding; and in reminiscing I count on myself and my co-reminiscers or listeners to be able to recognize what I am reminiscing about: to identify its subject matter as shared among us. 识别来完成各自的过程。提醒者与被提醒内容都必须被我们确认为已构成的提醒情境的组成部分；而在追忆时，我指望自己和共同追忆者或听众能够识别我所追忆的内容：将其主题确认为我们共同拥有的记忆。
Still more importantly, recognizing is actively inter-mediating by virtue of thrusting us into the presence of a nexus of recognita. This nexus is even vaster than the domains of reminders and of reminiscentia to which I have pointed in the previous two chapters. For it includes all manner of objects, not excluding reminders and reminiscentia themselves. Indeed, it even includes the world of Platonic Forms, which we must recognize if we are truly to know them. If Plato does not speak expressly of “recognizing,” this is only because recognition is so deeply presupposed in his thinking. What else does the dialectician do but recognize Forms in particulars? Plato’s general preoccupation with the realm of metaxu (“intermediaries”) and with the issue of methexis (“participation”) finds in recognition an invaluable if not explicitly acknowledged ally. 更重要的是，识别通过将我们推入认知对象的关系网络中而发挥着积极的媒介作用。这一关系网络甚至比我前两章所指出的提示物与回忆物领域更为广阔。因为它囊括了各类对象，其中也包括提示物与回忆物本身。事实上，它甚至包含了柏拉图式的理型世界——我们必须先识别这些理型，才能真正认识它们。虽然柏拉图并未明确提及"识别"概念，但这仅仅因为识别在其思想中已被深刻预设。辩证者所做之事，不正是从具体事物中识别出理型吗？柏拉图对"中介"（metaxu）领域及"分有"（methexis）问题的普遍关注，在识别过程中找到了虽未被明确承认却无比珍贵的盟友。
(4) Recognizing is intermediary in still another way as well: a way that helps to account for its literally intermediate location in this book. In recognizing, I find myself midway between my mind and my world. As a recognizer, I am rarely confined to mind alone: even in intra-psychic recognizing I discover pathways into the surrounding world by way of the content recognized or through the historicity of previous enactments. But, by the same token, I am not trapped within the circumambient world when I recognize; I retain access at all times to what Whitehead would call the “mental pole,” ^(29){ }^{29} thanks to the freedom with which I can shift attention and refocus in the process of recognizing. （4）识别还具有另一种中介性：这种特性有助于解释其在本书中字面意义上的中间位置。在识别过程中，我发现自己处于心灵与世界的中途。作为识别者，我很少仅囿于心灵：即便在心灵内部的识别中，我也能通过被识别的内容或过往行为的历史性，发现通往周遭世界的路径。但同样地，当我进行识别时，我并未被困于环绕的世界中；得益于识别过程中转移注意力和重新聚焦的自由，我始终保持着怀特海所谓"精神极"的通道。
As a result, recognizing engages us in a basic two-fold action. On the one hand, it plunges us willy-nilly into the unyielding perceived world regarded as a source of what Piaget calls “perceptual indices.” ^(30){ }^{30} What could be more obdurate, more determinately given than such indices taken as recognitory cues? On the other hand, recognizing draws us back into the interiority of our minds, where its complicated liaisons with recollecting reveal it to be capable of subtle psychical involutions. Its undeniably public face-its manifest and above-board character when it is allied with perception-is counterposed with its equally incontestable (albeit less manifest) private side when it is tied to recollection. The tension between these two directions or dimensions of recognizing is at once more dramatic and more consequential than the corresponding tension between external and psychical reminders, or that between co-reminiscing and auto-reminiscing. All three kinds of remembering exhibit both poles, mental as well as physical-indeed, just this homology helps to constitute them as a coherent group of “mnemonic modes”-but in recognizing the disparity between the two poles is most fully highlighted. 因此，识别行为将我们卷入一种根本的双重行动。一方面，它不由分说地将我们抛入被视为"知觉指标"（皮亚杰语）来源的顽固感知世界。还有什么比这些作为识别线索的指标更顽固、更确定地被给予呢？另一方面，识别又将我们拉回心灵的内部领域，在那里它与回忆的复杂联系显示出其精微的心理内卷能力。当识别与知觉结盟时，它那无可否认的公共面孔——其显明而坦率的特征——与其同样不容置疑（尽管较不显明）的私人面向形成对照，后者在联系回忆时显现。识别行为这两个方向或维度之间的张力，远比外部提示与心理提示之间的对应张力，或共同回忆与自我回忆之间的张力更为戏剧性且更具深远影响。 这三种记忆形式都展现出心理与身体的双重维度——正是这种同源关系使它们构成了一个连贯的"记忆模式"群体——但两者间的差异性在认知过程中体现得最为鲜明。
CODA 终章
There remain other, more deep-going differences between reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing. In part, these differences inhere in the peculiar medium of each mode. While reminding arises from the operation of various kinds of signs that constitute a specifically semiological medium, reminiscences favor words, that is, a distinctively verbal format: which is not to deny a significant overlap between the two media. Recognita, in contrast, occur in a (prototypically) perceptual context or else in an intrapsychic sphere, neither of which is strictly semiological or linguistic in status. Further, the three modes differ noticeably in their characteristic forms of temporality. We have seen that reminders send us either backward or forward in time-or both at once-while in reminiscing we are cast back into the past by virtue of reliving it. In recognizing, on the other hand, I am imbued with an irrescusable presentness and linked to the past only through its shadow in the present. Everywhere, then, differences abound among the mnemonic modes. 提醒、回忆与辨认之间还存在其他更为深刻的差异。这些差异部分源于每种模式特有的媒介：提醒产生于各类符号构成的特定符号学媒介运作，回忆则偏爱词语这一独特的语言形式——尽管二者存在显著重叠。相比之下，辨认发生于（典型）感知情境或内在心理领域，两者本质上都不属于严格意义上的符号或语言范畴。此外，三种模式在时间性特征上也存在明显区别。我们看到提醒将我们引向过去或未来——或同时指向两者，而回忆则通过重新体验将我们抛回往昔。辨认则不同，它让我沉浸在无可辩驳的当下，仅通过过去在当下的投影与之相连。由此可见，记忆模式间的差异无处不在。
But they abound only in the face of the basic fact that all three modes operate by intermediation between mind and world. Each in its own distinctive way is a mediatrix between mental and physical poles, an effective go-between connecting mind with body and body with world (including the world of others). If their connective capacities are not as powerful as the kinds of remembering to be explored in the next Part, the modes are nonetheless first forms of memory writ large and as such merit our closest attention. Together, they compose a dense, massive, and yet nuanced “instrumental complex” ^(1){ }^{1} which mediates between my present self and everything that is not an immediate component of this self. Between themselves, and precisely as beings-of-the-between, reminders, reminiscences, and recognitions co-constitute our proximate environment-the domain of our commitments and tasks, of our musings upon our diverse pasts, and of all that has recognitory value. The mnemonic modes build up an interworld of things to be done, of communication to be shared, of recognition to be accomplished. In exercising these modes of memory, we are already beyond the confinement of mind considered as the exclusive receptacle of remembering. At the same time we are on the way to still more radical ways of remembering in and through the world. 但它们之所以丰富，恰恰基于一个基本事实：这三种模式都通过心灵与世界的中介作用运作。每一种模式都以独特的方式充当着精神与物质两极之间的媒介，成为连接心灵与身体、身体与世界（包括他人的世界）的有效桥梁。尽管它们的联结能力不及下一部分将探讨的记忆类型那般强大，但这些模式仍是广义记忆的初始形态，值得我们密切关注。三者共同构成了一个密集、厚重却又细腻的"工具复合体"，在当下的自我与一切非直接构成自我的事物之间进行调停。作为居间存在者，提醒物、追忆与辨认相互交织，共同构建了我们最切近的环境——这个领域承载着我们的承诺与任务，容纳着我们对多元过往的沉思，也包含着一切具有辨认价值的事物。这些记忆模式构筑起一个中介世界，其中有待完成的事项、待分享的交流、待实现的认同交织并存。 在实践这些记忆模式时，我们已然超越了将心灵视为记忆唯一容器的局限。与此同时，我们正通往更根本的记忆之道——在世界之中并通过世界来记忆。
This page intentionally left blank 此页留白
Part Three 第三部分
Pursuing Memory beyond Mind 超越心灵的记忆追寻
PROLOGUE 序言
In this closet of Memory the Soul treasures up the Ideas of things, making use of a clear and subtil Spirit. . . . 在这记忆的密室中，灵魂珍藏着万物的理念，运用着一种清澈而精微的灵气......-Marius D'Affigny, The Art of Memory: A Treatise Useful for All, Especially Such as Are to Speak in Publick (London: Darby, 1706) ——马里乌斯·达菲尼，《记忆之术：普世实用论著，尤适于公开演说者》（伦敦：达比出版社，1706 年）
We have been witnessing the emergence of memory from within the encasement of mentalism. In viewing it as writ large in recognizing, reminding, and reminiscing, we have observed its indispensable, overt position in the world of perception, signs, and communal discourse. From containment and privacy within the mind of the individual rememberer, we have seen it take up a much more public stance-a stance on the borderline of self and other. Or more exactly, we have realized that it has always already occupied this very stance. If it has been thought to be anywhere else-in the mind in particular-this has been the result of presuming that the paradigm for all remembering is recollecting. Construed as the summoning up of past experiences in visualized scenes, recollection has been conceived as occurring exclusively within the closely containing canopy of mind. In the interest of simplification and in the context of a pervasive mentalism, other forms of remembering have been systematically neglected. The actuality of memory, however, comprises all such forms. 我们见证了记忆从心灵主义的桎梏中破茧而出。通过将其视为认知、提醒与追忆的宏观体现，我们观察到它在感知世界、符号系统及公共话语中不可或缺的显要地位。从个体记忆者心智中的封闭私密状态，我们看到它逐渐采取了一种更为公开的姿态——一种游走于自我与他者边界上的姿态。更准确地说，我们意识到它始终占据着这一独特位置。若有人认为记忆存在于其他场所——尤其是心智内部——那不过是由于将回忆假定为所有记忆形式的范式所致。回忆被理解为通过可视化场景召唤过往经验，这种构想使其被限定于严密封闭的心智穹顶之下。出于简化目的且在泛心灵主义的语境中，其他记忆形式遭到了系统性忽视。然而记忆的真实样态，本就涵盖所有这些形式。
We have taken important steps toward acknowledging this actuality by ascertaining reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing to be intermediate in status. Each of these mnemonic modes is situated midway between mind and the environing world. While each serves as a forceful ingression into this world, each remains tied to a mental pole, whether in the guise of psychical reminders, auto-reminiscences, or the inward recognition of one’s own mental acts. But just here we are led to ask: are there forms of remembering that do not retain even such tenuous ties as these to a mental pole? Are there ways of remembering that manifest an abiding and uncompromising implacement in the world? That there are such ways will be shown in this new Part, where we shall pursue memory beyond mind by recovering its roots in the world itself. 我们已通过确认提醒、追忆和识别作为中间状态，朝着承认这一现实迈出了重要步伐。这些记忆模式都处于心灵与周遭世界的中间地带。虽然每种模式都是进入这个世界的强力入口，但它们仍与心理极相连——无论是表现为心理提醒、自我追忆，还是对自身心理活动的内在识别。但正是在这里，我们不禁要问：是否存在某些记忆形式，甚至不保留这些与心理极的脆弱联系？是否存在某些记忆方式，能展现出在世界中持久而彻底的嵌入性？本新篇将证明这类方式确实存在，我们将通过追溯记忆在世界本身的根源，将记忆研究拓展至心灵之外。
In doing this, we will be in effect retracing the history of phenomenology. Part One relied on the classical model of intentionality as it arose in the mentalistic formulations of Brentano and Husserl. It was therefore not surprising that recollection or secondary memory loomed so large in the examples and discussions offered in that Part. In Part Two, in contrast, 这样做实际上是在重溯现象学的发展历程。第一篇依据的是布伦塔诺和胡塞尔在心智主义框架下提出的经典意向性模型。因此该篇所举事例和讨论中，回忆或次级记忆占据重要地位并不令人意外。与之相对，第二篇将......
emphasis was placed on aspects of what Heidegger might call “the worldhood of the world.” Implicitly at work was a species of intentionality which is Heideggerian rather than Husserlian in orientation and which is concerned with particular modes of being-in-the-world (including explicitly instrumental modes that would be ascribed to the realm of “readiness-tohand” in Being and Time). ^(2){ }^{2} Now, in opening Part Three, I begin with a consideration of body memory that quite naturally invokes Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “operative intentionality” in his Phenomenology of Perception. ^(3){ }^{3} But I also want to explore certain topics that were not expressly in MerleauPonty’s purview and that take us beyond the culminating phase of phenomenology which his work is so often taken to represent. These topics are place memory and commemoration, both of which bring us still more radically into the very heart of world implacement. But they do so only as guided by a prior understanding of body memory-to which we must now turn. 重点放在了海德格尔可能称之为"世界之世界性"的方面。这里隐含运作的是一种意向性类型，其取向更接近海德格尔而非胡塞尔，关注的是在世存在的特定模式（包括《存在与时间》中归属于"上手状态"领域的那些明确工具性模式）。 ^(2){ }^{2} 现在，在开启第三部分时，我首先思考身体记忆，这很自然地会让人联想到梅洛-庞蒂在《知觉现象学》中提出的"运作意向性"概念。 ^(3){ }^{3} 但我也希望探讨某些未被梅洛-庞蒂明确纳入视野的主题，这些主题将我们带出他的著作通常被视为代表的现象学巅峰阶段。这些主题是场所记忆与纪念仪式，两者都更彻底地将我们带入世界植入的核心。但它们只有在身体记忆这一先行理解的引导下才能实现——现在我们必须转向这一理解。
VIII 第八章
BODY MEMORY 身体记忆
Abstract 摘要
I think that all the nerves and muscles can serve [memory], so that a lute player, for example, has a part of his memory in his hands: for the ease of bending and disposing his fingers in various ways, which he has acquired by practice, helps him to remember the passages which need these dispositions when they are played. -Descartes, Letter to Mersenne, April, 1640 我认为所有的神经和肌肉都能服务于[记忆]，比如一位鲁特琴演奏者的双手就承载着部分记忆：通过练习获得的灵活指法，能帮助他回忆起演奏时需要这些指位安排的乐段。——笛卡尔，1640 年 4 月致梅森的信
I
The centrality of body memory comes home to us most vividly precisely when such memory fails us. This is evident even in comparatively trivial cases. When I settle into the chair in which I have been accustomed to do most of my reading and writing for the past several years, I am shocked to discover a different cushion pressing against me: suddenly my ongoing existence is destabilized, disoriented. So too, I am perplexed upon finding that the keyboard of the typewriter I have used for the last decade has lost its felt familiarity after I have been away for a month in a place where I was forced to rent a different machine. As I fumble to reacquaint myself with the keyboard, I feel myself to be a different person in the circumstance-an awkward being, unable to perform efficiently even a quite simple mechanical operation. Indeed, it is often in the suspension of just such a basic and taken-for-granted operation-a suspension whose significance for our sense of instrumentality has been singled out by Heidegger ^(1){ }^{1}-that we are reminded of how pivotal and presupposed body memory is in our lives. These lives depend massively on the continued deployment of such memory. Even someone as deprived of the normal functioning of every other kind of memory as is an extreme temporal lobe epileptic is still able to find his way around the hospital to which his brain-damaged state has consigned him. ^(2){ }^{2} As proper names are usually the first items to be systematically forgotten by almost everyone following mid-life, body memories are among the very last to go. This suggests that their role in our remembering is at least analogous to that of space and time in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic: a priori in 身体记忆的核心地位，恰恰在其失效时最为鲜明地显现。即便在相对琐碎的事例中，这种重要性也清晰可辨。当我坐进那把过去数年惯常用于阅读写作的扶手椅时，新换的坐垫触感令我惊愕不已：霎时间，我持续存在的安定感被瓦解，方向感随之丧失。同样地，当我发现使用了十年的打字机键盘在异地租赁不同机型一个月后竟变得陌生时，困惑感油然而生。笨拙地重新适应键盘时，我仿佛变成了另一个人——一个连简单机械操作都效率低下的笨拙存在。事实上，往往正是在这类基础且被视为理所当然的操作中断时——海德格尔曾特别强调这种中断对工具性感知的意义——我们才惊觉身体记忆在生活中的枢纽地位与先在性。我们的生存，极大程度仰赖于这类记忆的持续运作。 即便是像极端颞叶癫痫患者那样被剥夺了其他所有类型记忆正常功能的人，仍然能够在收治其脑损伤状态的医院中找到方向。 ^(2){ }^{2} 正如专有名词通常是中年后人群最先系统性遗忘的内容，身体记忆则是最晚消失的部分。这表明身体记忆在我们记忆活动中的作用至少类似于康德《先验感性论》中空间与时间的地位：具有先验性
status, constantly at work in one capacity or another, never not operative. Just as eliminating space and time as the indispensable parameters of our intuition would mean the undermining of human experience itself, so the absence of body memory would amount to the devastation of memory altogether. 特质，始终以某种形式持续运作，永不停歇。正如将空间和时间从我们直觉的必要参数中剔除将意味着对人类经验本身的破坏，身体记忆的缺失同样会导致记忆功能的整体崩溃。
I speak of “body memory,” not of “memory of the body.” Body memory alludes to memory that is intrinsic to the body, to its own ways of remembering: how we remember in and by and through the body. Memory of the body refers to those manifold manners whereby we remember the body as the accusative object of our awareness, whether in reminiscence or recognition, in reminding or recollection, or in still other ways. The difference is manifest in the noticeable discrepancy between recollecting our body as in a given situation-representing ourselves as engaged bodily in that situa-tion-and being in the situation itself again and feeling it through our body. Nevertheless, the difference is not always easy to discern or to maintain. What Jonas calls the “nobility of sight”-the tendency of vision to reassert itself at every turn, including the visualization that subtends most acts of recollection-has the effect of blurring the distinction between body memory and memory of the body. Indeed, at a number of points in the present chapter I fall prey to the all too natural temptation to substitute a recollective consciousness of the body as I remember it “objectively” for the way the body itself, in its sinews and on its surface, remembers its own activity. 我所说的"身体记忆"，而非"对身体的记忆"。身体记忆指的是内在于身体本身的记忆方式：我们如何通过身体、在身体之中、经由身体来记忆。而对身体的记忆，则涉及我们如何将身体作为意识宾格对象来回忆的多种方式——无论通过追忆或辨认，提醒或回想，抑或其他途径。这种差异明显体现在两种情形之间：其一是将身体作为特定情境中的对象来回忆（表现为我们在该情境中身体参与的形象），其二是重新置身于那个情境并通过身体感受它。然而，这种区别并非总能轻易辨识或保持。正如约纳斯所言"视觉的贵族性"——视觉在每个转折点都试图重新确立自身，包括支撑大多数回忆行为的视觉化倾向——这种特性往往会模糊身体记忆与对身体记忆之间的界限。 确实，在本章的多个地方，我都不免陷入一种再自然不过的诱惑——用"客观"回忆中身体的再现性意识，取代身体本身在其肌理与表层对自身活动的真实记忆。
Submission to this temptation has been indigenous to Western philosophy. It is a quite remarkable fact that there has been no sustained recognition of body memory from Plato through Kant. Bergson is the first philosopher to have devoted concerted attention to it; but he took a part of such memory (i.e., “habit memory”) for the whole of it. ^(4){ }^{4} Merleau-Ponty, very much inspired by the example of Bergson, speaks of the body as “habitual” in the Phenomenology of Perception; ^(5){ }^{5} and yet the otherwise admirable project of this book-which succeeds in according to the body a prominence that it has never before received in philosophical treatments in the West-fails to underline the importance of body memory as such. If Merleau-Ponty fills the void left gaping in Heidegger’s Being and Time-where the role of the body, though implicit throughout, is never thematized-his own text exhibits a no less glaring lacuna in its bypassing of body memory. 这种诱惑的屈服在西方哲学中由来已久。一个相当引人注目的事实是，从柏拉图到康德，身体记忆始终未能获得持续性的关注。柏格森是首位对此倾注系统研究的哲学家，但他仅将此类记忆的部分（即"习惯记忆"）当作其全部。 ^(4){ }^{4} 梅洛-庞蒂深受柏格森范例的启发，在《知觉现象学》中将身体描述为"习惯性的"； ^(5){ }^{5} 然而这部著作虽成功赋予身体西方哲学论述中前所未有的重要地位——这一成就本身值得称许——却未能凸显身体记忆本身的重要性。如果说梅洛-庞蒂填补了海德格尔《存在与时间》中身体角色始终隐而未显的空白，那么他自己的文本因回避身体记忆议题，同样暴露出不容忽视的缺憾。
This chapter proceeds by first distinguishing three major types of body memory (and thus avoids Bergson’s pars pro toto approach), followed by a discussion of the overall significance of body memory (in this way attempting to compensate for Merleau-Ponty’s silence on the subject). In so doing, I am not proposing that the body is a cause, directly or indirectly, of human memory generally: whatever the merits of such a claim, it is the proper concern of physiologists, not of philosophers. But I am proposing that the body is of centralmost concern in any adequate assessment of the range of remembering’s powers. For this reason, we cannot afford to neglect it any 本章首先区分了三种主要的身体记忆类型（从而避免了柏格森以部分代整体的方法），接着探讨了身体记忆的整体意义（以此尝试弥补梅洛-庞蒂对此主题的沉默）。在此过程中，我并非主张身体是人类记忆的直接或间接成因：无论这种主张有何价值，这都是生理学家而非哲学家应当关注的问题。但我确实认为，在对记忆能力的范围进行充分评估时，身体理应成为最核心的关注点。正因如此，我们再也无法忽视
longer. If the body is indeed “the natural subject of perception” and the “point of view on points of view,” 6 body memory is in turn the natural center of any sensitive account of remembering. It is a privileged point of view from which other memorial points of view can be regarded and by which they can be illuminated. 它的重要性。如果身体确实是"感知的自然主体"和"视角的视角"，那么身体记忆反过来就是任何关于记忆的敏锐论述的自然中心。它是一个特权视角，由此可以审视其他记忆视角，并借以阐明它们。
II 二
Consider a concrete instance of such remembering: 让我们思考一个具体的记忆实例：
I am on an isolated island in northern Sweden with several other people. The only available means of transportation is a 1926 Model T Ford. Although I have been assured that this ancient automobile is in “mint” condition, I cannot make any sense of how to drive it. The situation looks bleak. What to do? Suddenly, a friend, “JH,” stations himself in the seat, and begins to drive off-to the astonishment of all the rest of us. Later JH confesses that he had driven the Model T frequently in the past-in the course of several summers a decade or so ago, just after the car had been thoroughly rehabilitated. 我与几位同伴身处瑞典北部的一座孤岛上。唯一的交通工具是一辆 1926 年产的 T 型福特车。尽管有人向我保证这辆古董车"状态极佳"，我却完全不知该如何驾驶。形势看来不容乐观。该怎么办？突然，一位名叫"JH"的朋友坐进驾驶座，在我们所有人惊讶的目光中发动了车子。后来 JH 坦言，他过去经常驾驶这辆 T 型车——大约十年前连续几个夏天，就在这辆车刚彻底翻新后不久。
What is particularly striking in a case like this is not only the sudden, unpremeditated return of the relevant body memory-for which no express relearning or review was required-but the fact that no explicit recollection of past learning was called for. Even if my friend had happened to recall specific occasions on which he had learned (or relearned) to drive the Model T , specific recollections were not necessary to his successful driving. ^(7){ }^{7} Nor was there required even a minimal re-familiarization at the level of the ready-to-hand: JH did not have to become reacquainted with the odd assortment of levers and knobs when his hands went unhesitatingly to the correct instruments at the right moments. If the habitual body memory is suitably active, one need not have recourse to other levels or kinds of experience beyond that in which one is presently engaged. All that is called for is that one exist bodily in the circumstance where a given body memory is pertinent. 在此类案例中尤为引人注目的，不仅是相关身体记忆的突然、未经预谋的回归——这无需任何明确的重新学习或复习——更在于它根本不需要对过去学习经历的有意识回忆。即便我的朋友恰好记起他学习（或重新学习）驾驶 T 型车的具体场景，这些具体回忆对其成功驾驶也非必需。 ^(7){ }^{7} 甚至无需在"应手状态"层面进行最低限度的重新熟悉：当 JH 的双手在恰当时刻毫不犹豫地伸向正确操纵装置时，他根本不必重新认识那些古怪排列的操纵杆和旋钮。若习惯性身体记忆处于适当活跃状态，人们无需借助超出当下活动层面的其他经验形式。唯一需要的，就是以具身化的方式存在于特定身体记忆相关的境况中。
This sort of bodily remembering might usefully be termed “performative” remembering. My friend’s habit-based remembering of how to drive a Model T just was the performance of such actions as: cranking the engine; adjusting the hand choke; releasing the handbrake; putting the car into gear; etc. This remembering does not consist in the various mental manoeuvers (some of which may even be expressly mnemonic) which may accompany the bodily movements that effect turning on the ignition, shifting gears, braking, blowing the horn, and so on. Even if certain mental operations were in fact constant accompaniments of such movements, this is in no way required for the remembering which the body’s spontaneous actions execute. Nor would the occurrence of such operations constitute an adequate indicative sign of 这种身体记忆或许可以恰当地称为"表演性"记忆。我朋友基于习惯记住如何驾驶 T 型车，恰恰就体现在完成以下动作的表演中：摇动发动机曲柄、调节手动阻风门、松开手刹、挂挡等等。这种记忆并不存在于各种心理操作中（其中有些甚至可能是明确的助记手段），这些心理操作可能伴随着实现点火、换挡、刹车、鸣笛等身体动作。即使某些心理操作确实持续伴随着这些动作，但对于身体自发动作所执行的记忆来说，这绝非必要条件。这些心理操作的发生也不足以构成这种记忆的充分标志；
this remembering; ^(8)JH{ }^{8} \mathrm{JH} might possess an appropriate set of thoughts (including perfectly accurate recollections of past bodily executions) and yet utterly fail to remember how to drive the car. 某人可能拥有一整套恰当的想法（包括对过去身体动作执行的完美准确回忆），却完全记不起如何驾驶汽车。
It is evident from this example and many others like it that habitual body memories are at once pre-reflective and presupposed in human experience. As pre-reflective, they form a tacit, pre-articulate dimension of this experience. My friend neither reflected on nor articulated his body memory of driving a Model T; he simply enacted it. As presupposed, habitual body memories serve as our familiaris in dealing with our surroundings-as a constant guide and companion of which we are typically only subliminally aware. They are always already in operation in our ongoing lives. We could not initiate actions, much less continue them, unless we could count on such memories. Even the most probative, trial-and-error operations call for them-much as the body itself is presumed in all higher-order cognitive acts. We may even say of them that they constitute “the body of the body,” the connective tissue of the corporeal intentionality that ties us to the world in the first place. As such, they provide the actual ontological ground for Kant’s forms of intuition and are not merely analogous to them. 从这个例子以及许多类似案例中可以明显看出，习惯性身体记忆既是前反思的，又是人类经验中预设的存在。作为前反思的存在，它们构成了这种经验的隐性、前语言维度。我的朋友既没有反思也没有言说他对驾驶 T 型车的身体记忆；他只是直接践行了它。作为预设的存在，习惯性身体记忆充当着我们应对环境时的熟识向导——作为我们通常只在潜意识层面感知的恒定指引与伴侣。它们始终持续运作于我们进行中的生活之中。若无法依赖这类记忆，我们甚至无法发起行动，更遑论持续行动。即使最具试探性的试错操作也需要它们——正如所有高阶认知行为都预设了身体本身的存在。我们甚至可以说，它们构成了"身体之体"，是首要地将我们与世界联结起来的肉体意向性的结缔组织。正因如此，它们为康德的直观形式提供了真实的本体论基础，而不仅仅是对后者的类比。
The privileged position of habitual body memory did not emerge in earlier discussions of remembering in its act phase. There, remembering-how was only one in a series of act-forms. ^(9){ }^{9} This is an expectable result of any purely eidetic enterprise, which seeks a listing of the basic structures of experience without regard to their genesis, goal, or comparative importance. So too the treatment of mnemonic modes in Part Two refused to address the question of whether some modes are more fundamental than others. When we come to habitual body memory, we can no longer afford to be so neutral on this particular issue. For such memory establishes just how we are in the world-much as place memory determines where we are in it. Even if explicit body memories vary greatly in terms of detail and frequency of occurrence, such memories are continuously at work in our experience and are constitutive of its very fabric. 习惯性身体记忆的优越地位在先前关于记忆行为阶段的讨论中并未显现。当时，"如何记忆"只是众多行为形式中的一种。 ^(9){ }^{9} 这是任何纯粹本质性研究的必然结果——这类研究旨在列举经验的基本结构，而不考虑其起源、目标或相对重要性。同样，第二部分对记忆模式的探讨也回避了某些模式是否比其他模式更根本的问题。但当我们论及习惯性身体记忆时，就再也不能对这个特殊问题保持中立了。因为这种记忆确立了我们在世界中的存在方式——正如场所记忆决定了我们在世界中的位置。即使显性的身体记忆在细节和发生频率上差异巨大，这类记忆始终在我们的经验中运作，并构成了经验的基本结构。
Reflection on the above example and its implications suggests the following compact definition of habitual body memory: 通过对上述案例及其影响的反思，可以得出关于习惯性身体记忆的简明定义：
an active immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious, orienting, and regular manner. 过去在身体中的一种主动内在性，它以有效、定向且规律的方式影响着当下的身体行动。
Let us explicate this formula by looking closely at its three major parts: 让我们通过仔细审视其三个主要部分来阐释这一公式：
(1) Habitual body memory involves “an active immanence of the past in the body.” In such memory the past is embodied in actions. Rather than being contained separately somewhere in mind or brain, it is actively ingredient in the very bodily movements that accomplish a particular action. It is undeniable that JH’s habitual body memory was deeply rooted in the past period during which he learned the action of driving a Model T. Otherwise, （1）习惯性身体记忆涉及"过去在身体中的主动内在性"。在这种记忆中，过去被具身化于行动之中。它并非单独存在于心灵或大脑某处，而是作为活性成分融入完成特定动作的身体运动本身。不可否认，JH 的习惯性身体记忆深深植根于他学习驾驶 T 型车的过去时期。若非如此，
except by sheer random luck, my friend could not have successfully executed this action. Without prior experience or practice, there would be no body memory at all, for there would be nothing to be re-enacted. In the case in point, a moment of instruction preceded-both logically and chronologi-cally-the current capacity to drive the car successfully. But the past thus presupposed became active only as a sedimented force in the immanent present of habitual bodily movement. 除了纯粹靠运气，我的朋友不可能成功完成这个动作。没有先前的经验或练习，就根本不会有身体记忆，因为没有任何内容可供重演。在当前案例中，无论是逻辑顺序还是时间顺序，驾驶教学都先于成功驾车的能力。但这一被预设的过去，只有在习惯性身体运动的内在当下作为沉积力量时才变得活跃。
The activity of the past, in short, resides in its habitual enactment in the present. This means that the habitual is far from passive in character: as we can see from JH’s alert responsiveness. Beyond such a readiness to respond, in what does the active being of habit consist? Hexis, the Greek root of “habit,” connotes a state of character for which we are responsible, especially in its formative phases. ^(10){ }^{10} In fact, the early stages in the creation of anything habitual-whether it be character or virtue, ^(11){ }^{11} or body memories them-selves-are definitive for establishing the form that will be continually re-enacted. Not unlike the “primacy effect” that favors the retention of the first members of a list of items to be remembered, ^(12){ }^{12} the habitual in human affairs represents the continuing triumph of the early-established: not just its survival but its active continuance at later stages when its thorough establishment will help to guarantee its ongoing power. 简言之，过往行为的活性存在于当下对其的习惯性演绎中。这意味着习惯绝非被动特质：正如我们从 JH 的敏锐反应中所见。除了这种回应意愿，习惯的主动本质还包含什么？"Hexis"（习惯的希腊词根）暗示着一种需要我们负责的品性状态，尤其在形成阶段。事实上，任何习惯性事物——无论是品性、美德，还是身体记忆本身——在创建初期的形态确立都具有决定性意义。这与"首因效应"（优先记住清单开头项目的现象）颇为相似，人类事务中的习惯性体现着早期确立模式的持续胜利：不仅是其存续，更在于后期阶段当它彻底确立后仍能保持活跃延续，这种稳固性将确保其持续的影响力。
That habitual action is an active matter is also evident from the Latin root of “habit”: habēre, to have, to hold. ^(13){ }^{13} To be habitual is to have or hold one’s being-in-the-world in certain ways, i.e., those determined precisely by one’s settled dispositions to act in particular patterns. The presence of these dispositions means that our habitual actions help to constitute us as reliable actors within the world-to be counted on by others as well as to count on ourselves. Habituality means consistency in action, the ability to stay the same over time. Thus, my friend, thanks to an intact habitual body memory, remains a driver of his Model T over decades, even gaining part of his identity for others from this fact. 习惯性行为是一种主动行为，这一点从"habit"（习惯）的拉丁词根"habēre"（拥有、持有）中也能得到印证。 ^(13){ }^{13} 所谓习惯，就是以特定方式拥有或持守自身在世存有的状态——这些方式恰恰由我们根深蒂固的行为倾向所决定。这些倾向的存在意味着，习惯性行为帮助我们成为世界中可靠的行为主体，既值得他人信赖，也能自我信赖。习惯性意味着行为的一致性，即保持长期稳定的能力。正因如此，我的朋友凭借完好的习惯性身体记忆，数十年来始终驾驶着他的 T 型车，甚至由此成为他人认知其身份特征的一部分。
(2) The active immanence of the past also “informs present bodily actions.” A “habitude” (as we may call any habitual tendency toward re-enactment) ^(14){ }^{14} becomes an active ingredient in what we are doing in the present. This means that the habitude in-forms present bodily action: it gives to this action an immanent form, an identifiable character as an action of a certain kind. Part of the very activity of habitual body memory consists in this information, a subtle structuring of behavior along the lines of a personal or collective tradition that becomes readily reinstated in certain circumstances. My friend’s behavior behind the wheel of a Model T was not a matter of aleatory motion. It was an action that exhibited its own local history-a history that helped to shape its precise form of bodily movement. The same is true of other habitual body memories. They reflect their origins by their precipitation into a quite particular present action. (2) 往昔的主动内在性同样"形塑着当下的身体行动"。一种"习性"（我们可将任何重演的习惯性倾向如此称呼）成为当下行为中的活性成分。这意味着习性以内在形式塑造着当下的身体行动：赋予该行动某种可辨识的特质，使其成为特定类型的行动。习惯性身体记忆的运作机制，部分正体现在这种信息传递中——它依照个人或集体传统对行为进行精微建构，使其能在特定情境中迅速复现。我朋友驾驶 T 型车时的举止绝非随机动作，而是展现其独特地方史的行动——这段历史帮助塑造了其身体运动的精确形态。其他习惯性身体记忆亦复如是，它们通过沉淀为极其具体的当下行动，折射出自身的起源。
(3) Habitual body memories operate in “an efficacious, orienting, and regular manner.” Let us consider each of these three characteristics. (a) If such memories were not efficacious, they would be dead or frozen habits, routines of a sheerly repetitive sort: a matter merely of “going through the motions.” Such routines are not without utility; indeed, taken together, they constitute an entire “second nature” on which we count for the ongoingness of our being-in-the-world. But by “efficacious” I mean having a quite determinate impact on the circumambient world as well as being inherently effective within the immediate ambiance of the actor himself or herself. While the circumambient or outward effects create differences in the world-e.g., the driving of the Model T versus its inertial undriven con-dition-the immediate or inward effects ^(15){ }^{15} seek to salvage sameness in the face of change. How is such sameness achieved by habitual body memories? It is achieved by their acting in concert to constitute my lived body as a coherent and customary entity. In this way habitual body memories constitute an “effective-history” within my lived body and are as integral to it as its tissues and organs. Indeed, it is only through habitual memories that my body can have any history internal to itself. ^(16){ }^{16} The role that “tradition” plays in the constitution of cultural history is here paralleled by a set of habitual body memories that are the unique possession of a given individual. ^(17){ }^{17} （3）习惯性身体记忆以"有效、定向且规律的方式"运作。让我们逐一考察这三个特征。（a）若这类记忆不具备有效性，它们将成为僵化或冻结的习惯，沦为纯粹重复性的例行公事：仅仅是"机械地完成动作"。此类惯例并非全无用处；事实上，它们共同构成了我们赖以生存的完整"第二天性"。但所谓"有效"，我指的是对周遭世界产生明确影响，同时在行为者自身直接环境内具有内在效力。当这些周缘性或外向效应在世界中创造差异（例如驾驶 T 型车与其未被驱动的惯性状态之对比）时，直接性或内向效应 ^(15){ }^{15} 则致力于在变化中保持同一性。习惯性身体记忆如何实现这种同一性？它们通过协同作用，将我的生命体构建为连贯而惯常的存在实体来实现这一点。 就这样，习惯性身体记忆在我的生命体内构成了一种"有效历史"，它们与身体的组织器官一样不可或缺。事实上，正是通过习惯性记忆，我的身体才能拥有专属于自身的内部历史。 ^(16){ }^{16} "传统"在文化历史构成中所扮演的角色，在此处体现为一组习惯性身体记忆——这些记忆是特定个体独有的财富。 ^(17){ }^{17}
(b) Habitual body memories are also deeply orienting. It is striking that when we arrive in a new place to stay even for a short visit, we tend without any premeditation to establish a group of fledgling habits such as putting the drip grind coffee in a particular spot, our laundry in another, books in still a third, as well as rising at a certain hour, reading the newspaper at a certain time, etc. These are habituating actions: they help us to get, and to stay, oriented. They establish a base of assurance and ease upon which more complicated, or more spontaneous, activities can freely arise. But their value is more than purely utilitarian: they allow us to discern the sense of a situation, to “get the lay of the land,” quite apart from practical results to which they may give rise. Getting the lay of the land is a matter of realizing our being in the world in terms of what I shall call its “landscape” character in the next chapter. For now, I want only to point to the basic ways in which such ground-level orienting occurs via habitual body memories. （b）习惯性身体记忆同样具有深刻的定位作用。引人注目的是，当我们抵达一个新环境短暂停留时，总会不假思索地形成一系列初始习惯——比如将滴滤咖啡粉放在特定位置、换洗衣物归置另一处、书籍又摆放第三处，还包括固定时间起床、特定时段读报等。这些习惯性动作具有定位功能：帮助我们建立并维持方向感。它们构筑起安心与从容的基础，让更复杂或更自发的活动得以自由生发。但它们的价值远非纯粹功利性：这些习惯让我们得以洞悉情境的意义，"摸清周遭状况"，其意义已超越可能产生的实际效用。所谓摸清状况，实则是通过下一章我将称之为"景观"特性的维度，来体悟我们存在于世的方式。此刻我只想指出：这种基础层面的定位，正是通过习惯性身体记忆得以实现。
The main function of orienting is to effect familiarization with one’s surroundings. To be disoriented, or even simply unoriented, is to find these same surroundings unfamiliar, unheimlich: “Not to know where we are is torment, and not to have a sense of place is a most sinister deprivation.” ^(18){ }^{18} In particular, it is not to know which way to go or to turn-which route to follow. Getting oriented is to learn precisely which routes are possible, and eventually which are most desirable, by setting up habitual patterns of bodily movement. These patterns familiarize us with the circumambient world by indicating ways we can move through it in a regular and reliable 定向的主要功能是让人熟悉周围环境。迷失方向，甚至仅仅是缺乏方向感，都会使这些熟悉的环境变得陌生而诡异："不知身在何处是一种折磨，缺乏空间感是最阴险的剥夺。" ^(18){ }^{18} 具体而言，就是不知道该往哪个方向走或转——该选择哪条路线。定向的过程正是通过建立身体运动的习惯模式，来准确了解哪些路线可行，最终确定哪些路线最理想。这些模式通过指示我们能够以规律可靠的方式穿越周遭世界
manner. Without such patterned movements, we would be lost in an unfamiliar world. 从而让我们熟悉这个环境。若没有这种模式化的运动，我们将在陌生的世界中迷失方向。
If such path-finding operations are to be more than means of becoming familiar-if they are also to serve as ways of staying so-they must be more than fortuitous outcomes. In other words, more than what Merleau-Ponty calls the “momentary body” ^(19){ }^{19} needs to be mobilized. To remain oriented in a given circumstance, the formation of new habits must give way to consistent habitual responses: the unsettlement of the unknown is only finally vanquished by the acquisition of settled propensities to act. And for these latter to inhere in our behavior, habitual body memory is required. How else are we to carry forward our newly gained orientation into other similar circumstances? Lacking memory, we would be in the immensely demanding circumstance of having to rediscover or to reforge pathways on every subsequent occasion. All of our time would be spent in getting oriented again and again: say, each time we enter a Model T. 倘若这些路径探索行为不仅仅是为了熟悉环境——若它们还要作为保持熟悉的方式——那么它们就必须超越偶然的成果。换言之，我们需要调动的不仅是梅洛-庞蒂所称的"瞬时身体"。要在特定情境中保持方向感，新习惯的形成必须让位于持续的习惯性反应：唯有通过建立稳定的行为倾向，才能真正战胜未知带来的不安。而要让这些行为倾向根植于我们的行动中，就需要习惯性身体记忆的参与。否则，我们如何将新获得的方向感延续到其他相似情境中？若缺乏记忆，我们将陷入极度艰难的处境——每次遭遇新情况都不得不重新发现或重塑路径。所有时间都将耗费在反复定位上：比如每次坐进一辆 T 型车时。
Consider for a last time the example which has served as a prototype in this discussion. JH’s successful body memory arose effortlessly in the circumstance, although his friends’ hopes that he might be able to drive the ancient car may have helped to prompt his remembering-and his being actually seated in the driver’s seat helped even more. Still, the action of 让我们最后一次思考这个作为讨论原型的例子。JH 成功的身体记忆在情境中毫不费力地浮现，尽管朋友们希望他能驾驶这辆古董车的期待可能促发了他的回忆——而他实际坐在驾驶座上的事实则起到了更大的助推作用。然而，
driving itself was not necessitated by these encouraging factors. It came back on its own in the circumstance, as if it were re-visiting my friend from a far-away point in time. It was as if his customary body had suddenly merged with his momentary body. Habitual body memory in fact represents the fusing of the settled and the spontaneous in a re-enactive synthesis. The remembering thereby realized is characteristically sudden and precipitateand yet quite complete. Habitual body memory typically arises totum simul, as when the full action of driving a Model T (or doing the breast stroke or whatever) returns unbidden, in a flash. ^(21){ }^{21} 驾驶行为本身并非由这些鼓励性因素所必然引发。它是在情境中自行回归的，仿佛从遥远的时间彼岸重新造访我的朋友。就像他习惯性的身体突然与当下身体合二为一。习惯性身体记忆实际上体现了固化模式与自发行为在重演性综合中的融合。由此实现的记忆具有典型的突发性和迅捷性——却又相当完整。习惯性身体记忆通常以整体涌现的方式呈现，就像驾驶 T 型车（或进行蛙泳等动作）的完整行为在瞬间不请自来。 ^(21){ }^{21}
This structure of habitual body memory goes hand in hand with its regulated character. Rather than opposing spontaneity and regularity, we should realize that the unpremeditated and the regulated are natural allies. As in the comparable case of what Freud called “primary process” thinking, each calls for the other: the spontaneity of dreaming, far from being utterly unruly and chaotic, is made possible by formal rules of condensation, displacement, and symbolization. As Stravinsky has said, “In art, as in everything else, one can build only upon a resisting foundation. . . . My freedom thus consists in my moving about within the narrow frame that I have assigned myself.” ^(22){ }^{22} The free movements of dreams and art find their analogue in the unrehearsed return of habitual body memories, which also accomplish their full freedom only within a “narrow frame.” Thus the action of driving a Model T, if it is to be at all successful, must proceed in accordance with certain rules of sequence and of timing: 这种习惯性身体记忆的结构与其受规则约束的特性密不可分。我们不应将自发性和规律性对立起来，而应认识到未经预谋的行为与受规则约束的行为天然就是盟友。正如弗洛伊德所称"初级过程"思维的类似案例所示，二者相互依存：梦境的自发性绝非完全无序混乱，而是通过凝缩、移置和象征化的形式规则得以实现。正如斯特拉文斯基所言："在艺术中，如同其他一切事物，人只能在抵抗性的基础上构建......我的自由因而存在于我为自身设定的狭窄框架内的活动。"梦境与艺术的自由运动在习惯性身体记忆未经排练的复现中找到了对应物——它们同样只有在"狭窄框架"内才能实现完全自由。因此，驾驶 T 型车的动作若要成功，必须遵循特定的顺序规则和时机规则：
rule of sequence: give gas by operating a choke; turn on ignition; engage clutch; shift into first or reverse; depress accelerator, etc. 顺序规则：通过操作阻风门供油；开启点火装置；接合离合器；挂入一档或倒档；踩下油门等。
rule of timing: do not allow too long a period to elapse between turning on the ignition and engaging the clutch; and similarly between this latter and shifting into gear. 点火与踩离合器之间的时间间隔不宜过长，换挡操作同样需要把握时机。
Thanks to its habitual memories, the lived body effects such sequence and timing in a regularized way. And it does so all the more successfully as it does not have to focus on, much less to formulate, the rules at play. Indeed, to focus or formulate would not only impede spontaneity; it might well lead to a misperformance of the activity itself. So too might a concentrated effort to recollect scenes of instruction in which these rules were first propounded and learned. Where propositional formulation and pictorial representation (the two main forms of rule-articulation) are of immense value in the cases of memorizing or reconstructing-indeed, they often complement and strengthen each other in just these cases-they are second-level and often quite superfluous in habitual body memory. The peculiar efficacity and orienting capacity of such memory is most freely exercised in its being thoroughly regular and yet not expressly formulated in words or images, much less concretized in recollections. 凭借习惯性记忆，活生生的身体以规律化的方式实现这种操作时序与节奏。当无需刻意关注——更不必明确表述——其中规则时，身体反而能更出色地完成动作。事实上，过度聚焦或刻意表述不仅会阻碍动作的自然流畅，更可能导致操作失误。同样地，若竭力回忆最初学习这些规则的教学场景，也可能适得其反。命题式表述与图像再现（规则阐述的两种主要形式）在记忆训练或动作重建时极具价值——这两种形式在这些情境中往往相辅相成——但对于习惯性身体记忆而言，它们属于次级层面且常常显得多余。这种记忆特有的效能与导向能力，在其完全遵循规则却无需借助语言文字或图像进行明确表述——更不必通过回忆具体化——时，方能得到最自由的发挥。
III 第三章
A second major type of body memory is traumatic in character. Traumatic memories assume many forms, ranging from those that are strictly psychical in status (e.g., memories of painful thoughts) to those that are thoroughly interpersonal (as in memories of perceiving someone else in distress). Traumatic body memories, however, arise from and bear on one’s own lived body in moments of duress. They are themselves multifarious in type, since they include anything from memories of severe injury to alleviating memories of fleeting pleasure. Rather than setting forth a survey of this striking variety, I shall once again focus on a single instance: 第二种主要的身体记忆类型具有创伤性特征。创伤记忆呈现多种形式，既包括纯粹心理层面的（如痛苦想法的记忆），也涵盖完全人际间的（例如感知他人痛苦的记忆）。然而创伤性身体记忆源于并作用于个体自身在危急时刻的活体体验。这类记忆本身类型繁杂，既包含严重受伤的记忆，也涵盖短暂愉悦的缓解性记忆。与其全面列举这种惊人的多样性，我将再次聚焦于一个具体案例：
Each time my tongue passes over my right lower molar tooth these days, distinct memories of being in a dentist’s chair and, somewhat less frequently, of chewing on a hard kernel of popcorn still earlier, are elicited. In particular, I recall biting down on the kernel and feeling immediately afterward parts of something very hard lying loose in my mouth: at first I wasn’t sure whether these were bits of kernel or bits of tooth. I also remember, from a period about a month later, being in a dentist’s chair and experiencing acute pain as my dentist drilled deeply into the broken tooth as part of the procedure of crowning it. 近来每当我舌头舔过右下方的臼齿时，总会鲜明地唤起牙科诊疗椅上的记忆，偶尔还会想起更早之前咬到爆米花硬粒的情景。尤其记得当时咬下硬粒后，立刻感到嘴里散落着某种极硬的碎片：起初我分不清那是爆米花碎屑还是牙齿碎块。我还记得大约一个月后，坐在牙医椅上经历钻头深入断裂牙齿的剧痛——那是镶牙冠治疗过程中的必经步骤。
Notice, to begin with, how particularized this example of remembering is. In both of its closely related incidents, it bears on highly specific body parts-not only my mouth but a discrete part of it lying within a definite region. This part is, of course, my lower right molar, and my remembering is entirely engrossed in it and its fate: its sudden demolition and its subsequent rebuilding. Such a determinate entity gives to my remembering a point of particular attachment. Rather than being identified with an action or movement that links up smoothly with the surrounding world as in so many. habitual body memories, this remembering possesses a content centered on a single object whose very breakdown separates it from the world of ongoing action, forcing my memorial consciousness literally inside myself. 首先要注意的是，这个记忆案例具有多么鲜明的特殊性。在紧密相连的两个事件中，它都涉及高度具体的身体部位——不仅是我的口腔，更是位于特定区域的某个独立部分。这个部位当然就是我的右下臼齿，而我的记忆完全聚焦于它及其命运：它的突然损毁与后续重建。如此确定的实体为我的记忆提供了特殊的附着点。与那些将身体动作流畅融入周遭世界的习惯性身体记忆不同，这段记忆的内容始终围绕着一个独立对象，其损毁本身就将它与持续行动的世界割裂，迫使我的记忆意识彻底转向内在。
Notice, too, that this object, my afflicted molar, is being remembered bodily as subject to events which are unique and which alter its career in time radically. Neither the initial trauma nor the attempt at dental restoration has anything habitual or repetitive about it. Each is strictly episodic and is remembered as such. Each impinges on and interrupts the amorphous history of my body and renders what is indefinite and undated in this history diachronically distinct: first the breakdown, then the crowning activity several weeks later. As with all genuinely diachronic events, the sequence is irreversible, consisting as it does of episodes existing in what Kant calls an “objective succession.” ^(23){ }^{23} This succession ensures in turn the datability of these episodes, though only in units appropriate to the circumstance: here 还需注意的是，这颗病痛的臼齿正被身体性地记忆为遭受了独特事件的侵袭——这些事件彻底改变了它在时间中的历程。无论是最初的创伤还是随后的牙科修复尝试，都不具有任何惯常性或重复性。每一事件都严格遵循偶发性，并作为独立片段被记忆。它们冲击并中断了我身体那混沌不清的历史，使这段原本模糊无时序的历史呈现出清晰的历时性差异：先是牙齿崩裂，数周后则是镶牙手术。正如所有真正的历时性事件，这一序列不可逆转，由康德所称的"客观相继性"中的片段构成。 ^(23){ }^{23} 这种相继性进而确保了事件的可追溯性，尽管仅适用于特定情境的时间单位：此处
week and month (I remember the trauma’s occurring about two weeks ago, sometime in mid-July) rather than hour or year. 是以周和月为计量（我记得创伤发生在大约两周前，七月中旬某日），而非以小时或年计。
Despite the isolating concentration on the fate of a single tooth, which became a discrete object for me only at the moment of breakdown, there was a discernible setting in both incidents as remembered. The initial trauma occurred in the context of eating popcorn, and is recalled as situated in this context. Likewise, the pain of drilling is set in the dentist’s chair: it does not float free of this circumstance. Neither setting need be remembered in any considerable detail; as the bare location of a traumatic event, each can be quite minimal. Yet even when I remember the point of most intense pain during the drilling, my body is not brought back as locusless; this pain was happening somewhere, however denuded its description may be. 尽管对一颗牙齿命运的孤立关注（它只在崩裂那一刻才成为我意识中独立的对象），但两起事件在记忆中都有可辨识的场景。最初的创伤发生在吃爆米花的背景下，回忆也始终与这一情境相连。同样，钻牙的疼痛定位于牙医椅：它无法脱离这个具体场景。两个场景都无需被详尽记忆；作为创伤事件的简单发生地，每个场景都可以极其简略。然而即使当我回忆起钻牙时最剧烈的痛感，我的身体也不会以无场所的方式重现；这种疼痛总发生在某处，无论对其地点的描述多么贫乏。
The emotionality of both incidents is also vividly conveyed: the shock of realizing that my mouth contained bits of tooth as well as bits of popcorn, the peculiar dread that accompanies deep drilling (I asked myself, “Will this pain, already bad enough, become still worse?”). Although I had no desire to re-experience these feelings-quite the contrary!-I found that they nonetheless afforded access to the original scenes of which they formed such a painful part. A few weeks after the drilling had occurred I was in a service station and heard a pneumatic bolt tightener at work. The shrill grinding sound almost immediately evoked the dread of being the hapless subject of my dentist’s drill; I felt myself stiffening in anticipation of worse to come just as I had done in the dentist’s chair: ushered in by the dread, my body was itself remembering the trauma. This led in turn to a vivid recollection of the scene-which was, I suspected, a defense against a still more engaging body memory than I had so far allowed myself to undergo. Here is an illustration of how recollection is not consistently primary in its operation; indeed in this case it assumed the decidedly secondary role of helping to keep at bay a recently painful body memory. 两起事件中的情绪也被生动地传递出来：当我意识到嘴里既有爆米花碎屑也有牙齿碎片时的震惊，以及伴随深度钻牙而来的那种奇特恐惧（我自问："这种已经够糟的疼痛，会不会变得更严重？"）。尽管我完全不想重新体验这些感受——恰恰相反！——但我发现它们依然为我打开了那些构成痛苦记忆的原始场景。钻牙事件几周后，我在加油站听到气动螺栓紧固器工作的声音。尖锐的研磨声几乎立刻唤起了那种成为牙医钻头不幸对象的恐惧；我感到自己因预期更糟情况而全身僵硬，就像当初在牙医椅上那样：在恐惧的引导下，我的身体正在自行回忆那次创伤。这进而引发了对那个场景的鲜明回忆——我猜想，这是对一种比迄今为止我所允许自己承受的、更为强烈的身体记忆的防御。 这个例子说明回忆在运作中并非总是占据主导地位；事实上，在此案例中，它明显扮演了次要角色——帮助抵御近期痛苦的躯体记忆。
Another facet of the particularizing proclivity of traumatic body memories has to do with the fragmentation of the lived body. Where habitual body memory typically concerns the body as a coordinated whole-indeed, constitutes it as a single compositum-a traumatic body memory bears on what Lacan has called “le corps morcellé.” ^(24){ }^{24} This is the body as broken down into uncoordinated parts and thus as incapable of the type of continuous, spontaneous action undertaken by the intact body (“intact” thanks precisely to its habitualities, which serve to ensure efficacity and regularity). The fragmented body is inefficacious and irregular; indeed, its possibilities of free movement have become constricted precisely because of the trauma that has disrupted its spontaneous actions. Body memories of this trauma will necessarily reflect the same fragmentation, as will the terms descriptive of such memories: e.g., “particularization,” “isolation of object,” “concentration.” Such terms can be viewed as giving dimensions of the traumatized body, 创伤性身体记忆的特定化倾向的另一个方面与生活身体的碎片化有关。习惯性身体记忆通常关注身体作为一个协调的整体——事实上，将其构建为一个单一复合体——而创伤性身体记忆则涉及拉康所称的"le corps morcelé"（碎片化身体）。这是指身体被分解为不协调的部分，因而无法进行完整身体（"完整"恰恰得益于其习惯性，这些习惯性确保了效能和规律性）所展现的那种连续、自发的行动。碎片化的身体既缺乏效能又不规律；事实上，其自由运动的可能性正因为创伤而受到限制，这种创伤破坏了其自发性动作。关于这一创伤的身体记忆必然会反映同样的碎片化特征，描述这些记忆的术语也是如此：例如"特定化"、"对象孤立"、"集中"。这些术语可被视为描绘了受创身体的各个维度。
especially as it acts to inhibit action. Although this inhibition is more dramatically evident in cases of, say, dire back pain, it is still quite manifest in my own tooth trauma, which served to inhibit mastication. Much of the trauma and its associated affect consisted in this very inhibition: or, more precisely, in the realization that “I will henceforth not be able to eat as freely as before.” ^(25){ }^{25} The disabling nature of body trauma here stands in stark contrast with the enabling character of bodily habitudes; and just as the former implies the dissolution of the intact body, so the latter implies its continual re-synthesis. 尤其是当它起到抑制行动的作用时。尽管这种抑制作用在诸如严重背痛等情况下更为显著，但在我自身的牙齿创伤中仍相当明显——它抑制了我的咀嚼能力。创伤及其相关影响很大程度上正源于这种抑制：更准确地说，源于"我今后将无法像从前那样自由进食"的认知。 ^(25){ }^{25} 身体创伤的致残性质在此与身体习性的赋能特性形成鲜明对比；正如前者意味着完整身体的解体，后者则暗示着其持续的重构。
An aspect of traumatic body memory which the above example does not adequately illustrate is what could be called the phenomenon of “afterglow.” This refers to the way that some quite traumatic body memorieswhich may have been devastating at the moment of origin-will come in the course of time to seem acceptable and even pleasurable to remember. As Virgil says in a passage I have cited before, “Someday, perhaps, it will be a joy to remember even these things” (Aeneid, I, 203). My molar matter was too recent to be regarded with anything like pleasure. Yet even if I never take a positive pleasure in remembering it in the future, it is at least likely that I will be able to view it with equanimity and perhaps even with humor or irony. The same holds true for many body traumas, including almost all those that stem from childhood: e.g., my falling down the basement steps just before traveling to my grandparents’ home for Christmas many years ago. Although in this latter instance I hit my head against a steel girder, none of the pain associated with this fall survives. So, too, with such other traumatic experiences as being assailed by friends, shot in the leg with a B.B. gun, etc. 上述例子未能充分说明创伤性身体记忆的一个方面，即所谓的"余晖"现象。这种现象指的是，某些在发生当下极具破坏性的创伤性身体记忆，随着时间的推移会变得可以接受，甚至回忆起来令人愉悦。正如维吉尔在我曾引用过的段落中所说："也许有一天，想起这些事也会感到快乐"（《埃涅阿斯纪》第一卷 203 行）。我的臼齿问题发生时间太近，尚无法以愉悦的心情看待。但即便未来我永远不会以积极态度回忆此事，至少很可能能够平静面对，甚至可能带着幽默或反讽的态度。许多身体创伤都是如此，包括几乎所有童年时期经历的创伤：比如多年前在去祖父母家过圣诞节前，我从地下室楼梯摔下来的经历。尽管那次我的头撞到了钢梁，但与这次摔倒相关的所有疼痛都已不复存在。其他创伤性经历也是如此，比如被朋友攻击、被 BB 枪射中腿部等等。
This is not to deny that some traumatic body memories never lose their painful and even devastating sting, especially when they are accompanied by some form of humiliation of one’s own person-of which a ghastly limiting case would be memories of having been in a concentration camp. Precisely such memories, however, we try to repress, replace, or at least bowdlerize. It remains the case that the pain and poignancy of most traumatic memories recede with time. How does this happen? 这并非否认某些创伤性的身体记忆永远不会失去其痛苦甚至毁灭性的刺痛，尤其是当这些记忆伴随着某种形式的个人羞辱时——其中最可怕的极端例子就是集中营经历的记忆。然而，恰恰是这类记忆，我们试图压抑、替代或至少进行删改。大多数创伤记忆的痛苦与尖锐程度确实会随时间消退。这种现象是如何发生的？
One main way it happens, as one might well suspect by now, is that a tendency sets in to transform these memories into reminiscences and recollections. All of my childhood memories cited just above were of precisely this nature: they have become stories I tell to others or recollections in which I indulge when I am alone. Doubtlessly defensive in origin, these transformations have attained an autonomy sufficient for me to take independent pleasure in reactivating them in just these comparatively innocent forms. Closely related to this distancing tendency is the operation of what I called “ruminescence” in chapter 2 . When memories, even very painful ones, have become remote from their own point of origin, they often acquire a domesticated quality that encourages our ruminating over them- 正如人们现在可能已经猜到的那样，这种现象发生的一个主要方式是：这些记忆开始倾向于转变为追忆和回想。我上面引用的所有童年记忆都具有这种特质——它们已成为我向他人讲述的故事，或独处时沉溺的往事。这些转变最初无疑带有防御性，但如今已获得足够的自主性，让我能够以这些相对无害的形式重新激活它们，并从中获得独立的愉悦。与这种疏离倾向密切相关的是我在第二章所称的"反刍现象"的运作。当记忆（甚至是极度痛苦的记忆）远离其起源点时，它们往往会获得一种驯化的特质，促使我们对其进行反复咀嚼——
instead of simply replaying or radically repressing them (i.e., the two most likely ways of treating the memories of recent traumatic events). When we reminisce about them as well (e.g., by narrating them to ourselves or to others), we enter into a ruminescent state; and in turning them over in our minds in this way, we tame them yet further-to the point where they become our own re-creation. ^(26){ }^{26} 而非简单地重播或彻底压抑（即处理近期创伤事件记忆时最可能采取的两种方式）。当我们进一步追忆这些往事时（例如通过向自己或他人讲述），我们就进入了反刍状态；通过这种方式在脑海中反复琢磨，我们进一步驯化了这些记忆——直至它们成为我们自己的再创造。 ^(26){ }^{26}
The phenomena of after-glow and ruminescence strongly suggest that many body traumas remain threatening to us even, or rather precisely, as remembered. The return to the initial trauma that their bodily remembering entails brings with it an at least minor trauma of its own, which may in turn have to be defended against. ^(27){ }^{27} One way to do so is to channel the return of the trauma into a specifically somatic form, e.g., as a hysterical conversion symptom. This is an instance of a quite general strategy of containing a trauma, whereby we act to restrict its content and scope to a limited part of one’s body. Thus, even if the original trauma was an all-consuming fever, we may remember it as it became focused in a particular form such as dizziness. A second strategy for dealing with the revival of trauma is situating it, where the effort is to tie down the trauma by locating it fairly precisely in terms of place or time. In situating, the implicit psycho-logic can be formulated in this way: “if the trauma I am now remembering occurred there and then, it cannot have such a devastating effect on me here and now as I remember it.” Such an attempt to situate the original occurrence is a salient feature of many traumatic body memories and serves to distinguish them once more from habitual memories. These latter tend to be expansive rather than constrictive and, above all, nonepisodic, hence not pinned down as to date and place of origin: just where or when II acquired or reacquired a certain habitual bodily skill is normally a matter of indifference as I come to enact it subsequently. But I am far from indifferent as to the place and moment when I first underwent the body trauma I am now remembering. 余晖与微光现象强烈暗示着，许多身体创伤即使——或更准确地说——正因被记起，仍对我们构成威胁。身体记忆所引发的重返初始创伤，本身至少会带来轻微的二次创伤，而这种创伤又可能需要新的防御机制。 ^(27){ }^{27} 其中一种应对方式是将创伤的复现引导至特定的躯体形式，例如转化为癔症性转换症状。这是限制创伤影响范围的普遍策略之一，通过将创伤内容和作用范围压缩至身体的局部区域。因此，即便原初创伤是场吞噬全身的高烧，我们可能只记住它聚焦为眩晕等特定症状。第二种应对创伤重现的策略是空间定位法，即通过将创伤精确锚定在特定地点或时间点来束缚其影响。 在定位创伤时，这种隐含的心理逻辑可以表述为："如果我现在回忆的创伤发生在彼时彼地，那么它就不会对此时此地的我产生如此毁灭性的影响。"这种对原始事件进行定位的尝试，是许多创伤性身体记忆的显著特征，也再次将它们与习惯性记忆区分开来。后者往往具有扩展性而非收缩性，最重要的是非片段性，因此无需追溯其起源的时间和地点：当我随后施展某项习惯性身体技能时，通常不会在意 II 是在何时何地获得或重新获得这项技能的。但对于此刻正在回忆的身体创伤最初发生的场所与时刻，我却绝不可能无动于衷。
IV 第四章
The body retains memories of pleasures as well as of pains. Scrutinizing traumatic body memories, as has just been done in section 3, risks neglecting the fact that we remember many pleasures in and through our bodies. From among these pleasures I shall concentrate on specifically erotic onesnot because these are paradigmatic of all bodily pleasures (they are at once characteristic and exceptional in this regard) but because their memorial recapture is especially revealing for our purposes. 身体既保留着欢愉的记忆，也承载着痛苦的印记。正如第三节所述，若只聚焦于创伤性的身体记忆，便容易忽略我们通过身体铭记的诸多欢愉。在这些欢愉体验中，我将特别关注情欲快感——并非因其是所有身体愉悦的范式（在这方面它既具代表性又显特殊），而是因为对其记忆的重现尤其能阐明我们的研究主旨。
Let me begin once more with a leading example: 让我们再次从一个典型事例开始：
My shirt rubs against my shoulder one warm afternoon and I am suddenly reminded of the way a certain person used to place her hand on my shoulder 某个温暖的午后，衬衫摩擦着我的肩膀，突然间令我想起某人曾将手搭在我肩上的触感
while we were making love. The touch of her hand combined insistence with tenderness, and intimacy with a certain aloofness. The touch was warm but not oppressively hot, and it took place by a gentle grasping action involving the whole hand. I now experience the remembered touch as being subtly thrilling in its immediacy and in its positioning on my shoulder (it fits my shoulder in a very precise way). This particular body memory brings with it a vivid sense of the affection we once felt for each other. It also, by the closeness which it embodies, serves to dissolve the distance that now separates us. 在我们做爱时。她手的触碰既坚持又温柔，亲密中带着一丝疏离。那触感温暖却不灼热，整个手掌轻柔地包裹着。此刻回忆中的触碰仍让我感到微妙悸动——它如此直接，又恰好落在我肩头（与我的肩膀完美契合）。这段特殊的身体记忆生动地唤起了我们曾经对彼此的爱意。通过它所体现的亲密感，也消融了如今横亘在我们之间的距离。
Especially noteworthy in such an erotic body memory are the following features: 在这种情欲身体记忆中尤其值得注意的是以下特征：
(1) There is a sensuously specific source of bodily pleasure as remembered. This pleasure occurs at a quite definite site: i.e., the upper surface of my shoulder. This ties the experience down not only to a particular part of my body but to a special sensory modality, since it is my shoulder as touched that is at stake in this body memory. (1) 记忆中的身体快感具有感官上的具体来源。这种快感发生在非常明确的部位：即我的肩膀上部表面。这不仅将体验锚定在我身体的特定部位，还关联到特殊的感官模式，因为在这个身体记忆中，关键在于被触摸的肩膀。
(2) The bodily remembered touch is intrinsically pleasure-giving: the pleasure does not follow the experience but belongs to it as ingredient in it. Whereas I can often separate the performance of a skill from the exact movements of the body parts that effect it, it is not an easy matter to identify remembered erotic pleasure in separation from the precise place in which it occurred-a “place,” moreover, which may coincide with my body as a whole. (2) 身体所记忆的触摸本质上是带来愉悦的：快感并非伴随体验而来，而是作为内在成分属于体验本身。虽然我经常能将技能表现与实现该技能的身体部位精确动作分离开来，但若要将记忆中的情欲快感与其发生的精确位置——这个"位置"甚至可能与我的整个身体重合——分离开来辨认，则并非易事。
(3) In the same vein, it is difficult to draw any strict dividing line in such a memory between myself-as-being-touched by the other and the other-astouching me. The two of us form a dyadic pair who collaborate in the experience as it was once lived and is now being remembered. The members of this dyad are so intimately interlocked that I cannot say for sure where one leaves off and the other begins: the touched and the toucher merge in a phenomenon of interpersonal “reversibility.” ^(28){ }^{28} Each of us share in a genuinely common process that cannot be remembered without including both of us. Such dovetailing of self and other is rarely accomplished in other types of body memory. (3) 同理，在这种记忆中很难严格划分"被他人触碰的我"与"触碰我的他人"之间的界限。我们二人构成了一个二元组合，共同协作重现那段既经历又被铭记的体验。这对组合成员如此紧密交织，以至于我无法确切分辨彼此的界限：被触碰者与触碰者融入了人际"可逆性"现象之中。 ^(28){ }^{28} 我们每个人都参与了这个真正共有的过程，任何回忆都必然同时包含双方。这种自我与他者的榫卯契合在其他类型的身体记忆中鲜少实现。
(4) An important aspect of erotic body memory is found in the way in which this particular body memory arose: namely, by what we could call “memorial mimetism.” Just as two lovers often imitate each other’s gestures-a move of one calls for a like move of the other-so a non-erotic body experience seems suddenly to resemble an explicitly erotic experience of the body. Thus being touched on the shoulder by my shirt was immediately assimilated to being touched by a lover in the same place. In our natural eagerness to reexperience sensual pleasure we tend to draw together even quite disparate experiences or entities (here a shirt and a hand), provided only that the same （4）情欲身体记忆的一个重要方面体现在这种特殊身体记忆的生成方式上：即通过我们可称之为"记忆模仿"的机制。正如恋人常常模仿彼此的姿势——一方的某个动作会引发另一方类似的回应——一个非情欲的身体体验会突然变得与明确的情欲体验相似。因此衬衫触碰我肩膀的触感，立即被同化为爱人在同一部位的触碰。出于重新体验感官愉悦的自然渴望，我们倾向于将截然不同的体验或实体（此处是衬衫与手掌）联系起来，只要
part of the body is at play (in this case the shoulder) or at least the same sense of how it is experienced. 涉及身体的相同部位（本例中是肩膀），或至少具有相同的体验方式。
Let us consider certain still more general structures of erotic body memories: 让我们考察情欲身体记忆中某些更为普遍的结构：
INTERSENSORY EQUIVALENCE 感官间的对等
Merleau-Ponty observed that various bodily parts can stand in for one another to the point of becoming symbolic equivalents. This is dramatically illustrated in many erotic body memories, where there is a fluid interchange of parts of the body and an open movement between them. The interchange occurs to a much more considerable degree than in habitual body memories, which allow for only a limited substitutability of parts: e.g., right hand for left hand, a leg for an arm, etc. It also contrasts with traumatic body memories, in which the focus is often on a single component or aspect of the lived body. Neither in habitual nor in traumatic body memories is there anything like the free transfer of libido that occurs in erotic body memories, in which one body part can be exchanged with almost any other part in a virtually unfettered fashion. 梅洛-庞蒂注意到，身体的不同部位可以相互替代，甚至成为象征性的等价物。这一点在许多情欲身体记忆中表现得尤为显著——身体部位之间存在着流动的互换性，彼此间呈现开放的运动状态。这种互换程度远超习惯性身体记忆所允许的有限替代性（例如右手替代左手、腿部替代手臂等），也与创伤性身体记忆形成鲜明对比——后者往往聚焦于活体身体的单一组成部分。无论是习惯性还是创伤性身体记忆，都不存在情欲身体记忆中那种力比多的自由转移状态：在情欲记忆里，几乎任何身体部位都能以近乎无拘无束的方式相互置换。
A closely related facet of erotic body memories is the way in which movement between bodily parts can be summative and not merely substitutive. In such memories a shoulder can give rise to a hip and the latter to a breast in an exquisitely additive fashion. Instead of existing in competition with, or as compensation for, each other, these bodily parts constitute an erotic chain of heightening delight as their interconnections are taken up again in memory. How can this be? It is due to the fact that erotic pleasure arises from multiple sensory modalities: touch, sight, odor, hearing, etc. These modalities become genuinely intersensory in erotic activity, which serves to connect what might remain merely disparate in habitual or traumatic situations. This is not to deny distinct personal preferences in sensory modality; but it needs to be underlined that such preferences are subserved by a network of intersensory nodal points encountered in the course of erotic activity. These nodal points-i.e., particular touches, sights, and soundsallow for variation in the pursuit even of the most preoccupying erotic aim, including orgasm itself, one of whose primary pleasures consists precisely in the fact that it is not reached by a single sensory route alone. 情色身体记忆的一个密切相关的方面在于，身体部位之间的运动可以具有累积性，而不仅仅是替代性。在此类记忆中，肩膀可以引发臀部，而臀部又能以精妙的叠加方式唤起乳房。这些身体部位并非相互竞争或彼此补偿，而是构成了一条愉悦不断强化的情色链条，当它们的相互关联在记忆中被重新唤起时尤其如此。为何会如此？这是因为情色快感源自多重感官模式：触觉、视觉、气味、听觉等。这些模式在情色活动中真正实现了跨感官融合，从而连接了那些在习惯性或创伤性情境中可能保持分离的状态。这并非否认个人对特定感官模式的偏好；但需要强调的是，这些偏好背后存在着情色活动中遇到的跨感官节点网络的支持。 这些节点——即特定的触感、视觉和听觉——允许在最令人全神贯注的性爱目标（包括高潮本身）的追求中存在变化，而高潮的主要快感之一恰恰在于它并非仅通过单一感官途径达到。
REMEMBERED EROTIC PLEASURE 记忆中的情欲快感
It is crucial to keep in mind the distinction between erotic bodily pleasure as it was originally felt and the pleasure we are now taking in remembering this proto-pleasure. However vivid the original pleasure may have been, it is exceedingly difficult to recapture. This is apparent in the sense of loss and attendant nostalgia to which we are prone when we remember making love with someone to whom we were formerly close. Thus the “after-pleasure” of an erotic body memory cannot claim to be an adequate replication of its 必须牢记最初体验到的身体情欲快感与我们现在通过回忆这种原始快感所获得的愉悦之间的区别。无论原始快感多么鲜活，要重新捕捉它都极其困难。当我们回忆起与曾经亲密之人做爱的情景时，那种失落感及随之而来的怀旧情绪便充分说明了这一点。因此，情欲身体记忆的"后续快感"不能声称是其原型的充分复制。
prototype. Such dependent and late pleasure is a pleasure in and by deferment. 这种依赖性的延迟快感，本质上是一种通过延宕而获得的愉悦。
Erotic body memory here resembles traumatic body memory insofar as both call for a distinction between a primary and a belated phase. But erotic memories rarely exhibit any significant analogue of the reversal from pain to eventual pleasure that we observed in traumatic memories. Rather than such a reversal (or its opposite, from pleasure to pain), the original pleasure in an erotic experience tends to sustain itself in its bodily remembrancethough it is certainly subject to dilution or even to suspension (e.g., when the personal relationship on which it is based has gone awry). But for the most part traumatic body memories convey to us a diminished sense of well-being, while erotic body memories serve to underscore our sense of robust intactness. 在此，情欲身体记忆与创伤身体记忆相似，两者都需要区分初始阶段与延迟阶段。但与我们在创伤记忆中观察到的从痛苦最终转为愉悦的显著逆转不同，情欲记忆很少表现出类似的显著转变。情欲体验中的原始愉悦往往能在身体记忆中自我维持——尽管它确实可能被稀释甚至中断（例如当其所依托的人际关系出现裂痕时）。但总体而言，创伤身体记忆传递给我们的是幸福感减损的体验，而情欲身体记忆则强化着我们生机勃勃的完整感。
INTERPERSONAL ASPECTS 人际维度
Erotic body memories have the peculiarity that they offer two distinct possibilities so far as the self/other relationship is concerned. On the one hand, they may evoke an explicit sense of the other’s bodily presence, which is remembered and valued as such: just this posture in foreplay, just that thigh, just those sighs when excited, etc. In such cases, my memories focus explicitly on the other, and I tend to recall this person in terms of distinctive differences between us, whether these differences spring from basic differences of gender, personality, or whatever. On the other hand, instead of focusing on the other qua other in my erotic body memories, I may concentrate on the relationship itself: on just how it felt to be with the other in various activities and postures. In this event, the particular contours of the other matter mainly as contributing to a situation of mutual satisfaction. Similarly, my own positions and movements are not remembered in isolation but only as part of the interpersonal complex designatable as “myself-cum-other-in-erotic-interplay-together.” A double transcendence-of myself and the other as separate erotic entities-is effected in the realization of this complex. The result is a bivalent remembering that escapes the radical singularization of so much nonerotic remembering. In its characteristically dyadic and diffuse manner, erotic body memory is located midway between the alienation inherent in an individual’s self-safeguarded recollections and the community realized in a group’s genuinely collective remembering. 情欲身体记忆具有一种特殊性，它们在自我/他者关系方面提供了两种截然不同的可能性。一方面，这些记忆可能唤起对他者身体存在的明确感知——某个前戏中的特定姿态、某条大腿的触感、兴奋时特有的喘息等等，这些细节被原原本本地铭记与珍视。在此类情形中，我的记忆明确聚焦于他者，往往通过我们之间的显著差异来回忆这个人，无论这些差异源于性别、性格或其他根本区别。另一方面，在我的情欲身体记忆中，与其关注作为他者的对方，不如说我可能更专注于关系本身：在各种活动和姿态中与对方共处时的独特感受。此时，他者的具体特征主要作为促成相互满足情境的要素而存在。 同样地，我自身的姿态与动作并非被孤立地忆起，而是作为"自我与他者在情欲交融中共存"这一人际复合体的组成部分被唤起。当这个复合体被实现时，一种双重超越便产生了——将自我与他者作为独立情欲实体的双重超越。由此形成的是一种双重性的记忆，它摆脱了众多非情欲记忆中那种极端的单一性。情欲身体记忆以其特有的二元弥散特性，既不同于个体自我保护式回忆中固有的疏离感，也区别于群体真正集体记忆所实现的共同体意识，而是居于两者之间的中间地带。
ANTICIPATORY DIMENSION 预期性维度
One of the most distinctive features of erotic body memories is their actively anticipatory aspect. They propel us forward toward a future of possible sensual satisfaction that is patterned on satisfaction in the past. We rarely bask in such memories idly or innocently: even when they are not being employed expressly as a means of self-arousal, they evoke in us the projection of a possible repetition. This inbuilt futurism contrasts with the implicit temporality of traumatic body memories, where our concern with a point of 情欲身体记忆最显著的特征之一是其积极的预期性。它们推动我们朝着一种可能获得感官满足的未来前进，这种满足模式源自过去的体验。我们很少会单纯被动或天真地沉浸于这类记忆中：即便没有明确将其用作自我唤起的手段，它们也会在我们内心唤起对可能重复体验的投射。这种内在的未来主义与创伤性身体记忆隐含的时间性形成鲜明对比——后者中我们关注的是某个特定时刻
origin often reflects a dread of recurrence-and thus a future to-be-avoided rather than one to-be-sought. Erotic body memories are in this respect more like habitual body memories, which are realized by the body in the process of carrying out various particular projects-say, swimming the breaststroke, driving a Model T around an island, speaking in a foreign language. ^(29){ }^{29} The difference is found in the fact that the aim to be achieved in habitual body memories is strictly defined by a practical context of swimming, driving, speaking; the habitual body is exclusively engaged in what Heidegger has called an ‘in-order-to’ ( um-zuu m-z u ) relation: I am doing this (activity, practice) so as to accomplish that (aim, goal). ^(30){ }^{30} 对起源的恐惧往往反映出对重现的畏惧——因而是一种需要避免而非追寻的未来。就这一点而言，情欲身体记忆更类似于习惯性身体记忆，后者是身体在执行各种具体活动过程中实现的——比如游蛙泳、驾驶 T 型车环岛行驶、用外语交谈。两者的区别在于：习惯性身体记忆所要达成的目标严格受限于游泳、驾驶、说话等实际情境；习惯性身体完全沉浸在海德格尔所称的"为之故"（Um-zu）关系中：我从事这项（活动、实践）是为了达成那个（目的、目标）。
Erotic body memories are not easily subsumed into any such manifestly instrumental roles in the pursuit of practical projects. Instead of the in-order-to, their characteristic relation is the ‘just-as’: just as this past pleasure was remarkably (or moderately, etc.) good, to experience it again would be just as good (or still better). The future of re-enactment or continuation is not a final stage in an instrumentally defined process; rather than being valued for its actuality, it is esteemed for its status as a possibility: as leading us into an open future of possible pleasures of the same or similar type. We aim at these pleasures in their very possibility, and we do so out of our remembering of past prototypes-which provide for us the “repeatable possibilities” of our erotic existence. ^(31){ }^{31} These possibilities are multiplied not only because of the unknown status of the future but also because of the ready transposability of erotic pleasures from one part of the body to another. If we do not know just what to expect, we can eagerly anticipate new avatars of combination and interchange. ^(32){ }^{32} The anticipatory dimension of erotic bodily memories means, in short, that the actual cedes place to the possible, the habitual to the novel, the uniquely traumatic to the indefinitely pleasurable. 情欲的身体记忆不易被归入任何此类明显工具性的角色，以追求实际目标。它们特有的关系不是"为了什么"，而是"正如"：正如过去的愉悦是格外（或适度等）美好的，再次体验它也会同样美好（或更加美好）。重演或延续的未来并非工具性定义过程中的最终阶段；与其因其现实性而被重视，它更因其作为一种可能性的地位而受到珍视：引领我们进入相同或类似类型的可能愉悦的开放未来。我们瞄准这些愉悦本身的可能性，这样做是出于对过去原型的记忆——这些原型为我们提供了情欲存在的"可重复可能性"。 ^(31){ }^{31} 这些可能性之所以倍增，不仅因为未来的未知状态，还因为情欲愉悦可以轻易地从身体的一个部位转移到另一个部位。如果我们不知道具体期待什么，我们可以热切期待组合与互换的新化身。 ^(32){ }^{32} 简而言之，情欲身体记忆的预期维度意味着：现实让位于可能，习惯让位于新奇，独特的创伤让位于无限的欢愉。
RECENT VERSUS REMOTE ORIGINS 近期起源与遥远起源
We tend to divide erotic body memories into those that are recent and those that are more remote in origin. The two kinds present themselves to us as distinctively different. Recent erotic memories often still resonate or “tingle” in us. No revival is needed, much less any recollection: they are the bodily equivalent of primary memory, both forming an active fringe around the living present. It is as if an entire recent episode were still happening at some margin of our corporeal life; consequently, much of its affective and sensory specificity is also felt to be continuing. Long-term erotic memories, on the other hand, tend to lack such specificity and even to become stereotypical in status: “myself kissing Jan Stewart on the outskirts of Abilene.” Such memories can certainly be forceful and enduring-as is this Abilene memory, which happened over twenty-five years ago-but it lives on only in an emblematic format, characteristically compressed into just one episode: kissing Jan on a moonlit night while the two of us were standing by the car I 我们倾向于将情欲的身体记忆划分为近期与久远两类。这两类记忆呈现给我们的面貌截然不同。近期的情欲记忆往往仍在体内共鸣或"震颤"，无需唤醒，更不必刻意追忆：它们相当于身体层面的初级记忆，共同构成当下生命体验的活跃边缘。仿佛整个近期事件仍在肉体生命的某个边界持续发生；因此，其大部分情感与感官特质也被感知为持续存在。而长期的情欲记忆则往往缺乏这种具体性，甚至趋于模式化："我在阿比林市郊亲吻简·斯图尔特的情景"。这类记忆固然可能强烈而持久——正如这个发生在二十五年前的阿比林记忆——但它仅以象征形式存续，通常被压缩为单一场景：月光下我们站在我的车旁亲吻简。
had borrowed for the evening. In view of the paucity of detail in such a case, it is not surprising that we seek to supplement what we remember bodily by conventional recollections, recourse to diaries, and other sorts of testimonial evidence. ^(33){ }^{33} 当晚借来的书。鉴于此类案例中细节的匮乏，我们试图通过常规回忆、查阅日记及其他形式的佐证来补充身体记忆的不足，也就不足为奇了。
NARRATIVITY 叙事性
The three types of body memory so far distinguished differ decisively with regard to this last characteristic. Habitual body memories are largely indifferent to a narrative account: their being resides much more in their current efficacity than in any narratizable historicity which they may possess. Their strongly repetitive character, moreover, discourages interest in the kind of historical account that calls for narration. Traumatic body memories, on the other hand, call naturally for a narration of their history. This is due partly to their highly episodic character and partly to our concern about their exact origins. As a result, we often find ourselves recounting an experience of body trauma in narrative terms: telling its story from the moment of the original trauma up to the present moment of remembrance. 迄今区分的三种身体记忆类型在最后这一特征上存在决定性差异。习惯性身体记忆基本与叙事描述无关：其存在更依赖于当下的实效性，而非任何可被叙述的历史性。此外，其强烈的重复性特征也削弱了人们对需要叙事的历史描述的兴趣。而创伤性身体记忆则天然要求对其历史进行叙述，这既源于其高度片段化的特性，也源于我们对创伤确切起源的关切。因此，我们常会发现自己以叙事方式重述身体创伤经历：从最初创伤发生的那一刻起，直至当下回忆的瞬间，完整讲述这段故事。
Neither of these extremes-one deeply resistant to narration, the other insistently calling for it-is characteristic of erotic body memories. These do not resist narration in any tenacious way; indeed, they often suggest stories and may be woven effectively into larger narrative units. Nevertheless, there is no implicit imperative to narrate them, since they are often fully satisfying precisely in a fragmentary format. In fact, the content of much such remembering consists in fragments: this sense of being touched on the shoulder, that move in foreplay, a given body aroma, a particular perception of bodies interacting. Each of these suffices in itself, indeed is the memory in question, and does not call for a supervening narrative structure. The detail, in other words, is memorable just as detail and not because the detail is part of some more encompassing story. Even when we suspect that it does belong to such a story, our primary interest does not reside in knowing precisely how it does so: we leave any such concern to situations of reminiscence or recollection. 这两种极端——一种强烈抗拒叙述，另一种则迫切要求叙述——都不是情欲身体记忆的特征。它们不会以任何顽固的方式抵制叙述；事实上，它们常常暗示着故事，并能有效地融入更大的叙事单元。然而，并不存在必须叙述它们的隐含要求，因为它们往往以片段形式就足以令人完全满足。实际上，这类记忆的内容多由碎片构成：肩膀被触碰的感觉、前戏中的某个动作、特定的体香、对身体互动的特殊感知。每一个片段本身就已足够，实际上就是所讨论的记忆本身，并不需要更高层次的叙事结构。换言之，细节之所以难忘，正是因其作为细节本身，而非因为它是某个更宏大故事的一部分。即便我们怀疑它确实属于某个故事，我们的主要兴趣也不在于确切了解它如何融入其中：我们将这类考量留给追忆或回想的情境。
V
It is becoming clear that body memory is by no means the same thing as the memory of the perception of the body, which is a highly mixed form of remembering that includes among other things a component of recognizing (e.g., when one remembers perceiving oneself as younger in some particular physical aspect). This is not surprising: given that the human body is such a richly expressive vehicle, its perception will be anything but simple. The body as perceived, and hence the body remembered-as-perceived, will incorporate multiple layers of meaning and structure, calling for a complex 越来越明显的是，身体记忆绝不等同于对身体感知的记忆，后者是一种高度混合的回忆形式，其中包含诸多要素，比如识别成分（例如当人们回忆起自己在某些身体特征上显得更年轻时）。这并不令人意外：鉴于人体是如此丰富的表达载体，对其的感知绝不简单。被感知的身体，以及因此被记忆为被感知的身体，将包含多重意义和结构层次，需要一种复杂的
mode of apprehension. Not only recognition but also recollection will figure into such remembering; so too will place memory inasmuch as bodies are always perceived as occupying particular places. Here we do not encounter anything distinctively different from other situations of remembering in which mixed modes are called for-say, in remembering paintings one has seen or books one has read. 理解模式。在这种回忆中，不仅识别会发挥作用，回忆也会；同样，由于身体总是被感知为占据特定位置，场所记忆也将参与其中。这里我们遇到的与其他需要混合记忆模式的情境并无本质区别——比如回忆看过的画作或读过的书籍。
Body memory itself, however, is a unique form of remembering and not a mere composite entity. It has its own comparatively autonomous operation; ^(34){ }^{34} it is not a substitute for another kind of remembering or a stage in the realization of some overarching mnemonic telos. However much its specific schemata may change over time, and however much it is vulnerable to the incursions of accident or disease, ^(35){ }^{35} it is present throughout life. It is thus not just something we merely have; it is something we are: that constitutes us as we exist humanly in the world. 然而，身体记忆本身是一种独特的回忆形式，而非简单的复合体。它拥有相对自主的运作机制； ^(34){ }^{34} 它既非其他记忆形式的替代品，也非实现某种宏大记忆目的过程中的某个阶段。无论其具体图式如何随时间改变，无论它多么容易遭受意外或疾病的侵袭， ^(35){ }^{35} 它都贯穿我们的一生。因此它不仅是我们所拥有的东西，更是我们存在的本质：正是它构成了我们作为人类存在于世的方式。
If this is indeed the case, we should expect body memory to possess its own set of types and its own group of general traits. That it has its own typology has already emerged in the preceding delineation of habitual, traumatic, and erotic body memories. What has not yet emerged is any sense of general traits which qualify these types by subtending each in some significant respect. Let us therefore proceed to consider such traits. Their consideration will help to knit together much that has so far remained scattered. 若事实确是如此，我们理应认为身体记忆具备其独特的类型体系与普遍特征。前文对习惯性、创伤性和情欲性身体记忆的阐述已揭示其类型学特征。但尚未呈现的是那些能通过重要维度支撑各类身体记忆的普遍特质。让我们就此展开探讨，这些特质的梳理将有助于整合目前仍显零散的论述。
Marginality 边缘性
Body memories tend to situate themselves on the periphery of our lives so as not to preoccupy us in the present. By “periphery” I do not mean to imply that such memories are of peripheral importance; on the contrary, they are of quite central significance: we could not be who we are, nor do what we do, without them. But the fact remains that bodily remembering assumes for the most part a marginal position vis-à-vis our most pressing concerns-and is all the more effective for doing so. A body memory works most forcefully and thoroughly when, rather than dominating, it recedes from the clamor of the present. As marginal, it belongs to the latent or tacit dimension of our being. In the language of Gestalt psychology, it is a field factor, part of the ground of our experience rather than an explicitly highlighted figure. How this is so will become evident upon a brief review of the three types of body memory identified in preceding sections: 身体记忆往往栖居在我们生活的边缘地带，以免过度占据当下的注意力。这里所说的"边缘"并非指这类记忆无关紧要；恰恰相反，它们具有核心意义：若没有这些记忆，我们将无法成为现在的自己，也无法完成日常行为。但事实是，相对于我们最迫切的关注点，身体记忆大多处于边缘位置——而正是这种边缘性使其更具效力。当身体记忆从当下的喧嚣中退场而非占据主导时，其作用反而最为深刻彻底。作为边缘存在，它属于我们存在状态中潜在或默会的维度。用格式塔心理学的话说，它是场域因素，构成我们经验的背景而非被明确凸显的图形。通过简要回顾前文所述的三种身体记忆类型，这一点将变得显而易见：
HABITUAL BODY MEMORIES 习惯性身体记忆
These are perhaps the most fully marginal memories we possess. Part of the very meaning of “habitual” is to be so deeply ingrained in our behavior as not to need explicit recalling. To become habitual is to become part of the stock of our resources on which we can draw effortlessly. Such is the fate of most of our habits and thus of the habitual body which supports them. 这些或许是我们所拥有的最为边缘化的记忆。"习惯性"的部分核心含义，就是如此深刻地融入我们的行为之中，以至于无需刻意回忆。成为习惯，就意味着成为我们资源储备的一部分，可以毫不费力地调用。这正是我们大多数习惯的命运，也是支撑这些习惯的习惯性身体的宿命。
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the habitual body as an “incontestable acquisition,” a “general function.” ^(36){ }^{36} Particular bodily activities can be regarded as condensations or precipitations out of the habitual body, which provides a pervasive background layer to our lives. If such a background were to be explicitly remembered, it might well become intrusive and disorientingwhereas, precisely as marginal, it is the immediate basis for all becomingoriented in the world as well as for all stabilization there. Whether we take the habitual to be the strictly habit-bound or the merely recurrent-or, as Dewey suggests, as the innovatively habituating ^(37){ }^{37}-the remembering associated with it is in every case an implicit activity working in ways of which we are barely conscious: hence the inappropriateness of applying to it any strictly mentalistic model such as that of act intentionality. Only in situations of breakdown or when expressly retraining ourselves are we brought face to face with the exact form of its operative intentionality. The very efficacity and regulated character of this intentionality prosper in a situation of twilight consciousness-when we remember very well how to undertake certain actions without necessarily remembering that we did so successfully on any particular occasions in the past. 梅洛-庞蒂将习惯性身体描述为一种"无可争议的习得"和"普遍功能"。具体身体活动可被视为从习惯性身体中凝结或沉淀而出的产物，这种习惯性身体构成了我们生活的普遍背景层。若这种背景被明确记起，很可能会变得侵扰性且令人迷失方向——而恰恰作为边缘存在，它构成了我们在世界中定向与稳定的直接基础。无论我们将习惯性理解为严格受习惯约束的、仅是重复发生的，还是如杜威所言具有创新性习惯养成特征的——与之相关的记忆活动在每种情况下都是一种隐性运作，其运作方式几乎不为我们所觉察：因此将任何严格心智主义模型（如行为意向性模型）应用于此都不恰当。只有在崩溃情境中或当我们刻意重新训练自己时，才会直面其运作意向性的确切形式。 这种意向性的高效与规范特性在朦胧意识状态下最为活跃——我们清楚记得如何执行某些动作，却不必具体回忆过去任何特定场合是否成功完成过。
TRAUMATIC BODY MEMORIES 创伤性身体记忆
These are marginal for the readily understandable reason that making them thematic is to remind ourselves of pain once undergone-and perhaps undergone again upon its very remembrance. It is only too natural that we seek to avoid the full replay of such memories by confining them to the most peripheral position possible in our conscious life. Or we may attempt to transform their initial sting into an after-glow that calls for a complacent contemplation. Either way, we try to forestall a situation in which such memories might become preoccupying; a set of defenses, and sometimes an elaborate system of avoidances, is constructed so as to isolate, deny, split, project, or outright repress the painful content of these memories: all of which can be considered strategies of marginalizing. ^(38){ }^{38} 这些记忆之所以边缘化，原因显而易见：将其主题化就等于让我们重温曾经承受的痛苦——甚至可能在回忆时再次经历。我们本能地试图通过将这些记忆压制到意识最边缘来避免其完整重现。或者，我们可能尝试将其最初的刺痛转化为可供悠然品味的余晖。无论哪种方式，我们都在竭力防止这类记忆占据主导；为此构建起一系列防御机制，有时甚至是精密的回避系统，用以隔离、否认、割裂、投射或彻底压抑这些记忆的痛苦内容：所有这些都可视为边缘化策略。 ^(38){ }^{38}
EROTIC BODY MEMORIES 情欲身体记忆
These, it would seem, have no basis for being or remaining marginal. Why would we wish to hold in abeyance anything so inherently pleasurable as these memories? I have already remarked on how much less overtly defensive we are toward erotic activity as remembered-indeed, often less so than toward such activity as currently encountered! Nevertheless, apart from those occasions on which such memories would be distractions from work or other concerns, there is one important sense in which they are indeed marginal: a sense that leads us to expand the scope of marginality itself. I am thinking of the fact that erotic body memories have more to do with the possible than with the actual. They bear, as I have tried to indicate, on what is indefinite and undetermined in erotic experience. Rather than merely recapitulating what has gone before, they suggest to us new dimensions and 这些记忆似乎本就不该被边缘化。我们为何要将如此本真愉悦的体验悬置起来？前文已论及，相较于当下经历的性爱活动，我们对记忆中的情欲体验往往怀有更少的显性防御——事实上常常更为坦然！不过除了那些会干扰工作或其他要务的特殊情境，情欲身体记忆确实在某个重要维度上具有边缘性：这个维度将促使我们重新思考边缘性本身的范畴。我指的是这类记忆更关乎可能性而非现实性。正如我试图揭示的，它们承载着情欲体验中那些未定型的、未完成的面向。它们并非简单复现过往，而是向我们展现着情欲世界的新维度与
new directions in our bodily being: this is why, beyond their purely pleasurable aspect, they can play a liberating role. Their comparative indifference to questions of efficient historical causality, most directly manifested in the spontaneity of their contents, makes possible that anticipatory dimension that we found to be so critical in our experience of them; and this dimension is itself arrayed with branching possibilities. For erotic body memories lead us into the marginal qua possible: into a horizon of the not-yet encircling our actuality-bound lives. In contrast with the margin provided by the habitual-a deeply sedimented layer of the permanently possessedthe margin adumbrated by the erotic (indeed, by the hedonic broadly speaking) is projective of the still-to-come: the always-already-there is supplemented by the marginality of the ahead-of-ourselves, where certain possibilities might be realized. Much as I enjoy basking in erotism already accomplished, this very basking takes me into a future of so far unfulfilled pleasure. 我们身体存在的新方向：这正是为何，除了纯粹的愉悦层面，它们还能扮演解放者的角色。它们对历史因果效验问题的相对漠然——最直接体现在其内容的自发性上——使得那种前瞻性维度成为可能，我们在体验中发现这一维度至关重要；而这一维度本身又蕴含着诸多分支可能性。因为情欲的身体记忆将我们引向作为可能性的边缘：引向一个环绕着我们受现实束缚生活的"尚未"之境。与习惯提供的边缘——那永久拥有的深层积淀——不同，情欲（广义而言即快感）所勾勒的边缘投射着"尚未到来"：那"始终已在"被"超前于自身"的边缘性所补充，在此某些可能性或将实现。尽管我沉醉于已成事实的情欲，这种沉醉本身却将我带向尚未实现的愉悦未来。
A general remark suggests itself here. In the realm of body memory almost everything is marginal from the very start. Even if the lived body is the center of our active experience, as remembered it is continually being displaced into a dim backland of apprehension. The paradox is that body memory is rarely of the body as an explicit focus memorius. Contrast this situation with that obtaining in recollection, which is often expressly aware of itself as an act of mind. Even when such self-awareness is itself marginal, little else is. It is a striking fact that only one aspect of what I called the “mnemonic presentation” in Part One is marginal in status: namely, the “aura.” The aura alone is permitted to be radically indistinct, whereas the expectation is that the remainder of what we recollect will be lucidly set forth before us in clear mnemonic consciousness. This is a far cry indeed from the circumstance we encounter in body memories, which are pervaded by marginality at every significant level. 这里可以提出一个总体性的观察。在身体记忆的领域里，几乎一切从一开始就处于边缘地带。即使活生生的身体是我们主动体验的中心，但作为被记忆的对象，它不断被推移到感知的模糊背景中。吊诡的是，身体记忆很少将身体本身作为明确的记忆焦点。这与回忆中的情形形成鲜明对比——回忆往往明确意识到自身是心智活动。即便这种自我意识本身处于边缘，其他方面也很少如此。值得注意的是，我在第一部分所称的"记忆呈现"中，只有"氛围"这一方面处于边缘状态。唯独氛围被允许彻底模糊不清，而我们预期回忆的其他内容都会在清晰的记忆意识中明晰地呈现。这与我们在身体记忆中所遭遇的情形相去甚远——身体记忆在每个重要层面都弥漫着边缘性。
Density and Depth 密度与深度
Closely related to marginality is the singular fact that most body memories come to us as notably dense in felt quality: as bearing a high specific gravity. This density is experienced in such qualities as the massive, the opaque, the involuntary, the inarticulate. It is as if the density of body memories, their rootedness in the heft, the thick palpability of the lived body, rendered them mute. My own efforts above attest that they can be put into words, but it is also evident that they do not lend themselves to facile verbalization. 与边缘性密切相关的一个独特事实是：大多数身体记忆都以异常浓烈的情感质地呈现——仿佛承载着极高的比重。这种密度体现为厚重、晦涩、非自主、难以言说等特质。身体记忆的密度，它们根植于生活身体的重量与厚重可触性，似乎使它们陷入缄默。我前文的努力证明它们可以被言说，但显然它们并不轻易屈从于流利的语言表达。
One basic reason why it is so difficult to tease out the structures of body memory-and a reason why the subject has been so conspicuously neglected by writers on memory-lies in their initially inchoate form as well as in their recalcitrance to further specification. Now we must confront their very 身体记忆结构之所以如此难以梳理——也是记忆研究者长期显著忽视这一主题的根本原因之一——在于它们最初呈现的混沌形态，以及它们对进一步具体化的抗拒。此刻我们必须直面它们与生俱来的
mutism, which is a feature in its own right and not merely the absence of articulate speech. 缄默特质，这本身就是一种特征，而不仅仅是清晰言语的缺失。
To begin with, the felt density of body memories is itself a direct reflection of the body’s own densely structured being. Quite apart from its role in memory, the lived body possesses an inner opaqueness in all of its activities. Never wholly transparent to itself-even when it is self-focused-it is so deeply engaged in its various involvements as to be virtually selftranscending and thus unknown to itself. Consider only the way in which my hands and entire upper body are just now involved in typing these words: They seem to belong more to the typewriter than to my own torso. Even if these bodily parts become expressive for an observer or for myself on reflection, they do not take themselves to be such. They are so absorbed in the activity of typing itself that they are not felt to have any identity separate from that which their task calls for. Except in illness-when I am forced to pay attention to the body in and by itself-my body is continually engrossed in the world in much the same self-effacing way. This leaves it as an unreflective core at the heart of its own actions. ^(39){ }^{39} 首先，身体记忆所感受到的密度本身就是对身体自身密集结构的直接反映。撇开其在记忆中的作用不谈，活生生的身体在其所有活动中都具有一种内在的不透明性。它从未完全向自身透明——即使当它自我聚焦时——它如此深地卷入各种事务中，以至于几乎自我超越，从而对自身一无所知。只需考虑我的手和整个上半身此刻如何投入打字：它们似乎更多地属于打字机而非我自己的躯干。即使这些身体部位对观察者或反思中的我来说变得富有表现力，它们本身并不这样认为。它们如此专注于打字活动本身，以至于感觉不到任何与任务要求分离的同一性。除了在生病时——当我被迫关注身体本身——我的身体通常都以这种自我消隐的方式持续沉浸于世界中。这使得它成为自身行动中心的一个无反思内核。 ^(39){ }^{39}
Body memories share in this sense of self-opacity which does not even know its own name. Their remove in time from the moment of origin does not endow them with any reflective advantage, much less any tendency to articulate their specific content in words. But their density is not entirely without direction or structure. It is felt as a density in depth. Body memories manifest themselves as continually vanishing into the depths of our corporeal existence-and just as continually welling up from the same depths. This is particularly evident in the case of habitual body memories, which arise from and disappear into the dark interiority of our own bodies. But it is also true of erotic and traumatic memories, each of which exhibits an underside of depth: hence the sense of mystery that attaches to the origin of erotic impulses as well as to the unchartable course of a given trauma. Body memories of all sorts possess an essential dimension of depth. 身体记忆同样具有这种自我晦暗的特性，甚至连自己的名字都无从知晓。它们与源初时刻的时间距离并未赋予任何反思优势，更遑论用语言表述其具体内容的倾向。但其稠密性并非全然无序无构。这种稠密感是向深处沉积的。身体记忆不断消融于我们肉体存在的深渊中——又同样持续地从同个深渊涌现。这在习惯性身体记忆中尤为明显，它们从身体黑暗的内里升起，又消隐于其中。情欲记忆与创伤记忆亦复如是，二者皆展现出深度的暗面：因而情欲冲动的起源与创伤难以测绘的轨迹，都笼罩着神秘色彩。各类身体记忆皆具备深度的本质维度。
By “depth” is not meant Berkeley’s notion of the distance which we infer we would have to travel to reach a predesignated point. ^(40){ }^{40} This is the external depth through which our physical body moves. What is at stake in the density of body memory is the interior depth in which the lived body resides-in short, its own depth. Such depth, as Erwin Straus says, “is not a purely objective phenomenon.” ^(41){ }^{41} It is a felt or phenomenal dimension that is not measurable in any metric units; it is, in Merleau-Ponty’s formulation, “the dimension in which things or elements of things envelop each other.” ^(42){ }^{42} In the case of body memory, the enveloping occurs within the lived body and its immediate ambiance. Here depth supplies a vaguely determined but firmly felt inner horizon for the remembering of habitual movements, erotic play, traumatic injuries-and all else that belongs properly to body memory. 所谓“深度”，并非伯克利所指的我们为抵达预设点而需穿越的推断距离。 ^(40){ }^{40} 那是物理身体移动所经的外部深度。身体记忆密度所涉及的，是生活身体栖居的内在深度——简言之，其自身的深度。正如欧文·斯特劳斯所言，这种深度"并非纯粹客观现象"。 ^(41){ }^{41} 它是可感知的现象维度，无法用任何度量单位测算；用梅洛-庞蒂的话说，这是"事物或事物要素相互包裹的维度"。 ^(42){ }^{42} 就身体记忆而言，这种包裹发生在生活身体及其直接氛围中。在此，深度为习惯动作、情色游戏、创伤性损伤——以及所有真正属于身体记忆的内容——的回忆提供了模糊界定却清晰可感的内部视域。
If the lived body’s movements through depth-as-distance can be described as “horizontal” in their sweeping action, its own intrinsic depth is vertical and is remembered as such. As upright beings we engage in an upward and downward delving into depth: an etherealizing tendency and a gravitating propensity, normally mixed in a delicate balance of aspiring and anchoring. Habitual body memories can be said to draw mainly on the downwardmoving direction of bodily depth-in contrast with erotic memories, which are characteristically upward-moving (“exciting,” “thrilling” are words we apply to them). Between the opposed poles of verticality thereby established, traumatic and other kinds of body memories (e.g., of health and illness) come to be situated. Actual or remembered movement toward either pole represents a mode of self-transcendence out of and into depths which the mind in contemplation or recollection can neither fathom nor abide. 如果将活体在纵深距离中的运动描述为一种"水平"的扫掠动作，那么其内在深度则是垂直的，并以此被记忆。作为直立生命，我们进行着向上与向下探索深度的活动：一种轻盈化的倾向与一种重力牵引的习性，通常以渴望与锚定的精妙平衡相混合。可以说习惯性身体记忆主要利用身体深度的下行方向——与典型上行运动的性爱记忆形成对比（我们常用"刺激""兴奋"等词形容）。在由此建立的垂直性两极之间，创伤与其他类型的身体记忆（如健康与疾病）得以定位。朝向任一极的实际或记忆中的运动，都代表着一种自我超越的模式，从深处跃出又没入深处，这种深度是沉思或回忆中的心智既无法测度也无法驻留的。
In its density, body memory is therefore incurably depth-oriented and depth-affording. In this basic respect it once again differs dramatically from recollection. In recalling, I do not actively connect with the depth of the scene being called back to mind. Instead of moving into its depths, I contemplate its projected, quasi-pictorial distance from myself as a voyeur of the remembered. No such voyeurism occurs in body memory, which takes me directly into what is being remembered. In such remembering, I leave the heights of contemplative recollection and enter the profundity of my own bodily being. It is a matter of immersion in memorial depths beyond-or rather, beneath and before-the two-dimensional flatlands of recollected scenes. 因此，身体记忆在其稠密性中无可救药地趋向深度并赋予深度。这一基本特性使其与回忆再度形成鲜明对比。在回忆时，我并未主动与被唤回脑海的场景深度建立联系。我不曾深入其内部，而是如同记忆的窥视者般，凝视着那些投射出的、与我保持准图像化距离的景象。身体记忆中不存在这种窥视行为——它直接引领我进入被记忆的事物本身。在这样的铭记中，我脱离沉思式回忆的制高点，沉入自身肉体存在的深渊。这关乎对记忆深度的沉浸，那些深度超越——更准确地说，潜藏于并先于——被回忆场景的二维平面。
Co-immanence of Past and Present 过去与当下的共在性
We must pay close attention to the way that the past relates to the present in which body memories are actualized. On the one hand, the past can be regarded as overwhelming this present, captivating it to such an extent that the present seems to be its mere repetition. This is precisely Bergson’s view of “habit memory,” which so completely reinstates its own past that it ends up merely repeating it. On this view the present is the tip of a vast pyramidal past brought to bear upon it, ^(43){ }^{43} and it becomes, in effect, its own past. On the other hand, there is the complementary view that the past exists to become present in body memories. Now the pyramid is inverted, and the main directionality flows outward from the present rather than into it. Here the emphasis is not on how the past insinuates itself into the present but on how it is deployed there and carried on into the future. If habitual body memory seems to exemplify the first model, whereby the past invades the present, erotic body memory appears to illustrate the second situation, in which the past, rather than taking over the present from within, is material for the present (and its future). 我们必须密切关注过去与当下身体记忆被激活的现在之间的关系。一方面，过去可被视为压倒性地支配着当下，将其俘获到如此程度，以至于当下似乎只是过去的重复。这正是柏格森关于"习惯记忆"的观点——它如此完整地复现自身过往，最终仅成为对过去的重复。在这种视角下，当下如同被庞大金字塔式过往压迫的尖端，实际上变成了自身的过往。另一方面，互补性观点认为：过去的存在是为了在身体记忆中成为当下。此时金字塔被倒置，主要方向性从当下向外流动而非向内汇聚。此处重点不在于过去如何悄然渗入当下，而在于它如何在当下展开并延续至未来。如果说习惯性身体记忆似乎印证了第一种模式（即过去入侵当下），那么情欲身体记忆则展现了第二种情形——过去并非从内部接管当下，而是成为当下（及其未来）的素材。
Once more it is instructive to contrast body memory with recollectionand with verbal reminiscing as well. In these latter two activities, we peer resolutely backward toward a past that is felt to have its own independent being: hence the effect of significant distance from the present in both cases. At the most, the act of recollecting and the recollected content, the reminiscing and the reminisced-about can be said to intersect at certain critical points. But by and large there is precious little interfusion of past and present when we represent the past in mental images or words. Of this past Bergson said that it is “essentially that which acts no longer.” ^(44){ }^{44} In body memory, at least in its habitual forms, we have just the opposite circumstance: here the past is fully enacted in the present. As Bergson also remarks, habit memory “no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment.” ^(45){ }^{45} 再次将身体记忆与回忆及言语追忆进行对比颇具启发意义。在后两种活动中，我们坚定地回望过去，感觉那段过去具有独立的存在性：因此两者都体现出与当下存在显著距离感。充其量，回忆行为与被忆内容、追述过程与追述对象只能说在某些关键节点相交汇。但总体而言，当我们用心理意象或语言再现过去时，过去与现在的交融可谓微乎其微。柏格森对此评价道：这种过去"本质上是不再起作用的存在"。 ^(44){ }^{44} 而在身体记忆中（至少在其习惯性形式中），我们遇到的情形恰恰相反：过去在此刻得到了完整的重演。正如柏格森所言，习惯记忆"不再向我们呈现过去，而是将其演绎出来；若仍可称之为记忆，并非因其保存了过往影像，而是它将那些影像的实用效果延续至当下时刻"。 ^(45){ }^{45}
This suggests that in matters of body memory we should speak of immanence rather than of “intersection” between past and present. Instead of taking up a perspective on the past-getting a clearer “view” of it as we often attempt to do in recollection or in reminiscence-in body memories we allow the past to enter actively into the very present in which our remembering is taking place. Moreover, such immanence is a two-way affair: it is an immanence of the past in the present and of the present in the past. Carried to an extreme-an extreme which fully habituated body memories approach-the co-immanence verges on an identity of past and present. But if the two were to become strictly identical, we could no longer speak meaningfully of memory, which calls for the presence, however slight, of some décalage or differential between past and present. How are we to conceive concretely of this requirement? 这表明，在身体记忆的问题上，我们应当谈论"内在性"而非过去与现在之间的"交集"。不同于回忆或追忆时惯常采用的视角——试图对过去获得更清晰的"观照"——在身体记忆中，我们让过去主动融入正在发生记忆行为的当下。更进一步说，这种内在性是双向的：既是过去在当下的内在，也是当下在过去的内在。当这种共在性达到极致——完全习惯化的身体记忆便趋近于此——过去与当下几乎趋于同一。但若二者完全等同，我们就无法有意义地谈论记忆，因为记忆始终要求过去与当下之间存在某种微妙的时差或差异。我们该如何具体理解这一要求呢？
The co-immanence operative in body memory can be formulated as an “effective ingredience within.” This means that in body memories the past is a direct constituent of the present, a constituent mediated neither by image nor by word. By the same token, the present is effectively at work on the past’s very ingression into its own realm: instead of simply repeating this past, it modifies it by extending intentional threads to ever-changing circumstances, much as a pianist extends his or her already acquired skills in playing new and more difficult pieces. In this way the past is prolonged, given a new lease on life. Yet it does not merge entirely with the present into which it is sedimented, since it is modified by this very same present. Perhaps the most apt metaphor for the two-way immanence in question is that of enchevêtrement, complication or éntanglement by an overlapping of elements. These elements overlap in such a way as to leave a residue or remainder which maintains difference in the very context of sameness. It is a matter, in short, of a mutual com-plication of past and present in each other’s fate. 身体记忆中的共内在性可表述为"内在的有效成分"。这意味着在身体记忆中，过去直接构成了当下的组成部分，这种构成既非通过意象也非通过语言中介。同理，当下也切实作用于过去对其自身领域的侵入：它并非简单重复过去，而是通过向不断变化的情境延伸意向线索来修正过去，就像钢琴家通过演奏新曲目和更高难度作品来拓展既有技艺。如此一来，过去得以延续并获得新生。然而它不会完全融入其沉淀其中的当下，因为它正被这个当下所修改。或许最能贴切比喻这种双向内在性的，是元素交叠形成的 enchevêtrement（纠缠）、complication（错综）或éntanglement（缠结）。这些元素的交叠方式会留下残余物或剩余物，在相同的语境中保持差异。简言之，这是过去与现在在彼此命运中的相互 com-plication（共错综）。
This is not to deny important differences in the degree of overlap exhibited by various types of body memory. In habitual body memory we encounter a virtual coincidence with very little remainder (though it would still be mistaken to speak of “repetition” here), whereas in traumatic body memory there is much less overlap (hence the closely associated phenomena of defense and narration, both of which emphasize a greater separation of past from present). In between, we find erotic body memories, which carry the past more resolutely into the future. Despite such differences, we can say of all body memories that the enchevêtrement that they display acts as a cohesive internal bonding in which past and present accomplish unique and lasting forms of intimacy with each other. As the inner and outer horizons of the lived body act to draw its actions into the dense center of its own memories in depth, so the co-immanence of past-cum-present binds this body together in the realm of its self-remembrance. 这并非否认各类身体记忆在重叠程度上存在的重要差异。习惯性身体记忆中我们遭遇的是近乎完全重合的状态（尽管在此谈论"重复"仍属谬误），而创伤性身体记忆的重叠度则低得多（因此伴随防御与叙述这两种密切相关现象，二者都强调过去与当下更显著的分离）。介于两者之间的是情欲身体记忆，它们更为决绝地将过去携入未来。尽管存在这些差异，我们可以断言所有身体记忆所呈现的交织状态，都作为一种凝聚性的内在联结，使过去与当下达成独特而持久的亲密形态。正如活身体的内外视域将其行动拉向自身记忆深处的稠密中心，过去与当下共在的相互内在性，也将这个身体在其自我回忆的领域中紧密联结。
VI
“Density and depth,” “co-immanence of past and present”: these phrases designate respectively the spatiality and temporality of body memories. I have just discussed them as if they were neatly separable-as if they could be given the kind of precise analysis which they receive at the level of world-space and world-time (at which level they are independent variables according to a Newtonian world-view). But is this so? Are the spatial and temporal features of body memories so readily separable from each other? Consider, to begin with, that even the comparatively exact preliminary descriptions given in Part One of this book-where memorial space and time were simply juxtaposed within the “world-frame” of the mnemonic pre-sentation-no longer obtain at this point. In the case of body memory, there is nothing like a limpid plane of presentation, much less a coherent worldframe: these are the very features that we must leave behind as we move from a model in which recollection is paradigmatic to one that allows for the peculiarities of non-recollective remembering. In the latter, spatiality and temporality cannot be held apart any more; they intertwine, realizing a version of that reversibility that has been encountered above in the touched/ touching dyad of erotic body memories. "密度与深度"、"过去与现在的共在性"：这些短语分别指代身体记忆的空间性与时间性。我刚才讨论它们时，仿佛它们是泾渭分明的——仿佛可以对它们进行在世界空间和世界时间层面（根据牛顿世界观，在此层面它们是独立变量）所获得的那种精确分析。但事实果真如此吗？身体记忆的空间特征与时间特征真能如此轻易地分离吗？首先要注意，即便是本书第一部分中那些相对精确的初步描述——在记忆呈现的"世界框架"内将纪念性空间与时间简单并置——此刻也已不再适用。就身体记忆而言，根本不存在什么澄明的呈现平面，更遑论连贯的世界框架：当我们从以回忆为范式的模式转向容纳非回忆性记忆特殊性的模式时，这些恰恰是我们必须摒弃的特征。 在后一种情况下，空间性与时间性已无法割裂；它们相互交织，实现了某种可逆性版本——这种可逆性前文在情色身体记忆的"被触摸/触摸"二元关系中已有体现。
An emblematic example of this active intertwining of space and time occurs in the opening pages of Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past. The narrator, describing his tendency to fall asleep in various postures and to awaken in a state of confusion, offers the following observation: 这种时空主动交织的典型例证见于马塞尔·普鲁斯特《追忆似水年华》的开篇数页。叙述者描述自己以各种姿势入睡并在混沌状态醒来的习惯时，作出了如下观察：
When a man is asleep, he has in a circle round him the chain of the hours, the sequence of the years, the order of the heavenly host. Instinctively, when he awakes, he looks to these, and in an instant reads off his own position on the 当人入睡时，时间的链条、年岁的序列、天体的秩序如同圆环般环绕着他。醒来时，他会本能地环顾这些标记，瞬间便能读出自己在地球表面的位置
earth’s surface and the time that has elapsed during his slumbers; but this ordered procession is apt to grow confused, and to break its ranks. ^(46){ }^{46} 以及沉睡中流逝的时间；但这种有序的队列极易变得混乱，最终分崩离析。 ^(46){ }^{46}
The “ordered procession” is that of place and time in the waking world, where “chain,” “sequence,” and “order” are preserved and where position and date can be directly “read off” as from a presentation to one’s lucid consciousness. But on waking from sleep-itself a species of dense bodily experience-one does not gear easily into such an ordered world of space and time. The liminal state of awakening brings with it a disarray in which space and time are not only disordered but difficult to distinguish from each other: “For it always happened that when I awoke like this, and my mind struggled in an unsuccessful attempt to discover where I was, everything revolved around me through the darkness: things, places, years.” ^(47){ }^{47} Precisely as revolving around the narrator in the darkness, things, places, and years have begun to merge into a confused spatio-temporal mixture in his dawning awareness. "有序行进"指的是清醒世界中的空间与时间秩序，那里保存着"链条"、"序列"与"次序"，人们能像从清晰意识呈现中那样直接"读取"位置与日期。但从睡眠中醒来时——睡眠本身是一种浓重的身体体验——人并不容易立即融入这种有序的时空世界。觉醒的阈限状态伴随着一种混乱，在这种状态中时空不仅失序，而且彼此难分："每当我这样醒来，心智挣扎着试图弄清身在何处却徒劳无功时，万物都在黑暗中围绕我旋转：物件、场所、岁月。" ^(47){ }^{47} 正是当这些事物、地点与年份在黑暗中围绕叙述者旋转时，它们在其初醒的意识中已开始融合为混乱的时空混合物。
It is at just this moment that the narrator’s body memory comes most effectively into play. Only in and through this memory, not through the recollections of daytime consciousness, can significant connections with past things, places, and years arise: 正是在此刻，叙述者的身体记忆开始最有效地发挥作用。唯有通过这种记忆——而非通过白日意识的回忆——才能与过往的事物、地点和岁月建立重要联系：
My body, still too heavy with sleep to move, would endeavour to construe from the pattern of its tiredness the position of its various limbs, in order to deduce therefrom the direction of the wall, the location of the furniture, to piece together and give a name to the house in which it lay. Its memory, the composite memory of its ribs, its knees, its shoulder-blades, offered it a whole series of rooms in which it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen walls, shifting and adapting themselves to the shape of each successive room that it remembered, whirled round it in the dark. And even before my brain, lingering in cogitation over when things had happened and what they had looked like, had reassembled the circumstances sufficiently to identify the room, it, my body, would recall from each room in succession the style of the bed, the position of the doors, the angle at which the sunlight came in at the windows, whether there was a passage outside, what I had had in mind when I went to sleep and found there when I awoke. ^(48){ }^{48} 我的身体仍因睡意沉重而难以动弹，它试图从疲惫的肌理中解读四肢的位置，由此推断墙壁的走向、家具的方位，拼凑并命名此刻栖身的房屋。它的记忆——由肋骨、膝盖与肩胛骨共同编织的记忆——为它展开一连串曾安睡过的房间，而那些无形的墙壁随着记忆里不同房间的形状变换调整，在黑暗中绕着它旋转。甚至在我的大脑还在思索事件发生的时间与样貌、尚未重组足够线索来辨认房间之前，我的身体便已依次忆起每个房间的床榻款式、门扉位置、阳光透窗的角度、门外是否有走廊、入睡时的思绪与醒来时的所见。 ^(48){ }^{48}
Here body memory precedes any concerted “cogitation” over ordered ex-istence-a cogitation which results in the certain identification of things in space and time. Before such identification can occur, familiarity must obtain. Familiarization is the distinctive work of body memory, which is not concerned with the exact identities of things nor with their precise locations in time or space. It is a matter of the approximate positioning of things in experience. (And “things” are not physical only; the narrator’s body recalls what he had had in mind when he went to sleep: here body memory encompasses memory of mind itself!) Far from such approximation being a deficiency in memory, it is for Proust the very condition of the kind of exact 在这里，身体记忆先于任何对有序存在的系统性"思考"——这种思考会导致对时空中的事物进行确定性识别。在这种识别发生之前，必须首先获得熟悉感。熟悉化是身体记忆的独特功能，它不关心事物的确切身份，也不关心它们在时间或空间中的精确位置。它关乎的是事物在经验中的大致定位。（而"事物"不仅指物质对象；叙述者的身体回忆着他入睡时心中的念头：在这里，身体记忆甚至包含了心灵本身的记忆！）这种近似性远非记忆的缺陷，对普鲁斯特而言，它恰恰是实现那种精确记忆的必要条件。
remembering that is aimed at in recollection. Only when the narrator’s body memories of past things, places, and years have been allowed to run their course is he in a position to enter the world-frame of recollection, that is, the content of the novel itself: 回忆所指向的铭记。唯有当叙述者对过往事物、场所与岁月的身体记忆得以自然流淌时，他才能进入回忆的世界框架——亦即小说本身的内容：
My memory had been set in motion; as a rule I did not attempt to go to sleep again at once, but used to spend the greater part of the night recalling our life in the old days at Combray with my great-aunt, at Balbec, Paris, Doncières, Venice, and the rest; remembering again all the places and people I had known, what I had actually seen of them, and what others had told me. ^(49){ }^{49} 我的记忆开始运转；通常我不会立刻尝试重新入睡，而是用大半夜的时间回忆我们从前在贡布雷姑婆家、巴尔贝克、巴黎、东锡埃尔、威尼斯等地的日子，重温所有我熟悉的地方和人物，我对他们的真实印象，以及别人告诉我的关于他们的事情。
In this citation, “memory,” “recalling,” and “remembering” all refer to recollecting, the more or less exact reconstitution in one’s conscious mind of past scenes. Proust ingeniously inverts the usual order of proceeding from the psychical to the physical in matters of memory by showing that the richest route into recollection is through body memory. If so, the latter can no longer be considered derivative or trivial in status; nor can it even be seen as second-best (as it is for Bergson). Not only does it have its own validity and uniqueness, but it ushers in recollection itself in the most auspicious wayas we learn from the narrator’s remembrances of his childhood at Combray, remembrances that begin immediately after the above passage: “At Combray, as every afternoon ended, long before the time when I should have to go to bed and lie there, unsleeping. . . .” ^(50){ }^{50} 在这段引文中，“记忆”、“回忆”和“记住”都指的是在意识中对过去场景进行或多或少准确的重构。普鲁斯特巧妙地颠倒了记忆问题中从心理到物理的通常顺序，他表明通向回忆的最丰富途径是通过身体记忆。如果如此，后者就不能再被视为派生或次要的；甚至不能被视为次优（如伯格森所认为的）。它不仅具有自身的有效性和独特性，而且以最吉祥的方式开启了回忆本身，正如叙述者对康布雷童年时光的回忆所示，这些回忆紧随上述段落之后开始：“在康布雷，每天下午结束时，在我该上床睡觉却辗转难眠之前……” ^(50){ }^{50}
The past that Proust’s body memories brings back is at once spatial and temporal. Before the specific recollections of Combray set in-recollections that carry with them a separability of date and place ^(51){ }^{51}-the narrator’s body is remembering how it was to lie sleepless in his bedroom at Combray: where the “how” precedes the “that” of that it was so as well as the “when” of when it was so. Notice how, in the following passage, the narrator’s body memory merges place and time to the point of inseparability: 普鲁斯特的身体记忆所唤起的过去既是空间的也是时间的。在关于贡布雷的具体回忆涌现之前——这些回忆本身带有日期与地点的可分离性——叙述者的身体正记起躺在贡布雷卧室里失眠时的感受：此处的"如何"既先于"确实如此"的确认，也先于"何时如此"的时间界定。请注意在接下来的段落中，叙述者的身体记忆如何将地点与时间融合至不可分割的程度：
The stiffened side on which I lay would, for instance, in trying to fix its position, imagine itself to be lying face to the wall in a big bed with a canopy; and at once I would say to myself, “Why, I must have fallen asleep before Mamma came to say good night,” for I was in the country at my grandfather’s [i.e., at Combray], who died years ago; and my body, the side upon which I was lying, faithful guardians of a past which my mind should never have forgotten, brought back before my eyes the glimmering flame of the nightlight in its urn-shaped bowl of Bohemian glass that hung by chains from the ceiling, and the chimney-piece of Siena marble in my bedroom at Combray, in my grandparents’ house, in those far distant days which at this moment I imagined to be in the present without being able to picture them exactly, and which would become plainer in a little while when I was properly awake. ^(52){ }^{52} 例如，我躺卧时僵硬的那一侧身体，在试图确定自身方位时，会幻想自己正面向挂着帷幔的大床靠墙而卧；刹那间我就会对自己说："哎呀，妈妈肯定还没来道晚安我就睡着了"，因为我正住在乡下祖父家（也就是在贡布雷），而祖父多年前就已去世；我身体那侧——我正躺卧的一边——作为连心智都本不该遗忘的往昔的忠实守护者，将那些遥远岁月里贡布雷祖父母家中的景象重现在我眼前：天花板上链子悬垂的波希米亚玻璃瓮形夜灯里摇曳的火焰，我卧室里锡耶纳大理石壁炉台。此刻我虽无法精确勾勒，却恍惚觉得这些景象就是当下，而待完全清醒后，它们自会逐渐清晰起来。 ^(52){ }^{52}
Not being able to picture means, in this context, not recollecting via visualized scenes; it also means not being able to affix an exact date: hence the 此处"无法勾勒"意味着不能通过视觉化的场景进行回忆；同时也意味着无法确定确切日期：因此
vagueness of the text’s references to “years ago” and to “those far distant days.” The narrator’s body, here felt through its “stiffened side,” acts as guardian of a past which is not dated on any calendar and which is at once spatial and temporal. The canopied bed, the night-light suspended in an urn-shaped bowl, the marble chimney-piece: these are not simply discrete objects located in an indifferent space. Nor are they, or the narrator’s original experience of them, situated in a strictly temporal interval with an exactly designatable beginning and end. Any such interval and its concrete contents, not to mention the narrator’s remembered experience of these contents, are so deeply implicated with one another that their spatial and temporal dimensions have become inseparably interconnected. It is the narrator’s body memory that has made this extraordinary situation possible: extraordinary precisely from the separative standpoint of recollective memory. 文本中"多年前"和"那些遥远岁月"的模糊指涉。叙述者通过"僵硬的体侧"感知到的身体，守护着一段未被任何日历记载的过往，这段过往同时具备空间性与时间性。带顶篷的床榻、悬垂在瓮形碗中的夜灯、大理石壁炉台——这些并非仅仅存在于 indifferent 空间中的孤立物件。它们及叙述者对其的原初体验，也并非严格局限于具有明确起止时间点的时间区间内。任何这样的区间及其具体内容，更不用说叙述者对这些内容的记忆体验，都彼此深度交织，以致其空间维度与时间维度已不可分割地相互关联。正是叙述者的身体记忆使这种非凡情境成为可能：从回忆记忆的分离性视角来看，这种情境尤为非凡。
VII 第七章
The present chapter is in effect an extended tribute to the importance of body memory, which has not often been singled out for detailed description of the sort that has been offered in these pages. In and through this description, I have been attempting to show just how-in which precise ways-body memory is important in human experience. But we have not yet confronted the more general question of why body memory is so crucial in human experience. It is only in providing a satisfactory answer to this rather sweeping question that such purely descriptive efforts will receive their full justification. 本章实质上是对身体记忆重要性的深入探讨，这种记忆形式鲜少被单独提出并予以如此详尽的描述。通过这番阐述，我试图揭示身体记忆究竟如何——以哪些具体方式——在人类经验中占据重要地位。然而我们尚未触及更根本的问题：为何身体记忆在人类经验中如此关键？唯有对这个宏大问题给出令人满意的解答，此类纯粹描述性的努力才能获得充分理据。
To sharpen the issue and to set the stage for this answer, let me state baldly that there is no memory without body memory. In claiming this I do not mean to say that whenever we remember we are in fact directly engaging in body memory as it has been discussed in this chapter. Rather, I am saying that we could not remember in any of the forms or modes described in earlier chapters without having the capacity for body memory. But it remains far from clear how this can be so. How can body memory, which is typically so reticent and so submerged, be so basic for all memory? In what does its peculiar importance consist? 为了厘清问题并为解答奠定基础，我要直截了当地指出：没有身体记忆，就不存在任何记忆。我提出这个主张时，并非指每当我们回忆时都直接运用了本章讨论的身体记忆机制。而是强调，若不具备身体记忆能力，我们便无法以先前章节描述的任何形式或模式进行回忆。但这种现象何以成立仍远未明晰——为何通常如此缄默而隐秘的身体记忆，竟能成为所有记忆的基础？其独特重要性究竟体现在哪些方面？
A possible answer to such questions emerges when we consider once more what I have called the “marginality” of body memory. If such marginality is interpreted as assuming a position at the margin of any given memory, then it might seem plausible to claim that all remembering involves taking up some such stance: that is, some bodily perspective on an object, scene, or fact remembered. This would even appear to work for most recollections. Do we not recall events from a particular point of view that is, at least implicitly, defined by our bodily position at the time of the original happen- 当我们再次思考我所谓的身体记忆的"边缘性"时，这些问题或许能找到答案。如果将这种边缘性理解为在任何特定记忆的边缘占据位置，那么声称所有回忆行为都涉及采取某种立场似乎就言之成理：即对被回忆对象、场景或事实的某种身体视角。这种解释甚至对大多数回忆都适用。我们回忆事件时，不正是从某个特定视角出发的吗？这个视角至少隐含着我们当初经历事件时所处的身体位置。
ing? I say “at least implicitly,” for it is evident that we need not explicitly call back to mind the bodily position itself-either its exact contour or even the way it felt to assume it at the time. With this proviso, we can reliably assert that all recollection-and all reminiscence as well-does include or at least imply a bodily point of view. Yet “a bodily point of view” is not necessarily equivalent to a body memory, much less a memory of a body. Even if we can afford to omit an express representation of our own witnessing body while still claiming its immanent-marginal presence in all recollections, this still does not prove the actual ingredience of body memory within all recollective memory. Nor, for that matter, does it begin to account for any such ingredience of body memory in other memorial phenomena such as semantic memory (i.e., the recall of sheer information in which there is no representation of a memory episode at all), reminding, recognizing, remembering-on-the-occasion-of, primary memory, dream memory, ^(53){ }^{53} etc. This list could go on almost indefinitely, so numerous are the types of memory that do not appear to include, or even to imply, a bodily stance of the rememberer at their margin. 至少是隐性地，因为显然我们无需明确回想起身体姿势本身——无论是其确切轮廓，还是当时摆出这个姿势的感觉。有了这个前提，我们可以有把握地断言，所有的回忆——以及所有的追忆——都包含或至少暗示了一个身体的视角。然而，“身体的视角”并不一定等同于身体记忆，更不等同于对一个身体的记忆。即使我们可以在不明确表现自己见证身体的情况下，仍然声称它在所有回忆中具有内在的边缘性存在，这仍然不能证明身体记忆在所有回忆性记忆中的实际成分。同样，这也不能开始解释身体记忆在其他记忆现象中的任何此类成分，如语义记忆（即纯粹信息的回忆，其中完全没有记忆事件的表征）、提醒、识别、特定场合下的回忆、初级记忆、梦境记忆等。 这份清单几乎可以无限延伸，因为不涉及——甚至不暗示——记忆者身体姿态的记忆类型实在不胜枚举。
As promising as the notion of bodily point of view is, it cannot therefore fully cash in my primary claim that there is no memory without body memory. Nor will it suffice to say that taking the body (including its own memory as an intrinsic feature of it) as a necessary condition of all human experience allows us to deduce body memory as a necessary condition of all memorial experience. Even if true as a form of transcendental deduction, this assertion rings hollow for our purposes. Its formality fails to capture the particularity of the situation; it does not tell us in just what way body memory is inherent in all memory. If point of view is too specific in its role and if condition of possibility is too general, where are we to turn? 尽管"身体视角"这一概念颇具前景，但它仍无法完全兑现我的核心主张——没有身体记忆就没有记忆。同样，仅将身体（包括其固有记忆特征）视为所有人类经验的必要条件，从而推导出身体记忆是所有记忆经验的必要条件，这样的论证也远远不够。即便作为一种先验演绎成立，这种断言对我们的研究目的而言仍显空洞。其形式化表述未能捕捉情境的特殊性；它没有具体说明身体记忆究竟如何内在于所有记忆之中。若视角理论过于局限其作用范围，而可能性条件又过于宽泛，我们该何去何从？
I suggest that we turn to Whitehead’s notion of causal efficacy as providing the most promising basis for understanding the deep ingrediency of body memory in memory generally. Whitehead has written that memory is “a very special instance of an antecedent act of experience becoming a datum of intuition for another act of experience.” ^(54){ }^{54} The paradox is that Whitehead, while regarding memory (along with “visceral feelings”) as an altogether “obvious” example of causal efficacy, ^(55){ }^{55} does not say much about memory itself, much less about the manner in which it is “a very special instance” of such efficacy. For this reason we shall have to construct from Whitehead’s occasional remarks the outlines of a theory that is illuminating in the present context and yet not incompatible with his overall cosmology. 我认为，我们应当转向怀特海提出的因果效验概念，这为理解身体记忆在整体记忆中的深层构成提供了最具前景的理论基础。怀特海曾写道，记忆是"前在经验行为转化为后续经验行为直觉材料的特殊范例"。 ^(54){ }^{54} 吊诡之处在于，尽管怀特海将记忆（连同"内脏感受"）视为因果效验中"最显而易见"的例证， ^(55){ }^{55} 却对记忆本身着墨不多，更遑论阐明其作为因果效验"特殊范例"的具体运作方式。因此，我们有必要从怀特海的零散论述中构建一个理论框架——这个框架既要能阐明当前语境下的记忆现象，又不能违背其整体宇宙论体系。
The systematic setting for the notion of causal efficacy is supplied by Whitehead’s view of time. In the context of a critique of time regarded as pure succession (i.e., such as we find in Hume and Kant), he argues that “time in the concrete is the conformation of state to state, the later to the earlier; and the pure succession is an abstraction from the irreversible relationship of settled past to derivative present.” ^(56){ }^{56} This means that the 因果效力的系统性背景由怀特海的时间观提供。在对将时间视为纯粹接续（如休谟与康德所主张）的批判语境中，他提出"具体的时间是状态与状态的顺应，是后来者对先前者的顺应；而纯粹接续是从既定过去与衍生当下之间不可逆关系中抽象出来的概念。" ^(56){ }^{56} 这意味着
immediate present comes into being by conforming to the immediate past, which it reproduces as objectified in the present itself. ^(57){ }^{57} Crucial here is the notion of the past as to-be-conformed-to precisely because it is “settled and actual.” ^(58){ }^{58} Such a past implodes in the present as a “stubborn fact” that refuses to go away, with the result that "the man-at-one-moment concentrates in himself the colour of his own past, and he is the issue of it. " ^(59){ }^{59} Once this much is granted, causal efficacy follows forthwith. As one of the two “perceptive modes” of experience, it is definable as “the hand of the settled past in the formation of the present.” ^(60){ }^{60} In contradiction to Hume and Kant, Whitehead holds that causal efficacy precedes “our immediate perception of the contemporary external world, appearing as an element constitutive of our own experience.” ^(61){ }^{61} Where presentational immediacy (i.e., the other major perceptive mode) gives us “a world decorated by sense-data,” causal efficacy shows the world as “vague, haunting, unmanageable.” ^(62){ }^{62} 当下通过顺应刚刚消逝的过去而生成，并在当下自身中将过去客观化地再现。 ^(57){ }^{57} 关键在于将过去视为必须遵从的对象，正因为它是"既定且真实的"。 ^(58){ }^{58} 这样的过去作为"顽固事实"在当下内爆，拒绝消逝，其结果就是"瞬间之人凝聚着自身过往的色彩，他就是过往的产物"。 ^(59){ }^{59} 一旦承认这一点，因果效验便随之而来。作为经验两种"知觉模式"之一，它可定义为"既定过去在塑造当下时伸出的手"。 ^(60){ }^{60} 与休谟和康德相反，怀特海认为因果效验先于"我们对当代外部世界的直接感知，作为构成我们自身经验的要素显现"。 ^(61){ }^{61} 当表象直接性（即另一种主要知觉模式）为我们提供"被感觉数据装饰的世界"时，因果效验展现的世界却是"模糊的、萦绕不去的、难以驾驭的"。 ^(62){ }^{62}
But what has all this to do with memory and more particularly with body memory? Thus far, we might seem to be talking at most of the mere reproduction of the past in the present, its sheer “repetition” or “reproduction” there. ^(63){ }^{63} But surely, as I have argued against Bergson, memory involves more than mere repetition of the past. What else does it involve? The Whiteheadian answer, though Whitehead himself does not put it quite so brazenly, is body and more particularly the body as experiencing its own organs. For the body is “our most immediate environment”; ^(64){ }^{64} it is that with which we live, in contrast to the more remote environment of the physical world around us. Living with it, we conform to it: “we conform to our bodily organs and to the vague world which lies beyond them.” ^(65){ }^{65} But conformation, as we have just seen, is the basic action of causal efficacy. To experience our body qua set of organs is precisely to experience the causal efficacy of these organs and, through them, that of the external world as it impinges on us. ^(66){ }^{66} Put otherwise, the actions of these organs form the settled past to which we conform in the present of perception: 但这与记忆，尤其是身体记忆有何关联？至此，我们似乎最多只是在讨论过去在当下的单纯"复制"或"再现"。然而正如我反驳柏格森时所言，记忆绝不仅是对过去的简单重复。它还包含什么？怀特海式的答案（尽管怀特海本人未曾如此直白表述）指向身体，更准确地说，是身体对其自身器官的体验。因为身体是"我们最切近的环境"；与我们周遭物质世界这个更遥远的环境不同，身体是我们与之共生的存在。与身体共生，我们便与之相顺应："我们顺应自身器官，也顺应器官之外那个模糊的世界。"但正如前文所示，这种顺应正是因果效验的基本作用。体验作为器官集合的身体，本质上就是体验这些器官的因果效验，并通过它们体验外部世界对我们的冲击。换言之，这些器官的活动构成了我们于感知当下所顺应的既定过去：
For the organic theory, the most primitive perception is "feeling the body as functioning’. This is a feeling of the world in the past; it is the inheritance of the world as a complex of feeling; namely, it is the feeling of derived feeling. ^(67){ }^{67} 对于有机理论而言，最原始的知觉是"感受身体作为功能体而存在"。这是一种对过往世界的感受；它是对世界作为感觉复合体的传承；换言之，这是派生感觉的感受。 ^(67){ }^{67}
“The feeling of derived feeling”: here we come to the nub of the doctrine of causal efficacy as it bears on memory. Derived feeling is feeling felt as a direct legacy from the past; it is “a feeling of the world in the past.” For human beings, such derivation or inheritance could not occur except by way of the lived body, which is at once a transmitter of the inheritance of the external world and itself an inheritance for perception in the present. ^(68){ }^{68} What seems strangest in this view is just what makes it most valuable for our purposes. It is strange to think that we feel the body feeling its circumam- "派生感觉的感受"：此处我们触及因果效力学说的核心，因为它与记忆相关。派生感觉是被感受为直接来自过去遗产的感觉；它是"对过往世界的感受"。对人类而言，这种派生或传承只能通过活生生的身体发生，这身体既是外部世界传承的传递者，其本身又是当下知觉所继承的对象。 ^(68){ }^{68} 这一观点中最显奇特之处，恰恰使其对我们的研究最具价值。那种认为我们感受着身体感知其周遭环境的想法确实奇特
bient world. ^(69){ }^{69} The sense of strangeness is not altogether mitigated by Whitehead’s efforts to consider the body as merely a somewhat more specialized and more intimate part of the environment: “in principle, the animal body is only the more highly organized and immediate part of the general environment for its dominant actual occasion, which is the ultimate percipient.” ^(70){ }^{70} What Whitehead calls “bodily efficacy” is the unmediated feeling of the body’s causal efficacy qua “withness”; given as an “objective datum,” it is “feeling the body as functioning”-functioning as efficacious in its own right and not as a mere means. ^(71){ }^{71} To be efficacious in its own right is at once to be capable of producing further feelings on subsequent occasions and to re-enact prior feelings in memory. ^(72){ }^{72} 陌生的世界。 ^(69){ }^{69} 怀特海试图将身体仅仅视为环境中某种更为专门化且更亲密的组成部分，但这种努力并未完全消解陌生感："原则上，动物身体不过是其主导实际场合（即终极感知者）所处的一般环境中组织程度更高、更直接的部分。" ^(70){ }^{70} 怀特海所称的"身体效能"是身体作为"共在"的因果效能的直接感受；作为"客观材料"被给予时，它是"感受身体正在运作"——身体以其自身权利发挥效能，而非仅作为工具。 ^(71){ }^{71} 以其自身权利发挥效能，意味着既能在后续场合中产生更多感受，又能在记忆中重演先前的感受。 ^(72){ }^{72}
But if we thus feel the body feeling the world-i.e., feel the world in feeling “with” our own body-one level of feeling does not simply lead to another. Nor does one level reflect, represent, or even express another level; the first level always includes the second (and vice versa), whether by anticipation or by conformation. And if this is paradoxical for an actintentional view of feeling-which has difficulty admitting a second feeling as the content or “object” of a first feeling-it is quite compatible with the notion of operative intentionality in terms of which (following MerleauPonty) we have construed bodily behavior. According to this notion, the lived body is the operative force in human projects, including the project of remembering. As such, it is the natural-and certainly the most im-mediate-site for causally efficacious action. Moreover, this action is felt as such: felt in its very bodily efficacy. It is also remembered as such-though rarely in recollection, which typically forgets it. It is remembered instead in “primary memory,” the unique vehicle for knowledge of the immediate past. For the “direct knowledge” of the causal efficacy contained in the body’s withness is a knowledge of something that, though actual and settled, has just occurred. Whitehead sometimes refers in this connection to a temporal interval of micro-seconds ^(73){ }^{73}-which would accord with Husserl’s view that primary memory is sub-instantaneous. 然而，若我们如此感受身体对世界的感知——即通过"与"自身身体共同感受来体察世界——那么一种感受层次并不会简单地导向另一层次。某一层次既非反映、再现甚至表达另一层次；第一层次总是包含着第二层次（反之亦然），无论是以预期还是适应的方式。虽然这对行动意向性的感受观而言显得矛盾——因其难以承认第二种感受能作为第一种感受的内容或"对象"——但这与运作意向性的概念完全契合，我们（遵循梅洛-庞蒂的观点）正是借此来诠释身体行为。根据此概念，活生生的身体是人类各项规划（包括记忆规划）中的运作力量。正因如此，它成为因果有效行动最自然——无疑也是最直接的——发生场域。不仅如此，这种行动本身就被感受着：在其身体效能中被真切感知。它同样以此种方式被记忆——尽管回忆行为通常将其遗忘。它反而存续于"初级记忆"之中，这种独特载体承载着对刚刚流逝之过去的认知。 对身体"同在性"中所含因果效力的"直接认知"，实则是对某种虽已实际发生且既定、却刚刚消逝之物的认知。怀特海有时将此关联于微秒级的时间间隔 ^(73){ }^{73} ——这与胡塞尔认为初级记忆属于亚瞬时现象的观点相吻合。
What is most valuable in Whitehead’s view of primary memory-and what serves to distinguish it from Husserl’s conception-is the idea that such memory is just as bodily as it is mental in its operation. If “bodily efficacy” ^(74){ }^{74} seems at first a puzzling notion, it is the source of an insight that we cannot afford to overlook: an insight into why body memory plays such an important role in all remembering. It does so because of the working of causal efficacy itself. If the latter is indeed the primordial perceptive mode-is presupposed by presentational immediacy as well as by conceptual analysis-and if it is the privileged point of connection with a settled past (whether recent or remote), then its own bodily basis, i.e., the concrete feeling of bodily efficacy, will be intrinsic to any connection with any past. In other words, it will be intrinsic to any memory of any kind. Or to put it slightly differently: if my lived body always functions as an objective datum for the feeling that an 怀特海关于初级记忆的观点最有价值之处——也是它与胡塞尔概念的区别所在——在于他认为这种记忆在运作时既是身体的也是心理的。如果说"身体效能"初看是个令人费解的概念，它却揭示了我们不可忽视的洞见：即为何身体记忆在所有回忆中都扮演着如此重要的角色。这种重要性源于因果效能本身的运作机制。倘若因果效能确是最原初的感知模式——既被呈现直接性所预设，也被概念分析所预设——并且如果它是连接既定过去（无论近期或遥远）的特权节点，那么其自身的身体基础，即身体效能的具体感受，将内在于任何与过去的连接中。换言之，它将内在于任何类型的记忆中。或者稍作不同的表述：如果我的活体始终作为感受的客观资料发挥作用，
experience has become past, then it will be an indispensable ingredient in remembering that experience as past-whether the experience be directly of my own body or of the external world by means of (that is, with) this same body. In this way recognition is bestowed upon the lived body as an internal and necessary ingredient in all remembering. This is done without having to invoke a new kind of memory-other than “body memory” itself. And the lived body’s role, far from being merely formal, has become a material condition of possibility for remembering: it is this body as actually felt in causal efficacy that gives to it its seminal importance in matters of memory. 当经验成为过去时，它将成为回忆这段过往经历不可或缺的要素——无论这经验是直接来自我的身体，还是通过（或者说借助）这具身体对外部世界的感知。由此，生命体被确认为所有记忆活动中内在且必要的组成部分。这一认知无需借助除"身体记忆"之外的新型记忆形式。生命体的作用绝非仅是形式上的，它已成为记忆可能性的实质条件：正是这具在因果效力中被真实感知的身体，赋予了记忆事务中至关重要的孕育力量。
It is time to indicate several consequences of this importance as well as to look at some of its larger implications. There are two immediate consequences that need noting. First, if Whitehead is right, experience is always in the process of becoming past. What Dewey would call “an experience” 75 is something that is always already becoming settled-settled enough to be an immediate past immediately remembered. Just as there are no moments out of time, so there are no moments not settling into, or already settled in, a past to be remembered. Second, time-lapse is adventitious in memory; despite the fact that we often pride ourselves on accurately determining the exact elapsed time inherent in a given (typically recollective) memory, the lapse itself is "an abstraction from the more concrete relatedness of 'conformation "76-that is, from the very relation to the past which is the work of causal efficacy and which lies at the heart of all remembering dependent thereon. 现在需要指出这种重要性的几个后果，并探讨其更广泛的影响。有两个直接后果值得注意。首先，如果怀特海是正确的，经验始终处于成为过去的过程中。杜威所称的"一种经验"75，总是已经在沉淀——沉淀到足以成为被即刻忆起的直接过去。正如不存在时间之外的瞬间，也不存在不沉淀为（或已经沉淀为）待记忆之过去的瞬间。其次，时间间隔在记忆中具有偶然性；尽管我们常以能准确测定特定（通常是回忆性）记忆中固有的精确时间间隔为傲，但间隔本身是"从'符合'这一更具体关联性中抽象出来的"76——也就是说，从与过去的关联中抽象而来，这种关联是因果效力的作用，也是所有依赖于此的记忆活动的核心。
The large-scale implications are also two-fold. First, all that we call “the person,” “personal identity,” and the like-everything, in short, that pertains to an individual’s life-history-is rooted ultimately in body memory as construed in the above manner. If it is true that “the enduring personality is the historic route of living occasions which are severally dominant in the body at successive instants,” ^(77){ }^{77} then this body’s inherent memories of its own “historic route” will themselves be constituent features in the ongoing makeup of our lasting personality. The conformation realized in such memories will supply the critical connective tissue that binds together this personality and its route alike. A second implication bears on the role of mind and mentality. Although Whitehead considers it “a matter of pure convention as to which of our experiential activities we term mental and which physical,” ^(78){ }^{78} he maintains, nonetheless, that the bodily pole enjoys priority over the mental pole in a decisive way. For one thing, only the mental pole (in its intellectual phases) calls for conceptual analysis, which is itself a supervening mode of experience. ^(79){ }^{79} For another, causal efficacy in its primal form is robustly corporeal; and since bodily efficacy precedes presentational immediacy as well as conceptual analysis, bodily being has a distinct primacy. If this is so, then that form of memory indigenous to corporeality will also possess a primacy among forms of memory; and in 大规模影响同样具有双重性。首先，所有我们称之为"人格"、"个人身份"等概念——简言之，与个体生命历程相关的一切——最终都植根于以上述方式构建的身体记忆。如果"持久人格是生命事件在身体内相继占据主导地位的历史轨迹"这一论断成立，那么身体对其自身"历史轨迹"的内在记忆，将构成我们持久人格持续形成过程中的本质特征。此类记忆实现的形态将为维系人格与其轨迹提供关键的联结组织。第二个影响涉及心智与精神的作用。尽管怀特海认为"将我们的经验活动划分为心理或物理纯属惯例"，但他仍坚持身体极在决定性层面优先于精神极。原因之一在于，唯有精神极（在其智力层面）需要概念分析，而概念分析本身是一种叠加的经验模式。 另一方面，原初形态的因果效力具有强烈的身体性；由于身体效力既先于呈现的直接性，也先于概念分析，身体存在便具有独特的优先性。倘若如此，那么身体性所固有的记忆形式在各类记忆形态中也将占据首要地位；
particular, body memory will take precedence over recollection or secondary memory. ^(80){ }^{80} 具体而言，身体记忆将优先于回忆或次级记忆。 ^(80){ }^{80}
Causal efficacy is said to be “a heavy, primitive experience” which occurs most saliently when we undergo “a reversion to some primitive state.” 81 Furthermore, “such a reversion occurs when either some primitive functioning of the human organism is unusually heightened, or some considerable part of our habitual sense-perception is unusually enfeebled.” 82 What we then experience is indeed “vague, haunting, unmanageable.” ^(83){ }^{83} Suddenly we are reminded of the hapless and sleepless narrator in Remembrance of Things Past: 因果效力被称为"一种沉重而原始的体验"，当我们"退回到某种原始状态"时，这种体验最为显著。81 此外，"当人类有机体的某些原始功能异常活跃，或是我们习惯性感官知觉的相当部分异常衰弱时，这种回归就会发生。"82 我们当时所体验到的确实是"模糊的、萦绕不去的、难以驾驭的。" ^(83){ }^{83} 突然间，我们会想起《追忆似水年华》中那个不幸且失眠的叙述者：
But for me it was enough if, in my own bed, my sleep was so heavy as completely to relax my consciousness; for then I lost all sense of the place in which I had gone to sleep, and when I awoke in the middle of the night, not knowing where I was, I could not even be sure at first who I was; I had only the most rudimentary sense of existence, such as may lurk and flicker in the depths of an animal’s consciousness; I was more destitute than the cavedweller; but then the memory-not yet of the place in which I was, but of various other places where I had lived and might now very possibly bewould come like a rope let down from heaven to draw me up out of the abyss of not-being, from which I could never have escaped by myself: in a flash I would traverse centuries of civilization, and out of a blurred glimpse of oil-lamps, then of shirts with turned-down collars, would gradually piece together the original components of my ego. ^(84){ }^{84} 但对我来说，只要能在自己的床上沉睡到意识完全松弛便已足够；因为那时我会彻底忘却入睡时的场所，当我在午夜醒来，茫然不知身在何处时，甚至一时无法确定自己是谁；我只保留着最原始的存在感，如同潜伏在动物意识深处的微弱萤火；我比穴居者更为赤贫；但随后记忆——并非关于此刻所处之地，而是其他曾居住过、此刻很可能置身之处的记忆——会像天堂垂下的绳索，将我从虚无的深渊中拽出，那是我永远无法独自逃脱的深渊：刹那间我将穿越数个世纪的文明，从模糊瞥见的油灯，到翻领衬衫的影像中，逐渐拼凑出我本真的模样。
It is surely striking that Proust calls the experience he is describing “heavy” and that this experience, one of disorientation upon awakening in the middle of the night, is an experience of reversion: indeed, what else is sleeping and its twilight state but reversionary (“regressive” in Freud’s word)? It is also telling that the very terms by which Proust’s narrator comes to describe this experience-“rudimentary,” “destitute,” “the abyss of not-being,” “blurred glimpse,” etc.-express that vagueness which Whitehead ascribed precisely to causal efficacy. Striking as well as the reference to the “cave-dweller,” that is, someone to whom primitivity is unhesitatingly imputed; and closely associated with this image is the sense of existing that “may lurk and flicker in the depths of an animal’s consciousness,” recalling Whitehead’s “animal body” 85 and the general metaphorics of depth in his descriptions of causal efficacy. If Proust’s narrator is indeed piecing together “the original components” of his ego, Whitehead finds in causal efficacy the original components of human experience itself. And just as the narrator’s ego is linked with civilization, so presentational immediacy is held to be “the experience of only a few high-grade organisms” 86 and to be “vivid, precise, and barren” ^(87){ }^{87} in much the same way as “shirts with turned-down collars” and other accoutrements of civilized, daylight life are seen as epitomes of barrenness in Proust’s nocturnal vision. 普鲁斯特将所描述的体验称为"沉重"确实引人注目，而这种在深夜醒来时的迷失感正是一种回归体验：睡眠及其朦胧状态若非回归（弗洛伊德所说的"退行"）又能是什么呢？同样值得注意的是，普鲁斯特叙述者用来描述这种体验的术语——"原始的"、"贫瘠的"、"虚无的深渊"、"模糊的一瞥"等——都体现了怀特海特归因于因果效力的那种模糊性。提及"穴居者"同样发人深省，即毫不犹豫将原始性归诸的对象；与此意象紧密关联的是那种"可能潜藏在动物意识深处闪烁明灭"的存在感，令人想起怀特海特的"动物身体"85 及其描述因果效力时惯用的深度隐喻。如果说普鲁斯特的叙述者确实在拼凑自我"最初的组成部分"，那么怀特海特则在因果效力中发现了人类经验本身的原始构成要素。 正如叙述者的自我与文明紧密相连，呈现的即时性也被视为“仅属于少数高级生物的体验”86，并被描述为“生动、精准且贫瘠” ^(87){ }^{87} ，正如普鲁斯特夜间视野中，“翻领衬衫”及其他文明白昼生活的装饰品被视为贫瘠的典范。
Most striking of all, however, is the way that vivid and precise memorythe recollection of particular places in detail-comes to supervene on the dimness of the bodily state from which the narrator is slowly emerging in the above passage. As presentational immediacy stands out from causal efficacy like a flare in the night, so recollective memory in its very vividness is illuminated against the vagueness of body memory. In both cases, the original components of the more primitive experience, heavy in its dense implications for all subsequent re-membering, are superseded by the pictorial precision of a secondary state-by something presentational or representational, lacking therefore the body of a primary experience with its primary memory. Body memory gives way to its recollective successor not only as causal efficacy gives rise to presentational immediacy but, still more crucially, as-just as-such efficacy, realized in the body, emerges into such immediacy, and is manifested in mind. 然而，最引人注目的莫过于生动精确的记忆——对特定地点细节的追忆——如何逐渐取代叙述者正缓慢脱离的身体混沌状态。正如呈现性即时感从因果效力中凸显，犹如黑夜中的信号弹；回忆记忆也以其鲜明性，在身体记忆的模糊背景中熠熠生辉。这两种情形下，原始体验中那些对后续所有"再-成员"过程具有深远影响的粗粝成分，都被次级状态的图像化精确性所取代——被某种呈现性或表征性的事物替代，因而缺失了原始体验及其原生记忆的身体性。身体记忆让位于其回忆继承者，不仅如同因果效力催生呈现性即时感，更关键的是——恰如这种在身体中实现的效力本身涌现为即时性，并在心智中显现。
VIII 八
It cannot be emphasized enough that body memories are located in the body-not just the objective body of sinews and fibers but much more particularly the phenomenal body. This latter is what I have been calling the “lived body” (after Leib in Husserl). Such a body acts as a receptacle of memories by virtue of two of its basic capacities. First of all, it is composed of manifold organs-by which I mean not physiological parts per se but those aspects of its being that aid in the execution of its actions-and can itself be considered as an “organ” qua totality. ^(88){ }^{88} Construed thus as organismic, the lived body possesses, in its very being, an efficacious operative intentionality animating all of its ongoing maneuvers. This intentionality is quite sufficient to account for the purposiveness of these maneuvers and does not require recourse to the act intentionality of consciousness for the completion of a given “intentional arc.” ^(89){ }^{89} As a direct consequence, many body memories (above all, habitual ones) need not be accompanied by consciousness in any explicit form. Second, and closely affiliated with this first feature, is the fact that the body as a memorial container-as itself a “place” of memoriesfurnishes an unmediated access to the remembered past: unmediated, that is, beyond its own withness. No intercalation of representations, imagistic or verbal, is required; no mediation by mind and its machinations is called for. For such “memory can be understood only as a direct possession of the past with no interposed contents.” ^(90){ }^{90} It is for this reason that so much body memory arises spontaneously and without premeditation and that it is so rarely inferential or in need of further evidence. Because it re-enacts the past, it need not represent it; its own kinesthesias link it from within to the felt movements which it is reinstating; as a way of “dilating our being in the world,” ^(91){ }^{91} body memory includes its own past by an internal osmotic intertwining with it. 必须再三强调，身体记忆确实存在于身体之中——不仅存在于由肌腱与纤维构成的客观躯体，更特别地存在于现象身体之中。后者正是我（追随胡塞尔学说中的"Leib"概念）所称的"活生生的身体"。这样的身体凭借其两项基本能力成为记忆的容器：首先，它由多重器官构成——此处我指的不是生理部件本身，而是那些协助其完成动作的存在面向——其整体本身亦可被视为一个"器官"。 ^(88){ }^{88} 当被理解为有机整体时，活生生的身体在其存在本质中便具有一种有效的操作意向性，这种意向性激活着其所有持续进行的活动。该意向性已足以解释这些活动的目的性，无需诉诸意识的行动意向性来完成特定的"意向弧"。 ^(89){ }^{89} 由此直接导致的结果是，许多身体记忆（尤其是习惯性记忆）并不需要以任何显性形式与意识相伴而生。 其次，与第一个特征密切关联的是，身体作为记忆的容器——即记忆本身的"场所"——提供了通往过往记忆的直接通道：这种直接性超越了身体自身的在场性。它不需要任何表象（无论是图像还是语言）的插入，也无须借助心灵及其机制的调解。因为"这种记忆只能被理解为对过去的直接占有，其间没有任何中介内容"。正因如此，大量身体记忆会自发涌现且毫无预谋，它极少需要推理或额外证据。由于身体记忆通过重演来呈现过去，它不必对过去进行再现；其自身的动觉体验从内部将其与正在重现的感知运动相连；作为"扩展我们在世存在"的方式，身体记忆通过内在的渗透性交织将自身的过去包含其中。
The result of the locatability of memories in the body via its organismic and direct link to the past is exemplary of what I shall be discussing in chapter 11 as “thick autonomy.” Although such autonomy is at work in every kind of memory-even in imagistic recollection-it is doubtless most manifest in body memories. The very density of the remembering/remembered body and the way in which it provides an original past for remembering as a whole help to make these memories a peculiarly effective expression of thick autonomy. The nimble and mercurial powers of mind-as evidenced in instantaneous “flashes” of recollection or recognition-cede place to a more stolid and stable modus operandi whose paradigm is the working of habitual body memory in its reliably consecutive and consistent deployment. But the same thick autonomy of the bodily is evident in alleviated forms in erotic and traumatic body memories as well. In all of these otherwise so different cases there is at work a sure sense of the thickness of the flesh, of its durable and enduring qualities, of its subdued but obdurate being. ^(92){ }^{92} 记忆通过身体与过去的有机直接联系而具有可定位性，这一现象正是我将在第 11 章讨论的"厚重自主性"的典范。尽管这种自主性存在于所有类型的记忆中——甚至包括图像式回忆——但它在身体记忆中的表现无疑最为显著。记忆/被记忆身体的稠密本质，以及它为整体回忆提供原始过去的方式，共同使这些记忆成为厚重自主性特别有效的表达形式。心灵那种敏捷多变的能量——如瞬间"闪现"的回忆或识别所证明的——让位于更为沉稳稳定的运作模式，其典范便是习惯性身体记忆那种可靠连续且始终如一的运作方式。但同样的身体厚重自主性，在情欲性和创伤性身体记忆中以缓和形式同样显著。在所有这些差异悬殊的案例中，都存在着对肉体厚重感的确定认知——对其持久耐用的特质，对其内敛却顽固的存在本质的感知。 ^(92){ }^{92}
Along with the memory of places, things, and other human beings, body memory forms part of the general project in which this Part of the present book is engaged: making memory cosmic rather than strictly mental, psychological, or neurological. It is a matter, in short, of returning memory to the world. Places will take us most resolutely out into the circumambient world, since they regionalize this world and literally give it local habitations. As its most concrete denizens, material things and other people act as well to fill up the world around us. But the lived body is the truly pivotal member of this quaternity of cosmic terms. It is always in or from or through ^(93){ }^{93} this body that the other items are grasped or met, witnessed or transformed: There is no getting around the body. As Husserl said: 与对地点、事物及他人的记忆一样，身体记忆构成了本书这一部分的核心研究课题：让记忆成为宇宙性的存在，而非仅仅局限于心智、心理或神经层面。简言之，关键在于将记忆重新归还给世界。地点最能坚定地将我们引向周遭世界，因为它们将世界区域化，并实实在在地赋予其具体居所。作为最具体的居住者，物质实体与他人共同充实着我们周围的世界。但在这组宇宙性术语的四元结构中，活生生的身体才是真正关键的元素。其他事物总是经由这个身体被感知、遭遇、见证或转化——我们永远无法绕过身体。正如胡塞尔所言：
In a quite unique way the living body is constantly in the perceptual field quite immediately, with a completely unique ontic meaning. ^(94){ }^{94} 活体以一种极其独特的方式持续直接存在于感知领域，具有完全独特的存在论意义。
Itself felt as unmediated, thanks to its self-felt bodily efficacy, the body is the mediator, the pervasive with-operator, of everything else in human experience. It is “the general medium for having a world” ^(95){ }^{95} in that only in its terms and by its intervention can anything appear at all to us. If things appear to us in constant succession, this can only be due to the fact that the kinesthesias (and synesthesias) by which they are apprehended are actively attuned to this same succession, partly reflecting it and partly constituting it. ^(96){ }^{96} 身体因其自我感知的直接性而成为人类经验中万物的中介与普遍伴随者。作为"拥有世界的通用媒介" ^(95){ }^{95} ，唯有通过身体的运作与介入，万物才能向我们显现。若事物以持续更迭之姿呈现，这必然归因于我们借以感知它们的动觉（及联觉）机制主动契合着同样的更迭节奏——既部分映现着这种更迭，又部分构建着这种更迭 ^(96){ }^{96} 。
The recognition of the body’s pivotal position was first explicitly acknowledged by Bergson in his descriptions of the body as a continual “center of action” and as that “ever advancing boundary between the future and the past.” ^(97){ }^{97} The lived body is a center which refuses to be decentered, a central boundary that will not become peripheral, precisely because this body already encompasses the marginal within its own arena of activity: it creates its own margin even as it brings about its own modes of immanence and 柏格森首次明确认识到身体的核心地位，他将身体描述为持续运作的"行动中心"及"永远向前推进的未来与过去之边界" ^(97){ }^{97} 。活生生的身体是拒绝被边缘化的中心，是永不沦为外围的核心边界——正因这具身体早已将边缘性纳入自身活动场域：它在建立自身内在性模式的同时，也创造着属于自己的边缘地带。
movement. Echoing Bruno and Pascal, we can speak of it as an entity whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere. The lived body is the incessant center of its multifarious maneuvers-maneuvers without any perimeters other than those which it imposes on itself as it moves in a depth of its own making. Dense itself, the lived body is always in the thick of things; and as remembered, it continues to be concentric for the world which it has come to inhabit. What Merleau-Ponty calls the "Memory of the World"98 is very much the memory of being bodily in the world, being a central memorial presence there. 运动。与布鲁诺和帕斯卡相呼应，我们可以将其描述为一个中心无处不在、圆周无处可寻的实体。生活身体是其纷繁机动的持续中心——这些机动除了它自身在自我创造的深度中移动时所设定的边界外，别无其他界限。生活身体本身是密集的，始终处于事物的核心；而被记忆时，它对于它所栖居的世界仍然是同心的。梅洛-庞蒂所称的"世界的记忆"98，很大程度上就是在世界中具身存在的记忆，是在那里作为核心纪念性存在的记忆。
Despite its memorious density, the lived body remains “a place of meeting and transfer.” ^(99){ }^{99} Its very bulk and volume-its thickness and heft-have a borderline aspect as well. The body as lived and remembered is crucially interstitial in status. The basic borderline it occupies is traced between mind and place: it is their middle term, their tertium quid. On the one hand, body is contiguous with mind through the level of immediate kinesthetic experience; if my mind’s intentions are to be enacted, they must achieve expression in a felt movement which itself represents the overcoming of separation between body and mind. ^(100){ }^{100} On the other hand, the lived body is conterminous with place because it is by bodily movement that I find my way in place and take up habitation there. My body not only takes me into places; it habituates me to their peculiarities and helps me to remember them vividly. It does all this in various particular ways which we must now begin to explore. 尽管记忆密度极高，活生生的身体依然是"相遇与传递的场所"。 ^(99){ }^{99} 其庞大的体积与重量——它的厚实质感——同样具有边界属性。作为被体验和记忆的身体，本质上处于间隙性的存在状态。它所占据的基本边界游走于心灵与场所之间：是两者的中介项，是第三元存在。一方面，身体通过直接的动觉体验与心灵相连；若要将心智意图付诸实践，就必须通过可感知的动作来实现表达，这种动作本身就代表着身心隔阂的消弭。 ^(100){ }^{100} 另一方面，具身化的身体与场所共生共存，因为正是通过身体运动，我才能在场所中找到方向并栖居其中。我的身体不仅引领我进入各种场所，更使我适应其独特属性并帮助我生动地铭记它们。这一切都通过我们即将探讨的多种具体方式实现。
IX 第九章
PLACE MEMORY 场所记忆
In this unique world, everything sensuous that I now originally perceive, everything that I have perceived and which I can now remember or about which others can report to me as what they have perceived or remembered, has its place. 在这个独特的世界里，所有我此刻原初感知到的感性之物，所有我曾感知过且现在能回忆起的，或是他人能向我报告他们曾感知或记忆的，都有其位置。
-Husserl, Experience and Judgment ——胡塞尔，《经验与判断》
I
Isn’t memory a matter of the past? Is it not primarily a temporal phenomenon? How can we think of it otherwise after Kant and Husserl-not to mention Aristotle, who said straightforwardly that “memory is of the past”? Philosophers’ propensities apart, it is certainly true that whenever we think of memory, indeed whenever we actually engage in acts of remembering, we have to do with past time: with time that in some sense has elapsed and is now being revived in some guise (whether by image or word, or by bodily movement). This is undeniable-even if it is equally undeniable that such time past is ineluctably elusive and always reappears in memory “as seen through a veil.” ^(2){ }^{2} Since memory does not require exact repetition in any case, the elusiveness does not matter in the larger picture. In the larger picture, remembering seems fully preoccupied with the past. Who could possibly question such an apparently well-founded bedrock assumption as this? Would not questioning it amount to questioning the existence of memory itself? 记忆难道不是关乎过去吗？它本质上不正是种时间现象吗？在康德与胡塞尔之后——更不必说直截了断言"记忆属于过去"的亚里士多德——我们还能以其他方式思考记忆吗？暂且不论哲学家的倾向性，每当思考记忆时，确切地说每当实际进行回忆行为时，我们确实必须处理过去的时间：某种意义上已流逝、此刻正以某种形式（无论通过意象、语言还是身体动作）重现的时间。这是无可否认的——即便同样不可否认的是，这种过去的时间必然难以捉摸，总像"隔着一层纱"般在记忆中重现。 ^(2){ }^{2} 既然记忆无论如何都不要求精确复现，这种难以捉摸性在大局中便无足轻重。从宏观来看，回忆似乎完全沉浸于过去。谁又能质疑这个看似根基稳固的基本假设呢？质疑它岂不等于质疑记忆本身的存在？
And yet question it we must and on several grounds. Consider, to start with, the way in which the primary action of time can be said to be dispersive-time in Aristotle’s words “disperses subsistence” ^(3-whereas){ }^{3-w h e r e a s} memory is itself mainly collective in its basic work (which is not to say, however, that it is mainly recollective in its basic operation). Time’s dispersiveness means that, as a direct consequence, temporal phenomena tend to be conceived as grouping themselves in a monolinear pattern of sheer succession: an assumption common to Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl alike. Whitehead’s trenchant critique of this conception as an effect of abstraction 然而我们必须质疑这一点，且基于多重理由。首先考虑时间的主要作用方式——用亚里士多德的话说，时间具有"消散实体性"的特性 ^(3-whereas){ }^{3-w h e r e a s} 记忆在其基础功能上本质是聚合的（但这并不意味着其基本运作方式主要是回忆性的）。时间的消散性直接导致了一个结果：时间现象往往被构想为沿着单一线性模式纯粹相继排列——这是亚里士多德、康德和胡塞尔共同持有的观点。怀特海对此概念进行了尖锐批判，认为这是抽象化导致的谬误。
in the realm of presentational immediacy in no way eliminates the tenacity of the conception itself, which is only reinforced in the post-Cartesian world of “clock-time” and “public-time.” ^(4){ }^{4} On a monolinear view of time, there is dispersal and disintegration as each instant arises and dies awayinstantaneously. No time is left over in such a view: no time that might be gathered up in memory and kept therein. Thus, to say that memory is “of the past” resolves nothing; indeed, it may dissolve the effective basis for the reconnective capacity of memory itself. At the least, memory is of a nonpunctiform past. But we may say more radically that memory involves something more than the purely temporal in its own makeup. 在呈现直接性的领域中，概念本身的顽固性丝毫未被消除，这种特性在笛卡尔之后的"钟表时间"与"公共时间"世界里反而被强化了。 ^(4){ }^{4} 从单线时间观来看，每个瞬间生灭交替之际都伴随着消散与解体。这种时间观未留下任何余裕：没有可供记忆收集并保存的时间。因此，称记忆"属于过去"并不能解决任何问题；事实上，这种说法可能瓦解记忆自身再连接能力的有效基础。至少可以说，记忆属于非点状的过去。但我们更可以激进地断言：记忆的构成中包含着超越纯粹时间性的要素。
Consider the following line of thought. If remembering were a sheerly temporal phenomenon-and even allowing for a more capacious, less linear notion of time-it would remain largely disembodied. For time, even cohesive, nonpunctiform time, is something we contemplate or represent rather than something we feel “in our bones.” In our bones-in our bodies-we do not experience time or its depredations directly. We experience states of corporeal existence, e.g., health or illness, ecstasy or sluggishness; but it is only when we notice discrepancies between such states that we begin to infer the passage of time-most notably in observing oneself “getting older.” Time may be felt by the body (Whitehead would say “with” it) but it is not felt as such in it. And yet we have just learned in the last chapter that there is no memory without a bodily basis-that bodily efficacy is pervasive of all remembering, including the most purified acts of recollection. If the thesis that memory is of the past implies that memory is disembodied in its enactment, we must question the thesis itself. 试想这样一种思路。倘若记忆纯粹是一种时间现象——即便我们采用一种更包容、非线性的时间概念——它本质上仍会脱离身体。因为时间，即便是连贯的、非点状的时间，也是我们沉思或再现的对象，而非我们"刻骨铭心"的感受。在我们的骨骼里——在我们的身体中——我们并不直接体验时间或其侵蚀。我们体验的是肉体存在的状态，例如健康或疾病、狂喜或倦怠；唯有察觉这些状态间的差异时，我们才开始推知时间的流逝——最明显的莫过于觉察自己"日渐衰老"。身体或许能感知时间（怀特海会说"与之共感"），但并非将其作为内在体验。然而我们刚在上一章了解到，记忆无不以身体为基础——身体效能渗透于所有记忆行为，包括最纯粹的追忆。如果"记忆属于过去"这一命题意味着记忆在发生过程中脱离身体，我们就必须质疑命题本身。
But if memory is not simply or exclusively “of the past,” what does it involve in addition? The very embodiment of remembering hints at an answer. To be embodied is ipso facto to assume a particular perspective and position; it is to have not just a point of view but a place in which we are situated. It is to occupy a portion of space from out of which we both undergo given experiences and remember them. To be disembodied is not only to be deprived of place, unplaced; it is to be denied the basic stance on which every experience and its memory depend. As embodied existence opens onto place, indeed takes place in place and nowhere else, so our memory of what we experience in place is likewise place-specific: it is bound to place as to its own basis. Yet it is just this importance of place for memory that has been lost sight of in philosophical and common sense concerns with the temporal dimensions of memory. 但如果记忆不仅仅或完全“关乎过去”，它还涉及什么？记忆的具体化本身就暗示了答案。具身化就意味着必然采取特定的视角和立场；它不仅拥有一个观点，还拥有我们所处的位置。它占据了一部分空间，我们既在其中经历特定体验，也在此回忆这些体验。失去具身化不仅意味着被剥夺位置、无处立足；更是被剥夺了所有体验及其记忆赖以存在的基本立足点。正如具身化存在向场所敞开，实际上就发生在场所之中而非他处，我们对场所中体验之事的记忆同样具有场所特定性：它如同依附于自身根基般与场所紧密相连。然而，正是场所对记忆的这种重要性，在哲学界和常识对记忆时间维度的探讨中被忽视了。
This was not always so. The ancient Greeks devised an elaborate and effective “art of memory” to which I made brief reference in the Introduction to this book. In this art, which was in fact more than a merely instrumental mnemotechnique, the role of place was altogether central: hence its classical description as a “method of loci.” A locus is definable as “a place easily grasped by the memory, such as a house, an intercolumnar space, a corner, 事实并非总是如此。古希腊人曾设计出一套精密高效的"记忆术"，我在本书导论中已简要提及。这种技艺远非单纯的工具性记忆技巧，其中场所的作用至关重要：因此被经典地描述为"轨迹记忆法"。所谓轨迹，可定义为"易于记忆把握的场所，例如房屋、柱间空间、角落、
an arch, or the like.” ^(5){ }^{5} A given place or set of places acts as a grid onto which images of items to be remembered are placed in a certain order. The subsequent remembering of these items occurs by revisiting the place-grid and traversing it silently step by step in one’s mind. In Cicero’s words: 拱门等类似之处。" ^(5){ }^{5} 特定场所或场所组合构成记忆网格，需记忆事项的形象按特定顺序置于其上。后续回忆时，只需在脑海中重新造访这个场所网格，并逐步静默遍历。用西塞罗的话来说：
Persons desiring to train this faculty of memory must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things . . . and we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and the letters written on it. ^(6){ }^{6} 欲训练此记忆能力者，须选择场所并在心中形成待记事物之形象，将这些形象存储于场所之中，如此场所顺序便能保存事物顺序......我们将分别运用场所与形象，犹如蜡板与其上所刻文字。 ^(6){ }^{6}
Here the model of memory as a wax-tablet returns, but this time not to be summarily dismissed as it was by Plato. ^(7){ }^{7} On the contrary: as signifying an underlying grid of places, the wax-tablet points to the reliance of the art of memory upon a stable place system. For the operative premise of this system is that “the order of the places will preserve the order of the things [to be remembered].” It is all the more impressive that such preservative power is imputed to place even when the places in question are imagined and not perceived. For the loci themselves can be quite fictitious in origin, and yet manage very effectively to hold in memory the images deposited on them. An extraordinary situation: the fragility of images and the silence of the memorizer ^(8){ }^{8} combine with the stability of place to bring about a mnemotechnique so efficacious that to this day it is still being recommended in popular memory manuals. 蜡板记忆模型在此重现，但这次它不再像柏拉图时代那样被草率摒弃。相反，作为空间基础网格的象征，蜡板暗示着记忆艺术对稳定场所系统的依赖。因为该系统的运作前提是"场所的顺序将保留[待记忆]事物的顺序"。更令人惊叹的是，这种保存力量被归因于场所本身——即便这些场所纯属想象而非实际感知。记忆场所的起源可以完全虚构，却仍能高效承载铭刻其上的意象。这形成了一种奇特现象：意象的脆弱性与记忆者的缄默，同场所的稳定性相结合，催生出如此高效的记忆术，以至于当今通俗记忆手册仍在推荐这种方法。
I cite the ars memorativa tradition as one salient piece of evidence that the relationship between memory and place is at once intimate and profound. Outside this tradition, whose subterranean vicissitudes have been traced so brilliantly by Yates and Spence, the relationship remains largely unsuspected: either taken for granted or not noticed at all. This, too, is extraordinary and calls for remedial measures of the sort which this chapter aims to provide. For it is a fact that memory of place, of having been in a place, is one of the most conspicuously neglected areas of philosophical or psychological inquiry into remembering. My own treatment of memory up to this point in the book has been no exception to this unspoken rule; apart from a few observations on “remembered space” and the “scene” of remembering, I have not begun to do justice to place-whereas, and very much in keeping with predominant Western proclivities, the temporal aspects of remembering have received the lion’s share of attention. It is time to call this preoccupation with remembered time into question and to accord to remembered place its rightful due. 我将记忆术传统作为一项重要证据，用以说明记忆与场所的关系既亲密又深刻。在这一传统之外——其隐秘的变迁已被耶茨和斯宾塞精彩地追溯——这种关系大多未被察觉：要么被视为理所当然，要么完全被忽视。这同样非同寻常，需要采取本章旨在提供的补救措施。因为事实上，关于场所的记忆、关于曾身处某地的记忆，正是哲学或心理学记忆研究中最被明显忽视的领域之一。我在本书中迄今对记忆的探讨也未能免俗；除了对"被记忆的空间"和记忆"场景"的少许观察外，我尚未开始公正对待场所问题——而与此形成鲜明对比的是，与西方主流倾向高度一致，记忆的时间维度却获得了绝大部分关注。现在是时候质疑这种对记忆时间的偏执关注，并给予记忆场所应有的重视了。
And what a due this is! Only consider how often a memory is either of a place itself (e.g., of one’s childhood home) or of an event or person in a place; and, conversely, how unusual it is to remember a placeless person or an event not stationed in some specific locale. To be placeless in one’s remembering is not only to be disoriented; it is to be decidedly dis- 这是多么恰当的债务啊！只需想想，记忆要么是关于某个地方本身（比如童年的家），要么是关于某个地方发生的事件或人物；反过来，记起一个无地点归属的人或未定位于特定场所的事件又是多么罕见。在回忆中失去场所感不仅会让人迷失方向，更意味着被剥夺了
advantaged with regard to what a more complete mnemonic experience might deliver. Place serves to situate one’s memorial life, to give it “a name and a local habitation.” The link between place and situation is close indeed. As Heidegger has observed: 更完整记忆体验可能带来的优势。场所为我们的记忆生活提供了定位，赋予它"一个名称和本地居所"。地点与情境之间的联系确实紧密。正如海德格尔所言：
To situate means . . . first of all to point out the proper place or site of something. Secondly it means to heed that place or site. These two methods, placing and heeding, are both preliminaries to a topology. ^(9){ }^{9} 定位意味着……首先指出某物的恰当位置或场所。其次意味着留意那个位置或场所。这两种方法——安置与关注——都是拓扑学的预备步骤。 ^(9){ }^{9}
Where Heidegger is ultimately interested in a “topology of Being,” ^(10){ }^{10} my concern here is exclusively with a topology of the remembered. We must come to heed the proper place of the remembered-its manner not just of occupying place but of incorporating it into its own content. Situating by its very nature, place adequately heeded will help us to situate memory more fully than has been possible thus far. It is a matter of acknowledging the placement of place itself in memory; and since we become oriented in place mainly by bodily movements, we shall have to trace out the corporeal basis of remembering in ways that were barely glimpsed in the last chapter. 海德格尔最终关注的是"存在的拓扑学"，而在此处，我仅专注于被记忆之物的拓扑学。我们必须开始关注被记忆之物的恰当位置——它不仅占据位置的方式，更将其纳入自身内容的方式。位置本质上具有定位功能，充分关注位置将帮助我们比以往更全面地定位记忆。关键在于承认位置本身在记忆中的安置；由于我们主要通过身体运动在空间中获得方向感，因此必须沿着上一章仅略窥门径的路径，追溯记忆的身体基础。
II 第二部
If place is indeed so important for memory, why has it been so pervasively overlooked? One answer has already been suggested: the primacy accorded to time and to temporal phenomena generally. But there is a second reason as well. ^(11){ }^{11} This is that the significance of place, formerly unquestioned, has been forcibly undercut by a fixation on what I shall call “site,” that is, place as leveled down to metrically determinate dimensions. Much has changed since the early Pythagorean Archytas declared that place is “the first of all beings, since everything that exists is in a place and cannot exist without a place.” ^(12){ }^{12} Aristotle, acknowledging with Archytas that “everything is somewhere and in place,” 13 adds that “if such a thing is true, the power of place will be a remarkable one, and prior to all things.” ^(14){ }^{14} In his Physics Aristotle attempts to spell out this power by attributing to each place in the natural world a “certain influence” and a “distinct potency.” ^(15){ }^{15} Thus each place has its own distinctive dimensions such as up/down, before/behind, and right/left. These dimensions constitute “regions” which cannot be defined in terms of their occupants alone. Having thus established that place is active, independent in its being, ^(16){ }^{16} and necessary for the existence of other existents, Aristotle proceeds to define place as “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains.” ^(17){ }^{17} It ensues that there is a tight fit between a given thing and its place; the outer surface of the thing coincides with the inner surface of the place. “Place is thought to be a kind of surface,” says Aristotle, “and as it were a vessel, i.e., a container of the thing. Place is coincident with the thing, for boundaries are coincident with the bounded.” 18 如果地点对记忆确实如此重要，为何它会被如此普遍地忽视？一个答案已经给出：人们普遍优先考虑时间及时间性现象。但还有第二个原因。这是因为地点的重要性——这一曾经毋庸置疑的特质——已被对所谓"场所"的执着强行削弱，即把地点降格为可度量的确定维度。自早期毕达哥拉斯学派的阿契塔宣称"地点是万有之先，因一切存在皆居于某处，无地点则不能存在"以来，情况已发生巨变。亚里士多德虽认同阿契塔"万物皆在某处，皆居于地点"的观点，并补充道"若此言不虚，则地点之力必卓尔不凡，先于万物"，但他在《物理学》中试图通过赋予自然界每个地点以"特定影响"和"独特潜能"来阐明这种力量。因此每个地点都拥有上下、前后、左右等独特维度，这些维度构成了无法仅凭占据者来定义的"区域"。 既然已确立空间具有能动性、存在独立性且为其他存在者存续之必需，亚里士多德进而将空间定义为"包容物最内层静止的边界"。由此可推知：特定事物与其所处空间存在严丝合缝的对应关系——事物外表面与空间内表面完全重合。"空间被认为是一种界面"，亚里士多德阐述道，"犹如器皿，即事物的容器。空间与事物共生共灭，因为边界总与被限定之物相生相伴。"
Nonetheless, what is “first of all” for Archytas and Aristotle ends by being last, and it becomes so by the close of the seventeenth century-when space, and place along with it, became geometrized. For the Greeks, this development was not possible. For one thing, they did not think in terms of spatial coordinate systems, the basis for any thorough geometrization. For another, their very conception of space was resistant to being formally geometrized: space was either “something inhomogeneous because of its local geometric variance (as with Plato) [or] something anisotropic owing to directional differentiation in the substratum (Aristotle).” ^(19){ }^{19} Not even Euclidean geometry could apply without resistance to Aristotle’s regionalized, direction-bound universe. It was evident that the very idea of space had to undergo a metamorphosis not just for Euclidean geometry to apply to it but more particularly for rational geometry to be able to specify it. 然而，对阿基塔斯和亚里士多德而言"首要"的事物最终沦为末位，这一转变在十七世纪末完成——彼时空间连同位置一起被几何化。对古希腊人来说，这种发展是不可能的。一方面，他们不具备空间坐标系思维，而这是任何彻底几何化的基础。另一方面，他们对于空间的概念本身就抗拒形式化的几何处理：空间要么是"因局部几何变异而不均匀的存在（如柏拉图所言）[要么]是基质中方向分化导致的各向异性存在（亚里士多德观点）"。 ^(19){ }^{19} 即便是欧几里得几何学，也难以毫无阻力地应用于亚里士多德那个区域化、方向限定的宇宙。显然，空间概念本身必须经历蜕变，不仅是为了让欧氏几何能适用其中，更是为了让理性几何能够精确界定它。
This metamorphosis, and with it the demotion of place (which depends on inhomogeneous and anisotropic qualities for its very vitality), was effected by the audacious speculations of Newton, Descartes, Bernoulli, and others, for all of whom space was conceived as continuous extension in length, breadth, and width and, thus, as mappable by the three-dimensional coordinate system of rational geometry. Descartes was doubtless the most unspoken on this point, and he drew the direst consequences: “We conceive a place to contain nothing but extension in length, breadth, and depth.” ^(20){ }^{20} Here place is conceived as sheer spatial site. It follows that place qua site is merely a matter of relative position: “When we say an object is ‘in’ a place we are merely thinking of its occupying a position relatively to other objects.” ^(21){ }^{21} This contention marks a turning-point in Western thinking about place. While for the Greeks the relativity of place is far less important than its inherent character (“Places do not differ merely in relative position,” said Aristotle, “but also as possessing distinct potencies”), ^(22){ }^{22} for Descartes and his immediate successors place is strictly a relative matter, that is, a question of fixed positions in relation to each other within a systematic whole. 这一转变，连同随之而来的场所地位的贬抑（场所的活力恰恰依赖于非均质性与各向异性特质），是由牛顿、笛卡尔、伯努利等人大胆的思辨所实现的。对他们而言，空间被构想为长、宽、高三维的连续延展，因而可通过理性几何的三维坐标系进行测绘。笛卡尔无疑是此观点最沉默的代言人，却得出了最严峻的推论："我们认为场所无非包含长、宽、深的延展。" ^(20){ }^{20} 在此，场所被简化为纯粹的空间点位。由此推知，作为点位的场所仅关乎相对位置："当我们说某物'在'某处时，我们仅考虑其相对于其他物体的位置关系。" ^(21){ }^{21} 这一论断标志着西方场所认知的转折点。 对希腊人而言，场所的相对性远不如其内在特质重要（亚里士多德曾说："场所的差异不仅在于相对位置，更在于其独特潜能"），而在笛卡尔及其直接追随者看来，场所纯粹是相对性的问题，即系统整体中彼此关联的固定位置关系问题。
What we witness in Descartes is therefore the supersession of place by site. A site is not a container but an open area that is specified primarily by means of cartographic representations such as maps or architects’ plans. It embodies a spatiality that is at once homogeneous (i.e., having no internal differentiations with respect to material constitution) and isotropic (possessing no inherent directionality such as up/down, East/West, etc.). A site is thus leveled down to the point of being definable solely in terms of distances between “positions” which are established on its surface and which exist strictly in relation to one another. As a result, a site is indifferent to what might occupy it-and to what we might remember about it. 因此我们在笛卡尔学说中见证的是场所被场址所取代。场址不是容器，而是主要通过地图或建筑平面图等制图表现来界定的开放区域。它体现的空间性既是均质的（即物质构成上无内部差异），又是各向同性的（不具备上下、东西等固有方向性）。场址被简化为仅能通过其表面确立的"位置"之间的距离来定义，这些位置严格以彼此关系存在。因此，场址对可能占据它的内容——以及我们可能对它的记忆——都漠不关心。
The triumph of site over place has continued from the Cartesian epoch until the present day. This triumph has crucial consequences for the memory of place. As essentially empty (its vacuity is expressed in a phrase like “building site”), a site lacks the variegations or “obtrusions” ^(23){ }^{23} that aid in 自笛卡尔时代至今，场所对地方的胜利持续不断。这种胜利对地方记忆产生了至关重要的影响。由于场所本质上是空无的（其空虚性体现在"建筑工地"这类表述中），它缺乏那些有助于
remembering unsited places. A site possesses no points of attachment onto which to hang our memories, much less to retrieve them. By denuding itself of particularity, site deprives itself of what James called “contiguous associates,” i.e., the most efficacious cues for remembering. ^(24){ }^{24} Place, in contrast, characteristically presents us with a plethora of such cues. Thanks to its “distinct potencies,” a place is at once internally diversified-full of protuberant features and forceful vectors-and distinct externally from other places. Both kinds of differentiation, internal and external, augment memorability. We observe this when an indifferent building lot, easily confused with other empty lots, is transformed into a memorable place by the erection of a distinctive house upon it. 记忆无场所之地的多样特征或"突兀存在"。场所不具备任何可供悬挂记忆的附着点，更遑论找回记忆。通过剥离自身特殊性，场所丧失了詹姆斯所称的"邻近关联物"——即最有效的记忆线索。相比之下，地方通常为我们提供大量此类线索。凭借其"独特效力"，地方既具有内部多样性——充满突出的特征和有力的向量——又在外部与其他地方截然不同。这种内外双重差异性都增强了可记忆性。当一块原本平淡无奇、极易与其他空地混淆的建筑用地，因建造起一栋特色房屋而转变为令人难忘的地方时，我们便能观察到这种现象。
It is the nature of place, in contradistinction from site, to encourage and support such distinctiveness, thereby enhancing memorability. Requisite to any full understanding of memory of place is thus a recognition of the way in which place itself aids remembering. It does so precisely as being well suited to contain memories-to hold and preserve them. 与场所不同，地方的本质在于鼓励并维系这种独特性，从而强化记忆的留存。要充分理解地方记忆，就必须认识到地方本身如何助力回忆——它恰恰通过完美承载记忆、保存记忆的特性来实现这一功能。
It was precisely Aristotle’s contention that the primary action of place is that of containing. “Container” in Greek is periechon, literally a having or holding around. To be in a place is to be sheltered and sustained by its containing boundary; it is to be held within this boundary rather than to be dispersed by an expanding horizon of time or to be exposed indifferently in space. In fact, the most characteristic effect of place is that of maintaining or retaining rather than dividing or dispersing. This is what lies behind such idioms as “marching in place,” “having a place of your own,” “that’s a nice place to be,” “getting in place,” etc. In each case the expression draws on place’s peculiar power to hold in or keep in. No wonder, then, that access to place is not deeply problematic: in its abiding character, place is there to be re-entered, by memory if not by direct bodily movement. As continually available, place does not naturally lead us to become preoccupied with indirect, symbolic representations of it, or to feel that we are somehow forced to choose between these representations. The very persistence of place helps to make it accessible in a way that is rarely true of a comparable unit of time or a given site. For place tends to hold its contents steadily within its own embrace, while site and time characteristically replace their respective contents. Think of the kaleidoscopic array of items that can fill up just one hour’s time as they succeed one another in a sometimes confusing alacrity, and compare this with the stability of any given place such as a house, a plaza, an office, etc. Sites are also all too easily filled up with a clutter of things or events that may appear and disappear in disconcerting rapidity. 亚里士多德的核心主张正是：场所的首要作用在于容纳。希腊语中的“容器”（periechon）字面意为“环绕的拥有或持握”。置身于场所即被其包容的边界所庇护与维系；是被涵容于此边界之内，而非被时间延展的地平线所驱散，或漠然地暴露于空间之中。事实上，场所最典型的效应在于维系与保留，而非分割或消散。这正是“原地踏步”、“拥有自己的天地”、“那是个好去处”、“各就各位”等习语的深层意涵——每种表达都依托于场所特有的收束与持存之力。无怪乎进入场所从不会构成深刻难题：凭借其恒常特质，场所始终可供重临，纵非以身体直接移动，亦可借由记忆达成。由于持续可及，场所天然不会使我们沉迷于对其间接的符号化表征，亦不会让人感到被迫在这些表征间作出抉择。 场所的持久性特质使其具有一种罕见的可及性，这种特性在时间单位或特定场址中几乎不存在。因为场所往往能稳固地容纳其内容物，而场址与时间则惯常更替其承载之物。试想那些万花筒般接连涌现的琐碎事物——它们以令人应接不暇的速度填满短短一小时，再对比房屋、广场、办公室等任何特定场所的稳定性。场址同样极易被杂乱物品或事件占据，这些内容往往以令人不安的速率出现又消失。
It is the stabilizing persistence of place as a container of experiences that contributes so powerfully to its intrinsic memorability. An alert and alive memory connects spontaneously with place, finding in it features that favor and parallel its own activities. We might even say that memory is naturally 正是场所作为经验容器的这种稳定持存性，为其内在的可记忆性提供了强大支撑。敏锐鲜活的记忆会自发地与场所建立联结，在其中发现那些与记忆活动相契合的平行特征。我们甚至可以说记忆天然地
place-oriented or at least place-supported. Moreover, it is itself a place wherein the past can revive and survive; it is a place for places, meeting them midway in its own preservative powers, its “reservative” ^(25){ }^{25} role. Unlike site and time, memory does not thrive on the indifferently dispersed. It thrives, rather, on the persistent particularities of what is properly in place: held fast there and made one’s own. 以场所为导向或至少以场所为依托。不仅如此，记忆本身就是一个能让过去复苏并延续的场所；它是容纳场所的场所，凭借其自身的保存力量——即"存留"功能——在中间地带与其他场所相遇。与地点和时间不同，记忆并不依赖于无差别的分散状态。相反，它依赖于那些恰如其分地处于特定位置、被牢牢固定并化为己有的持久特殊性而蓬勃发展。
III 第三章
But let us leave history and theory aside for the moment and turn to actual cases of place memory. It is a revealing fact that five of the six examples of memory set forth in chapter 1 involved place to a significant degree. Yet in only one instance-that of my memory concerning the philosophy librarydid I expressly remark on place as a relevant factor, and then just in passing. Otherwise, my analysis was oblivious to the presence of place: as oblivious as almost every treatment of memory after Aristotle. True to this forgetful tradition, I stressed either purely temporal factors (e.g., the dating of the Yosemite memory, the moment-after aspects of the tea-tasting episode) or parameters of sheer site (“we had come over to Yosemite from San Francisco”: a cartographic claim). Just as contemporary cognitive psychologists are largely blind to the role of place in their experimental material despite their topographic language of “storage,” “levels of processing,” etc. ^(26){ }^{26}-so I was opaque to the dimension of place in my first round of examination. 不过，让我们暂且搁置历史与理论的探讨，转向实际案例中的场所记忆。一个发人深省的事实是：第一章列举的六个记忆案例中，有五例都显著涉及场所要素。然而除了一处——即我对哲学图书馆的记忆——我曾明确提及场所的相关性，且仅是顺带提及。除此之外，我的分析完全忽视了场所的存在：这种忽视程度与亚里士多德之后几乎所有关于记忆的论述如出一辙。遵循这种健忘的传统，我当时要么强调纯粹的时间因素（如约塞米蒂记忆的时间标记、品茶事件中"片刻之后"的细节），要么着眼于绝对位置的参数（"我们从旧金山来到约塞米蒂"：这种地图式的陈述）。正如当代认知心理学家尽管使用"存储"、"加工层次"等拓扑学语言，却对其实验材料中场所的作用视而不见——我在首轮考察中同样对场所维度浑然不觉。
But consider these early examples more closely. The Yosemite memory itself was place-saturated. It began with a look at the valley of the park as viewed on first approach: here one place was seen from another. This pristine moment was itself photographed and installed in another place I also vividly remember, my mother’s dressing table. Moreover, the main memory proceeds as a virtual tour of places within Yosemite valley: Half Dome, the cabin where my family stayed, the waterfall. It is striking that the only allusion to “place” that was allowed in my analysis of this memory had to do with the indefiniteness of the cabin’s exact location-that is, with an imperfectly remembered site. But the massive place-orientation of the memory as a whole was passed over in silence. 但让我们更仔细地审视这些早期案例。约塞米蒂记忆本身就浸透着场所感。它始于初次接近公园山谷时的眺望：一个场所从另一个场所被看见。这个原初时刻本身被拍摄下来，并安置在我同样记忆鲜活的另一个场所——母亲的梳妆台上。更值得注意的是，这段主要记忆如同对约塞米蒂山谷内各场所的虚拟巡礼：半圆顶、家人居住的小木屋、瀑布。耐人寻味的是，当初分析这段记忆时，唯一被允许提及"场所"的暗示竟与小木屋确切位置的不确定性相关——即某个记忆模糊的地点。而整段记忆强烈的场所导向性，却被全然忽略了。
If less conspicuous in their neglect of place, the other examples examined in chapter 1 are nevertheless illuminating to ponder in retrospect. In the case of my Small Change memory, there was a marked succession of places as the setting changed from dinner at Clark’s to the Lincoln Theater, with a paperback bookstore serving as an intermediate point. My family and I then found “places” in the movie theater and interchanged seats-a matter of sites set within a place. The theater building itself, however, was no mere site for me; as the scene of many memorable movies I had seen there over a period of nearly two decades, it was redolent with the past: it held the past in place. 如果说第一章探讨的其他案例对场所的忽视不那么明显，那么回顾起来它们依然颇具启发性。就以我的《小玩意》记忆为例，随着场景从克拉克餐厅的晚餐切换到林肯剧院，其间还经过一家平装书书店，场所发生了显著的更迭。随后我和家人在电影院里找到了各自的"位置"，并交换了座位——这属于场所内部位点的转换。然而剧院建筑本身对我而言绝非单纯的位点；作为近二十年间我看过许多难忘电影的场所，它浸透着往昔的气息：将过去凝固在特定场所中。
Part of the power of this particular place was due to the fact that the memorable movies I had viewed there were themselves highly place-specific-as was the case with the decidedly French setting of Small Change. 这个特定场所的力量部分源于一个事实：我在那里观看的那些难忘电影本身都具有高度场所特异性——正如《小玩意》中鲜明的法国背景所体现的那样。
Even the most compressed of my initial memories manifested basic place aspects. In recalling “902,” the number on my office door, I was after all remembering a feature of a place. Although the item was remembered in a quite isolated way, it was nevertheless recollected as detached from the office it emptily designated. This place remained as an essential backdrop to the remembering itself. In the similar case of recalling the single word “Culligan,” the backdrop (the basement of my childhood home) arose indistinctly but unmistakably into my remembrance. This penumbral quality of place-my analysis spoke of “a nebulous setting”-was also evident in the tea-tasting episode, whose scene was set by the top of my desk. At every level, then, and even in instances in which a setting was only dimly specified (and was sometimes altogether unspecified) the presence of place reveals itself on close inspection. 即便是我最初那些最简短的记忆，也显现出基本的地点特征。回想"902"这个办公室门牌号时，我终究是在回忆某个场所的细节。虽然这个数字是以相当孤立的方式被记起，但它仍被回忆为与它所空洞指代的那间办公室相分离。这个地点始终作为记忆行为本身的必要背景存在着。同样地，当回忆起"卡利根"这个单词时，那个背景（我童年家中的地下室）虽然模糊却确凿无误地浮现在记忆中。这种地点的半影特质——我的分析曾称之为"朦胧的场景"——在品茶事件的回忆中同样明显，那个场景是由我的办公桌面构成的。由此可见，在每个层面上，甚至在某些场景仅被隐约指明（有时完全未被指明）的案例中，只要仔细观察，地点的存在就会自我显现。
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of every other leading example which has been employed in this book. Was it a matter of indifference that the paradigm of a habitual body memory was set in an isolated island off the coast of northern Sweden? Here the place lent poignancy and point to the circumstance of starting up a moribund automobile: remembering how to start it was especially prized in such a place, and I in turn remembered the episode as indissolubly place-bound. The same is true of my erotic and traumatic memories. In their case, however, my own body served as a pertinent place, as the immediate setting for what I came to remember. In still other cases, place continued to be deeply ingredient: whether as the postcard photograph of the Parthenon that reminded me of the glory that was Greece, the grim battlefield about which elderly veterans reminisce, or the South Bend airport in which a scene of recognition took place. The reservative role of place is evident in every instance. However unobtrusive this role may be, it serves to contain-to shelter and protect-the items or episodes on which the act of remembering comes to focus. 本书所采用的其他主要例证亦是如此，只需稍作变通。将习惯性身体记忆的范例设定在瑞典北部海岸外一座孤岛上，难道是无足轻重的吗？此处的地理位置为启动一辆濒临报废的汽车赋予了特殊意义：在这样的地方，记住如何发动它显得尤为珍贵，而我也因此将这个片段记忆为与地点密不可分的存在。我的情欲记忆与创伤记忆同样如此。不过在这些案例中，我自己的身体成为了相关场所，成为记忆浮现的直接场景。在其他案例中，地点依然作为深层要素存在：无论是让我想起希腊辉煌的帕特农神庙明信片照片，还是老兵们追忆的惨烈战场，抑或发生相认场景的南本德机场。地点的保存功能在每种情境中都清晰可辨。无论这种作用多么不引人注目，它始终承担着容纳——庇护与保护——那些成为记忆焦点的物品或事件片段的功能。
The paradox is that despite the undeniability of this role, it remained terra incognita in my own previous assessments. Not only in these, however: the place of place in human memory is enormously difficult to detect in almost any traditional model of remembering. This is as true of a Kantian account of memory as “reproductive imagination” (i.e., as imagistic recollection) as it is of a Husserlian act-intentional analysis. Indeed, it is true for Aristotle’s view of memory as “the having of an image regarded as a copy of that of which it is an image.” ^(27){ }^{27} As presented in his treatise De Memoria et Reminiscentia, this view leaves little room for Aristotle’s description in the Physics of place as containerlike. And yet it is the latter notion that is so suggestive for a more thorough understanding of place memory, one which refuses to reduce place to site or to let the spatial aspects of memories be overwhelmed by their temporal features. 吊诡之处在于，尽管这一作用无可否认，它在我先前的评估中却始终是片未知领域。不仅于此：在几乎所有传统记忆模型中，都极难察觉"场所"在人类记忆中的位置。无论是康德将记忆视为"再生产性想象"（即图像式回忆）的论述，还是胡塞尔对记忆进行行为意向性分析的理论，皆是如此。亚里士多德认为记忆是"拥有被视为原物复本的意象"，这一观点同样未能为场所留出空间。 ^(27){ }^{27} 正如他在《论记忆与回忆》中阐述的那样，这种观点与其在《物理学》中将场所描述为容器般的特性几乎无法兼容。然而正是后一种概念，为更透彻理解场所记忆提供了重要启示——它拒绝将场所简化为地点，也不允许记忆的空间维度被时间特征所淹没。
Such considerations lead us to the following two-fold observation. On the one hand, place is selective for memories: that is to say, a given place will invite certain memories while discouraging others. The fact is that we can’t attach just any memories to a particular place-as can occur in the case of a site, whose featurelessness is nonselective with respect to memories, much as a blank television screen can accommodate any and all images that might flit across it. Place is always definite, and regarding a given place only some memories, indeed only certain kinds of memory, will be pertinent. My memory, say, of seeing Small Change at a particular theater calls for remembering that is limited to certain visual, auditory, and (to a lesser degree) kinesthetic modalities. It would be literally “out of place” to associate systematically with this theater memories of isolated cogitation, of jogging, of painting, etc. A movie theater is a place with local peculiarities that would not welcome such memories as these: if not disallowing them altogether, it is a most unpropitious setting for them. 这些思考引出了以下双重观察。一方面，场所对记忆具有选择性：特定场所会唤起某些记忆，同时抑制其他记忆。事实上，我们无法将任意记忆附着于特定场所——这与无特征的场地不同，后者对记忆不具有选择性，就像空白电视屏幕能容纳所有闪过的画面。场所总是明确的，对于特定场所，只有某些记忆、甚至特定类型的记忆才是相关的。例如，我对在某家影院观看《零用钱》的记忆，必然局限于特定的视觉、听觉及（较小程度上）动觉模态。若系统性地将独自沉思、慢跑或绘画等记忆与这家影院关联，那将真正"不合时宜"：电影院作为具有局部特殊性的场所，本就不接纳此类记忆——即便不完全排斥，也是最不适宜的载体。
On the other hand, memories are selective for place: they seek out particular places as their natural habitats. Why this propensity? Partly because places furnish convenient points of attachment for memories; but also because places provide situations in which remembered actions can deploy themselves. Or more precisely, places are congealed scenes for remembered contents; and as such they serve to situate what we remember. Here we encounter once more place’s periechon being, its containing/ surrounding function. Place is a mise en scène for remembered events precisely to the extent that it guards and keeps these events within its self-delimiting perimeters. Instead of filtering out (as place can do for inappropriate, ill-placed memories), place holds in by giving to memories an authentically local habitation: by being their place-holder. 另一方面，记忆对场所具有选择性：它们会寻找特定场所作为其自然栖息地。这种倾向从何而来？部分原因在于场所为记忆提供了便利的依附点；同时也因为场所为被记忆的行动提供了展开的情境。更准确地说，场所是记忆内容凝结的场景；正因如此，它们能为我们所记忆的内容定位。在此我们再次遭遇场所的包容性存在——其容纳/环绕功能。场所成为记忆事件的舞台，恰恰在于它将事件守护并保留在其自我划定的边界之内。场所并非过滤排除（虽然它确实能筛除不恰当、不合时宜的记忆），而是通过赋予记忆真正的地方性栖居来实现包容：即成为记忆的栖居之所。
IV 第四章
But it is still not clear just how such an intimate relationship between memory and place is realized. Through what agency does this become possible? The answer can only be: through the lived body. The lived body’s basic “inter-leaving” ^(28){ }^{28} activity makes it ideally suited as a means for mediating between two such seemingly different things as memory and place. As psycho-physical in status, the lived body puts us in touch with the psychical aspects of remembering and the physical features of place. As itself movable and moving, it can relate at once to the movable bodies that are the primary occupants of place and to the self-moving soul that recollects itself in place. Above all, through its active intentional arc, the lived body traces out the arena for the remembered scenes that inhere so steadfastly in particular places: the body’s maneuvers and movements, imagined as well as actual, make room for remembering placed scenes in all of their complex composition. In the end, we can move into place, indeed be in a place at all, only 然而，记忆与场所之间这种亲密关系究竟如何实现仍不明确。通过何种媒介才能使这种关系成为可能？答案只能是：通过活生生的身体。活生生身体的基础"交织"活动，使其成为连接记忆与场所这两种看似迥异事物的理想中介。作为兼具心理物理属性的存在，活生生的身体让我们同时触及记忆的心理维度与场所的物质特征。它本身既能移动又处于运动状态，因此可以即时关联场所的主要占据者——那些可移动的物体，以及能在场所中自我回忆的自主动魂。最重要的是，通过其活跃的意向弧，活生生的身体为那些始终固着于特定场所的记忆场景勾勒出呈现的舞台：无论是想象中还是实际的身体动作与移动，都在为那些具有复杂构成的场所记忆场景创造空间。归根结底，我们得以进入场所，甚至真正身处某个场所，
through our body’s own distinct potencies. And if it is the body that places us in place to start with, it will be instrumental in re-placing us in remembered places as well. As integral to the original experience of places which we come to remember, it is also central to the motion and time that depend on place. ^(29){ }^{29} 通过我们身体独特的潜能。如果说最初是身体将我们置于某个场所，那么它同样会在重新定位我们于记忆中的场所时发挥关键作用。作为那些最终被我们记住的场所原初体验的组成部分，身体对于依赖于场所的运动和时间也至关重要。 ^(29){ }^{29}
Accordingly, we must now take up the role of the body in memory of place. Doing so will carry forward the work of the last chapter. Body memory is by no means confined to matters of place. But such memory, in several of its basic aspects, can be regarded as importantly operative in memory of place. In any case, whether subject to memory or not, the lived body is indispensable to remembering places of every sort. 因此，我们现在必须探讨身体在场所记忆中的作用。这样做将延续上一章的工作。身体记忆绝不仅限于场所相关事项。但这种记忆的若干基本层面，可以被视为在场所记忆中发挥着重要作用。无论如何，无论是否涉及记忆，活生生的身体对于记住各类场所都是不可或缺的。
A full discussion of just how the body is constitutive for memory of place would have to include consideration of the ways in which it establishes directionality (e.g., right/left, North/South), spatio-temporal distance, and a sense of level in given places. As I have treated these matters elsewhere, ^(30){ }^{30} we can move immediately to a reflection on what can be called “in-habitation.” By this I mean the manner in which, thanks precisely to the lived body, we find ourselves to be familiar with a particular place in which we are located. I underline “familiar” and “in” to indicate what is characteristic of places in contrast with sites. A site, for example a development lot, resists familiarization just as it resists movement into its interior. In its well-surveyed stolidity, the lot stands over against us. It seems to want to keep us out-unless we are prospective buyers, and even then it seems to oppose any attempt to become fully familiar with it. For familiarity to begin to set in, we must project a state of already having inhabited it, e.g., the dwelling we plan to build on it. Otherwise, it remains foreign, even inimical, to us. Such a site is not the stuff of which memories are made! Its indifference to us is answered by our commensurate indifference in remembering it. It is just one more lot to look at, and as such it is distinctly unmemorable. 若要全面探讨身体如何构成对场所的记忆，就必须考量身体确立方向性（如左右、南北）、时空距离以及在特定场所中层次感的方式。鉴于我已在他处论述过这些问题，我们可以直接转向对所谓"栖居"的思考。我指的是这样一种状态：正是凭借活生生的身体，我们发现自己对所处特定场所产生熟悉感。我强调"熟悉"与"在其中"，以指明场所区别于地点的特质。例如一块待开发的地块作为地点，既抗拒熟悉化过程，也抗拒向内部移动。在它被精确勘测的顽固性中，地块与我们形成对峙。它似乎要将我们拒之门外——除非我们是潜在买家，即便如此，它仍抗拒任何试图完全熟悉它的努力。要开始建立熟悉感，我们必须投射一种已经栖居其上的状态，比如计划建造的住宅。否则，它对我们而言始终是异质的，甚至充满敌意。 这样的场所绝非记忆形成的素材！它对我们漠不关心，我们回忆时也报以同等冷漠。这不过是又一个可供观望的地块，因此它显然难以被铭记。
Merleau-Ponty wrote that “we must . . . avoid saying that our body is in space or in time. It inhabits space and time.” ^(31){ }^{31} When such inhabitation concerns place specifically, it is best construed under the two headings of ‘in’ and ‘familiarity’, which we must now consider at more length. 梅洛-庞蒂曾写道："我们应当……避免说我们的身体处于空间或时间中。它栖居于空间与时间。" ^(31){ }^{31} 当这种栖居特指场所时，最好从"在之中"与"熟悉性"两个维度来理解，我们现在需要更详细地探讨这两个方面。
‘in’ 在之中
In discussing eight ways in which one thing can be said to be in another, Aristotle cites as “the strictest sense of all, [the way] a thing is ‘in’ a vessel, and generally ‘in’ a place.” 32 The vessel is not casually invoked here. It had already been introduced in Book IV of the Physics with the remark that “place is supposed to be something like a vessel.” ^(33){ }^{33} It is like a vessel insofar as both are forms of container: “Place is thought to be a kind of surface and, as it were, a vessel, i.e., a container of the thing.” ^(34){ }^{34} This is not to say that a vessel is a perfect analogue of place. Place, it will be recalled, is defined by 亚里士多德在讨论"一物存在于另一物"的八种方式时，将"事物'在'容器中，以及普遍而言'在'场所中"列为"最严格意义上的存在方式"32。此处对容器的援引并非随意之举。在《物理学》第四卷中已有论述："场所被认为类似于容器" ^(33){ }^{33} 。二者的相似性在于都是容纳形式："场所被视为某种表面，或者说容器，即事物的容纳者" ^(34){ }^{34} 。这并非说容器是场所的完美类比物。需要记住的是，场所的定义在于
Aristotle as “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains.” Therefore, whereas “the vessel is a transportable place,” place itself is “a nonportable vessel.” ^(35){ }^{35} But portability aside, what remains valid in the vessel analogy is the structure of close confinement, of snug fit. As water fills up a vessel into which it is poured and is protected by that vessel, so the lived body can fit snugly into a particular place and be protected by it. ^(36){ }^{36} 亚里士多德将其称为"包容物最内在的静止边界"。因此，虽然"容器是可移动的处所"，但处所本身却是"不可移动的容器"。 ^(35){ }^{35} 暂且不论可移动性，容器类比中仍然有效的是那种紧密包容、严丝合缝的结构。正如水注满容器并受其保护，活生生的身体也能与特定处所严丝合缝地契合并受其庇护。 ^(36){ }^{36}
At play here is a two-fold movement. On the one hand, there is an active in-sertion into place by means of the body. In its propulsive power, its dynamic intentional arc, the body thrusts us into each successive place we inhabit, pulls us into place, puts us in the very midst of it as in a surrounding vessel. Bodily insertion into place is a matter of what Merleau-Ponty calls the “gearing” of my body into the world, becoming emmeshed in it: 这里存在着双重运动。一方面，身体主动嵌入处所。凭借其推进力和动态意向弧，身体将我们推入每个相继栖居的处所，将我们拉入其中，如同置入环绕的容器般让我们身处其核心。身体嵌入处所正是梅洛-庞蒂所谓身体与世界"啮合"的过程，即与之紧密交织：
My body is geared to the world when my perception presents me with a spectacle as varied and as clearly articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they expect from the world. ^(37){ }^{37} 当我的知觉向我呈现尽可能丰富清晰的景象，当我的运动意图在展开时获得世界预期的回应，我的身体便与世界实现了啮合。 ^(37){ }^{37}
This statement makes it clear that a dialectic between subject and world is operative in bodily implacement and that actions of in-sertion into the world (via “motor intentions”) are matched by contributions (“responses”) from the world itself. On the other hand, there is an answering activity of in-taking on the part of place per se. Such activity is responsible for my feeling fully contained in place, with no empty space left over. Here is doubtless the origin of our sensitivity to intimate places, those into which we “just fit,” which seem “just right” because we sense that we are somehow perfectly coincident with what is containing us. These lieux intimes are especially memorable as well, suggesting a profound linkage between memorability and being bodily in a “cozy spot.” The linkage is made possible by the factor of in-taking, which allows us to feel well-contained in place. Thanks to in-taking, we become convinced indeed that “our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism.” ^(38){ }^{38} 这段论述清晰地表明，在身体定位中存在着主体与世界之间的辩证关系：我们通过"运动意向"将自身嵌入世界的行为，与世界本身提供的"回应"相互匹配。另一方面，场所本身也进行着吸纳的应答活动。正是这种活动使我们产生被场所完全容纳的感受，不留丝毫空隙。这无疑是我们对亲密场所敏感性的起源——那些我们"刚好契合"的空间之所以感觉"恰到好处"，是因为我们感知到自己与容纳我们的环境达成了某种完美重合。这些亲密场所（lieux intimes）往往也特别令人难忘，暗示着记忆性与身处"舒适角落"的身体体验之间存在深刻关联。这种关联得以形成的关键在于吸纳因素，它让我们感受到被场所妥善容纳。正是通过吸纳作用，我们才真正确信"我们的身体处于世界中，就像心脏处于有机体内"。 ^(38){ }^{38}
FAMILIARITY 熟悉性
When taken together, the ‘in’ of in-sertion and the ‘in’ of in-taking yield the sense of familiarity that inheres in human in-habitation-in all dwelling and being-in-the-world. ^(39){ }^{39} We only inhabit that which comes bearing the familiar; and the familiar in turn entails memory in various forms. Familiar places are places we are apt to remember-to hold and keep in mind. "置入"之"入"与"摄入"之"入"共同构成了人类栖居——所有居住与在世存在——中固有的熟悉感。 ^(39){ }^{39} 我们只栖居于携带着熟悉感而来之物；而这种熟悉感又需要以各种形式的记忆为前提。熟悉之地正是我们倾向于铭记——留存于心——的场所。
Familiarity of place ranges all the way from the barely recognizable (“I think I’ve been here before, but I can’t say just when or in what circumstances”) to the thoroughly known (e.g., one’s office, one’s domicile). Present throughout, however, is the feeling of being chez soi, at home, domestic. This “down home” sentiment is not only a matter of feeling at ease in a given place but of feeling at ease in a place that has become one’s own in 场所的熟悉度涵盖了从勉强可辨认（"我觉得曾来过这里，但说不清具体何时或何种情形"）到完全熟稔（如个人办公室、住所）的整个光谱。但贯穿始终的，是那种如归己宅、宾至如归的居家感。这种"归家般"的情愫不仅意味着在特定场所感到自在，更意味着在某个以特别重要方式成为"己属"的场所中获得安适。
some especially significant way. “One’s own” does not imply possession in any literal sense; it is more deeply a question of appropriating, with all that this connotes of making something one’s own by making it one with one’s ongoing life. "己属"并非字面意义上的占有；更深层而言，这是关于"据为己有"的问题——这个词蕴含的全部意义在于：通过使某物与持续的生命历程合而为一，从而使其成为自我的一部分。
The appropriation of familiar places is accomplished by the lived body, which has “a knowledge bred of familiarity that does not gives us a position in objective space.” ^(40){ }^{40} The kind of space that figures here is an “attuned space,” a space with which one feels sympathetic at some very basic level-in contrast with the indifferent site-space of cartography or rational geometry. ^(41){ }^{41} In the presence of the latter, it is quite difficult to feel chez soi unless one happens to be a cartographer or a geometer. ^(42){ }^{42} In the ambiance of attuned space, it is correspondingly difficult not to feel at home; for this is the very space that inheres in the place one has made one’s own through establishing such dimensional features as level, distance, and directionality. These features effect an attunement of in-habited space, helping it to become familiar precisely because it is largely one’s own achievement. 对熟悉场所的占有是由生活身体完成的，这种身体拥有"一种源于熟悉的知识，它并不给予我们在客观空间中的位置"。 ^(40){ }^{40} 这里所涉及的空间是一种"共鸣空间"，一种人在最基础层面能与之产生共鸣的空间——这与地图学或理性几何学中冷漠的坐标空间形成鲜明对比。 ^(41){ }^{41} 面对后者时，除非碰巧是制图师或几何学家，否则很难产生归属感。 ^(42){ }^{42} 而在共鸣空间的氛围中，相应地很难不感到如归故里；因为这正是通过建立水平、距离和方向性等维度特征而使之成为己有的空间。这些特征实现了栖居空间的调谐，帮助它变得熟悉，正因为这很大程度上是个人自主创造的成果。
But how are we to account for this attunement of the body in a place? How is it established and maintained? We have already encountered the source of the attunement. It lies in the customary body as conceived by MerleauPonty: 但我们该如何解释身体在场所中的这种调谐？它是如何建立并维持的？我们已经遇到过这种调谐的源头。它存在于梅洛-庞蒂所构想的习惯身体中：
Our body comprises as it were two distinct layers, that of the customary body and that of the body at this moment . . . my body must be apprehended not only in an experience which is instantaneous, peculiar to itself and complete in itself, but also in some general aspect and in light of an impersonal being. ^(43){ }^{43} 我们的身体仿佛由两个截然不同的层次构成，即习惯性身体与当下此刻的身体……对身体的把握不仅需要通过那种转瞬即逝、独具特性且自成一体的体验，还需借助某种普遍视角，从非个人化存在的角度加以观照。
A dramatic example of the customary body existing in dissociation from the momentary body is found in experiences of phantom limbs, in which the accustomed sense of still possessing a healthy arm or leg persists even though one is forced to deny it in perceiving one’s “body at this moment.” The persistence can occur only because the memory of the missing member has attained a degree of generality that is not undermined by the fact that the member is perceived as absent. This generality, this “impersonal being,” characterizes every aspect of the customary body, which is why it “gives to our life the form of generality, and develops our personal acts into stable dispositional tendencies.” ^(44){ }^{44} Precisely as impersonal and general-as not being overwhelmed by a mass of personal recollections that take me resolutely out of the present into the past-the customary body anchors me all the more firmly in the present, even at the price of leading me to believe I possess a missing limb. Although the customary body is rooted in the past, it does not return me to the past: it engages me in present in-habitation. 一个关于习惯性身体与瞬时性身体分离的戏剧性例子见于幻肢体验中——尽管人们被迫在感知"此刻的身体"时否认其存在，但那种仍拥有健康手臂或腿的惯常感觉却持续存在。这种持续性之所以可能，仅因为对缺失肢体的记忆已达到某种不被"肢体被感知为缺失"这一事实所动摇的普遍性。这种普遍性，这种"非人格的存在"，正是习惯性身体每个方面的特征，因此它"赋予我们生活以普遍性形式，并将个人行为发展为稳定的倾向性定势"。 ^(44){ }^{44} 正是作为非人格和普遍的存在——不被那些坚决将我带离当下、拽回过去的大量个人回忆所淹没——习惯性身体反而更牢固地将我锚定在当下，甚至不惜以让我相信自己拥有已缺失的肢体为代价。尽管习惯性身体植根于过去，它并不将我送回过去：它使我投入当下的栖居之中。
It is in much the same way that familiarity of place is brought about. Proust knew this well. In a passage from the Overture to “Swann’s Way” he calls upon custom in the guise of “habit.” This occurs at the very point where 熟悉一个地方的方式大抵如此。普鲁斯特深谙此理。在《追忆似水年华》第一卷"去斯万家那边"的序曲中，他以"习惯"之名召唤了习俗的力量。这段文字正出现在
the narrator’s confused insomniacal state has acted to suspend a sense of familiarity with the room in which he finds himself: 叙述者因失眠而神思恍惚，暂时失去了对所居房间的熟悉感之时：
Habit had changed the color of the curtains, silenced the clock, brought an expression of pity to the cruel, slanting face of the glass, disguised or even completely dispelled the scent of the vetiver, and appreciably reduced the apparent loftiness of the ceiling. Habit! That skillful but slow-moving arranger who begins by letting our minds suffer for weeks on end in temporary quarters but whom our minds are none the less only too happy to discover at last, for without it, reduced to their own devices, they would be powerless to make any room seem habitable. ^(45){ }^{45} 习惯已为窗帘换了颜色，让钟表静默无声，给那冷酷斜睇的玻璃镜面蒙上怜悯之色，既掩盖了香根草的气息，甚或将其完全驱散，又明显降低了天花板那看似高不可攀的威严。习惯啊！这位灵巧却行动迟缓的布置者，起初任由我们的心灵在临时居所里煎熬数周，但我们的心灵终究欣喜地发现了它——因为若没有习惯，单凭自己，心灵根本无力让任何房间变得宜居。 ^(45){ }^{45}
As surrounding passages make clear, habit is at work here as deeply sedimented into the troubled sleeper’s customary body, which has gained control over the confusion and malaise of his momentary body. It is this customary body that not only finds but makes the surrounding bedroom familiar and thus habitable; and it does so by allowing initially unfamiliarseeming objects to find their own “right places,” ^(46){ }^{46} that is, their proper places in a fully familiarized setting. The familiarization itself does not occur by means of recollecting the room in question, much less by comparing it explicitly with other rooms of a similar sort. It arises instead from a succession of postures assumed by the semi-dormant body as it projects various possible habitats (e.g., a “Louis XVI room,” “rooms in summer,” “rooms in winter,” ^(47){ }^{47} etc.), inhabiting each via successive corporeal memories until it comes to attach itself securely to the actual habitat in which the narrator finds himself. 正如上下文所示，习惯在此发挥着作用，它深深沉淀于失眠者习以为常的身体之中，这种身体已能掌控瞬间身体的混乱与不适。正是这具惯常的身体不仅发现而且塑造了周围卧室的熟悉感，从而使其宜居；它通过让最初显得陌生的物品找到各自的"正确位置"——即完全熟悉环境中的恰当位置——来实现这一点。这种熟悉化的过程并非通过回忆特定房间来实现，更非通过明确对比同类房间而产生，而是源于半休眠身体在投射各种可能栖息环境（如"路易十六风格房间"、"夏日房间"、"冬日房间"等）时采取的一系列姿态，通过连续的身体记忆逐一栖居其中，直至最终牢固地依附于叙述者所处的实际栖居空间。
Such work of the customary body is domesticating in function; it forges a sense of attuned space that allows one to feel chez soi in an initially unfamiliar place. It does so in a manner quite analogous to the way in which the same body, through its own remembrances, feels already at home in the past places which its memories summon up. In this we observe the exceedingly close tie between body memory and memory of place-close to the point of their becoming virtually indistinguishable in many lived experiences of remembering. Body memory establishes the familiarity that is requisite to the full realization of place memory. The “things, places, years” which revolve around the Proustian narrator in the darkness and to which his mind is manifestly unequal are revolving around his body, a body “still too heavy with sleep to move.” ^(48){ }^{48} 习惯性身体的这种运作具有驯化功能；它锻造出一种协调空间感，使人在最初陌生的地方也能感到宾至如归。其运作方式与同一具身体通过自身回忆在记忆唤起的过往场所中已然感到自在的情形极为相似。在此我们观察到身体记忆与场所记忆之间异常紧密的联系——紧密到在许多具体的回忆体验中几乎难以区分。身体记忆建立起场所记忆充分实现所必需的熟悉感。普鲁斯特笔下叙述者在黑暗中面对的"事物、场所、岁月"——那些他心智明显无力应对的存在——正围绕着他"仍因睡意沉重而无法移动"的身体旋转。
In-habitation, we may conclude, is at once an effectuation and a culmination of bodily being-in-place. It achieves an extremely close bonding to place by realizing the dual ‘in’ of in-sertion and in-taking; and it accomplishes the deep familiarity of feeling chez soi, thanks in turn to the sense of attuned space which the customary body brings with it. Beyond the specific contributions of human dwellings to making places more inhabitable, ^(49){ }^{49} there is, still more basically, the customary body’s contribution. This contribution not 我们可以得出这样的结论：栖居既是身体"在场所中"的实现，也是其巅峰状态。它通过实现"嵌入"与"吸纳"的双重"内在性"，达成了与场所极为紧密的联结；同时，由于习惯性身体所带来的协调空间感，又实现了"如归家般"的深层熟悉感。除了人类居所对场所宜居性的具体贡献外，更为根本的是习惯性身体所作的贡献。这种贡献不仅...
only leads to enhanced memorability (above all, by helping to create places with an intensely felt intimacy) but infuses place with memory throughout. The customary body contains its own sedimented memories of place, whether these be of the particular place in which one presently finds oneself, contiguous places, places of a like kind, etc. Moving in or through a given place, the body imports its own implaced past into its present experience: its “local history” is literally a history of locales. This very importation of past places occurs simultaneously with the body’s ongoing establishment of directionality, level, and distance-and indeed influences these latter in myriad ways. Orientation in place (which is what is established by these three factors) cannot be continually effected de novo but arises within the ever-lengthening shadow of our bodily past. As Bergson says of all “habit memory,” the body’s past acts in the present: “it is part of my present, exactly like my habit of walking or of writing; it is lived and acted, rather than represented.” ^(50){ }^{50} In the actions of the customary body, then, we observe the continuance of time in place-a continuance that connotes not merely maintenance but active incorporation. In this way the past becomes “our true present”; ^(51){ }^{51} it loses its identity as a separate past (a past of another time and place) through its precipitation into the present of bodily behavior, which enacts the past rather than picturing it. And this presentment of the past is nowhere more active or more evident than in bodily memory of place. 这不仅显著增强了记忆性（尤其是通过帮助营造具有强烈亲密感的场所），更将记忆渗透于场所的每个角落。习惯性身体承载着自身对场所的积淀记忆——无论是当下所处之地、毗邻之所，还是同类场域。当身体在特定场所中移动或穿越时，它会将自身"场所化的过去"导入当下体验：其"地方史"本质上就是场所的历史谱系。这种对过往场所的导入，与身体持续建立的方向感、水平度和距离感同步发生——并实际上以无数方式影响着后者。场所中的定向（由这三个要素确立）无法持续凭空产生，而是在我们身体性过去不断延伸的阴影中逐渐形成。 正如柏格森所言，所有"习惯记忆"都是身体的过去在当下发挥作用："它是我当下的一部分，就像我行走或书写的习惯一样；它是被经历和执行的，而非被再现的。" ^(50){ }^{50} 因此，在习惯性身体的行动中，我们观察到时间在场所中的延续——这种延续不仅意味着维持，更意味着积极的融合。通过这种方式，过去成为"我们真实的当下"； ^(51){ }^{51} 当过去沉淀为身体行为的当下时（这种行为是践行而非描绘过去），它便丧失了作为独立过去（另一时空的过去）的身份。而这种对过去的呈现，在场所的身体记忆中表现得最为活跃和显著。
V
Concerning the role of body in memory of place we need to make two further general remarks: 关于身体在场所记忆中的作用，我们还需要补充两点总体性说明：
(1) This role exhibits just how decisive the distinction between place and site is. Few if any of the activities of the body that have just been sketched would be relevant, or even possible, in the kind of space determined by sites. Achieving orientation in a homogeneous, isotropic space would be at best a merely mechanical matter. It would reduce to alignment with preestablished axes and positions. Directionality would amount to convergence with, or divergence from, one of the three axes of a three-dimensional coordinate system. Level, if it existed at all, would be matter of situatedness in relation to two of these axes, the vertical and the horizontal. Distance would be measured along the third axis, that of depth as objectively determinable in exact metric equivalents. For such factors as in-sertion or in-taking-indeed, for the sense of being bodily ‘in’ anything-there would be no equivalents at all. (1) 这一角色充分展现了场所与地点之间区分的决定性意义。在由地点界定的那种空间里，前述身体活动的绝大部分要么无关紧要，要么根本不可能实现。在均质、各向同性的空间中获得方位感，至多只是机械性的操作——即与预设坐标轴和位置的对齐。方向性将简化为与三维坐标系中某条轴线的趋同或背离。水平面若存在，也不过是相对于垂直与水平两条轴线的位置关系。距离则沿第三条轴线（即可精确量化的客观深度轴）进行测量。至于诸如嵌入或吸纳等要素——乃至"身体处于某处"的感知——在此类空间中将完全找不到对应物。
For sites do not contain or enclose but either open out endlessly into infinity (as in a Newtonian conception of “absolute space”) or are simply juxtaposed with one another (as in the case of building sites). Moreover, in the absence of a sense of place-as-container-which is, in the Aristotelian 因为场所既不包含也不封闭，而是要么无限向外延伸至无穷（如牛顿"绝对空间"概念所示），要么只是彼此并置（如建筑工地的情况）。此外，在缺乏"场所即容器"这一亚里士多德式认知的情况下
view of place that I have taken as paradigmatic, to lack a sense of lived place altogether-there can be no experience of place-as-shelter: hence, no sense of habitable place. Yet in-habitation, as we have seen, is central to a full sense of being in place, of being there in an attuned and customary way. Sites are to be built on but not lived in (it is the houses constructed on them that we dwell in), just as they are measured in space rather than savored in memory. Sites are prospective in character; they are sites for building, exploring, surveying, etc. Places, in contrast, are retrospectively tinged: we “build up” memories there, are moved by them in nostalgic spells, are exhilarated or get “stuck” in them. In short, it is thanks to places, not to sites, that we are inhabitants of the world. Can it be surprising to us that we find ourselves longing to get back into place, whether by memory or in some other way? Getting out of place, being displaced, is profoundly disorienting. As John Russell has observed: 我所视为典范的场所观认为，若完全缺乏对生活场所的感知，便无法体验场所作为庇护所的存在：因而也就失去了可栖居之地的概念。然而正如我们所知，栖居行为对于充分感知"在场"——即以协调且惯常的方式存在于某处——至关重要。场地可供建设却不宜居住（我们实际居住的是其上建造的房屋），正如它们以空间尺度丈量而非在记忆中品味。场地本质上是前瞻性的：它们是用于建造、探索、测绘等的场所。相比之下，场所则带有 retrospective 色彩：我们在那里"构筑"记忆，在怀旧时刻被它们触动，或为之振奋，或陷入其中。简言之，正是场所而非场地，使我们成为世界的栖居者。当我们发现自己渴望通过记忆或其他方式重返某个场所时，这难道值得惊讶吗？错位与流离会带来深重的迷失感。正如约翰·罗素所言：
‘Where am I?’ is, after all, one of the most poignant of human formulations. It speaks for an anxiety that is intense, recurrent, and all but unbearable. Not to know where we are is torment, and not to have a sense of place is a most sinister deprivation. ^(52){ }^{52} "我在哪里？"终究是人类最痛彻心扉的追问之一。这声诘问道出了某种强烈、反复且近乎难以承受的焦虑。不知身在何处是种折磨，而丧失场所感则是最阴险的剥夺。 ^(52){ }^{52}
No wonder, then, that we so much prize memory of place and often seek out “old haunts.” Precisely as a container (not just of movable bodies but of our entire memorial lives), place acts to alleviate anxieties of disorientation and separation. Places and their memory sustain us in our everyday lives, subject as these lives are to fragmentation and rupture of so many sorts. Even persons (i.e., the very beings who are the sources of separation anxiety) are experienced and remembered primarily as persons-in-particular-places: “Crawford at Asheville,” “Dan at the Handcraft Center,” “Tunie in Topeka.” 难怪我们如此珍视场所记忆，并时常寻访"旧游之地"。场所正是作为容器（不仅承载可移动的躯体，更容纳我们全部的纪念性生命），发挥着缓解迷失与分离焦虑的作用。场所及其记忆支撑着我们的日常生活——这些生活本就承受着各式各样的碎片化与断裂。即便是人（即那些作为分离焦虑源头的存在），也主要被体验和记忆为"特定场所中的人"："阿什维尔的克劳福德"，"手工艺中心的丹"，"托皮卡的图妮"。
(2) But back to the body: unless it feels oriented in place, we as its bearers are not going to feel oriented there either. If our body does not feel at home in the world, we shall almost certainly experience Heimatlosigkeit. This is why I have placed such stress on the way the lived body familiarizes us with regard to place; for this familiarization, more than any other single factor, brings about the conviction of being at home in the world. We cannot even imagine what feeling chez soi would be like without the body’s abiding presence-nor could we remember what it was like. It is in and by the body’s polymorphic powers of situating us in place that we come to have a sense of what being-in-place can mean for human existence. (2) 但回到身体本身：除非它能在场所中感知到方向感，否则作为承载者的我们同样无法获得方位感。若我们的身体在世间无所归依，我们几乎必然要经历"无家可归"的生存状态。正因如此，我才如此强调活生生的身体如何让我们熟悉场所——这种熟悉感，比其他任何单一因素都更能带来"在世如归"的确信。我们甚至无法想象，若没有身体恒久在场，"居家之感"会是何种体验——更遑论回忆这种感受。正是通过身体将我们安置于场所的多元力量，我们才得以领会"栖居"对人类生存意味着什么。
But there is a closely related matter that we must not neglect. Beyond orienting and situating us in place-in the very place in which it is locatedthe lived body itself serves as a place. It is a place not just for its internal organs but for all of its activities of presentment in place. In this respect it can be considered as a place of places-or more exactly, a placer of places. We could even call it, following Bergson, a “place of passage”: 然而还有一件密切相关的事我们不可忽视。除了在所处位置中为我们定向和定位外，活生生的身体本身也充当着场所。它不仅是内部器官的场所，更是所有在场呈现活动的场所。从这个意义上说，它可被视为场所中的场所——更准确地说，是场所的安置者。我们甚至可以追随柏格森的脚步，称其为"通道场所"：
[The body] is the place of passage of the movements received and thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link between the things which act upon me and the things upon which I act-the seat, in a word, of sensori-motor phenomena. ^(53){ }^{53} [身体]是接收与反射运动的通道场所，一个连字符，一个连接作用于我之物与我作用于之物的纽带——简言之，是感觉运动现象的席位。 ^(53){ }^{53}
What kind of place is the body as a place of passage? It consists in being at once an intra-place and an inter-place. 作为通道场所的身体究竟是何种场所？它同时具备内部场所与中介场所的双重属性。
(a) Body as intra-place: Within a given place there may be a simple unbroken expanse or else a set of subplaces (e.g., partitioned-off parts of a room). In either case the body plays a special role as an interior place: as a dynamic but stationary force that selectively organizes the spatiality of those things that surround it. Such things (material objects, other people, etc.) gain position in relation to the body-place as an organizational center. Here the body is more than an abstract point in indifferent space, more than a group of vital functions, more even than a set of habits. It is itself a place with a “distinct potency” that helps to structure the overall spatiality of the place in which it finds itself, making it into a place within which the body resides and toward which it acts in manifold ways. The body as intra-place is thus a place through which whatever is occurring in a given setting can take place: it is a place of passage for such occurrences, which array themselves around it (and do so even if it is only their silent witness). For this reason we almost always remember places from the point of view of our body’s own intra-place within a remembered place: there we were, there and nowhere else. The body’s own intra-place within place is a place of anchoring, of staying put in relation to the scene remembered; it is a mainstay of memory of place. （a）身体作为内部场所：在特定场所内，可能存在一个简单连续的空间，或是一系列子场所（例如房间中被分隔出的区域）。无论哪种情况，身体都作为内部场所发挥着特殊作用——它是一种动态却静止的力量，有选择地组织着周遭事物的空间性。这些事物（物质对象、他人等）依据作为组织中心的身体-场所获得定位。此时的身体已不仅是冷漠空间中的抽象点，不仅是一组生命机能，甚至不仅是一套习惯体系。它本身就是一个具有"独特效力"的场所，这种效力有助于构建其所处场所的整体空间性，使其成为身体栖居其中并以多种方式行动的场所。作为内部场所的身体，因而成为特定情境中所有事件得以发生的通道：它是这些事件的必经之地，事件围绕它展开布局（即使身体仅是事件的沉默见证者，这种布局依然存在）。 正因如此，我们回忆场所时几乎总是以身体在该场所内部所处的位置为视角：我们曾在那里，就在那个特定的位置。身体在场所内部占据的位置如同锚点，让我们与记忆中的场景保持稳固联系；这正是场所记忆的重要支柱。
(b) Body as inter-place: But the lived body is at the same time a moving body. Even if it is its own place, it also moves us from place to place. As Erwin Straus says, "In a landscape we always get to one place from another place; each location is determined only by its relation to the neighboring place within the circle of visibility. "54 No longer is it a matter of the body as a stationary center of a to-be-remembered scene; now it is a question of the body as the basis for changing places. In changing place the body transports its whole organic mass from one stationing-point to another. The trajectory traced out by this movement describes an inter-place, a place between places that is itself a special kind of place. Inter-places arise whenever our body moves along a forest path, through a hallway, over a tennis court, etc. The body’s locomotion in such cases is forward-tending, since the place-to-cometo is experienced as an aim. ^(55){ }^{55} Or more exactly, the locomotion is to be construed in terms of a dialectic between the here and the there. ‘Here’ is the place from which we are departing in our bodily movement; ‘there’ is the place we are aiming at through this same movement. The lived body creates the inter-place in which the two epicenters of the here and the there are brought into concrete connection. (b) 身体作为间位：但活生生的身体同时也是一个运动中的身体。即便它是自身的处所，它也推动我们在不同地点间移动。正如欧文·斯特劳斯所言："在景观中，我们总是从一处抵达另一处；每个位置仅能通过其与可视范围内相邻位置的关系来确定。"54 这里讨论的不再是身体作为待回忆场景的固定中心，而是身体作为位置转换的基础。在位置转换中，身体将其整个有机体从一个驻点运送到另一个驻点。这种运动轨迹勾勒出的是一种间位——位于场所之间的特殊场所形态。当我们的身体沿着林间小径移动、穿过走廊或在网球场行进时，间位便随之产生。此类情境中身体的位移具有前趋性，因为即将抵达的位置被体验为目标。 ^(55){ }^{55} 更准确地说，这种位移应理解为"此在"与"彼在"之间的辩证运动。"此在"是我们身体运动出发的场所；"彼在"则是通过这同一运动所指向的目标场所。 活生生的身体创造了"间位"，将"此处"与"彼处"这两个中心点具体连接起来。
VI 第六章
The question remains: How can place, plain old place, be so powerful in matters of memory? In what does the power of place for memory consist? We have seen Aristotle driven to speak of a place’s “active influence,” its “distinct potencies.” Similarly, the Romans posited a “genius loci,” an indwelling spirit, for each significant place: for instance, the Lar (the “owl” of the ancestors) for the home, the Lares for more public places (typically at crossroads), and the Penates for the property and welfare of the family and the state. In English we still speak of “the spirit of a place,” and ascribe to particular places attractive or repelling forces far beyond what their position in geographic space or historic time might indicate. Think of the resonance which certain place-names can possess: not only “Combray,” “Balbec,” “Paris,” “Doncières,” and “Venice” but (for many Americans) “San Francisco,” “New Orleans,” “Cape Cod,” and (for myself) “Abilene,” “Enterprise,” “Asheville.” The resonance stems from a distinctive power of place and, more particularly, from the way this power elicits remembering. 问题依然存在：为何平凡无奇的地点在记忆中有如此强大的力量？地点对记忆的影响力究竟源于何处？我们看到亚里士多德不得不谈及地点的"主动影响"及其"独特潜能"。同样，罗马人假定每个重要场所都有"守护灵"——一种内在精神：例如家庭的拉尔（祖先的"猫头鹰"），十字路口等公共场所的拉瑞斯，以及守护家庭与国家财产福祉的珀那忒斯。英语中我们仍会提及"场所精神"，并将远超地理空间位置或历史时间所能解释的吸引力或排斥力归因于特定地点。想想某些地名能引发的共鸣：不仅是"贡布雷"、"巴尔贝克"、"巴黎"、"当西埃"和"威尼斯"，还包括（对许多美国人而言）"旧金山"、"新奥尔良"、"科德角"，以及（对我个人来说）"阿比林"、"恩特普赖斯"、"阿什维尔"。这种共鸣源自地点独特的力量，更准确地说，源于这种力量唤起记忆的方式。
How are we to account for the power of place-as-remembered? I have already suggested one main line of response: namely, the orienting function of the lived body as it situates us steadily in and between places, helping to create that specific gravity by which they can exert their full power. Places are empowered by the lived bodies that occupy them; these bodies animate places, breathe new life into them by endowing them with directionality, level, and distance-all of which serve as essential anchoring points in the remembering of place. 我们该如何解释被记忆之地的力量？我已提出一条主要的回应思路：即生活身体的定向功能，它让我们稳定地置身于场所之间，帮助形成那种特定的引力，使场所得以充分施展其力量。场所因栖居其中的生活身体而获得力量；这些身体激活了场所，通过赋予方向感、层次与距离为其注入新生——这些要素在场所记忆中都充当着至关重要的锚定点。
But beyond the body’s indispensable contribution, we must also look at some of the inherent features of place itself. All of these features can be considered aspects of place in its landscape character. “Landscape” is here taken in Straus’s sense of the full correlate of bodily sensing (rather than of perceiving, which calls for an objective, universal medium): “the space of the sensory world stands to that of perception as the landscape to geography.” ^(56){ }^{56} Strictly geographic or perceptual space answers to what I have been calling “site”; in such space all positions are determined in relation to each other and finally to the whole that is structured by a coordinate system. This space is “constant and invariant,” “systematized and closed.” ^(57){ }^{57} As mapped, it allows us to travel to points beyond the visible horizon. 但除了身体不可或缺的贡献外，我们还必须审视场所本身的一些固有特征。所有这些特征都可被视为场所景观特性的组成部分。此处"景观"采用斯特劳斯的定义，即身体感知（而非需要客观普遍媒介的知觉）的完整对应物："感觉世界的空间与知觉空间的关系，就如同景观与地理的关系。" ^(56){ }^{56} 严格意义上的地理或知觉空间对应着我所称的"地点"；在此类空间中，所有位置都相互关联，并最终归属于由坐标系构建的整体。这种空间是"恒定不变的"、"系统化且封闭的"。 ^(57){ }^{57} 通过地图化处理，它使我们能够抵达视野之外的地点。
In landscape, by contrast, there is always a visible (or at least a sensed) horizon. Thanks precisely to our body as basis of orientation, we find ourselves surrounded by a horizon, whatever our immediate location may be. Assuming that we know the terrain in some minimal fashion, we go from place to place within this horizon by means of our moving body, needing no map or plan with which to navigate. Moreover, the spatiality of the places between which we move in landscape is at once inconstant and variant, unsystematic and open: as anyone can attes ^("t "){ }^{\text {t }} from an afternoon’s hike in the 相比之下，在景观中总存在着可见（或至少可感知）的地平线。正是由于我们以身体作为定向基础，无论身处何方，总能发现自己被地平线所环绕。只要对地形有最基本的了解，我们就能通过移动的身体在地平线范围内自由穿行，无需依赖地图或导航方案。此外，我们在景观中移动时所经之处的空间性既不稳定又多变，既无系统性又开放包容：正如任何人在午后远足时都能证实的那样
low foothills of the California Sierras. Even when there are marked trails, these follow the irregular lay of the land, converge and diverge unpredictably, vary in width and in regard to how cleared they are, and in still other ways they resist charting in strictly geographic terms. When we are in a landscape setting, in other words, we are very much in the presence of place in its most encompassing and exfoliated format, a format in which we are sensuously attuned to its intrinsic spatial properties rather than imposing on it our own site-specifying proclivities. 加利福尼亚山脉低矮的山麓地带。即便存在明显的小径，这些路径也顺应着地势的天然起伏，时而交汇时而分离难以预料，宽度不一且清理程度各异，还有其他种种特征使得它们难以用纯粹地理学术语来测绘。换句话说，当我们置身于这样的自然景观中，便完全处于场所最包罗万象且层次分明的形态之中——这种形态让我们能通过感官感知其内在的空间特性，而非将人类惯常的场地界定倾向强加于其上。
Landscape contributes to place’s memorial evocativeness in three primary ways: by its variegation, its sustaining character, and its expressiveness. 景观主要通过三种方式增强场所的记忆唤起性：其多样性、持续性特征以及表现力。
VARIEGATION 多样性
It is a remarkable fact that landscape presents itself to us in continual variety-as plain and mountain, path and brook, hillside and river bed, tree and bush, not to mention such urbanscape variants as building and sidewalk, corridor and bedroom, entranceway and exit. Everywhere we encounter diversity of content, even on the barest plain or the emptiest shopping mall parking lot. The very being and structure of landscape consist in this ongoing proliferation of irregularities, of expected as well as unexpected obtrusions, all of which are thrust before us by the surrounding world. Whether facilitating or obstructing with regard to the pathways we are tracing out at the time, these obtrusions act as points of attachment: as “landmarks” by which we gauge our progress through a given part of the landscape and on which we hang lasting memories. 一个显著的事实是，景观总是以持续变化的形式呈现在我们面前——平原与山脉、小径与溪流、山坡与河床、树木与灌木，更不用说城市景观中的建筑与人行道、走廊与卧室、入口与出口等变体。无论在最贫瘠的平原还是最空旷的购物中心停车场，我们处处都能遇到内容的多样性。景观的存在与结构正体现在这种持续衍生的不规则性中，包括预期与非预期的突起物，所有这些都被周遭世界推至我们面前。无论这些突起物对我们当时行进的路径是助力还是阻碍，它们都成为记忆的锚点：作为"地标"让我们衡量穿越某处景观的进程，并承载我们持久的记忆。
It is just such variegation that draws us so insistently to landscape-and if landscape itself is not available to us, then to its representation in painting or photography. Landscape of sufficient variety promises surprises at every turn; at the very least, it furnishes relief from the monotony and nonsurprise of strictly sited space, in which protuberant variegation has been leveled down. What protrudes in a landscape offers us something to grasp at the most basic level of sensory awareness. Thus a rock in the midst of a mountain path arrests the body momentarily in its onward motion, gives it pause, that is, gives it something to fasten onto-with the result that it no longer glides through “free space” where there would be nothing to attach to, and thus nothing to remember. ^(58){ }^{58} Memory of place entails having been slowed down, stopped, or in some other way caught-in-place. Within a suitably variegated spatial scene, “the hold is held.” ^(59){ }^{59} 正是这种斑驳陆离的景象如此执着地吸引我们走向地景——若无法亲临实地，便转向绘画或摄影中的地景再现。足够丰富的地景总能在每个转角带来惊喜；至少，它能将我们从严格限定场所的单调与无趣中解脱出来，那些场所早已将突出的多样性夷为平地。地景中突显的物事让我们在感官意识的最基础层面有所依托。因此山径中央的岩石会瞬间阻滞身体的前行，令其驻足，亦即赋予其可依附之物——结果是我们不再滑行于"自由空间"中，那里空无一物可依附，因而也无物可追忆。 ^(58){ }^{58} 对场所的记忆必然包含着被减速、停滞或以其他方式定格的体验。在恰当多元的空间场景中，"抓握得以持续"。 ^(59){ }^{59}
SUSTAINING CHARACTER 持续特性
Landscape does more than make possible various pursuits and projects of ours; it sustains them by serving as their continuing durable ground. This sustaining occurs in two forms. First, the perimeter of the landscape-place (perhaps best called a “placescape”) acts to delimit all that lies within its compass. A perimeter can be as confined and confining as the walls of my 景观不仅为我们的各种追求和计划提供了可能性，更通过作为持续稳固的基础来维系着它们。这种维系以两种形式呈现。首先，景观场所的边界（或许最宜称为"场所景观"）起着界定其范围内一切事物的作用。一道边界可以如同我房间的墙壁那般局促而具有限制性
study, or it can seem to stretch out endlessly as in sunsets at sea. Either way, it defines the outer limits of the place I find myself in. Where sites are delimited for mainly functional reasons (e.g., because a building code dictates that each construction site be precisely 1 acre), places possess perimeters in a pre-given and yet unpreplanned manner: Thus, that line of hills over there at once occludes any further vista and acts to frame the valley I am traveling through. The perimeter closes in from without; it en-closes by keeping things contained within its limits. Second, that which is thereby contained is located in a field upholding whatever specific action takes place in it. This field is sustaining from below, as it were. It stands under specific actions as a matrix of support, helping them to cohere as single events or as a concatenated set of events occurring just here and nowhere else. More extensive than a particular protuberance but less encompassing than a perimeter, the field subtends subtly but securely. ^(60){ }^{60} Taken together, perimeter and field lend to the landscape its abidingly sustaining capacity: its ability to underlie a potentially immense stock of memories and to ramify into our lives in extra-memorial ways as well (e.g., by providing us with an assured sense of ease of action). When Straus says that “in the landscape I am somewhere,” ^(61){ }^{61} he is invoking the sustaining power of place. The apposition of “am” with “somewhere” bears out the ancient claim of Archytas that in order to be at all, one must be in a place: supported and sustained there. 研究，也可能像海上的日落般无限延伸。无论哪种情况，它都界定了我所处之地的外部边界。当场所主要因功能性原因被划定界限时（例如建筑法规要求每个工地必须精确占地 1 英亩），而地方则以一种既先天给定又未经规划的方式拥有边界：因此远处那道山脊线既遮蔽了更远的视野，又恰好框住了我正穿行的山谷。边界从外部合拢；它通过将事物限制在其范围内来实现围合。其次，被围合之物位于一个场域中，这个场域支撑着其中发生的任何具体行动。可以说，这个场域从下方持续提供支持。它作为支撑矩阵存在于具体行动之下，帮助这些行动凝聚为单一事件，或串联成仅在此地发生的一系列事件。场域比特定突起更广阔，但不及边界那般包罗万象，它以微妙而稳固的方式延展着。 ^(60){ }^{60} 综合来看，边界与场域赋予了景观持久维系的能力：它既能承载潜在海量的记忆库存，又能以超记忆的方式渗透进我们的生活（例如为我们提供一种笃定的行动自如感）。当斯特劳斯说"在景观中我身处某处"时， ^(61){ }^{61} 他正是在召唤场所的维系力量。"存在"与"某处"的并置印证了阿契塔斯的古老主张：若要存在，必居于场所——在那里获得支撑与维系。
EXPRESSIVENESS 表意性
Lawrence Durrell has written that “human beings are expressions of their landscapes.” 62 If this is indeed so, it is only because landscapes are themselves expressive to begin with. They come to us enveloped in a “sympathetic space” 63 that favors the physiognomic over the geometric, the expressive over the merely communicative. Consider only the way that an ordinary skyscape full of clouds can spontaneously suggest human figures and faces. It is at the basic level of sensing that such expressiveness arises unbidden and unrehearsed. Sensing conveys the world’s density in all of its qualitative richness: what are labeled “secondary” qualities by Locke and Descartes here become of primary importance. Only when such qualities (i.e., colors, contours, sounds, and the like) are objectified do they lose their primary expressive capacity and become items to be represented. ^(64){ }^{64} 劳伦斯·达雷尔曾写道："人类是其风景的具象化表达。"62 若果真如此，那正是因为风景本身首先就具有表现力。它们裹挟着"共鸣空间"63 向我们涌来，这种空间更青睐面相学而非几何学，更注重表现性而非单纯的交流性。只需想想布满云朵的寻常天空如何能自发地唤起人形与面孔的联想。正是在感知的基础层面，这种表现力未经召唤便自然涌现。感知传递着世界质性的丰盈密度：被洛克与笛卡尔贴上"次要"标签的特质在此显现出首要意义。唯有当这些特质（即色彩、轮廓、声响等）被客体化时，它们才会丧失原始的表现力，沦为待再现的客体。 ^(64){ }^{64}
The relationship between emotion and expression is close indeed, and it is therefore not surprising to discover that the expressiveness of landscapes is linked to their inherent emotionality. This link is especially evident in the case of “special places,” which bring with them, as well as engender, an unusual emotional claim and resonance. The power of such places to act on us, to inspire (or repell) us, and thus to be remembered vividly is a function of such emotionality-but only as it finds adequate expression in the features of landscapes which have just been discussed. Instead of merely indicating 情感与表达之间的关系确实紧密，因此发现景观的表现力与其内在情感性相关联也就不足为奇。这种关联在"特殊场所"中尤为明显，这些场所不仅承载着非同寻常的情感诉求与共鸣，更能催生这种情感。此类场所作用于我们、激励（或排斥）我们，从而被生动铭记的力量，正是这种情感性的功能体现——但前提是它能在前述景观特征中得到充分表达。这些特征不能仅仅暗示
or symbolizing this emotional expressiveness, these features must embody it. 或象征这种情感表现力，而必须将其具象化。
A considerable part of the power of place to move us relates to its unique form of visibility, which is, along with emotionality, the other foundation of its expressiveness. By “visibility” I do not mean its literally seen configurations but something closer to luminosity-the kind of light that seems to stem from within an object rather than being merely refracted onto it from some external source. In this sense, places can be said to radiate out from the exact shape they possess in objective space, the space of sites. How or why they do this is not our concern here; it is only a question of observing that it occurs and that it contributes forcefully to the expressive power of places. Places possess us-in perception, as in memory-by their radiant visibility, insinuating themselves into our lives, seizing and surrounding us, even taking us over as we sink into their presence. When this happens-it is the very opposite of being in a sited situation, which we dominate by measurement, positioning, etc.-we feel ourselves merging with a place, which on this very account suddenly becomes invisible, dissolved in its own luminosity, disintegrated as a discriminate object. We experience this objectlessness in moments of overwhelming joy or fear or abandon. Here “landscape is invisible, because the more we absorb it, the more we lose ourselves in it. To be fully in the landscape we must sacrifice, as far as possible, all temporal, spatial, and objective precision.” ^(65){ }^{65} 场所之所以能如此深刻地打动我们，很大程度上与其独特的可见性形式相关——这种可见性与情感性共同构成了场所表现力的双重根基。此处所谓的"可见性"并非指其物理形态的视觉呈现，而更接近于一种内在辉光，即仿佛源自物体内部而非仅由外部光源折射而来的光芒。从这个意义上说，场所似乎能从其在客观空间（即具体区位空间）中拥有的精确形态向外辐射能量。至于这种辐射如何或为何发生并非本文探讨的重点；我们只需注意到这种现象的存在，并承认它极大地增强了场所的表现力。场所通过这种辐射性的可见性占有我们——无论是在感知中还是在记忆里——它们悄然渗入我们的生活，将我们俘获并包围，甚至当我们沉浸于其存在时完全占据我们。这种现象与处于可测量、可定位的区位情境截然相反——我们感到自己正与场所融为一体，正因如此，场所本身突然变得不可见，消解于自身的光辉中，作为独立可辨的客体已然瓦解。 我们在极度的喜悦、恐惧或放纵中体验到这种无对象性。此时"风景变得不可见，因为我们越是吸收它，就越是在其中迷失自我。要完全融入风景，我们必须尽可能牺牲所有时间、空间和对象的精确性。" ^(65){ }^{65}
We also sacrifice any explicit consciousness of our own body in such a circumstance: it too becomes invisible as it merges with the very place to which it has been our main link. This is a moment of maximum expressiveness, one that is rarely achieved altogether since various modes of explicit visibility tend to remain present. But experiences of ecstasy serve to remind us of its ongoing possibility. The paradox is that the power of place is most fully manifested at the very moment when place and body fuse and lose their separate identities. At this point, the variegated and sustaining aspects of a place’s power cede place to an expressiveness no longer containable by parameters of the here and the there, the without and the within, perimeter and field. Emotion itself has become e-motion, a moving out and away from the epicenters of body and place and their reciprocally realized positioning in space. Yet significance abides, and with it memorability. 在此情境下，我们也牺牲了对自身身体的明确意识：当身体与这个我们主要连接的地方融为一体时，它也变得不可见。这是最具表现力的时刻，一个很少能完全实现的时刻，因为各种形式的显性可见性往往仍然存在。但狂喜的体验提醒着我们这种可能性始终存在。悖论在于，地方的力量在最充分展现的时刻，恰恰是地方与身体融合、失去各自独立身份的时刻。此时，地方力量中那些多样而持续的方面让位于一种表现力，这种表现力再也无法被此处与彼处、外部与内部、边界与场域的参数所容纳。情感本身已转化为"出-动"（e-motion），一种从身体与地方的中心及其在空间中相互实现的位置中向外移动的状态。然而意义依然存在，随之而来的是可记忆性。
The memorability of place amounts to more than what the recollection of place can yield; it is the source as well as the reinforced product of experiences of being-in-place. Perhaps the single most fateful such experience, by means of which place comes to be most deeply memorable, is that in which a given place and the lived body as its correlate dissolve as discrete source-points while uniting in a mutual invisibility. Then place becomes ours at last; but in remembering it, we remain beholden to its intrinsic power. 场所的可记忆性远不止于对场所的回忆所能产生的效果；它既是"在场"体验的源泉，也是这种体验强化后的产物。或许最具决定性意义的体验，正是通过这种体验，某个特定场所与其对应的活体身体作为离散的源点逐渐消融，在相互的不可见性中融为一体。至此，场所终于成为我们的一部分；但在回忆它时，我们依然受制于其内在的力量。
VII 第七章
One of the most eloquent testimonies to place’s extraordinary memorability is found in nostalgia. We are nostalgic primarily about particular places that have been emotionally significant to us and which we now miss: we are in pain (algos) about a return home (nostos) that is not presently possible. It is not accidental that “nostalgia” and “homesickness” are still regarded as synonyms in current English dictionaries and that one and the same German word, Heimweh, means both at once. Johannes Hofer, who coined the word “nostalgia” in his Medical Dissertation on Nostalgia (1688), advised that the affliction “admits no remedy other than a return to the homeland.” ^(66){ }^{66} Indeed the sooner the better: “The patient,” said Hofer, “should be taken [home], however weak and feeble, without delay, whether by a traveling carriage with four wheels, or by sedan chair, or by any other means.” ^(67){ }^{67} Post haste in short! 关于地方非凡记忆力的最有力证明之一，可见于怀旧之情。我们怀念的主要是那些曾对我们具有情感意义、而今却无法触及的特定场所：我们因无法实现"归家"（nostos）而承受着"痛苦"（algos）。当代英语词典仍将"nostalgia"与"homesickness"视为同义词并非偶然，德语词"Heimweh"更是一词双关。创造"nostalgia"一词的约翰内斯·霍弗在其医学论文《论怀乡病》（1688 年）中明确指出："此症除却回归故土，别无良方。" ^(66){ }^{66} 且愈快愈好："无论患者如何虚弱，"霍弗强调，"都应立即用四轮马车、轿辇或其他交通工具护送其返乡。" ^(67){ }^{67} 可谓刻不容缓！
It does not matter that Kant scoffed at this remedy, remarking that such a Heimkunft or homecoming is often “very disappointing” insofar as the homeplace itself may have become “wholly transformed.” ^(68){ }^{68} What does matter is that the phenomenon of nostalgia bears mainly on place; the nostalgic person is condemned, in Hofer’s words, to “think continually about the Fatherland” ^(69){ }^{69}-as did the paradigmatic young Swiss conscripts who, encamped on the flatlands of Holland, longed for the valleys in which they had been brought up. In being nostalgic, we are all in the position of these dis-placed conscripts. 康德对这种疗法的嗤之以鼻并不重要——他评论说这种"返乡"往往"令人大失所望"，因为故乡本身可能已"面目全非"。 ^(68){ }^{68} 关键在于怀旧现象本质上关乎地方；用霍弗的话说，怀旧者注定要"不断思念故土" ^(69){ }^{69} ——正如那些驻扎在荷兰平原的瑞士年轻新兵的典型事例，他们日夜思念着养育自己的山谷。当我们怀旧时，都成了这些背井离乡新兵的化身。
This is not the place to pursue the nature of nostalgia. ^(70){ }^{70} All that we need to notice is that the poignant power of the phenomenon-which can virtually paralyze those under its sway-has everything to do with memory of place. That the place in question is normally that special place called “home”“there is no place like home,” according to nostalgia’s primary axiomtestifies emphatically to the strength of the internal bond between place and memory. Once more then we must ask: In what does this bond consist? Why is place so potent as a guardian of memories? 此处不宜深究怀旧的本质。 ^(70){ }^{70} 我们只需注意到这种现象令人心碎的力量——足以使沉溺其中的人陷入瘫痪——完全源于对地方的记忆。根据怀旧的首要法则"世上没有比家更好的地方"，这个特定地方通常就是被称为"家"的特殊所在，这有力证明了地方与记忆之间深刻的内在联结。于是我们必须再次追问：这种联结由何构成？为何地方能如此强有力地守护记忆？
So far I have isolated three general “landscape” structures which help to answer these questions: place’s variegation, its sustaining nature, and its expressiveness. These do not yet account, however, for the peculiar hauntingness of places that we experience in nostalgia-to the point where we may be quite overwhelmed by their memory, even so obsessed by them that we overlook the particular place we occupy in the present. Nostalgia leads us to invoke the following principle: in remembering we can be thrust back, transported, into the place we recall. We can be moved back into this place as much as, and sometimes more than, into the time in which the remembered event occurred. Rather than thinking of remembering as a form of re-experiencing the past per se, we might conceive of it as an activity of re-implacing: re-experiencing past places. By the same token, if it is true 迄今为止，我已梳理出三种有助于解答这些问题的普遍"景观"结构：场所的多样性、其持续存在的本质及其表现力。然而这些尚未解释我们在怀旧中体验到的场所那种特殊的萦绕感——这种感受如此强烈，有时甚至会让我们被记忆彻底淹没，甚至痴迷到忽略当下所处具体场所的程度。怀旧引导我们援引以下原则：在回忆时，我们可能被猛然推回、传送至所忆起的场所。我们重返这个场所的程度，有时甚至会超过重返事件发生时的那个时间节点。与其将记忆视为对过去经历本身的重现，不如将其理解为一种"重新置位"的活动：即对过往场所的重新体验。同理，若果真如此
that all memory has a bodily component or dimension, the memory-bearing body can be considered as a body moving back in(to) place. Aristotelian physics remains pertinent for a phenomenology of human memory: bodies of every sort move from place to place. ^(71){ }^{71} Such is their fate-and ours as embodied rememberers. Our remembering/remembered bodies are ineluctably place-bound; they are bound to be in a place, whether this place be a common or a special one. ^(72){ }^{72} 所有记忆都具有身体的成分或维度，承载记忆的身体可以被视为一个回归原位的身体。亚里士多德的物理学对人类记忆的现象学仍然适用：各类物体都在空间之间移动。 ^(71){ }^{71} 这就是它们的命运——也是我们这些具身记忆者的命运。我们正在记忆/被记忆的身体无可避免地与场所绑定；它们必定存在于某个场所，无论这个场所是普通的还是特殊的。 ^(72){ }^{72}
In searching for a still more adequate understanding of the memorial potency of place, we need to notice the way in which the functions of memory and place are strikingly parallel. They accomplish a similar task at a quite basic level. This task is that of congealing the disparate into a provisional unity. To begin with, any given place serves to hold together dispersed things, animate or inanimate; it regionalizes them, giving to them a single shared space in which to be together. But a place can also draw together different spaces-as when a town square brings together several converging streets, each of which leads into a region of its own. As opposed to a sheer site-a space that acts to define and exclude-a place encourages the inclusion and overlap of a set of various spaces. These spaces become co-inherent in the place in which they conjoin. Thanks to place’s “nearing nearness,” ^(73){ }^{73} they constitute a sense of neighborhood or vicinity. 为了更充分地理解场所的记忆效力，我们需要注意到记忆功能与场所功能之间惊人的相似性。它们在相当基础的层面上完成着类似的任务——将分散的事物凝结为暂时的统一体。首先，任何特定场所都能将分散的物体（无论有无生命）聚合在一起；它使这些事物区域化，为它们提供一个共存的共享空间。但场所还能汇聚不同的空间——就像城镇广场将几条交汇的街道聚集起来，每条街道都通向各自的区域。与纯粹的地点（仅用于界定和排除的空间）不同，场所鼓励多种空间的包容与重叠。这些空间在交汇的场所中形成相互蕴含的关系。借助场所"临近的切近性"，它们构成了邻里或周边的感觉。
Compare with this the way that human remembering-quite apart from memory of place as such-acts to draw together diverse moments of time: not only the remote past with the present moment (as in secondary memory) but also the immediate past with the given ‘now’ (as in primary memory). If it does nothing else, memory effects temporal synthesis, indeed may be the sole source of such synthesis: as Leibniz (pondering Aristotle’s doctrine of motion) affirmed in his monadology, and as Kant was to proclaim still more explicitly in his doctrine of reproductive imagination, which associates items in terms of temporal succession. ^(74){ }^{74} This assertion of the importance of temporal synthesis goes hand in hand with the demise of “place” as a technical philosophical term in post-Kantian philosophy. Time is given a function parallel to that formerly ascribed to place: a congealing function (Aristotle would say “containing”). For temporal synthesis-and thus the synthesis realized by memory viewed in the modernist perspective of time-is a matter of congealing disparate moments into various forms of unity. 与此相比，人类记忆（且不论地点记忆本身）如何将不同时间片段聚合：不仅将遥远过去与当下时刻相连（如次级记忆），更将即刻过去与给定的"此刻"相系（如初级记忆）。即便别无他用，记忆也实现了时间综合，甚或成为此类综合的唯一源泉：正如莱布尼茨（沉思亚里士多德运动学说时）在其单子论中所断言，亦如康德在其再生性想象力学说中更为明确宣称的——该学说依据时间序列来联结事项。 ^(74){ }^{74} 这种对时间综合重要性的主张，与后康德哲学中"地点"作为专业哲学术语的消亡相伴而生。时间被赋予的功能，与昔日归属于地点的功能并驾齐驱：即凝结功能（亚里士多德会称之为"容纳"）。因为时间综合——进而从现代主义时间视角审视的记忆所实现的综合——本质上是将离散时刻凝结为各种统一形态的过程。
If congealing on the part of the lived world-i.e., that effected by placeis symmetrical in operation with congealing on the part of the temporal subject (i.e., that effected by memory), then the alliance of memory and place, as well as the peculiar power of memory of place, is assured, even in a post-Kantian world-view. The fact is that place has always functioned in human experience in a manner analogous to how memory was thought to operate by Leibniz and Kant. And if this is so, we have every reason to believe that to remember particular places, or to remember by means of them, will intensify our memorial powers: synthesis to the second power! 如果生活世界方面的凝结——即由场所产生的凝结——与时间主体方面的凝结（即由记忆产生的凝结）在运作上是对称的，那么记忆与场所的联盟，以及场所记忆的特殊力量，即使在后康德世界观中也是确定无疑的。事实上，场所一直在人类经验中以类似于莱布尼茨和康德所认为的记忆运作方式发挥作用。如果是这样，我们完全有理由相信，记住特定场所或通过这些场所进行记忆，将增强我们的记忆能力：这是合成力量的二次方！
What we have been discussing as place’s inherently sheltering role-its capacity to have and hold memories, to hold them together-can only enhance the role of remembering conceived as a power of temporal synthesis. Both roles, the one containing and the other synthesizing, are fundamentally “reservative” by dint of forming a preserve, a virtual reservation, within which disparities can co-exist. No wonder, then, that memory and place continue to reinforce each other-even in a world preoccupied by questions of time and of site. 我们一直在讨论的场所固有的庇护作用——它拥有和保存记忆、将它们凝聚在一起的能力——只会增强被视为时间合成力量的记忆作用。这两种作用，一种是包容性的，另一种是合成性的，本质上都是"保存性的"，因为它们形成了一个保存区，一个虚拟的保留地，差异可以在其中共存。难怪记忆和场所会持续相互强化——即使在一个被时间和地点问题所困扰的世界中也是如此。
VIII 第八章
The place/memory parallel assumes still further forms which we can designate under the headings of “horizon,” “pathway,” and constituent “things.” Let us take these up in succession: 场所/记忆的平行关系呈现出更多形态，我们可以将其归类为"地平线"、"路径"和构成性"事物"。让我们依次探讨这些概念：
HORIZON 地平线
Horizon is essential to the reservative role of memory and place, each of which involves a sense of intrinsic delimitation. The delimitation is intrinsic because it comes from within as well as from without, resulting in a double horizonal structure. Experienced in its fullest form, a place exhibits an internal and an external horizon ^(75){ }^{75}-whereas a site, as leveled-down, possesses neither kind of horizonal structure. By “fullest form” I mean a landscape construed as a coherent collocation of intertwining places. The external horizon of a given landscape encompasses all the particular places, regions, and things within its enclosure. It is exemplified in (but is not limited to) the horizonal line formed by the meeting of earth and sky. The internal horizon of any particular entity, place, or region is its immediate inner limit. Horos, the root of “horizon,” means boundary or limit, especially as this serves to define a material thing. Thus Aristotle’s conception of place in terms of innermost boundary (peras) is in fact a conception of place as internal horizon. 地平线对于记忆与场所的保存功能至关重要，二者都涉及内在界限的感知。这种界限之所以是内在的，因为它既来自内部也来自外部，形成了双重地平结构。一个场所若以最完整形态呈现，会展现出内部地平线与外部地平线——而被夷平的遗址则不具备任何地平结构。所谓"最完整形态"，我指的是被理解为交织场所之连贯组合的景观。特定景观的外部地平线囊括其范围内所有具体场所、区域与事物，其典型表现（但不限于）天地交界形成的地平线。任何特定实体、场所或区域的内部地平线，则是其直接的内在边界。"Horizon"的词根"horos"意指边界或限度，尤其用于界定物质实体。因此亚里士多德将场所理解为最内层边界（peras）的观点，本质上就是将场所视为内部地平线。
A place as remembered will often involve both horizonal structures. When I remember, say, sweeping the porch of my grandparents’ house in Abilene, I recall being contained by the internal horizon of the porch itself-a horizon constituted by the roof of the porch and the side of the house with which it was contiguous-and being surrounded by an entire setting composed of a yard, grape arbor, neighbors’ houses, a creek, etc., all of these latter establishing the external horizon of the scene as I remember it. 记忆中某个场所往往同时包含两种地平结构。当我想起在阿比林祖父母家门廊打扫的情景时，我既记得被门廊内部地平所包围——这个地平由门廊屋顶和与之相连的房屋侧墙构成——也记得被由庭院、葡萄架、邻居房屋、小溪等元素组成的整体环境所环绕，所有这些后者共同构成了我所记忆场景的外部地平。
It is a striking fact that Husserl, doubtless inspired by James’s notion of “fringe,” called the retentions of primary memory “horizons.” ^(76){ }^{76} These retentions surround each fading moment like a halo or “comet’s tail” (in Husserl’s favorite metaphor), forming a rapidly subsiding but distinctive horizon for 值得注意的是，胡塞尔显然受到詹姆斯"边缘"概念的启发，将初级记忆的滞留称为"地平线"。 ^(76){ }^{76} 这些滞留如同光晕或"彗尾"（胡塞尔最爱的比喻）般环绕着每个消逝的瞬间，形成一个快速消退却特征鲜明的地平
that moment. Moreover, this temporally internal horizon can be remembered as such-as “the past of the past” ^(77){ }^{77} which we recall in bodily, pictorial, or verbal forms. A concatenation of such horizoned moments constitutes what could be termed a “scene,” the episodic-temporal equivalent of a landscape. The temporally specified limits of this scene, its duration, represent the temporal form of its external horizon. What I called “aura” in chapter 4 is nothing other than the spatio-temporal expression of the same phenomenon, echoes of which we also discerned in reminding (i.e., the outer edge of the adumbrated remindand), in recognizing (as the limits of perceptual suffusion), in reminiscing (in the beginning and ending of the reminisced-about event), and even in body memory (as the outer arc of the lived body’s remembered movement from place to place). There are also equivalents of internal horizons in each case-too many to trace out here. What most merits noticing is that in every instance internal and external horizons are at once spatial and temporal (ultimately, they are spatiotemporal) and that both kinds of horizon are shared by memory and place alike. 那一刻。此外，这种时间性的内在视域本身就能被记住——作为"过去的过去"，我们以身体、图像或语言的形式将其召回。这类视域化时刻的串联构成了可称为"场景"的东西，即与景观相对应的片段性时间单元。这一场景在时间维度上的限定边界及其持续时长，代表了其外在视域的时间形式。我在第四章所称的"氛围"，正是同一现象的时空表达——我们在提醒（即被暗示物的外缘）、再认（作为知觉弥漫的边界）、追忆（所追忆事件的起止点）乃至身体记忆（活体在空间位移中记忆运动的弧线轨迹）中都能辨识到它的回响。每种记忆形态也都存在内在视域的对等现象，其复杂程度难以在此尽述。最值得注意的是：所有案例中内在与外在视域都同时具备空间性和时间性（究其本质是时空一体），且这两类视域为记忆与场所所共有。
PATHWAY 路径
A second feature shared in common by memory and place is the existence of pathways in and through their midst. Such pathways are of two sorts: those that give access or egress and those that facilitate internal exploration. We witness both in our experience of place. A given place can be entered by multiple pathways through a landscape that acts as its external horizon. This place also permits exiting by the same pathways or by others that we come to discern. Once within a particular place, still more interior pathways open to us-or more exactly, to our moving bodies, which are the vehicles of path-breaking or path-following. However limited these inner paths may be, they at least allow movement in more than one direction. The resulting sense of free exploration contrasts with the planned journeys that occur within cartographic or sited space. ^(78){ }^{78} 记忆与场所共有的第二个特征，是其间存在可穿行的路径。这些路径分为两类：提供出入通道的路径与促进内部探索的路径。我们在场所体验中能同时感知这两种路径。某个特定场所可通过景观中多条路径进入，这些景观构成其外部边界。该场所也允许通过相同路径或我们逐渐发现的其它路径离开。一旦进入特定场所内部，更多内在路径会向我们——更准确地说，向我们移动的身体——展开，这些身体正是开辟或追随路径的载体。无论这些内部路径多么有限，它们至少允许多方向的移动。由此产生的自由探索感，与地图空间或定点空间中规划路线的旅程形成鲜明对比。
Once more the analogy to memory is striking. A given memory possesses multiple modes of entry (“access,” “retrieval”), as well as of egress (whether by moving to another memory or by simply forgetting). The structure of these routes-a structure that allows them to range from random cues to highly predictable stimulus-response situations-has been the subject of feverish and fruitful research on the part of cognitive psychologists. These same scientists have also explored the interior drama of memory in terms of its complex “associative networks.” ^(79){ }^{79} Such networks exhibit ramifying pathways even in the case of a seemingly straightforward memory: to remember my childhood dog “Peggy” is at the same time to enter a microcosm of that period of my life, a mini-world in which “Peggy” links up with the other dogs my family owned, with the way they were regarded by my siblings, with the way they made that domestic space more warmly familiar, etc. Each of the 记忆的类比再次显得惊人。特定记忆拥有多重进入方式（"访问"、"提取"），同样也有多种退出途径（无论是转向另一段记忆还是单纯遗忘）。这些路径的结构——从随机线索到高度可预测的刺激-反应情境——一直是认知心理学家们狂热而富有成果的研究主题。这些科学家还从复杂"联想网络"的角度探索了记忆的内在戏剧性。 ^(79){ }^{79} 即便在看似简单的记忆案例中，这类网络也展现出分叉路径：回忆我童年的狗"佩吉"的同时，也进入了那段生活的微观世界——在这个迷你世界里，"佩吉"与我家养过的其他狗产生联结，与兄弟姐妹看待它们的方式产生关联，与它们如何让那个家庭空间更显温馨熟悉等等。每一个
themes just mentioned represents a pathway in this particular part of my past; and from each pathway still others diverge: from “Peggy” the dog to Peggy Mills, the wife of my father’s law partner, to “Peg O’ My Heart,” or to Charles Peguy, the French writer. As the English and French associationists outlined in theory, and as Freud realized in practice, any limit on such associative pathways is a matter of arbitrary foreclosure. Exploration within memory-even within a single given memory-is potentially endless. This is something which St. Augustine knew long before the associationists, Freud, or contemporary cognitive psychologists: 上述主题中的每一个都代表着我过去特定部分的一条路径；而每一条路径又会分岔出更多支路：从名叫"佩吉"的狗，到我父亲律所合伙人的妻子佩吉·米尔斯，再到歌曲《我心中的佩吉》，或是法国作家查尔斯·佩吉。正如英国和法国的联想主义者在理论上所概述的，也如弗洛伊德在实践中认识到的，对这种联想路径的任何限制都是一种武断的阻断。在记忆中的探索——即使是在单一给定的记忆中——都可能是无止境的。这一点，圣奥古斯丁早在联想主义者、弗洛伊德或当代认知心理学家之前就已了然：
Memory . . . is like a great field or a spacious palace, a storehouse for countless images of all kinds. . . . It is a vast, immeasurable sanctuary. Who can plumb its depths? ^(80){ }^{80} 记忆……犹如广袤的原野或宏伟的宫殿，是无数各类意象的储藏所……它是无边无际、不可度量的圣所。谁能探测其深渊？ ^(80){ }^{80}
The unplumbable nature of memory has everything to do with what characterizes place as well: an openness to traversal by multiple pathways. 记忆的不可测度性与场所的特性息息相关：都具备被多重路径穿越的开放性。
THINGS 物事
Material things not only frequently constitute the specific content of places and memories alike, but by their special memorability they draw memory and place together in a quite significant way. I cannot, for example, remember my early experiences at my great-uncle Ralph’s home without the reappearance, within the memory, of his house (including its interior rooms), the pond next to it, and the alley behind. Hence my sense of shock when I revisited Kansas a few years ago and discovered that his house had been razed and the pond eliminated following a major fire on the property. With the disappearance of these things, the main elements of a quite special place in my childhood, and thus the source of a treasured set of place memories, had vanished. 物质事物不仅常常构成地点与记忆的具体内容，更以其独特的可记忆性，将记忆与地点以一种极为显著的方式紧密联结。例如，当我回忆在拉尔夫叔公家度过的童年时光时，那座房屋（包括其内部房间）、屋旁的池塘以及后巷总会浮现在记忆中。正因如此，几年前重返堪萨斯时，我震惊地发现他的房屋已在一次大火后被夷为平地，池塘也消失无踪。随着这些物质实体的消逝，我童年那个特殊场所的核心元素——以及随之而来的一系列珍贵场所记忆——都已荡然无存。
If things do not form necessary conditions of every memory of place-one can certainly imagine cases of remembering utterly desolate, empty placesthey do enter into active alliances with particular places. Aristotle was already alert to such alliances: “Just as every body is in place, so, too, every place has a body in it.” ^(81){ }^{81} Things are manifestly of place as well as in place; they are its natural occupants. If horizons and pathways serve to delimit places from without and within respectively-to give them contour and structure-things fill out places, giving to their shape a substance. And as horizons and pathways delineate movements in places, so things bring about fixation and focus there. In this regard, the role of things in places is curiously comparable to that of the lived body. The body and things both lend a distinctive density to their immediate surroundings; and as the body is central for the experiencing and remembering subject who pivots around (and with) it, so things are pivotal points in a given place, constellating it by their presence. 如果说事物并不构成每个场所记忆的必要条件——人们当然可以想象那些关于完全荒芜空旷之地的记忆——但它们确实会与特定场所形成活跃的联结。亚里士多德早已觉察到这种关联："正如每个物体都处于场所中，每个场所也都有物体存在于其中。" ^(81){ }^{81} 事物既显现在场所之中，又归属于场所本身；它们是场所天然的占据者。如果说地平线与路径分别从外部和内部界定了场所——赋予其轮廓与结构——那么事物则充实了场所，为其形态赋予实质。正如地平线与路径勾勒出场所中的运动轨迹，事物则在场所中带来固定性与聚焦点。就此而言，事物在场所中的作用与身体经验有着奇妙的可比性。身体与事物都为其直接环境赋予独特的密度；正如身体对于以它为中心（并与之共转）的体验与记忆主体具有核心意义，事物也是特定场所中的枢轴点，通过其存在构成场所的星群布局。
What we have just said of things and bodies as they figure into place is above all true of things as they form part of explicit place memories. In such memories (e.g., of my great-uncle’s house), things are centers of coalescence and provide points for attentive reattachment. They augment continuing recognition of scenes we remember as well as facilitating our ability to repeat these scenes in subsequent rememberings. As the items that we recollect fill in the specific content of mnemonic presentations, so things fill out place memories by acting as their gathering-points, their main means of support. Things congeal the places we remember, just as places congeal remembered worlds-and as the present of remembering congeals the past remembered. Things put the past in place; they are the primary source of its concrete implacement in memory. 我们刚才关于事物和身体在场所中呈现方式的论述，尤其适用于那些构成显性场所记忆的事物。在这类记忆（比如对我曾叔父房子的回忆）中，事物是凝聚的核心，为注意力重新附着提供了支点。它们既增强我们对记忆场景的持续辨识，也促进我们在后续回忆中重现这些场景的能力。正如回忆中的细节填充了记忆呈现的具体内容，事物也通过作为聚集点和主要支撑手段来充实场所记忆。事物凝结了我们记忆中的场所，就像场所凝结了被记忆的世界——也如同回忆的当下凝结了被记忆的过往。事物将过去安置在特定位置；它们是记忆中对过去进行具体空间定位的主要来源。
IX 第九章
Despite the crucial importance of things in memories of place, it is only as positioned in relation to pathways and as situated within horizons that things assume their most fully determinative role. The interplay between all three factors is what helps to make place memories so potent a part of our memorial lives. A celebrated passage from Remembrance of Things Past brings out this interplay eloquently: 尽管事物在场所记忆中至关重要，但唯有当其与路径相关联并置身于视域之中时，事物才能发挥其最完整的决定性作用。三者间的动态交织，正是使场所记忆成为我们回忆生活中如此有力部分的原因。《追忆似水年华》中有段著名文字精妙地展现了这种互动：
As soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me . . . immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to attach itself to the little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built out behind it for my parents . . . and with the house the town, from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was fine . . . in that moment all the flowers in our garden and in M. Swann’s park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings and the parish church and the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea. ^(82){ }^{82} 当我尝到那片浸泡在椴花茶中的玛德琳蛋糕的味道时——那正是我姑妈过去常给我的那种……那幢临街的灰旧老宅立刻如舞台布景般升起，与她那间屋子相连，又接上花园尽头为父母增建的小亭……随之浮现的还有整座城镇，无论晴雨晨昏，我曾跑腿的广场，天气晴朗时漫步的乡间小路……那一刻，我们花园里的所有鲜花，斯万家林园中的草木，维冯河上的睡莲，村里的善良居民和他们的小屋，教区教堂，整个贡布雷及其周边，都从我的茶杯中涌现，带着形态与质感，城镇与花园皆然。 ^(82){ }^{82}
The “shape and solidity” of that special place called “Combray” are given to it by a diverse set of ingredients. These ingredients begin and end with things (“the taste of the piece of madeleine,” “my cup of tea”); and they proceed through particular places in ever-increasing amplitude (from the pavilion giving on to the garden, and from Aunt Léonie’s house to the town as it includes the Square, the local church, other houses, and the Vivonne river). Connecting all of these places within Combray are the pathways afforded by the streets of the town (Léonie’s house is set “upon the street,” a street eventually linking up with all other streets in the town and thus with the “country roads” leading outside of town as well). Acting as external horizon 那个被称为"贡布雷"的特殊之地的"形态与坚实感"，源自一系列多样化的元素。这些元素始于物也终于物（"玛德琳蛋糕的味道"、"我那杯茶"）；它们经由特定场所不断扩展（从通向花园的亭阁，到莱奥妮姑妈家，再到包含广场、本地教堂、其他房屋及维冯河的小镇）。将这些贡布雷内部所有场所串联起来的，是小镇街道提供的路径（莱奥妮家"临街而建"，这条街道最终与镇上所有其他街道相连，进而通向"乡间小路"延伸至镇外）。作为外部边界
for “the whole of Combray” is the circumambient countryside, the “surroundings”; internal horizons are provided by the Square, the church tower, and Swann’s estate. The concatenation of all these components contributes to making Combray a memorable place. Beyond furnishing focus and variegation, and a space in which free movement is possible, they transform what would be a sheer site-i.e., “Combray” as a mere location on a map of France-into a full-fledged place-of-provenance for memory. Horizons, pathways, and things bestow on Combray an abiding memorability for the narrator of the novel and for us as its readers. 因为"整个贡布雷"就是环绕的乡野，"周边环境"；内部视野则由广场、教堂钟楼和斯万家宅邸构成。所有这些元素的串联共同造就了贡布雷这个令人难忘的地方。它们不仅提供了焦点与变化，以及可自由活动的空间，更将原本只是地图上一个法国坐标的"贡布雷"，转化为记忆里完整的故乡。地平线、小径和物件为小说叙述者——也为我们这些读者——赋予了贡布雷恒久的可追忆性。
Or recall in this connection the method of loci as employed in the classical “art of memory,” a method in which, as we know, the establishing and revisiting of a grid of places (typically a house full of rooms or a street with many stopping points) is crucial. This technique is all the more impressive in that it may arise spontaneously-as happened in the case of “S.,” the Russian mnemonist studied by Luria. S. used Gorky Street in Moscow as his underlying grid and deposited images (often in elaborate synesthetic formats) at various points along its length. ^(83){ }^{83} Quite apart from its actual utility, this mnemotechnique has the notable feature of combining the three elements which were under scrutiny in the last section. Pathways are present in the form of the routes which the memorizer takes in laying down the basic grid. Horizons are provided by factors as external as the city of Moscow or as intimate as the walls of the house whose rooms one is revisiting. ^(84){ }^{84} Things appear as the images-or rather, in the images-which have been devised as particular mementos of the items-to-be-remembered. These images are typically of human bodies or parts of bodies set forth in vivid, and even grotesque, poses; and as such they act to gather together, to harbor and preserve, the content to be remembered. ^(85){ }^{85} 或者回想一下古典“记忆术”中运用的轨迹法，这种方法的关键在于建立并反复造访一个由地点构成的网格（通常是一栋满是房间的房屋或一条有许多站点的街道）。这一技巧尤为令人惊叹的是，它可能自发形成——正如卢里亚研究的俄罗斯记忆术者“S.”的案例所示。S.以莫斯科的高尔基街为基础网格，沿街各个节点存放图像（通常以复杂的联觉形式呈现）。 ^(83){ }^{83} 抛开实际效用不谈，这种记忆术的显著特征在于融合了上一节探讨的三大要素。路径以记忆者铺设基础网格时所经路线的形式存在。地平线则由莫斯科城这类外部因素，或重返房间时面对的房屋墙壁这类私密因素构成。 ^(84){ }^{84} 事物则以图像形式——更准确地说，在图像中——显现，这些图像被设计成待记事项的特定纪念物。 这些图像通常以生动甚至怪诞的姿势呈现人体或身体部位；正因如此，它们能够汇聚、容纳并保存那些需要被铭记的内容。 ^(85){ }^{85}
Let us consider a final case in point, one which will allow us to observe the full panoply of traits that characterize place memories. This is the Chinese garden, about which Edwin T. Morris has written 让我们思考最后一个典型案例，这将使我们得以观察场所记忆特征的全貌。这就是中国园林，关于它，埃德温·T·莫里斯曾写道：
[it] was designed by highly cultivated individuals in such a way that a walk through the paths and arcades of its many sections would trigger reminiscences and images evoked from all aspects of the cultural tradition. Here a rock outcropping would kindle recollections of a famous mountain painting; there a few lines of calligraphy carved in stone would allude to a famous hermit who found solace in nature centuries before. ^(86){ }^{86} [它]由高度修养的文人设计，漫步其间的曲径回廊时，会触发来自文化传统各个层面的回忆与意象。此处一方嶙峋山石能唤起名山画作的记忆；彼处石刻的几行书法，则暗指数百年前在自然中寻得慰藉的著名隐士。 ^(86){ }^{86}
Even in this cursory description of the Chinese garden, memory is very much at stake in the form of “reminiscences” and “recollections.” Morris adds that “the visitor [to the Chinese garden] brought as much to the garden as he or she found there.” ^(87){ }^{87} What is brought but the personal and the cultural past-and each as remembered? Remembering such pasts is elicited by the garden itself, that is, by a place whose constituent elements were designed “in memorable ways.” 88 即便在这对中国园林的粗略描述中，记忆也以"追忆"和"回想"的形式占据核心地位。莫里斯补充道："（中国园林的）访客为园林带来的，不亚于他们在此寻获之物。" ^(87){ }^{87} 他们所携带的，不正是个人与文化的过往——每一段都被铭记于心？园林本身唤起了对这些往昔的追忆，也就是说，这个场所的构成元素被设计得"令人难忘"。88
Gardens of many kinds are conceived as intimately related to a surrounding landscape which they at once mirror and condense. This is especially true of the Chinese garden, which is designed as a microcosm of nature: “The garden is a miniature of China, transformed by the alchemy of the artistic spirit. In the garden we find represented all the great mountains, rivers and lakes, the soil, flora, and the dwellings of the people.” ^(89){ }^{89} The very fact of the limited space in which Chinese gardens were set encouraged this effort at miniaturization: “A great emotional charge could be wrung from a garden that was only a few acres in physical space, but expansive in poetical space.” ^(90){ }^{90} In contrast with “physical space” (i.e., sited space), “poetical space” is the space of memorable place, and it is constituted by allusions that draw specifically on memories: “Allusions were created everywhere, to stir memories already present, but dormant, in the breast of the onlooker.” ^(91){ }^{91} The garden-as-microcosm, as a place within the poetical space of landscape, is thoroughly memorial. Just as a given garden would “borrow” a surrounding landscape by opening up vistas on it, so being in that garden would open up vistas of one’s memory by engaging in evocations of the past. ^(92){ }^{92} Other means are used to underline the microcosmic nature of gardens: gardens within gardens, bonsai trees, and a sensitivity to seasons. ^(93){ }^{93} In other words, "the inclusion of all components of nature made it [into] a miniature world."94 各式园林都被视为与周围景观密不可分，它们既映照又浓缩了周遭景致。中国园林尤其如此，其设计理念是将自然微缩化："园林是中国的缩影，经艺术精神点化而成。园中可见名山大川、江湖土壤、草木花卉与民居聚落。" ^(89){ }^{89} 中国园林有限的占地规模恰恰促进了这种微缩化尝试："方寸之地的园林虽仅数亩实景，却能在诗性空间里拓展出撼动心魄的意境。" ^(90){ }^{90} 与"实体空间"（即具象场所）相对，"诗性空间"是由记忆构成的意境空间："园中处处暗藏典故，为唤醒观者胸中蛰伏的旧忆。" ^(91){ }^{91} 作为景观诗性空间中的场所，微缩宇宙般的园林本质上是记忆的圣殿。 正如一座特定的花园会通过展现周围景观而"借景"，身处那座花园也会通过唤起过往记忆而打开记忆的景致。 ^(92){ }^{92} 其他手法被用来强调花园的微观宇宙特性：园中之园、盆景艺术以及对季节变化的敏感。 ^(93){ }^{93} 换言之，"对自然所有元素的包容使其成为微型世界。"94
The “diffused polycentrism” ^(95){ }^{95} of the Chinese garden draws on all of the factors that we have found to be essential to the memorability of place. To begin with, expressiveness of an explicitly emotional sort is built into a setting where the configuration of a given garden is evocative of prior experiences of being in certain landscapes (or viewing their representations in paintings). What gives to the garden experience its moving quality is not any factor of exact representation. It is the expressiveness with which it elicits memories of having been in (or seen represented) similar places. Likewise, the sustaining character of a garden is evident in its careful reinforcement of motifs by natural as well as by cultural means. If one is not already sustained enough by the physical entities in the garden, the written signs that are placed over doorways, inside pavilions, and on furniture afford further assurance that various pasts can be richly remembered. ^(96){ }^{96} Moreover, variegation was practically an obsession of the Chinese garden designer. Not only were gateways strenuously varied in name and shape-being vaseshaped, moon-shaped, fan-shaped, leaf-shaped ^(97){ }^{97}-but windows were asystematically different, both in terms of grillework and in terms of vistas offered. Staggered perspectives were employed to variegate vertical space; ^(98){ }^{98} and in the horizontal plane there was often a complex subdivision of space: the sixteenth-century Garden of the Unsuccessful Politician in Suzhou included no less than thirty-one sub-places, each with its own distinctive design. ^(99){ }^{99} 中国园林的“弥散式多中心主义” ^(95){ }^{95} 汲取了我们所发现的地域记忆性所有关键要素。首先，这种园林布局能唤起人们对特定景观（或绘画中景观再现）的既往体验，其情感表现力被直接镌刻在场所营造中。赋予园林体验以动人特质的并非精确再现的要素，而是它能以富有表现力的方式唤起对相似场所（或其艺术再现）的记忆。同样，园林的持久性特征体现在它通过自然与文化双重手段对主题元素的精心强化。若园中实体景物尚不足以维系记忆，那么镌刻在门楣、亭台与家具上的题字，则为丰富追忆往昔提供了进一步保障 ^(96){ }^{96} 。此外，斑驳变化几乎成为中国园林设计者的执念。 这些门洞不仅在名称和造型上极尽变化之能事——有瓶形、月牙形、扇面形、叶形等样式——窗棂的纹饰与框景的构图更是自成体系。错落的景深设计丰富了垂直空间的层次；而在水平维度上，空间往往被精巧地划分：十六世纪苏州的拙政园内就包含了多达三十一处各具匠心的景观单元。
We also witness at work the three features singled out for discussion in section VIII. Horizons are a subdued but crucial presence in this polycentric 我们还能在此观察到第八章重点讨论的三大特征。在这片多中心的园林天地中，地平线以含蓄而关键的方式存在着
circumstance. Given the walled-in character of most gardens, especially in urban locations, the horizons of a surrounding landscape are less perceived than adumbrated within a particular garden: e.g., through water-and-rock combinations that serve as miniature landscapes. What would otherwise remain literally external (i.e., in the space of sites) is here made interior to the internal horizons of the garden itself. These horizons are most decisively delineated by various walls, which establish north-south orientation as well as segmenting a given garden compound. “To have a garden without a wall is almost unthinkable,” ^(100){ }^{100} and the Chinese were masters of placing one wall before another in such a way as to simulate and exaggerate recession in depth. This multiplication of horizons helps to give a sense of everexpanding space, all within an area whose actual extent may be quite modest. ^(101){ }^{101} 在大多数花园中，尤其是城市中的花园，由于围墙的封闭特性，周围景观的地平线更多是通过花园内部的暗示而非直接感知：例如通过作为微型景观的山水组合来呈现。那些本应存在于外部空间（即场地空间）的元素，在此被内化为花园自身的地平线。这些地平线最显著的特征是由各种围墙界定的，它们不仅确立了南北朝向，还将整个园林划分为若干区域。"无墙不成园" ^(100){ }^{100} ，而中国人尤其擅长通过层层叠叠的围墙布局，营造并强化纵深的退隐感。这种地平线的多重叠加，使得即便在面积有限的区域内，也能产生空间无限延伸的视觉效果。 ^(101){ }^{101}
Pathways are important as well in the Chinese garden. A combination of covered arcades and open spaces maximize possibilities of movement. There is always more than one route which can be taken across a given expanse; and at any point on a given route there are striking views to be had: “While buildings frequently mark fixed vantage points for carefully composed views, the walkways and paths throughout the garden are planned for enjoying the landscape in a changing, or moving, focus.” ^(102){ }^{102} In this way garden pathways become analogous to “the roads that appeared and disappeared in mountain painting.” ^(103){ }^{103} Whether in a garden or in a painting imitated by that garden, pathways help to make landscape accessible from various points of view. ^(104){ }^{104} 在中国园林中，路径同样至关重要。廊庑与空地的巧妙组合极大拓展了游走的可能性。穿越任何一片区域时，总有多条路线可供选择；而每条路线的任意节点都藏着惊艳的景致："建筑常作为固定观景点呈现精心设计的画面，而园中步道与小径的布局，则让人能在动态视野中品味移步换景之妙。" ^(102){ }^{102} 如此，园林路径便与"山水画中时隐时现的山径"形成异曲同工之妙。 ^(103){ }^{103} 不论在园林还是其所摹绘的画卷里，曲径总能引领人们从不同视角领略景致。 ^(104){ }^{104}
A Chinese garden is also replete with things of many kinds-with buildings and plants, soil and stones. Yet these are never presented in such profusion as to confuse: there is a sense of abiding order, of clear space for rumination. Each thing in a Chinese garden counts, has its own fully accountable spot, within the perimeters provided by pavilions, terraces, and walls. This arrangement is not only aesthetically pleasing and conducive to meditation; it also gives rise to clarified remembering. Indeed, a Chinese garden is exemplary of what a well-ordered memory of place can become when brought outside the mind (where it had been confined in the art of memory) ^(105){ }^{105} and into the perceptual world. Its ingenious use of viewing-places-e.g., moon terraces or covered pavilions-invites the stroller to stop and contemplate groups of material objects as if they were items of a mnemonic presentation: which they may well become by this intense and lucid viewing. The structure of such a garden is memorial from beginning to end; memorable in itself as a privileged place to be, it also induces memories of other places one has known. 中国园林同样充盈着各式各样的元素——亭台楼阁、花草树木、泥土山石。然而这些景物从不以杂乱无章的姿态呈现：园中始终保持着恒定的秩序，留有供人沉思的澄明空间。在亭台楼阁与围墙界定的范围内，园中每处景致都各得其所，占据着精心考量的位置。这般布局不仅赏心悦目、宜于冥想，更能唤起清晰的记忆。事实上，中国园林堪称场所记忆的典范——当那些原本囿于记忆艺术中的有序记忆被释放到感知世界时，便成就了如此景致。园中观景处（如赏月台或廊亭）的精妙设计，邀请游者驻足凝望成组的实体景物，仿佛它们正是记忆呈现的载体——而通过这种强烈而澄澈的观照，这些景物确实可能转化为记忆载体。这般园林自始至终都是纪念性的存在：它本身作为 privileged place（特殊场所）已令人难忘，同时又能唤起人们对其他熟悉场所的记忆。
X
I have been presenting the Chinese garden as exemplary of a place rendered acutely memorable by the employment of a number of memory- 我将中国园林呈现为一个典范之地，其令人难忘的特质源于多重记忆
supportive factors. Their interaction results in a literal com-plication of the space of the garden, which cannot be adequately experienced in terms of what Whitehead would call “simple location.” A simple location “does not require for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time.” ^(106){ }^{106} In vivid contrast with the separative aspect of simple locations is the “prehensive” character of space or time regarded as inclusive in scope, e.g., as exhibited in that bodily form of causal efficacy discussed at the end of the last chapter. In a world in which place is characterized by prehensions, one can say that 支持因素的运用。这些因素的相互作用导致园林空间形成一种字面意义上的"复杂交织"，无法用怀特海所称的"简单定位"来充分体验。所谓简单定位，"其解释无需参照时空的其他区域"。 ^(106){ }^{106} 与简单定位的分离特性形成鲜明对比的，是空间或时间所具有的"统摄性"特征——即其包容性范畴，正如上一章末尾讨论的因果效验的身体形式所展现的那样。在一个以统摄性为场所特征的世界里，可以说
everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world. ^(107){ }^{107} 一切事物无时无刻不在所有地方。因为每个位置都包含着自身在所有其他位置中的某个面向。因此每个时空视点都映现着整个世界。 ^(107){ }^{107}
Although Whitehead finds the perfect exemplification of this doctrine in the Romantic view of nature, ^(108){ }^{108} we could claim as much for the Chinese garden. In both cases the landscape world of nature is attained by a prehensive conception of place, whether this be the place of the poet or that of the solitary walker in the garden. 尽管怀特海德在浪漫主义的自然观中找到了这一学说的完美例证，我们同样可以宣称中国园林也充分体现了这一理念。在这两种情况下，自然的景观世界都是通过场所的统摄性概念来实现的——无论是诗人的场所，还是园中独步者的场所。
The implications for memory of place are crucial. Such memory cannot be based on the simple locations provided by sites; this would only lead to the very separatism in space which undermines effective remembering. ^(109){ }^{109} Instead, place memory calls for a radically inclusive notion of space in which the full landscape contexture of given places can be accounted for. As Rilke wrote to von Hulewicz, it is a matter of instating “what is here seen and touched within the wider, within the widest orbit.” ^(110){ }^{110} Memory of place does just this by locating the particularities of place-“what is here seen”-within the “wider orbit” of a surrounding landscape. 这对场所记忆的启示至关重要。这种记忆不能建立在场地提供的简单定位上，否则只会导致空间割裂，从而破坏有效的记忆。相反，场所记忆需要一种彻底包容的空间概念，能够完整呈现特定场所的景观脉络。正如里尔克致信胡列维奇时所写，关键在于将"此处所见所触之物置于更广阔、最广阔的轨道之中"。场所记忆正是通过将场所的特殊性——"此处所见"——置于周边景观的"更广阔轨道"中来实现这一点。
This is not to claim that there is any exact parallelism between Chinese and Western conceptions of place in relation to memory. If we set aside Whitehead and the Romantic poets, we are left in the West with the tendency, steadily mounting since Descartes, to convert place-being into site-being. One concrete consequence of the encroachment of site on place has been the favoring of architectural space, especially architecturally modeled domestic space, as a privileged domain of memorability: Descartes meditating next to his stove is the progenitor of Proust writing in his cork-lined room. In China, by contrast, there has been a concerted search for an equilibrium between the architectural and the natural-between garden and landscape, indeed between constructed and organic elements within the garden itself. The equilibrium is sanctioned by an entire cosmology. For example, the combination of water and rocks in a garden represents the conjunction of Yin (soft, yielding, dark) with Yang (hard, resistant, bright): 这并非声称中西方的场所观念与记忆之间存在任何精确的对应关系。若将怀特海和浪漫派诗人暂且搁置，西方自笛卡尔以降便日益倾向于将场所存在转化为场地存在。场地对场所的侵蚀带来一个具体后果：建筑空间——尤其是仿建筑模式的居家空间——被推崇为记忆的特权领域：笛卡尔在火炉旁冥思，正是普鲁斯特在软木贴面房间里写作的先驱。相比之下，中国始终致力于寻求建筑与自然之间的平衡——花园与景观之间，乃至花园内部人造元素与有机元素之间的平衡。这种平衡受到整个宇宙观的认可。例如，园林中水与石的组合便象征着阴（柔、顺、暗）与阳（刚、抗、明）的交融：
To understand how the Chinese garden works is to understand the Chinese view of the workings of the universe. According to the Chinese, the pairing of Yin and Yang concepts implies their very interdependence and interaction: their combinations and permutations guarantee infinite change as well as ultimate harmony in the universe. ^(111){ }^{111} 要理解中国园林的奥妙，就是理解中国人对宇宙运行规律的认知。在中国人看来，阴阳概念的配对正暗示着二者相互依存、彼此作用的关系：它们的组合与变化既保证了宇宙的无穷演变，也维系着终极的和谐。 ^(111){ }^{111}
Such a view leads naturally to a preoccupation with microcosm/macrocosm parallels and to a special concern with varied means of representation as ways of achieving “a harmonious oneness through infinite metamorphosis.” ^(112){ }^{112} 这种观念自然引发人们对微观世界与宏观世界对应关系的执着探索，并特别关注以多样化的表现手法来实现"通过无穷变幻达成和谐统一"的境界。 ^(112){ }^{112}
Post-Cartesian Western thinking does not seek any such ultimate harmony between microcosm and macrocosm. Instead of finding a focus memorius in gardens with their delicate complementarities, such thinking focuses on the house as an archetypal place for the most significant remembering. It is a revealing fact that Bachelard and Heidegger, both trenchant critics of space conceived as mere site, alike stress the space of inhabitation, of “building” and “dwelling.” Heidegger’s project of a “topology of Being” and Bachelard’s strikingly similar notion of “topo-analysis” do not propose anything like a return to nature, nor do they intend an ideal state in which human dwelling and nature would exist in equilibrium. Heidegger’s exemplary cases of things-as-locations are such decidedly artifactual objects as a jug and a bridge. ^(113){ }^{113} Bachelard defines topo-analysis as “the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives” ^(114){ }^{114}-where such “sites” are precisely houses, places of dwelling. Indeed, these manifestly non-natural locations are said to be the proper place-holders of memories: 后笛卡尔时代的西方思想不再追求微观世界与宏观世界之间的终极和谐。这种思想不再从花园及其精妙的互补性中寻找记忆的焦点，而是将房屋视为承载最重要记忆的原型场所。一个发人深省的事实是，巴什拉和海德格尔——这两位对"空间即场所"概念提出尖锐批判的哲学家——都不约而同地强调居住空间、"筑造"与"栖居"的空间。海德格尔提出的"存在之拓扑学"与巴什拉极具相似性的"场所分析"概念，既非主张回归自然，也非构想人类栖居与自然和谐共处的理想状态。海德格尔所列举的典型"物即场所"案例，恰恰是水壶、桥梁这类人工制品。巴什拉将场所分析定义为"对我们私密生活场所的系统心理学研究"，而这些"场所"正是指房屋这类栖居之地。事实上，这些明显非自然的场所被认为才是记忆的真正载体：
Thanks to the house, a great many of our memories are housed, and if the house is a bit elaborate, if it has a cellar and a garret, nooks and corridors, our memories have refuges that are all the more clearly delineated. ^(115){ }^{115} 多亏了房屋，我们的大量记忆得以安放；若这房子稍显精巧，配有地窖与阁楼、角落与走廊，我们的记忆便有了更为分明的栖身之所。 ^(115){ }^{115}
In China the house opens onto the garden and is thus not a self-contained place of memory; being only part of a garden compound that is a microcosm of nature, its role in remembering is that of a vestibule and its memorial significance is quite literally marginal. In the Western world, where dwellings are so often closed off from nature, ^(116){ }^{116} it is therefore not surprising to be told that “the house is one of the greatest powers of integration for the thoughts, memories, and dreams of mankind.” ^(117){ }^{117} In this perspective, houses hold memories; they are the primary exemplars of remembered places. 在中国，房屋向花园敞开，因而并非自成一体的记忆场所；作为自然缩影的园林院落的一部分，它在记忆中的角色如同门厅，其纪念意义实则是边缘化的。而在西方世界，居所常与自然隔绝， ^(116){ }^{116} 因此当听闻"房屋是人类思想、记忆与梦想最强大的整合力量之一"时，便不足为奇了。 ^(117){ }^{117} 由此观之，房屋承载记忆；它们是记忆场所的首要典范。
Precisely as self-enclosed, houses encourage memories in which intimacy is a leading value. Inhabited space brings with it what Bachelard calls “the being of within” and Frank Lloyd Wright “interior spaciousness.” ^(118){ }^{118} In being remembered, each room, and each corner of each room, realizes an “intimate immensity”: 正是作为封闭的实体，房屋孕育了以亲密性为核心价值的记忆。居住空间带来了巴什拉所称的"内在存在"，以及弗兰克·劳埃德·赖特所说的"内部广阔感"。 ^(118){ }^{118} 在被记忆的过程中，每个房间及房间的每个角落，都实现了"亲密的无限"。
The topo-analyst starts to ask questions: Was the room a large one? Was the garret cluttered up? Was the nook warm? How was it lighted? How, too, in these fragments of space, did the human being achieve silence? How did he relish the very special silence of the various retreats of solitary daydreaming? ^(119){ }^{119} 地形分析师开始提出问题：那个房间宽敞吗？阁楼是否杂乱无章？角落温暖吗？采光如何？在这些零碎的空间里，人类又是如何获得寂静的？他如何品味独处遐想时各个避世之所特有的宁静？ ^(119){ }^{119}
Here we are reminded of the silent memorizer, pursuing the ancient art of memory by introspecting the interior spaces of his remembered places-in contrast with the equally silent Chinese meditator, gazing directly onto nature from the Moon Terrace of his garden. If cosmological unity is realized spontaneously and with minimal assistance from architecture in the Chinese circumstance, it is only by a paradoxical twist that any comparable unity is achieved in the Western situation, where inhabited space is at once highly interiorized and heavily built-over. Even though such space is not attuned to landscape, it does give rise to a distinctive metaphysical unity of its own: 这让我们想起静默的记忆者——他通过内省记忆中的场所内部空间来践行古老的记忆艺术，与之形成对比的是同样静默的中国冥想者，从花园的月台直接凝视自然。如果说在中国情境中，宇宙的统一性是自发实现且几乎不依赖建筑辅助的，那么在西方情境下，任何可比的统一性都只能通过一种悖论式的转折才能达成——那里的居住空间既高度内化又层层叠建。尽管这样的空间与自然景观并不协调，它却孕育出自身独特的形而上统一体：
It is through their [respective] ‘immensity’ that these two kinds of space-the space of [architectural] intimacy and world space-blend. When human solitude deepens, then the two immensities touch and become identical. ^(120){ }^{120} 正是通过它们各自的"浩瀚"，这两种空间——[建筑]亲密的内部空间与外部世界空间——得以交融。当人类的孤独感加深时，这两种浩瀚便会相互触碰，最终合而为一。
This is not the place to pursue the precise ways in which Western architecture has attempted to enhance its own memorability. ^(121){ }^{121} These include a greater emphasis on perimeters and horizons than is typically found in Chinese gardens; less stress on pathways and more on various “liminal” regions such as doorways; and a more complex dialectical interplay between inside and outside. Despite such differences, one critical commonality between East and West nevertheless remains. Place memories of all kinds, however diverse they may be otherwise, require that the place remembered serve as an enclosure of some sort: as a reservative region. Even in the most disparate cultural settings, Aristotle’s model of place-as-container remains deeply pertinent to the remembrance of place. In China the garden contains nature even as it mirrors it, and in this very capacity it is a privileged preserver of place memories. In Europe and America of the last three centuries, it is the domicile that has served as the primary container of memories of place. This is especially true of the childhood house, our first “home,” itself often the subject of the most profound nostalgia. As Bachelard says in the wake of Proust: 此处不宜详述西方建筑如何刻意提升其可记忆性的具体手法。这些手法包括：比中式园林更强调边界与视野；较少关注路径而更重视门廊等"阈限"区域；以及内外空间更复杂的辩证互动。尽管存在这些差异，东西方仍有一个关键共性——无论何种场所记忆，无论其差异多大，都需要被记忆的场所具备某种围合性：即作为保存性区域。即便在最迥异的文化背景下，亚里士多德"场所即容器"的模型对场所记忆仍具深刻意义。在中国园林中，围合自然的同时亦映照自然，正因如此它成为保存场所记忆的特权载体；而近三百年的欧美世界，住宅则扮演着场所记忆的主要容器角色，尤以童年故居——我们最初的"家"为甚，它往往成为最深切乡愁的寄寓之所。 正如巴什拉在追忆普鲁斯特时所言：
After we are in [a] new house, when memories of other places we have lived come back to us, we travel to the land of Motionless Childhood, motionless the way all Immemorial Things are. We live fixations, fixations of happiness. We comfort ourselves by reliving memories of [childhood] protection. Something closed must retain our memories, while leaving them their original value as images. Memories of the outside world will never have the same tonality as those of home. ^(122){ }^{122} 当我们住进新居时，往昔居所的回忆便纷至沓来。我们重返静止的童年国度，那种静止如同所有亘古之物的永恒静止。我们活在幸福的固着中，重温童年庇护的记忆以自慰。某个封闭空间必须封存我们的记忆，同时保留它们作为意象的原初价值。外界记忆永远无法拥有家园记忆的独特音调。 ^(122){ }^{122}
A house, especially one that has been our childhood home, is certainly not a simple location, for such a location cannot effectively contain memories. Instead, in its prehensive power, a house serves as an active enclosure for the most cherished-which is to say, the most intimate-memories of place. 房屋——尤其是承载童年记忆的家——绝非简单的地理位置，因为地理位置无法有效容纳记忆。相反，房屋以其包容之力，成为最珍贵（即最私密）空间记忆的活性容器。
XI 第十一章
Aristotle was right in another regard: “the power of place,” as he said, is “a remarkable one.” Even if place is not “prior to all things”-as Aristotle claimed, echoing Archytas-it certainly holds its own: and it holds its own (in) memories. Places are potently receptive and preservative of memories, which they hold to keep. As much as body or brain, mind or language, place is a keeper of memories-one of the main ways by which the past comes to be secured in the present, held in things before us and around us. In place, “the hold is held,” for in places the presentment of memories occurs as their implacement in non-simple locations. If it is true that “what keeps us in our essential nature holds us only so long . . . as we for our part keep holding on to what holds us,” ^(123){ }^{123} then place is the primary scene in which we hold (onto) memories: we are beholden to them there, precisely to the extent that place itself is a holding power. Such is the dialectic of place memories: "They are as much in us as we are in them. ^(124){ }^{124} It is this dialectic that Straus describes as the interplay of the visible and the invisible in landscape. The same dialectic is at work in the ninth Duino Elegy: “Earth, isn’t this what you want: an invisible re-arising in us? Is not your dream to be one day invisible? Earth! Invisible!” ^(125){ }^{125} It is in providing outward display for things and pathways as they exist within the horizons of landscape that places enable memories to become inwardly inscribed and possessed: made one with the memorial self. The visibility without becomes part of the invisibility within. 亚里士多德在另一个观点上也是正确的：他所说的“地方的力量”确实“非同寻常”。即便地方并非如亚里士多德（呼应阿契塔斯）所宣称的那样“先于一切事物”，它无疑拥有其独特地位：而这种独特地位（体现在）记忆中。地方对记忆具有强大的接纳性和保存性，它们承载并守护着记忆。与身体或大脑、心灵或语言一样，地方也是记忆的守护者——它是过去得以在当下被保存的主要方式之一，被保存在我们面前和周围的事物中。在地方中，“持有被持续”，因为记忆的呈现发生在它们被安置于非单一位置的过程中。如果说“维系我们本质的事物，只有当我们持续坚守那些维系我们的事物时才能维系我们” ^(123){ }^{123} ，那么地方就是我们坚守记忆的主要场景：我们在那里受惠于记忆，正因地方本身就是一种维系力量。这就是地方记忆的辩证法：“它们既存在于我们之中，我们也存在于它们之中。” ^(124){ }^{124} 斯特劳斯将这种辩证法描述为景观中可见与不可见的相互作用。 同样的辩证关系在《杜伊诺哀歌》第九首中显现："大地，这不正是你所渴望的吗：在我们体内无形地重生？你的梦想不正是有朝一日化为无形吗？大地！无形的！" ^(125){ }^{125} 正是通过为景观视域内存在的事物与路径提供外在显现，场所使得记忆得以被内在铭刻与拥有：与记忆中的自我融为一体。外在的可见性转化为内在的不可见性。
In closing this chapter, I wish to point to two concrete consequences of the foregoing analysis: 在结束本章时，我想指出上述分析带来的两个具体结论：
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF RECOLLECTION 回忆的不足性
In recollection or secondary memory, place is at best a mere setting for the object or episode that is being remembered; it may not even figure in recollection’s quasi-narrations, which can omit mention of place altogether. In short, recollection does not begin to do justice to the manifold ways in which place figures into human remembering. Nor does it adequately reflect the fate of body memory vis-à-vis place; just as the body moves us into place and orients us there, so body memories are often memories of body-in-place. Indeed, even such mnemonic modes as reminding and recognizing frequently imply implacement: we are reminded about doing XX in situation YY, and we recognize person P in circumstance C -where “situation” and “cir- 在回忆或次级记忆中，场所充其量只是被忆起对象或事件的背景；它甚至可能不会出现在回忆的准叙事中，这些叙事可以完全省略对场所的提及。简言之，回忆远未能充分体现场所参与人类记忆的多种方式。它也没有恰当地反映身体记忆相对于场所的命运；正如身体将我们带入场所并在其中定位我们，身体记忆往往就是身处场所的记忆。事实上，即使是提醒和识别这类记忆模式，也常常暗示着场所性：我们被提醒要在 YY 情境中做 XX ，我们在 C 环境中认出 P 这个人——这里的"情境"和"环
cumstance” are both matters of place. It is evident, then, that the power of place exceeds what recollection-as well as other forms of rememberingcan effectively encompass. “环境”与“境况”皆关乎场所。由此可见，场所的力量超越了回忆——以及其他记忆形式——所能有效涵盖的范畴。
SPATIALITY VERSUS TEMPORALITY 空间性与时间性
Just as memory of place calls the exclusive priority of recollection into question, so it also brings us beyond a reliance on time as an exclusive medium for what we remember-that is, beyond the very thing which recollecting favors by its narratizing tendency. In particular, it reminds us of the centrality of space for much remembering. Body memory had already pointed in this direction in its position-taking capacity as well as in its kinesthetic dimension. Only in memory of place, however, are we enjoined to undertake a full-fledged topo-analysis of the spatiality of remembering. Precisely in contrast with psychoanalysis-which emphasizes diachrony and development in their interpersonal ramifications ^(126){ }^{126}-topo-analysis investigates the solitary experience of space: what it is to be, and to have been, in particular places rather than in particular times. In a great deal of remembering, this is a pervasive concern. We often remember ourselves in a given place; but how often do we remember ourselves as having been at a given date? 正如对场所的记忆质疑了回忆的排他性优先权，它也将我们带离对时间作为记忆唯一媒介的依赖——即超越回忆本身通过叙事化倾向所偏好的那种东西。尤其值得注意的是，它提醒我们空间在多数记忆中的核心地位。身体记忆早已通过其立场采取能力及动觉维度指向这一方向。然而唯有在对场所的记忆中，我们才被要求对记忆的空间性进行彻底的地志学分析。与精神分析——强调人际脉络中的历时性与发展——形成鲜明对比的是，地志学分析探究的是空间中的独处体验：置身于特定场所而非特定时间意味着什么，以及曾经如此存在意味着什么。在大量记忆活动中，这始终是个普遍关切。我们常忆起自己身处某地；但可曾有多少次，我们会忆起自己存在于某个具体日期？
By its very immobility-through the stolid concreteness of things set within pathways and horizons-place acts to contain time itself. This is not to trivialize time but to make it into a dimension of space through the active influence of place. On the other hand, time is trivialized when it is reduced to calendrical-historical dates; and it is precisely memory of place that teaches us that 正是通过其不动性——那些坚定地矗立在路径与地平线上的具体事物——场所发挥着容纳时间本身的作用。这并非贬低时间，而是通过场所的能动影响将其转化为空间的维度。另一方面，当时间被简化为历法-历史日期时，它确实被庸俗化了；而正是场所记忆教导我们：
to localize a memory in time is merely a matter for the biographer and only corresponds to a sort of external history, for external use, to be communicated to others . . . localization in the spaces of our intimacy is more urgent than determination of dates. ^(127){ }^{127} 将记忆定位于时间只是传记作者的工作，仅对应着某种外在的历史，供外部使用并传递给他人......在我们亲密空间中的定位远比确定日期更为迫切。 ^(127){ }^{127}
If Bachelard is here correct about the nature of memory, not only is narratizing of secondary interest but the idea of remembering as re-experiencing the past is rendered moot, including Husserl’s claim that “we can relive the present [even if] it cannot be given again.” ^(128){ }^{128} Also contested is Heidegger’s view in Being and Time that Dasein achieves authenticity only in a resolute repetition of its past. Could it be that authenticity lies instead in the very spatiality which Heidegger makes into a mere function of temporality? ^(129){ }^{129} 如果巴什拉对记忆本质的论述是正确的，那么不仅叙事化退居次要地位，"记忆即重新体验过去"的观念也变得站不住脚——这包括胡塞尔所谓"我们能重新体验当下[即便]它无法再次被给予"的主张。 ^(128){ }^{128} 海德格尔在《存在与时间》中认为此在只有通过对其过去的决断性重复才能达到本真性，这一观点同样受到质疑。难道本真性其实存在于海德格尔仅视为时间性功能的空间性之中？ ^(129){ }^{129}
Throughout this chapter, we have witnessed what amounts to an elective affinity between memory and place. Not only is each suited to the other; each calls for the other. What is contained in place is on its way to being well remembered. What is remembered is well grounded if it is remembered as being in a particular place-a place that may well take precedence over the 在本章中，我们见证了记忆与场所之间存在着一种天然的契合。二者不仅彼此适配，更相互召唤。场所中所蕴含的内容，注定会被深刻铭记。而被记忆的内容若能锚定于特定场所——一个可能优先于其他记忆的场所——便获得了坚实的根基。
time of its occurrence. Thus it is certainly true that “memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are.” ^(130){ }^{130} But precisely where memory is at stake, to be fixed in space is to be fixed in place. If memories are motionless, this is the work of the places in which they come to inhere so deeply. In remembering "I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say [just] where. And I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in time. ^(131){ }^{131} To be there-to be truly da-sein-is to be in place, which cannot be reduced to site (the just where) any more than time can be shrunken to date (the just when). Being-in-place is a main modalization of being-in-the-world. Having been in places is therefore a natural resource for remembering our own being in the world. It is indispensable for knowing what we are (now) in terms of what we were (then). 在记忆发生的时刻。因此确实可以说"记忆是静止不动的，它们在空间中锚定得越牢固，就越可靠。" ^(130){ }^{130} 但恰恰在记忆问题上，被锚定在空间就意味着被锚定在场所。如果记忆是静止的，那正是得益于它们所深深栖居的那些场所。在回忆时"我只能说：我们曾到过那里；却无法说出[具体]何处。我也无法说出持续了多久，因为那会将记忆置于时间维度。" ^(131){ }^{131} 存在于此——真正的此在——就是处于场所之中，这既不能简化为坐标点（具体方位），就像时间不能被压缩为日期（具体时刻）那样。栖居于场所是在世存在的主要模态。曾居于某些场所，自然就成为我们回忆自身在世存在的资源。这对于通过过去（彼时）来理解当下（此刻）的我们而言，是不可或缺的。
Footfalls echo in the memory . . . 脚步声在记忆中回响……
There rises the hidden laughter 树丛间突然迸发出
Of children in the foliage 孩子们隐秘的笑声
Quick, now, here, now, always- ^(132){ }^{132} 快，此刻，这里，现在，永远—— ^(132){ }^{132}
Memory of place implaces us and thus empowers us: gives us space to be precisely because we have been in so many memorable places, enjoyed such intimacy in them, known such pain there as well. If body memory moves us-is the prime mover of our memorial lives-it moves us directly into place, whose very immobility contributes to its distinct potency in matters of memory. 对场所的记忆将我们锚定于彼处，并由此赋予我们力量：正因为我们曾置身于诸多难忘之地，在那里体验过亲密无间，也经受过刻骨之痛，记忆才为我们提供了存在的空间。如果说身体记忆驱动着我们——它是我们记忆生命的第一推动力——那么它正是直接将我们送入场所之中，而场所的恒定性恰恰强化了其在记忆领域中的独特效力。
XX
COMMEMORATION 纪念
A miraculous acte, and worthie (in deede) of sempiternall remembraunce. 一项奇迹般的壮举，确实（诚然）值得永恒的铭记。
-William Painter, The Palace of Pleasure -威廉·佩因特，《欢乐宫》
(1569)
I
Abstract 摘要
I rise early and rush to the town Green, arriving just in time to catch the beginning of the parade. With scores of other townspeople, I follow the marching bands and city officials eastward to the cemetery on Boston Street. After everyone is settled at the cemetery, prayers to the war dead are offered, a multiple gun salute explodes, and “taps” are played by a lonely bugler hidden among the gravestones. Somewhat subdued, I walk back with the crowd to the Green, pausing along the way to observe a magnificent bank of flowers that are flourishing on this late spring day. At the Green speeches are read by the First Selectman and the congressional representative from the local district. Following a benediction, the gathering disperses and the Green reverts to its usual somnolent state. 我早早起身赶往镇上的绿地，恰好赶上游行开始。与众多镇民一起，我跟随行进中的乐队和市政官员向东前往波士顿街的墓地。当众人在墓地安顿好后，人们向阵亡将士祈祷，鸣放多响礼炮，一位隐匿在墓碑间的孤独号手吹响了《熄灯号》。带着几分肃穆之情，我随人群走回绿地，途中驻足观赏晚春时节盛放的绚丽花丛。在绿地上，第一行政官和本选区国会代表分别致辞。祝福仪式结束后，人群散去，绿地又恢复了平日的静谧状态。
This is a description of a recent Memorial Day observance. It depicts an activity of commemoration. Commemoration? What is this? What is it doing in a book entitled Remembering? This last question is especially pointed in view of the fact that at no moment during the entire experience just described did I remember any single historical event-even though a number of such events were being commemorated on this occasion. Or more exactly, the occasion was designed to commemorate those who had “given their lives” in these events-all of them wars-and yet I was not remembering any of the war dead who were being honored: that is to say, I was not recollecting them in discrete scenic form. Indeed, I was not even thinking of them at all during most of the ceremony. I suspect the same mental vacuity obtained for many of my fellow citizens. But we were nevertheless commemorating and in this capacity engaging in remembering of a certain sort. What kind of remembering is this? 这是一段关于近期阵亡将士纪念日活动的描述。它描绘了一种纪念行为。纪念？这是什么？它为何会出现在一本名为《记忆》的书中？考虑到在整个描述的经历中，我始终没有回忆起任何具体历史事件——尽管这个场合本应纪念诸多此类事件（它们都是战争），最后一个问题显得尤为尖锐。更准确地说，这个场合旨在纪念那些在这些战争中"献出生命"的人们，然而我并未追忆任何被缅怀的战争逝者：也就是说，我并未以离散的场景形式回忆他们。事实上，在仪式的大部分时间里，我甚至根本没有想到他们。我猜想许多同胞也处于同样的精神空白状态。但我们仍在进行纪念，并以此身份参与着某种形式的记忆。这究竟是何种记忆？
A crucial component of the answer to this question has to do with the role of others-my companions in commemoration. If I am remembering at all on 回答这个问题的关键要素与"他者"的作用有关——那些与我共同纪念的同伴们。如果说我确实在进行记忆活动，那么
such an occasion, I am remembering with them, and they with me. It is a matter of something thoroughly communal. Indeed, it is almost as if the absence of recollection on my part-and doubtless that of other in-dividuals-was somehow being compensated for by an activity that occurred at the level of the group. We have certainly come a long way from Descartes’s stove and Proust’s study! Suddenly we are thrust headlong into a crowd of co-rememberers-into what Nietzsche might call disdainfully a “herd” or Heidegger “das man.” And yet it is precisely in this unpropitious setting, in the company of others who are likely to be just as oblivious as I with regard to explicit remembrance, that remembering of a decidedly commemorative sort is going on. A strange situation perhaps, but one that arises fairly frequently in our lives, especially at crucial ceremonial moments. 在这样的时刻，我与他们共同回忆，他们也与我共同回忆。这完全是一种集体行为。事实上，仿佛正是由于我个人——无疑也包括其他个体——缺乏具体记忆，才通过群体层面的活动得到了某种补偿。我们显然已远离笛卡尔的火炉与普鲁斯特的书房！突然间，我们被抛入一群共同回忆者之中——尼采或许会轻蔑地称之为"群氓"，海德格尔则可能称作"常人"。然而正是在这种看似不利的环境中，在与那些和我一样可能对具体记忆浑然不觉的人们相处时，一种明确的纪念性回忆正在发生。这或许是个奇特的情境，但在我们生活中却相当常见，尤其是在重要的仪式性时刻。
In view of its recurrent importance, it is bizarre that we do not know more about the nature of commemoration. The very absence of recollective consciousness that may accompany its enactment leaves us in a vacuum-or at least a quandary. Where shall we turn for clues to the working of this “miraculous acte,” in which we find ourselves unselfconsciously engaging without knowing what we are doing? Despite its importance, commemorating is among the most elusive forms of remembering, and it is surely the most recalcitrant to being understood on the model of straightforward recollecting. Even to approach it in a preliminary way is to be forced to pursue memory beyond mind-now further beyond mind than we have yet ventured in this Part. No wonder that it is rarely treated in books on memory, not even in such master works as James’s Principles of Psychology or Husserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. In Western philosophy and psychology alike, its fate has been to be ignored-to be as unknown as it was by me in attending an ordinary Memorial Day ceremony. Despite this neglect, commemoration remains “worthie (in deede) of sempiternall remembraunce.” But how are we to comprehend its structure and operation? 鉴于纪念活动反复出现的重要性，我们对纪念本质知之甚少的现状显得尤为怪异。当执行纪念行为时，那种可能伴随而来的回忆意识的缺席，让我们陷入真空——至少是困境之中。我们该从何处寻找线索，来理解这个"神奇举动"的运作机制？在这个举动中，我们总是不自觉地参与其中，却不知自己究竟在做什么。尽管纪念至关重要，但它却是记忆形式中最难以捉摸的一种，也最抗拒被简单回忆的模式所理解。即便是初步探讨它，也不得不迫使我们将记忆研究推向心智之外——比我们在本部分中迄今所涉足的领域更为深远。难怪关于记忆的著作很少论及纪念，就连詹姆斯《心理学原理》或胡塞尔《内时间意识现象学》这样的杰作也不例外。在西方哲学和心理学中，纪念的命运始终是被忽视——就像我在参加普通阵亡将士纪念日仪式时对它的无知一样。 尽管被如此忽视，纪念活动依然"确实值得永恒的铭记"。但我们该如何理解其结构与运作方式？
II 二
In this bewildering circumstance-in which we spontaneously accomplish an activity of remembering which we are not even certain we can confidently label as remembering-we are in desperate need of a Leitfaden, a guiding thread. One lies ready to hand in the fact that in its most ancient acceptation “commemoration” means an intensified remembering. ^(1){ }^{1} Further, two of its oldest meanings are the deliverance of a formal euology and participation in a liturgical service (wherein a “lesser feast” is observed by being included, in parts, in a “greater feast”). ^(2){ }^{2} Taken together, these early senses of the word 在这种令人困惑的情境中——我们自发地完成一项记忆活动，却甚至不确定能否自信地将其称为记忆——我们迫切需要一条 Leitfaden（指导线索）。一个现成的线索在于："纪念"最古老的含义是指一种强化的记忆。 ^(1){ }^{1} 此外，它最古老的两个含义是：发表正式悼词和参与礼拜仪式（其中通过将"次要节日"的部分内容纳入"主要节日"来庆祝）。 ^(2){ }^{2} 综合来看，这个词的早期含义
imply that in acts of commemoration remembering is intensified by taking place through the interposed agency of a text (the eulogy, the liturgy proper) and in the setting of a social ritual (delivering the eulogy, participating in the service). The remembering is intensified still further by the fact that both ritual and text become efficacious only in the presence of others, with whom we commemorate together in a public ceremony. 暗示着在纪念行为中，记忆通过文本媒介（悼词、正式礼拜仪式）的介入和社会仪式（发表悼词、参与礼拜）的场景得以强化。由于仪式和文本只有在他人共同参与的公共典礼中才产生效力，这种记忆又得到了进一步强化。
The “through,” “in,” and “with” that I have underlined suggest that commemoration is a highly mediated affair-that it involves a quite significant component of otherness at every turn. Neither the withness of the body nor the in-ness of place involved any comparable mediation. Body and place are things which we are or in which we find ourselves fully immersed: their density is not that of a medium but of an element in which we live and move and have our being. 我所强调的"通过"、"在"和"与"表明，纪念是一种高度中介化的行为——它在每个环节都包含着相当重要的他者成分。身体的"同在性"和场所的"内在性"都不曾涉及类似的中介过程。身体和场所是我们所是之物或我们完全沉浸其中的所在：它们的密度不是媒介的密度，而是我们生活、活动和存在其中的元素的密度。
How different is the situation in commemorating! On Memorial Day I found myself so completely with others, and so dependent on a given ritual and text, that I was taken out of my self-confinement as a body or a mind. So too I left the intimacy of my house, “my own place,” to enter the public space of the ritual observance. Instead of contemplating the past in a private mental space or experiencing it “in my bones” in an almost equally private room, I attained my commemorative aim only via an interpolated ritual and text in the co-presence of others. All of these mediational factors or “commemorabilia” juxtaposed themselves between myself as commemorator and that which I was commemorating, the “commemorandum.” 纪念活动的情形何其不同！在阵亡将士纪念日，我发现自己如此彻底地与他人同在，如此依赖于特定的仪式和文本，以至于我脱离了作为身体或心灵的自我封闭状态。同样，我也离开了"我的地方"——家的私密空间，进入仪式举行的公共领域。与在私人心理空间沉思过去，或在几乎同样私密的房间里"切身"体验不同，我唯有通过他人共在场域中被插入的仪式和文本，才能达成纪念目的。所有这些中介因素或"纪念媒介"都横亘在作为纪念者的我与被纪念对象"纪念事项"之间。
I commemorate, in short, by remembering through specific commemorative vehicles such as rituals or texts-or any other available commemorabilia. The “through” of commemorative remembering-through signifies such things as: through this very vehicle, within its dimensions, across its surface. For the past is made accessible to me by its sheer ingrediency in the commemorabilium itself. It is commemorated therein and not somewhere else, however distant in time or space the commemorated event or person may be from the present occasion of commemorating. For instance, one of the explicit commemoranda on Memorial Day is the First World War, which occurred some seventy years ago in forlorn trenches in France and was fought by soldiers whom I did not know, indeed could not have known, personally. Nevertheless, neither such distance in space and time nor such anonymity in identity detracts from the efficacy of commemoration as II and others now celebrate it on Memorial Day. The distance and the anonymity do not matter, thanks to the immanence of the commemoranda in the vehicles that sustain them. These vehicles make even the most alien presences available to me as a commemorator, and they do so in the only way that matters. Through the appropriate commemorabilia I overcome the effects of anonymity and spatio-temporal distance and pay homage to people and events I have never known and will never know face-to-face. The mystery of the matter-but also an insight into its inner working-resides in 简言之，我通过特定的纪念载体——如仪式或文本，抑或其他任何可用的纪念物——来铭记往事。纪念性记忆中的"通过"意味着：经由这一载体本身，在其维度之内，跨越其表面。因为过往正是通过其在纪念物中的纯粹在场性而为我所触及。它被铭刻于此而非他处，无论被纪念的事件或人物与当下纪念时刻相隔多么遥远。例如，阵亡将士纪念日上明确的纪念对象之一便是第一次世界大战——那场约七十年前发生在法国荒凉战壕中的战役，由我素未谋面、事实上也永无可能相识的士兵们浴血奋战。然而，时空的遥远与身份的陌生性都无损于当下人们在阵亡将士纪念日践行纪念的效力。距离与匿名性无关紧要，只因纪念对象永恒存在于承载它们的载体之中。 这些载体让作为纪念者的我得以接触那些最为陌生的存在，且是以唯一重要的方式实现。通过恰当的纪念物，我克服了匿名性与时空距离的影响，向那些素未谋面也永不会相见的人物与事件致敬。此中玄机——亦是对其内在运作的洞见——在于
the way II remember the commemorated past through various commemoratively effective media in the present. It is as if this past were presenting itself to me translucently in such media-as if I were viewing the past in them, albeit darkly: as somehow set within their materiality. 我如何通过当下各种具有纪念效力的媒介来铭记被纪念的过往。仿佛这段过往正透过这些媒介半透明地向我呈现——犹如我正透过它们晦暗地观看着过去：某种程度嵌于其物质性之中。
Contrast this situation with that obtaining in recollection. When I succeed in retrieving the recollected past, it presents itself to me limpidly, as if through a transparent glass. No mediation, no otherness, is experienced as I seem to come back into immediate contact with what I am recollecting. Even if we have seen reason to doubt the real possibility of re-experiencing the past per se, it cannot be denied that it may appear to present itself in propria persona as a previously experienced scene flashes back before my memorious eyes (or ears). In secondary memory we often seem-or at least we would like it to seem-that we are holding up a looking glass to our own past. This impression (which may be, in fact, an ideal masquerading as an impression) of a transparent recapture of the past itself reflects the extraordinarily high valence which Western thinkers from Plato to Descartes and Husserl have placed on the criterion of claritas: especially the clarity that is achieved by the human mind in its most lucid moments, including those of recollective lucidity. Given the logocentric tendency to link veritas with lux, it is hardly surprising that recollection has been so prized as a paradigm of remembering. Nor is it surprising, by the same token, that commemorative remembering, in which the recollected past is veiled and sometimes even altogether absent, has received short shrift in prior assessments of human remembering. Insofar as commemorating is wedded to the dense translucency of remembering-through it does not bring its deliverances forward into what Husserl has revealingly described as “the brightly lit circle of perfect presentation.” ^(3){ }^{3} 将这种情况与回忆中的情形相对比。当我成功唤回过往记忆时，它如透过明净玻璃般清晰地呈现在我面前。在看似直接触及回忆内容的过程中，我感受不到任何中介或他异性。即便我们有理由质疑真正重新体验过去的可能性，但不可否认的是，当曾经经历的场景在我记忆之眼（或耳）中闪回时，它确实可能以本真面目显现。在次级记忆中，我们常常觉得——或至少希望如此——仿佛正为过往举起一面明镜。这种对过去本身透明重获的印象（实际上可能是伪装成印象的理想），折射出从柏拉图到笛卡尔再到胡塞尔的西方思想家赋予明晰性标准的极高价值：尤其是人类心灵在最清明时刻——包括那些回忆性澄明的时刻——所达致的清晰度。 鉴于逻各斯中心主义倾向将真理与光明相联系，回忆作为记忆的范式备受推崇也就不足为奇了。同理，在过往对人类记忆的评估中，那种被回忆的过去若隐若现、有时甚至完全缺席的纪念性记忆遭到冷落，也并非意料之外。由于纪念行为始终与记忆的朦胧半透明性紧密相连——它并未将其承载之物带入胡塞尔精辟描述的"完美呈现的明亮光圈"之中。
Not since we examined reminding in chapter 5 have we met with such mediation, such inherent indirection, such importance of the material medium. In that chapter we had to acknowledge the necessary role of an intermediary factor, i.e., the reminder itself. The latter interposes itself between the person being reminded and the remindand, that of which he or she is put in mind. It follows that both reminding and commemorating possess an essentially triadic structure. But there are two crucial differences between these forms of remembering. On the one hand, reminders, while often public in status, may be entirely private-as when I write notes to myself bearing on what I plan to do the next day. Commemorabilia, in contrast, are never wholly private, not even (as we shall see in detail later) when they are intrapsychic in nature: they are always trans-individual in their scope and function. On the other hand, a reminder always retains a certain instrumental bearing; it possesses the zuhanden structure of the "in-order-to’. ^(4){ }^{4} If I write the letter " TT " on the book mark in the novel I am reading so as to remind me to purchase tea tomorrow, this is done in order to motivate the future purchase. No such instrumentalism is present in a 自我们在第五章探讨"提醒"现象以来，再未遇到如此强烈的中介性、如此本质的间接性，以及物质媒介如此关键的作用。该章节中我们不得不承认中介因素的必要角色，即提醒物本身。这个中介物横亘在被提醒者与提醒内容之间——后者正是需要被唤起的记忆。由此可见，提醒与纪念本质上都具有三重结构。但这两种记忆形式存在两个关键差异：一方面，提醒物虽常具公共属性，却可能完全私有化——比如我为自己写下次日计划的便签；而纪念物则截然不同，它们从来不是完全私密的，即便（后文将详述）当它们属于心理内部现象时，其影响范围与功能始终具有跨个体性。另一方面，提醒物始终保持着工具性指向，具有"为之故"的"上手"结构。 ^(4){ }^{4} 如果我在阅读的小说书签上写下" TT "以提醒自己明天购买茶叶，这一行为旨在促发未来的购买行动。而纪念物则完全不具备这种工具性，
commemorabilium, which embodies the commemorandum rather than adumbrating it as still outstanding, still to be realized. It is precisely because what I commemorate has already entered a terminal stage that I can do nothing in the present but honor it by my commemorative activity. 它体现的是已被铭记的对象，而非将其勾勒为尚待实现之事。正因为我所纪念之事已进入终结阶段，此刻我能做的唯有通过纪念活动向其致敬。
This is not to deny the possibility of combining commemorating with reminding. ^(5){ }^{5} The postcard which my erstwhile student sent to me from the Acropolis had elements of both. In reminding me of “the glory that was Greece,” it also commemorated this glory; the photograph of the Parthenon was at once a reminder adumbrating a vanished past and a commemorabilium embodying it in the materiality of the photographic medium. But even in such a hybrid case a critical distinction remains. Where the aim of reminding is fully satisfied by my mere perception of the postcard as it leads to the thought about Grecian glory, there is no comparable completeness of commemorating on the basis of this same postcard. As I stare at the photograph, I realize that something is lacking. The photographic image certainly honors the past of Athenian prowess; the mere fact of its inclusion on the postcard (and many others like it) pays homage to this past. Yet am I fully commemorating such a past as I gaze at the bare image before me? Clearly I am not. But why not? What is missing? 这并非否认将纪念与提醒结合的可能性。 ^(5){ }^{5} 我从前那位学生从雅典卫城寄来的明信片就兼具这两种元素。在提醒我"希腊昔日的荣光"时，它也纪念着这份荣光；帕特农神庙的照片既是对消逝过往的暗示性提醒，又是通过摄影媒介的物质性对这份荣光的具体纪念。但即便在这种混合案例中，仍存在关键区别。当明信片引导我思考希腊荣光、仅凭对其的感知就完全满足了提醒目的时，基于同一张明信片的纪念行为却无法达到类似的完整性。凝视照片时，我意识到某种缺失。这张影像确实致敬了雅典辉煌的往昔；它被选入明信片（以及无数类似载体）的事实本身就是在向这段历史致意。但当我注视着眼前这帧单薄影像时，我真的在完整地纪念那段过往吗？显然没有。但为何没有？究竟缺失了什么？
III 第三章
What is missing has everything to do with remembering-through. The mute photographic image, while perfectly adequate as a reminder, is inadequate as a commemorabilium. It lacks throughness, that peculiar combination of a translucent medium and the power of conveying attention to the commemorandum. The conveyance is accomplished not despite the translucency-whose dimness is problematic only if we take the limpidity of recollection ^(6){ }^{6} as paradigmatic-but by its very means. While the unclarity of reminding resides in the adumbrative relation of a reminder to its remindand, the unclarity of commemorating is found in the very constitution, the actual materiality, of the commemorative vehicle itself. We could even say that the photographic image of the Parthenon, in its exact resemblance to this building, is too clear for commemorative purposes: it conveys this building (itself a symbol of faded Greek glory) too directly, leaving no significant unclarified remainder. 缺失之处与"经由记忆"息息相关。哑默的摄影图像作为提醒物虽完美胜任，作为纪念载体却有所不足。它缺乏"穿透性"——那种半透明介质与传递对纪念对象注意力之力量的独特结合。这种传递并非不顾半透明性（其朦胧性唯有当我们以回忆的清澈 ^(6){ }^{6} 为范式时才成问题），而恰恰是凭借半透明性得以实现。提醒的模糊性存在于提醒物与被提醒物之间的暗示性关系中，而纪念的模糊性则存在于纪念载体自身的构造中，存在于其实际物质性里。我们甚至可以说，帕特农神庙的摄影图像因其与建筑的高度相似，对纪念目的而言过于清晰：它太过直接地传递了这座建筑（其本身即是消逝的希腊荣光的象征），未留下任何重要的未澄明残余。
Commemorating thrives on indirection; it lives from unresolved, unimaged remainders; it is altogether a phenomenon of “restance.” In being swept along by the Memorial Day parade, I was caught up in something I did not clearly grasp at all. Neither perceived images such as photographs nor the psychical images of recollections were present to me; and even had they been, they would not have been decisive in the attainment of commemoration on this occasion. Not even various body memories and place 纪念活动在间接性中蓬勃发展；它源自未解决、未成形的残留物；它完全是一种"存留"现象。当我被阵亡将士纪念日的游行队伍裹挟前行时，我陷入了一种自己完全无法清晰理解的状态。无论是照片这样的感知图像，还是回忆中的心理图像，当时都没有出现在我面前；即便它们出现了，对于这次纪念活动的实现也不会起到决定性作用。甚至各种身体记忆和场所
memories, important as they might be as conditions of commemorating, are sufficient by themselves in realizing the action. Once more, then, we must say: something else is called for. What can this be? 记忆——尽管它们作为纪念活动的条件可能很重要——其本身也不足以实现这一行为。因此，我们必须再次指出：还需要其他东西。那会是什么呢？
This something else, the very basis of remembering-through, is found in the mediation of ritual and text. Both of these were powerfully present in my Memorial Day experience. My movements with my fellow commemorators through a certain procession of ceremonial way-stations (i.e., Green-Boston St.-cemetery-return to Green) constituted a ritualistic action that is fixed and invariant from year to year-however seemingly casual it might appear to a non-participant. The texts that were read were equally essential; they articulated the solemn purpose of the occasion and set the honorific tone that prevailed throughout. Although I was not focusing on such ritual as ritual or on such texts as texts-nor was anyone else, save possibly the speakersboth factors served as crucial commemorative vehicles. As conjointly intensifying in effect, they added precisely what was missing in the image of the Parthenon: an image which, for all its resplendent clarity, was not a fully efficacious commemorabilium. ^(7){ }^{7} 这种别样之物，作为贯穿记忆的根本，存在于仪式与文本的媒介之中。两者在我的阵亡将士纪念日经历中都强烈地呈现着。我与纪念者们共同穿行于一系列固定仪式站点（即格林街-波士顿街-公墓-返回格林街）的队列，构成了年复一年固定不变的仪式行为——尽管在外人眼中可能显得随意。被诵读的文本同样不可或缺：它们阐明了场合的庄严意义，奠定了贯穿始终的敬仰基调。尽管当时我并未以仪式本身或文本本身的角度去关注它们——其他参与者大抵也是如此，或许唯有发言者例外——但这两者都充当了至关重要的纪念载体。当它们共同增强效果时，恰恰弥补了帕特农神庙影像所缺失的要素：尽管那影像光彩夺目、清晰可辨，却并非完全有效的纪念载体。 ^(7){ }^{7}
Of the two main ways of realizing remembering-through-which is to say, the two primary forms of concrete commemorabilia-let us turn first of all to ritual. In contrast with place and its situating/stabilizing effect, ritual is a dynamic affair whose most determinative matrix is temporal rather than spatial. In comparison with text-which has its own, typically typographic stability, encouraging comparatively passive roles of listening and specta-torship-ritual is action-oriented and may even lack any specific form of notation. Ritual calls for direct participation by commemorators: the vicarious experience of the reader of texts cedes place to the direct involvement of the ritualist, whose commemoration is effected in the first person. The initial alienation of confronting a written text ^(8){ }^{8} gives way to an experience less dependent on a fixed medium such as print (or paint, stone, film images, etc.). Indeed, it gives way precisely to the body, which (as we have seen in its role in place memory) ties us in an intimate and non-alienating way to our immediate ambiance. For rituals are performed by bodily actions-actions that link us to our proximal environs by orienting us in them. This includes orientation with regard to fellow ritualists. While texts appeal to an indefinite and anonymous audience whose members typically do not know or even perceive each other, rituals entail bodily behavior that effects immediate interaction with (and direct perception of) other participants. 在实现记忆的两种主要方式中——即两种具体的纪念形式——让我们首先探讨仪式。与场所及其定位/稳定作用不同，仪式是动态的，其最具决定性的基质是时间性而非空间性。相较于文本（其自身具有典型的印刷稳定性，鼓励相对被动的聆听与旁观角色），仪式以行动为导向，甚至可能缺乏特定的记录形式。仪式要求纪念者直接参与：文本读者那种间接体验让位于仪式实践者的亲身参与，其纪念行为是以第一人称完成的。面对书面文本时最初的疏离感 ^(8){ }^{8} ，逐渐转变为一种较少依赖印刷品（或绘画、石刻、电影影像等）固定媒介的体验。事实上，这种体验最终让位于身体——正如我们在场所记忆中所见——身体以亲密且非异化的方式将我们与当下环境紧密相连。因为仪式正是通过身体动作来完成的，这些动作通过引导我们在周遭环境中的定向，将我们与近身环境联系起来。 这包括与其他仪式参与者之间的方位关系。文本诉诸于一个不确定且匿名的受众群体，其成员通常互不相识甚至无法感知彼此；而仪式则涉及身体行为，能立即与其他参与者产生互动（并直接感知对方）。
But what then is “ritual”? The word itself has expanded enormously in scope since its origin in ritus or “rite.” It now includes such diverse phenomena as handshaking and shaving rituals, customs of many kinds, performative utterances (which, if not rituals themselves, are at least highly ritualistic: “I thee wed”), initiation rites and funeral rites, religious practices of numerous sorts, table manners and menus, Balinese cockfights and Spanish bullfights, etc. ^(9){ }^{9} The list could go on indefinitely in view of the ritualiza- 但究竟什么是"仪式"？自其源于 ritus 或"仪式"一词以来，这个词的范畴已极大扩展。如今它涵盖握手与剃须仪式、各类习俗、述行话语（即便本身不算是仪式，也极具仪式性特征："我与你结为夫妻"）、成人礼与葬礼、多种宗教实践、餐桌礼仪与菜单、巴厘岛斗鸡与西班牙斗牛等等 ^(9){ }^{9} 。鉴于生活中几乎每个领域都存在仪式化现象，这份清单可以无限延续下去。
tion of so much of human existence. The Chinese have long since recognized this fact in giving to all ritualistic behavior which is specifically humanizing the generic appellation “li.” ^(10){ }^{10} Our task, however, is to delimit ritual so as to be able to grasp more perspicuously its commemorative dimensions. With this aim in mind, I shall exclude from consideration: those rituals enacted by individuals in a situation of isolation (e.g., rituals of the toilette, obsessive actions such as continual hand-washing, painters’ rituals of preparations for painting, etc.); all those customs, habits, manners, and practices which are done unreflectively (“as a matter of course”) and which cannot be said to honor an event or a person: e.g., eating rituals having to do with etiquette alone, sartorial practices (often a mere reflection of “fashion”), styles of handwriting, patterns and practices of driving a car, mowing a lawn, etc. ^(11){ }^{11} and cyclical patterns of repetition in history-what Vico called “ricorsi”-whose scope exceeds not only individuals but entire collectivities as well. 人类存在的诸多方面早已被中国人所认识，他们将所有具有人性化特质的仪式行为统称为"礼"。然而，我们的任务是对仪式进行界定，以便更清晰地把握其纪念性维度。基于这一目标，我将排除以下考量：个体在孤立情境中进行的仪式（如梳妆仪式、持续洗手等强迫性行为、画家作画前的准备仪式等）；所有那些未经反思（"理所当然地"）实施且不能说是对事件或人物表示敬意的习俗、习惯、礼仪及实践：例如仅与礼节相关的饮食仪式、着装惯例（往往只是"时尚"的反映）、书写风格、驾驶汽车的模式与实践、修剪草坪等；以及历史中周期性重复的模式——维科所称的"复归循环"——其范围不仅超越个体，更涵盖整个群体。
What then is left which may count as rituals that are at least potentially commemorative in character? To begin with, an entire set of socially determined practices having as their minimal conditions an adequate time for reflection on the part of participants and an allusion, however indirect, to a pre-existing event or person. But such preliminary practices, even if essential, do not tell us much about rituals in their specifically commemorative aspect. Nor does the following definition offered by an anthropologist: “By ‘ritual’ I mean prescribed formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine, [but] having reference to beliefs in mystical beings or powers.” ^(12){ }^{12} “Beliefs in mystical beings or powers” may well be commemorative in nature, but what matters for our purposes is the specific sedimentation of these beliefs in ritualistic actions. Consider the following example: 那么，究竟什么才能算作至少具有潜在纪念性质的仪式呢？首先，整套社会性实践行为至少需满足两个基本条件：参与者有充分时间进行反思，以及（无论多么间接地）影射某个已存在的事件或人物。但这些初步实践即便至关重要，也未能充分揭示仪式特有的纪念性维度。人类学家提出的以下定义同样未能切中要害："所谓'仪式'，我指的是为那些非技术性常规场合规定的正式行为，[但]涉及对神秘存在或力量的信仰。" ^(12){ }^{12} 对"神秘存在或力量的信仰"本身可能具有纪念性质，但关键在于这些信仰如何具体沉淀在仪式行为中。请看以下实例：
It was the custom in Tanagra for the handsomest young man to walk around the city in the Hermes festival with a ram draped over his shoulders. The god himself, as the story goes, once freed the city from a pestilence by making the rounds in this way, and the ritual was established to commemorate this event. ^(13){ }^{13} 塔纳格拉城有个习俗：在赫耳墨斯节期间，最俊美的青年要肩扛公羊绕城游行。传说这位神祇曾以此方式消除城中瘟疫，该仪式正是为纪念此事而设。 ^(13){ }^{13}
Here we certainly have “prescribed formal behavior” (the choice of the most attractive young man; the position of the sacrificial ram around his shoulders) on a non-technological occasion (what could be less technological than a Hermes festival?), along with a “reference to beliefs in mystical beings or powers” (i.e., a belief in Hermes himself and in his healing power). But the beliefs are wholly immanent in the ritualistic behavior, which honors Hermes by its enactment at the appropriate time and place. This enactment, the ceremony proper, does not simply presuppose a belief in Hermes-as-healer; it embodies the belief; and in so doing it affords the opportunity to reflect on Hermes in his healing capacity-a reflecting which, as enacted, is itself commemorative in character. 这显然属于"非技术场合下的规定性仪式行为"（遴选最俊美的青年；将祭羊置于其肩头的姿势）——还有什么比赫耳墨斯节更远离技术呢？同时伴随着"对神秘存在或力量的信仰"（即对赫耳墨斯及其治愈神力的信仰）。但这些信仰完全内化于仪式行为之中，通过在特定时空的展演来尊崇赫耳墨斯。这种仪式展演不仅预设了"赫耳墨斯作为治愈者"的信仰，更以具身化的方式承载着该信仰，从而为人们提供了沉思赫耳墨斯治愈神性的契机——这种沉思本身，通过仪式展演，便具有了纪念性特质。
It is instructive to notice, however, that even when it acknowledges the mythical past of Hermes, such an act of reflection is hardly tantamount to a fully commemorative ritual. Two further fundamental factors are needed: the active role of the body and the collective character of the enterprise. Both of these elements are ingredient in the Hermetic example; the young man is forcefully ambulatory and his ritualistic walk is “around the city” at the time of a communally celebrated festival. As Otto remarks: 然而值得注意的是，即便当这种反思行为承认了赫尔墨斯的神话过往，它也远非等同于完整的纪念仪式。还需要两个更根本的要素：身体的积极参与和仪式的集体属性。这两个要素都体现在赫尔墨斯的例证中——那位年轻人有力地行走着，他的仪式性巡游发生在全城共庆的节日期间，"环绕整座城市"。正如奥托所言：
The vision which the people of Tanagra saw was far from an hallucination. It was a mythic encounter which demanded that man give it concrete form by using his own body in ceremonial action. And with this the community came into contact with the sphere of the Divine. ^(14){ }^{14} 塔纳格拉民众所见的异象绝非幻觉。这是一次神话般的际遇，要求人们通过仪式化的身体行动将其具象化。正是藉此，整个社群得以与神性领域建立联系。 ^(14){ }^{14}
Ritual, as it contributes to commemoration, thus involves at least four formal features: an act of reflection or an occasion for such an act (“a mythic encounter” is precisely such an occasion since it gives rise to reflection); an allusion to the commemorated event or person (including a god or a mythical power) that precedes or sanctions the ritual itself (e.g., Hermes as a shepherd god who carried a ram on his shoulders); bodily action (here the perambulation of the handsome young man); and collective participation in the ritualistic action (e.g., in the form of perceiving and appreciating the significance of the young man’s movements, which served as a focus for the coordinated actions of his fellow citizens). ^(15){ }^{15} 仪式在促进纪念方面至少涉及四个形式特征：一种反思行为或促成这种行为的场合（"神话邂逅"正是这样的场合，因为它引发反思）；对仪式本身所纪念或认可的事件或人物（包括神或神话力量）的暗示（例如赫尔墨斯作为牧羊神肩扛公羊的形象）；身体动作（此处指英俊青年的巡游）；以及集体参与仪式行为（例如以感知和欣赏青年动作意义的形式，这些动作成为市民协调行动的核心）。 ^(15){ }^{15}
Beyond these four factors, we must consider three structurally specific features of commemorative ritual: solemnization, memorialization, and perdurance. 除了这四个因素外，我们还需考虑纪念仪式的三个结构性特征：神圣化、纪念化和持久性。
Solemnization 神圣化
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, commemorating is “a calling to remembrance, or preserving in memory, by some solemn observance, public celebration, etc.; ‘solemnization of the memory of anything’.” ^(16){ }^{16} “Solemnization” itself is defined as “the action of celebrating in a ceremonial manner.” The first meaning of “solemnize” is “to dignify or honor by ceremonies; to celebrate or commemorate by special observances or with special formality,” ^(17){ }^{17} while the last meaning is literally “to make solemn; to render serious or grave.” We may take a cue from these various definitions and say that commemorating solemnizes by at once taking the past seriously and celebrating it in appropriate ceremonies. Let us explore each of these subtraits separately: 根据《牛津英语词典》的释义，纪念是"通过某种庄严仪式、公开庆典等方式唤起记忆或保存记忆；'对任何事物的记忆进行庄严仪式'"。 ^(16){ }^{16} "庄严仪式"本身被定义为"以仪式化方式进行庆祝的行为"。而"solemnize"的首要含义是"通过仪式赋予尊严或荣誉；以特殊仪式或特定形式进行庆祝或纪念" ^(17){ }^{17} ，其最终含义则直指"使之庄严；使之严肃或凝重"。我们可以从这些多元定义中获得启示：纪念活动正是通过同时严肃对待过往并以恰当仪式进行庆祝来实现庄严化。让我们分别探讨这两个子特征：
TAKING THE PAST SERIOUSLY 严肃对待过往
One can recollect, quite fully and successfully, in a spirit of insouciance or levity regarding that which one remembers. In certain situations one can even recollect more completely in such a spirit-that is, when one is just “going over” events in one’s mind without allowing oneself to become 人们可以带着对所忆之事的漫不经心或轻率态度进行回忆，这种回忆甚至可能相当完整且成功。在某些情境下，以这种心态反而能更完整地回忆——即当人们仅仅在脑海中"重温"事件而不让自己陷入...
involved, emotionally or otherwise, in this re-view. Also, a given part of the past may rise up before one’s mind, unbidden and in a strictly spontaneous presentation. Contrast either of these situations with the circumstance of commemorating. In the latter, it is just because the past has been considered to be worthy-of-commemoration that we take it seriously. This taking seriously consists not in doting on the past or becoming morbidly preoccupied by it, but in acknowledging its importance to oneself or others. It is a matter of letting the past matter-of giving it its due weight, its full impact and import. Often this is accomplished by the way in which one rehearses past events to oneself, e.g., by carefully going over remembered content as when I ask myself, “Which summer did I go to Lindsborg with my grandmother?” Whenever I ask, “Did it really happen like that?” I am taking the past seriously, probing it, submitting it to scrutiny. But I need not actively examine it to let it matter: I can just let its content unfold before me and be its willing witness. In so doing, I do not have to be solemn in an affective sense; though I cannot be indifferent or dismissive, I can take the past seriously without having to assume a dour attitude: solemnization and humorless solemnity are by no means constantly conjoined. 无论是情感上还是其他方面，都参与了这种重新审视。此外，过去的某个片段可能会不请自来地浮现在脑海中，以一种完全自发的方式呈现。将这两种情况与纪念行为进行对比：在后者中，正是因为我们认为过去值得纪念，才会认真对待它。这种认真对待并非沉溺于过去或病态地执着，而是承认它对自身或他人的重要性。关键在于让过去产生分量——赋予它应有的重量、完整的影响力和意义。这通常通过人们向自己复述往事的方式实现，例如当我仔细梳理记忆内容时自问："我是哪年夏天和祖母去的林德斯堡？"每当我追问"事情真是那样发生的吗？"，就是在严肃对待过去，探究它，接受审视。但要让过去产生意义，我不必主动检视它：只需让记忆内容在眼前自然展开，成为心甘情愿的见证者。 如此一来，我在情感上不必显得庄严肃穆；虽然我不能表现得漠不关心或轻蔑不屑，但我可以认真对待过去而不必摆出一副阴郁的姿态：庄重化与刻板的严肃绝非总是相伴而生。
CELEBRATING IN APPROPRIATE CEREMONIES 在适宜的仪式中颂扬
Just as solemnizing is something more and other than acting in a dour way, so it is also more and other than rehearsing or reliving the past in one’s own mind. Here commemoration moves us decisively beyond mind. In solemnizing, something distinctly extra-mental is involved: ceremonial observance. Such observance truly accomplishes solemnization, realizes it in its complete form, enacts it. It does so by bringing together these four factors: 正如庄重化不仅仅是阴郁行事，它也不同于在脑海中复述或重温往事。此时纪念活动将我们坚决地带离了内心世界。庄重化过程中涉及某种明显超脱心智的存在：仪式性操演。这种操演真正实现了庄重化，使其以完整形态呈现，并将其付诸实践。它通过统合以下四个要素达成：
Repetitiveness in observance: 仪式操演的重复性：
There is no such thing as a ceremonial observance enacted once only; it must already have been enacted on previous occasions or allow for the possibility of future enactments, even if the form is not precisely the same throughout. Moreover, its own internal structure often includes repetitive elements: repetition-within-repetition. ^(18){ }^{18} 不存在仅举行一次的仪式活动；它必须已在先前场合举行过，或允许未来再次举行的可能性，即便形式并非完全相同。此外，其内在结构往往包含重复元素：重复之中的重复。 ^(18){ }^{18}
Re-enactment of some former circumstance: 对过往情境的重现：
This is itself a form of repetition but now in the specific sense of reactualization, that is, realizing again an anterior event or experience. Eliade’s interpretation of myth emphasizes this aspect of ceremony. Mythos and ceremonial action alike are re-enactments of primordial (often cosmogonic) events posited at, or before, the beginning of human history: “Every religious festival, any liturgical time, represents the reactualization of a sacred event that took place in a mythical past, ‘in the beginning’.” ^(19){ }^{19} Thus a particular ceremony undertaken in concrete, worldly time (e.g., a dance), is “a repetition, and consequently a reactualization, of illud tempus, ‘those days’.” ^(20){ }^{20} We shall return to Eliade’s general interpretation below. For now, we need 这本身就是一种重复形式，但此刻特指重新现实化，即再次实现先前的事件或体验。伊利亚德对神话的阐释强调了仪式的这一面向。神话与仪式行为同样都是对人类历史开端之时（或之前）的原初（通常是宇宙生成）事件的重现："每个宗教节日、任何礼仪时间，都代表着对发生在神话时代'太初之时'的神圣事件的重新现实化。" ^(19){ }^{19} 因此，在具体世俗时间中进行的特定仪式（如舞蹈），就是"对'彼时'的重复，因而也是对其的重新现实化。" ^(20){ }^{20} 我们将在下文回到伊利亚德的整体阐释。目前我们需要
only stress that the re-enactment is of something significantly removed in time (and often in space) from the scene of present observance. This very distance is crucial to commemoration, which aims at keeping a particular past event alive through ceremonial observance precisely because the increasing remoteness of this event from the here and now threatens its oblivion. 仅需强调，这种重演针对的是在时间上（通常也在空间上）与当前仪式场景显著隔绝的事物。这种距离感对于纪念活动至关重要——正是通过仪式化的操演来维系特定历史事件的鲜活记忆，因为该事件与当下时空的日益疏离正威胁着其被遗忘的命运。
Social sanction of the ceremony: 仪式获得的社会认可：
Unless there is sanction of some kind by others, ritualistic action lacks a legitimation which it needs. It needs it because a private ceremonial, if possible at all, has a peculiarly deficient character vis-à-vis a more thoroughly social ritual which it reflects in truncated form. Thus, an obsessive ceremonial of continually washing one’s hands is (in Freud’s interpretation) only a condensed epitome of a much vaster religious ritual of collective atonement. ^(21){ }^{21} In fact “[ceremonial] performances . . . are phases in broad social processes, the span and complexity of which are roughly proportionate to the size and degree of differentiation of the groups in which they occur.” ^(22){ }^{22} The “social processes” in question are not merely conditions of ceremonial observance but serve to sanction it-to legitimate what might otherwise seem to be a meaningless set of elaborate actions. The sanctioning is done by a subtle mixture of inculcated tradition (“this is the way it’s always been done”) and contemporary pressure (“this is how you must do it now”), with the result that the ceremonialist does not have to offer any further justification to herself or to others. 除非得到某种形式的他人认可，仪式性行为就缺乏其所需的正当性。这种认可之所以必要，是因为即便私人仪式可能存在，相较于它所截取反映的更彻底的社会性仪式而言，其本质上具有一种特殊的缺陷性。因此，（根据弗洛伊德的解释）强迫性地不断洗手这一仪式，不过是对更宏大的集体赎罪宗教仪式的浓缩缩影。 ^(21){ }^{21} 事实上，"仪式表演……是广泛社会进程中的阶段，其跨度与复杂程度大致与实施群体规模及分化程度成正比。" ^(22){ }^{22} 这些"社会进程"不仅是仪式遵守的条件，更通过潜移默化的传统灌输（"历来如此行事"）与当下压力（"此刻必须如此行事"）的精妙混合，对仪式进行认可与合法化——使得那些否则可能显得毫无意义的繁复动作获得正当性，仪式执行者因而无需向自己或他人提供任何额外辩解。
Formality: 形式性：
This is a final feature of ceremonies. It can occur in terms of words, bodily gestures, or interactions with others-often all three. Also contributing to formality is repetition itself, which aids in making a formal structure into a coherent and well-articulated whole. ^(23){ }^{23} If social sanction provides a reason for a given ceremony, formality furnishes its rhyme. Formality is often aesthetic in its appeal to (and its hold on) the participants in a ceremony or the spectators of it, the felt perfection of the form contributing forcefully to the total experience. At the same time, formality serves to express and specify emotion while channeling any tendency to excess. ^(24){ }^{24} The formality of ritual solemnizes the expression of emotion on the occasion. 这是仪式的最后一个特征。它可以通过言语、肢体动作或与他人的互动来体现——通常三者兼具。重复性本身也促成了形式的庄重，有助于将正式结构塑造成一个连贯而清晰的整体。 ^(23){ }^{23} 如果说社会认可为特定仪式提供了理由，那么形式的庄重则赋予其韵律。形式往往具有美学吸引力（并牢牢抓住）仪式的参与者或旁观者，形式所呈现的完美感受极大地增强了整体体验。与此同时，形式的庄重既能表达和细化情感，又能疏导任何过度倾向。 ^(24){ }^{24} 仪式的形式感使情感表达在特定场合显得庄严肃穆。
Taken together, the foregoing four features effect the ceremonialization inherent in commemoration qua solemnization: commemorating solemnizes by communalizing in a ceremony. Such communalizing is crucial, since taking the past seriously (the other root of solemnification) is unable by itself to achieve solemnization in any strict sense. In fact, nothing effected by oneself alone is adequate to the task of commemoration. As the “com-” of “commemorate” indicates, and as is also evident in the archaic synonym “commemorize,” commemorating is an essentially interpersonal action. It is undertaken not only in relation to others and for them but also with them in a common action of communalizing-as I witnessed on Memorial Day. 综上所述，前述四个特征共同构成了纪念活动内在的仪式化本质：通过仪式化的集体参与，纪念行为实现了庄严化。这种集体参与至关重要，因为仅凭严肃对待历史（庄严化的另一根源）本身无法真正实现严格意义上的庄严化。事实上，任何仅由个体完成的行为都不足以承担纪念的使命。正如"纪念（commemorate）"一词中"com-"前缀所示，其古语同义词"commemorize"同样表明，纪念本质上是一种人际互动行为。这种行为不仅关乎他人、为他人而进行，更需要与他人共同参与集体仪式——正如我在阵亡将士纪念日亲眼见证的那样。
This situation is to be compared with that of reminiscing, which can take place in private and yet still be quite complete. In chapter 6 we saw that co-reminiscing, while paradigmatic in many ways, is not indispensable to all reminiscing. Moreover, while putting the past into words is basic to reminiscence, this verbalization does not require an explicitly interpersonal context: reminiscential discourse can occur as a “dialogue of the soul with itself.” In commemorative ceremonializing, in contrast, the presence of others is explicit and (normally) experienced as such: especially in ceremonial behavior, wherein oneself and others are interinvolved in the same commemorative drama. Commemoration comes to completeness in the co-action and compresence of ceremony. 这种情况应与回忆的情形相比较——回忆虽可独自进行，却仍能保持相当的完整性。第六章中我们已看到，共同回忆虽在许多方面具有典范性，但并非所有回忆都必需如此。此外，尽管用语言表述过去是回忆的基本形式，但这种言语化并不需要明确的人际语境：回忆性话语可以表现为"灵魂与自身的对话"。而纪念仪式则截然不同，他人的在场是明确且（通常）能被真切感知的：尤其在仪式行为中，自我与他人共同参与同一场纪念戏剧。纪念活动正是在仪式的共同行动与共时在场中达致完满。
Memorialization 纪念化
Ceremonies are not only undertaken and enacted; they are celebrated. In this context “celebration” connotes not only an affirmation of there being, or one’s having, such a past as is being commemorated, but above all an honoring of this past, a paying homage to it. Honoring itself consists in at least two closely co-ordinated actions: 仪式不仅被履行和展演，更被隆重举行。此处的"庆祝"不仅意味着对存在或被纪念之过去的确认，更重要的是表达对这段历史的尊崇与致敬。致敬行为本身至少包含两个紧密协调的动作：
PAYING FITTING TRIBUTE 致以恰如其分的礼赞
This is honoring in an appropriate way, not only with the right words, gestures, or other symbolic expressions, but more importantly in the proper proportion, that is, without either exaggeration (as in a grotesquely oversized monument) or diminution (e.g., in an implicitly demeaning eulogy). The fittingness has several parameters: language certainly (“sensitive words”), but also place (i.e., a suitable location), circumstance (the right occasion), and time (the right “timing” of the memorial’s institution or expression). 这是以恰当的方式表达敬意，不仅通过恰当的言辞、手势或其他象征性表达，更重要的是把握适度——既不过度夸张（如建造怪诞的巨大纪念碑），也不刻意贬低（例如在隐含轻蔑的悼词中）。这种恰如其分包含多个维度：语言固然重要（"措辞得体"），但还包括地点（即合适的场所）、情境（恰当的时机）以及时间（纪念活动或表达时机的"适时性"）。
PAYING TRIBUTE IN A LASTING WAY 持久致敬的方式
Honoring can be done in quite indirect and even casual forms-as when the mere mention of someone’s name in a conversation amounts to honoring: “he’s certainly a diligent worker all right”; “that was a brilliant article of hers,” etc. But honoring in a full-bodied way requires more than passing praise. It seeks to preserve and stabilize the memory of the honoree, and to do so in a time-binding, invariant manner. The explicit aim is to maintain this memory in the face of the corrosive action that laid Ozymandias low: “Nothing beside remains, round the decay/Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare/The lone and level sands stretch far away.” ^(25){ }^{25} 表达敬意可以采取相当间接甚至随意的方式——比如在谈话中仅仅提及某人的名字就相当于一种致敬："他确实是个勤奋的员工"；"她那篇文章写得真精彩"等等。但完整的致敬仪式需要的不仅仅是随口的赞美。它旨在以跨越时间、恒久不变的方式保存并稳固被纪念者的记忆。其明确目标就是要对抗那些将奥西曼提斯摧毁的侵蚀力量："残骸四周空荡荡，唯见荒凉废墟旁/无边无际的平沙向远方延伸。"
In view of such a concern with lastingness, it is not at all surprising to discover that many memorials are constructed of stone, the most durable natural substance available in large quantities. The very hardness and hardiness of granite or marble concretize the wish to continue honoring into the quite indefinite future-and thus, by warding off the ravages of time, to 鉴于这种对持久性的关注，我们毫不意外地发现许多纪念碑都是由石头建造的——这种能大量获取的最耐久的天然材料。花岗岩或大理石的坚硬特质，恰恰具象化了人们希望将纪念延续至遥远未来的愿望——通过抵御时间的侵蚀，
make commemoration possible at any (at least foreseeable) time. At the same time, a memorial in stone-a tombstone, a memorial plaque, a sculpted figure, etc.-is a public presence and hence accessible to many potential viewers. The distension in time is matched by a comparable extendedness in space. 使纪念活动在任何（至少可预见的）时间成为可能。与此同时，石质纪念碑——墓碑、纪念牌匾、雕塑人像等——作为公共存在，可供众多潜在观者瞻仰。时间维度上的延展性与空间维度上的扩展性相互呼应。
Such permanency need not, of course, be sought in stone alone. It can even be pursued by the use of materials which in themselves are quite perishable and subject to decay. A memorial volume, for example, will last no longer than the paper on which it is printed. Yet what this kind of memorial lacks in temporal obduracy, and even in the actual volume of space it occupies, ^(26){ }^{26} is compensated for by its considerable accessibility to the many who can own individual copies of it. One must travel to the site of the stone memorial to be in its material presence; but a mere photograph of the same memorial, or its description in words, will convey its represented presence to those who cannot visit the original site. It is as if the expanded propagating power of the image or word counterbalanced the more imposing presence of the monument itself. 当然，这种持久性不必仅通过石材来实现。即便使用本身极易腐朽衰败的材料，也能达成纪念目的。例如一本纪念册的存续时间，不会超过印制它的纸张寿命。但这类纪念物在时间坚韧性上的不足，甚至其实际占据的空间体量 ^(26){ }^{26} ，都能通过其可被大量复制的特性得以弥补——许多人可以拥有各自的副本。人们必须亲临石质纪念碑所在处才能感受其物质存在；而仅仅一张纪念碑照片，或一段文字描述，就能将象征性的存在传递给无法亲临原址的人们。仿佛图像与文字的传播力扩展，恰好平衡了纪念碑本身更具压迫性的实体存在。
Memorialization through ritualized activity shares with stolid monuments an attachment to place, being enacted in an appropriate (or at least acceptable) arena of action. But it is like a memorial volume in allowing many to participate in its commemorative function-not as isolated spectators but as conjoined participants acting together. Moreover, this “together” is strictly spatio-temporal; a given ritual brings together its enactors during one time as well as at one place, a time and place of shared assembly. Memorializing is accomplished-the past is concretely honored-by taking action together. Rather than paying tribute in one’s mind by recollection, or in conversation by reminiscence, one creates a common object. This object, however, has neither the mute visibility of the monument nor the articulate fixity of a text-only the sun, remarks Wordsworth, reads the epitaphs on gravestones. At once perceptual in status and accessible in principle, the ritual is a strictly composite object; it is the conjoint creation of its participants. 通过仪式化活动进行的纪念与坚固的纪念碑一样，都与场所紧密相连，在恰当（或至少可接受）的行动场域中展开。但它又如同纪念文集，允许多人参与其追思功能——不是作为孤立的旁观者，而是作为共同行动的联合参与者。此外，这种"共同"具有严格的时空性；特定仪式将执行者聚集于同一时间与同一地点，即共享集会的时空场域。纪念通过共同行动得以实现——过去由此获得具象化的尊崇。不同于在脑海中通过回忆致敬，或在交谈中通过追忆致敬，人们创造了一个共同客体。然而这个客体既不具备纪念碑的沉默可见性，也不具备文本的清晰确定性——华兹华斯曾说，唯有阳光会阅读墓碑上的铭文。仪式作为一种严格意义上的复合客体，既具有感知层面的即时性，又在原则上具有可参与性；它是参与者们共同的创造物。
This occurs strikingly in the case of a funeral, often revealingly labeled a “memorial service.” Here textual and paratextual elements-printed programs (formerly termed “funeral broadsides”), eulogies, somber music-are encompassed within the movement of the ritual itself. Essential to this latter is the fact that those who are in attendance form a momentary community of co-mourners; they are com-memorators bound together by the common aim of honoring the deceased. However silent and unspontaneous their actions may be-to the point of seeming stultification, as if to mimic the sealed silence of death itself-these actions represent a memorialization undertaken in concert and in a dynamic mixture of space and time. Hence the power of a funeral service to deeply move those who are present. At the same time, it acts to ensure the continuing memory of the deceased in the 葬礼场合中这一现象尤为显著——这类仪式常被直白地称为"追思会"。印刷程序单（旧称"丧葬传单"）、悼词、哀乐等文本与副文本元素，都被统摄于仪式本身的动态进程中。其核心在于参与者会暂时形成哀悼共同体，这些共同追忆者因缅怀逝者的统一目标而凝聚。即便他们的行为可能沉默刻板到近乎僵化，仿佛在模仿死亡本身的缄默，这些行为仍代表着时空动态交织下的协同纪念。正因如此，葬礼才能如此深刻地触动在场者。与此同时，它更致力于确保逝者记忆在
minds and lives of the mourners. No less than in the case of a monument or a text, memorialization via ritual strives to effect lastingness. 悼念者的思想与生命中延续。与纪念碑或文本无异，仪式性纪念同样追求永恒的存续。
Perdurance 持存性
“Perdurance” is the concrete form assumed by the lastingness aimed at in memorialization. Perduring itself is a neglected temporal mode that has received scant attention in Western thought. The reason for this neglect doubtless lies in the fact that reflection on time has focused on the extremities of “time” and “eternity.” Eternity connotes an intelligible, wholly fulfilled order of being, while time, in contrast, signifies something degenerate, fleeting, and opaque to intelligence. Indeed, time may come to be regarded as the mere “image” of eternity, its “moving likeness (eikon)” in Plato’s phrase. ^(27){ }^{27} Beginning with such a dichotomy as this, one inevitably expends a great deal of effort trying to reconcile, or at least to relate, such disparate modes. ^(28){ }^{28} "持存"是纪念行为所追求的持久性的具体形式。持存本身是一种被忽视的时间模式，在西方思想中鲜少受到关注。这种忽视无疑源于对时间的思考总是聚焦于"时间"与"永恒"这两个极端。永恒意味着一种可理解的、完全实现的存在的秩序，而时间则相反，象征着某种堕落的、转瞬即逝的、对理智而言晦暗不明的东西。事实上，时间可能仅仅被视为永恒的"影像"，用柏拉图的话说就是其"流动的摹本（eikon）"。 ^(27){ }^{27} 从这种二元对立出发，人们不可避免地要耗费大量精力试图调和——或至少关联——这两种截然不同的模式。 ^(28){ }^{28}
Perdurance represents a via media between eternity and time. If it is something less than what the ancient Greeks (thinking of the regular epicycles of the heavenly bodies) called the “everlasting” or the Medievals (thinking of angels) the “sempiternal,” it is also something more than duration as defined by Locke: “the distance between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds.” ^(29){ }^{29} This latter view commits us to a mentalism that is the mere mirror-opposite of Greek cosmologism. Nor does mere continuance in time-such as we find in Dilthey’s idea of “the connectedness of life [in human history]”-do justice to the notion either. For sheer temporal continuity is representable only as a line connecting two datable now-points: "duration is but as it were the length of one straight line, extended in infinitum. ^(30){ }^{30} 持久性代表着永恒与时间之间的中间道路。如果说它不及古希腊人（考虑到天体的规则周转）所称的"永恒"或中世纪（考虑到天使）所称的"永世"，那么它也超越了洛克定义的绵延："我们心中任何两个观念出现之间的距离"。 ^(29){ }^{29} 后一种观点使我们陷入了一种纯粹与希腊宇宙论相对立的心智主义。单纯的时序延续——如狄尔泰提出的"（人类历史中）生命联结性"概念——同样无法充分体现这一理念。因为纯粹的时间连续性只能表现为连接两个可确定"此刻"点的直线："绵延不过是一条无限延伸的直线长度"。 ^(30){ }^{30}
In Being and Time Heidegger attempted to re-interpret duration by reference to Dasein’s actively “stretching itself along” in history. ^(31){ }^{31} Later, he introduced the factor of “lasting,” which I take to be essential to perdurance: 在《存在与时间》中，海德格尔试图通过此在在历史中主动"自我延展"来重新诠释绵延。 ^(31){ }^{31} 后来他引入了"持存"要素，我认为这正是持久性的核心所在：
To presence (Wesen) means to last (Währen). But we are too quickly content to conceive lasting as mere duration, and to conceive duration in terms of the customary representation of time as a span of time from one now to a subsequent now. To talk of presencing (An-wesen), however, requires that we perceive biding and abiding in lasting as lasting in present being (Anwähren). What is present concerns us, the present, that is: what, lasting, comes toward us, us human beings. ^(32){ }^{32} 在场（Wesen）意味着持续（Währen）。但我们往往太快满足于将持续仅仅理解为延续，并将延续按照惯常的时间表象来构想——即从一个此刻到下一个此刻的时间跨度。然而，谈论在场（An-wesen）要求我们在持续中感知驻留与持存，将其理解为当下存在（Anwähren）中的持续。当下之物关涉着我们这些在场者，也就是说：那持续着向我们人类迎面而来的存在。 ^(32){ }^{32}
What lasts has permanence: ^(33){ }^{33} at least insofar as it “comes toward us.” A cultural tradition is a case in point: it lasts, has an ongoing “effective-history,” precisely insofar as it comes toward us and engages us (and we it) in that activity of mutual encounter called “interpretation.” Perdurance is enduringthrough such an encounter, and it is the most characteristic temporal form of a ritual transmitting a tradition. 持续者具有恒久性： ^(33){ }^{33} 至少就它"向我们迎面而来"而言是如此。文化传统便是一个恰当的例子：它持续着，拥有绵延的"效果历史"，正因它向我们迎面而来，并在被称为"诠释"的相互遭遇活动中与我们（以及我们与它）彼此交融。持存就是在这种遭遇中穿越时间而延续，这正是传承仪轨最具特征的时间形态。
Other perduring matters include natural languages and currency systems, various habits and tendencies, world-historical or metaphysical “epochs” as well as strictly local customs and mores. What all such concrete cases of perdurance share is a combination of sameness or permanence over time with a capacity to modify or evolve. ^(34){ }^{34} Between the fixity, the sheer ever-the-sameness of eternity, and the ceaseless flux of transient temporality (wherein all is ever-the-other), there is the perduring, providing sameness and difference, motion and rest, at the same time and not just in succession. 其他持久存在的事物还包括自然语言和货币体系、各种习惯与倾向、世界历史或形而上学的"时代"，以及严格意义上的地方习俗与道德规范。所有这些持久性的具体实例共同之处在于，它们既具有随时间推移的同一性或恒久性，又具备改变或演化的能力。 ^(34){ }^{34} 在永恒纯粹的固定不变（其中一切始终如一）与短暂时间性的无尽流变（其中一切永远相异）之间，存在着持久之物，它同时提供同一性与差异性、运动与静止，而非仅仅依次呈现。
It is hardly surprising to discover that ritual-itself such a decisive tertium quid in human affairs ^(35){ }^{35}-exhibits perdurance as its own main temporal mode. This is evident, for example, in Confucius’s summation of the ancient Odes as teaching us the lesson of “not swerving from the right path.” ^(36){ }^{36} Where Lucretius makes swerving or clinamen the very principle of creativity in the otherwise unproductive universe of atoms moving in straight lines, ^(37){ }^{37} swerving from the straight lines of lil i-from the human universe of ritual-is unproductive inasmuch as it undermines the perduringness of ceremonies enacted and re-enacted over generations. Not swerving from a tradition is what allows it to last-not just to come down to the present but, as Heidegger suggests, to come toward it actively. 不难发现，仪式——这个人类事务中如此决定性的第三方——展现出持久性作为其自身主要的时间模式。这一点在孔子对《诗经》的总结中尤为明显，他教导我们"不偏离正道"的训诫。当卢克莱修将偏离或原子偏斜视为直线运动的原子构成的贫瘠宇宙中创造力的根本原则时，从直线路径的偏离——从人类仪式宇宙的偏离——却是无益的，因为它削弱了代代相传的仪式行为的持久性。不偏离传统正是使其得以延续的关键——不仅是传承至今，正如海德格尔所言，更是主动地迎向当下。
Nevertheless, just as perduring does not require simple continuance of the self-identical (which would amount to the stasis of eternity-or to death), so the non-swerving of a tradition-based ritual is compatible with modification and innovation within its formal structures. ^(38){ }^{38} Here, as elsewhere, it is a matter of what Confucius calls “the spirit of the rites.” ^(39){ }^{39} For what matters in the performance of rites is the manner in which they are conducted. ^(40){ }^{40} Conduct makes manifest the spirit of ritualized activity which, without this spirit, falls into the emptiness of bare repetition. It also helps to make ritual genuinely perduring, and therewith more readily rememberable and more lastingly memorable. 然而，正如持存并不要求自我同一性的简单延续（那将沦为永恒的静止或死亡），基于传统的仪式不偏离其本质，也与其形式结构内的调整创新并行不悖。 ^(38){ }^{38} 在此处与其他场合一样，关键在于孔子所称的"礼之本"。 ^(39){ }^{39} 因为仪式实践的核心在于其执行方式。 ^(40){ }^{40} 行为彰显了仪式活动的精神内核——若缺乏这种精神，仪式就会沦为空洞的机械重复。正是这种精神使仪式真正持存，从而更易被铭记，也更长久地留驻记忆。
Perdurance, thus construed, can be considered the main means by which the temporality of memoralization is achieved. What in the individual is divisive and diasporadic (thanks to the effects of succession in time) becomes, in and through the perdurance realized by ritual, consolidating (in oneself) and conterminous (with others). In fact, the commemorating that is accomplished by a memorializing ritual is an especially efficacious remedy against time’s dispersive power. 如此理解的持存，可视为实现记忆时间性的主要途径。个体因时间接续效应而产生的分裂与流散状态，通过仪式实现的持存，转化为（内在的）自我整合与（人际的）边界共融。事实上，纪念性仪式所完成的缅怀行为，正是对抗时间消散力的特效良方。
Furthermore, it is through perdurance that the past, present, and future dimensions of commemorative ritual are at once affirmed and made compatible with each other. In the lastingness achieved by such ritual the past to which tribute is being paid is allowed to perdure-to last as coming toward us-through the present of the commemorative act and onward into the future as well. Or more exactly: 此外，正是通过持久性，纪念仪式的过去、现在和未来维度得以同时被确认并彼此协调。在这种仪式所达成的恒久性中，被致敬的过去被允许持续存在——作为向我们走来的延续——穿过纪念行为的当下，并继续延伸至未来。更准确地说：
(1) The past figures as the primary temporal locus of the commemorandum. Whatever its precise position in world-time, and whether it is dated as such, the pastness is indispensable: we do not memorialize in the present what is happening at present. A time-lapse of some significant sort is needed if we are truly to pay tribute by memorialization. Moreover, part of what we honor by memorializing the past is the sheer fact of the survival of its memory in the present. The memorial action seeks to enshrine and to perpetuate this same survival. （1）过去作为被纪念事项的主要时间场域而存在。无论其在世界时间中的确切位置如何，也不论其是否被明确标注日期，过去性是不可或缺的：我们不会在当下纪念此刻正在发生的事。若要真正通过纪念活动致敬，某种具有意义的时间间隔是必需的。此外，我们通过纪念过去所致敬的部分内容，正是其记忆在当下得以存续这一纯粹事实。纪念行动旨在供奉并使这种存续本身永续长存。
(2) The present forms part of memorialization in two ways. First, it is always and only in the present that we pay homage to the past; there is no other time for the ritualistic enactment of memorializing. Second, the ritual is itself devised to command our attention and bodily activity. Not unlike the grimly admonishing skulls on early New England gravestones-which are literal memento mori ^(41){ }^{41}-commemorative rituals draw in their participants by salient features dramatically displayed in the present: an open casket, a ram carried on a young man’s shoulder, a moving melody. (2)当下以两种方式构成纪念活动的一部分。首先，我们致敬过去的行为永远且只能发生在当下；纪念仪式的展演不存在其他时间场域。其次，仪式本身的设计就是为了调动我们的注意力与身体参与。正如早期新英格兰墓碑上那些森然警示的骷髅——它们堪称具象化的"死亡警示"——纪念仪式通过当下戏剧性呈现的显著特征吸引参与者：敞开的灵柩、青年肩头扛着的公羊、一段动人的旋律。
(3) The future is also implicated in a dual capacity. On the one hand, it is emblematic of the very survival which the ritual seeks to encourage in the present: by its sheer recurrence it points to a future that may well postdate the demise of present participants. On the other hand, a genuinely commemorative ritual is exhortatory in nature; it calls to us from a certain indefinite future as if to say: “I will be constant in my own permanency; will you, in ritualistic recognition of this, be constant in your commemoration of what I honor?” It also calls to others, yet unborn, who will hopefully draw inspiration from the same ritual as it comes to be re-enacted. (3) 未来同样以双重方式参与其中。一方面，它象征着仪式试图在当下促成的延续：通过其纯粹的重复性，它指向一个可能远超当前参与者生命长度的未来。另一方面，真正的纪念仪式本质上具有劝勉性；它从某个不确定的未来向我们呼唤，仿佛在说："我将恒久保持我的永恒；而你们，能否通过仪式性的认可，恒久地纪念我所尊崇的事物？"它也向尚未出生的后来者发出召唤，期待他们能从这不断重演的仪式中获得启迪。
That all three temporal modi of perdurance are operative in memorialization is evident in the text inscribed on a Civil War monument located on the same Green that figured in my opening example in this chapter: 持久存在的这三种时间模态都在纪念行为中发挥作用，这一点在本章开篇提到的绿地上一座内战纪念碑的铭文中清晰可见：
IN MEMORY OF 纪念THE MEN OF GUILFORD WHO FELL 吉尔福德阵亡将士AND IN HONOR OF THOSE WHO SERVED 谨以此纪念那些为联邦战争服役的人们IN THE WAR OF THE UNION 在联邦战争中THE GRATEFUL TOWN ERECTS THIS MONUMENT 心怀感激的城镇立此纪念碑THAT THEIR EXAMPLE MAY SPEAK TO COMING GENERATIONS 愿他们的榜样垂范后世
Here the tenses or aspects say it all: “fell/served” (past); “erects” (present); “may speak to” (subjunctive in allusion to the future). But they say it in a text, not a ritual. What kind of difference does this make? What is the role of texts in commemorative actions? 时态或体貌道尽一切："坠落/服务"（过去时）；"竖立"（现在时）；"可能诉说"（虚拟语气暗指未来）。但它们是在文本中诉说，而非仪式中。这造成了何种差异？文本在纪念行为中扮演什么角色？
IV 第四章
That full commemoration occurs by ritual alone might seem to follow from Eliade’s view that the point of commemorative ceremonies is to achieve “reactualization” of an act of cosmic creation. ^(42){ }^{42} In this view, such ceremonies aim at “collective regeneration through repetition of the cosmogonic act.” 43 Insofar as the cosmogonic act itself is not textual, its repetition in ritual would not have to be textual either: the wordless Ur-act of creation would seem to call for an after-act, a re-enactment, that is equally wordless. Yet Eliade himself avers that any ritualistic reactualization of “the atemporal instant of primordial plenitude” is always a “symbolic return.” ^(44){ }^{44} A symbolic return must include the possibility of a return through language and not through bodily action alone. Indeed, one of Eliade’s own leading examples of a repetition of a cosmogonic event in The Myth of the Eternal Return involves words centrally. Io, a supreme god among the early Polynesians, creates the world by saying “Ye waters of Tai-Kama, be separate. Heavens, be formed!” ^(45){ }^{45} As a consequence: 仅凭仪式就能实现完整的纪念，这一观点似乎源自伊利亚德的看法，即纪念仪式的目的是实现对宇宙创造行为的"再现实化"。 ^(42){ }^{42} 按照这一观点，此类仪式旨在"通过重复宇宙起源行为来实现集体再生"。43 既然宇宙起源行为本身并非文本性的，那么其在仪式中的重复也不必是文本性的：无言的原始创造行为似乎要求一个同样无言的后继行为，即重演。然而伊利亚德本人断言，任何对"原始丰盈的无时间性瞬间"的仪式性再现实化，始终是一种"象征性回归"。 ^(44){ }^{44} 象征性回归必须包含通过语言而不仅是通过身体行动回归的可能性。事实上，在《永恒回归的神话》中，伊利亚德自己列举的一个关于宇宙起源事件重复的主要例子就核心地涉及语言。早期波利尼西亚人崇拜的最高神祇伊欧通过说出"泰卡玛之水啊，分开吧。诸天啊，成形吧！"创造了世界。 ^(45){ }^{45} 因此：
The words by which Io caused light to shine in the darkness are used in the rituals for cheering a gloomy and despondent heart, the feeble aged, the decrepit; for shedding light into secret places and matters. . . . For all such the ritual includes the words (used by Io) to overcome and dispell darkness. ^(46){ }^{46} 伊奥用以驱散黑暗、照亮幽冥的咒语，被用于提振消沉意志的仪式，慰藉衰迈老者与羸弱之躯；亦能照彻隐秘之境与未明之事......凡此种种仪轨，皆包含（伊奥所传）破除黑暗的密语。 ^(46){ }^{46}
But we need not have recourse to such an exotic source as this to appreciate the role of texts in acts of commemoration. In one form or another, a text figures even in the most quotidian cases of commemoration. My Memorial Day experience included speeches, invocations, and a benediction. Funeral services, make use of eulogies, prayers, and sometimes printed programs-not to mention reminiscences shared among the mourners. One of the most complete commemorative events still extant is the celebration of the Eucharist, which provides a subtle and elaborate blending of written and spoken liturgy (“Take this in remembrance of me”) with bodily action (e.g., the ingestion of wine and bread). Even the granite Civil War Memorial on the Guilford Green is far from mute: its inscribed stony surface still speaks to us today. Indeed, everywhere we look we find ritualistic acts-and stolid monuments-intimately conjoined with words. 但我们无需借助如此奇特的来源，也能理解文本在纪念活动中的作用。无论形式如何，即便在最日常的纪念场合中，文本也占据着重要位置。我的阵亡将士纪念日经历包含了演讲、祷词和祝福语。葬礼仪式中会运用悼词、祈祷文，有时还有印刷程序单——更不用说哀悼者之间分享的追忆。现存最完整的纪念活动之一便是圣餐礼的庆祝，它将书面与口述的 liturgy（"你们应当如此行，为的是记念我"）与身体动作（如啜饮葡萄酒和食用面包）进行了精妙而复杂的融合。即便是吉尔福德绿地那座花岗岩制成的内战纪念碑也绝非沉默：它镌刻着文字的坚硬表面至今仍在向我们诉说。事实上，放眼四周，我们会发现仪式性行为——以及那些沉默的纪念碑——都与文字紧密相连。
The presence of a textual element in so much commemorative activity does not mean that it is unproblematic in status. Is it simply subordinate to ritual, as occurs when words serve only to introduce or conclude a commemorative ceremony? Does it displace or replace the ritualistic factor-as seems to happen when a commemorative ceremony becomes largely or entirely formulaic, e.g., the singing of “The Star-Spangled Banner” in rote fashion at the beginning of sporting events? Does it complement ritual, matching word with action-as occurs so saliently in the finely balanced 纪念活动中大量存在的文字元素并不意味着其地位毫无争议。它是仅仅从属于仪式——就像那些仅用于开启或结束纪念仪式的致辞？还是取代了仪式性要素——正如当纪念仪式变得高度或完全程式化时所呈现的那样（例如体育赛事开头机械式地唱响《星条旗》）？抑或是与仪式形成互补，让言语与行动相得益彰——正如那些精心设计的......
performance of the Eucharist? Does it supplement ritual, either in the straightforward sense of adding on something that is otherwise missing (e.g., the precise naming of otherwise anonymous soldiers fallen in war) or in Derrida’s more radical sense of being the very condition for that which it is supplementing? ^(47){ }^{47} In differing degrees and on different occasions, all of these alternatives obtain. This is true even of the last, most extreme alternative. One way of construing a funeral service, for instance, is to view it as the radical supplementation of death itself by words proffered in honor (and in place) of the deceased. Commemorative language not merely replaces the loss effected by death; it is a substitute for death that allows death to come forward as death-as when a moving eulogy brings home to mourners the full impact of the loss they must now sustain. Much the same situation obtains in the chanting of mantras in Tantrism: “mantra” has the same root as “memory” and is itself a commemorative act. Not only does the chanting of a given mantra take over from bodily action-an action reduced to a nonmoving position of meditation-but in its scope and significance this chanting conditions bodily action of any kind, including that which is explicitly ritualistic. 圣体礼的仪式表现？它是否是对仪式的补充，无论是直白地添加原本缺失的内容（例如为战争中阵亡的无名士兵精确命名），还是如德里达所激进指出的——成为被补充之物得以存在的根本条件？在不同程度和不同场合下，所有这些可能性都存在。即便对于最后那个最极端的选项也是如此。举例而言，我们可以将葬礼仪式理解为：通过献给逝者的悼词（并替代逝者），对死亡本身进行根本性的补充。纪念性语言不仅弥补了死亡造成的缺失；它更是死亡的替代品，使死亡得以作为"死亡"显现——就像感人的悼词让哀悼者真切体会到他们必须承受的损失之沉重。密教诵咒的情形也极为相似："咒语"（mantra）与"记忆"（memory）同源，其本身就是一种纪念行为。 特定咒语的诵念不仅取代了身体动作——这种动作被简化为静坐冥想的姿态——而且就其范围和意义而言，这种诵念制约着任何形式的身体行为，包括那些明确具有仪式性质的动作。
Extreme as such cases might seem-and apart from any vindication of Derrida’s grammatological theses-they point to a central issue in any consideration of commemoration. This is the indispensability of language or “text” in the broadest sense. ^(48){ }^{48} It is striking that the very first definition of commemoration in the Oxford English Dictionary is “the action of calling to the remembrance of a hearer or reader.” This implies that there is no commemoration without calling, which occurs in and through language. 尽管这些案例可能显得极端——且不论对德里达文字学论点的任何辩护——它们都指向纪念活动思考中的一个核心问题：语言或广义上的"文本"具有不可或缺性。值得注意的是，《牛津英语词典》对"纪念"的第一条定义便是"唤起听者或读者回忆的行为"。这意味着没有语言的召唤就不存在纪念，这种召唤正是通过语言并在语言中发生的。
Recall the leading features of ritual as I discussed it in the last section. How could there be such a thing as “an allusion to the commemorated event or person” without the mediation of language? How would “collective participation” arise if not by means of a language shared by all participants and a text that prescribed their conjoint actions (e.g., The Book of Common Prayer, which sets forth the appropriate actions of commemorators in the Eucharist)? Indeed, how could there be solemnization without a solemnizing formula or text that not merely sets the tone of a celebrative ceremony but furnishes both point and purpose to such a ceremony? Can we adequately memorialize without a text of some sort? What would it mean to “pay tribute” without the tribute itself being stateable in language? Is not even perdurance most effectively achieved in and by a text? 回想我在上一节讨论的仪式主要特征。若没有语言的媒介，怎可能存在"对被纪念事件或人物的暗示"？若不是通过所有参与者共享的语言和规定其联合行动的文本（例如规定圣餐礼中纪念者相应行为的《公祷书》），"集体参与"又如何产生？事实上，若没有庄严化的公式或文本——不仅为庆典仪式设定基调，更为此类仪式提供意义与目的——庄严化又如何实现？没有某种文本，我们能否充分进行纪念？若"致敬"本身无法用语言表述，其意义何在？难道持久性不正是通过文本才得以最有效地实现吗？
What I am suggesting is that the remembering-through that lies at the basis of commemorating is always a remembering through a text. The text itself may be merely implied or tacit on a given occasion, for example, when the melody of “The Star-Spangled Banner” is played. But at whatever remove the text exists and in whatever guise it is found, when we do commemorate we do so through a verbal medium. Language is intrinsic to 我所要阐明的是，作为纪念活动基础的"通过记忆"始终是一种"通过文本来记忆"的过程。文本本身在特定场合可能只是隐含或默示的，例如当《星条旗永不落》的旋律奏响时。但无论文本以何种形式存在、以何种面貌呈现，当我们进行纪念时，总是通过语言媒介实现的。语言内在于
the otherness that is part and parcel of all commemorating; it is uneliminable from its mediational nature. It is also at one with its irredeemably social aspect: the “com-” of com-memoration is inseparable from what I called the “communal-discursive” factor in my discussion of reminiscing. In being inescapably communal, commemoration is at the same time discursive: that is to say, a matter of language, dependent upon language, taking place through language. 构成所有纪念活动本质的"他者性"之中；这种中介性特质无法被剥离。它也与纪念活动不可救药的社会性维度浑然一体："共同-"这个前缀与我在讨论回忆现象时提出的"社群-话语"要素密不可分。纪念活动因其不可避免的社群属性，同时必然具有话语性：也就是说，它关乎语言、依赖于语言、通过语言得以实现。
It follows that there is no purely ritualistic commemorating if by “ritualistic” is meant occurring by bodily movements alone. Although I considered the ritualistic element of commemoration in isolation from any verbal factor in section III, this was at best a provisional move in which I prescinded from the role of language. “Ritual” henceforth must include text as well as bodily action if it is to be adequate to the complex tasks of commemoration. 由此可见，若将"仪式性"单纯理解为仅通过肢体动作进行，就不存在纯粹的仪式性纪念。尽管我在第三节中将纪念的仪式性要素与任何语言因素割裂开来考察，但这充其量只是一种临时性做法，我刻意忽略了语言的作用。若要使"仪式"足以胜任复杂的纪念任务，从今往后它必须同时包含文本和肢体行动。
A more radical line of questioning opens up here. Could it be that in its communal-discursive aspect commemorating forms part of all remembering? If so, this would imply that there is no remembering of any kind that is not in some sense verbal or verbally-based: if not occurring expressly in language, then arising through its agency. Just as commemoration is a calling to remembrance through language-through ritual-cum-text, ritual as text-so memory is indeed a matter of “re-call.” Might it even be that recollection, seemingly dependent upon images alone, occurs as re-collection through language? Can there be such a thing as a purely renascent image that counts as a memory-or a purely bodily action that counts as a commemorationwithout the intervention of words at some significant stage? 这里开启了一条更为激进的追问路径。是否有可能，在其社群-话语层面，纪念构成了所有记忆行为的一部分？若果真如此，则意味着任何形式的记忆都在某种意义上与语言相关或以语言为基础：即使没有明确以语言形式呈现，也是通过语言的媒介作用产生的。正如纪念是通过语言——通过仪式即文本、仪式作为文本——来唤起记忆那样，记忆本质上确实是一种"重新召唤"。甚至看似仅依赖意象的回忆，是否也通过语言以"重新汇集"的方式发生？是否存在纯粹重生的意象——无需在关键阶段借助语词介入——就能被视为记忆？或者存在纯粹的身体动作——无需言语干预——就能被视为纪念？
Whatever the answers to such questions may be, it is evident that certain kinds of commemorating are more text-bound than others. This is due to the fact that they employ texts more centrally in their enactment and show vividly the effects of these texts in their result. The effects include a greater specificity of reference (i.e., a more exact articulation of the commemorandum), a larger audience of co-commemorators in principle (thanks to the virtually unlimited range of a text’s potential dissemination), and a greater freedom from a given material medium. This last property is especially noteworthy. Whereas the strictly ceremonial aspects of commemoration require bodily movements of a certain sort and could not take place without them, the textual aspects can be conveyed in any of several ways: by printing or speaking out loud, by words on a tape, or even by skywriting. But some particular material vehicle remains requisite in every case; the articulateness of the wording on a given occasion, including its elegance of style, in no way transcends the concreteness of the commemorabilium in which the wording is embodied. While alleviating what might otherwise be an almost complete opacity of a commemorative medium such as unsculpted and uninscribed stone, a text never succeeds in making this medium fully transparent: it remains translucent at best. For instance, the addition of the proper names beneath the gigantic heads of American presidents at Mt. Rushmore might 无论这些问题的答案如何，显而易见的是，某些类型的纪念活动比其他类型更依赖于文本。这是因为它们在实施过程中更核心地运用了文本，并在结果中生动展现了这些文本的效果。这些效果包括：更具体的指涉（即对纪念对象更精确的表述）、原则上更广泛的共同纪念者群体（得益于文本潜在传播范围几乎无限）、以及对特定物质媒介更大的自由度。最后这一特性尤为值得注意。虽然纪念活动中严格的仪式性部分需要特定类型的身体动作且缺之不可，但文本部分却可以通过多种方式传递：印刷或大声朗读、磁带上的文字，甚至空中文字。但无论如何，某种具体的物质载体始终是必需的；特定场合下措辞的清晰表达，包括其风格的优雅，绝不会超越承载这些措辞的具体纪念物本身。 尽管文本能够缓解未经雕琢和铭刻的石头这类纪念媒介近乎完全的不透明性，但它永远无法使这种媒介变得完全透明：充其量只能达到半透明状态。例如，在拉什莫尔山美国总统巨型头像下方添加姓名或许
make the commemoration effected by these megaliths less likely to be misidentified by unknowledgeable spectators. But it would not overcome the obdurate density of the sculpted images themselves, which commemorate efficaciously in the eloquent silence of their stony stares. ^(49){ }^{49} 能让这些巨石产生的纪念意义更不易被无知的观者误认。但它无法克服雕塑图像本身顽固的密度——这些石质凝视以雄辩的沉默，高效地实现着纪念功能。 ^(49){ }^{49}
At the opposite extreme from such petroglyphic muteness are cases of commemoration that can be considered entirely textual. In addition to the mantras alluded to above, there are whole texts that are commemorative in character. These include autobiographies, biographies, and historical memoirs. Poetry can also be quite fully commemorative, whether directly (e.g., Stevens’s “To an Old Philosopher in Rome”) or indirectly (e.g., Eliot’s “The Wasteland”). One of the most striking examples of sheerly textual commemoration is found in the Analects, which at first does not appear to be commemorative at all. Supposedly by Confucius, this text was in fact written by his disciples in an act of collective commemoration. Practically all of its passages, even those that are not engaged in directly quoting “the Master,” can be said to be commemorative of Confucius. Of Confucius in what respect? Not of him as a historical personage but as someone possessing an unrivaled practical wisdom. His sagacity is the true subject of the commemoration, and it is specified as a commemorandum by citing appropriate aphorisms: 与这种岩画般的缄默截然相反的，是完全可被视为纯文本形式的纪念行为。除了前文提及的咒语外，还存在整体上具有纪念性质的文本。这类文本包括自传、传记和历史回忆录。诗歌同样能实现充分的纪念功能，无论是直接的（如史蒂文斯的《致罗马一位老哲学家》）还是间接的（如艾略特的《荒原》）。《论语》堪称纯文本纪念最显著的范例之一——这部乍看毫无纪念色彩的著作，据传出自孔子之手，实则是弟子们集体纪念的产物。几乎书中所有段落，即便那些并非直接引述"夫子"的内容，都可视为对孔子的纪念。纪念孔子的何种特质？并非其作为历史人物的身份，而是其无与伦比的实践智慧。圣贤的睿智才是纪念的真正主题，而通过征引恰切的箴言，这种智慧被具体化为纪念对象：
The Master said, “In his errors a man is true to type. Observe the errors and you will know the man.” ^(50){ }^{50} 孔子说："观过，斯知仁矣。" ^(50){ }^{50}
As in the case of Socrates, the commemorative vehicle is constituted by the Master’s originally spoken words, words which in their condensed written transcription embody the very wisdom they recommend. 如同苏格拉底的情形一样，纪念载体是由夫子最初口述的言语构成的，这些被凝练记录的文字本身就体现着它们所传递的智慧。
A second kind of commemorandum is also present in the Analects. This is an entire tradition-that is, something massively collective. For Confucius conceived himself not as an original thinker but as a “transmitter” of the tradition begun in the Chou dynasty and disintegrating in his own time. In particular, he wished to preserve the insights contained in the “Six Classics,” which stemmed from that earlier period. He is thus cited citing from these revered books: 《论语》中还存在着第二种纪念对象——即整个传统，某种具有集体性规模的事物。孔子从不以原创思想家自居，而是自称为周朝开创、在其时代逐渐式微之传统的"传承者"。他尤其希望保存源自更早时期的"六经"中所蕴含的洞见。因此我们能看到他引用这些经典著作的记载：
The Master said, “The Odes are three hundred in number. They can be summed up in one phrase, Swerving not from the right path.” ^(51){ }^{51} 子曰："《诗》三百，一言以蔽之，曰'思无邪'。" ^(51){ }^{51}
As Fung Yu-lan says in this connection: “Confucius was ‘a transmitter and not a creator, a believer in and lover of antiquity’ (Analects VII, 1). What he transmitted was the Chou civilization.” ^(52){ }^{52} Where Socrates set out to dispute existing traditions, Confucius sought to honor the Chou tradition, offering exemplary actions and sayings as vehicles through which it could be remembered. These actions and sayings are therefore commemorabilia in their own 正如冯友兰所言："孔子是'述而不作，信而好古'（《论语·述而》）。他所传承的是周代文明。" ^(52){ }^{52} 当苏格拉底致力于质疑既有传统时，孔子则力图尊崇周制，通过提供可供效法的言行作为载体，使传统得以铭记。这些言行本身便是具有纪念意义的典范。
right, since they commemorate the Chou tradition even as they convey it. This outcome is not incompatible with the fact that most readers of the Analects take the text to be only secondarily a celebration of Chou wisdom or the Six Classics. Primarily the book is taken as setting forth the wisdom of Confucius himself. In being commemorated by Confucius, the Chou tradition is less represented in the text than embodied there, becoming so fully immanent in the cited words of the Master as virtually to dissolve as a separate entity. This tradition is thereby commemorated in a curiously indirect or submerged way: through the very words through which, in turn, we as readers commemorate Confucius. Commemoration is redoubled by means of this adroit textual remembering-through. ^(53){ }^{53} 确实如此，因为它们既传递了周代传统，又对其进行了纪念。这一结果与大多数《论语》读者的理解并不矛盾——他们主要将文本视为孔子本人智慧的阐述，其次才看作对周代智慧或六经的颂扬。通过孔子的纪念行为，周代传统在文本中与其说是被呈现，不如说是被具象化，它如此彻底地内化于圣贤的引述之言中，几乎消解为一个独立的实体。这种传统由此以一种奇特而间接的、近乎隐匿的方式被纪念：正是通过这些言语，我们作为读者又反过来纪念着孔子。凭借这种巧妙的文本性"通过-记忆"，纪念行为实现了双重叠加。 ^(53){ }^{53}
Most cases of commemoration lie somewhere between the taciturnity of Mt. Rushmore and the articulateness of the Analects. They are frankly hybrid in status. Sometimes they mix images with text: e.g., in painted icons bearing an attached text and in quilts that depict an object while also describing it in words. More often, however, the hybridization is composed of ritualistic bodily actions combined with texts: as in funeral services, the celebration of the Eucharist, and Memorial Day parades. In fact, almost every public ceremony that is commemorative in character brings together the impelling corporeal movements of the participants with the equally urgent authority of a text. This becomes evident when we think of the observance of a public holiday, which carries with it a factor of proclamation and a feature of festivity. The 4th of July is routinely celebrated with official pronouncements on the one hand (e.g., a “special message” by the president) and with picnics and fireworks on the other. Each signifies “Independence Day”; or more exactly, the two together embody the Day: in the one case, by an apposite text, in the other, by ritualistic forms of action. In this composite way, American independence from Britain is remembered through two commemorabilia that are at once concretely instantiated and conjointly realized. (By “conjointly realized” I mean both the co-ordinate action of text-cum-ritual and the thoroughly public character of the occasion.) On this occasion and many others like it, the sociality of the observance is rendered all the more effective by occurring in two registers, ritualistic and textual-registers that together act to extend the scope (and hopefully to improve the quality) of the commemoration thereby effected. ^(54){ }^{54} 大多数纪念活动介于拉什莫尔山的沉默寡言与《论语》的雄辩滔滔之间，其本质实为一种混合体。有时它们将图像与文字交融：例如绘有题字的圣像画，或是既描绘图案又用文字叙述的绗缝作品。但更常见的是仪式化身体动作与文本的结合：如葬礼仪式、圣体庆典和阵亡将士纪念日游行。事实上，几乎所有具有纪念性质的公共仪式，都将参与者强烈的身体律动与文本不容置疑的权威性融为一体。当我们思考公共节日的庆典时，这点尤为明显——它既包含宣告要素，又具有欢庆特征。七月四日通常以两种方式庆祝：一方面是官方宣言（如总统的"特别致辞"），另一方面是野餐和烟花表演。二者共同诠释着"独立日"的内涵：前者通过恰切的文本，后者借助仪式化的行为形式。 通过这两种纪念物的结合，美国脱离英国独立的记忆被同时具体化和共同实现。（“共同实现”我指的是文本与仪式的协同行动，以及这一场合彻底的公共性。）在这一场合及许多类似场合中，纪念活动的社会性因其以仪式性和文本性两种形式呈现而更为有效——这两种形式共同作用，扩展了纪念活动的范围（并有望提升其质量）。
V
We have been encountering the deeply communal and communalizing character of commemoration at every turn: most overtly on public holidays but just as importantly at private funerals, in the celebration of the Eucharist, and in the words of Confucius. Whenever commemorating occurs, a community arises. Not only is something communal being honored, but the 我们处处都能感受到纪念活动深刻的公共性与凝聚性：最明显的体现在公共假日，但同样重要的还有私人葬礼、圣体庆典以及孔子的话语中。每当纪念活动发生时，一个共同体便随之形成。不仅是在共同缅怀某件事物，
honoring itself is a communal event, a collective engagement. What are the roots of this common enterprise? On what is it based? 纪念本身是一种集体活动，一种共同的参与。这一共同事业的根源是什么？它建立在什么基础上？
A clue is furnished in Van Gennep’s idea that there are three phases in every significant rite of transition: separation, margin, and aggregation. ^(55){ }^{55} Each of these phases is found in the Eucharist. “Separation” involves purification, which we observe in the placement of the “Confession of Sin” before the act of communion: the worshipper needs to be properly penitent before receiving the sacraments. From the separation which such penitence implies one can move to a “marginal” state-as in that state of readiness for communion which is expressed concretely by the communicants’ movement together to the edge or threshold of the altar, where one spatial margin (that of the domain of the celebrants) becomes contiguous with another (that of the communicants). “Aggregation” follows as the formation of an ongoing community of worshippers who will continue to practice the Eucharist when together (or even, remembering each other, when apart). 范热内普提供了一个线索，他认为每个重要的过渡仪式都包含三个阶段：分离、边缘和聚合。 ^(55){ }^{55} 这些阶段在圣餐礼中都能找到对应。"分离"涉及净化，这体现在将"认罪祷告"置于领圣体之前：信徒在领受圣礼前需进行适当的忏悔。从这种忏悔所暗示的分离状态，人们可以进入"边缘"状态——就像领圣体前的预备状态，具体表现为领圣者共同走向祭坛边缘或门槛，在那里一个空间边界（主礼者的领域）与另一个边界（领圣者的领域）相连。随后是"聚合"，即形成一个持续的信徒团体，他们将在相聚时继续实践圣餐礼（甚至分离时通过彼此纪念来维系）。
Looking at the eucharistic ceremony in this three-stage manner has the effect, however, of keeping the phase of marginality apart from community: as if the latter were to be achieved only after the attainment of the former. In fact, there is reason to believe that the two are much more closely conjoined than this peremptory application of Van Gennep’s phase analysis suggests. If we consider more closely the constituent features of the marginal period as this occurs in rituals of many kinds, we begin to suspect that, far from being precommunitarian, it possesses its own form of community. The anthropologist Victor Turner supports this line of thought by his research into the relationship between the marginal phase or “liminality” and community. As something "essentially unstructured (which is at once destructured and prestructured), "56 liminality in Turner’s view resists facile unifications by virtue of its paradoxical combination of the no-longer and the not-yet, the living and the dead. People who are in liminal states such as those undergone by initiates 然而，以这种三阶段方式审视圣餐仪式，会导致边缘阶段与共同体相分离的效果：仿佛后者只有在前者达成后才能实现。事实上，有理由相信二者的联系远比范热内普这种武断的阶段分析法所暗示的更为紧密。如果我们更细致地考察多种仪式中边缘期的构成特征，就会开始怀疑：它绝非前共同体状态，而是拥有自身独特的共同体形式。人类学家维克多·特纳通过研究边缘阶段（或称"阈限性"）与共同体的关系支持了这一观点。特纳认为，阈限性作为"本质上非结构化的存在（同时具备解构与前结构双重特性）"，凭借其矛盾性地融合"已不复存在"与"尚未成形"、"生者"与"死者"的特质，抵制着任何简单的统一。处于阈限状态的人们——比如经历入会仪式的受礼者——
are at once no longer classified and not yet classified. In so far as they are no longer classified, the symbols that represent them are, in many societies, drawn from the biology of death, decomposition, catabolism. . . . The other aspect, that they are not yet classified, is often expressed in symbols modeled on processes of gestation and parturition. . . . The essential feature of these symbolizations is that the neophytes are neither living nor dead from one aspect, and both living and dead from another. Their condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the customary categories. ^(57){ }^{57} 它们既不再被归类，也尚未被归类。就其不再被归类而言，在许多社会中，代表它们的符号取自死亡、分解、分解代谢的生物学……另一方面，它们尚未被归类的状态，则常以妊娠和分娩过程为模型的符号来表达……这些象征化的本质特征在于：从某个角度看，新入会者既非生者亦非死者；从另一角度看，他们既是生者又是死者。他们的状态充满模棱两可与矛盾悖论，是对所有惯常分类的混淆颠覆。 ^(57){ }^{57}
Further contributing to the ambiguity and paradox is a characteristic role reversal. The chieftain-to-be in the Ndembu tribe is reviled and humiliated during the liminal period before he assumes office: “Be silent! You are a mean and selfish fool, one who is bad-tempered! You do not love your 进一步加剧这种模棱两可与矛盾悖论的是典型的角色逆转现象。恩登布部落的准酋长在就职前的阈限期内会遭受辱骂与羞辱："闭嘴！你是个卑鄙自私的蠢货，脾气暴躁！你根本不爱你的"
fellows, you are only angry with them! Meanness and theft are all you have!” ^(58){ }^{58} In the pre-installation ceremony, the chief-elect wears only a wornout waist-cloth and must sit with one of his wives in a posture of shame and servility. Given this circumstance, it is evident that liminal persons “have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing indicating rank or role, position in a kinship system.” ^(59){ }^{59} They are in a limbo of non-being and non-distinction; they are dispossessed and disoriented. ^(60){ }^{60} "伙计们，你们只是对他们发怒！卑鄙和偷窃就是你们的全部！" ^(58){ }^{58} 在就职仪式前，当选首领只能裹着破旧的腰布，必须与其中一位妻子以羞耻卑微的姿态就座。由此可见，阈限者"没有地位、财产、徽章、象征等级或角色的世俗服饰，也没有亲属制度中的位置。" ^(59){ }^{59} 他们处于非存在与非区分的混沌状态；既被剥夺一切，又迷失方向。 ^(60){ }^{60}
What makes otherwise painful and senseless liminal experiences sustainable are two closely related functions which they serve: commemoration and the creation of community. The commemoration is effected via the tradition that prescribes the forms of liminality itself. The submissiveness that is exacted of the initiate is finally submissiveness to this tradition conceived as a “total community.” ^(61){ }^{61} In following the injunctions of the ceremony, the initiate is in effect commemorating all those who, anonymous as they may be, have been responsible for giving to these injunctions their present shape and sequence. The purified state of the neophyte-which is analogous to the confessed mind of the communicant-is maximally receptive of tradition and ready to commemorate it. ^(62){ }^{62} Sometimes, indeed, the commemoration is explicit-as occurs in the same Ndembu ceremony cited above. When the chastened chief-to-be emerges from his confined state, a subchief offers the following prayer: 使原本痛苦且无意义的阈限体验得以持续的原因，在于它们承担的两项密切相关的功能：纪念与社群构建。纪念通过规定阈限形态本身的传统来实现。新人所表现出的顺从，归根结底是对这种被视为"整体社群"的传统的顺从。 ^(61){ }^{61} 遵循仪式戒律的过程中，新人实际上是在纪念所有那些——无论他们多么默默无闻——为这些戒律赋予现有形态与顺序的人。新人的纯净状态（类似于忏悔后领圣餐者的心灵）最能接纳传统，并准备好传承它。 ^(62){ }^{62} 有时这种纪念会直接显现——如前文引用的恩登布仪式所示。当经受磨练的未来酋长脱离禁闭状态时，一位副酋长会献上如下祷词：
Listen, all you people. Kanongesha [the new chieftain] has come to be born into the chieftainship today. This white clay [mpemba], with which the chief, the ancestral shrines, and the officiants will be annointed, is for you, all the Kanongesha of old gathered together here. [Then the ancient chiefs are mentioned by name.] And, therefore, all you who have died, look upon your friend who has succeeded [to the chiefly stool], that he may be strong. He must continue to pray well to you. . . . The chieftainship has appeared. ^(63){ }^{63} 诸位子民且听分明。卡农格沙[新任酋长]今日已承袭大位。这白色圣土[姆彭巴]将涂抹于酋长、祖祠及祭司之身，乃为尔等——所有汇聚于此的历代卡农格沙而备。[随即逐一诵念历代酋长名讳]故尔等已故先灵，当庇佑继任者[承袭酋长之位]使其强健。彼必将继续虔诚向尔等祈愿......酋长之位已现世。 ^(63){ }^{63}
Here the theme of rebirth from the commemorated person(s) is as expressly stated as in the Eucharist, wherein the communicants are spiritually reborn through their incorporation into Christ. Still more generally, we can say that both ceremonies illustrate the principle that commemoration, in honoring the past, revivifies the present, giving it a new birth-whether of a political or of a spiritual nature. 此间关于逝者重生的主题，正如圣餐仪式中信徒通过融入基督获得灵性重生般直白。更广泛而言，我们可说这两种仪式都彰显了如下真谛：纪念在尊崇过往的同时，亦使当下重获新生——无论是政治意义上的更迭，还是精神层面的涅槃。
But such renascence of the individual participant in commemorative rituals can only occur in the presence of others who form with him or her a special form of community. One of the primary meanings of the Ndembu liminal ceremony of enforced abstemiousness is the setting aside of “private and privative wishes” ^(64){ }^{64} so as to join together with others in the formation of what Turner calls “communitas.” In the case of the Ndembu ceremony, such communitas is implicit in these words spoken by “Kafwana” to the expectant chieftain: 然而，参与纪念仪式的个体若要获得这种新生，唯有在与其他参与者共同形成的特殊社群中才能实现。恩登布人强制节欲的阈限仪式核心意义之一，正是要摒弃"私欲与褊狭的愿望" ^(64){ }^{64} ，以便与他人共同构建特纳所称的"共睦态"。在恩登布仪式中，这种共睦态隐含在"卡夫瓦纳"对候任酋长的训诫中：
We have granted you chieftainship. You must eat with your fellow men, you must live well with them. . . . Do not be selfish, do not keep the chieftainship to yourself: You must laugh with the people. . . . You must not be ungenerous to people! ^(65){ }^{65} 我们授予你酋长之位。你必须与族人共食，与族人和谐共处......勿存私心，勿独享权柄：你当与民众同乐......切莫对族人吝啬！ ^(65){ }^{65}
It is striking that the most concrete activity here recommended is to “eat with your fellow man”-which is just what happens in the ingestion of eucharistic sacraments. In such shared activity of incorporation, the injunction to “live well with [others]” is most concretely realized. Moreover, the common partaking of food and drink acts to suspend rigid distinctions of rank and status that obtain in society at large. In a communitas, where unity is less important than fellowship, all who come are welcome. This is the situation in the eucharistic ceremony, to which all are welcome whatever differences of class or education obtain otherwise. As much as the Ndembu ceremony so tellingly described by Turner, the rite of the Eucharist offers a blend of “lowliness and sacredness, of homogenity and comradeship.” ^(66){ }^{66} 引人注目的是，这里推荐的最具体活动是"与同伴共食"——这正是圣餐圣事中领受仪式的核心。在这种共同参与的融合行为中，"与他人好好生活"的诫命得到了最切实的体现。此外，共享饮食的行为能暂时消解社会普遍存在的严格等级与地位区分。在强调情谊胜过统一的共融团体中，所有到来者都受到欢迎。这正是圣餐仪式所呈现的场景——无论阶级或教育背景存在何种差异，所有人都被接纳。正如特纳生动描述的恩登布仪式，圣体圣事同样完美融合了"谦卑与神圣、平等与情谊"的特质。 ^(66){ }^{66}
It is the liminality of both ceremonies that fosters communitas. In a marginal or threshold state, which brings with it the suspension of constraints and differentiations that hold people apart in civil society, there can occur the kind of commingling-laughing with others, sharing food with them, welcoming them-that overcomes separation while not yet becoming organized into determinate aggregations. It is evident that rituals of the sort we have been considering are enacted in sacred spaces and effect perduring times. Thanks to the notion of liminality, we can also understand how such rituals in their intermediary being (the “liminal period,” says Turner, is “betwixt and between”) ^(67){ }^{67} make possible confluences of sacred and profane, and of past, present, and future. In so doing, they favor, and often themselves realize, commemoration. 正是这两种仪式的阈限性促成了共融。在边缘或阈限状态下，那些在文明社会中将人们分隔开的约束与差异被暂时搁置，此时便可能发生一种交融——与他人欢笑、共享食物、热情相迎——这种交融消弭了分离，却尚未形成确定的聚合体。显然，我们所探讨的这类仪式在神圣空间中展演，并创造出持久的时间。借助阈限概念，我们还能理解这些仪式如何在其间性存在（特纳称之为"既非此也非彼"的"阈限期"）中，促成神圣与世俗、过去现在与未来的交汇。正因如此，它们促进并常常直接实现了纪念行为。
The remembering-through which represents the core action of commemorating finds one of its most fortuitous occasions in ritualistic enactments containing a marked liminal phase. For in that phase the various com-memorabilia-whether these be words and sacraments as in the Eucharist or words alone as in the Ndembu chieftain’s initiation ceremony-most effectively conjoin the disparate spatial and temporal factors of which commemorating is composed. By the same token the liminality of these occasions helps to create the kind of community that is essential to the collective character of commemorating. The communitas thereby realized is comparatively free from those established social and political distinctions that prevent commemorating from being an activity in which all who wish to honor a given past person or event can freely participate. Just such distinctions are held in abeyance when people commemorate together. This is most manifest on festive public holidays. But the distinctions in question are at least muted at other commemorative moments, especially in rituals of the kind that have been analyzed in the pages of this section. The liminality of these rituals- 作为纪念核心行为的"追忆"，在那些包含显著阈限阶段的仪式性活动中找到了最幸运的展现契机。因为在那个阶段，各种纪念元素——无论是圣餐礼中的圣言与圣礼，还是恩登布酋长就职仪式中单纯的祝词——都能最有效地统合构成纪念活动的异质时空要素。同样，这些场合的阈限性有助于形成对纪念活动集体特质至关重要的共同体意识。由此实现的"共融"相对摆脱了既定社会政治区隔的束缚，使纪念活动成为所有希望致敬特定历史人物或事件者皆可自由参与的实践。当人们共同纪念时，这些区隔确实会被暂时悬置。这在公共节庆假日表现得最为明显。但即便在其他纪念时刻，尤其是本节所分析的各类仪式中，相关区隔至少也会被弱化。这些仪式特有的阈限性——
expressed in manifold ways-encourages communitas, itself the most propitious setting for commemoration in its collective dimension. 以多种方式表达的——促进了共同体意识，这本身就是集体维度纪念活动最有利的环境。
VI 六
Can there be commemoration without communitas? Is action on the part of a closely co-ordinated community required for commemorating? Need this action always be fully concrete in a material-visible mode, and must it represent the express concerns and interests of the participants? Could we eliminate both bodily rituals and written or spoken texts and still speak of genuine commemorating? In short, can we commemorate without recourse either to an active community of co-present commemorators or to concrete commemorabilia? In fact we can-and we do so much more frequently than we consciously realize. How does this occur? 是否存在无需共同体的纪念？纪念行为是否需要高度协调的群体参与？这种行为是否必须始终以物质-可见模式完全具体化，且必须体现参与者的明确关切与利益？我们能否既摒弃身体仪式又取消文字或口头文本，仍能称之为真正的纪念？简言之，我们能否既不依赖共同在场的纪念者群体，也不借助具体纪念物来进行纪念？事实上我们可以——而且这种情形远比我们意识到的更为频繁。这是如何实现的？
It occurs by means of a process that I shall term “intrapsychic memorialization.” The primary operative factor within such memorialization is identification understood in Freud’s sense of the term. The process of identification suggested itself to Freud as he pondered the nature of the totem meal in his highly speculative essay Totem and Taboo. The totem meal-which may well be the progenitor of the eucharistic meal ^(68){ }^{68} represented in his view the ritualistic re-enactment of an ancient parricide. As such, it is “a repetition and a commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed.” ^(69){ }^{69} But something more than symbolic repetition is involved in the totem meal-something more than the sacrifice of a “surrogate victim” that stands in for the sacrifice of the primal father. ^(70){ }^{70} This extra factor is identification. Speaking of the parricidal group of brothers, Freud reflected that in institutionalizing the totem meal, they “satisfied their hatred and . . . put into effect their wish to identify themselves with [the father].” ^(71){ }^{71} 这一过程通过我称之为"心理内部纪念化"的机制实现。此类纪念化的核心运作因素是弗洛伊德意义上的认同机制。当弗洛伊德在其极具推测性的论文《图腾与禁忌》中思考图腾餐的本质时，认同过程的概念便自然浮现。图腾餐——很可能就是圣餐礼的原型 ^(68){ }^{68} ——在他看来是对远古弑父行为的仪式性重演。因此，这是"对那个值得纪念的犯罪行为的重复与纪念" ^(69){ }^{69} 。但图腾餐所包含的远不止象征性重复——它超越了作为原始父亲替代品的"替罪羊"献祭 ^(70){ }^{70} 。这个额外因素就是认同。论及实施弑父的兄弟群体时，弗洛伊德指出：通过将图腾餐制度化，他们"既满足了仇恨......又实现了与[父亲]认同的愿望" ^(71){ }^{71} 。
The identification in question has three main distinguishing marks. First, it is an entirely psychical process. Even if concretely enacted by a totem meal, it is not itself a material matter since it involves identifying part of one’s psyche with the character or person of another. Second, the identification itself occurs by way of a psychical incorporation that is analogous to the ingestion of a meal but decisively different in its history and consequences. Third, the identification typically occurs between oneself and one other person: the critical “cohort” has two members only. Despite being psychical in status and limited to a dyadic format, such identification with another is more tenacious in its effects than is the totem meal. Whereas the sacrificial meal must be continually re-enacted, psychical identification, once established, needs no further repetition; unlike the meal, it commemorates without repeating. 这种认同具有三个主要特征。首先，它完全属于心理过程。即便通过图腾餐具体实施，其本质也非物质性的，因为它涉及将自我心理的某部分与他者的特质或人格相融合。其次，这种认同通过心理内化实现——虽与进食行为类似，但在形成机制和后续影响上存在根本差异。第三，此类认同通常发生于自我与单一他者之间：关键"组合"仅包含两个成员。尽管属于心理范畴且限于二元结构，这种对他者的认同在效果上比图腾餐更为持久。献祭仪式需要不断重复举行，而心理认同一旦建立就无需反复；不同于仪式餐宴，它能实现纪念功能却不必循环再现。
Freud found reinforcement for the idea of psychical identification in the phenomenon of mourning. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” he reflected on 弗洛伊德在哀悼现象中为心理认同理论找到了佐证。在《哀悼与忧郁》中，他深入探讨了
how slow and drawn out is the “work of severance” from a mourned-for object. Since detachment from such an object is not done willfully, it has to be effected little by little. But the very process of giving up memories of a loved one only acts to intensify these same memories: will I not cling desperately to them if they are the main means of access to the person I have lost? How can I give them up so that the experience of mourning will not become indefinitely prolonged? Identification provides the answer: it “makes it easier for the object to be given up.” 72 Thanks to the incorporative action of identification, I interiorize the other, set him or her up within me as an abiding presence. More than narcissistic assimilation of self and other is involved in such deep-going identification. As I take the other in, I am essentially altered, aggrandized. I gain increased psychic structure by means of greater internal differentiation. As Hans Loewald has put it: 从哀悼对象中“分离的工作”是多么缓慢而漫长。由于对这种对象的脱离并非有意为之，它必须一点一点地实现。但放弃对所爱之人记忆的过程本身只会强化这些记忆：如果它们是我与逝者联系的主要方式，我难道不会拼命抓住它们不放吗？我该如何放弃它们，以免哀悼的体验无限延长？认同提供了答案：它“使放弃对象变得更容易”。72 由于认同的吸纳作用，我将对方内化，使其在我内心成为一种持久的存在。这种深刻的认同不仅仅涉及自我与他人的自恋式同化。当我接纳对方时，我本质上被改变、被扩展。通过更大的内在分化，我获得了更强的心理结构。正如汉斯·洛伊沃尔德所说：
Identification is a way-station to internalization, but in internalization, if carried to completion, a redifferentiation has taken place by which both subject and object have been reconstituted, each on a new level of organization. ^(73){ }^{73} 认同是内化的中转站，但在彻底完成的内化过程中，会发生一种再分化现象——主体与客体都将在新的组织层面上被重构。
How then is identification a matter of commemoration? It cannot just be that, as Roy Schafer says, “introjects are made out of memories.” ^(74){ }^{74} Introjects or internalized presences are not simply composed of (mainly unconscious) memories; they are themselves memorializing in their effects. Mourning itself is to be construed as a way of establishing an internal memorial to (and of) the lost other, and in this very activity it commemorates that other. Freud, concerned with the issue of detachment from hypercathected recollections, omits this crucial point, even though his entire treatment of the mourning process calls for it. When he says, for example, that “mourning impels the ego to give up the object [as recollected] by declaring the object to be dead and offering the ego the inducement of continuing to live,” ^(75){ }^{75} we need to add that this inducement is bolstered by the establishment of the lost object within as a commemorated presence. This presence is “redifferentiated” (in Loewald’s term) precisely when it attains a genuinely commemorative status in the mind via intrapsychic memorialization. And if it is true that “internalization as a completed process implies an emancipation from the [lost] object,” ^(76){ }^{76} it also implies this object’s continuing presence as commemorated within the psyche. 那么，认同何以成为纪念之事？这不能仅如罗伊·谢弗所言"内摄物由记忆构成"。内摄物或内化的存在并非仅由（主要是无意识的）记忆组成；它们本身通过其效应发挥着纪念功能。哀悼本身应被理解为一种为逝去的他者建立内在纪念（并关于他者）的方式，而这一行为本身正是对他者的纪念。弗洛伊德虽关注与过度投注回忆分离的问题，却忽略了这一关键点——尽管他对哀悼过程的整个论述都指向这一点。例如当他说"哀悼通过宣布对象[如所忆]已死，并给予自我继续生存的诱因，迫使自我放弃该对象"时，我们必须补充说明：这种诱因正是通过将失去的对象确立为内心被纪念的存在而得到强化。这种存在"被重新分化"（用洛瓦尔德的话说），恰恰是当它通过心灵内部的纪念化过程在思想中获得真正的纪念性地位时。 如果说"内化作为一个完成的过程意味着从[失去的]对象中解放出来" ^(76){ }^{76} ，那么它也意味着这个对象作为被纪念的存在在心灵中持续在场。
Even if Freud did not elect to interpret his own idea of psychical identification as a form of commemoration, he was extremely alert to its pervasive consequences. Let us consider the most critical of these in brief succession: 尽管弗洛伊德没有选择将他自己的心理认同概念解释为一种纪念形式，但他对其深远影响极为警觉。让我们简要考察其中最关键的部分：
SUPER-EGO 超我
The super-ego is the product of two stages of identification: first, a “primary” identification with both parents that occurs very early in life; ^(77){ }^{77} 超我是两个认同阶段的产物：首先是生命早期与父母双方的"原始"认同； ^(77){ }^{77}
second, an identification with the child’s main parent-rival after the “dissolution” of the Oedipus complex. As the “heir” of this nuclear complex, the super-ego is “the representative of our relation with our parents.” 78 Precisely in this capacity it commemorates these parents, especially the parent of the same sex. The latter is said, revealingly, to be “erected . . . within oneself,” ^(79){ }^{79} just as a memorializing marker might be. In fact, the super-ego is expressly designated by Freud as “a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego” ^(80){ }^{80} and therefore also a memorial of the corresponding strength of one’s parents as primal authorities. Such memorials give “permanent expression” to the persons thus memorialized and “perpetuate [their] existence.” ^(81){ }^{81} The super-ego’s values, indeed its very voice (typically the voice of the conscience), memorializes these persons in a perduring way thanks to the power of multiple identifications with them. ^(82){ }^{82} The term “überich” (literally, “over-ego”) eloquently expresses this memorializing function: as if to suggest that one’s parents are remembered in (and as) a magisterial monument erected over one’s ego, much as a gravestone stands over the body of the very person it memorializes. 其次，在俄狄浦斯情结"消解"后对儿童主要竞争对手——父母的认同。作为这一核心情结的"继承者"，超我"代表着我们与父母的关系"。78 正是在这种角色中，它纪念着这些父母，尤其是同性父母。具有启示性的是，后者被描述为"在自我内部建立"， ^(79){ }^{79} 正如一座纪念性标志物那样。事实上，弗洛伊德明确将超我称为"自我昔日软弱与依赖的纪念碑" ^(80){ }^{80} ，因而也是对作为原始权威的父母相应力量的纪念。这类纪念碑"永久表达"了被纪念者，并"使其存在得以延续"。 ^(81){ }^{81} 超我的价值观，乃至其声音（通常是良知的声音），通过对父母的多重认同力量，以持久的方式纪念着这些人。 ^(82){ }^{82} 术语"überich"（字面意为"超我"）精妙地表达了这种纪念功能：仿佛暗示着父母被铭记于（并作为）矗立在自我之上的权威丰碑，就像墓碑立于它所纪念之人遗体的上方。
CHARACTER 性格
Freud remarks that “the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and . . . contains the history of these object-choices.” ^(83){ }^{83} The precipitation is the work of incorporation, and the containment stems from the ego’s identification with the abandoned object-choices. What is unusual in Freud’s statement is the explicit acknowledgment of the history of these choices. What could such an internalized history be other than an intrapsychic memorialization-effected not in static, monumental terms but in terms of diachronic retelling, as if it were the biography of others recounted wholly within oneself? 弗洛伊德指出："自我性格是被放弃对象贯注的沉淀物……并包含着这些对象选择的历史。" ^(83){ }^{83} 这种沉淀是内化作用的结果，而包含性则源于自我对被放弃对象选择的认同。弗洛伊德论述中不寻常之处在于明确承认了这些选择的历史。这种内化的历史除了是一种心灵内部的纪念——不是以静态的、纪念碑式的方式，而是通过历时性重述实现的，就像完全在内心讲述的他者传记——还能是什么呢？
TRANSFERENCE 移情
One of the main operative factors at work in transference is the revival of parental imagoes through varying degrees of identification with the analyst. These imagoes are in turn distillations of primary identifications with parents and become the prototype for all later relationships with figures who stand (like the analyst) in loco parentis. As stable internalized entities, these imagoes serve as intrapsychic commemorabilia of parents as commemoranda. Thanks to their perduring presence, a “transference” of libidual energy can be made onto the figure of the analyst, who comes increasingly to resemble one or both parents as the analysis proceeds. 移情运作中的一个主要因素是，通过与分析师不同程度的认同，使父母意象得以复苏。这些意象本身又是对父母原初认同的提炼，成为日后所有与类父母角色（如分析师）关系的原型。作为稳定的内化实体，这些意象充当着父母作为纪念物的心灵内部纪念品。得益于它们持久的存在，力比多能量得以"转移"到分析师形象上——随着分析的推进，分析师会越来越像父母一方或双方。
PRIMAL PHANTASIES 原始幻想
These were posited by Freud to designate schematic, universal psychic structures that organize one’s phantasy life in an a priori fashion: e.g., viewing the primal scene, seduction by a parent, castration threat, etc. Since Freud holds that such Urphantasien are inherited, they are in effect memo- 弗洛伊德提出这一概念，用以指代那些以先验方式组织个体幻想生活的图式化、普遍性心理结构，例如目睹原始场景、被父母引诱、阉割威胁等。由于弗洛伊德认为这类原始幻想（Urphantasien）是遗传获得的，它们实质上构成了记忆...
rializations of phylogenetically acquired experiences: they are the genicallytransmitted memories of such experiences. Similarly, the overwhelming sense of individual guilt to which Freud increasingly directed his attention is held to have a phylogenetic basis: to be the continuation in memorial terms of the very guilt which the parricidal sons incurred in primeval times: “what began in relation to the father is completed in relation to the group.” 84 种系发生所获体验的具现化：它们是这类体验通过基因传递的记忆。同样，弗洛伊德日益关注的压倒性个体内疚感也被认为具有种系发生基础：即远古时期弑父之子所招致的内疚在记忆层面的延续："始于对父亲的行为，终结于对群体的关系。"84
With the allusion to primeval parricide, we have come full cycle. According to the bold hypothesis of Totem and Taboo, this parricide gave risethanks to ambivalent feelings of remorse and guilt-to its ritualistic repetition and commemoration in totem meals. But it was still bolder of Freud to suggest that commemorating could take place within the psyche-without the support of concrete commemorabilia, much less of a surrounding community of co-commemorators. As such purely psychical commemorating is without a text, so it is also without a ritual. No external vehicle is required to bear or express the identifications of which it is composed. Nevertheless, intrapsychic memorialization shares the following features with overt ritualistic commemoration: 通过影射原始的弑父行为，我们完成了一个完整的循环。根据《图腾与禁忌》的大胆假设，正是这种弑父行为——源于悔恨与愧疚的矛盾心理——催生了图腾餐仪式性的重复与纪念。但弗洛伊德更大胆地提出，纪念活动可以在心灵内部进行，无需具体纪念物的支撑，更不需要共同纪念者组成的社群。这种纯粹心理层面的纪念既无文本依托，也无仪式形式。它不需要任何外在载体来承载或表达其构成的认同。然而，内在心理的纪念化与公开仪式性纪念共享以下特征：
(1) Both proceed by a form of incorporation, whether as actual ingestion (e.g., of the totem animal) or as interiorization of the absent other. It is striking that such incorporating precedes other phases of the commemoration as if it were a necessary condition for them. The logic seems to be: unless the other has been brought within, in-corporated, I cannot fully commemorate it. （1）两者都通过某种内化形式进行，无论是实际吞食（如图腾动物）还是对缺席他者的内心接纳。值得注意的是，这种内化行为往往先于纪念的其他阶段，仿佛是其必要条件。其内在逻辑似乎是：除非将他者纳入体内、完成内化，否则我无法充分纪念它。
(2) Ongoing, steady remembering is accomplished in an at least quasipermanent way (i.e., over many generations; or at least over the lifetime of a given psyche) without any dependence on recollective remembering. Something like a law of inverse ratio-which Freud might call a “complemental series” ^(85){ }^{85}-seems to obtain in the two instances: the less recollection is active or needed (or even pertinent), the more efficacious and valuable is commemoration. Already in Totem and Taboo Freud wrote that “the less [the original parricide] was recollected the more numerous must have been the substitutes to which it gave rise.” ^(86){ }^{86} So too we have seen how the decathexis of recollective memories in the mourning process exists in inverse ratio to identifications that prove indispensable to the fully internalized presence of the other. ^(87){ }^{87} (2)持续稳定的记忆以至少准永久的方式完成（即跨越数代人；或至少贯穿特定心灵的一生），无需依赖回忆性记忆。某种类似反比定律的现象——弗洛伊德或许会称之为"互补序列" ^(85){ }^{85} ——似乎在这两种情形中都成立：回忆活动越少或越不需要（甚至越不相关），纪念就越有效且珍贵。早在《图腾与禁忌》中弗洛伊德就写道："[原始弑父]被回忆得越少，它产生的替代物就必然越多。" ^(86){ }^{86} 同样，我们也看到哀悼过程中回忆记忆的去贯注与被证明对完全内化的他者存在不可或缺的认同之间存在着反比关系。 ^(87){ }^{87}
(3) A focus memorius is at work throughout. In the case of ritualized commemoration, this focus is provided by a spatio-temporally specified set of particulars (whether objects or actions), whereas in intrapsychic memorialization it is given in the form of the other as introject: as inward memorial. Despite such a focus, however, in both instances there is a continual trespassing of established boundaries, whether these be generational-social (e.g., totemic) or personal-psychological (e.g., egological). This means that both sorts of commemorating can be considered liminal in status, occurring at the edges of psyche and of society alike. (3) 记忆焦点始终贯穿其中。在仪式化纪念活动中，这一焦点由时空特定的具体事项（无论是物体还是行为）所构成；而在心理内部的纪念行为中，它则以内化他者的形式呈现：即作为内在记忆。然而尽管存在这样的焦点，在这两种情形下都持续存在着对既定界限的逾越——无论是代际社会的（如图腾式的）还是个人心理的（如自我学式的）。这意味着两种纪念形式都可被视为处于阈限状态，既发生在心灵的边缘地带，也存在于社会的交界处。
(4) Despite this very liminality-this playing at the borderlines of our experience-commemoration by ritualistic action and commemoration via indentification accomplish for their respective objects an “immortality,” 88 or at least an abiding perdurance. If it is indeed true that “the memory of the first act of sacrifice thus proved indestructible, in spite of every effort to forget it” ^(89){ }^{89}-the memory surviving as ritualized commemoration-the memory of others we once loved also proves indestructible: in spite of every effort to forget them, we commemorate them within our psyche by means of intrapsychic memorialization. (4)尽管这种仪式性行动与身份认同的纪念方式都处于我们经验的边缘地带——在边界线上游走——它们却为各自的对象实现了某种"不朽"，或者说至少是持久的延续。如果说"第一次献祭行为的记忆确实被证明是不可摧毁的，尽管人们竭力想要遗忘它"——这种记忆以仪式化纪念的形式留存——那么我们曾经爱过之人的记忆同样被证明是不可磨灭的：尽管我们努力想要遗忘，却仍在心灵深处通过内在心理纪念的方式追忆着他们。
But wait! Are we not “pursuing memory beyond mind” in this Part of the book? How can we be moving beyond mind with all this talk of the “intrapsychic” and the “internalized”? Isn’t “identification” a strictly psychological conception-thus belonging exclusively to mind or psyche? Granting that we have moved beyond representationalism, have we moved beyond mentalism? 且慢！本书这一部分不正是要"追寻超越心智的记忆"吗？当我们大谈"心理内在"和"内化"时，又如何能声称超越了心智？难道"身份认同"不是一个严格意义上的心理学概念——因而完全属于心智或心灵范畴吗？即便我们已经超越了表征主义，但我们真的超越了心理主义吗？
In drawing on Freudian psychoanalysis for a coherent model of nonritualistic commemoration, we have indeed moved beyond mind: beyond mind conceived in that determinate way which has come to dominate our thinking about it. I refer to the Cartesian-Lockian notion that the mind is an exclusively private arena. In this view, mind is always and only mym y mind, self-enclosed within its own epistemological space. It follows that any and all memories-considered as denizens of such a mind-are mym y memories only. In other words, memories of every kind are at once: 在借鉴弗洛伊德精神分析学构建非仪式性纪念的连贯模型时，我们确实已超越了心智范畴——这里的心智是指那种已主导我们思维方式的确定性概念。我所指的是笛卡尔-洛克式观点，即认为心智完全是一个私密领域。按照这种观点，心智永远且只能是 mym y 心智，自我封闭在其认识论空间内。由此推论，所有作为此心智栖居者的记忆都只能是 mym y 记忆。换言之，各类记忆都具有以下双重特性：
Individuated: 个体化：
This reflects the fact that memories are affairs of the solitary individual, the solus ipse who recalls his or her past in hermetic isolation. Thus we speak of “possessing” our memories and of “storing” them as if they were privately acquired commodities, stamped somehow with our own proper names. No wonder that we speak of “jealously guarded” memories, as if sharing them were to threaten their very being! 这反映出记忆本质上是孤独个体的专属事务——那个与世隔绝的 solus ipse（独在之我）在密闭状态中追忆其过往。因此我们常说要"占有"记忆、"储存"记忆，仿佛它们是贴着个人专属标签的私有物品。无怪乎我们会谈及"严防死守"的记忆，似乎分享它们就会危及记忆本身的存在！
Individuating: 个体生成性：
This is Locke’s twist on the paradigm; precisely as existing within the ambiance of the self alone, memories become self-definitive. More than any other factor, they determine our personal identity: to be a self at all is to be the self that we can remember. ^(90){ }^{90} Memories, our own possession, come to possess us; instead of expanding our experience, they serve to limit it. 这是洛克对范式的独特诠释；记忆恰恰因其仅存在于自我的氛围中，而成为自我定义的核心要素。相比其他任何因素，记忆更能决定我们的个人身份：所谓自我，本质上就是我们所能够回忆起的那个自我。 ^(90){ }^{90} 这些本应属于我们的记忆，最终却反过来占有了我们；它们非但未能拓展我们的经验，反而局限了它。
Psychoanalysis proposes a model of mind that challenges the CartesianLockean prototype. It challenges it not just by recognizing an unconscious dimension of fantasy and memory, but also by specifying that mind is ineluctably intersubjective in origin and import. Such is the implication of the idea of identification itself. It needs to be stressed that identification is always identification with an other, whether this other be parent, sib- 精神分析提出了一种挑战笛卡尔-洛克原型的心灵模型。其挑战性不仅在于承认了幻想与记忆的无意识维度，更明确指出心灵在起源和意义上都不可避免地具有主体间性。这正是认同概念本身所蕴含的深意。必须强调的是，认同始终是对他者的认同——无论这个他者是父母、兄姊
ling, lover, friend, an ideal, or even one’s own mirror image. ^(91){ }^{91} When Freud spoke of “a new psychical action” ^(92){ }^{92} by which every ego is formed, he meant the action of identification (mainly identification with one’s parents); and we have seen how the super-ego is entirely a product of identifications. Even the id “inherits” identifications in the form of imagoes and repressed memories, mixing these in with instinctual representatives. At every level, the human psyche is constituted by identifications. And if this is so, the mind is radically non-solipsistic; it is something shared and non-solitary from the start. Likewise with regard to the memories attached to this mind: these will be neither strictly individuated (or will be this only at a pathological extreme that is named precisely “isolation”) nor wholly individuating. The self that we remember is a composition of many selves-all the selves with which we identify in the course of a life. There is no such thing as strict self-identity; or rather, such identity is thoroughly inter-subjective from the beginning: “le je est un autre.” ^(93){ }^{93} If the self is indeed an other, its memories will be at once othered and othering: 情人、挚友、理想形象，乃至自己的镜中映像。当弗洛伊德谈及"新的心理作用"塑造每个自我时，他指的是认同作用（主要是对父母的认同）；而我们已经看到超我完全是由认同构成的产物。即便是本我，也以意象和被压抑记忆的形式"继承"着认同，将之与本能表征相融合。在每一层面，人类心灵都由认同构成。若果真如此，心智从根本上就非唯我独尊；它自始便是共享的、非孤立的。附着于这个心智的记忆同样如此：它们既非严格个体化的（或仅在名为"隔离"的病理极端下如此），也非完全个体性的。我们所忆起的自我，实乃众多自我的复合体——那些我们在生命历程中认同过的所有自我。严格意义上的自我同一性并不存在；或者说，这种同一性自始便是彻底主体间性的："我即是他者"。倘若自我确是他者，其记忆将同时具备他者性与他者化特质：
Othered: 他者化：
Memories are formed from the first in the image of the other, primarily the caretaking parent; also in view of the other, though not just the literal view. It is a matter of keeping the other in mind. In all this, the other(s) act as a template for further development thanks precisely to identification, which establishes these other ( s ) within as active internalized presences. 记忆最初形成于他者的形象，主要是照料者的形象；同时也形成于对他者的观照，尽管这不只是字面上的观看。关键在于将他者铭记于心。在这一切中，他者恰恰通过认同机制成为进一步发展的模板，正是这种认同将这些他者确立为活跃的内化存在。
Othering: 他者化过程：
Once such presences are in place, they become the basis of still further identifications, as occurs most manifestly in the case of transference or in relation to mentors. Older identifications, essential to the formation of the self in the first place, enable new identifications, which alter the self once again, i.e., make it still other than what it was. 一旦这些内在存在确立，它们就会成为更深层次认同的基础，这种现象在移情关系或与导师的关系中表现得最为明显。那些最初对自我形成至关重要的早期认同，能够促成新的认同，而这些新认同又会再次改变自我，即使其与原先的状态有所不同。
If this double othering obtains-if Freud and his followers (most notably the British School of object-relations) have set forth a plausible alternative model of mind according to which memories are intrinsically non-private-we have indeed moved memory beyond mind considered as a solipsistic snare. By the same stroke we have preserved the commemorative status of the intrapsychic sphere as a whole. On the psychoanalytic paradigm, to be mental or psychical at all is to arise from identifications with others. However unconscious they may be, memories of these identifications will be commemorative of these same others by furnishing inward memorials of them and of the acts by which identifications were first formed. Far from being exceptional, such memories come to provide the memorial infrastructure of mind itself; taken together, they at once reflect and further mind’s own inherent alterity. The commemoration they effect from within, instead of keeping us within, expresses the fact that mind is fashioned from with- 倘若这种双重他者化得以成立——如果弗洛伊德及其追随者（尤其是英国客体关系学派）提出的替代心智模型具有说服力，即记忆本质上并非私有——那么我们确实已将记忆从唯我论的桎梏中解放出来。与此同时，我们完整保留了心灵内部领域的纪念性特质。在精神分析范式中，任何心智或心理活动的产生都源于对他者的认同。无论这些认同多么无意识，相关记忆都会通过构建内在的纪念性表征来铭记这些他者以及最初形成认同的行为。这类记忆绝非特例，反而构成了心智本身的纪念性基础结构；它们共同反映并强化了心智与生俱来的他异性。这种由内而生的纪念行为，非但没有将我们禁锢于内在，反而昭示着心智始终由外而内塑造成型。
out-known from without via identifications with others. The intrapsychic is ineluctably interpsychic: this is the operative principle. Just as memory of place has mainly to do with containment (despite being ostensibly preoccupied with externality), psychic commemoration, seemingly so selfcontained, breaks out of self-enclosure through its enduring identifications with others. 通过与他人的认同从外部被认知。内心世界不可避免地是相互心理的：这是运作的原则。正如对场所的记忆主要与包容有关（尽管表面上专注于外在性），看似自我封闭的心理纪念，却通过与他人持久的认同而突破了自我封闭。
VII 第七章
What are the role of body and place in commemoration? Here brief indications will have to suffice in the face of the considerable complexity of the topic. 身体和场所在纪念中扮演什么角色？面对这一主题的相当复杂性，这里只能给出简要的提示。
BODY 身体
The body’s role in ritualistic commemoration is altogether central. It serves as the primary bearer of the concrete commemorabilia through which such commemorating is effected. The body moves the commemorator into the appropriate ritualistic space, in which it proceeds to perform the gestures by which the commemorative act is accomplished. Thus, in the Eucharist, it brings the worshipper into the vicinity of the officiants, and it guides the movements of all parties in the ceremony. Moreover, the body of the worshipper is an analogue of the body of Christ; and the incorporation of the bread and the wine is an assimilation of Christ’s symbolic body into the worshipper’s physical body. In other circumstances, the body itself may become a commemorabilium: as happens in the case of the young man from Tanagra whose body, bearing a sacrificial ram, becomes Hermetic. Either way, the body does more than represent the commemoration; it serves as an expressive sign of that which is commemorated: hence the importance of nuanced differences in the exact form of ritualistic re-enactment. At the same time, the body assumes a quite liminal role in many commemorative ceremonies, being the borderline between actual and virtual movement, present and past, sacred and profane. ^(94){ }^{94} 身体在仪式性纪念活动中扮演着核心角色。它是承载具体纪念物的主要载体，通过这种载体实现纪念行为。身体将纪念者带入恰当的仪式空间，并在其中完成构成纪念行为的各种动作。例如在圣餐仪式中，身体引导信徒接近主礼者，并协调仪式中所有参与者的动作。此外，信徒的身体与基督的身体形成对应；而饼与酒的摄入，则象征着基督的象征性身体与信徒物质身体的融合。在其他情境中，身体本身可能成为纪念物：就像那位来自塔纳格拉的年轻人，他背负祭羊的身体化身为赫尔墨斯的象征。无论哪种形式，身体都不只是纪念的象征，更是被纪念之物的表达性符号——这也解释了为何仪式重演的具体形式存在微妙差异如此重要。 与此同时，在许多纪念仪式中，身体扮演着极为阈限的角色——它成为实际运动与虚拟运动、当下与过去、神圣与世俗之间的分界线。 ^(94){ }^{94}
The body is also active in textually focused commemoration. This becomes evident when we consider the intoning of the liturgical formula, “Take this in remembrance of me,” as the worshippers are ingesting the sacraments: the sonorous physicality of the heard text intimately rejoins the kinesthetictactile physicality of the giving/receiving body. The bodily production of sounds by actual pronunciation is no less important in the Ndembu ceremony, where the invocations of Kafwana and other figures are chanted out loud. Even when the text is written and not spoken-as in its inscription on war memorials-the body is solicited: e.g., in circumambulating the memorial so as to take in its message from several points of view. ^(95){ }^{95} 身体在以文本为核心的纪念活动中同样活跃。当信徒们领受圣餐时吟诵"你们应当如此行，为的是记念我"这一礼拜仪式用语，便能清晰见证这一点：被聆听文本的声音物质性，与给予/接收身体的动觉触觉物质性紧密交融。在恩登布仪式中，通过实际发音产生的身体声响同样至关重要，人们会高声吟诵卡夫瓦纳等角色的祷词。即便当文本以书写而非口述形式呈现——如镌刻在战争纪念碑上时——身体仍被征召：例如通过环绕纪念碑行走，从多重视角接收其传递的信息。 ^(95){ }^{95}
But what of the psychic sphere? Does not my claim in chapter 8 that body memory is indispensable to all human memory find its limit just here? 但心理领域又如何呢？我在第八章提出的"身体记忆对所有人类记忆都不可或缺"的主张，是否恰恰在此处遭遇了边界？
It does-if “body” means visibly moving, phenomenally perceived body only. But body can mean much else besides; quite apart from claims as to the existence of an “astral” or “sublime” body, there is a straightforward, unmysterious bodily component of psychical identification. To identify with someone in Freud’s rich sense of the term is to merge not only with that person’s mental or psychic being. It is also to assimilate his or her corporeality in its full emotional resonance. This is above all true of those early identifications on which Freud in fact centered his attention. The infant identifies with the mother’s felt flesh, especially with particular parts of it such as breast, lips, and hands. These “part-objects,” once introjected into the infant’s psyche in the form of fantasies and memories, become veritable commemorabilia of the mother’s body qua commemorandum. In this way, endopsychic memory contains an unmistakable bodily component; it is bodily in its being-and bodily precisely in being commemorative in character. 确实如此——如果"身体"仅指可见的、运动中的、现象层面被感知的躯体。但身体还包含更多意涵；且不论所谓"星体"或"崇高"身体的存在主张，心理认同本身就包含着一种直接而不神秘的肉体成分。按照弗洛伊德对该术语的丰富定义，认同某人不仅意味着与其心理或精神存在相融合，更意味着在完整的情感共鸣中吸纳其肉体性。这一点尤其适用于弗洛伊德实际关注的早期认同现象：婴儿通过母亲可感知的血肉之躯实现认同，特别是乳房、嘴唇和双手等特定部位。这些"部分客体"以幻想和记忆的形式被婴儿心灵内摄后，便成为母亲身体作为纪念对象的真实纪念物。由此，心灵内部记忆包含着不容忽视的身体成分——其存在方式是具身的，而其作为纪念的根本特征也正是通过身体性得以体现。
PLACE 场所
Commemoration is no less implaced than it is embodied. Once more, this is most evident in ritualistic commemorating: 纪念活动既具身又置境。这一点在仪式性纪念中尤为显著：
Time and place are essential features of ritual action, and both mark a specific orientation or setting for ritual. . . . The shape, spatial orientation, and location of the ritual setting are essential features of the semantics of ritual action. ^(96){ }^{96} 时间与空间是仪式行为的基本要素，二者共同构成了仪式的特定情境框架......仪式场所的形制、空间方位及地理位置，构成了仪式行为语义学的核心特征。 ^(96){ }^{96}
Consider only that the setting of the Eucharist in a church, and more particularly at the altar, is hardly an indifferent feature of the ceremony; this setting provides internal and external horizons, prescribed pathways (e.g., aisles), and, in general, a sanctified ambiance in which the ritual can be carried out. Funeral services also require a properly solemn setting. In both of these cases the place is variable within certain limits. In the Hermes festival at Tanagra, however, only that one city (indeed, only a certain street of that city) is permitted as a place of enactment. Whatever the exact circumstances, place is primordial in ritualized commemorating-as we might expect in view of the prominence of overt, expressive bodily movements in the performance of ritual. Bodies, after all, move us into places and keep us there. 试想圣餐礼在教堂——尤其是祭坛前——举行的场景，这绝非仪式的无关细节；该场景既界定了仪式内外部的精神场域（如规定行走的甬道），更营造出进行神圣仪轨所需的整体氛围。丧葬仪式同样需要庄严肃穆的特定场所。这两类仪式虽允许场所存在一定弹性空间，但在塔纳格拉城的赫尔墨斯节庆中，唯有该城特定街道才具备仪式展演的合法性。无论具体情境如何，空间在仪式化纪念活动中具有本源地位——考虑到仪式表演中那些外显的、富有表现力的身体动作，这一现象正在意料之中。毕竟，正是身体引领我们进入特定空间并驻留其中。
Commemorative texts possess a dimension of placement as well. Not only are they read or presented in an apposite public space-say, in a cemetery at a Memorial Day ceremony-but they exhibit spatial or quasi-spatial qualities of their own. By these latter I have in mind all that Derrida has discussed under the general heading of a text’s espacement: e.g., its framing effects, especially those of its margins. ^(97){ }^{97} Indeed, the importance of margins in commemorative texts-the edges of epitaphs, the pauses before and after a eulogy, etc.-remind us of the critical role of liminality in the constitution of 纪念文本同样具有空间维度。它们不仅被阅读或呈现在恰当的公共空间——比如阵亡将士纪念日仪式上的墓地——更展现出自身特有的空间或类空间特质。我所说的后者，涵盖了德里达在"文本间距"总标题下讨论的所有要素：例如文本的框架效应，尤其是其边缘效应。 ^(97){ }^{97} 事实上，纪念文本中边缘的重要性——墓志铭的边界、悼词前后的停顿等——提醒我们阈限性在构建诸多纪念行为中的关键作用。
so much commemorating. Such margins signify the very state of transition that characterizes the commemorandum as an absent or vanishing existent. 这些边缘象征着过渡状态本身，正是这种状态将被纪念者定义为缺席或消逝的存在。
Even intrapsychic memorialization is not without its own mode of implacement. It is not accidental that Freud was concerned to devise a convincing topographic model of the mind in The Interpretation of Dreams, his first treatment (after the abortive “Project for a Scientific Psychology”) of the mind in its full scope. In fact, the very idea of “in-corporation” presumes a psychic space into which the other-to-be-identified-with is drawn. Moreover, the internalized presences which are the precipitates of incorporation not only occupy psychic space but also help to create it. Each of these presences brings about a new place in the psyche-a new memorial location that, far from freezing the past into fixity, opens ever more expansively into the future. 即便是心灵内部的记忆活动也并非没有其自身的空间安置模式。弗洛伊德在《梦的解析》中致力于构建一个令人信服的心理地形模型并非偶然——这是他（继流产的《科学心理学方案》之后）首次全面探讨心理领域的著作。事实上，"内化"这一概念本身就预设了某种心理空间的存在，被认同的他者正是被吸纳进这个空间。此外，作为内化沉淀物的这些内在存在不仅占据着心理空间，更参与构建了这个空间。每一个这样的存在都在心灵中开辟出新场所——这些崭新的记忆位点非但不会将过去凝固成僵化状态，反而会向着未来不断延展。
VIII 八
We have yet to confront what might be termed the “functional essence” of commemoration. This is participation. Commemorating, by its very structure, encourages and enhances participation on the part of those who engage in it. The primary participation is in the commemorandum, the commemorated object, person, or event. This participation occurs via the mediating presence of various commemorabilia, material or psychical; we remember through these translucent media; but we could just as well say that we participate with them in honoring a common commemorandum. In ceremonial commemoration, we also participate with other persons, forming with them a “horizontal,” participatory communitas that lies perpendicular to the “vertical” community which the commemorator (or group of commemorators) establishes with the commemorandum proper. ^(98){ }^{98} On certain occasions, the two communities-the two kinds of participation-coincide. In mourning, for example, the dyadic community of myself-as-griever and the other-as-grieved is at once horizontal and vertical. Here, participation is unusually intense: not only is there incorporation of the other into myself (as also occurs in the Eucharist and in totem meals) but a con-fusion of self and other thanks to identification, itself a form of inter-psychic participation. 我们尚未直面纪念活动的"功能本质"——参与性。纪念行为本身的结构就鼓励并强化参与者的投入。最根本的参与是对纪念对象（人或事）的参与，这种参与通过物质或精神层面的纪念媒介实现；我们透过这些半透明的介质进行回忆；但同样可以说，我们与这些媒介共同参与了对同一纪念对象的礼敬。在仪式性纪念中，我们还与他人形成"横向"的参与性共同体，这与纪念者（或纪念群体）同纪念对象本身建立的"纵向"关系形成正交。某些情境下，这两种共同体——两种参与形式——会重合。譬如哀悼仪式中，作为悼念者的"我"与作为被悼念者的"他者"构成的二元共同体，就同时兼具横向与纵向维度。 在这里，参与感异常强烈：不仅存在将他人融入自我的过程（圣餐仪式和图腾餐宴中亦有此现象），更因身份认同而产生自我与他者的交融，这本身就是一种心灵间参与的形式。
I borrow the term “participation” from Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, whose writings on the subject of “primitive mentality” first developed the idea of a “law of participation.” This law is “the first and most general” 99 feature of such mentality in its collective character. The participation is between "参与"这一术语我借自吕西安·列维-布留尔，他关于"原始思维"的著作首次提出了"参与律"的概念。该定律是此类集体性思维"首要且最普遍"的特征。这种参与发生在
beings and objects linked in a collective representation. This is why, for want of a better term, I shall call the appropriate principle of the ‘primitive’ mentality which governs the connexions and the preconnexions of these representations, the law of participation. ^(100){ }^{100} 通过集体表象相互关联的存在体与客体之间。正因如此，在缺乏更恰当术语的情况下，我将把支配这些表象之间关联与预关联的"原始"思维基本原则称为参与律。 ^(100){ }^{100}
For a Western philosophical mind, the single most striking aspect of participation is its freedom from the constraints of contradiction. Thanks to participation, things can be simultaneously themselves and not themselves, here and also there, past as well as present. ^(101){ }^{101} The metaphysical basis for participation is “a mystical community of essence between beings,” beings which enjoy an “essential identity.” ^(102){ }^{102} Thus, identity of the members of one’s clan “results from participation in the invisible and timeless essence of the group.” ^(103){ }^{103} The totem of such a clan is its essence. As a consequence, there is “a similar identity between the individuals of a totemic group and their totem.” ^(104){ }^{104} 对西方哲学思维而言，参与最显著的特征在于它能摆脱矛盾律的束缚。通过参与，事物可以同时是自身又非自身，既在此处又在彼处，既是过去也是现在。 ^(101){ }^{101} 参与现象的形而上学基础在于"存在者之间神秘的本质共通性"，这些存在者享有"本质同一性"。 ^(102){ }^{102} 因此，氏族成员的身份认同"源于对群体无形永恒本质的参与"。 ^(103){ }^{103} 这种氏族的图腾即是其本质体现。由此产生"图腾群体个体成员与其图腾之间存在类似同一性"的现象。 ^(104){ }^{104}
Participation is not, however, limited to horizontal and vertical communities as these relate to a totem. Lévy-Bruhl was struck by the sheer multiplicity of types of participation. For the primitive, there is a profound participation between himself and his “appurtenances,” that is, any part of himself or his life with which he could be said to be identical: e.g., clothes, fingernails, excreta, footprints. These appurtenances do not merely represent or simply “belong to” a particular person. They are him: hence the respect with which they must be treated. There is also participation between humans and non-totemic animals; between an individual and his or her ancestors (mythical and real); between a person and what he or she eats. ^(105){ }^{105} In the end, everything is swept up into participation: “All objects and beings are involved in a network of mystical participations and exclusions.” ^(106){ }^{106} 然而，参与性并不仅限于与图腾相关的横向和纵向社群关系。列维-布留尔曾被参与形式的纯粹多样性所震撼。对原始人而言，他们与"附属物"——即任何可被视为与其自身或生命等同的部分（如衣物、指甲、排泄物、足迹）——之间存在着深刻的参与关系。这些附属物不仅代表或简单地"属于"某个特定个体，它们就是个体本身：因此必须对其保持敬畏。人类与非图腾动物之间、个体与其祖先（神话中的与真实的）之间、人与所食之物之间也都存在参与关系。 ^(105){ }^{105} 最终，万物皆被卷入参与之网："所有物体与生命都交织在神秘参与与排斥的网络中。" ^(106){ }^{106}
The law of participation gives rise to three working principles, each of which is highly suggestive for a study of commemoration: 参与法则衍生出三项运作原则，每一项都对纪念研究极具启发性：
BI-PRESENCE 双重在场性
This refers to being present in two different places at the same time. Lévy-Bruhl cites an example from a missionary named Grubb: an Indian dreamed that he [Grubb] was stealing pumpkins from the garden, even though Grubb was able to prove that he was 150 miles away at the time. The Indian, unimpressed, maintained that both claims were true and did not conflict. ^(107){ }^{107} 这指的是同时存在于两个不同地点。列维-布留尔引用了一位名叫格拉布的传教士的例子：一个印第安人梦见格拉布正在菜园里偷南瓜，尽管格拉布能证明自己当时在 150 英里外。印第安人不为所动，坚称两种说法都成立且并不矛盾。 ^(107){ }^{107}
DUALITY-UNITY 二元性-统一性
A being can become two beings and still stay one being nonetheless. The most common instance of this is found in the relation between a corpse and the ghost which has arisen from it. Whereas a Westerner might distinguish these carefully, for many primitive peoples the two entities remain one: “the ghost and the corpse constitute together a duality-unity, in short they participate in one another.” ^(108){ }^{108} 一个存在可以变成两个存在，却依然保持为一个存在。最常见的例子见于尸体与其衍生出的鬼魂之间的关系。西方人或许会仔细区分这两者，但对许多原始民族而言，这两个实体仍是一体的："鬼魂与尸体共同构成了二元统一体，简言之，它们彼此交融。" ^(108){ }^{108}
CONSUBSTANTIALITY 同质共体
Participation at once presupposes and confirms an abiding consubstantiality between participating items. Thus, parts of the body cannot be considered as separate from each other or the body but as strictly con-substantial. As a result, in many primitive languages “the organs are never [named] without possessive pronouns”; 109 “foot” is always “my foot.” 参与行为既预设又确认了参与要素之间持久的同体性。因此，身体的各个部分不能被视作彼此分离或与身体分离，而应严格视为同体共生的。正因如此，在许多原始语言中"器官名称从不[脱离]所属人称代词而单独使用"；"脚"永远要说成"我的脚"。
We need only call to mind the Eucharist to realize that such principles of participation are by no means restricted to the practices of pre-literate peoples. In the eucharistic rite, Christ’s bi-presence is at work: he is at once in the communion taking place in the present and in the Last Supper honored by this communion. Duality-unity is also felt: there is at once Jesus, the finite and historical man, and Christ, who transcends death and history. ^(110){ }^{110} And consubstantiality is actively present: in and through the sacraments the communicants become con-substantial with Christ, their bread and wine become identical with his body and blood. 我们只需回想圣餐仪式就能明白，这种参与性原则绝非仅限于前文字时代民族的实践。在圣餐仪式中，基督的双重临在同时运作：他既临在于当下正在进行的圣餐礼中，也临在于这个仪式所纪念的最后晚餐里。人们还能感受到双重性的统一：有限的历史人物耶稣与超越死亡和历史的基督同时存在。同体性也活跃地呈现着：通过圣礼，领圣餐者与基督成为同体，他们的面包和酒与基督的身体和血合而为一。
Participation is prominently present in many other commemorative practices as well. Ancestor worship in early Chinese civilization, for example, attempts to strengthen continuity with forebears by reminding a person of his or her participation in the same family line. What Lévy-Bruhl says of the initiation ceremonies of the Arunta could also be said of Chinese ancestor worship: "By imitating what, in certain circumstances, the mythical ancestors have done, and by reproducing their gestures and actions, one has communion with them and truly shares in their essences. " ^(111){ }^{111} For the Arunta as for the Chinese there is consubstantiality between one’s ancestors and oneself. 参与性同样显著体现在许多其他纪念仪式中。例如，中国早期文明中的祖先崇拜，就是通过提醒个体同属一个家族血脉的参与感，来强化与先人的连续性。正如列维-布留尔对阿伦塔人入会仪式的描述同样适用于中国祖先崇拜："通过模仿神话祖先在特定情境中的行为，重现他们的姿态与动作，人们便与祖先建立了共契关系，真正分享了他们的本质。" ^(111){ }^{111} 对阿伦塔人和中国人而言，祖先与后代之间存在着实质同一性。
In the same vein we could say that the Tanagran ritualist has become identical with Hermes through participation in a common essence: Hermes and the young man have become two-in-one, and bi-presence is realized. Even in the less dramatic instance of modern funerals, the departed soul is invoked in the eulogy as if asked to linger near his or her own corpse in an ambiguous state which, if not duality-unity in any strict sense, is an emotionally effective analogue of it. In funerals, ritual and text combine in an effort to promote participation, enabling the mourners to feel at one with the deceased person. Even texts isolated from any expressly ritual component call upon commemorators to identify themselves with the object or event they commemorate: “in memory of the men of Guilford . . . that their example may speak to coming generations.” What The Book of Common Prayer calls “continual remembrance,” or what still earlier in the English language was designated as “sempiternall remembraunce,” ^(112){ }^{112} points to the temporal character of an ongoing sense of identity between commemorators and commemoranda. Indeed, “perdurance” can be construed as a mode of continuing participation. It is perduring participation which the Eucharist as well as the Analects, funeral services along with many commemorative texts, strive to foster in commemorators. 同理，我们可以说塔纳格拉仪式执行者通过参与共同本质而与赫尔墨斯合二为一：赫尔墨斯与青年男子已成为一体双身，双重临在由此实现。即便在现代葬礼这一较不戏剧化的场景中，悼词里召唤的逝者灵魂仿佛被要求以暧昧状态徘徊于自身遗体旁——这种状态虽非严格意义上的二元统一，却是其情感层面的有效对应。葬礼中，仪式与文本共同作用以促进参与感，使哀悼者感到与逝者融为一体。即便是完全脱离仪式成分的文本，也要求纪念者与其纪念对象或事件产生认同："纪念吉尔福德的男人们……愿他们的榜样对后世发言"。《公祷书》所称的"持续纪念"，或更早英语表述中的"永恒纪念"，都指向纪念者与被纪念者之间持续存在的认同感所具有的时间性特质。事实上，"持久性"可被解读为持续参与的一种模式。 圣餐仪式与《论语》、葬礼仪式及诸多纪念文本一样，都致力于培养纪念者这种持存性的参与。
Intrapsychic memorialization also exhibits aspects of participation. Perdurance in the form of a lasting super-ego, character, and active internalized presences is accomplished by a deepgoing participation between one person and another. I have already suggested that interpsychic identification is a form of participation. Now we can add that it occurs in each of the three forms recognized by Lévy-Bruhl: bi-presence is at play in identification, whereby one is at once oneself and another, even though continuing to inhabit a 心理内部的纪念同样展现出参与的面向。通过人与人之间深层次的参与，持存性以持久超我、性格特质及活跃的内化存在等形式得以实现。前文已指出，心理间的认同是参与的一种形式。现在我们可进一步补充：这种认同以列维-布留尔所区分的三种形式存在——在认同过程中发挥作用的双重在场性，使人既能保持自我又同时成为他者，即便仍栖居于
separate body; duality-unity is experienced inasmuch as the other comes to be so fully interiorized within my psyche as to become one with me, an added layer of my being; and consubstantiality is effected by the entire process-as the other becomes more fully incorporated, I become more like him or her, psychic flesh of his or her introjected flesh. Thus, even in something as unconscious and unritualized as is identification we can observe the truth of Lévy-Bruhl’s dictum: “what is given in the first place is participation.” ^(113){ }^{113} Our very being as independent individuals, as well as our existence as effective commemorators, is formed in the crucible of participation with others. 独立的身躯；二重性-统一性的体验在于，他者如此彻底地内化于我的心灵之中，以至于与我融为一体，成为我存在的一个附加层次；而共质性的实现则通过整个过程——随着他者被更充分地吸纳，我变得愈发像他或她，成为其内化血肉的心灵之躯。因此，即便在认同这样无意识且非仪式化的行为中，我们仍可验证列维-布留尔格言的真谛："最初给予的乃是参与。" ^(113){ }^{113} 我们作为独立个体的本质存在，以及作为有效纪念者的生存状态，都是在与他人参与的熔炉中锻造而成。
IX 第九章
The preceding considerations give rise to some still more encompassing concluding reflections. If commemoration has everything to do with partic-ipation-if its functional essence is to solicit and sustain participation between commemorators and that to which they pay homage, often by means of co-participation in special communities and just as often by sharing in commemorabilia through which the commemorandum is made present-then by the same token commemoration has to do with overcoming the separation from which otherwise unaffiliated individuals suffer. Still more radically, commemoration suggests that such separation is a sham. If it is true that “to be is to participate,” ^(114){ }^{114} the beings who participate cannot be atomic entities who are merely gathering to commemorate out of a motive of repetition, guilt, piety, or fellow feeling. The commemorators are already deeply conjoined, bonded at the most profound level: 前述思考引发了一些更具包容性的结论性反思。如果纪念活动与参与行为密不可分——如果其功能本质在于通过特殊社群中的共同参与，或借助使纪念对象得以呈现的纪念物共享，来激发并维系纪念者与被纪念对象之间的参与关系——那么同理，纪念活动也关乎克服原本互不相属的个体所遭受的分离状态。更彻底地说，纪念活动揭示这种分离实为假象。倘若"存在即参与" ^(114){ }^{114} 这一命题成立，那么参与存在者就不可能是出于重复、愧疚、虔敬或同袍之情等动机而聚集纪念的原子式个体。纪念者早已在最深层次上紧密联结：
The representation of a separate individual, which seems to us so simple and so natural, is nevertheless not a primitive one. It occurs only secondarily and never alone. . . . [Let us] show how much this mental attitude differs from ours. . . . ^(115){ }^{115} 看似简单自然的独立个体表象，实则并非原始状态。这种认知仅具次生性且从不单独存在......[让我们]揭示这种心智态度与我们的根本差异...... ^(115){ }^{115}
But does it differ so greatly from ours as Lévy-Bruhl here avers? Doubtlessly it does so at an explicitly conscious level, especially in the post-Cartesian and post-industrialist West. It is, indeed, our conscious conviction that minds are discrete entities and that remembering is an individual affair alone. But at a preconscious or unconscious level we know how shallow (and how vicious) such separatism can be. Separatism itself presupposes collective roots of various kinds: from language to class, from gender identity to personal identity, from shared history to shared tradition. And it is just because of the reality of such deeply interpersonal roots that commemoration assumes unusual importance in our culture-and doubtless in every culture. For commemoration promotes participation even as it thrives on it. Commemorating calls upon us not as separate beings but as always already intertwined; it calls on us in our strictly social being. 但它与我们的记忆方式真有列维-布留尔所言的巨大差异吗？在显意识层面确实如此，尤其在后笛卡尔时代与后工业化的西方世界。我们确实坚信心智是独立实体，记忆纯属个人行为。但在前意识或无意识层面，我们都明白这种割裂论何其肤浅（又何其有害）。割裂论本身预设了各类集体根基：从语言到阶级，从性别认同到个人认同，从共同历史到共同传统。正是这些深刻的人际根基之现实，使得纪念仪式在我们的文化中——无疑也在所有文化中——具有非凡意义。因为纪念既促进参与，又因参与而兴盛。纪念召唤的并非孤立的个体，而是始终相互交织的存在；它召唤的是我们严格意义上的社会性存在。
But more than this is at stake. Commemorating also creates new forms of sociality, new modes of interconnection: between past and present, self and other, one group and another, one form of thinking or acting or speaking and another, one sex and another, one art form and another. In these ways commemorating brings about “a mystical community of essence between beings,” ^(116){ }^{116} constituting a shared identity more lasting and more significant than would be possible in an uncommemorated existence. Commemorating does more than pay tribute to honorable actions undertaken in the past and at another place. It constructs the space, and continues the time, in which the commendably inter-human will be perduringly appreciated. Rather than looking back only, commemoration concerns itself with “what, lasting, comes toward us.” 但问题远不止于此。纪念行为还催生了新的社会形态和新的联结模式：在过去与现在之间、自我与他者之间、群体与群体之间、不同思维或行为或言说方式之间、性别与性别之间、艺术形式与艺术形式之间。通过这些方式，纪念实现了"存在者之间本质的神秘共同体"， ^(116){ }^{116} 构建出比未经纪念的存在更为持久且更具意义的共同身份。纪念不仅是对过往他处高尚行为的致敬，它更构筑了空间，延续了时间，使值得称颂的人际关系得以被恒久珍视。纪念不只关乎回望，更关注"那些持久向我们走来的事物"。
From this view of commemoration as a thoroughly conjoint participation in a project of continuing connection with the commemorandum-whether this be effected by ritual or text or by psychic identification-we may derive three corollary insights: 从这种将纪念视为与纪念对象保持持续联结的完全共同参与（无论通过仪式、文本还是心理认同实现）的视角出发，我们可以得出三个推论性洞见：
(1) Commemoration cannot be accomplished by representations alone, however accurate or adept or dramatic these may be. It is noteworthy that Lévy-Bruhl claims that the participation ingredient in primitive rites does not yield to a representationalist model: （1）纪念仅凭再现是无法完成的，无论这些再现多么精确、巧妙或富有戏剧性。值得注意的是，列维-布留尔指出，原始仪式中的参与成分并不符合再现主义模式：
[Participation is falsified when] we connect it, in whole or in part, with mental activity in so far as this is representational or cognitive; because, in doing this, we inevitably apply to it the general scheme of representation and knowledge as established by ancient philosophy, and by modern psychological thought or attempts at a theory of knowledge. Now, to try to apply this scheme to participation is to do it violence and to distort it. ^(117){ }^{117} [当我们将参与]完全或部分地与具有再现性或认知性的心理活动联系起来时，这种参与就被歪曲了；因为这样做时，我们不可避免地套用了古代哲学以及现代心理学思想或认识论尝试所确立的再现与知识的一般框架。而试图将这一框架应用于参与，就是对它施暴并使其扭曲。 ^(117){ }^{117}
The fact is that representationalism in philosophy and psychology goes hand in hand with that very individualism which the experience of commemorative participation contests: as we can see most clearly in the case of John Locke, for whom representations are private possessions and for whom specifically memorial representations are the exclusive constituents of personal identity. ^(118){ }^{118} The Lockian paradigm is antithetical to understanding commemoration, which cannot be effected adequately by means of set and static representations belonging to an isolated human subject. The contrary is the case. As any ritual must allow for, and as we have observed most tellingly in the case of intrapsychic memorialization, whatever representations are at play must be capable of changing and deepening over time: as in the transition from the mere imitation of the other (an activity whose products resemble Lockian “ideas” or representations in their isomorphic character) to the internalized presence of that other. In short, whenever we become engaged in commemorative activity-whether this occurs in a dyadic or a polyadic contextrepresentation cedes place to participation. 事实上，哲学与心理学中的表征主义与那种纪念性参与体验所质疑的个人主义密不可分：正如我们在约翰·洛克案例中最清晰地看到的，对他而言表征是私有财产，而特定的记忆表征更是个人身份的唯一构成要素。 ^(118){ }^{118} 洛克式范式与理解纪念活动背道而驰——孤立人类主体所拥有的固定静态表征永远无法充分实现纪念。真实情况恰恰相反。正如任何仪式都必须承认的，也正如我们在心理内部纪念活动中最具说服力地观察到的，任何参与其中的表征都必须能够随时间改变与深化：就像从单纯模仿他人（其产物在同构性上与洛克的"观念"或表征相似）过渡到将他人内化为存在的过程。简言之，当我们参与纪念活动时——无论是二元还是多元情境——表征总会让位于参与。
(2) The participatory element in commemoration is so extensive that it includes not only minds or psyches but aspects of body and place as well. In a circumstance of commemoration, body, place, and psyche become more fully participatory. They commingle with one another intimately, and they invite other factors to join in. A revealing instance of such mutually enhanced participation, especially as it involves body memory, is found in another passage from the episode of the “petite madeleine”: (2) 纪念活动中的参与性要素如此广泛，不仅涵盖心灵或精神层面，还包含身体与空间的维度。在纪念情境中，身体、空间与精神实现了更完整的参与。它们彼此紧密交融，并吸引其他要素加入其中。这种相互强化的参与模式有个典型例证——尤其当涉及身体记忆时——见于"小玛德莱娜点心"桥段的另一段描述：
And suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because on these mornings I did not go out before mass), when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tissane. ^(119){ }^{119} 突然间，往事浮现在眼前。那味道正是我小时候在贡布雷（因为礼拜天早晨做弥撒前我都不出门），每当我到莱奥妮姑妈卧室向她请安时，她总会先在她那杯茶或药茶里浸一下，然后递给我的那块小玛德莱娜点心的滋味。 ^(119){ }^{119}
This brief but critical scene shows body, place, and psyche not merely as juxtaposed but as dynamic co-participants. Just as the taste of the madeleine penetrates Marcel’s remembering/remembered body and as the latter moves through the bedroom of Aunt Léonie, so the room itself and the larger setting of Combray are inseparable from the body memory awakened by the tea taste: this memory imbibes place as surely as Marcel’s young body imbibed the fateful tea. Body memory and place memory alike fill out the recollection, “the memory” of the entire event as this is recaptured in the psyche of the adult Marcel, who is recollecting the petite madeleine episode from a point in time many years later. But thanks to the embodied and implaced character of this episode, what would otherwise be a purely psychical act of recollection exfoliates fully into the past it is remembering, participating concretely in it. The passing mention of a “mass” on Sunday morning reinforces the participatory power of the scene as we are suddenly made aware that Marcel and his aunt, who together form a dyadic communitas, are experiencing their own communion in advance of the official ceremony. The petite madeleine and the tea become the sacraments in an informal ritual that is no less commemorative than the Eucharist itself, since it exhibits elements of solemnification and memorialization. Perdurance is present as well: the remembrance of this particular scene unlocks an entire past which will be continually recaptured in the course of the novel, and it encourages the reader to perpetuate this same past in his or her memory-to honor it by future readings or rememberings. From this moment on, the past of Combray will be lastingly coming toward us. 这一简短却关键的场景展现了身体、地点与心灵不仅是并置的，更是动态的共同参与者。正如玛德琳蛋糕的滋味渗入马塞尔那正在记忆/被记忆的身体，而后者穿行于莱奥妮姨妈的卧室，这房间本身乃至整个贡布雷的大环境都与茶香唤醒的身体记忆密不可分：这段记忆如同马塞尔幼时身体啜饮那杯命运之茶般，确凿地吸纳了场所。身体记忆与场所记忆共同充盈着"那段记忆"——当成年马塞尔在多年后某个时刻重新捕捉小玛德琳插曲时，整个事件的回忆在其心灵中复苏。但由于该片段具身化与情境化的特质，本可能仅是纯粹心理层面的回忆行为，却完全舒展至它所追忆的往昔，具体地参与其中。周日早晨对"弥撒"的匆匆提及，强化了场景的参与性力量——我们突然意识到，马塞尔与他姨妈这对二元共同体，正在正式仪式前经历着属于他们的共融。 小巧的玛德琳蛋糕与茶水在这场非正式仪式中成为了圣礼，其纪念意义不亚于圣餐本身，因为它同样具备庄严化与追忆的特质。持久性亦蕴含其中：对这一特定场景的回忆开启了一个完整的过往世界，这一世界将在小说进程中不断被重新捕捉，并促使读者在其记忆中延续这段过往——通过未来的阅读或回忆来致敬它。从此刻起，贡布雷的往昔将持久地向我们涌来。
It is telling that the opening onto this past is provided by a sensation of taste, surely the most thoroughly participatory form of body memory and contrasting, in this very respect, with visual memory. Remarking that it could not have been the visual shape of the petite madeleine that would evoke the world of Combray-having seen so many similar shapes that it had lost its “power of expansion” ^(120){ }^{120}-Marcel muses: 值得注意的是，通往这段过往的入口是由味觉感受提供的——这无疑是身体记忆中最具参与性的形式，与视觉记忆在这方面形成鲜明对比。马塞尔沉思道：不可能是玛德琳蛋糕的视觉形态唤起了贡布雷的世界（因其见过太多相似形状已失去"扩张力"） ^(120){ }^{120} ——
But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, taste and smell alone, more fragile but more enduring, more unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, remain poised a long time, like souls, remembering, waiting, hoping, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unflinchingly in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection. ^(121){ }^{121} 然而当久远的往昔已荡然无存，当故人皆已离世，当旧物尽数破碎消散，唯有味觉与嗅觉——虽更脆弱却更恒久，更虚无却更执着，更飘渺却更忠贞——如同灵魂般长久悬停在所有废墟之中，铭记着，等待着，希冀着；并在它们那微小到几乎难以察觉的精髓里，无畏地承载着回忆的宏伟大厦。
Memory of taste (and of smell, closely associated with it) perdures because of its capacity to permeate one’s entire sensibility and thus to be an invaluable sacrament, a worthy commemorabilium able to “bear unflinchingly” the weight of the commemorandum (here, Combray-in-the-past). Precisely as so deeply interfusing-as a profoundly participatory element-such memory is also able to bear “the vast structure of recollection”: which is to say, the episodic past as conveyed by successive mental representations. In comparison with body memory in its most highly participatory mode-and in a significantly commemorative setting-recollection presents itself as a secondary formation, as a superstructure of memory. This suggests that just as representation supervenes upon and presupposes participation, so recollection is parasitic on body memory and the commemoration which it helps to realize. 味觉记忆（以及与之紧密相关的嗅觉记忆）之所以持久，是因为它能渗透人的整个感知系统，从而成为一种无价的圣礼，一种值得珍藏的纪念品，能够"坚定地承载"被纪念之物的重量（在此处即指过去的贡布雷）。正是这种深度交融——作为一种高度参与性的元素——使得此类记忆也能承载"回忆的宏大结构"：也就是说，通过连续的心理表征所传递的片段式过往。与身体记忆最具参与性的模式相比——在一个极具纪念意义的场景中——回忆呈现为一种次级构造，是记忆的上层建筑。这表明，正如表征以参与为前提并叠加其上，回忆也寄生于身体记忆及其所协助实现的纪念活动之中。
(3) Commemoration is not separable in the end from body memory-or from place memory either. Each is an essential component, an equiprimordial part, in remembering that goes beyond-perhaps we should also say under-mind. Moreover, far from being a momentary affair, something restricted to particular ceremonial occasions, commemorating is continually occurring. We can even say that all remembering has a commemorative component. How can this be? (3) 纪念活动最终无法与身体记忆——或场所记忆——割裂开来。它们都是记忆行为中不可或缺的要素，是超越心智（或许我们还应说潜藏于心智之下）的同等原初组成部分。不仅如此，纪念远非转瞬即逝之事，不只局限于特定仪式场合，而是持续不断地发生着。我们甚至可以说，所有记忆行为都包含着纪念成分。何以如此？
The remarkable capacity of participation to connect even the most disparate entities and events is what lies behind commemoration’s own quite remarkable connectiveness, which is unrivaled in the realm of memory. Consider, for example, the fact that the universe for Plato would be hopelessly bifurcated between Forms and particulars unless the latter somehow participated in the former, that is, managed to share in their constancy and reiterability. Material particulars would otherwise be so wholly contingent as to be parts of Becoming only; they would be strictly inconstant, indeed would never really be at all. By the same token, Forms need the participation of particulars if they are not to be entirely abstract and otiose. ^(127){ }^{127} In other words, the participation is quite reciprocal: what the particular gains by way of definiteness, the Form gains as realization in the empirical world. 参与所具有的非凡能力，能将最不相干的实体与事件联系起来，这正是纪念活动本身无与伦比的联结性背后之奥秘。试想，若柏拉图的宇宙中，具体事物无法以某种方式参与理念——即分享其恒常性与可重复性——那么形式与具体事物将陷入无可救药的割裂。物质性的具体事物将彻底沦为偶然，仅属于流变之域；它们将全然无常，甚至根本谈不上真实存在。同理，理念若不想完全沦为抽象无用之物，也需要具体事物的参与。换言之，这种参与是双向互惠的：具体事物由此获得确定性，而理念则得以在经验世界中实现自身。
Even in the most ordinary forms of commemorating we discover just such a mutual conditioning of primary terms-terms that thereby participate in each other in ways that strikingly resemble the operation of Platonic methexis or metaphysical participation. As the commemorandum gives specificity of focus and stability of reference to the commemorabilium, so the commemorative vehicle in its material or psychical concreteness allows the commemorated object or event to be regained in memory-to be realized there. What I have called “remembering-through” is itself an expression of this reciprocal participation: the commemorative medium can be traversed in two directions. Moreover, just as the result of methexis is the creation of continuity where before there had been only the prospect of an unredeemed dualism, so commemorating likewise links terms otherwise belligerently opposed (e.g., body/mind, self/other) or indifferently juxtaposed (i.e., past/present). The effect is one of interpenetration from within, an effect which resonates throughout remembering of every major kind. If body memory anchors human existence and if place memory locates it, commemoration connects iti t. 即便在最普通的纪念形式中，我们也能发现基本术语之间存在着这种相互制约的关系——这些术语以惊人相似于柏拉图"分有论"（methexis）或形而上学参与机制的方式彼此交融。当纪念对象（commemorandum）为纪念载体（commemorabilium）提供具体的聚焦点和稳定的参照系时，具象化的物质或心理纪念载体也让被纪念的对象或事件得以在记忆中重现——在那里获得实现。我称之为"穿透式记忆"的现象，正是这种双向参与的体现：纪念媒介可以沿两个方向被穿越。此外，正如分有论的结果是在原本不可调和的二元对立中创造出连续性，纪念行为同样能联结那些原本尖锐对立（如身体/心灵、自我/他者）或漠然并置（即过去/现在）的术语。这种从内部发生的相互渗透效应，会在所有重要类型的记忆过程中产生共鸣。如果说身体记忆锚定了人类存在，场所记忆为其定位，那么纪念行为则实现了 iti t 。
That the participation ingredient in the operation of commemoration and the participation at work in Platonic metaphysics are more than merely 纪念活动中的参与成分与柏拉图形而上学中的参与运作远非仅止于此
formally similar is suggested by Plato’s own doctrine of anamnesis, “recollection” in his strictly non-representational use of the term. In grounding a finite awareness of one’s immediate world in an absolute knowing of the Forms, anamnesis at the same time connects the individual soul with its own past existence. Attainment of eidetic knowledge occurs only in and through reconnection with a former state of being. Further, this re-connection is commemorative in character: not just because tribute is being paid to previous experiences of knowing or because there is a ritualistic element involved (i.e., moving through preordained stages of philosophical dialectic) but more importantly because a process of intrapsychic memorialization is at play in anamnesis. As in mourning, there is a sedimentation of earlier experiences into the soul such that they require being drawn out in acts of maieusis (“mid-wifery”) which are reminiscent of acts of psychoanalytic transference. As consolidated within, these proto-experiences ^(128){ }^{128} constitute psychical memorials of a primal knowing which it is the object of anamnesis to recover. Such inward coming-to-know-again is as deeply commemorative as is the equally interior retaining of other persons as internalized presences in mourning. If “knowledge is recollection,” ^(129){ }^{129} knowledge is also commemoration; it re-connects us with a past life via internalized sedimentations of an Urknowing originally obtained in that life. ^(130){ }^{130} 柏拉图本人提出的"回忆说"（anamnesis）——他严格非再现性地使用这一术语——暗示了形式上的相似性。回忆说将个体对当下世界的有限认知建立在对于理型的绝对认识之上，同时将个体灵魂与其过往存在相连接。获得本质知识只能通过并经由与先前存在状态重新建立联系来实现。更进一步说，这种重新连接具有纪念性质：不仅因为要向先前的认知经验致敬，或因为其中涉及仪式性元素（即经历预先规定的哲学辩证阶段），更重要的是因为回忆说中运作着一种心理内部的纪念化过程。如同哀悼一般，早期经验在灵魂中沉积，需要通过"接生术"（maieusis）行为将其引出——这种行为令人联想到精神分析中的移情作用。这些被内化的原始经验构成了对原初认知的心理纪念物，而回忆说的目标正是要重新获取这种认知。 这种内在的再度认知，与哀悼中将他人作为内化存在的同等内在保留一样，具有深刻的纪念性。若"知识即回忆"，那么知识也是纪念；它通过最初在该生命中获得的原初认知所内化的沉淀物，将我们与过往生命重新连接起来。
X
But, surely, commemoration has as much to do with ends as with origins! For one thing, we cannot fully commemorate something unless it has come to an end in some significant sense: if it were still going on, still acting or living, we would be enjoying or celebrating it (or suffering from or execrating it) rather than commemorating it. For another, the very ending of something may induce regret or nostalgia-a feeling of loss-which in turn encourages commemoration as a way of coping with the fact of ending itself. Commemoration can even be viewed as a way of coming to terms with the absence or distance effected by ending. This is the gist of Freud’s treatment of the commemoration accomplished by mourning, itself a response to “object loss.” Couldn’t we say that much of the motivation for commemoration derives from having to confront “separation anxiety”-for which death merely provides the most acute occasion? Could we not even say that commemoration of origins themselves is somehow about ends-about events (or persons or ideas) that, precisely as origins, have come to an end, ^(131){ }^{131} or that are still engaged in a process of ending? 然而，纪念确实与终结和起源同样密切相关！一方面，除非某事物在某种重要意义上已经终结，否则我们无法充分纪念它：如果它仍在继续，仍在行动或存活，我们更可能是在享受或庆祝它（或是因它受苦或憎恶它），而非纪念它。另一方面，事物的终结本身可能引发遗憾或怀旧——一种失落感——这反过来促使人们通过纪念来应对终结这一事实。纪念甚至可以被视为一种与终结造成的缺席或疏离达成和解的方式。这正是弗洛伊德对哀悼所完成的纪念的论述核心，而哀悼本身是对"客体丧失"的回应。我们难道不能说，纪念的动机很大程度上源于不得不面对"分离焦虑"——而死亡只不过为此提供了最尖锐的契机？我们甚至可以说，对起源本身的纪念在某种程度上关乎终结——关乎那些恰恰作为起源已经终结的事件（或人物、观念）， ^(131){ }^{131} 或仍处于终结过程中的事物？
This last-named possibility is an important one. Even when commemoration bears straightforwardly on something that is ending-e.g., “the end of an era”-it still may not be directed at anything simply terminal. On the contrary, the commemorating may itself serve to prolong the ending, giving to it 最后这种可能性尤为重要。即便纪念活动直指某种终结之物——例如"一个时代的终结"——它也可能并非仅仅指向终点。相反，纪念行为本身或许正延续着这种终结，赋予它
(and to its origin) a species of after-life. If “what has been brings about futural approaching,” ^(132){ }^{132} this is all the more true in the case of commemorating, which is capable of transforming something “frozen in the finality of rigor mortis” ^(133){ }^{133} into a re-living presence, alive in the minds and bodies of its commemorators. In mourning, the dead or absent other is transmogrified into an active internal presence; thus something that has come to an end in terms of world-time acquires an ongoing ending in and through commemoration. Insofar as such ending is not yet concluded, it will be going on in the future. Commemorating here exhibits its Janusian ability to look at once forward and backward: or more exactly, to look ahead in looking back. （及其起源）某种形式的来世。如果说"过往造就未来的临近" ^(132){ }^{132} ，那么在纪念活动中这点尤为显著——它能将"冻结在死亡僵局中的事物" ^(133){ }^{133} 转化为鲜活的在场，存活于纪念者的身心之中。哀悼仪式里，逝者或缺席者被转化为活跃的内在存在；因此，在世界时间中已然终结的事物，通过纪念获得了持续性的终结。只要这种终结尚未真正完结，它就将在未来持续延展。纪念在此展现出其两面神般的双重能力：既能同时瞻前顾后，更准确地说，是在回望中前瞻。
Freud would have described such a situation as one of “deferred action” (Nachträglichkeit): by being commemorated, what might otherwise end altogether, come to a definite close, is granted a delayed efficacy. In this respect commemorating enables the past not just to evanesce in the present ^(134){ }^{134} but, more crucially, to traverse the present on its way to becoming future. It is as if the very delay in discovery or recognition-or in simple appreciationempowers the past to gain an increased futurity. As Freud remarks of deferred happenings generally, the effect seems to exceed the cause, contravening the Aristotelian-Cartesian assumption that there must be at least as much reality in a cause as in its effect. ^(135){ }^{135} Such is the force of commemoration when it is fully and freely enacted. 弗洛伊德会将这种情境描述为"延迟作用"（Nachträglichkeit）：通过被纪念，那些本可能彻底终结的事物获得了延后的效力。就此而言，纪念不仅让过去不会消逝于当下 ^(134){ }^{134} ，更重要的是使其穿越当下而抵达未来。仿佛正是这种发现、认知或单纯欣赏的延迟，赋予了过去更强的未来性。正如弗洛伊德对延迟事件的普遍评论：效果似乎超越了原因，违背了亚里士多德-笛卡尔关于"原因至少要与结果具有同等实在性"的假设 ^(135){ }^{135} 。这就是当纪念被充分自由地实施时所展现的力量。
If commemoration is indeed a way of coming to terms with ending and if it succeeds to the extent that it refuses to succumb to the sheer pastness of the past-its facticity, its “frozen finality,” its severe “It was” ^(136){ }^{136}-then it must consist in an action of carrying the past forward through the present so as to perdure in the future. But the past can be carried forward in this fashion only if it has attained a certain consistent selfsameness in the wake of the perishing of the particulars by which it had once presented itself. This selfsameness is what Whitehead calls “objective immortality”: “actual entities ‘perpetually perish’ subjectively, but are immortal objectively.” ^(137){ }^{137} Commemoration not only looks forward in looking back, thereby transmitting deferred effects of the past, it affirms the past’s selfsameness in the present by means of a consolidated re-enactment, thus assuring a continuation of remembering into the future. Whether this re-enactment is by text or ritual, or whether it occurs within the psyche, it connects past with present in a genuinely perduring way. And if commemoration brings about a circumstance in which “what has been offers future to itself,” ^(138){ }^{138} it does so less from the future-as Heidegger holds-than from the present. In this present, where commemorating is bound to occur, a memorialization of the past is brought forth which, as ritualistic, textual, or intrapsychic, allows for the past to be borne forward rememoratively into the future. Ultimately, we remember through such a memorialization, which defies reduction to the separatist categories of ‘matter’ or ‘psyche’-indeed, to ‘self’ and ‘other’, or even to ‘past’ and ‘present’. In 倘若纪念确是一种与终结达成和解的方式，且其成功之处在于拒绝屈服于过往纯粹的逝去性——即其事实性、"凝固的终局"、严酷的"曾经存在"——那么纪念必然蕴含一种将过去经由当下传递至未来以求永续的行动。但唯有当过去在细节消亡后仍保持某种恒定的自我同一性时，它才能以这种方式被传递。这种自我同一性正是怀特海所称的"客观不朽"："现实实体会在主观层面'不断消逝'，却在客观层面获得不朽。"纪念不仅通过回望来前瞻，从而传递过去的延迟效应，更通过强化的重演仪式在当下确认过去的自我同一性，由此确保记忆活动在未来持续。无论这种重演以文本或仪式为载体，抑或发生于心灵内部，它都以真正持久的方式将过去与当下相连。 如果说纪念创造了一种情境，使"过往得以向自身馈赠未来" ^(138){ }^{138} ，那么这种馈赠更多源自当下——而非海德格尔所主张的未来维度。正是在这个必然发生纪念行为的当下时刻，对过去的记忆化过程得以展开；无论通过仪式实践、文本记载还是心理内化，这种记忆化使得过去能够以追忆的方式被承载至未来。归根结底，我们正是通过这种记忆化来实现回忆——它拒绝被简化为"物质"与"心灵"的二元对立，甚至消解了"自我"与"他者"、"过去"与"现在"的严格分野。
this memorialization all such metaphysically determined dyads begin to dissolve, and the inner connection of their respective members-their intimate participation in each other-becomes apparent. 在这种记忆化过程中，所有形而上学设定的二元结构都开始瓦解，其组成要素间的内在联结——它们彼此间深刻的相互参与——变得清晰可辨。
It is usual to regard commemoration (when commemoration is considered at all) as a merely derivative mode of memory. But I have been suggesting that, on the contrary, commemorating is an “intensified remembering” and that it is integral to remembering, as inherent in it as are body memory and place memory. Memory is always memorializing-however fleetingly, inconsistently, or inadequately on a given occasion. To remember is to commemorate the past. It is to redeem the perishing of particulars in a selfsameness that conspires in the present to persist into the future. 人们通常认为纪念（如果纪念确实被考虑的话）仅仅是记忆的一种衍生模式。但我一直在暗示，恰恰相反，纪念是一种"强化的记忆"，它是记忆不可或缺的组成部分，就像身体记忆和场所记忆一样内在于记忆本身。记忆总是在进行纪念——无论某个特定场合下的纪念多么短暂、不一致或不充分。记忆就是对过去的纪念。它是在自我同一性中救赎那些消逝的细节，这种同一性在当前密谋着要持续到未来。
Whitehead cites a Latin inscription on ancient sundials: Pereunt et imputantur, “the hours perish and are laid to account.” ^(139){ }^{139} Commemoration can be considered the laying to account of perishings, the consolidating and continuing of endings. It is the creating of memorializations in the media of ritual, text, and psyche; it enables us to honor the past by carrying it intact into new and lasting forms of alliance and participation. 怀特海引用古代日晷上的拉丁铭文：Pereunt et imputantur，"时光流逝，但会被记取"。纪念可以被视为对消逝之物的记取，是对终结的巩固与延续。它是通过仪式、文本和心理等媒介创造纪念形式；它让我们能够通过将过去完整地带入新的、持久的联结与参与形式中来尊崇过去。
CODA 终章
The purpose of this Part has been to pursue memory beyond mind-or more exactly, to show that it is already beyond it. “Beyond” does not mean simply external to, much less triumphant over. Mind remains essential to human remembering; it continues to exhibit its importance in memorial matters-as we have just witnessed in the case of intrapsychic memorialization. And precisely because an activity like commemorating puts the body/ mind dichotomy into suspension, it suggests that mentation continues to be deeply ingredient in memory even when a given act of remembering is not explicitly cogitative in character. Indeed, the rooting of the word “memory” in memor- (mindful)-and ultimately of “remembering,” “reminding,” and “reminiscing” in mens (mind)-bespeaks the same ingrediency, as does the striking fact that gemynd in Old English means equally “memory” or “mind.” If we are to move beyond mind in memory in the ways that have been explored in the preceding six chapters, we must not forget that mind always lies close behind memory. However withdrawn it may be as an origin, and however skeptical we may be as to its role in modern theories of memory, it is never altogether absent from the memorial life. 本部分的目的是将记忆研究拓展至心灵之外——更准确地说，是揭示记忆本就超越心灵范畴。"超越"并非简单指外在独立，更非凌驾其上。心灵对人类记忆活动仍至关重要；正如我们刚在心理内部纪念活动中所见，它持续展现着在记忆事务中的核心地位。正因纪念这类活动使身心二元对立得以悬置，它表明即便某个记忆行为不具明显思维特征时，心智活动仍深度参与记忆构成。事实上，"memory"（记忆）一词植根于 memor-（留心的）——最终"remembering"（回忆）、"reminding"（提醒）和"reminiscing"（追忆）都源自 mens（心智）——这种词源关系同样昭示着心智的构成性作用，古英语中 gemynd 同时表示"记忆"与"心智"的惊人事实亦复如是。若要通过前六章探讨的方式实现记忆对心灵的超越，我们切不可遗忘：心灵始终潜藏于记忆近旁。 然而，无论它作为起源多么隐退，无论我们对它在现代记忆理论中的作用多么怀疑，它从未在记忆生活中完全缺席。
It is of considerable interest, however, to notice that memory is also cognate with “Minerva,” goddess of wisdom, and with “mania,” madness in the express sense of being “out of one’s mind.” Minerva would doubtless advise us to move beyond constricted conceptions of mind so as to be closer to the heart: minna (love) is yet another etymon of memory. ^(1){ }^{1} The way of wisdom is not to become caught in encapsulated, self-limiting notions of what is to have (or to be) a mind-notions which are all too prominent in the post-Cartesian era of representationalism. To follow the lead of Minerva in this matter may well take us out of our minds; it may even require a measure of mania, a certain démesuré boldness that contrasts with the sobriety of many accounts of memory, including that given in Part One of this book. But mania is in turn closely related to mantis (seer), and to mantra (counsel, prayer, hymn). ^(2){ }^{2} To go out of one’s mind is to see beyond what there is to see within the confines of the sheerly mental, where everything is nested within a hierarchy of representations. It is to obtain counsel, a special seeing, which might not otherwise be obtainable: excess may be the only means of access. 然而值得注意的是，记忆（memory）与智慧女神"密涅瓦"（Minerva）同源，也与"癫狂"（mania）——即"心神出离"的直白含义——存在词源关联。密涅瓦必定会建议我们超越狭隘的心智概念，从而更接近心灵本质：古语"minna"（爱）正是记忆的另一个词源。 ^(1){ }^{1} 智慧之道在于避免陷入那些自我设限的、将心智视为封闭容器的观念——这种观念在后笛卡尔时代的表征主义思潮中尤为盛行。追随密涅瓦的指引或将使我们进入"出神"状态；这甚至需要某种程度的癫狂，一种与本书第一部分等众多记忆论述所持的审慎态度形成鲜明对比的、近乎僭越的勇气。但癫狂本身又与"先知"（mantis）、"真言"（mantra，含谕示/祷文/颂诗之意）紧密相连。 ^(2){ }^{2} 所谓"心神出离"，实则是要超越纯粹心智疆域内可见之物——在那里，万物皆被嵌套于表征的等级秩序之中。 这是为了获得一种特殊的洞见，一种可能无法通过其他方式获得的指引：过度或许才是唯一的途径。
So it has been in the present case. In Parts Two and Three intensive and extensive treatments have been devoted to aspects of memory that move us beyond mind construed in any narrowly epistemological sense. This has been possible only because the mind that is genuinely immanent in memory was already beyond itself when it was construed as solipsistic self-enclosure. The mind of memory is already in the world: it is in reminders and in reminisc- 当前的研究正是如此。在第二和第三部分中，我们对记忆的诸多面向进行了深入而广泛的探讨，这些探讨使我们超越了任何狭隘认识论意义上的心灵概念。之所以能做到这一点，是因为真正内在于记忆中的心灵，当其被理解为孤立的自我封闭时，其实早已超越了自身。记忆中的心灵本就存在于世界之中：它存在于各种提示物里，存在于往事的追忆间。
ences, in acts of recognition and in the lived body, in places and in the company of others. In each of these six circumstances, mind, interpreted as a cogito thinking a cogitatum, is exceeded; each case is extra-cogitational. Yet, except as refracted in the mental mirror of a Cartesian consciousness, these circumstances have not been accorded their rightful due in modern epistemologies. They are either systematically neglected-as happens with reminders and reminiscences, and with body and place-or considered irresolvably problematic (as in the history of lucubrations on the nature of recognition or “the problem of other minds”). But precisely in their outcast status they merit our attention: they deserve being remembered in their own right. 在认知行为与生活体验中，在识别活动与鲜活躯体里，在特定场所与他人相伴时。这六种情境中，每一种都超越了将心智解读为"我思故我在"的认知模式；每种情形都属于超思维范畴。然而，除了在笛卡尔意识的心理镜像中被折射外，这些情境在现代认识论中并未获得应有的重视。它们要么被系统性忽视——正如提示物与追忆、身体与场所的遭遇——要么被视为无法解决的难题（如同历史上关于识别本质的艰深研究或"他心问题"的探讨）。但恰恰是这种被放逐的处境使它们值得我们关注：它们本身就值得被铭记。
In a common movement beyond mentalism, the three topics treated in Part Three-body memory, place memory, commemoration-are of special significance. Each offers an adverbial twist to human memory: 在共同超越心理主义的进程中，第三部分探讨的三个主题——身体记忆、场所记忆和纪念仪式——具有特殊意义。每个主题都为人类记忆提供了状语性的转折：
WITHNESS 共在性
Whitehead remarks that “we see the contemporary chair, but we see it with our eyes” ^(3){ }^{3} and that, overall, “we feel with the body.” ^(4){ }^{4} This bodily withness, though elusive, is ever-present: “It is the withness that makes the body the starting point for our knowledge of the circumambient world.” ^(5){ }^{5} Body memory can be said to bear and build on this very withness: to be concerned with it in a basic sense even if it is often only tacitly experienced. What else is habitual body memory but memory of an ongoing, reliable withness of the body in its customary actions? Other kinds of body memory-e.g., erotic or traumaticbring out other aspects of corporeal withness. 怀特海指出："我们看见的是当下的椅子，但我们是透过眼睛看见它" ^(3){ }^{3} ，并总结道："我们是用身体来感知" ^(4){ }^{4} 。这种身体的共在性虽然难以捉摸，却始终存在："正是这种共在性，使身体成为我们认识周遭世界的起点" ^(5){ }^{5} 。可以说，身体记忆承载并建立在这种共在性之上：即使通常只是被默会地体验，它本质上仍与这种共在性密切相关。习惯性身体记忆，不正是对身体在其惯常行动中持续可靠之共在性的记忆吗？其他类型的身体记忆——例如情欲记忆或创伤记忆——则彰显了身体共在性的其他面向。
AROUNDNESS 环绕性
To be implaced in memory is to know our way around: to know the world around us. In memories of place we remember things, pathways, horizons as these concern and encompass us. Together, they constitute a structure of containment, an environment for remembering of many kinds and with many interests: “interest, interesse, means to be among and in the midst of things.” ^(6){ }^{6} As we are among and amidst things in the world, so we are enclosed by the places we inhabit and remember. 在记忆中处于被安置状态，意味着知晓我们的周遭路径：了解环绕我们的世界。在对场所的记忆里，我们忆及那些与我们相关并环绕我们的事物、路径和地平线。它们共同构成了一个包容性结构，一个容纳多种记忆类型与兴趣的环境："兴趣（interest/interesse）意味着置身于事物之中" ^(6){ }^{6} 。正如我们身处世间万物之中，我们也被所栖居和记忆的场所包围着。
THROUGHNESS 通透性
The remembering-through of commemoration occurs in many possible modalities-most conspicuously in textual and ritualistic ones. Quite apart from explicit ritual actions, what I have called “vertical” and “horizontal” communities exhibit an interpersonal throughness, which in commemorative ceremonies occurs in close conjunction with the withness of the body and the aroundness of place. Even in intrapsychic memorialization, however, there is a distinct through-factor, that of identification with the other as sedimented into internalized presence. 纪念活动中的"贯穿性记忆"以多种可能的形式呈现——最显著的是文本形式和仪式形式。除了明确的仪式行为外，我所称的"纵向"和"横向"社群都展现出一种人际间的贯穿性，这种贯穿性在纪念仪式中与身体的"共在性"及场所的"环绕性"紧密相连。然而，即使在个体心理内部的记忆活动中，也存在着明显的贯穿因素——即通过将他人内化为存在而与那个被沉淀的他人产生认同。
Withness, aroundness, and throughness are notably missing from the substantive, unadverbial Cartesian model of mind. As mirroring, this mind is essentially empty; in Locke’s version, it is an entirely empty slate unless and "共在性"、"环绕性"和"贯穿性"在笛卡尔那种实体化、非副词化的心智模型中明显缺失。作为镜像反映，这种心智本质上是空洞的；在洛克的版本中，它完全是一块白板，除非...
until it is filled with representations. Adverbial variegation of the sorts introduced by the three kinds of memory treated in this Part is lacking in a view of mind as strictly self-identified, as egologically self-confined, and as transparent to itself. Hence the concern of the Cartesian conception of mind with accuracy of representation in recollection and reconstruction; hence too its tendency to center, to be centered and central, wherever possible. By contrast, the effect of structures of aroundness, throughness, and withness is to suspend a preoccupation with exactitude and thus to de-center: as we have seen in the polyvalence operative in body memory, the unsuspected complexity of a Chinese garden, and the intricate movements of participants in commemorative ceremonies. In all such cases, there is a noticeable outwarddirectedness, a moving beyond egological boundaries, a moving beyond oneself-beyond one’s self-contained mind in a connective re-membering that is at once manic and mantic, ecstatic and encompassing, outgoing and ongoing. 直到它被各种表征所填满。将心灵视为严格自我认同、自我封闭且对自身透明的观点，缺乏本部分讨论的三种记忆所带来的那种状语式多样性。因此，笛卡尔式心灵观关注回忆与重构中表征的准确性；也因此它倾向于——只要可能——成为中心、被中心化并保持中心地位。相比之下，"周遭性"、"通透性"与"共在性"结构的作用，是悬置对精确性的执着，从而实现去中心化：正如我们在身体记忆的多价性、中国园林出人意料的复杂性以及纪念仪式参与者错综复杂的动作中所见。所有这些情形都呈现出显著的外向性，一种超越自我封闭边界的运动，在连接性的"重新-成员化"过程中超越自身——超越那个自足的心灵，这种过程既是狂躁的又是预言的，既令人狂喜又包罗万象，既外向延伸又持续进行。
Part Four 第四部分
Remembering Re-membered 被重新成员化的记忆
XI 十一
THE THICK AUTONOMY OF MEMORY 记忆的厚重自主性
As those mysterious beings in ancient tales rise from the ocean’s bed invested with seaweed, so [your innermost thought] now rises from the sea of remembrance, interwoven with memories. 正如古老传说中那些神秘生物披着海藻从海底升起，[你内心最深处的思绪]此刻也从记忆之海中浮现，与回忆交织在一起。
-Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol. I ——克尔凯郭尔《非此即彼》第一卷
I
At this late point in an increasingly demanding project we need to perform our own act of anamnesis lest amnesia set in. We have come a long way from the moment of departure in chapter 1-when brief, straightforward analyses of a few first-hand experiences of remembering sufficed to get things underway. We have come a long way, too, from the self-assurance that accompanied the application of an intentionalist model of mind to memory, not to mention the comparative ease of picking out conspicuous eidetic traits of remembering. Since then, matters have become considerably more complex. We have had to confront the many ways in which we remember in media vita, in the very thick of things. This is why we undertook a trajectory in Part Two that drew us not just into the past world of the remembered but decisively into the life-world of the rememberer. To take such memorial phenomena as reminding or recognizing seriously is to be thrust into the particularities of the perceptual world-just as reflection on the nature of reminiscing lands us squarely in the domain of the communal and the discursive. Still more dramatically, we found ourselves caught up in Part Three in circumstances of growing difficulty and diversity as we explored the roles of body and place in remembering, reaching a climax in a consideration of commemorating that had to account for such disparate factors as text, ritual, and intrapsychic identification. By the end of chapter 10, a situation had been reached in which any pretense of providing a merely formal treatment, especially as measured in the classical phenomenological terms 在这个日益繁复的研究项目中，此刻我们亟需进行自己的记忆回溯，以免陷入遗忘的深渊。从第一章开篇时对几则亲身记忆体验的简短直白分析——那些足以启动研究的初步探索——我们已跋涉了漫长路程。同样远去的，还有当初将意向主义心智模型应用于记忆研究时的笃定，更不用说早期挑选记忆显著本质特征时的相对从容。此后，问题变得异常复杂。我们不得不直面"生命中途"记忆的诸般样态，在纷繁世相的核心处探寻记忆真谛。正因如此，我们在第二部分选择的研究路径，不仅将我们引向被记忆者的过往世界，更决然地深入至记忆者的生活世界。若要严肃对待"提醒"或"再认"这类记忆现象，就不得不投身感知世界的特殊肌理——正如对追忆本质的思考，直接将我们置于公共性与话语实践的领域。 更为戏剧性的是，在第三部分探讨记忆中的身体与场所作用时，我们逐渐陷入日益复杂多元的境况。当涉及纪念活动的分析时，这种复杂性达到顶点——我们必须同时考量文本、仪式和心理内部认同等截然不同的因素。到第十章结尾时，任何试图保持纯粹形式化处理的伪装（尤其是以经典现象学标准衡量的尝试）都已难以为继。
with which the book commenced, had to be given up. At that point, “ecstasy” (i.e., literally “standing outside” oneself) had become just as constitutive as anything “encompassing” (i.e., being surrounded in a comfortably comprehensive way). 本书开篇所持的立场不得不被放弃。彼时，"出神"（即字面意义上的"超然于自我之外"）已与"包罗万象"（即以令人安适的全面方式被环绕）同样具有建构性意义。
As it stands, the situation edges on the entropic. Excess and unbalance seem to have replaced the equipoise attained by the end of Part One. Before things get out of hand altogether, we need to re-member remembering; we must put the pieces back together again. These pieces have become not merely numerous-so far, at least twelve major forms of remembering have been identified, ^(1){ }^{1} along with many minor modes-but difficult to assimilate to each other. The danger is only partly that of ending with a static tableau, a mere listing, of prominent features. This is a danger that inheres in any descriptive enterprise, including the present one. Of graver consequence is the danger of incoherence itself-that the forms and structures discussed in the course of our investigations do not cohere with each other, that the pieces do not fit together. What does reminding share with body memory? How does recognition relate to commemoration? Where do place memory and reminiscing become contiguous? 目前的情况正趋于混乱。过度与失衡似乎已取代了第一部分末尾所达成的平衡。在事态彻底失控之前，我们需要重新整合记忆；必须将这些碎片重新拼合。这些碎片不仅数量庞大——迄今为止至少已识别出十二种主要记忆形式，以及诸多次要模式——更难以彼此融合。危险仅部分在于最终呈现静态的图景，即对显著特征的简单罗列。这是任何描述性工作（包括本研究）固有的风险。更严重的后果在于不连贯性本身的危险——我们探究过程中讨论的形式与结构彼此无法呼应，碎片无法契合。提醒与身体记忆有何共通之处？识别与纪念如何关联？场所记忆与追忆在何处接壤？
In asking such questions, I am not seeking for a new set of universal traits held in common by the variety of phenomena scrutinized in this book. To seek such traits would be to attempt yet another eidetic analysis, this time with respect to the results of the book as a whole. Nor is it a question of pursuing in detail the intricate interrelations between particular forms of remembering. Fascinating as these interrelations might prove to be-think only of the subtle interplay that arises between recognition and habitual body memory-they are beyond the scope of the present project. Let me attempt instead to remember where we have been. By this I mean a literal re-membering of the course we have taken, viewing it in terms of what an Aristotelian might label a “unity by analogy.” ^(2){ }^{2} By such unity is not meant a strict synthesis, but a way in which the various parts of the analysis may be seen to cohere with one another in the end. 提出这些问题时，我并非在寻找本书所考察的各种现象共有的新普遍特征。若寻求此类特征，无异于试图进行又一次本质分析——这次是针对全书成果的整体性考察。这也不是要详尽探究特定记忆形式之间错综复杂的相互关系。尽管这些相互关系可能极为迷人——只需想想识别与习惯性身体记忆之间微妙的互动——但它们已超出本项目的研究范围。让我尝试重新忆溯我们走过的路径。我指的是字面意义上的"重新拼合"我们所经历的历程，以亚里士多德学派可能称之为"类比统一性"的视角来审视。 ^(2){ }^{2} 这种统一性并非指严格的综合，而是指分析的各部分最终能够相互契合的方式。
We may take as a clue-a crucial Leitfaden-the observation that as this book has progressed from Part to Part, and even from chapter to chapter, there has been a noticeably deepening rooting of remembering in what could be called the “native soil” of its own enactment. But this rooting has not meant-as we might expect it to mean-an engulfment of memory, its dissolution in particular contents or contexts. Even in the most engaged moments-say, in the very midst of an Ndembu initiation ceremonyremembering retains its identity as a recognizably memorial event. Such self-persistence is one aspect of what I shall designate as memory’s “autonomy.” But more than autonomy is involved in the distinctive self-identity possessed by remembering in its various forms. These forms exhibit in 我们可以将这一观察作为关键线索——随着本书从部分到部分，甚至章节到章节的推进，记忆活动明显更深地扎根于其自身实现的"原生土壤"中。但这种扎根并不意味着——正如我们可能预期的那样——记忆被吞没，消解于特定内容或语境中。即便在最投入的时刻——例如恩登布人成年礼仪式进行时——记忆仍保持着其作为可辨识纪念事件的身份。这种自我持存性，正是我将称之为记忆"自主性"的一个方面。但记忆在各种形式中所具有的独特自我认同，涉及的不仅是自主性。这些形式展现出
differing degrees a trait which can be called “thickness.” It is this trait, above all, that offers a guiding thread at this concluding point. 不同程度地具有一种可称为"厚度"的特质。正是这一特质，在总结阶段为我们提供了关键的指引线索。
Already, in the opening paragraph just above, I said that in the course of this book we had been thrust into “the very thick of things.” This phrase points to the single most inclusive movement in which earlier chapters have been engaged. This is a movement of progressive thickening. The progress of this movement has its own immanent logic. What may have seemed naive or disingenuous about the first steps undertaken in Part One resulted less from an attempt at simplification than from an effort to consider those features of remembering that are diaphanous by nature-transparently given, as only mind can be to itself. As a consequence, the picture of remembering that emerged, based as it was on an intentionalist paradigm, shared much in common with the quite mentalistic portrait of imagination which I have presented elsewhere. Remembering, like imagining, can be depicted as a lambent, evanescent mode of mentation. At once fragile and pellucid, self-aware and self-transcending, memory seen in this light is modeled on a representationalist view of mind-a view controlled by a concern with clarity of insight and with detachment from the surrounding world. 在上文开篇段落中，我已提及本书将带领读者深入"事物最稠密之处"。这个短语指向贯穿前几章最具包容性的思想脉络——一种渐进式稠密化的演进过程。这种演进自有其内在逻辑。第一部分初始步骤中那些看似天真或不够坦诚的论述，与其说是刻意简化，不如说是为了考察记忆那些天生透明的特质——就像心灵对自身呈现般澄明。由此形成的记忆图景，基于意向性范式，与我曾在别处描绘的极度心灵化的想象图景多有共通。记忆如同想象，可被描述为一种轻盈易逝的思维模式。如此观之，记忆既脆弱又澄澈，既自我觉知又自我超越，其模型源自表征主义的心灵观——这种观点执着于洞察的明晰性，追求与周遭世界的超然分离。
It is just such clarity and detachment that come into question when remembering is considered apart from the prismatic looking-glass furnished by mentalism. As soon as we look beyond the glass-and in the actual experience of remembering we always do, even when we think we are still confined within it-we encounter an entire circumambient world, filled with such concreta as instruments and words, perceived objects and other people. In Part Two, I began to take account of such critical “intermediaries” by considering ways in which remembering links up concretely with the world of specific tasks, perceptual configurations, and forms of social life. The role of adumbrative signs in reminding, for example, was seen to tie us to instrumental complexes wherein basic actions are accomplished. So too the communal-discursive aspect of reminiscing serves to mediate between the privacy of auto-reminiscence and full-scale reminiscing in public. And the suffusion that is operative in recognition is characteristic not just of our own remembering minds but of the obdurate objects we confront routinely in the everyday world of work and leisure. In singling out these phenomena, we were acknowledging the interpenetration of remembering into the world around us and of this world itself into our remembering. Thanks to this mutual contamination, each could be said to “thicken” the other in the process. 正是这种明晰与超然，在记忆被抽离出心灵主义提供的棱镜式视角时受到质疑。一旦我们越过这面镜子——在实际的记忆体验中我们总是如此，即便自以为仍困于其中——便会遭遇一个完整的周遭世界，那里充斥着器具与言语、感知对象与他人等具体存在。在第二部分，我开始通过考察记忆如何具体关联特定任务领域、知觉构型及社会生活形态，来关注这些关键的"中介者"。例如，提醒活动中轮廓性符号的作用，被视为将我们与实现基本行为的工具复合体相联结。同样，怀旧的公共言说维度，也在私人自我追忆与完全公开的集体怀旧之间起着调解作用。而识别过程中弥漫的渗透性，不仅是我们记忆心智的特征，更是日常工作与休闲世界中那些顽固对象的固有特质。 在挑选这些现象时，我们承认了记忆对我们周围世界的渗透，以及这个世界本身对我们记忆的渗透。正是这种相互交融，使得双方在此过程中都能"增稠"对方。
The thickening deepened in Part Three. There, we looked carefully into forms of remembering that draw directly, and not just through intermediaries, on our immersion in the life-world. What could be more intimately connected with the life-world than our own body as it remembers itself? Thanks to its powers of habituation and orientation, this same body moves us 这种增稠效应在第三部分得到深化。在那里，我们仔细考察了那些直接（而非仅通过中介）依赖于我们生活世界沉浸的记忆形式。有什么能比我们记忆自身的身体与生活世界联系得更紧密呢？凭借其习惯化和定向能力，正是这个身体推动着我们
resolutely into the places that make up the familiar landscape of our lives. The body-place Gestaltkreis is itself a basic unit-perhaps the basic unit-of human being-in-the-world. Through the stabilized implacement it makes possible, we truly enter into the thick of things, and thus into their enriched memory as well. When still other modes of thickening are in playthickenings via text, or ritual, or the psychical incorporation of others-we find a dense situation indeed: thickening on thickening, thickening of thickening. This is precisely what we discover in commemoration, which represents an extreme in this very respect. In its multi-layered translucency, it stands as an antipode of recollection’s self-transparency and monoscenic dimensionality. 坚定地融入构成我们生活熟悉景观的那些地方。身体-场所的格式塔循环本身就是人类在世存在的基本单元——或许是最基本的单元。通过它所实现的稳定安置，我们真正进入了事物的核心，也因此进入了它们丰富的记忆之中。当其他增稠模式也在发挥作用时——通过文本、仪式或对他者的心理内化——我们确实面临一种稠密的情境：层层叠加的增稠，增稠之上的增稠。这正是我们在纪念活动中所发现的，在这方面它代表了一种极致。在其多层次的半透明性中，纪念与回忆的自我透明性和单场景维度形成了鲜明对照。
Other indications of the thickening of memory include the adverbial structures of throughness, aroundness, and withness that were delineated in the Coda to Part Three. Each of these structures represents a special manner of memory’s insertion into a particular life-world. We realize some of our most significant remembering by means of these structures: e.g., enacting bodily skills, or remembering having been in certain places. Perhaps most strikingly, the inherent solipsism of recollecting, that is, recalling the past to myself and by myself, gives way to the collectivism of commemoration, in which the density of group awareness and interaction figures prominently. Furthermore, the participation whose prototype is found in commemoration is also at work in body memory and place memory, and in all three cases the divisive dualisms of body/mind, self/other, and past/present are suspended-in contradistinction to recollection, which thrives on these very dualisms. The suspension itself is a matter of thickening, of allowing for increased coalescence of otherwise disjunctive terms. 记忆增厚的其他迹象包括第三部分尾声所描述的"贯穿性"、"环绕性"与"共在性"等副词结构。这些结构各自体现了记忆嵌入特定生活世界的特殊方式。我们正是通过这些结构实现某些最重要的记忆行为：例如激活身体技能，或忆起曾经到访的某些场所。或许最引人注目的是，回忆行为固有的唯我主义——即由我独自向自己召唤过往——让位于纪念活动的集体主义，其中群体意识与互动的密度显得尤为突出。此外，以纪念活动为原型的参与性同样作用于身体记忆与场所记忆，在这三种情形中，身心二分、自我/他者对立以及过去/现在割裂等分裂性二元论都被悬置——这与依赖这些二元对立的回忆行为形成鲜明对比。这种悬置本身就是增厚的过程，使得原本分离的要素得以增强融合。
Although I have been drawing thus far mainly on the metaphorical resonances of the word “thick” in the phrase “thick autonomy”-as is most evident in my talk of memorial “thickening” of several kinds-the word has a determinate semantic content. For “thick” as it applies to matters of memory means centrally: possessing a depth not easily penetrable by the direct light of consciousness (most obviously in the case of obdurate body memories but also in circumstances of reminding and recognizing, reminiscing and commemorating); resistant to conceptual understanding (for example, when I cannot understand why a given memory obsesses me so much); sedimented in layers (as occurs when an entire set of memories clusters around a particular place); and having “historical depth” (i.e., when my memories bear on the same thing as those of a preceding generation through our sharing the same symbolic nexus). Also invoked in calling memories “thick” are such things as a specific temporal density (e.g., “perdurance” as this was discussed in chapter 10); a concentrated emotional significance, ranging from feelings of regret or nostalgia to the sheer pleasure of recognizing a longabsent friend; a coarsely textured surface (i.e., as a result of the overlay of 尽管迄今为止我主要借助"厚重自主性"这一短语中"厚重"一词的隐喻性回响——这在我对多种记忆"增厚"现象的讨论中尤为明显——但该词本身具有明确的语义内涵。就记忆领域而言，"厚重"的核心含义包括：具有意识之光难以直接穿透的深度（最明显地体现在顽固的身体记忆中，也存在于提醒与识别、追忆与纪念的情境中）；抗拒概念性理解（例如当我无法理解为何某个记忆如此困扰我时）；以层层沉积的方式存在（如当整套记忆围绕特定地点聚集时）；以及具有"历史深度"（即当我的记忆通过共享的符号网络与前代人关于同一事物的记忆产生关联时）。 将记忆称为“厚重”时，还涉及以下特质：特定的时间密度（如第 10 章讨论的“持久性”）；浓缩的情感意义，涵盖从遗憾或怀旧之情到认出久别老友的纯粹喜悦；粗糙的纹理表面（即由多重记忆层叠形成的结果）。
successive rememberings); a closely packed or “thickset” format (e.g., filled up with detail); an intimate familiarity in content (as is connoted in the phrase “as thick as thieves”); a compression of objects or events which Freud would label “condensation” in the instance of dreams; and an indistinct presentation (as is true of almost all except “eidetic” memories). As this group of primary and secondary meanings suggests, the semantic scope of “thick” is practically co-extensive with the range of remembering itself. It follows that to remember at all is to connect up with the past in a manner that can be described as thick in one or more of the senses just mentioned. It is to become enmeshed in the thicket of the past-a past which yields itself to remembering only across densely presented (and often multiply mediated) modes of display. 连续不断的回忆）；一种密集或"厚重"的形式（例如充满细节）；内容上的亲密熟悉（如"亲密无间"这一短语所暗示的）；弗洛伊德在梦境实例中会称之为"凝缩"的对象或事件压缩；以及模糊的呈现（除了"遗觉记忆"外，几乎所有记忆都是如此）。正如这组主要和次要含义所示，"厚重"一词的语义范围实际上与记忆本身的范围几乎重合。由此可见，任何形式的回忆都是以一种可被描述为"厚重"的方式与过去建立联系——这种厚重体现在上述一个或多个层面。这意味着陷入往事的密林之中——那个只通过密集呈现（且常常多重媒介化）的展示方式才向回忆敞开的过往。
In the very midst of these diverse modes of memorial thickening we can detect an autonomous action of remembering at work. In fact, I am more, not less, autonomous when I remember in place and about place, in and with my body, in and through others. The range as well as the subtlety of my remembering is enhanced as I enter more fully into my memorial in-der-Welt-Sein. The same is true of the mnemonic modes studied in Part Two. By reminding myself and others, I am a more autonomous agent in the world, less dependent on the whims of others or on the vagaries of circumstance. Indeed, I would scarcely be an autonomous being if I could not recognize others in the first place; and my reminiscing with them consolidates social bonds that empower me in various ways. At every step, an increased density goes hand in hand with an undiminished autonomy. Without this autonomy, the density might be suffocating. But we do not yet know in what such autonomy consists. 在这些记忆稠密化的多元模式中，我们仍能辨识出自主记忆行为的运作。事实上，当我在场所中记忆、关于场所记忆，通过我的身体记忆，与他人共同记忆时，我的自主性不仅没有削弱，反而增强了。随着我更深地融入在世存在的记忆状态，我的记忆广度与精妙程度都得到了提升。第二部分探讨的诸种记忆模式同样如此。通过提醒自己和他人，我成为世界中更具自主性的行动者，更少受制于他人的心血来潮或境遇的无常。若我无法首先识别他者，就几乎谈不上是自主的存在；而与他们的共同追忆巩固了社会联结，以多种方式赋予我力量。每一步发展中，密度的提升都与毫未减损的自主性相伴相生。若失去这种自主性，稠密感或将令人窒息。但我们尚未明了这种自主性究竟由何构成。
II 第二部
The thick autonomy of memory exists in relation to what we might call the factor of the “unresolved remainder.” Certain human activities are essentially remainderless. They merely take place-and exhaust themselves in their occurrence without leaving any significant residue. Imagining is often a case in point, especially when it arises gratuitously and disappears without leaving a trace. Given imagination’s proclivity for the purely possible, it is not surprising that many acts of imagining-e.g., those that we would describe as mere “passing” reveries-do not precipitate themselves into our subsequent life in any lasting way. They “go their own way.” What I have called their “thin autonomy” is an expression of this etherealizing, evaporating tendency. It is hardly surprising, either, that one would tend to conceive such thin autonomy in resolutely mentalistic terms. And it is also not surprising that my own eidetic-cum-intentional analysis of imagination could claim completeness, if not exhaustiveness. ^(3){ }^{3} In the domain of imagining, the question of the unresolved remainder, the restance in Derrida’s term, is not of pres- 记忆的厚重自主性存在于我们可称之为"未解决残余"因素的关联中。某些人类活动本质上是无残余的。它们仅仅发生——并在发生过程中耗尽自身，不留任何重要痕迹。想象往往就是典型案例，尤其是当它无端产生又消逝无踪时。鉴于想象对纯粹可能性的偏好，许多想象行为（例如我们称之为"转瞬即逝"的白日梦）不会以任何持久方式沉淀进我们后续生活，这并不令人意外。它们"自行其是"。我所说的"稀薄自主性"正是这种缥缈蒸发倾向的表现。人们倾向于用纯粹心理学术语来构想这种稀薄自主性，这也毫不奇怪。同样不足为奇的是，我对想象的本质意向性分析即使称不上穷尽，也可宣称是完整的。 ^(3){ }^{3} 在想象领域，未解决残余的问题——德里达术语中的"存留"——并不具...
sing concern. When imagining does move into matters of weight and force (as happens in “active imagination” in Jungian analysis), it moves with more import and yields a more lasting sedimentation. Remembering, in contrast, abides in these same matters as if they constituted its original habitat: it dwells like a native in the realm of remainders. If imaginative autonomy possesses the gossamerlike quality of the wings of Icarus, rising sunward in dry cerulean freedom, any autonomy to which memory may aspire must, like Antaeus, make continued contact with the dense earth of recalcitrant experience. 当想象确实触及重量与力量的问题时（如在荣格分析中的"主动想象"），它会带着更重要的意义移动，并产生更持久的沉淀。相比之下，记忆则安居于这些相同的事物中，仿佛它们构成了其原始栖息地：它如同原住民般栖居在残余物的领域。如果说想象的自主性拥有伊卡洛斯翅膀般轻薄的特性，在干燥蔚蓝的自由中向太阳攀升，那么记忆可能渴望的任何自主性都必须像安泰俄斯那样，与顽固经验的厚重大地保持持续接触。
This does not mean, however, that remembering is anything like a uniform phenomenon. The forms of remembering considered in Part One exhibited minimal density in their operation and so tended to leave very little by way of residue. Such structures as the “mnemonic presentation,” the “memory-frame,” even the “aura” encircling an enframed presentation: all of these imply that remembering consists in a play of surfaces or that it is merely epiphenomenal, having little depth and leaving no important remainder. Similarly, such neatly paired eidetic traits as were explored in chapter 2-i.e., search/display, encapsulment/expansion, and persistence/ pastness-suggest that memory can be categorized and condensed into formal patterns without significant residua. The intentionalist account given in chapters 3 and 4 revealed much the same commitment (or more exactly, pre-commitment) to a binary structuring of the phenomenon-as if it could be exhaustively examined in terms of its act and object phases. The combined results of Part One, constituting only a first approach, need not be questioned at their own level. But we cannot help but wonder whether there was not already in play an uncaptured remainder to which a formalistic analysis is not fully sensitive. 然而，这并不意味着记忆是一种单一的现象。第一部分探讨的记忆形式在其运作中展现出极低的密度，因此往往几乎不留下任何残余。诸如"记忆呈现"、"记忆框架"乃至环绕着框架化呈现的"光晕"等结构：所有这些都暗示着记忆存在于表面的游戏中，或者说它仅仅是附带现象，缺乏深度且不留重要残余。同样，第二章探讨的那些整齐配对的本质特征——即搜索/展示、封装/扩展以及持续/过去性——表明记忆可以被分类并浓缩为形式模式，而不产生显著残留。第三章和第四章给出的意向性描述，也显示出对现象二元结构的类似承诺（或更准确地说，预先承诺）——仿佛记忆可以仅通过其行为阶段和对象阶段就被彻底检视。第一部分综合得出的结论仅构成初步探索，在其自身层面无需质疑。 但我们不禁要问，是否早已存在某种未被捕捉的残余，而形式主义分析对此并不完全敏感。
It was, of course, much this same kind of concern that led Heidegger to depart from Husserl’s noetico-noematic conception of mind with its stress on act-intentionality and to turn to being-in-the-world as a realm in which phenomenology could deal more adequately with all that fell outside the lucidity of pure consciousness-all that remained over after an intentional analysis of such consciousness had been accomplished. Inspired in part by Heidegger’s example, Part Two of this book turned to the unexamined residues which Part One, in its Husserlian zeal, had left out of consideration. Whether in the form of the perceptual particulars that provide the context for recognizing, the semiotic dimensions of reminding, or the role of concrete discourse in reminiscing, we confronted things that would no longer submit to the austerely formal treatment that had been possible in the opening chapters of this book. With this move beyond the eidetic and the intentional, we moved not so much beyond phenomenology as into some of its deeper reaches. 正是这种类似的关切促使海德格尔背离胡塞尔强调行为意向性的"意向活动-意向相关项"心智概念，转而投向"在世存在"这一领域——在此领域中，现象学能更充分地处理那些游离于纯粹意识明证性之外的存在，即对这类意识完成意向分析后仍残留的一切。部分受到海德格尔范例的启发，本书第二部分转向了那些在第一部分胡塞尔式热忱中被忽略的未检视残余。无论是作为识别背景的知觉细节、提醒行为的符号学维度，还是追忆过程中具体话语的作用，我们遭遇的事物已不再屈从于本书开篇章节中那种严格的形式化处理。通过这种对本质与意向性的超越，我们并非要脱离现象学，而是深入其更为幽邃的领域。
In Part Three we entered into still deeper domains. Much as MerleauPonty, in the wake of Heidegger, taught us to immerse ourselves in a single aspect of being-in-the-world-in his case, that of the lived body-so we took 在第三部分中，我们进入了更为深邃的领域。正如梅洛-庞蒂追随海德格尔的脚步，教导我们沉浸于在世存在的某个特定面向——对他而言是活生生的身体——我们同样深入探究了
up three ways in which mnemonic remainders exist in depth. One of these is body memory itself, and its decidedly ingrained character was seen to exhibit a restance resistant to classical or modern categorizations. But we also discovered comparable resistances in the case of place memory and commemoration. Neither unsited landscape features, such as meandering pathways, nor the unplanned movements of rituals can be absorbed without remainder into maps or prescriptions for ceremonial order; and yet precisely as resistant to such modes of organization, these features and movements are crucial for the remembrance of place and of events of collective significance. Not only is there a close affinity between remembering and remaindering in these cases; the thick texture of memory itself is seen in bas-relief. 记忆残余以三种方式深度存在的形态。其一是身体记忆本身，它根深蒂固的特性展现出对古典或现代分类法的抗拒。但我们在场所记忆与纪念仪式中也发现了类似的抵抗性。无论是蜿蜒小径这类无固定位置的景观特征，还是仪式中未经规划的流动轨迹，都无法被完全纳入地图或典礼规程的框架；而正是这种对组织化模式的抵抗，使得这些特征与动态成为纪念场所和集体意义事件的关键所在。这些案例中不仅显现出记忆与残余间的紧密亲缘，记忆本身的厚重肌理也以浅浮雕的形式清晰呈现。
Freud liked to cite Virgil’s oracular pronouncement: Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo, “if I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I will move the Lower Regions.” ^(4){ }^{4} Not altogether unlike Freud, we have turned away from the Higher Powers of mind so as to move into the Lower Regions of body, place, and commemoration-regions where the waters of Acheron, winding circuitously within the memorial underworld of unredeemed remainders, run as thick as they run deep. 弗洛伊德喜欢引用维吉尔的预言性宣言："Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo"（"若我不能使上层力量屈服，我将搅动冥河之水"）。 ^(4){ }^{4} 与弗洛伊德的做法并非完全不同，我们已从心灵的上层力量转向，转而深入身体、场所与纪念的底层领域——在这片未被救赎的残余记忆构成的冥界中，蜿蜒曲折的阿刻戎河水既深且浊。
III 第三章
Let us grant the remarkable and ever-growing density of memorial phenomena as we descend into the lower depths of remembering. In these depths much has remained unexplored, indeed often unsuspected, in previous accounts. But to acknowledge the thickening of memory, its dark underside, is not the same thing as to affirm its autonomy. In fact, it might seem that autonomy is less and less likely to be found as we move into the full density of the phenomenon. At least this would be so in any classical conception of autonomy as self-controlled and self-regulated action. ^(5){ }^{5} The more we discover how immersed memory is in our lives-and our lives in it-the less we may be inclined to consider it as either a creature or a creator of autonomous action. 让我们承认，随着我们深入记忆的底层，记忆现象呈现出显著且不断增长的密度。在这些深层区域，许多内容在以往的叙述中仍未被探索，甚至常常未被察觉。但承认记忆的稠密性及其阴暗面，并不等同于肯定其自主性。事实上，当我们深入这一现象的全部密度时，似乎越来越不可能发现自主性。至少在将自主性理解为自我控制与自我调节行为的任何经典观念中会是如此。 ^(5){ }^{5} 我们越是发现记忆如何深深浸透于我们的生活——以及我们的生活如何浸透于记忆——就越不会倾向于将其视为自主行为的产物或创造者。
If autonomy appears to be an inappropriate designation at this darkened end of the memorial spectrum, it seems just as inapt at the other end, where luminosity prevails. I am thinking specifically of secondary memory in its canonical form as the visualized representation of an episode or scene. Here all is, or should be, clarity and light: the better the memory, i.e., the more “accurate” it is, the more it ought to resemble the original scene as first experienced. The ideal of what Husserl calls “clarification” (Klärung) is pertinent and frequently invoked: “let’s get clear about this memory” we say in this context. ^(6){ }^{6} With the language of illumination goes the idea of transparency; the most completely clarified secondary memory would represent the past so diaphanously that it would rise before us without any of the 如果说自主性在记忆光谱的晦暗一端显得不合时宜，那么在光明占据主导的另一端，它同样显得格格不入。我特指那种典范形式的次级记忆——即对某个事件或场景的视觉化再现。这里的一切都应当清晰明朗：记忆越"准确"，就越应当接近最初体验时的原始场景。胡塞尔所称的"澄清"（Klärung）理想在此显得尤为贴切且常被援引："让我们把这个记忆弄清楚"——我们在此情境中如是说。 ^(6){ }^{6} 与光明语言相伴的是透明性理念；最彻底澄清的次级记忆将如此通透地再现过去，以至于它能毫无阻碍地呈现在我们面前。
distorting effects of an interposed medium such as a text or a bodily action. The absence of any such medium is what allows for the unburdened, the selfillumined character of the situation. We rejoin Kundera at this point: “The absolute absence of a burden causes man to be lighter than air, to soar into the heights, take leave of the earth and his earthly being.” ^(7){ }^{7} 插入媒介（如文本或身体动作）所产生的扭曲效应。正是由于没有任何此类媒介的存在，情境才能呈现出无负担、自我照明的特质。此刻我们与昆德拉的观点不谋而合："绝对的无负担会让人比空气更轻盈，飞向高处，告别大地与尘世的存在。" ^(7){ }^{7}
Unbearable as the lightness of being may be when regarded from a metaphysical standpoint, it is highly prized in the realm of mind-especially when the mind is considered capable of reproducing the past by recollecting it in secondary memory. Given the criteria of accuracy and transparency, the aim of such remembering can only be to picture the past as exactly as possible. What does the “secondary” of secondary memory-and its German analogue, the wieder (“again”) of Wiedererinnerung-mean except precisely to offer a reprise, a repetition, a second presentation, a re-presentation, of a past event that has elapsed in its first form of appearance? The more we press in this direction, the closer we come to an ideal of pictoriality that deserves to be called “photographic.” The photograph suggests itself all too naturally as a paradigm of what recollective remembering ought to be in its fullest realization. “Picture your memories” is a standard statement in Kodak advertising. We are also reminded of the high value placed in our culture on a “photographic memory,” as rare as it is impressive. The ancient ars memorativa, as we have seen, called for the use of explicit and detailed visual imagery. Even in ordinary procedures of memorizing the exact picturing of items is consistently prized and encouraged. 从形而上学的角度看，存在的轻盈或许令人难以承受，但在精神领域却备受珍视——尤其是当心灵被认为能够通过次级记忆重现过往时。根据准确性与透明性的标准，这种回忆的目的只能是尽可能精确地描绘过去。"次级"记忆中的"次级"（及其德语对应词 Wiedererinnerung 中的"wieder"即"再次"）除了意味着对已逝往事最初呈现形式的复现、重复、二次呈现或再现之外，还能有何深意？我们越是朝这个方向深入，就越接近一种值得称为"摄影式"的图像性理想。照片自然而然地成为回忆性记忆在完满实现时应当效仿的范式。"用画面定格回忆"是柯达广告的经典标语。我们也意识到，文化中对"照相式记忆"的推崇——这种能力既罕见又令人惊叹。 正如我们所看到的，古代记忆术要求运用明确而细致的视觉意象。即使在普通的记忆程序中，对事物进行精确的形象化也始终受到重视和鼓励。
The photographic paradigm as applied to memory is a revealing instance of what I called the “passivist” tradition in the Introduction. Passivism, it will be recalled, is the view that all memories of necessity repeat the past in a strictly replicative manner. The contribution of the remembering subject, according to this view, is nugatory-if it is not outright distortive or destructive. From here it is but a short step to the claim that memories are (or should be) copies of past events and objects. Memories should take the form of images that are isomorphic with what they are images of. Aristotle, as we know, was the first to formulate explicitly the claim that remembering is “the having of an image regarded as a copy of that of which it is an image.” ^(8){ }^{8} The claim persists in Russell’s insistence on the pictographic status of “visual memory-images,” which have an “analogy of structure” with their origins. ^(9){ }^{9} Indeed, the hold of passivism is as widespread as it is tenacious, as is evident in a continuing adherence to the idea that memory traces are “structural analogues” of remembered experiences. ^(10){ }^{10} 将摄影范式应用于记忆研究，揭示了我在前言中所称的"被动主义"传统的典型特征。这种观点认为，所有记忆必然以严格复制的方式重现过去。依照此说，记忆主体的能动贡献微不足道——甚至可能完全成为扭曲或破坏性因素。由此只需一步之遥，便可断言记忆（或理应）成为过往事件与对象的复制品。记忆应当呈现为与其所指对象同构的意象。正如我们所知，亚里士多德最早明确提出"记忆就是拥有被视为原物复本的意象"这一主张。罗素则坚持认为"视觉记忆意象"具有图像文字特性，与其源头存在"结构相似性"，延续了这一观点。事实上，被动主义的影响既广泛又顽固，这从学界持续认同记忆痕迹是所记经验的"结构对应物"便可窥见一斑。
The photographic ideal of a purely pictorial memory brings the tradition of passivism to an extreme point. For it suggests that the reproduction of the past at work in secondary memory or recollection is sheerly mechanical in operation. This is an even more extreme conception than is found in the neurophysiological view of engrams-a view which at least maintains the idea of an organic basis of replication. The crucial point for our purposes is 纯粹图像记忆的摄影理想将被动主义传统推向极致。因为它暗示着次级记忆或回忆中对过去的再现纯粹是机械运作的。这一概念甚至比神经生理学对记忆痕迹（engrams）的理解更为极端——后者至少还坚持着复制过程存在有机基础的观点。对我们而言最关键的是
that to the extent that pictoriality of a quasi-photographic sort becomes a paradigm for recollection, no significant sense of autonomy can attach to such memory. For a photograph is nothing other than the determinate effect of a particular efficient cause: such is its fate as a merely mechanical process. As a purely physical product, it has zero autonomy even when “autonomy” is understood in the most constricted sense. A photograph cannot control or regulate itself; it is entirely dependent on external conditions (i.e., the scene to be photographed, the photographer, the physical camera itself). If recollection is indeed a matter of depicting the past in a crisp, visualized format, a format modeled on that of photographic likeness, it will be deprived of any effective autonomy of its own. 当类摄影的图画性成为回忆的范式时，这种记忆便无法获得任何重要的自主性意义。因为照片不过是特定有效原因所决定的产物——这就是它作为纯粹机械过程的宿命。作为一种纯粹的物理产物，即便在最狭义上理解"自主性"，它也毫无自主可言。照片既不能控制也无法调节自身；它完全依赖于外部条件（即被摄场景、摄影师、相机实体本身）。如果回忆确实意味着以清晰可视化的形式——一种仿效摄影相似性的格式——来描绘过去，那么它也将被剥夺任何实质性的自主权。
In fact, it will lack even the thin autonomy that can be attributed to imagination in its freest movements. In its “verticalizing” capacity, imaginative autonomy is guided by the pursuit of pure possibilities. ^(11){ }^{11} No such pursuit, and therefore no such autonomy, is possible in a circumstance in which nothing but the strict replication of settled actualities is at stake. For when recollection takes place in the form of an exact image-that is, with a pictoriality that is isomorphic with the scene remembered-the image employed is wholly dependent on the scene it depicts. No autonomous play, much less any free play, is possible in such a closely conditioned setting. ^(12){ }^{12} 事实上，它甚至将丧失想象力在最自由活动中所能拥有的微弱自主性。在"垂直化"能力中，想象力的自主性由对纯粹可能性的追求所引导。 ^(11){ }^{11} 当回忆以精确意象的形式出现——即与所忆场景同构的图像性时，被调用的意象完全依赖于它所描绘的场景。在这种严格受限的情境下，既不存在自主运作的空间，更遑论任何自由活动。 ^(12){ }^{12}
It must be emphasized, however, that any such situation of zero autonomy is itself a limiting case. It conveys what would obtain if recollection were indeed strictly modeled on the prototype of the photograph. The paradox it presents-the fact that its being disburdened of a distorting medium brings with it the burden of having no autonomy of its own-need not detain us if, in fact, the enactment of recollection rarely attains anything like the photographic ideal but only, at most, a lame approximation to it. And this latter is indeed often the case. Was my memory of vacationing at Yosemite painstakingly pictographic in character? Far from it. Not only were many crucial details lacking-details bearing on such principal matters as time, place, even the sequence of events-but large parts of my recollection were altogether indistinct (e.g., as to where my family ate, the spot we stayed in overnight, the route to the falls). So pictorially imperfect was the memory as a whole that I even called on an actual photograph as an aide-mémoire. My secondary memory itself invoked this photograph as a valuable supplementary object, yet this invocation did not mean that my own act of remembering was quasi-photographic in status. 然而必须强调的是，任何这种零自主性的情况本身都是一种极限案例。它传达的是如果回忆确实严格遵循照片原型时会出现的情形。这种悖论——即摆脱扭曲媒介的同时却背负着缺乏自主性的重担——若回忆行为实际上很少能达到类似摄影理想的状态，至多只是对其蹩脚的近似，那么我们就不必为此困扰。而后者确实是常见情况。我对约塞米蒂度假的记忆真的具有费尽心思的图画特征吗？远非如此。不仅许多关键细节缺失——涉及时间、地点甚至事件顺序等重要事项的细节——而且我回忆中的大部分内容都完全模糊不清（例如家人在哪里用餐、过夜的地点、前往瀑布的路线）。这段记忆在画面呈现上如此不完美，以至于我甚至借助真实照片作为记忆辅助工具。 我的次级记忆本身将这张照片视为有价值的补充对象，但这种召唤并不意味着我的记忆行为在本质上类似于摄影。
The truth of the matter is that recollective memory, however much it may strain after an ideal of purely pictorial replication, only rarely achieves this ideal in practice and, still more tellingly, just as rarely considers the actualization of this ideal to be required for successful remembering. My recollection of the Yosemite visit, for all its obvious shortcomings, was perfectly satisfactory for my purposes-for my personal purposes in remembering it spontaneously and even for my didactic purposes in present- 事实上，回忆性记忆无论多么竭力追求纯粹图像复制的理想，在实践中都极少能实现这一理想。更关键的是，人们同样很少认为实现这种理想是成功回忆的必要条件。我对约塞米蒂之行的回忆尽管存在明显缺陷，却完全满足了我的需求——既满足了我自发回忆的个人目的，甚至也满足了我当前教学示范的意图。
ing it as an initial example in this book. What complicates matters is not the experience of recollecting itself but the charged expectations that are laid on it-expectations that arise from a tendentious theoretical ideal of clarity and exactitude. 本书将其作为初始案例。问题不在于回忆体验本身，而在于人们强加给它的过高期待——这些期待源于对清晰性与精确性带有倾向性的理论理想。
We can be still more positive in our assessment of secondary memory. Not only is most recollecting not purely passive-as it comes to be considered when it is analogized to engrams and especially to photographs-but it contains important elements of activism. These elements include retrospective interpolations, self-interpretations, factors of search-within-memory (as when I ask myself “what must have happened next?”), the heuristic use of imagery or words (i.e., so as to elicit a spontaneous recollection), and even the deliberate use of another quite different recollection to illuminate a currently obscure recollection. In all of these ways I am being anything but passive, much less mechanical. I am not merely picturing my memories; I am bringing them forth in a concerted, and often a quite constructive, manner. Even reproduction, therefore, has a productive aspect. Collection is at work in recollection, and there is something “primary” in secondary memory-something attributable to my own efforts. 我们对次级记忆的评价可以更加积极。不仅大多数回忆并非纯粹被动——当它被类比为记忆痕迹尤其是照片时往往被视为如此——而且它包含着重要的主动成分。这些成分包括回溯性填补、自我诠释、记忆内部搜索因素（比如当我自问"接下来必定发生了什么？"时）、意象或词语的启发式运用（即用以引发自发回忆），甚至刻意使用另一个截然不同的回忆来照亮当前模糊的记忆。通过这些方式，我绝非被动，更非机械。我不仅是在描绘记忆，更在以协同且通常极具建设性的方式召唤它们。因此，即便是再现也具有生产性维度。收集中蕴含着回忆，次级记忆中存在着某种"原发性"——某种源自个人努力的特质。
This is not to say that such an analysis of recollection would confirm Piaget’s position of extreme activism, whereby the schematizing activity of the recollector is given the lion’s share of the credit for what is recollected. ^(13){ }^{13} But it would certainly rule out the opposite extreme of abject passivism as it is found in Aristotle or Russell-and in many kindred empiricists. In fact, it would suggest that the situation is a mixed one, in which active and passive elements vie with one another in the generation of any given recollection. In this situation, passivism serves to remind us that memory is indeed “of the past”; ^(14){ }^{14} it bears on it and borrows from it. This means that memory must be true to the past in certain basic respects. (These will be examined below in section VI.) But mimicry of the past is not required for remembering to occur: to remember is not to pantomime (literally, to “imitate all”), much less to copy something pre-existent. For one can very well have in mind-or enact in the lived body-a simulacrum of the past without remembering that past at all: as in highly repetitive behavior (e.g., a phobia whose origin we have forgotten), or in a memory image so isolated from an appropriate identifying context as to lose its memorial power (as when an unidentified tune haunts us). Just here passivism reaches the limit of its own truth. 这并不是说，对回忆的这种分析会证实皮亚杰的极端能动主义立场——按照这种观点，回忆者图式化活动在回忆内容中占据了绝大部分功劳。 ^(13){ }^{13} 但它确实会排除亚里士多德或罗素（以及许多类似经验主义者）所持的极端被动主义立场。事实上，这表明实际情况是混合的，在任何特定回忆的产生过程中，主动和被动因素相互竞争。在这种情境下，被动主义提醒我们记忆确实是"关于过去"的； ^(14){ }^{14} 它关联并借鉴过去。这意味着记忆必须在某些基本方面忠实于过去（这些将在下文第六节探讨）。但记忆的发生并不需要模仿过去：回忆不是哑剧表演（字面意思是"模仿一切"），更不是复制预先存在的事物。 因为人们完全可以在脑海中——或在活生生的身体里——重现过去的某种拟像，却根本不曾真正回忆起那段过去：比如在高度重复的行为中（例如我们已忘记起源的某种恐惧症），或是当某个记忆影像脱离了恰当的识别语境，从而丧失了其纪念力量时（就像一段无法辨认的旋律萦绕心头那样）。正是在这里，被动主义抵达了其真理性的边界。
In contrast, activism is right to remind us of the positive contributions of the rememberer. The mind of this person-quite apart from his or her bodily actions, implacement, and interpersonal relations-makes a very real difference, not only in how things are remembered but even in precisely what is remembered on a given occasion. Here we observe a formative structuring of the remembered in its cognitive, affective, social, and still other aspects. Think merely of all the circumstances in which “believing 相比之下，主动主义正确地提醒我们记住者的积极贡献。这个人的心智——完全独立于其身体动作、所处位置及人际关系之外——会产生非常实际的影响，不仅影响事物被记住的方式，甚至决定着在特定场合下究竟哪些内容会被记住。在此我们观察到被记忆之物在认知、情感、社会及其他层面上的建构性结构。只需想想所有那些"相信
makes it so”: as often occurs in the notoriously dubious testimony of witnesses to automobile accidents. But this is not to say that memories literally create the past by bringing it into being. ^(15){ }^{15} That thesis lies at the limit of activism, and we need to avoid it as decisively as the corresponding extremity of passivism, while preserving what is permanently insightful in both positions. 使其如此”：正如汽车事故目击者那众所周知的不可靠证词中经常发生的那样。但这并不是说记忆通过将过去带入存在而字面意义上创造了它。 ^(15){ }^{15} 这一论点处于能动主义的极限边缘，我们需要像坚决避免相应的被动主义极端一样避开它，同时保留两种立场中始终具有洞察力的部分。
What has all this invocation of activism and passivism to do with the issue of autonomy? A great deal indeed. Despite our propensity for subjecting recollection to the passivist paradigm of the photograph, recollecting itself is hardly an unactive affair. It models the past rather than merely remodeling it, and to be able to do this is to be autonomous in a way that is not just “thin,” tempting as it may be to apply this term to it. Recollecting no more pursues pure possibilities than does the most engaged body memory. It deals with past actualities, which it transforms rather than simply transmits. The transformative work of recollection belongs to a complex circumstance in which effort and resistance, recasting and re-viewing, are all in play. The existence of such complexity means that any criterion of immediate transparency, when not rejected altogether, will need to be questioned. So too will any notion of sheer passivity. It would be better to speak with Husserl of a “passivity in activity” that brings with it its own complexity of operation. ^(16){ }^{16} 这些关于能动与受动的讨论与自主性问题有何关联？实际上关系重大。尽管我们倾向于将回忆归入照片般的受动范式，但回忆行为本身绝非消极之事。它塑造过去而非仅仅重塑过去，而能够做到这一点，就意味着获得了一种绝非"稀薄"的自主性——尽管人们很容易用这个词来形容它。回忆既不像最投入的身体记忆那样追求纯粹可能性，也不满足于简单传递过往现实，而是对现实进行转化。回忆的转化工作属于一个复杂情境，其中努力与抵抗、重塑与重审都在发挥作用。这种复杂性的存在意味着，任何关于直接透明性的标准——若未被全然否定——都需要受到质疑。纯粹的受动性概念同样如此。不如跟随胡塞尔谈论"活动中的受动性"，这种表述本身就蕴含着运作的复杂性。 ^(16){ }^{16}
The autonomy of recollection is nevertheless much less dense than that displayed in many other forms of remembering. In such forms there is a more considerable thickening to be observed, one that takes place in the very midst of autonomous actions. No longer is the thickness merely a function of interventions on the part of the rememberer. The medium of remembering comes into prominence as the seeming transparency of recollecting gives way to translucency. The role of context, which is often kept at a decided distance in recollection, becomes indispensable and is acknowledged as such-above all, when attention is given to the factor of place. Perception and language loom large-rendering the mnemonic presentation anything but purely pictorial-as do entire communities of corememberers. As the world of the rememberer is brought bodily into his or her remembering, this remembering itself is thickened with all that has remained over, and was unaccounted for, on the regulative ideal of a purely pictorial recollection. 回忆的自主性远不如其他许多记忆形式所展现的那般稠密。在这些形式中，可以观察到更为显著的致密化过程，这种致密化恰恰发生在自主行动的核心地带。稠密性不再仅仅是记忆者干预的结果。当回忆表面上的透明性让位于半透明性时，记忆媒介便凸显其重要性。语境的作用——在回忆中常被刻意疏远——此刻变得不可或缺并得到明确认可，尤其是当关注点转向场所因素时。感知与语言显得格外重要（使得记忆呈现绝非纯粹的图像化），核心记忆群体同样如此。当记忆者的世界被具身化地纳入其记忆活动时，这种记忆本身便因所有残留的、未被纳入纯粹图像化回忆规范理想的内容而变得厚重起来。
Remembering, rendered ever thicker in these ways and others, is no less autonomous for becoming so intertwined with the circumambient world. In addition to passivism, the other threat to memorial autonomy is memory’s own increasing thickness, its immersion in the remembering/remembered world. Nevertheless, remembering stays autonomous in the thick of things. Not only is its autonomy uncompromised by its immersion: it is even enhanced and strengthened. How can this be? 记忆，通过这些方式及其他途径变得愈发厚重，却并未因其与周遭世界如此紧密交织而丧失自主性。除被动性外，对记忆自主性的另一威胁来自记忆自身不断增长的厚重性——它深陷于记忆/被记忆的世界中。然而，记忆在纷繁复杂中依然保持自主。这种沉浸不仅无损其自主性，反而使之得到提升与强化。何以如此？
IV 第四章
Let us consider certain indications laid down in the history of language. There we find that the very etymology of the word “memory” already points toward its thick autonomy. As this etymology is extraordinarily diverse and rich-it merits one of the most detailed entries in Eric Partridge’s OriginsI shall restrict consideration to three particularly pertinent cases in point. 让我们考察语言史上留下的某些线索。我们会发现"记忆"一词的词源本身就指向其厚重的自主性。鉴于该词源异常多样且丰富——它在埃里克·帕特里奇《词源》中拥有最详尽的词条之一——我将仅聚焦三个特别相关的典型案例。
MOURNING 哀悼
Memor, Latin for “mindful,” and the Old English murnan, “to grieve,” are both traceable to the Sanskrit smárati, “he remembers.” ^(17){ }^{17} This is not entirely surprising, since we realized in the last chapter that mourning, as a process of intrapsychic memorialization, is itself a form of commemoration. “Commemoration,” as we also learned, originally meant an intensified remembering. ^(18){ }^{18} One way to intensify something is to give it a thicker consistency so as to help it to last or remain more substantively. Such thickening is surely the point of any memorialization, whether it be ceremonial, sculptural, scriptural, or psychical. Every kind of commemoration can be considered an effort to create a lasting “remanence” for what we wish to honor in memory-where “remanence” signifies a perduring remainder or residuum (as in the literally thick stone of war memorials or grave markers). Mourning effects such remanence within the psychical sphere; and it is notable that it is accomplished slowly. In the context of mourning, we are especially prone to say that “the old dies hard,” implying the thickness of time and history. Mourning is also concerned with endings-with deaths or absences that linger like ghosts or revenants to haunt us. These ghostly endings are “remanents,” that which is “left behind, remaining, when the rest is removed, used, done, etc.” ^(19){ }^{19} But it is precisely because mourning is a slowly enacted process of working-through that it manages to transform such remanents/revenants into genuine remnants: exorcizing the ghosts of their external haunting power and aiding us in identifying with what is left. In this way, internal presences are moulded from the thick memorial magma of the mourning process. The moment of transfiguration is the moment of autonomy, since it lends new (psychical) life to the departed persons. It is an autonomy that is achieved not despite, or beyond, the memorial magma but in and through this thickened matter itself. Hence, the prolonged grieving, often extending over many years; hence also, a frequent failure to see the process through to its full ending. Memor 在拉丁语中意为"留心"，古英语的 murnan 意为"哀悼"，两者都可追溯至梵语 smárati（"他记得"）。 ^(17){ }^{17} 这并不完全令人惊讶，因为我们在前一章已认识到，哀悼作为心灵内部纪念化的过程，本身就是一种纪念形式。正如我们同样了解到的，"纪念"最初意味着强化的记忆行为。 ^(18){ }^{18} 强化某事物的方式之一，是赋予它更浓稠的质地以延长其存续时间或增强其实质性。这种增稠过程无疑是所有纪念形式的核心要义——无论是仪式性、雕塑性、经文性还是心理性的纪念。每种纪念都可视为创造持久"剩磁"的努力，用以铭记我们想要致敬的事物——此处"剩磁"指代持久存在的残余或沉淀（正如战争纪念碑或墓碑那实质厚重的石材）。哀悼在心理领域实现了这种剩磁效应；值得注意的是，这个过程是缓慢完成的。在哀悼语境中，我们尤其倾向于说"旧事物难以消逝"，这暗示着时间与历史的稠密质地。 哀悼同样关乎终结——那些如同幽灵或亡魂般萦绕不散的死亡与缺席。这些幽灵般的终结是"残留物"，即"当其余部分被移除、消耗、完成时，所遗留、剩余之物"。但正因为哀悼是一个缓慢展开的"修通"过程，它才能将这些残留物/亡魂转化为真正的遗存：驱散其外在萦绕力量的幽灵，并帮助我们与留存之物认同。由此，内在存在从哀悼过程那浓稠的记忆岩浆中被塑造出来。变容的时刻正是自主性诞生的时刻，因为它赋予逝者新的（心灵）生命。这种自主性并非脱离或超越记忆岩浆而达成，而是穿透并经由这浓稠物质本身实现的。因此，漫长的哀悼往往持续多年；也因此，人们常常难以将这一过程彻底完成。
CARING 关怀
Closely related to mourning is caring: how could I mourn for what is indifferent to me? Caring also implies remembering, that is to say, keeping the other person (or thing) in mind. Thus, it comes as a confirming fact to learn that “memory” is also cognate with the Greek me-rimna, “care,” “solici- 与哀悼紧密相连的是关怀：我怎会为漠不关心的事物哀悼？关怀也意味着记忆，即将他人（或事物）留存于心。因此，当我们得知"记忆"一词在希腊语中与 me-rimna 同源——后者意为"关怀"、"牵挂"、"焦虑"、"悲伤"时，这便成了确证的事实。
tude,” “anxiety,” “sorrow.” ^(20){ }^{20} Remembering is caring for what we remem-ber-intensified, once more, in commemorating. Indeed, it can be loving as well, via minna: this way lies the heart-memory link. Moreover, both caring and loving take time; neither can occur instantaneously; both require the fullness of time. Yet neither, when fully enacted, becomes time’s fool: each represents a triumph within time, not a subordination to it. And in this “sweet victory” each is autonomous in its memorial action, realizing itself through the density of its immersions. 记忆即是对所铭记之物的珍视——在纪念行为中，这种珍视会再度强化。通过 minna（古英语"爱"），记忆确实也能成为爱的载体：由此形成了心灵与记忆的联结。况且，关怀与爱都需要时间沉淀，二者皆非瞬间发生，而是需要时间的充分酝酿。然而当它们完全展现时，都不会沦为时间的奴隶：每一种都是时间范畴内的胜利，而非对时间的屈从。在这"甜蜜的胜利"中，二者在纪念行为中各自保持自主性，通过深度沉浸来实现自我。
Care, anxiety, solicitude: these are strikingly Heideggerian terms, bespeaking enmeshment in being-in-the-world. Whereas imagining characteristically glides above and beyond such enmeshment-its thin autonomy signifying freedom from concern and solicitude ^(21){ }^{21}-remembering cannot help but engage us in Angst and Sorge along with their many affiliated states of mind. This is how the thick autonomy of remembering is experienced at the level of emotion and mood: as mermeros, “solicitous,” “caring,” “anxious.” ^(22){ }^{22} Brooding is not far afield here, as we are reminded by mimeren, “to muse,” “brood” in Middle Dutch. In its pensive slowness, brooding is the cognitive counterpart of care and solicitude: to brood is to be painfully care-ful in thought. Brooding also belongs to the Heideggerian Weltbild, in which “the burdensome character of Dasein” ^(23){ }^{23} is so prominent. In all of these closely related ways, the caring aspect of memory’s thick autonomy manifests its tethering action, its tendency to tie things down tenaciously rather than to release them. 关怀、焦虑、挂虑：这些极具海德格尔色彩的术语，道出了此在在世存在的纠缠状态。想象的特征性表现是滑翔于这种纠缠之上并超越它——其稀薄的自主性意味着摆脱关切与挂虑 ^(21){ }^{21} ——而回忆则不可避免地让我们卷入焦虑与烦忧，连同其诸多关联的心绪状态。回忆的厚重自主性正是在情感与情绪层面如此被体验：作为 mermeros（"忧心忡忡的"、"关怀的"、"焦虑的"） ^(22){ }^{22} 。沉思与此相去不远，正如中古荷兰语 mimeren（"沉思"、"苦思"）所提醒我们的。在它沉思般的缓慢中，苦思是关怀与挂虑在认知层面的对应物：苦思就是在思想中痛苦地小心翼翼。沉思也属于海德格尔的世界图景，其中"此在的负重特性" ^(23){ }^{23} 如此显著。以所有这些紧密关联的方式，记忆厚重自主性中的关怀面向，显现出其束缚作用——它倾向于顽强地束缚事物，而非释放它们。
DELAY 延迟
Delay is implicit in mourning and caring alike, both of which act in a patient and slow fashion. Mora is Latin for delay: stopping and pausing; hence moratorium and such words as Old Irish maraim, “I remain,” and Gaelic mair, “to last,” and mairneal, “dilatoriness.” All of these moratorial matters are deeply memorial in character, reflecting not merely the fact that remembering always takes place “after the fact” but more importantly that it is an essentially time-taking operation (whether the time at stake be the micro-seconds of primary memory or the epochal durability of Egyptian monuments). Indeed, many kinds of memory involve massive delaying tactics, that is, concerted efforts to delay time’s erosive force. ^(24){ }^{24} 延迟内在于哀悼与关怀之中，二者都以一种耐心而缓慢的方式运作。"Mora"在拉丁语中意为延迟：停止与暂停；由此衍生出"moratorium"（暂停期）以及古爱尔兰语"maraim"（意为"我停留"）、盖尔语"mair"（意为"持续"）和"mairneal"（意为"拖延"）等词汇。所有这些与延迟相关的事物都具有深刻的纪念性特征，不仅反映出记忆总是"事后发生"这一事实，更重要的是它本质上是一个需要时间沉淀的过程（无论这个时间是初级记忆的毫秒级瞬间，还是埃及纪念碑般的纪元性持久）。事实上，多种记忆形式都包含着宏大的延迟策略，即通过协同努力来延缓时间的侵蚀力。 ^(24){ }^{24}
The factor of delay is also found in one of memory’s most distinctive capacities: its “deferred action” or Nachträglichkeit. Freud introduced this notion in a letter to Fliess written in 1896: 延迟因素也体现在记忆最具特色的能力之一："延迟行动"或称"事后性"（Nachträglichkeit）中。弗洛伊德在 1896 年写给弗利斯的信中首次提出这一概念：
I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come into being by a process of stratification: the material present in the form of memory-traces being subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances-to a re-transcription (Umschrift). ^(25){ }^{25} 我基于这样的假设开展工作：我们的心理机制是通过分层过程形成的——以记忆痕迹形式存在的材料会不时根据新情况进行重新排列，即经历重新转录（Umschrift）。 ^(25){ }^{25}
In other words, memories may gain a new psychical efficacy as a result of modifications introduced by evolving circumstances over time. Delay in 换言之，随着时间推移和环境演变带来的修正，记忆可能获得新的心理效力。时间的延迟
time, instead of diminishing the force of a given memory, serves to increase this force-to give the memory “a new lease on life.” We encounter here the unsuspected power of belatedness: “the memory-trace is revised belatedly so as to adjust either to new experience or to a new vision of experience.” ^(26){ }^{26} It is not just that new vision calls for re-vision but that the later vision is inherently stronger-more lasting, more forceful-than the first vision. Pausing strengthens; and the remainder of events, their true remanence, may become more powerful than the original events themselves. ^(27){ }^{27} 非但不会削弱特定记忆的力量，反而会增强这种力量——赋予记忆"新的生命力"。我们在此遭遇了延迟现象的潜在力量："记忆痕迹会被延迟修正，以适应新体验或对体验的新认知。" ^(26){ }^{26} 这不仅意味着新认知需要重新审视，更意味着后续认知本质上比初次认知更强大——更持久、更有力。停顿会强化记忆；而事件的余波，它们真正的残余磁力，可能比事件本身更具影响力。 ^(27){ }^{27}
Memory’s delaying power constitutes in effect another critique of passivism, for which the power resides in the initial impressions and not in the memorial outcome. But it also calls into question any pure activism that would invite us to conceive the past as a manipulable, neutral matter without any form or life of its own. The delaying power points instead to a model in which the past provides the very depth of memory, yet is continually reshaped in the present. Rather than being a simple stockpile of dead actualities-an instance of what Heidegger would term “standingreserve” ^(28){ }^{28}-the past “begins now and is always becoming.” ^(29){ }^{29} In short, the past develops, thanks to the delaying action of remembering. Such development is abundantly apparent in the role of narration as re-shaping what we have experienced. As Janet makes clear in his notion of la conduite du récit, a narrative account reilluminates and reformulates the past in multiple ways. ^(30){ }^{30} Any such après coup action in memory gestures toward a middle ground lying between the poles of activism and passivism: an in-between of past and present in which the brunt of the past, its very thickness, is supported and carried forward (often heavily re-vised) by an autonomous remembering in the present that is not the mere proxy of its own origins. 记忆的延宕力量实际上构成了对被动主义的另一种批判，因为被动主义认为力量存在于初始印象而非记忆结果中。但它也对任何纯粹的主动主义提出了质疑，后者会诱使我们把过去视为可操纵的、中性的材料，认为其不具备任何自身的形式或生命。延宕力量指向的是一种模型：过去为记忆提供了深度，却又在当下被不断重塑。过去并非只是已逝现实的简单堆积——海德格尔称之为"持存物"的实例——而是"始于当下并始终处于生成状态"。简言之，正是由于记忆的延宕作用，过去得以发展。这种发展在叙事重构我们经历的过程中表现得尤为明显。正如让内在其"叙事行为"概念中所阐明的那样，叙事叙述以多种方式重新照亮并重构过去。 任何此类记忆中的事后行为都指向介于积极主义与消极主义两极之间的中间地带：一个过去与现在之间的过渡区域，在此处，过去的冲击及其厚重感被当下自主的记忆所承载并延续（往往经过大幅重构），而这种记忆绝非其起源的简单代理。
The slowness inherent in delay-and prominently present as well in mourning and caring-evokes what I called “ruminescence” earlier in this book. The fast action of imagination and alert thought gives way to a regime of slow digestion: of considerate ingestion and accrued assimilation. This is not only a temporal affair. The autonomy of remembering is all the thicker for having to deal as well with the spatial densities that populate body and place memories, where the slowness exhibits itself in ritardando movements through space. There, too, ruminescence is solicited as an emotional correlate of memory’s thick autonomy. 延迟中固有的缓慢——在哀悼与关怀中同样显著存在——唤起了我在本书前文所称的"反刍性沉思"。想象力的快速运作与警觉思维让位于缓慢消解的机制：一种体贴的吸纳与渐进同化的过程。这不仅是时间性的问题。记忆的厚重自主性正因其必须同时应对充盈着身体与场所记忆的空间密度而愈发显著，在那里，缓慢通过空间中的渐缓运动展现自身。同样地，反刍性沉思作为记忆厚重自主性的情感对应物被召唤出来。
V
Thus far does language speak on the matter. The very etymons of “memory,” in their crisscrossing histories and slow growth, attest eloquently to the thick autonomy of remembering. Etymological dictionaries, after all, are themselves forms of public memory; “digests” of the genealogy of words and their meanings, they constitute a diachronic map of the memory of natural 迄今为止，语言如是言说此事。"记忆"一词的词源在其交错的历史与缓慢生长中，有力印证了记忆的厚重自主性。毕竟，词源字典本身就是公共记忆的形式；作为词语谱系及其意义的"消化产物"，它们构成了自然语言记忆的历时性图谱。
languages. ^(31){ }^{31} But we are by no means restricted to the history of language in witnessing the work of memorial autonomy. Our lives are pervaded by this work, which refuses confinement to any single area of human experience. Nothing human is unmemorial-even if very little is immemorial! And if this is so, it will also be the case that everything human will be touched by the three aspects of memory’s thick autonomy which have just been identified: mourning, caring, and delaying. 语言。 ^(31){ }^{31} 但我们绝非仅限于语言的历史来见证记忆自主性的运作。这种运作渗透于我们的生活，它拒绝被局限在人类经验的任何单一领域。没有什么人类事物是不被记忆的——即便极少事物是亘古不变的！倘若如此，那么所有人类事物也必将被刚刚指出的记忆之厚重自主性的三个维度所触及：哀悼、关怀与延宕。
To appreciate the pervasiveness of such autonomy, consider a seemingly unpromising instance: a modern wedding ceremony. Such a ceremony certainly has far more to do with beginnings than with endings, and in this respect contrasts graphically with the Eucharist or with funeral rites. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals other dimensions than merely “beginning a new life together.” To start with, any such beginning entails a leaving-hence an ending-whether this be in relation to one’s parents, a former marriage, friends, a part of the country, or one’s previous status as single. For this reason, mourning is by no means absent from weddings, even though it is typically suppressed or delimited; the ceremony itself, by its very formality, acts to forestall excessive displays of grief-e.g., on the part of the father who “gives away his daughter” in a public and pre-established manner. Any contemporary mourning tends to be left to the future-as is fitting, not only for reasons of propriety but in view of the prolonged process of mourning. The ceremony conspires with the process. Notice, further, that a wedding expressly celebrates caring, especially in the forms of cherishing and loving. Indeed, marriage is the very institutionalization of caring over time: “till death do us part.” The ceremony can even be considered the admonitory inculcation of Fürsorge or caringness of the marriage partners for each other. As a performative action, it calls for caring in a committing way that, it is hoped, will last indefinitely. In the face of such commitment, it is only to be expected that anxiety-closely related to care if language does not mislead us-will also arise and will even be quasi-institutionalized (“the nervous groom”). Just as marriage is a leave-taking and a matter of mourning, so it is equally an engagement in Mitsein, in a new being-together-in-the-world, and as such it involves anxious care. 要理解这种自主性的普遍存在，不妨观察一个看似无关的实例：现代婚礼仪式。这种仪式显然更关乎开端而非终结，就此而言，它与圣餐礼或葬礼形成鲜明对比。但细究之下，婚礼的意义远不止于"共同开启新生活"。首先，任何新开端都意味着某种告别——亦即某种终结——无论是与父母分离、结束前段婚姻、告别友人、离开故土，还是告别单身身份。正因如此，哀悼情绪在婚礼中绝非缺席，尽管通常被压抑或限定；仪式本身通过其高度程式化的形式，恰好能防止过度宣泄悲伤——例如父亲以公开预设的仪式"将女儿托付他人"时。当代婚礼往往将哀悼留待未来——这不仅是出于礼节考量，更因哀悼本就是延展的过程。仪式与这一过程形成共谋。还需注意的是，婚礼明确颂扬着关怀，尤其以珍视与爱恋的形式呈现。 婚姻确实是长期关怀的制度化体现："至死不渝"。仪式甚至可以被视为对婚姻伴侣间相互关怀（Fürsorge）的劝诫性灌输。作为一种述行行为，它要求以承诺的方式践行关怀，这种关怀理应无限延续。面对这样的承诺，与关怀密切相关的焦虑——如果语言没有误导我们的话——自然也会产生，甚至会被准制度化（"紧张的新郎"）。正如婚姻既是告别与哀悼之事，同样也是投身于共在（Mitsein），投身于一种新的在世共处，因此它必然包含着焦虑的关怀。
Even beyond what has already been suggested, the role of delay is strikingly present. Rather than a mere instantaneous acknowledgment of affection between two people, a wedding ceremony acts to underscore the fact that the value of a given marriage will only be known in and through a considerable period of time. Its very gravity and solemnity point in this direction and set the tone. At the same time, the ceremony and the occasion themselves serve to lay down memories whose importance can be savored only in a nachträglich manner: they will be most effective precisely in their deferred action. The role of wedding gifts, and especially of wedding photographs, illustrates the power of deferred appreciation. Often barely noticed or considered banal at the time, such gifts and photographs can come to be 即便超出前文所述，延迟的作用也显著存在。婚礼仪式并非仅仅是对两人之间情感的即时确认，而是强调了一个事实：特定婚姻的价值唯有经过相当长的时间才能被真正认知。其庄重与肃穆正指向这一方向，奠定了基调。与此同时，仪式与场合本身也在构筑记忆——这些记忆的重要性只能以事后追溯的方式被体味：它们恰恰在延迟生效时最具效力。婚礼礼物（尤其是结婚照片）的作用，便印证了延迟欣赏的力量。当时看似平淡无奇甚至鲜少被留意的礼物与照片，日后却可能成为
increasingly cherished as time goes by. Photographs in particular seem to be conventionally taken largely with an eye to possibilities of future enjoyment. The memorability of the occasion is, as it were, displaced onto subsequent moments of ruminescent savoring. Through the medium of the formal photograph, the ceremonial moment becomes belated in respect to itself; it becomes what it will be seen to be; it becomes something which will lastingly come toward us. ^(32){ }^{32} The exchange of rings and vows works in much the same manner. Binding by its very enactment, this ritual will nevertheless gain force only with time-that is, when lived out in new and often trying circumstances. It is evident that delay here links up closely with “perdurance.” A ceremony such as a wedding establishes memories that are meant to perdure-not just because they are encased in photographs or crystalized in gems, but because only as perduring will they gain that deferred efficacy that will render them sustaining and inspiring in the future to come. 随着时间的推移而愈发珍贵。尤其是照片，其拍摄初衷似乎大多着眼于未来重温的乐趣。那个场合的可记忆性，可以说被转移到了后续回味悠长的时刻。通过正式照片这一媒介，仪式性时刻相对于自身变得滞后；它成为了未来被看到的样子；它成为了某种将持续向我们走来的存在。 ^(32){ }^{32} 戒指与誓言的交换也以类似方式运作。尽管仪式本身具有约束力，但唯有经过时间洗礼——即在全新且往往充满考验的情境中践行时——它才会真正彰显力量。显然，这里的延迟与"持久性"紧密相连。像婚礼这样的仪式所建立的记忆，其意义就在于持久——不仅因为它们被封装在照片中或凝结为宝石，更因为唯有持久存在，它们才能获得那种延后的效力，从而在未来岁月里成为支撑与启迪的源泉。
It is only as thickly autonomous that remembering can figure in such an unlikely format as this, in which the emphasis falls upon the future. Or more exactly, upon a past on its way to becoming future in a certain present. Remembrance is not only now, but then . . . and then . . . and then . . . The sequence of then’s indicates that it is not a question of achieving per-manence-only memorials and monuments pretend to this-but of attaining a reliable and ongoing remanence. Or we could say that, thanks to its thick autonomy, remembering here remainders itself. The remainders do not consist in depositions laid down-as is assumed in theories preoccupied with leaving marks and traces in an unchanging material base-but in pathways that branch off ever more diversely into a multiple futurity. The belatedness, in other words, is not that of deferred events which have happened, but of expanding eventualities that might happen. As in marriage itself, the issue is less one of actuality (the actual ceremony, the actual guests, the actual vows, the actual gifts and photographs) than of virtuality: what all this will have become in the unchartable course of time (and in the vagaries of space). ^(33){ }^{33} 唯有作为高度自主的存在，记忆才能以如此出人意料的形式呈现——这种形式将重心落在了未来。更准确地说，是落在某个当下正通往未来的过去之上。记忆不仅是此刻，更是彼时……以及彼时……以及彼时……这一连串的"彼时"表明，关键不在于实现永恒——只有纪念碑和纪念馆才妄图如此——而在于获得一种可靠且持续的记忆存留。或者可以说，正是由于其高度的自主性，记忆在此处不断自我留存。这些留存物并非如某些理论所假设的那样，沉积于不变的物质基底上以留下标记与痕迹，而是化作愈发多样分岔的路径，通向多元的未来。换言之，这种延迟性并非已发生事件的滞后，而是可能发生之事的不断扩展。正如婚姻本身，重点不在于实际发生的场景（实际的仪式、实际的宾客、实际的誓言、实际的礼物与照片），而在于其可能性：在不可预测的时间长河（与变幻莫测的空间维度）中，这一切终将成为的模样。 ^(33){ }^{33}
When the past is viewed as something simply actualized or settled, it is reduced to being an inert sedimentation, a mere residuum. It is just such a past that is regarded as acting upon the present by efficient causality, pushing this present into existence by its pre-formed and unchanging actuality. The notion of Nachträglichkeit has forewarned us of the insufficiency of this model, since the present (and the future!) can outdo its own causal origins in terms of effective force. But memorial autonomy is more than a matter of deferred effects: this is still to speak the language of causa efficiens even if by reversal of order. As Heidegger reminds us, the issue is that of human beings’ own distinctive way of putting this autonomy into practice: one “historizes out of [the] future on each occasion.” ^(34){ }^{34} Such historizing happens not just once in a while (e.g., in moments of decision or resolve) but “on each occasion”-not only at weddings but in divorce proceedings, not 当过去被视为某种已然实现或确定之物时，它就被简化为一种惰性的沉积，仅仅是残余物。正是这样的过去被认为通过动力因作用于当下，以其预先形成且永恒不变的现实性将当下推入存在。延迟性（Nachträglichkeit）概念早已警示我们这种模式的不足，因为当下（乃至未来！）在效力上能够超越其自身的因果起源。但记忆的自主性远不止于延迟效应的问题：即便通过顺序倒置，这仍是在使用动力因的语言。正如海德格尔提醒我们的，问题在于人类实践这种自主性的独特方式：人"总是从未来出发进行历史化"。 ^(34){ }^{34} 这种历史化并非偶尔发生（例如在决定或决断时刻），而是"在每一个场合"——不仅在婚礼上，也在离婚诉讼中；
only in buying clothes but in wearing them daily, not only in setting out to write a book like this one but in finishing it a decade later. 不仅在购买衣物时，也在日常穿着时；不仅在动笔撰写这样一本书时，也在十年后完成它时。
Here the thickness of memory’s autonomy consists in the way in which the past is carried continually forward in being remembered at different mo-ments-indeed, even when it is momentarily forgotten or repressed. But if there were only such conveying actions, we might indeed be overwhelmed by the past in our present and succumb to the efficient causalism of the passivist model; for we could easily become stuck in the past, mired in its repetition. Yet we are not so mired-or need not be-if the carrying forward is anticipatory of a future toward which we are actively tending. To historize out of such a future is to realize a genuinely autonomous action, one that requires us to come to terms with the virtuality of the past itself. Rather than awaiting the future-e.g., by “expectation,” through which we make the future determinate beforehand, a form of inauthenticity ^(35){ }^{35}-we make it possible. 记忆自主性的厚度体现在过去如何在不同时刻被持续回忆——甚至在被短暂遗忘或压抑时——而不断向前推进。但若仅有此类传递行为，我们确实可能被过去淹没于当下，屈服于被动主义模型的高效因果论；因为我们极易陷入过去的泥沼，沉溺于其重复之中。然而，若这种推进同时预示着我们所积极趋近的未来，我们便不会（或不必）如此困顿。从这样的未来出发进行历史化，就是实现真正自主的行动，这要求我们直面过去本身的虚拟性。我们不是通过"期待"（一种预先确定未来的非本真形式 ^(35){ }^{35} ）来等待未来——而是使其成为可能。
We make the future possible precisely by envisaging it in terms of the past we bear in the viscosity of the present, allowing its remanence to arise in an act of foreshadowing what might be. In contrast with the purely possible that is projected in imagining, however, “what might be” is here a function of what has been and thus of the thickness of the past as it comes to bear on the present and on the future. Hence we must modify Eliot’s formula: “What might have been and what has been point to one end, which is always present.” ^(36){ }^{36} Rather: what might be and what has been point to one end, which is the future as enlivened in the present. Only an activity capable of a remarkably compressed density could possess such an intimately interwoven temporality as this. As Lacan states: 我们之所以能让未来成为可能，恰恰是通过以当下所承载的过去为基底来构想它，允许其残留在预示可能性的行为中显现。与想象中投射的纯粹可能性不同，这里的"可能性"是已发生之物的函数，是过去之厚重对当下及未来施加影响的结果。因此我们必须修正艾略特的公式："本可能发生之事与已发生之事指向同一终点，那终点始终是现在。" ^(36){ }^{36} 更准确地说：可能之事与已发生之事指向同一终点，那终点是在当下被激活的未来。唯有具备惊人压缩密度的活动，才能拥有如此紧密交织的时间性。正如拉康所言：
What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, nor even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming. ^(37){ }^{37} 在我的历史中实现的，既非已然消逝之事的过去完成时，亦非构成当下之物的现在完成时，而是我将要为正在生成之自我所成为之事的将来完成时。 ^(37){ }^{37}
It is precisely because the remembered past is neither “definite” nor “per-fect”-is not to be forced onto the Procrustean bed of date and bare eventthat a future of open fulfillment (and not of mere projection) becomes possible. And vice versa: an open future helps to keep the remembered past alive. Even “what I shall have been” is not to be confined to the future perfect tense in which it is formulated; as reflecting “what I am in the process of becoming,” it is anterior to its own perfection. At every point-“now” and “then” and “then” (where the “then” can be future as well as past in status)the thick autonomy of remembering dismantles, by its own massive action, the temporal determinacy of the past. 正是因为被记忆的过去既非"确定"也非"完美"——不应被强行束缚在日期与孤立事件的普罗克鲁斯特之床上——才使得一个充满开放可能性（而非简单投射）的未来成为可能。反之亦然：开放的未来有助于保持记忆中的过去鲜活。甚至"我将成为的样子"也不应局限于表述它的将来完成时态；作为"我正在成为的过程"的反映，它先于自身的完美状态。在每一个时间节点——"此刻"与"彼时"与"彼刻"（这里的"彼刻"既可以是未来的也可以是过去的）——记忆那厚重的自主性通过其自身的强大作用，瓦解了过去的时序确定性。
Since the same deconstructive process is at work in matters of space-as we have observed in chapter 9, where “site” gave way to “place” in being remembered-we begin to discover the larger implications of memorial 鉴于同样的解构过程在空间维度同样发挥作用——正如我们在第九章观察到的，当"位置"在记忆过程中让位于"场所"时——我们开始发现记忆行为更深远的影响。
autonomy. This autonomy acts to undo the stranglehold of the determinate wherever this arises in time or space. The determinate is a perfectly appropriate object of thought-e.g., in the guise of the necessary-but it cannot be regarded as having supreme value even in perceiving, where internal and external horizons introduce an essential indeterminacy. In imagining and remembering it is of distinctly dubious value. Whereas to imagine is to engage in the indeterminate as such-indeterminacy is the close counterpart of pure possibility ^(38){ }^{38}-to remember is to commit oneself to an ever-thickening admixture of the determinate (i.e., as actual) and the indeterminate (as virtual). Remembering cannot do without reference to the actual-whether straightforwardly in allusion to the past, or indirectly via perception-but it always manages to exceed any simple actualism of experience. Thanks to the bivalent orientation of its own autonomous action, it is always on the move: away from what was and has been and toward what is now becoming via-à-vis a still-to-be determined futurity. Memory moves us as surely into the realm of what shall be as it moves us back to what has been; by extracting what is indeterminately lasting from the latter, it allows the former to come to us. 自主性。这种自主性旨在消解任何时空场域中确定性因素的桎梏。确定性作为思维对象本无不妥——譬如以必然性面貌呈现时——但即便在感知活动中，由于内外视域带来的本质不确定性，它也不应被奉为至高价值。对于想象与记忆而言，其价值更显可疑。如果说想象是对不确定性本身的投入——不确定性与纯粹可能性如影随形——那么记忆则是将自我托付于确定性（即实存性）与不确定性（即虚拟性）不断交融的稠密基质。记忆无法脱离对实存的指涉，无论是直接援引过往，还是通过感知间接关联，但它总能超越经验的简单实存主义。凭借其自主行动的双重取向，记忆始终处于动态之中：既远离曾经存在的过去，又通过尚未确定的未来性，朝向正在生成的新现实。 记忆既将我们带向未来之境，又引领我们回溯过往；它从过往中提取那些难以确定却持久存在之物，使未来得以向我们显现。
VI 第六章
To acknowledge the active element in remembering is already to point toward its possible autonomy, at least its negative autonomy. For a major consequence of the findings of thinkers as diverse as Piaget and Freud is that memories are not strictly tied down to their own origins; in varying degrees, they may become free from these origins by virtue of the transforming effects of displacement, projection, sublimation, or schematization. In being negatively autonomous, remembering is not restricted to a sheer replication of the past, as is demanded by the model of passivism. Particular and pertinent origins-e.g., perceptual, historical, linguistic-are certainly incorporated into eventual memories and are often represented in or alluded to by such memories; but they need not provide the sole source of their content, much less their total structure. In gaining this independence of causal/factual origins, memories exhibit a negative autonomy, a capacity not to be determined by the past. 承认记忆中的能动因素，已然指向其可能的自主性——至少是消极的自主性。从皮亚杰到弗洛伊德等思想家的研究发现，记忆并不严格受限于其起源；通过置换、投射、升华或图式化的转化作用，记忆能在不同程度上摆脱这些起源。这种消极自主性意味着，记忆不必如被动主义模式所要求的那样，仅仅复制过去。特定的相关起源（如感知的、历史的、语言的）固然会被纳入最终形成的记忆，并常常通过这些记忆得以呈现或暗示；但这些起源不必构成记忆内容的唯一来源，更不必决定其整体结构。在摆脱因果/事实起源的束缚时，记忆展现出一种消极的自主性——一种不被过去所决定的能力。
But this leaves unanswered the more difficult question: what positive autonomy, if any, does remembering exhibit? By “positive autonomy” I mean not merely free from (origins, sources, causes regarded as exclusive and sufficient conditions) but free for-for a development, an expressive exfoliation, which moves beyond the heteronomous power of past particularities. Such autonomy is comparatively easy to demonstrate in the case of imagining, which exhibits an indigenous freedom of mind. But the price to be paid for this freedom, which consists largely in the indefinite 但这仍未解答一个更为棘手的问题：记忆究竟展现出何种积极的自主性？我所说的"积极自主性"不仅指摆脱（起源、源头、被视为排他且充分条件的各种成因）的自由，更是指朝向某种发展的自由——一种能超越过往特殊性之他律力量的表达性展开。这种自主性在想象活动中相对容易证明，因其展现出思维原生的自由。但为这种自由付出的代价（主要表现为不确定性）
variability of imagined content, is an equally indigenous ethereality that reflects a dramatic distance from particular origins. The positive autonomy of remembering, in contrast, is enmeshed in its origins even when it seems to be functioning independently of them. The result is an autonomy so dense as often to obscure its own recognition and description-indeed, precisely dense enough to tempt many to view memory as an utterly passive process. 想象内容的可变性，是一种同样固有的缥缈特质，反映出与特定起源之间戏剧性的距离。相比之下，记忆的积极自主性即便在看似独立运作时，仍深嵌于其起源之中。由此产生的自主性如此稠密，以至于常常遮蔽了对其自身的辨识与描述——确切地说，其稠密程度恰恰诱使许多人将记忆视为完全被动的过程。
We must acknowledge that there is nothing in remembering that is comparable to imaginative freedom of mind; there is nothing like an open ranging among freely projected variants that have no assignment to instantiate (or even to represent) the actual. Whatever its ability to broach the virtual, the commitment of memory to the already actualized cannot be rescinded. Nor does remembering possess any exact equivalent of two features of imagining that support its inherent freedom of mind: ease of access and assured success of enactment. Precisely because of remembering’s engagement in the actual-its duty to stand in for it faithfully to some significant extent-we are not always able to come up with the particular memory we seek. As everyone knows to his or her frustration-sometimes excrutiatingly so in a tip-of-the-tongue experience-many memories slip away and evade our most earnest efforts to retrieve them. In David Krell’s phrase, they are “on the verge.” ^(39){ }^{39} At the same time, even when a quite crystalline mnemonic presentation does emerge as a possibility, we are by no means assured, by its appearance alone, that its specific content is the content we are looking for: there is no inbuilt guarantee that our intention and its fulfillment will coincide in that seamless Deckung that Husserl posited as an epistemological ideal. ^(40){ }^{40} Quite apart from amnesia (i.e., the inability to remember anything), paramnesia (remembering the wrong thing) threatens us throughout. 我们必须承认，在回忆中没有任何事物能与想象的思维自由相提并论；不存在那种在自由投射的变体间任意徜徉的状态——这些变体无需承担实例化（甚至无需代表）现实的责任。无论记忆触及虚拟领域的能力如何，它对已实现之事的忠诚承诺都无法撤销。回忆也不具备想象活动中支撑其内在思维自由的两大特质：轻易可及性与实施成功的确定性。正因为记忆对现实的介入——它在相当程度上必须忠实代表现实的职责——我们并不总能唤出所追寻的特定记忆。正如每个人在沮丧时（有时这种挫败感在话到嘴边却说不出的体验中尤为剧烈）所深知的那样，许多记忆会悄然溜走，躲避我们最诚挚的追索努力。 用戴维·克雷尔的话说，它们"处于临界状态"。 ^(39){ }^{39} 与此同时，即便当某种极为清晰的记忆呈现确实可能浮现时，我们也绝不能仅凭其表象就确信其具体内容正是我们所追寻的：胡塞尔所设想的认识论理想中那种无缝的"覆盖重合"，并不存在内在保证能让我们的意向与其实现完全吻合。 ^(40){ }^{40} 且不论完全失忆（即无法记住任何事物），错忆（记错事物）始终如影随形地威胁着我们。
The thick autonomy of remembering is therefore a more difficult autonomy to accomplish than is the thin autonomy of imagining. More of “the patient labor of the negative” is required in its realization. As the Sisyphean labors of psychoanalysis painfully attest, it is not uncommon to engage in quite strenuous efforts to bring back certain memories-efforts that include disentangling these memories from the morass of contiguous or similar memories to which they stand closely related. Moreover, internal clarifications of a given memory are also often needed. It is evident, then, that the autonomy of remembering is hard-won; it does not fall into our laps in the way in which autonomous imagining characteristically does. Despite these difficulties, however, autonomous remembering does occur; and the autonomy therein achieved is of a distinctly positive sort. ^(41){ }^{41} 因此，记忆的厚重自主性比想象的稀薄自主性更难实现。它的实现需要更多"否定的耐心劳作"。正如精神分析学西西弗斯式的努力痛苦地证明的那样，人们常常需要付出相当艰辛的努力才能唤回某些记忆——这些努力包括将目标记忆从与之紧密相连的相邻或相似记忆的泥沼中剥离出来。此外，对特定记忆的内部澄清也常常是必要的。显然，记忆的自主性是来之不易的；它不会像自主想象那样自然而然地降临。然而尽管存在这些困难，自主记忆确实会发生；并且其中实现的自主性具有明显的积极特质。 ^(41){ }^{41}
I shall restrict consideration of such positive autonomy to a single instance, that of the truth we attain in remembering. The issue of truth arises not just from the ever-present possibility of erroneous memories or from moments of forgetting. It also arises from the fact that the past we recall has a certain definiteness of form, spatial and temporal and qualitative, to which 我将把这种积极自主性的探讨限定在一个具体实例上，即我们在回忆中所获得的真理。真理问题不仅源于错误记忆或遗忘时刻这种始终存在的可能性，还源于我们所回忆的过去具有某种确定的形式——包括空间性、时间性和质性——这种确定性使得
we somehow try to do justice. In other words, we try to be true to it, to speak the truth about it-where both “to” and “about” express an action of positive approximation. Such approximation to the past certainly does not mean producing a duplicate of it, something that would correspond to it point by point. In Platonic language, an eikon does not convey the eidos. Iconicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for remembering, which can be true to its own subject matter in a non-isomorphic fashion. But in what does such truth consist, and how does it embody a positive autonomy of remembering? 我们试图以某种方式公正对待它。换言之，我们努力忠于它，如实讲述它——这里的"对"和"关于"都表达了一种积极接近的行为。这种对过去的接近当然并不意味着要复制它，制造出与之逐点对应的复本。用柏拉图的话说，影像（eikon）并不传递理念（eidos）。图像性对于记忆既非必要也不充分，记忆可以以非同构的方式忠实于其主题。但这种忠实性究竟包含什么？它又如何体现记忆的积极自主性？
The truth in question possesses two basic forms: truth to the “how” and truth to the “that.” 此处讨论的真理具有两种基本形式：关于"如何"的真理与关于"那个"的真理。
truth to the how 真相在于方式
This is a matter of being true to our own experiencing, to how we experienced a given situation. Included under “experiencing” are emotional responses, stray thoughts we had at the time, interpretations we may have made of the original experience, fantasies arising from it, etc. In addition, there is the body’s mode of experiencing-how we assimilated the event corporeally, how it felt “in our bones.” Given the complexity and multilayeredness of how we experienced the situation, it is clear that we cannot do justice to all such factors as those just mentioned; nor need we do so in order to attain adequate or even accurate remembering. We can be highly selective and still retain the special subjective savor of our experiencing: the selectivity may be the most effective way of preserving the savor. Indeed, even where there is no explicit representation whatsoever of the original experience-as occurs in many body memories-we can be true to how it felt to have been present in that experience by summoning up pertinent feelings or related thoughts. 这关乎忠实于我们自身的体验，忠实于我们如何经历某个特定情境。"体验"范畴包含情感反应、当时闪现的思绪、对原始经验可能作出的诠释、由此产生的幻想等。此外还包括身体的体验方式——我们如何以肉身消化事件，那种"刻骨铭心"的感受。鉴于我们体验情境方式的复杂性与多层次性，显然无法完全兼顾上述所有因素；其实要实现充分甚至准确的记忆，也无需面面俱到。我们可以高度选择性地保留体验中独特的主观韵味：这种选择性或许正是保存韵味最有效的方式。事实上，即便在完全无法显性再现原始经验的情况下（如许多身体记忆所示），我们仍可通过唤起相关感受或关联思绪，来忠实呈现置身该体验时的真实感受。
TRUTH TO THE THAT 忠实于彼在
This is the truth to the factuality of the event experienced-to the fact of its occurrence. By “event” is usually meant a publicly ascertainable happening; but events may also include my own feelings, perceptions, and thoughts, which I may remember as facts in separation from their experiential content per se. Thus I can recall that I was feeling acute remorse three weeks ago without now engaging in an analogous emotional state or a representation of any such state and its specific content. The evidence for the truth of such a claim will most likely be found within my own experience. Of course, I can consult others who were with me at the time and who may have noticed my remorse; but since I may have been deceiving them by pretending to be happy, their testimony cannot be regarded as requisite, much less definitive, for the truth of what I claim about my own state of mind. Such a situation contrasts with that of remembering a public fact. In that case, corroboration by other people is essential for bearing out the truth of memory claims, which can be definitively disproven by others: as when I 这是对经历事件之事实性的真实描述——即事件确实发生过。通常所说的"事件"指可公开验证的发生之事；但事件也可能包含我个人的感受、知觉和思想，我可以将这些作为独立于其体验内容本身的事实来记忆。因此，我现在能回忆起三周前曾感到强烈悔恨，却不必重新陷入类似情绪状态或再现任何此类状态及其具体内容。这类陈述的真实性证据很可能存在于我的个人体验中。当然，我可以咨询当时在场的其他人，他们或许注意到我的悔恨；但由于我可能通过假装快乐来欺骗他们，他们的证言不能被视为必要证据，更无法最终证实我对自己心理状态的描述。这种情况与记忆公共事实形成鲜明对比——后者必须通过他人佐证才能确认记忆主张的真实性，且可能被他人明确证伪：例如当我...
claim to recall seeing Joan at noon downtown, whereas she was having lunch in her home with persons who now testify to this fact. Here the factual component of remembering belongs to a public domain in which my own subjective states can no longer count as evidentially decisive. But in neither instance-whether it is a case of a public event or a state of mind-does the memory of a factual occurrence demand detailed representation. Even in the case of public remembering-that, the sketchiest of descriptions may suffice: e.g., “yesterday, sometime in the late afternoon, I remember that the ferry pulled into the dock.” ^(42){ }^{42} 我声称记得中午在市中心见过琼，而实际上她当时正在家中与一些人共进午餐，这些人现在可以为此作证。在此，记忆的事实成分属于公共领域，我个人的主观状态已无法作为决定性的证据。但无论是公共事件还是心理状态，对事实的记忆都不需要详尽再现。即便在公共记忆的情况下，最简略的描述也可能足够，例如："昨天傍晚某个时候，我记得渡轮靠岸了。"
Taken together, truth to the “how” and truth to the “that” constitute a distinctive positive autonomy of remembering. Our being true to the past in these two ways does not mean merely that we are not beholden to it-that we are not bound to repeat it. In entering into the domain of truth, something other than negative autonomy-i.e., independence from the past-is at stake. Nor is it just a matter of degrees of latitude allowed with regard to determinate origins. For it is now a question of being able to affirm that the past was thus-and-so as a fact, or was experienced in such-and-such a way. In this circumstance, memories are not reducible to mere evidential sources, mere pre-texts to truth: affirmation cannot be reduced to confirmation. And the affirmation itself is not to be confused with assertion, i.e., its articulation in words. Truth emerges in and through the act of remembering itself. This is what we mean when we say that a given memory is “true to an experience,” or that we are “truly remembering” something. In such cases the truth resides not in statements that may accompany the remembering, or in items of evidence, but in the remembering itself-in its relation to the past with which it is reconnecting, whatever the precise evidence or expression in words may be. 综合来看，"如何"之真与"事实"之真共同构成了记忆独特的积极自主性。我们以这两种方式忠实于过去，并不意味着我们仅仅不受其束缚——不必重复它。进入真理领域时，真正重要的并非消极自主性（即独立于过去）。这也不仅仅是关于确定起源所允许的自由度问题。因为现在的问题在于能否确认过去确实如此这般作为事实存在，或以某种特定方式被体验过。在此情境下，记忆不能被简化为单纯的证据来源或真理的借口：确认不能被简化为证实。而这种确认本身也不应与断言（即用语言表述）混为一谈。真理在记忆行为本身之中并通过记忆行为显现。这正是当我们说某个记忆"忠实于体验"，或我们"真正记住"某事时所表达的含义。 在这种情况下，真相并不存在于伴随记忆的陈述或证据条目中，而是存在于记忆本身——存在于它与正在重新连接的过去的关系中，无论确切的证据或语言表达可能是什么。
It follows that for such an immanent truth-in-memory to arise no explicit representations of the past, whether in the form of words or images, need to be involved. Memorial truth is attainable without employing representations of any kind. Although we see this most clearly in the case of body memories, it also occurs whenever I think rememoratively and yet non-imagistically and non-verbally of the past-as happens in meditative musings on previous experiences. In fact, I can even remember the past truthfully through a misrepresentation of it, as we observe not only in the instance of screen memories (when I remember something through a false facade) but when a certain figure is misidentified, a detail is omitted, or a false substitution of one thing for another arises. Despite the manifest inaccuracy of such rememberings, they can still manage to convey the “how” of the remembered situation and perhaps also its “that” as well: the gist of the situation. For I can achieve a significant level of truthful remembering even as I frankly fail at the level of documentation or proof. I can regain the past in truth even if I cannot regain it in exactitude, much less in totality. I can regain it as a partial 由此可见，这种内在的记忆真理得以显现时，并不需要任何关于过去的显性表征——无论是言语形式还是图像形式。记忆真理的获得无需借助任何类型的表征手段。虽然我们在身体记忆的案例中对此看得最为分明，但每当我以非图像化、非言语化的追忆方式思索过往时——就像在冥想中回味前尘往事那样——这种现象同样存在。事实上，我甚至可以通过对过去的错误表征来实现真实记忆，这不仅体现在屏忆现象中（当我透过虚假的表象回忆某事时），也见于认错某个形象、遗漏某个细节或用甲物错误替代乙物的情况。尽管这类记忆存在明显的不准确，它们仍能传递被忆情境的"如何"，或许还包括其"彼在"——即情境的精髓。因为即便在文献记录或实证层面彻底失败，我仍能达到相当程度的真实记忆。我可以在真理中重获过去，即便无法精确地——更遑论完整地——重现它。 我能以片段的
and even distorted presence-as part of my own past as I now reclaim it, or as part of a collective past as an entire group might commemorate it. To be able to do such things-to fly in the face of the ideal of verisimilitude in remembering-is a forceful sign of memory’s positive autonomy. 甚至扭曲的形式重获它——作为我现在重新认领的个人过往的一部分，或作为整个群体可能共同纪念的集体记忆的一部分。能够做到这些事情——在回忆中公然违背逼真性的理想——正是记忆积极自主性的有力证明。
Such autonomy is not a matter of transcending perceptual or historical or linguistic origins, whether personal or social. Its action occurs in their very midst. Memorial truth is discovered within the various matters of memory, not outside them or beyond them. Because of this immersion, the autonomy of remembering remains thick. Implicit in all remembering is a commitment to truth concerning the past, a truth that reflects the specificity of this past even if it need not offer an exact likeness of it. Once I enter into remembering, there can be no backing out of this commitment, which creates a special bond to the past in its “how” and its “that.” This bond links us to the past in a relation of “certification”: ^(43){ }^{43} to remember is to certify, to oneself or to others, the truth of what one remembers. It is to engage in a claim to truth and a responsibility for it. It is thus to thicken the experience of remembering past a point that is found in experiences of imagining or thinking, neither of which entails a commitment to relations of the truth-to variety. ^(44){ }^{44} 这种自主性并非超越感知、历史或语言起源的问题，无论这些起源是个人的还是社会的。它的行动恰恰发生在这些起源之中。记忆的真实性是在记忆的各种素材内部被发现的，而非在其之外或之上。正因这种沉浸状态，记忆的自主性始终保持着厚重质感。所有记忆行为都隐含着对过往真相的承诺——这种真相即使不必提供与过去完全一致的复刻，也必然反映着那段过去的独特性。一旦进入记忆状态，就无法撤回这种承诺，它通过"如何"与"彼在"的特殊联结将我们锚定在过去。这种联结以"确证"关系将我们与过去相连： ^(43){ }^{43} 记忆即是对自己或他人确证所记之事的真实性，是对真相的主张与责任承担。由此记忆体验的厚度超越了想象或思考的临界点——后两种活动均不包含对"真相关联"的承诺。 ^(44){ }^{44}
Not only is truthful remembering not accountable for each and every detail in its rendering of a given past scene, it can modify in a far-reaching way those details which it does select for purposes of presentation. This is not merely to say that we remember what we want to remember, though this is often the case. We may not know precisely what we want to remember, and still attain to truth, recapturing the brute being of an original scene even though we had no intention of doing so and even though we grasp this scene in a format considerably altered from its original configuration. The recapture, undertaken without conscious motive or aim, is exemplary of the thick autonomy of memory in its unrehearsed operation. Far from being antithetical to the achievement of truth, such unwitting transformation of the remembered may be a quite effective means of attaining truth. Instead of a mechanical rehashing of what has happened in its pointillistic detail, this transformative remembering presents us with the brunt, the force or thrust, of what occurred-what truly happened in what actually happened. We remember the significant thing that occurred. Hence our tendency in many kinds of remembering, consciously pursued or not, to valorize conspicuous but condensed features in what we recall; to make them bearers of the burden of truth. These features are incomplete from the standpoint of an ideal of pictorial representation, but they may be essential from the standpoint of truth. For the truth of which we are capable in remembering is not just a truth about what we remember-an “about” that calls for completeness as well as accuracy-but an actively engaged truth in what we remember. 真实的记忆不仅无需对重现某一过往场景时的每个细节负责，它还能以深远的方式调整那些为呈现目的而选择的细节。这不仅仅意味着我们记住想记住的内容——尽管情况往往如此。我们可能并不确切知道自己想记住什么，却仍能抵达真实，重新捕捉原始场景的粗粝存在，即便我们本无此意图，即便我们是以与原初形态大相径庭的形式把握这一场景。这种无意识动机或目标驱动的重获，彰显了记忆在自发运作中厚重的自主性。这种对记忆内容的无意改造非但与实现真实相悖，反而可能是抵达真实的相当有效的方式。这种改造性记忆不是对已发生事件点状细节的机械复述，而是向我们呈现事件的核心、力量或要旨——在真实发生的事件中真正发生的内容。我们记住的是发生的要义。 因此，我们在多种形式的回忆中——无论是有意识追寻还是无意识涌现——都倾向于珍视记忆中那些显著却凝练的特征；让它们成为真理重担的承载者。从理想化图像再现的标准来看，这些特征或许并不完整，但从真理的立场而言，它们可能至关重要。因为我们通过回忆所能获得的真理，不仅关乎被回忆对象本身（这种"关乎"既要求完整性也要求准确性），更是一种积极参与被忆之物的活态真理。
VII 第七章
Precisely in its thickness, memory’s positive autonomy cannot help but reflect its tie to past actualities, whether this tie occurs as rootedness in perception, origination in the past, or involvement in the quest for truth about the past itself. Perception, the past, and truth all act as anchors for remembering, settling it into the dense impasto of human experiencing. This anchoring gives to memory its very materiality, along with a grounding in something at once recalcitrant and substantial. From such grounding, remembering gains not only its ultimate validity-its being well-founded as well as well-funded-but also its value in everyday life. Just because memory is so massively grounded in the past, it can be of inestimable importance in the present, illuminating it with a light not otherwise available, proferring insight that cannot be acquired in any other way-insight “from within,” from within our own experience-as-remembered. 正是在其厚重性中，记忆的积极自主性不可避免地反映出它与过往现实的联系——无论这种联系表现为植根于感知、发端于过去，还是参与对过去本身真相的追寻。感知、过去与真相共同成为记忆的锚点，将其固定于人类体验的浓稠肌理之中。这种锚定赋予记忆以物质性，同时使其根植于某种既顽固又坚实的存在。由此根基出发，记忆不仅获得其终极有效性——既根基牢固又储备丰富——更赢得其在日常生活中的价值。正因为记忆如此深植于过去，它才能在当下展现出无可估量的重要性，以其他途径无法获得的光芒照亮现在，提供"由内而外"的洞见——源自我们自身被记忆重构的经验深处的领悟。
The result of memory’s multiple ties to sources such as perception, language, or thought, over which it does not exert complete control, is its enrichment from these same sources. It imbibes from them what it cannot bring forth from itself alone-a process to which a model of pure activism fails to do justice. Yet it imbibes not in the interest of imitation and transmis-sion-as models of passivism so often propose-but in order to gain sustenance from what exceeds it, from what is outside its own immediate reach in the present. Such sustenance is not taken in dumbly or unappreciatively; it is incorporated selectively and sensitively. As a consequence, memory finds itself continually aggrandized-not simply by the accretion of specific contents remembered but more importantly by the incorporation of new directions and new orders of orientation, new ways of proceeding and new styles. What “remains over”-not to be confused with any bare residuum-becomes embedded in memory as an “abiding possession” ^(45){ }^{45} and is transmuted in the process. In this way memory grows-grows beyond what any preestablished receptacle of experience could absorb or contain. 记忆与感知、语言或思想等多重来源的联系，虽无法完全掌控这些来源，却因此从这些源头中汲取养分。它吸收那些仅凭自身无法产生的东西——纯粹的能动性模型无法充分解释这一过程。然而，这种吸收并非为了模仿与传递——如被动性模型常主张的那样——而是为了从超越其当下直接触及范围的外部事物中获取滋养。这种滋养并非盲目或不知感恩地接纳，而是经过选择性且敏锐地融合。其结果是，记忆不断自我扩展——不仅通过所记具体内容的累积，更重要的是通过吸纳新的方向与定位秩序、新的行进方式与风格。那些"留存之物"——不可与任何原始残余混淆——作为"恒久财富"嵌入记忆并在过程中发生转化。由此，记忆得以生长——生长到任何预设的经验容器都无法容纳的程度。
Rather than a mere repository of experience, remembering becomes thereby a continually growing fund for experience: a source itself, indeed a resource, on which not only future acts of remembering but many other experiential modes can draw as well. This funding function provides more than a storehouse of ready-to-hand information and knowledge (though it certainly does this too, and indispensably so). It also supplies a supportive Hintergrund for ongoing experience: a backdrop which at once unifies and specifies what comes to appear in the foreground. Any experiential scene, even one with a quite minimal unity, possesses such a background, which contributes depth to an otherwise shallow setting. The depth is both temporal, insofar as it leads us back into the past, and spatial, insofar as it furnishes other scenes to the place in which we are presently situated. 记忆由此不再仅是经验的储存库，而成为持续增长的经验基金：它本身即是源泉，更确切地说是一种资源，不仅为未来的记忆行为，也为诸多其他经验模式提供养分。这种基金功能远不止于现成信息与知识的仓库（尽管它确实也无可替代地承担着这一职能），还为持续进行的经验提供支撑性的背景：一个既能统合又能细化前景显现内容的幕布。任何经验场景，即便统一性极弱，都拥有这样的背景，它为原本浅薄的场景赋予深度。这种深度既是时间性的——将我们引回过去，也是空间性的——为我们当下所处之地提供其他场景。
This memorial depth is a primary instance of the virtual dimension of remembering. Although such depth is also tied to the actual by numerous historical and perceptual threads, the actual qua actual-the strictly de-terminate-is superseded in the end. For the impingement of discrete actualities is not what is at stake here; indeed, their too finely detailed recollection can even induce that state of clutter and confusion which Luria’s subject " SS " reported as a living nightmare. ^(46){ }^{46} What is at stake is the presence of something much more diffuse-something virtual that has been held in readiness for many eventualities. It is this virtuality which keeps open and proliferates the ways by which unfolding experiences of various kinds can be funded from their abiding memorial background. 这种记忆深度是回忆虚拟维度的首要例证。尽管这种深度也通过众多历史与感知线索与现实相连，但纯粹确定的现实性最终会被超越。因为离散现实的冲击并非关键所在；事实上，对细节过于精确的回忆反而可能导致卢里亚研究对象" SS "所描述的那种如噩梦般的混乱状态。 ^(46){ }^{46} 真正重要的是某种更为弥散之物的在场——一种为诸多可能性预先准备的虚拟存在。正是这种虚拟性保持开放并增殖了各种展开经验得以从其持存的记忆背景中汲取养分的途径。
Memory thus regarded establishes a basso continuo for much of human experience-a “figured bass” that provides meaning and value. Remembering keeps this experience together, keeps it coherent and continuous, by virtue of its re-membering action from below. Even in this profoundly bass position, it remains positively autonomous, and still more thickly so than ever before. For here it realizes an identity, and achieves a force, of its own. No longer the mere agglomeration of the actualities which it nevertheless presupposes and which on occasion it singles out as such, remembering at this level is a dimension of our experience not reducible to any other-not even to its own ingredients of perception, pastness, and truth. Linked irrevocably to these latter, and made thicker still by its own diffuse virtuality, remembering regarded as “a diverse organized mass” ^(47){ }^{47} funds experience in the life-world from within its own unending resources. 记忆由此构成了人类大部分经验的基础低音部——一种赋予意义与价值的"数字低音"。通过其自下而上的重组行为，记忆维系着这种经验的整体性，保持其连贯与延续。即便处于如此深层的低音位置，它仍保持着积极的自主性，且比以往任何时候都更为浑厚。在此层面上，记忆实现了自身的同一性，并获得了独特的力量。它不再只是其所预设的那些实际存在的简单聚合体（尽管偶尔会将其单独提取），而是我们经验中不可简化为其他任何维度的存在——甚至无法简化为其自身的感知要素、过往性与真实性。记忆与这些要素不可分割地联系在一起，并因其自身弥散的虚拟性而更显浑厚，当被视为"多样化的有机整体"时，它从自身无尽的资源中为生活世界的经验提供内在支撑。
VIII 第八章
One central conclusion can be drawn without hesitation from the fact of memory’s thick autonomy as it has been described in this chapter. This is that whenever we remember and in whatever way we remember we get a different past every time. If memory is not a matter of pictographic trans-parency-if it is an active affair of dense interinvolvement with a massive past-it will not bring any particular past experience back again in a pristine format. Or more exactly, if and when it does so, e.g., in “photographic memory,” this will be exceptional, something to wonder at rather than to take for granted. Otherwise-which is to say, most of the time-we keep getting the past back differently. That we do so says something important both about the past and about memory. (a) About the past it says unmistakably that what has become past in relation to the present is in no way comparable to an essence. In other words, Hegel was wrong to claim dogmatically that “Wesen ist was gewesen ist” (essence is what has been). ^(48){ }^{48} As Husserl insisted, an essence or Wesen is precisely what is indefinitely repeatable in acts of cognition, above all those involving eidetic insight. 从本章所描述的记忆具有深厚自主性这一事实中，我们可以毫不犹豫地得出一个核心结论：无论何时以何种方式回忆，我们每次获得的都是不同的过去。如果记忆不是象形文字般的透明传递——如果它是与庞杂过去进行密集交互的能动过程——那么它就不会以原始形态重现任何特定的过往经验。更准确地说，即便在"照相式记忆"等特殊情况下确实实现了精确重现，这种现象也属于例外，值得惊叹而非视为理所当然。在绝大多数情况下，我们不断以不同方式重构过去。这种重构现象既揭示了过去的本质，也彰显了记忆的特性。(a)关于过去，它明确无误地表明：相对于当下而言的过往，与本质（Wesen）毫无相似之处。换言之，黑格尔武断宣称"本质即过往"（Wesen ist was gewesen ist）的观点是错误的。正如胡塞尔所坚持的，本质或 Wesen 恰恰是那些在认知行为中——尤其是涉及本质直观的行为中——能够无限重复的东西。
Indeed, as Derrida adds, an essence depends on this repeatability. ^(49){ }^{49} But the presence of thick autonomy means that the clarity of eidetic insight is notably lacking in the case of memory. What memory, including secondary memory, brings back is not the ever-the-sameness of an essence. It retrieves a past that is ever-different-different not just because of the erosion effected by time or because of the different act-form of remembering it corresponds to, but intrinsically different thanks to the action of thick autonomy. 诚如德里达所言，本质正依赖于这种可重复性。 ^(49){ }^{49} 但厚重自主性的在场意味着，在记忆的案例中明显缺乏本质直观的明晰性。记忆（包括次级记忆）所唤回的并非本质的永恒同一性，它检索到的是一种始终差异的过去——这种差异不仅源于时间的侵蚀作用或与之对应的回忆行为形式之不同，更因厚重自主性的运作而具有内在差异性。
(b) About memory, therefore, something important is also being said. This is that remembering makes a very considerable difference in how we relate to the past. Indeed, through its action of uncovering the past as everdifferent, it makes all the difference. In remembering we do not repeat the past as self-identical, as strictly unchanging and invariant. We regain the past as different each time. Or more exactly, we regain it as different in its very sameness. Sameness, as Heidegger (commenting on Hegel) has pointed out, is not to be confused with strict self-identity. Where the self-identical excludes the different altogether, the same allows for the different-even fosters it on occasion. ^(50){ }^{50} One of these occasions, I would suggest, is that of remembering itself. And it is precisely memory’s thick autonomy that makes this possible. In and through the dense operations of autonomous remembering, I recall the same past differently on successive occasions: now as I recapture it in reminiscence, now in body memory, now commemoratively, now even in recognition. Indeed, I regain the same past anew even as I return to it continually in the same act-form of remembering. No wonder we keep coming back to the past in memory-whether in ordinary life or in history or in psychoanalysis-without finding it in the least boring! As autonomous rememberers, we are generating our own everdiffering versions of the same past. No wonder, either, that what had seemed cause for despair when measured against exact recall (wherein we recollect the self-identical past per se) becomes reason for hope. For we are getting the past back as self-same, if not as self-identical. We are remembering this past and not merely spinning off variant versions of it. Each time we remember truly we are refinding the past, our past; however radical the differences between successive rememberings may be, they remain differences that accrue to the same past which we are attempting to recapture. In recognizing and in reminding, in place memory and in com-memorating-and in all the other ways in which the thick autonomy of memory expresses itself-we are refashioning the same past differently, making it to be different in its very self-sameness. (b) 因此，关于记忆，我们也在言说某种重要之事。这即是：记忆行为极大地改变了我们与过去的关系。事实上，通过其揭示"过去永不相同"的作用力，记忆彻底改变了这种关系。在回忆中，我们并非以绝对不变的自我同一性重复过去，而是每次都以不同方式重获过去。更准确地说，我们在其同一性中重获其差异性。正如海德格尔（在评论黑格尔时）所指出的，不应将"同一"与严格的"自我同一"混为一谈。绝对的自我同一性彻底排斥差异，而"同一"却为差异留出空间——甚至在某些时刻培育差异。 ^(50){ }^{50} 我认为这些时刻之一正是记忆行为本身。正是记忆厚重的自主性使这成为可能。在自主记忆的稠密运作中，我在不同时刻以不同方式回忆同一段过去：此刻通过追忆重现，彼刻通过身体记忆，此时以纪念方式，彼时甚至通过再认。事实上，即便我持续以同一种记忆行为形式重返过去，每次仍能崭新地重获同一段过去。 难怪我们不断重返记忆中的过去——无论是在日常生活中、历史研究里，还是精神分析时——却丝毫不觉得乏味！作为自主的回忆者，我们正在为相同的过去创造持续变化的版本。同样不足为奇的是，当以精确回忆（即重现完全同一的过去本身）为标准时曾令人绝望的事，反而成了希望的源泉。因为我们正以"自我同一"（即便不是"完全同一"）的方式重获过去。我们是在铭记这个过去，而非仅仅衍生其变体版本。每次真实的回忆，都是对过去——我们的过去——的重新发现；无论连续回忆之间的差异多么显著，它们始终归属于我们试图重新把握的同一个过去。在识别与提醒中，在场所记忆与共同纪念里——以及记忆那丰厚的自主性得以彰显的所有其他方式中——我们正以不同方式重塑着相同的过去，使其在自我同一性中呈现差异。
This is even true in recollection, which also makes the past in its image, and precisely as an image. For images have their own thickness. As forming part of memory of any kind, they are less than fully diaphanous. Whatever personal or theoretical expectations we may place on them, and however much we might wish or demand that they live up to the highest standards of 回忆亦是如此，它同样以自己的方式重塑过往，且恰恰是以意象的形式。因为意象自有其厚度。作为任何记忆形式的组成部分，它们并非完全透明。无论我们对其寄托何种个人期待或理论期许，也不论我们多么渴望或要求它们达到最高标准的
claritas, they do not render recollecting luminous. Despite my animadversions against recollection regarded as a paradigm for all remembering, it cannot be denied that recollecting itself shares, however sparingly, in the same thickness that we have observed to characterize other forms of remembering in more patent ways. And precisely in having its own thick autonomy, it conveys and transfigures the past in its own distinctive manner. 明晰度，它们都未能使回忆过程真正澄明。尽管我对将回忆视为所有记忆范式的观点持有异议，但不可否认的是，回忆行为本身——尽管程度有限——仍具有我们已观察到的、在其他记忆形式中更为明显的厚度特征。而正是凭借这种独特的厚重自主性，回忆以其特有的方式传递并重塑着过去。
We may go still further. Even the past as photographed has a unique memorial value. That which serves so readily as a norm for recollection itself possesses its own density as a material medium through which we remember the past differently. Why else would we so assiduously document our travels with multiple photographic images-and savor these images afterwards so much-unless they displayed a peculiar power to re-present (and not just to represent) the past effectively? Hence, the importance of that photograph of myself and my sister standing eagerly and expectantly near the entrance to Yosemite. This photograph has its own dense mode of insertion into the past, which it retrieves and recreates as distinctively as my own flawed secondary memory. Hence, too, the importance of the wedding photographs discussed in section V above. They also reconnect with a poignant moment, forming a bond with it that cannot be described as thin or unsubstantial. Through such photographs we remember the past differently but not less effectively than if we recollected it or reminisced about it. ^(51){ }^{51} At the same time, by this same image-mechanical as it is in its production, and precise as it is in the accuracy of its depiction-we inculcate a funded future of remembering, thereby thickening the matrix of our memorial participation. 我们还可以更进一步思考。即便是被拍摄下来的过去，也具有独特的纪念价值。那些作为回忆标准的事物本身作为一种物质媒介，拥有其独特的密度，使我们能够以不同方式记住过去。若非这些照片展现出一种特殊力量，能有效地重现（而不仅仅是代表）过去，我们又为何会如此热切地用大量照片记录旅程，并在事后如此珍视这些影像？正因如此，我和妹妹站在约塞米蒂国家公园入口处那幅充满期待的照片才显得尤为重要。这张照片以其特有的厚重方式嵌入过去，它所唤回和重塑的过去，与我自身有缺陷的次级记忆同样独特。同样重要的还有前文第五节讨论的婚礼照片。它们也与某个刻骨铭心的时刻重新连接，形成一种无法被形容为单薄或空洞的联系。通过这些照片，我们以不同的方式记住过去，其效果并不亚于通过回忆或追忆。 ^(51){ }^{51} 与此同时，通过这种既机械化生产又精确再现的图像，我们培植了记忆的资本化未来，从而加厚了我们参与记忆的基质。
If what I have just said is true of recollection as well as of the photograph, then we need not depend exclusively on Lower Regions in gaining an appreciation of the thick autonomy of remembering. This appreciation can be acquired as well among the Higher Powers. In the enactment of thick autonomy the mind itself may play an essential part-and so may recollection and recollection’s own putative prototype, the photograph. Just as remembering reaches out to every aspect of the past as different-in-itssameness, so every kind of remembering, including the most mentalistic (and this latter as mechanically aided), has pertinence and validity in the effort to recapture the past and to let it flourish in the present and in the future. 倘若我刚才所述既适用于回忆也适用于摄影，那么我们不必仅依赖"下界"来理解记忆的厚重自主性。这种理解同样可以在"上界"中获得。在践行厚重自主性时，心智本身可能发挥关键作用——回忆及其假定的原型（即摄影）亦是如此。正如记忆会触及过去每个"同中之异"的面向，所有类型的记忆——包括最唯心主义的（以及机械辅助的后者）——在重获过去并让其于当下及未来绽放的努力中，都具有相关性与有效性。
XII 十二
FREEDOM IN REMEMBERING 记忆中的自由
Memory is a kind of accomplishment a sort of renewal even an initiation 记忆是一种成就，一种更新，甚至是一种启蒙-William Carlos Williams, Paterson ——威廉·卡洛斯·威廉斯，《佩特森》
This is the use of memory: for liberationnot less of love but expanding of love beyond desire, and so liberation from the future as well as the past. 记忆的用途在于：为了解脱——不是减少爱，而是将爱扩展到欲望之外，从而既从过去也从未来中获得解脱。
-T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” (Four Quartets) ——T.S.艾略特，《小吉丁》（《四个四重奏》）
I
In the course of this book we have seen an eidetic and intentional analysis of remembering-in which recollection played a privileged role-give way to a concern with the outreach of memories into the surrounding world of the remembering subject. This outreach led us to explore reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing as three ways in which the mentalistic model of act-intentionality proved to be inadequate. The transcending of mind as a container of memories was even more strikingly evident in our investigations of body memories, place memories, and various forms of commemoration. As we pursued memory beyond mind we continually found a centrifugal movement outward from the rememberer’s mind into his or her world-a world filled with perceptual objects and historical events, signs and texts, rituals and other people. So engaging is this world that the insertion of memories into it, their manifold modes of connection with it, came to be described as a matter of “thick autonomy”-a density of involvement that, as we saw at the end of the last chapter, inheres in recollection itself. 在本书的探讨过程中，我们看到对记忆现象的本质与意向性分析——其中回忆占据着特殊地位——逐渐让位于对记忆向记忆主体周遭世界延伸的关注。这种延伸引导我们探索了提醒、追忆和识别这三种形式，它们共同证明了以心智活动为意向性基础的理论模型存在不足。当我们研究身体记忆、场所记忆及各类纪念形式时，记忆超越心智容器的特性表现得更为显著。随着研究视野超越心智范畴，我们不断发现记忆呈现出离心运动——从记忆者的意识向外扩散至其生活世界，这个充满知觉对象与历史事件、符号与文本、仪式与他人互动的世界。这个世界如此引人入胜，以至于记忆嵌入其中的方式及其与世界的多重联结，最终被描述为一种"厚重自主性"——正如我们在上一章结尾所见，这种深刻的参与性本就内在于回忆行为本身。
But even if the validity of this book’s exterocentric direction is grantedespecially in the light of theories of memory that have been dominated by mentalistic prejudices-the reader may be moved to ask a final set of questions. Has justice been done to the remembering subject in all this? Won’t this subject come forth to say that in some inalienable sense memories 但即便我们认可本书这种以外界为中心的研究方向的合理性——尤其是考虑到那些长期受心智主义偏见主导的记忆理论——读者或许仍会提出最后一组疑问：这一切是否公正地对待了记忆主体？难道这个主体不会站出来宣称，在某种不可剥夺的意义上，记忆
are “mine”-not mine as mere minions of my mind, or as something that I simply possess, but as part and parcel of my personal being? When I remember, after all, do I not engage in an activity that is undeniably mym y own? However much this activity may be shared with others in ceremonial moments, does it not remain identifiably mine insofar as II enact it and have continuing access to it-where “I” signifies myself-as-rememberer? Moreover, does not the content of a given memory inevitably include perspectives which can only be called “personal” and which reflect my unique position as a rememberer? And will not the same memory become integral to my ongoing life history, not just because it can be re-remembered but because it may alter my personal identity in the process? Indeed, if it is true in general that my existence is “mine to be in one way or another,” ^(1){ }^{1} then are not my memories mine to live out, as intimately as any other aspect of me? In other words, is not the incursion of memories into my life as massive and unavoidable as the rooting of these memories themselves in the world? Isn’t “the world” finally mym y world in some significant sense? 这些记忆是“属于我的”——并非作为我思想的附庸，或仅仅是我拥有的物品，而是作为我个人存在的组成部分？毕竟，当我回忆时，难道不是在从事一项无可争议地属于 mym y 自身的活动吗？尽管这项活动可能在仪式性时刻与他人共享，但只要 II 在实施并持续接触它——这里的“我”指向作为记忆者的自我——它不就依然可辨识为我的吗？此外，特定记忆的内容难道不必然包含只能被称为“个人”的视角，这些视角反映了我作为记忆者的独特立场吗？同样的记忆难道不会成为我持续生命历程的组成部分，不仅因为它能被重新记起，更因为它可能在此过程中改变我的个人身份？事实上，如果一般而言我的存在“以某种方式属于我”这一命题成立， ^(1){ }^{1} 那么我的记忆不也如同我其他面向一样，亲密无间地属于我去活现吗？换言之，记忆侵入我生活的程度，难道不正如这些记忆本身扎根于世界的程度那般巨大且不可避免吗？在某种深刻意义上，“世界”最终不正是 mym y 世界吗？
Even if they cannot be completely answered at this late point, these questions cannot be evaded. This book’s commitment to showing the efficacy and scope of memory beyond mind has been purchased at the risk of neglecting the remembering subject as such. Only this subject’s lived body has been accorded concerted attention. But our headlong hegira from the entrapment of mind into the embrace of the world has meant passing over many personal features of remembering-features that belong intrinsically to my Jemeinigkeit. ^(2){ }^{2} It is about time, therefore, that the rememberer himself or herself reclaim our attention. This book began by setting out an informal grouping of its author’s own, i.e., mym y memories, and it is only fitting that we come full cycle and return at the end to the personal self of the rememberer. 即便在此时无法完全解答这些问题，它们也无法被回避。本书致力于展示记忆超越心智的效力与范围，却以忽视记忆主体本身为代价。唯有这一主体的鲜活身体得到了集中关注。但我们从心智的桎梏中仓促逃向世界怀抱的过程，意味着跳过了记忆的诸多个人特征——这些特征本质上属于我的"本己性"。 ^(2){ }^{2} 因此，现在正是记忆者自身重新获得我们关注的时候。本书开篇时曾以作者自身记忆的非正式集合为起点 mym y ，而我们在结尾处回归记忆者的个人自我，恰是圆满的循环。
In the trajectory we have undertaken, this self has been in effect depersonalized. What remained of the self from the externalizing movements of Parts Two and Three was effectively submerged in the treatment of thick autonomy with which the present Part opened. Even in its positive, truthgenerating mode, this autonomy expresses the immersion of the rememberer in an anonymous pre-personal level of experience-a level that resists specification in terms of the individual self. Its most characteristic dimension is that of depth, and its description as a layer of the “Lower Regions” reinforces the sense in which thickly autonomous remembering underlies the remembering subject. The very terms by which I have designated its enactment-e.g., “funding,” “background,” “basso continuo,” etc.-only serve to underscore the impersonality of memory’s thick autonomy. In depicting memory as autonomous in this immersionist mode, we court the danger of losing ourselves in our own description; our sense of intact selfidentity may dissolve. 在我们所探讨的轨迹中，这个自我实际上已被去人格化。从第二、三部分外化运动中残存的自我，已然彻底沉没在本部分开篇所论述的厚重自主性之中。即便以其积极且能生成真理的形态存在，这种自主性也昭示着回忆者沉浸于一种匿名的前人格经验层面——这个层面抗拒以个体自我的方式被具体化。其最典型的特征在于深度维度，而将其描述为"下界区域"的一层，更强化了厚重自主性记忆构成回忆主体基础这一认知。我用以指称其运作的术语——如"积淀"、"背景"、"通奏低音"等——恰恰突显了记忆厚重自主性的非人格特质。当我们将记忆描绘为这种沉浸模式中的自主存在时，我们正冒险迷失于自己的描述之中；我们完整的自我认同感或将消解。
II 第二部
Precisely in this circumstance of submergence in the depths of thick autonomy, it is not surprising that the remembering subject might wish to reclaim responsibility for his or her own actions. To own up to this responsibility is another way of saying “these memories are mine,” mine to experience and mine to dispose of as I see fit. But to reclaim mineness in the guise of responsibility is at the same time to claim freedom in remembering, a freedom with which we must now come to terms. To understand this freedom is to gain an understanding of memory’s thick autonomy as it is enacted “in person”-as it is based in the actions of the rememberer as well as in his or her world. Such freedom assumes two main forms, freedom to be oneself and freedom of in-gathering. 正是在这种沉浸于厚重自主性深处的境况下，记忆主体渴望重新获得对自己行为的责任也就不足为奇了。承认这种责任，无异于宣称"这些记忆属于我"——我有权体验它们，也有权按照自己的意愿处置它们。但以责任为名重新主张记忆的所有权，同时也意味着主张记忆的自由，这种自由正是我们现在必须面对的。理解这种自由，就是理解记忆的厚重自主性如何在"亲身"实践中实现——它既植根于记忆者的行动，也植根于其所在的世界。这种自由主要呈现为两种形式：成为自我的自由与内聚的自由。
Freedom to Be Oneself 成为自我的自由
It is an inescapable fact about human existence that we are made of our memories: we are what we remember ourselves to be. We cannot dissociate the remembering of our personal past from our present self-identity. Indeed, such remembering brings about this identity. The theme is familiar to readers of John Locke: 人类存在的一个无可逃避的事实是：我们由记忆构成。我们就是我们所记得的那个自己。我们无法将个人过去的记忆与当下的自我认同割裂开来。事实上，正是这种记忆塑造了我们的身份。这个主题对约翰·洛克的读者而言并不陌生：
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat [i.e., in memory] the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come . . . the same consciousness uniting these distinct actions into the same person. ^(3){ }^{3} 只要一个智慧生命能够以最初行动时的相同意识[即在记忆中]重现任何过去行为的观念，并以对待当下行为的相同意识来重复它，那么它便是同一个自我人格。因为正是通过对其当下思想与行为的意识，它此刻才成为自身的自我，并且只要这同一意识能延伸至过去或将来的行为……这同一意识便将那些不同的行为联结为同一个人。
As we have seen, remembering thrives in the constitution of the same (in contrast with the self-identical), and it is not at all surprising to find Locke claiming that sameness of consciousness is established by remembering. This sameness is the basis for a continuous personal identity, which requires that my consciousness now be the same as my consciousness then-where “the same” allows room for the significantly different as well. Thus, where Locke says that it is “the same consciousness” that unites past, present, and future selves “into the same person,” we can just as well say that it is the same memories that unite our temporally disparate selves into one self: mym y self. 正如我们所见，记忆在构建"同一性"（与"自我同一"相对）的过程中蓬勃发展。因此，发现洛克主张"意识的同一性由记忆确立"这一观点毫不令人惊讶。这种同一性是持续人格同一性的基础，它要求我此刻的意识必须与彼时的意识相同——而这里的"相同"也为显著差异留下了空间。因此，当洛克指出"同一意识"将过去、现在和未来的自我"统一为同一个人"时，我们同样可以说正是相同的记忆将我们时间上分散的自我统一为一个自我： mym y 自我。
The failure of memory to integrate experiences into a single personal identity can be dire, resulting in the pathological condition of “multiple personality.” In this predicament someone who is historically and physically continuous at the level of gross description is radically splintered at the level of personal identity. Even when there is a central, “official” self, the various 当记忆无法将经验整合为单一的人格同一性时，后果可能十分严重，会导致"多重人格"的病态状况。在这种困境中，一个在历史和物理层面具有连续性的人，在人格同一性层面却会彻底分裂。即便存在一个核心的"官方"自我，那些多样化的
separate selves fail to connect with each other, whether directly or through the core self. The critical dysfunction is that of memory: the multiple selves cannot remember one another (if and when they do, it is in a merely superficial fashion, that is, without any sense of belonging to the same self-system). ^(4){ }^{4} The causative mechanism in multiple personality is usually designated as “dissociation.” ^(5){ }^{5} But the dissociation itself reflects a failure of memory to link the multiple selves of the same person into “the same consciousness,” that is to say, the same continuously felt personhood. In still other instances, we may detect an analogous if less severe, failure: e.g., the lack of connection between the true and false selves of the “schizoid” personality. Indeed, whenever I cannot “get my life together” and feel it to be divisively fragmentary, the reconnective powers of memory have failed me. 分离的自我无法彼此连接，无论是直接地还是通过核心自我。关键的功能障碍在于记忆：多重自我无法记住彼此（即便偶尔记得，也只是流于表面，即缺乏同属一个自我系统的感知）。多重人格的成因机制通常被称为"解离"。但这种解离本质上反映了记忆未能将同一个体的多重自我联结为"同一意识"，也就是持续感知的同一人格。在其他案例中，我们或许能发现类似但程度较轻的障碍：例如"分裂样"人格中真实自我与虚假自我间的联结缺失。事实上，每当我无法"整合自己的人生"并感到四分五裂时，正是记忆的联结功能出现了问题。
Short of such situations of dispersion, I find myself able to connect temporally diverse aspects of myself and put them into meaningful communication with each other. Even more importantly, I can consolidate the self I have been and shape the self I am coming to be. As Locke intimates, both my past self and my future self are involved in my personal identity, since “the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come.” My freedom in remembering is accordingly bi-directional. It bears on prior as well as subsequent aspects of my life. (a) Concerning what has already taken place, it acts to organize what might otherwise be a mere assemblage of contingently connected events. It does this by selecting, emphasizing, col-locating-sometimes condensing and sometimes expanding-and in general regrouping and reconfigurating what I have experienced so as to allow a more coherent sense of self to emerge. I am free to reconstruct and reconstrue what I have experienced: there is no set script for my life as I elect to remember it. This does not mean that there are no limits to such backwardlooking modes of re-membering my experiences. We confront limits in the empirical and historical actuality in which the thick autonomy of memory immerses us-and even more so in the concern of this autonomy (in its positive form) to be true to the past so far as is possible. Yet these limits do not undercut memorial freedom of the specific sorts just mentioned. They may even collaborate with such freedom, as when an effort to be true to a particular part of my past allows me to recall its detailed infrastructure more freely. 在缺乏这种分散情境的情况下，我发现自己能够将时间上分散的自我面向联系起来，并使它们彼此进行有意义的交流。更重要的是，我能够整合曾经的自我，并塑造正在形成的自我。正如洛克所暗示的，我的过去自我和未来自我都参与了我的个人身份认同，因为"同一意识可以延伸到过去或将来的行动"。因此，我在记忆中的自由是双向的。它既关乎我生命中的先前面向，也关乎后续面向。(a) 对于已经发生的事情，记忆的作用是组织那些可能只是偶然关联事件的集合。它通过选择、强调、并置——有时压缩有时扩展——以及总体上重组和重构我的经历来实现这一点，从而让更连贯的自我意识得以浮现。我有自由去重建和重新诠释我的经历：当我选择记忆时，我的生活并没有固定的剧本。这并不意味着这种回溯式的经验重组模式没有任何限制。 我们面临着经验与历史现实中的种种限制——记忆那厚重的自主性将我们浸没其中，而当这种自主性（以其积极形态）力求尽可能忠实地呈现过去时，限制就更为显著。然而这些限制并不会削弱前文所述的特殊记忆自由。它们甚至可能与这种自由形成协作，例如当我努力忠实还原某段个人历史时，反而能更自由地回忆起其精微的内在结构。
(b) At the same time, I am free in establishing my ongoing and future personal identity by means of my own remembering. This remembering determines (in Lacan’s formula) “what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming.” What I shall have been, my eventual personal identity, is very much a function of what I shall remember myself to be-which is in turn a function of what II now remember myself to have been. And what I now remember myself to have been is by no means a fixed affair. It is once more a matter of freedom, specifically the freedom to decide which features （b）与此同时，我通过自身的记忆行为，自由地构建着持续演进与未来的人格同一性。这种记忆行为决定着（用拉康的公式表述）"我将要成为的样态中曾有的自我"。我将要成为的样态，即最终的人格同一性，很大程度上取决于我将要记住的自己——而这又取决于 II 此刻所记住的曾经自我。此刻我所记住的曾经自我绝非既定不变，它再次关乎自由，特别是决定选择哪些特质
of my previous life to honor or reject, celebrate or revile, in the future. This freedom is expressly evaluative; it is a freedom realized through assessing my own past as a prologue for my own future-an assessment carried out on the basis of values I am maintaining in the present. 我过往生命中的种种，未来将予以尊崇或摒弃、颂扬或唾弃。这种自由本质上是价值判断的自由；它通过将自己的过去视为未来的序章来实现——这种评估基于我当下所秉持的价值观。
At play in both phases (a)(a) and (b)(b) of the constitution of personal identity is the noticing of differences between past and present selves. The sameness of personal identity not only incorporates these differences; it may even thrive on them. Thus, just because I grasp my tolerance for sexism on my part and others noticeably decreasing with age, I gain an ever more secure sense of who I am in the present-and very likely will be in the future. Operative here is a peculiar capacity of memorial freedom to consider myself both same and other in one and the same apprehension: the same self precisely in and as differing from itself. Husserl has named such self-differing selfapprehension “de-presentation.” ^(6){ }^{6} By remembering myself in this selfdifferentiating way, I de-present myself to myself. The forging of my personal identity calls continually for such de-presentational activity. Through this activity, I come to know myself, indeed, to be myself. 在个人身份建构的两个阶段 (a)(a) 和 (b)(b) 中，关键都在于注意到过去自我与现在自我之间的差异。个人身份的同一性不仅包含这些差异；它甚至可能因这些差异而蓬勃发展。因此，正是因为我意识到自己及他人对性别歧视的容忍度随着年龄增长显著降低，我才对当下的自己——很可能也包括未来的自己——获得了越来越确定的认知。这里起作用的是记忆自由的一种特殊能力，它让我能在同一种觉知中既视自己为相同又视自己为相异：在差异中保持精确的自我同一。胡塞尔将这种自我差异化的自我觉知称为"去当下化" ^(6){ }^{6} 。通过这种自我差异化的方式回忆自己，我向自己实施了去当下化。我的个人身份锻造过程持续需要这种去当下化活动。正是通过这种活动，我得以认识自己，并真正成为自己。
Therefore, it is clear that, thanks to memory, we have a quite considerable part to play in our own self-begetting as persons-where “person” connotes not just the biological or legal entity but the very self which we know to be an indispensable basis for being-in-the world. It is not a decisive objection to claim (as did Butler in his critique of Locke) that the self that thereby constitutes itself from memories must be presupposed in the process of constitution. ^(7){ }^{7} This must be conceded: there is never a selfless moment-at least not after the earliest phases of an individual’s development-and each successive self is built on its own selective stock of memories. But by the same token, each successive self can re-orient itself by altering its hold on old memories and weaving in new ones; it can reinterpret its history in a different manner; it can even represent itself to itself in a variant manner. Everywhere there is the production of personal identity, a production proceeding by the free remembering of the self by itself. 因此显而易见的是，由于记忆的存在，我们在自我人格塑造过程中扮演着举足轻重的角色——这里的"人格"不仅指生物学或法律意义上的实体，更是指我们深知作为在世存在之必要基础的"自我本身"。即便有人提出（如巴特勒在批判洛克时所言）这种通过记忆建构的自我必须在建构过程中被预先设定，也不构成决定性反驳。 ^(7){ }^{7} 我们必须承认：从个体发展的最初阶段之后，就从未存在过无自我的时刻——每个后续的自我都是基于其选择性记忆库存构建而成。但同理，每个后续的自我都能通过调整对旧记忆的把握、编织新记忆来重新定位自身；它能以不同方式重新诠释自身历史；甚至能以变化的方式向自身呈现自我。无处不在的是人格同一性的生产，这种生产通过自我对自身进行的自由回忆而持续推进。
Freedom of In-Gathering 自由的内聚
If it is now evident that personal identity is dependent upon the free activity of remembering, we still do not know how this activity actually works. A clue is contained in a statement of Heidegger’s: “Memory is the gathering of thought.” ^(8){ }^{8} In its free action, memory gathers much else besides thought; it also gathers emotions, perceptions, bits of discourse-ultimately, all the parts of our life history. “Gathering” connotes assembling, drawing together of items into a provisional unity. When gathering is memorial in character, the unity is no longer merely provisional-it is a unity that we retain, guard, keep. “Keeping,” says Heidegger, “is the fundamental nature and essence of memory.” ^(9){ }^{9} The freedom at work in such gathering-as-keeping 如果说现在已明确个人身份认同依赖于记忆的自由活动，我们仍不清楚这种活动如何实际运作。海德格尔的一句话提供了线索："记忆是思想的聚集。" ^(8){ }^{8} 在自由行动中，记忆不仅聚集思想，还聚集情感、感知、话语片段——最终汇聚我们生命历程的所有组成部分。"聚集"意味着将元素汇集为暂时的统一体。当聚集具有纪念性质时，这种统一就不再仅是暂时的——而是我们保留、守护、保存的统一体。海德格尔说："保存是记忆的基本性质和本质。" ^(9){ }^{9} 这种作为保存的聚集所蕴含的自由
is more than merely selective in its operation. It is a freedom of amalgamation, of creating synthetic wholes, and not just of selecting parts. At the same time, this freedom involves the decision to preserve the wholes thus drawn together: to validate them as memorable, as worthy of being retained in memory. 其运作方式远不止于选择性。这是一种融合的自由，创造综合整体的自由，而不仅仅是选择部分。同时，这种自由包含保存这些聚合整体的决定：确认它们值得被铭记，值得保留在记忆中。
It is striking that the word “recollection,” understood in terms of its origins rather than in terms of the use to which it has been put in Western thought, captures these same two aspects of memorial gathering. “Collection” derives from the Latin collecta, a “gathering together,” and, still more primordially, from colligere, literally a “binding together” (as is signified in the English verb “to colligate”); whereas “re-” signifies “back” or “again.” In a primary act of re-collection, I bind things together, keep them in a gathered unity, so that I can return to them again and again. Such re-collecting contrasts strikingly with recollection qua secondary memory, wherein the basic action is that of reflecting (as in a mirror or photograph) whatever is presented to it. The result of this basic action is a re-presentation that, in claiming to possess likeness to an original presentation, offers no unification of its own, no gathering together that is binding on its own terms. In other words, recollection fails to be genuine re-collection. Or more exactly, it fails to manifest the way in which, despite its derivative status as iconic, it gathers the past together and guards it in its own unique manner. 令人惊叹的是，当我们从其词源而非西方思想中赋予它的具体用法来理解“回忆”这一概念时，它恰好捕捉到了纪念性聚合的这两个核心方面。“收集”一词源自拉丁语 collecta，意为“聚集在一起”，而更原始的词根 colligere 则意味着“绑定在一起”（正如英语动词“colligate”所暗示的）；而“re-”则表示“回到”或“再次”。在回忆的原始行为中，我将事物绑定在一起，保持它们在集合的统一性中，以便我能够一次又一次地回到它们。这种回忆与作为次级记忆的回忆形成鲜明对比，后者的基本行为是反射（如镜子或照片）所呈现的事物。这种基本行为的结果是一种再呈现，它在声称与原呈现具有相似性时，并未实现自身统一，也未形成一种具有自身约束力的聚集。换言之，回忆未能成为真正的重新收集。 或者更准确地说，它未能展现出这样一种方式：尽管作为图像性存在具有派生性质，它仍以自身独特的方式将过去聚合起来并加以守护。
But the gathering action of free remembering involves still more than a twofold movement of collecting and keeping. The gathering of memory is a gathering in, as is testified in such phrases as “keeping in memory” or “bearing the past in mind.” It is not sufficient for remembering to draw together and retain its content so as to exhibit it-that is, to display it as might a computer screen. The language of “display,” to which I was tempted in chapter 2, all too easily becomes just another expression of the predominance of the visual mode that is already evident in the constrictive interpretation of recollection as iconic re-presentation. ^(10){ }^{10} Beyond the presentational immediacy of display, memory seeks to preserve its content within. 但自由回忆的聚合行为所包含的远不止收集与保存的双重运动。记忆的聚合是一种内在的聚合，正如"铭记于心"或"心怀过往"这类短语所印证的那样。回忆若仅止于将内容汇集并保留以便展示——就像电脑屏幕显示那样——是远远不够的。我在第二章曾倾向于使用的"展示"语言，极易沦为视觉模式主导地位的另一种表达，这种主导性早已体现在将回忆狭隘解读为图像性再现的做法中。 ^(10){ }^{10} 超越展示的呈现即时性，记忆追求的是将其内容内在地保存。
Within what? Within the remembering subject. I say “subject” and not “mind”-despite the force of the idiom, “keeping the past in mind.” ^(11){ }^{11} To keep the past in the mind alone is to keep it within something that fancies itself to be transparent to itself and its objects-indeed, to be the very image of the objects it encounters and knows. Once again we must suspend a dogmatic adherence to “the nobility of sight” in order to uncover layers of our personal being that are not valued for their strictly visual display. The lived body represents one such layer, and it is crucial that we have been able to locate memories in this body: body memories, as we saw in chapter 8, are not just about the body but sedimented into it and at one with it. Yet in its free action remembering gathers itself into every aspect of the human subject-not only into the body and mind of this subject but into his or her 在什么之中？在记忆的主体之中。我说"主体"而非"心智"——尽管"将过去留在心中"这个习语颇具影响力。 ^(11){ }^{11} 仅仅将过去保留在心智中，就是将其保留在某种自以为对自身及其对象完全透明的东西里——甚至认为自身就是所遭遇和认知对象的精确映象。我们必须再次搁置对"视觉高贵性"的教条式坚持，才能揭示那些不以严格视觉呈现为价值的人性层面。活生生的身体就是这样一个层面，而关键在于我们已能将记忆定位于这个身体：正如第八章所见，身体记忆不仅关乎身体，更沉淀于身体之中，与身体融为一体。然而在自由行动中，记忆将自身汇聚于人类主体的每个面向——不仅进入这个主体的身体与心智，更融入他或她的
emotional life, circle of thoughts, set of social relations, and capacity to speak and listen. It is a matter, in short, of in-gathering memory into the person as a whole. Nothing less than this will do if freedom in remembering is to attain its full range in human existence. As Plato himself put it, remembering of the most significant sort-and this means recollection of forms, anamnesistakes place “within oneself” (ex hautou). ^(12){ }^{12} 情感生活、思维循环、社会关系网络以及言说与倾听的能力。简言之，这是将记忆内化为完整人格的过程。若要使回忆的自由在人类存在中获得充分展现，唯有如此方能达成。正如柏拉图所言，最具深意的回忆——即对形式的追忆，对理念的"回忆"（anamnesis）——发生于"自身之内"（ex hautou）。
It is just here that we reach the inwardmost point of our journey in this book. To be within the remembering subject-Plato would say the remembering soul ^(13){ }^{13}-is to be at a point considerably more interior than mind itself is. In fact mind, as it has come to be conceived since Descartes, is, for all of its self-encapsulation (and precisely in flight from such selfenclosure), turned resolutely outward in its eagerness to absorb and re-flect-to “represent”-the determinate outer world. In its ec-centricity, it lacks the inwardness that remembering requires in the most complete expression of its freedom. How are we to conceive such distinctively memorial interiority if it cannot be conveyed by a mentalistic model and if we hesitate to revert to the language of the soul-if we decide to follow neither Descartes nor Plato? 正是在此处，我们抵达了本书旅程最深邃的内核。置身于记忆主体之中——柏拉图称之为记忆灵魂——意味着抵达比心智本身更为内在的维度。事实上，自笛卡尔以来被构想的心智，尽管具有自我封闭性（且恰恰通过逃离这种封闭），却始终坚定地向外转去，热切地吸收并重新映射——"再现"——那个确定的外部世界。这种离心性使得心智缺乏记忆活动充分展现其自由所需的内在性。若这种独特的记忆内在性无法通过心智主义模型传达，而我们又犹豫是否回归灵魂的语言——倘若我们决定既不追随笛卡尔也不效法柏拉图——该如何构想它？
My suggestion is that the ‘in’ of memory’s in-gathering freedom be conceived as a matrix of matrices. “Matrix” has the curious property of signifying something that is at once material and formal. From its root in mater, “mother,” it stands for a material region of origin and development. ^(14){ }^{14} In the present context, the materiality of a matrix is detectable in the depth of the remembering subject and more particularly in the thick autonomy through which this subject realizes its freedom. As a matrix in depth, the subject who remembers inwardizes experiences, incorporating them into the density of his or her inner being instead of merely refracting these experiences back onto the world. But “matrix” also means formal framework, a topologically defined network in which items can be allotted locations. In this capacity, the notion of matrix points to another aspect of memory’s in-gathering activity, namely, its proclivity for arranging its contents in ordered groupings and for finding a location, a specific topos, for these groupings within the vast keep that we denote by the mass noun “memory.” The density of memory’s material inherence in the subject is here matched by the elegance and economy of its formal arrangements. When we take into account this dual dimensionality, we are led to conceive the in-gathering action of remembering as a material matrix (in depth) of formal matrices (located within this same depth). 我的建议是，将记忆“向内”聚集的自由构想为一个矩阵的矩阵。“矩阵”具有一种奇特属性，它同时指代物质性与形式性的存在。从其词源“mater”（母亲）来看，它象征着起源与发展的物质领域。在当前语境下，矩阵的物质性体现于记忆主体的深度之中，更具体地说，体现在主体实现其自由时所展现的浓厚自主性里。作为深层的矩阵，进行内向记忆的主体将经验内化，使其融入自身内在存在的密度之中，而非仅仅将这些经验折射回外部世界。但“矩阵”同时也意味着形式框架——一种通过拓扑学定义的网络，其中各要素都能被分配特定位置。 在这种意义上，"基质"概念指向记忆内聚活动的另一个面向，即记忆倾向于将其内容有序编排成组，并在我们以物质名词"记忆"所指称的广袤领域中为这些组群找到特定位置——一个具体的拓扑空间。记忆材料在主体中的稠密内在性，在此与其形式编排的优雅简约相得益彰。当我们考量这种双重维度时，就会将回忆的内聚活动理解为形式基质（位于此深度之中）的物质基质（在深度层面）。
In-gathering is a concrete process of drawing in memories from various states of forgetfulness, marginality, virtuality, and indirectness. These memories are grouped or “filed”-put into a formal matrix-in terms of their thematic content: e.g., visits with a close friend to a certain place, traumatic experiences of a given type, my childhood during a particular stretch of time, etc. In relation to these special groupings (each of which represents a 内聚是从遗忘、边缘化、虚拟性和间接性等各种状态中汲取记忆的具体过程。这些记忆根据其主题内容被归类或"归档"——置入形式基质：例如与密友同访某地的经历、某类创伤性体验、特定时间段内的童年记忆等。相对于这些特殊组群（每个组群都代表着
discrete domain of my existence), my personal identity can be considered a guiding matrix, that which gives coherence and consistency to all the others, allowing them to articulate with each other. The identity of my person (itself a product as well as a repository of remembering) enables me to identify these formal aggregates as " mym y memories," and it lends to them a peculiar depth they would not otherwise possess. As a matrix of matrices, my personal being is a being-in-depth, a moi profond, in and through which my thematically distinct memories come to be connected from below. In this Lower Region memories fuse and become owned as mine; here the autonomy of memory is as thick as the self is deep; and here, too, my freedom in remembering is most fully gathered in upon itself. 在我存在的离散领域中，个人身份可视为一种引导性矩阵，它为所有其他记忆提供连贯性与一致性，使它们能够相互联结。我的人格身份（既是记忆的产物也是记忆的储存库）使我能够将这些形式聚合体识别为"记忆"，并赋予它们原本不具备的特殊深度。作为矩阵中的矩阵，我的个人存在是一种深度存在，一个"深层自我"——正是在这个深层领域里，那些主题各异的记忆从底层相互连接。在这个"下部区域"，记忆相互融合并被确认为"我"所有；在此处，记忆的自主性与自我的深度同样厚重；也正是在这里，我在回忆过程中的自由得以最充分地回归自身。
III 第三章
We need to explore the freedom of in-gathering more fully. Such freedom has three main components: collecting; keeping; and inwardizing by means of material and formal matrices. Taken together, these components serve to distinguish such freedom from any mere process of selection or what is traditionally termed “freedom of choice.” Or more precisely, the components incorporate freedom of choice into a more encompassing sphere of free action. Take, for example, that part of personal identity which we are accustomed to call “character.” We tend to consider a person’s character as a group of settled dispositions to act in certain ways, and we may think in this connection of the dictum “a man’s character is his fate.” ^(15){ }^{15} This is to presume that character is somehow unchangeable or a matter of external compulsion. In fact, as both Aristotle and Freud point out, character is very much a matter of freedom-freedom of choice. Aristotle specifies that the reliable “habits” (hēxeis) on which character is based depend on particular choices made during the time when the habits were being formed. ^(16){ }^{16} Freud, as we have seen, explicitly defines character as “a precipitate of abandoned objectcathexes [which] contains the history of these object-choices.” ^(17){ }^{17} What is left unacknowledged by both thinkers is the role of remembering in the transformation of mere “object-choices” into that “precipitate” or massive habituality we call personal character. This role is epitomized in the freedom of in-gathering, all of whose component parts are operative in the formation of character. There is, first of all, an activity of drawing together inasmuch as character condenses all of the determinate choices which have preceded it: it is, as it were, their summary statement. Precisely as it is unifying these choices, the gathering action of remembering also preserves them, keeps and guards them, as the ground of character. As specifically in-gathering, remembering takes prior choices (collected together as an amalgamated mass) into the self, where they are grouped by thematic content into formal matrices and connected in depth by the material matrix of one’s personal 我们需要更充分地探究内聚的自由。这种自由包含三个主要组成部分：收集；保存；以及通过物质与形式矩阵进行内化。这些要素共同作用，将此类自由与单纯的筛选过程或传统所称的"选择自由"区分开来。更准确地说，这些要素将选择自由纳入了更广阔的自由行动范畴。以我们惯称为"性格"的那部分个人身份为例——我们倾向于将性格视为一系列稳定的行为倾向，并可能联想到"性格即命运"这句格言。 ^(15){ }^{15} 这实则假定性格是不可改变的，或是外部强制使然。事实上，正如亚里士多德与弗洛伊德所指出的，性格很大程度上关乎自由——选择自由。亚里士多德明确指出，构成性格的可靠"习性"（hēxeis）取决于习性形成过程中所做的特定选择。 ^(16){ }^{16} 正如我们所看到的，弗洛伊德明确将性格定义为"被放弃的对象贯注的沉淀物[它]包含着这些对象选择的历史"。 ^(17){ }^{17} 两位思想家都未承认的是，记忆在将单纯的"对象选择"转化为我们称之为个人性格的"沉淀物"或稳固习性过程中所起的作用。这种作用集中体现在内聚的自由中，其所有组成部分都在性格形成过程中发挥作用。首先存在一种聚合活动，因为性格浓缩了所有先前的确定性选择：可以说，性格就是这些选择的总结性陈述。正是在统一这些选择的同时，记忆的聚合作用也保存、保留并守护着它们，作为性格的基础。作为特定的内聚过程，记忆将先前的选择（作为混合体被收集在一起）带入自我，在那里它们按主题内容被分组为形式矩阵，并通过个人物质矩阵在深度上相互连接。
identity. Thanks to this complex assimilative process, we are able to say that “my character” has many facets (reflecting the many kinds of choices on which it is founded) and yet is fully consolidated (and thus is a constituent feature of my personal identity). Far from being fated, then, my character is altogether an expression of my free remembering in its in-gathering power. 身份。得益于这种复杂的同化过程，我们才能说"我的性格"具有多面性（反映了其所基于的多种选择），却又完全统一（因此构成我个人身份的特征）。由此可见，我的性格绝非命中注定，而是我自由回忆所具有的聚合力量之完整体现。
Tempting as they may be to employ, models of subsumption (of matter under form, content under category) do not adequately delineate the basic activity of in-gathering. Whether these models are set forth in a Kantian or a Piagetian format-i.e., in terms of categories or schemes-they fail to capture the intricate, side-long, non-hierarchical movements that both allow and express freedom in remembering. The in-gathering of memory contests the presumption that there is some single concept (or scheme, thought, idea) under which remembered content must be subsumed. In their laterality, memorial matrices resist any such hierarchical ordering. As a particular matrix is itself always evolving and is never fully settled, nothing can be definitively subsumed under it, nor can it be simply subsumed under something else. Instead of such coming-under in a pre-established, topdown (or bottom-up) situation, there is a coming-in of memorial material, which radiates laterally and non-subsumptively within the remembering subject. As we have seen, there is a loose grouping into formal matrices; but the thematic content of these latter is not rigidly defined: “my college years,” “the times when I worked on the book,” “last year in Marienbad,” “that trip to Yosemite.” The members of each such aggregate may overlap one another; in any case they are not arranged in a vertical hierarchy of subsumption. They are not even subsumed under the material matrix of personal identity: I have termed this critical matrix “material” in order to indicate that it is ingredient within the formal matrices with which it is allied. Mineness is thus not an abstract universal but a concrete notion immanent within every memory I can rightfully claim as “mine.” 尽管套用归类模型（将质料归入形式，将内容纳入范畴）的做法颇具诱惑，但这些模型无法充分描述记忆内聚的基本活动。无论是康德式的范畴论还是皮亚杰式的图式论，这些框架都未能捕捉到回忆过程中那些错综复杂、横向展开且非等级化的动态——正是这些动态既允许又彰显着记忆的自由本质。记忆的内聚过程挑战了那种认为存在某个单一概念（或图式、思想、观念）必须统摄所有回忆内容的预设。记忆矩阵以其横向延展的特性，抗拒任何等级化的排序。由于特定记忆矩阵本身始终处于流变之中且永不安定，既无法将任何事物绝对地统摄其下，也无法被简单地归入其他框架。记忆材料的汇入并非发生在预先确立的、自上而下（或自下而上）的统摄关系中，而是在记忆主体内部以横向辐射、非统摄的方式展开。 正如我们所见，记忆会松散地归类于形式母体之中；但这些母体的主题内容并无严格界定："我的大学岁月"、"我写书的那段日子"、"去年在马里昂巴德"、"那次优胜美地之旅"。每个记忆集合的成员可能相互重叠；无论如何，它们并非按照垂直的从属层级排列。这些记忆甚至不被归入个人身份的物质母体之下：我将这个关键母体称为"物质性"，旨在表明它内在于与之关联的形式母体之中。因此，"属我性"并非抽象普遍概念，而是内在于我有权称之为"我的"的每一个记忆中的具体概念。
Just as we must resist the seductions of subsumption in any thorough consideration of in-gathering, so we must also resist the temptations of containment. The very word “in” arouses these temptations: recall Aristotle’s discussion of this word and its implications for a strict containership view of topos. ^(18){ }^{18} Where the snug fit of the vessel could serve as an appropriate image for our discussion of the role of place in remembering, this fit is not applicable to all forms of memory. Nevertheless, the idea of strict containment dies hard. It is an idée fixe in contemporary information processing models of human memory. So as to fit the closely confining containers represented by parts of computers, incoming experiences must be tidily presented to begia with: hence their designation as “input” that is divisible into “bits” of information. Moreover, one form of determinacy begets another. For memory to be efficient, bits of information need to be “chunked” into mathematically determinable sets and then given “encoding specificity.” ^(19){ }^{19} The language of “input,” “bit,” “chunk,” “encoding” bespeaks a 正如我们在深入思考"内聚"时必须抵制归类的诱惑，同样也必须抗拒"容器论"的诱惑。"内"这个字本身就容易引发这种倾向：回想亚里士多德对这个词的讨论及其对严格容器论式场所观的影响。 ^(18){ }^{18} 虽然容器严丝合缝的意象或许适合用来探讨场所在记忆中的作用，但这种契合性并不适用于所有记忆形式。然而，严格容器论的观点根深蒂固，它已成为当代人类记忆信息处理模型中的执念。为了适应计算机部件所代表的严密容器，输入的经验必须从一开始就被整齐地呈现：因此它们被称为可分割为信息"比特"的"输入"。更甚者，一种确定性催生另一种确定性。为了使记忆高效运作，信息比特需要被"组块化"为数学可确定的集合，然后赋予"编码特异性"。 ^(19){ }^{19} "输入"、"比特"、"组块"、"编码"这些术语昭示着...
situation in which to be in memory is necessarily to be snugly ensconced within predetermined limits and exact boundaries. No wonder that there is so much talk of “packaging” information in this self-contained machine model. Not to mention repackaging! As a leading psychological theorist states, “Our language is tremendously useful for repackaging material into a few chunks rich in information.” ^(20){ }^{20} Useful this language may be-and it is increasingly tempting to employ it as computers become indispensable parts of our lives-yet we have to ask whether it does justice to the indirections of the ‘in’ of in-gathering. This ‘in’ resists being containerized-and thus quan-tified-as fiercely as it resists being subsumed under a category or a scheme. The same resistance applies to any effort to assimilate it to a neurological model of containment within brain cells. 在这种情境下，记忆的存在必然意味着被安全地安置于预先设定的界限与精确边界之内。难怪在这个自成体系的机器模型中，人们如此频繁地谈论"打包"信息。更不用说重新打包了！正如一位杰出的心理学理论家所言："我们的语言极其擅长将材料重新打包成几个信息丰富的组块。" ^(20){ }^{20} 这种语言或许确实实用——随着计算机成为生活中不可或缺的部分，使用这种语言的诱惑与日俱增——但我们仍需追问：它是否公正地对待了"内聚"中"内"字的迂回特性。这个"内"字抗拒被容器化——因而也抗拒被量化——其激烈程度不亚于它抗拒被归入某个类别或框架。同样的抵抗也适用于任何试图将其同化为脑细胞内包容机制的神经学模型。
The crucial question for our purposes is: what if memories are not neatly packageable and repackageable-at least not without losing what is essential to their very nature within the in-gathering person? And what if the inward movement they undergo in being in-gathered into the remembering subject is not comparable to entering a storage vault or “memory bank”? What if the interior of human memory is more like a laterally exfoliating labyrinth with numerous intentional threads connecting the in-gathered memories belonging to one formal matrix with memories in other formal matrices? And what if the same labyrinthine structure has, instead of a single “output,” many exits, many issuing avenues that give upon the same being-in-the-world from which the memories were initially gathered? If answers to these questions are affirmative, then not only container models of memory but the dualisms of self/other, self/site, and mind/body that subtend these models also fall under suspicion. The gathering-in is an active trespassing of, and a collecting across, the boundaries that separate the members of such dyads. As an expression of the freedom of the remembering subject, in-gathering cannot be understood as generating input for an internal archive of the mind, brain, or computer. Rather than being brought like captives into any such archive, memories are drawn into the many matrices of already funded experiences: into the ambience, indeed the circum-ambience, of other memories, co-existing with which they come to constitute a delicate web of relations not reducible to containerlike structures. 对我们而言，关键问题在于：如果记忆无法被整齐地打包重组——至少这样做会使其在聚合者内在的本质特性丧失呢？如果记忆在被收纳入回忆主体时经历的内在运动，根本不像存入保险库或"记忆银行"呢？如果人类记忆的内部更像一个横向延展的迷宫，无数意向性线索将属于某个形式矩阵的聚合记忆与其他形式矩阵中的记忆相连呢？如果这个迷宫结构并非单一"输出端"，而是拥有众多出口、无数释放通道，全都通向记忆最初采集的同一个在世存在呢？若这些问题的答案都是肯定的，那么不仅记忆的容器模型站不住脚，支撑这些模型的自我/他者、自我/场所、心灵/身体的二元对立也同样值得怀疑。记忆的聚合过程，实则是对这类二元边界的主动跨越与横贯收集。 作为记忆主体自由意志的表达，内聚行为不能被理解为向心灵、大脑或计算机的内部档案库输送信息。记忆并非像囚徒般被驱赶进任何此类档案库，而是被吸纳进无数已有经验构成的母体之中：进入其他记忆的氛围——确切地说是环绕氛围——与之共存的记忆共同编织出一张精妙的关系网络，这种网络无法被简化为容器般的结构。
I am not proposing that we simply avert our gaze from models of memory based on computers. Much is to be learned from these models-much that is suggestive for a phenomenological approach such as I have been developing in this book. Just above I drew spontaneously on the idea of “files” as a way of understanding a formal matrix of in-gathering. More substantively, the notion of “information flow” evokes an inherent dynamism that is also at work in my concept of thick autonomy. I suspect that a more extensive treatment of the metaphorics of information processing would reveal other illuminating features of its models of human memory-much as we found the 我并非主张我们应当完全摒弃基于计算机的记忆模型。这些模型蕴含着许多值得借鉴之处——许多内容对我在这本书中发展的现象学方法具有启发性。就在上文，我自发地运用了"文件"概念来理解内聚行为的形式母体。更具实质意义的是，"信息流"这一概念唤起的固有动态性，也体现在我所提出的"厚实自主性"理念中。我推测，若对信息处理的隐喻体系进行更深入探讨，将揭示其人类记忆模型中更多富有启发性的特征——正如我们之前发现的那样
photograph as a prototype for recollection to possess its own positive potential. 照片作为回忆的原型，拥有其独特的积极潜能。
It remains, however, that the computer, like the photograph, pushes human memory out of its natural shape. If the photograph (like the wax tablet of the Theatetus) leads remembering too far in the direction of sheer passivism (i.e., by privileging passively received impressions), the computer (akin to Plato’s metaphor of the aviary) conducts it to the opposite pole of activism. What else does “processing” connote but a continual reshaping of memories? Much the same is true of “rehearsal” and the incessant cycle of encoding, decoding, and recoding to which memories are said to be submitted. Moreover, just as the photograph offers a parody of the legitimate passivism that is an intrinsic feature of human remembering-namely, its embroilment in thick autonomy-so the computer caricatures the valid activism that belongs to the freedom we realize in remembering: above all, the freedom of in-gathering. In the end, both the photograph and the information processing machine fail to capture any significant sense of the freedom to be oneself. Each is utterly impersonal in operation-if not in origin or effect. Thus neither is capable of conveying what it is like to build up from fragmentary memories a truly personal identity, a quality of perduring mineness. Any identity they possess is imputed to them by the photographer or the programmer; it is not generated from within, ex hautou. A photograph or an item stored in a computer may certainly be regarded as strikingly memorylike. But I cannot coherently say of either that it is-that it counts legitimately as-“my memory.” 然而，计算机与照片一样，都在迫使人类记忆偏离其自然形态。如果说照片（如同《泰阿泰德篇》中的蜡板）将记忆过度引向纯粹被动性（即偏重被动接收的印象），那么计算机（类似于柏拉图的鸟笼比喻）则将其推向主动性的另一极端。"处理"一词除了暗示对记忆的持续重塑外，还能意味着什么？所谓的"复述"以及记忆被迫经历的编码、解码与再编码的无尽循环，本质上亦是如此。此外，正如照片戏仿了人类记忆内在的合理被动性（即深陷于厚重自主性中的状态），计算机也扭曲了我们在回忆时实现的正当主动性——尤其是内聚的自由。最终，无论是照片还是信息处理机，都未能捕捉到"做真实自我"这一自由的真谛。二者的运作方式（即便不是起源或效果）都彻底抹杀了人格色彩。 因此，两者都无法传达从碎片化记忆中构建真正个人身份的过程，那种持久"属我性"的特质。它们所拥有的任何身份都是由摄影师或程序员赋予的，并非从内部自发产生。一张照片或计算机中的存储项确实可以被视为极具记忆特征。但我无法言之成理地宣称其中任何一个是"我的记忆"——它们无法被合法地认定为"我的记忆"。
In-gathering is the basic action of a fully realized memorial freedom. It includes phases of fore-gathering-i.e., in anticipatory and exploratory movements-as well as after-gathering (e.g., consolidation and reflection). We remain at liberty during the circuitous process of in-gathering to change its course and content. At one pole of possibilities, we may yield to instreaming memories as they arrange themselves into convergent groupings without any concerted intervention from us: just this pole dominates the efforts of those who make exact reduplication an ideal (e.g., in the form of an eidetic or photographic memory). We have already found reasons-discussed in the last chapter-for questioning this ideal. At another pole, in-gathering becomes a willful, and even a forceful, effort to reshape a given matrix: this pole holds sway in the cult of computers, a cult which pretends that there are no abiding constraints on memorial freedom. These constraints-evident in such diverse phenomena as habitual body memories, a tenacious character structure, the length of time required for adequate working-throughpreclude us from embracing an overzealous activism. They also warn us against any meliorism or progressivism in matters of memory. Despite the fact that the word “gather” has its Greek origin in agathon (good), ^(21){ }^{21} the gathering of in-gathering need not accomplish any particular good, any manifestly beneficial aim or end. It can amount to amassment for its own 内聚是完全实现的记忆自由的基本行为。它包含预聚阶段（即预期性和探索性活动）以及后聚阶段（如巩固与反思）。在内聚的迂回过程中，我们始终保有改变其进程与内容的自由。在可能性的一极，我们可能屈服于自行汇流的记忆，任其形成趋同性群集而无需我们刻意干预：正是这一极主导着那些将精确复现奉为理想（例如以遗觉记忆或照相式记忆的形式）之人的努力。我们已在上一章讨论过质疑这种理想的理由。在另一极，内聚则成为重塑既定记忆矩阵的刻意乃至强力的尝试：这一极在计算机崇拜中占据主导，这种崇拜假装记忆自由不存在任何持久的限制。这些限制——体现在习惯性身体记忆、顽固的性格结构、充分处理所需时间长度等多元现象中——使我们无法拥抱过度狂热的行动主义。 他们还告诫我们，在记忆问题上不要抱有任何改良主义或进步主义的幻想。尽管"聚集"一词的希腊语词源 agathon（意为"善"）暗示着某种美好，但记忆的内在聚集过程并不必然实现任何特定的善行、明显有益的目标或结局。这种聚集可能仅仅是为了积累而积累
sake, and on occasion it can breed trouble (as when in-gathered memories of emotions serve to detonate a buried anger). All that one can say for certain is that in the realm of remembering, in-gathering is continually going on. 有时甚至会滋生麻烦（比如当聚集的情感记忆引爆了埋藏已久的愤怒时）。唯一可以确定的是，在记忆的领域里，内在聚集的过程始终持续不断地进行着。
Memory is indeed “the gathering of thought.” It is also the gathering of much else-of our personal history, our personal identity, ultimately of our lives themselves. If this is so, it is thanks very much to the intricate activities at work in the in-gathering by which we finally become ourselves. These activities weave veritable inseams into our lives-inseams that not only serve to connect disparate parts (some of which would never become contiguous save for the intermediation of memories) but that create together a fabric which is at once distinctive in format and expressive of many experiences. It is due to such interweaving that remembering becomes genuine re-membering, a re-gathering of these experiences in and through ingathering. 记忆确实是"思想的汇聚"。它同时也是诸多其他事物的汇聚——我们的个人历史、个人身份，最终是我们生命本身的汇聚。若果真如此，这很大程度上要归功于那些在内在汇聚过程中运作的复杂活动，正是通过这些活动，我们最终成为自己。这些活动在我们的生命中编织出真实的内部接缝——这些接缝不仅连接着原本互不相干的片段（其中某些部分若非记忆的中介将永远无法相邻），更共同创造出一幅既具有独特结构又能表达多重体验的织锦。正是这种交织使得回忆成为真正的"重新-成员化"，一种在并通过内在汇聚对这些体验的重新收集。
IV 第四章
It is one thing to point to the general structure of freedom in remembering. It is quite another to detect this structure in actual operation. In this section I shall take a look at memorial freedom in concreto in three distinct regions of human experience. ^(22){ }^{22} Despite their diversity, and setting aside many nuances of detail, these regions manifest the two main forms of free remembering in an instructively specific manner. 指出记忆自由的一般结构是一回事，在实际运作中察觉这种结构则完全是另一回事。在本节中，我将从人类经验的三个不同领域来具体考察记忆自由。 ^(22){ }^{22} 尽管这些领域存在差异，且忽略诸多细节上的微妙之处，它们仍以极具启发性的具体方式展现了自由记忆的两种主要形式。
Depth Psychology 深度心理学
Here I shall restrict consideration to the depth psychology of Freud and Jung and more especially to their conception of psychotherapy. Precisely as concerned with the depth of the psyche, they provide what information processing views of memory refuse to offer-a treatment of personal identity that is neither quantified nor containerized and that respects memorial freedom at every turn. To begin with, both psychologists attempt to promote on the part of their patients a distinctive freedom to be themselves. This is achieved, paradoxically, by encouraging them to get in touch with a prepersonal part of themselves, whether this be conceived as the repressed unconscious (Freud) or the collective unconscious (Jung). In both instances remembering leads the way, either in the form of the abreaction of a repressed trauma or as introverted libido. As do dreams, vividly experienced memories offer a via regia into the unconscious. Thanks to their sinuous subterranean status-their thick autonomy-they are able to guide patients downward beneath their encrusted ego defenses and their social personae to a realm where a re-enlivened sense of personhood becomes possible. In Freud’s language, it is a matter of delving beneath the reality-dominated 在此我将讨论范围限定于弗洛伊德和荣格的深度心理学，尤其是他们关于心理治疗的理念。正是由于关注心灵深处，他们提供了信息处理记忆观所拒绝给予的内容——一种既非量化也非容器化的个人身份处理方式，始终尊重记忆的自由。首先，两位心理学家都试图帮助患者获得一种成为自我的独特自由。吊诡的是，这通过鼓励他们接触自身前个人部分来实现，无论这部分被构想为被压抑的无意识（弗洛伊德）还是集体无意识（荣格）。在这两种情况下，记忆都引领着道路，无论是通过压抑创伤的宣泄形式，还是作为内倾的力比多。与梦境类似，鲜活体验的记忆提供了通往无意识的王道。得益于它们蜿蜒的地下状态——那种厚重的自主性——这些记忆能够引导患者穿透固化的自我防御和社会人格面具，抵达一个可能重获人格活力的领域。 用弗洛伊德的话来说，这关乎深入现实主导的
demands of “secondary process” to make contact with the “primary process” of the unconscious. For Jung, it is a question of getting in touch with the archetypal basis of one’s personality: with one’s “paleopsyche.” Either way, one emerges from this nekyia or journey into the underworld with an enriched and strengthened self; and at every stage along the route, remembering is essential to the emergence. In being continually elicited and valorized in the course of therapy, this remembering restores otherwise forgotten or dissociated content to one’s personal identity, while at the same time it acts as a liberating force in its own right. “This is the use of memory: for liberation”-if Eliot’s line applies anywhere, it applies just here. Memory not only supports the freedom to be oneself; in depth-oriented psychotherapy it is the privileged means of attaining this freedom. "次级过程"要求之下，与无意识的"初级过程"建立联系。对荣格而言，关键在于触及人格的原型基础：即个体的"古心灵"。无论哪种方式，经历这场冥府之旅或地下世界探索后，人们都将获得更丰富、更强大的自我；而在旅程的每个阶段，记忆对这种自我显现都至关重要。在治疗过程中被持续唤起和强化的记忆，能将那些被遗忘或分离的内容重新整合到个人身份中，同时它本身也作为一种解放力量发挥作用。"记忆之用，在于解放"——如果艾略特的诗句有适用之处，那正是此处。记忆不仅支撑着成为自我的自由；在深度心理治疗中，它更是获得这种自由的特权途径。
Memorial freedom in its other dominant form, that of in-gathering, is also prominently present in such psychotherapy. Consider merely the fact that in undergoing psychoanalysis of either sort a nuanced grasp of one’s life as a whole-its main directions and covert intentionalities-is a desideratum. In attaining this grasp, depth-therapeutic in-gathering is indispensable, for it enables the unification (or re-unification) of disparate memories: memories previously disunified by psychopathology, which has as one of its most acute effects the dispersal of the patient’s memorial life. As collected together in therapy-and as aided by conjoint efforts at reconstruction of the past on the part of analyst and patient alike-these memories are retrieved and retained as an invaluable “stock” on which subsequent therapeutic moves can draw. Not only discovering lost memories (or revaluing familiar ones) but keeping them continually available for further insight is basic to the therapeutic process. Even more crucial is the inwardizing that completes the cycle of in-gathering. After being rescued from the nether realm of the unconscious, therapeutically efficacious memories must be grafted back onto the conscious life of the afflicted self if this self is to be liberated from their oppressive spell as un-remembered. As with all inwardizing, there is a collocation of the regained memories in open-ended formal matrices and a rooting of them in the material matrix of personal identity. In the course of depth-psychological therapy one can observe at first-hand the ramiform matrix of memories as they extend through one’s life-history. “Free association” for Freud and “active imagination” for Jung rely expressly on this spontaneously non-subsumptive, non-vertical character of free remembering in its actively in-gathering action. 记忆自由的另一种主要形式——内聚式记忆，在这类心理治疗中也显著存在。只需考虑这一事实：在接受任何一种精神分析时，对个人生命整体（其主要走向与潜在意向性）的细腻把握都是必要目标。要实现这种把握，深度治疗中的记忆内聚不可或缺，因为它能使那些因精神病理学而分裂的记忆重新统一——精神病理学最严重的后果之一，就是导致患者记忆生活的碎片化。当这些记忆在治疗中被汇集起来（并通过分析师与患者共同重构过去的努力得到辅助），它们就被重新获取并保存为珍贵的"记忆储备"，可供后续治疗步骤调用。治疗过程的基础不仅在于发现遗失的记忆（或重新评估熟悉的记忆），更在于持续保持这些记忆可供进一步洞察。而完成内聚循环的关键，则在于将这些记忆彻底内化的过程。 从无意识的幽冥之境被解救出来后，那些具有疗愈效能的记忆必须重新嫁接回受创自我的意识生命中，唯有如此，这个自我才能从那些未被记起的压抑魔咒中解放出来。与所有内化过程一样，重获的记忆会在开放的形式母体中重新归位，并扎根于个人身份认同的物质母体。在深度心理治疗的过程中，人们能亲眼目睹记忆的枝状母体如何在生命史中延展。弗洛伊德的"自由联想"与荣格的"积极想象"都明确依赖于自由回忆在主动收聚行动中展现的这种自发的非归约性、非垂直性特质。
In quite direct and graphic ways, therefore, depth psychology in its very practice exhibits freedom in remembering. Or more exactly, it persistently inculcates this freedom in its subjects as an integral part of its therapeutic task. In a moment of candor, Freud once said that the aim of psychoanalysis is to restore to patients their “freedom to decide one way or the other.” ^(23){ }^{23} But this freedom of choice is in turn made possible by the memorial freedom at work in the psychoanalytic process itself. 因此，深度心理学以其极为直观的方式，在记忆实践中展现了自由。更准确地说，它持续向受试者灌输这种自由，将其作为治疗任务不可或缺的一部分。弗洛伊德曾坦言，精神分析的目的是让患者恢复"自主抉择的自由"。 ^(23){ }^{23} 而这种选择的自由，又是由精神分析过程中运作的记忆自由所实现的。
Art 艺术
Goethe wrote that “closely scrutinized, the productions of [artistic] genius are for the most part reminiscences.” ^(24){ }^{24} If so, they embody that freedom in remembering which we have been tracing out. Leaving aside the place of memory for the spectator or critic of works of art-a momentous place indeed, considering that there could be no continuous perceiving of works of art, much less reflecting on them, without their accessibility in the memory of appreciators-let us focus on the artist, and more particularly on his or her creation of a style. When we say that the artist “struggles to find his style,” we are speaking of the very situation I have designated as eliciting the freedom to be oneself. Just as an individual realizes this freedom by attaining a coherent personal identity, so the artist actualizes the same freedom by creating an achieved style. But in so doing the artist must be prepared to go outside established ego boundaries, indeed to lose himself or herself in the non-personal or extra-personal. No less than in psychotherapy, the way to the self lies outside the self. The artist has to touch base with the un-conscious-as both Freud and Jung liked to emphasize-but he or she must, in additon, connect with other artists, especially with those most admired figures in a given tradition. Thus Cézanne routinely copied revered predecessors in the Louvre, and Picasso’s works allude continually to classical Greek art and to Spanish Baroque painting. Each painter was extraordinarily inventive in attaining a style (in Picasso’s case, several of them), and yet each came to this achievement only through a profound immersion in the work of others. The immersion is evident even in their most “original” works-so that we remark the presence of Chardin and Poussin in Cézanne’s still lifes and figure studies, and of Velasquez in Picasso’s later paintings. As concerted and prolonged remembering leads to a more consolidated selfidentity, so these two artists’ active remembering of their predecessors came to fruition in their mature styles: styles that established their lasting identity as painters. 歌德曾写道："细究之下，[艺术]天才的创作多半是追忆。" ^(24){ }^{24} 若果真如此，这些作品便体现了我们一直在探寻的那种记忆中的自由。暂且不论记忆在艺术观赏者或评论家心中的地位——考虑到若没有欣赏者记忆中的可及性，就根本不可能持续感知艺术作品，更遑论对其进行反思，这种地位确实至关重要——让我们聚焦于艺术家，尤其是他或她创造风格的过程。当我们说艺术家"为寻找自己的风格而挣扎"时，指的正是我所说的激发做真实自我的自由之境。正如个人通过获得连贯的自我认同来实现这种自由，艺术家也通过形成成熟风格来实现同样的自由。但在此过程中，艺术家必须准备好超越既定的自我边界，甚至要在非个人或超个人的境界中迷失自我。与心理治疗如出一辙，通往自我的道路恰恰在自我之外。 艺术家必须触及无意识领域——正如弗洛伊德和荣格都强调的那样——但除此之外，他或她还必须与其他艺术家建立联系，尤其是与特定传统中最受推崇的人物。因此，塞尚经常在卢浮宫临摹备受尊崇的前辈作品，毕加索的作品则不断向古希腊艺术和西班牙巴洛克绘画致敬。每位画家在形成个人风格方面（毕加索更是发展出多种风格）都展现出非凡的创造力，但他们的成就都源于对他人作品的深刻沉浸。这种沉浸甚至在他们最"原创"的作品中依然清晰可辨——我们能在塞尚的静物画与人物习作中看到夏尔丹和普桑的影子，在毕加索晚期作品中感受到委拉斯开兹的存在。正如持续而长久的记忆会形成更稳固的自我认同，这两位艺术家对前辈作品的主动记忆也在他们成熟的风格中结出硕果：这些风格确立了他们作为画家的永恒身份。
Memorial in-gathering is at work in such instances as well. The creation of a style involves a deep-going collocation of all that one has seen and learned-and now remembers in a synoptic manner. Memory’s contractive power, first observed early in this book, is drawn upon in the constitution of a style, which condenses a vast array of an artist’s experiences over time, much as an emblem or monogram is a compressed expression of a larger totality. For this very reason, an artist’s style is able to bear memories-to hold them formally and materially in its own preserve. In its “stamp” and allure, style exhibits what I have called memory’s “reservative” capacity, its ability to hold its content within its own keeping. 在这些实例中，记忆的聚合同样发挥着作用。风格的创造涉及对所见所学——如今以综观方式所铭记的一切——进行深层次的组合编排。本书开篇所探讨的记忆收缩力，在风格构建过程中被充分调动，它将艺术家经年累月的丰富经验高度凝练，犹如徽章或花押字是对更宏大整体的压缩表达。正因如此，艺术家的风格能够承载记忆——以形式与物质的双重方式将其保存在专属领域。通过其"印记"与魅力，风格展现了我所称的记忆"保存性"能力，即将内容留存于自身疆界之内的特质。
What is perhaps most remarkable about artistic style is its combination of collective-cum-preservative power with the singularity that marks it as an artist’s own style, allowing him or her to say: “This is my style.” The 艺术风格最非凡之处或许在于，它将集体性与保存力相结合的同时，又保持着使其成为艺术家专属标记的独特性，让创作者能够宣称："这就是我的风格。"
evolution of a style’s mineness, the artist’s most demanding struggle, is at one with the process of inwardizing. For the artist must bring in-bring into himself or herself-what he or she has absorbed from others, not to reflect it back (this would be mere “imitation”) but to enable it to become his or her own creation. In this way something personal and unique is created, and the artist feels redeemed via-à-vis other artists, whatever may be the “anxiety” of their influence. ^(25){ }^{25} This accomplishment-which may end up taking a life-time-involves the creative juxtaposition of material and formal matrices of memories in an evolving network that is truly labyrinthine in its complexity: hence the difficulty of tracing the precise evolution of a particular style. But the result is there for all to see. It is manifest in that recognizable Gestalt that we call Cézanne’s “proto-Cubism” or Picasso’s “analytic Cubism,” each of which is nevertheless quite distinct from the other. “Le style, c’est l’homme même” goes the French adage. Exactly. In finding his or her style, the artist finds himself or herself. In this convergence of findings, remembering in its two forms of freedom plays an indispensable role. No wonder that Mnemosyne was said by the Greeks to be the Mother of the Muses: she brings forth the style of works of art as surely as she ushers in the personal style of the human beings who create these works. 一种风格"属我性"的演变——艺术家最严苛的挣扎——与内化过程密不可分。艺术家必须将吸收自他人的养分内化为己有，不是简单地反射回去（那只是"模仿"），而是使其成为自己的创造。由此诞生出独特而个性化的作品，艺术家也得以在其他艺术家的影响下获得救赎，无论这种影响带来怎样的"焦虑"。 ^(25){ }^{25} 这项可能耗费毕生心血的成就，需要在不断演变的记忆网络中创造性地并置物质与形式的母体——这个网络的复杂性堪比迷宫：因此要追溯特定风格的确切演变轨迹极为困难。但成果有目共睹。它体现在那些可辨识的完形中，我们称之为塞尚的"原始立体主义"或毕加索的"分析立体主义"，而两者又截然不同。法国谚语有云："风格即人"。确实如此。艺术家在寻找风格的过程中，找到了自我。 在这两种自由形式的记忆交汇处，回忆扮演着不可或缺的角色。难怪希腊人称记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅为众缪斯之母：她既孕育艺术作品的风格，也必然引领着创造这些作品之人的个人风格。
Philosophy 哲学
The alliance between memory and philosophy is intimate and longstanding. As Nietzsche remarks: 记忆与哲学的结盟亲密而悠久。正如尼采所言：
The most diverse philosophers keep filling in a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies. . . . Their thinking is, in fact, a return and a homecoming to a remote, primordial, and inclusive household of the soul, out of which [philosophical] concepts grew originally: philosophy is to this extent a kind of atavism of the highest order. ^(26){ }^{26} 形形色色的哲学家不断填充着某种确定的哲学基本框架......他们的思想实际上是对灵魂深处那个遥远、原始而包容的故园的回归，[哲学]概念最初正是从这个家园生长出来的：就此而言，哲学是最高层次的返祖现象。 ^(26){ }^{26}
Let us narrow our attention to the role of memory in philosophical method. My invocation of Plato’s doctrine of recollection has already introduced the topic. This doctrine shows considerable affinity with Freud’s view of memory. Much as abreactive recollection becomes possible only through dialogical confrontation in psychotherapy, philosophical recollection or anamnesis arises after a process of dialectical cross-examination (elenchus). And just as we reconnect in therapy with the pre-personal sphere of the unconscious, so in Platonic recollection we rediscover those sources of our knowledge that originate in a pre-existent state. Moreover, as in both depth psychology and art, here too we realize our memorial freedom to be ourselves most effectively by going out of ourselves in an essential detour. For Plato, this recapture of the self outside itself is sanctioned not only by his official theory of the soul’s pre-existence, but by the very grammar of the crucial phrase “ex hautou,” which we have seen to be central to his theory of 让我们将注意力聚焦于记忆在哲学方法中的作用。柏拉图关于回忆的学说已为这一议题埋下伏笔。该学说与弗洛伊德的记忆观存在显著亲缘性：正如心理治疗中唯有通过对话式对峙才能实现宣泄性回忆，哲学层面的回忆（即"回忆说"）也需经历辩证诘问（辩驳术）的过程方能达成。我们在治疗中重新连接前个人化的无意识领域，恰如柏拉图式回忆让我们重新发现那些源自前世状态的知识源泉。更进一步说，无论是深层心理学还是艺术领域，我们皆通过本质性的迂回——走出自身——来实现最有效的记忆自由，从而成为真正的自我。对柏拉图而言，这种"在自身之外重获自我"的合法性，不仅源自其官方理论中灵魂先在说，更植根于关键短语"出自自身"（ex hautou）的语法结构——我们已看到这一表述在其回忆理论中的核心地位。
recollection. Although the phrase is usually translated as “within oneself,” its literal meaning is “from out of (ex)/oneself ('autou).” The activity of recollection, in which the method of dialectic culminates, occurs-as an activitywithin (“from”) one’s current mortal self, and yet it aims at something transcendent to (“out of”) this same finite self: i.e., the Forms of Knowledge. Only insofar as transcendent and immanent directions coincide in the inquiring subject-arise “from out of” this subject-can we speak of the inquirer as gaining his or her identity as a knower. As with the personal identity of any given individual, such noetic identity is dependent on appropriate acts of remembrance. 回忆。虽然这个短语通常被译为"在自身之内"，但其字面意思是"从（ex）/自身（'autou）之外"。回忆这一活动——辩证方法在此达到顶峰——是作为一种活动发生在（"从"）一个人当前有限的自我之内，然而它却指向某种超越（"之外"）这个同样有限的自我之物：即知识的理型。只有当超越与内在的方向在探究主体中重合——"从...之外"这个主体中产生——我们才能说探究者获得了作为认知者的身份。与任何个体的个人身份一样，这种智性身份依赖于恰当的回忆行为。
In-gathering, the other form of memorial freedom, is also important in the pursuit of philosophical method. “Recollection,” traced from its root in recolligere and ultimately in legein, means to assemble and lay out an articulate account: hence Plato’s claim that learning qua recollection is a matter of assembling pertinent examples and picking out essential defining features. At play here is that component of in-gathering which we have already termed “collecting.” This component is also thematized by Husserl, who insists that his method of “free variation in imagination” has to include a survey of relevant and variant examples so that one can notice the “congruences” or overlaps between them. Husserl further stresses that these examples must be “retained in grasp” ^(27){ }^{27}-much as the interlocutors in a Platonic dialogue are enjoined by Socrates to keep in mind the course of their discussions. In both cases, eidetic insight is the ultimate objective, and such insight becomes possible only in and through the collective-cumretentive powers of memory. ^(28){ }^{28} 内聚作为记忆自由的另一种形式，在哲学方法探索中同样至关重要。"回忆"（Recollection）一词源于 recolligere，最终可追溯至 legein，意指汇集并阐述清晰的论述：因此柏拉图主张学习即回忆，关键在于汇集相关范例并提炼本质特征。这里发挥作用的内聚要素，我们已称之为"收集"。胡塞尔也专题讨论过这一要素，他坚持认为其"想象中自由变更"的方法必须包含对相关变体范例的考察，以便发现其间的"契合"或重叠之处。胡塞尔进一步强调这些范例必须"保持在把握中" ^(27){ }^{27} ——正如柏拉图对话录里苏格拉底要求对话者牢记讨论进程。两种情况下，本质直观都是终极目标，而这种洞见唯有通过记忆的聚合-持存能力才能实现 ^(28){ }^{28} 。
It is quite striking that Husserl classifies the objects of eidetic inquiry into “formal” and “material” essences. Such essences occupy corresponding formal and material regions, which are suggestively akin to the formal and material matrices that structure the activity of inwardizing in memory. As inhering in the depth of the personal subject, these matrices occupy a domain that Husserl would name “the transcendental ego” and Plato simply “the soul.” For both thinkers the purpose of philosophical method is to suspend the baneful effects of unexamined belief so as to make insight into essences possible. Whether the basic act conveying this insight is called “recollection” (as by Plato) or “reactivation” (Husserl), ^(29){ }^{29} it arises through an intensive inwardizing, a soul-searching, “a return and a homecoming to a remote, primordial, and inclusive household of the soul.” 胡塞尔将本质研究的对象划分为"形式"本质与"质料"本质的做法颇为引人注目。这类本质占据着相应的形式与质料领域，这些领域与构建记忆内化活动的形式基质和质料基质有着耐人寻味的相似性。作为人格主体深处的固有存在，这些基质占据的领域被胡塞尔称为"先验自我"，而柏拉图则简单地称之为"灵魂"。对两位思想家而言，哲学方法的目的在于悬置未经检验的信念所产生的有害影响，从而使本质洞察成为可能。无论传递这种洞察的基本行为被称为"回忆"（如柏拉图所言）还是"再激活"（胡塞尔术语），它都通过深刻的内化过程、一种灵魂拷问、"向灵魂遥远、原始且包容一切的故园回归与返乡"而得以实现。
In depth psychology, art, and philosophy we can thus observe a concurrence as to the concrete importance of freedom in remembering. Whether in the form of the freedom to be oneself-oneself as eidetic inquirer, or as depth-psychological self-knower, or as artist who creates a style-or by virtue of the freedom of in-gathering, the patient, the artist, and the philosopher alike come to a more sensitive self-awareness, a deepened 在深度心理学、艺术和哲学领域，我们因此可以观察到关于自由在回忆中具体重要性的共识。无论是作为本质探究者保持本真的自由，还是作为深度心理学的自我认知者，抑或是创造独特风格的艺术家——又或是通过内聚的自由力量，患者、艺术家和哲学家都同样获得了更为敏锐的自我意识，一种对记忆厚重自主性的深刻体悟，这都得益于他们自身自由回忆的微妙运作与重塑。
sense of the thick autonomy of memory, thanks to the subtle workings and reworkings of their own free remembering. （注：根据翻译规则，此处保留原文段落分隔符，但实际中文表达中通常不单独保留"sense of the thick autonomy of memory"作为独立段落。若需严格遵循原文格式，可补充为：）对记忆厚重自主性的深刻体悟，皆源于他们自由回忆的微妙运作与重塑。
V
Let us grant that the freedom we realize in remembering is con-siderable-or at least much more considerable than mechanistic or physiological models, including those that take information-processing as a paradigm, might permit. Does this mean that the more remembering we can do-the more items we recall-the freer we are? Not at all. Recall the poignant plight of " S ," whose life was enormously overburdened by the mere fact that he remembered too many things. In any event, the two forms of freedom under discussion in this chapter have little if anything to do with the sheer amount, or even the accuracy, of information retained by the remembering subject. (This realization suggests that the ideals of flawless retention and unlimited storage-both of which guide the design of com-puters-are misleading as applied in any rigorous way to human memory.) 我们承认，在回忆中实现的自由是相当可观的——至少比机械论或生理学模型（包括那些以信息处理为范式的模型）所允许的要可观得多。这是否意味着我们能回忆得越多——想起的条目越多——我们就越自由？绝非如此。想想"S"那令人心酸的困境，他仅仅因为记住太多事情，生活就承受了巨大的负担。无论如何，本章讨论的两种自由形式与记忆主体所保留信息的绝对数量甚至准确性几乎无关。（这一认识表明，完美保留和无限存储的理想——这两者都指导着计算机的设计——若以任何严格方式应用于人类记忆，都会产生误导。）
If memorial freedom is not to be assessed quantitatively, is it the case that remembering is (in Aristotle’s phrase) “up to us when we wish”? ^(30){ }^{30} It is not clear that this is true even of imagining-which is what Aristotle is characterizing in this phrase-and it is certainly not true of remembering. As we witness so dramatically in the instance of Proustian “involuntary memory” as well as in many quotidian cases of obsessively returning memories, much remembering arises without our wishing or willing it. And, by the same token, much remembering fails to arise precisely when we want it to: “what is her name?” we ask ourselves in stupefaction as we encounter someone we know very well, racking our brain to discover the name. The mere existence of amnesias of many sorts, with or without an organic basis, forbids us to assert that remembering is an activity whose course we can confidently control, or even predict. But if remembering is by no means entirely within our control, it is also not wholly outside our control eithersomething merely mechanical, a sheer process of biological determinism. We, individual rememberers and co-rememberers, are part of the process, contributing to it vitally albeit often in a tacit manner. What remains in memory remains up to us-if not precisely when we wish or as we wish, nevertheless as belonging to the realm of our own freedom to remember. 如果纪念自由无法以数量来衡量，那么是否意味着回忆（用亚里士多德的话说）"取决于我们何时愿意"？ ^(30){ }^{30} 即便对于想象——亚里士多德这句话所描述的对象——这一论断都未必成立，对回忆而言则更不适用。正如我们在普鲁斯特式"非自愿记忆"的典型案例以及日常生活中那些不断闪回的强迫性记忆中如此鲜明地见证的那样，许多回忆的产生并非出于我们的意愿或意志。同理，当我们迫切需要时，回忆却常常缺席："她叫什么名字？"——当我们遇到非常熟悉的人却目瞪口呆地自问时，只能绞尽脑汁搜寻那个名字。仅就多种形式失忆症的存在（无论是否具有器质性基础）而言，我们就不能断言回忆是一种能够自信掌控甚至预测进程的活动。但如果说回忆绝非完全受控于我们，它同样也不全然超出我们的控制范围——并非仅是机械的、纯粹生物决定论的过程。 作为个体的记忆者与共同记忆者，我们参与并深刻影响着记忆过程——尽管这种贡献往往以默会的方式存在。留存于记忆中的内容终究取决于我们自身，即便不能完全按照意愿精确操控，它们仍属于我们自由记忆的疆域。
But now we must confront remembering’s unfreedom, which is just as pressing a matter as its freedom. The idea of thick autonomy developed in the last chapter already pointed in this direction. In its positive modes, thick autonomy conveys the concrete freedom of the rememberer, the critical difference that free remembering can make in his or her memorial life. But just as “thick,” as a matter of thorough immersion, such autonomy also reminds us that most remembering is not up to the remembering subject 但此刻我们必须直面记忆的不自由性，这与记忆的自由同样紧迫。上一章提出的"厚重自主性"概念已预示了这一方向。在其积极形态中，厚重自主性彰显了记忆者具体的自由，以及自由记忆对其纪念性生命可能产生的关键差异。但正如"厚重"所暗示的深度沉浸特质，这种自主性同样提醒我们：多数记忆行为并不受记忆主体掌控
when he or she wishes. So much does remembering embroil us in experiences and structures over which we do not retain effective control that it would be more accurate in many instances to say merely that “remembering is going on” rather than that “I choose to remember.” The going-on is the primary phenomenon, not the willed actions of the rememberer; and this ongoing remembering is happening, always, in the thick of thingssometimes most of all when it seems most irrelevant (e.g., when a spontaneously appearing memory image reveals a seemingly senseless preoccupation with its specific content). 当一个人想要回忆时，记忆便会将我们卷入那些我们无法有效掌控的经验与结构之中。在许多情况下，与其说"我选择回忆"，不如更准确地说"回忆正在发生"。这种发生才是根本现象，而非回忆者刻意为之的行动；这种持续进行的回忆始终在事物的核心处发生——有时恰恰在看似最无关紧要的时刻（例如，当一个自发浮现的记忆影像暴露出对其具体内容看似无意义的执着时）最为显著。
Another way of stating this is to say that memories impose themselves upon us. They demand respect. They demand respect not only as stemming from the past but as clarifying and influencing the present, and as shadowing forth a possible future. We are certainly free to in-gather them in various ways and to interrelate them with differing degrees of intensity and involvement. But this freedom does not alter the fundamental fact that we are not-and should not expect to be-masters of the memory game. Only in mnemonics, thanks to its formal and manipulative aspects, is anything like mastery approached; but our ambivalence toward even the most remarkable mnemonists is reflected in the epithet “memory freak.” It is as if their manifest mastery of remembering were freakish or monstrous: too much of a monstration, too little of substance. ^(31){ }^{31} We are thereby admonished to admit to the inherent limitations of our memorial powers. The sheer ability to recall facts and figures, even whole experiences, is not a fair gauge of the genuine prowess of remembering and fails altogether to capture the density of its autonomy. Once more, accuracy and quantity regarded as ideal parameters fall short of the mark; they do not give the true dimensions of the phenomenon. 另一种表述方式是，记忆会强加于我们。它们要求被尊重。这种尊重不仅源于它们来自过去，更因为它们能澄清并影响当下，同时预示可能的未来。我们当然可以自由地以各种方式收集记忆，并以不同的强度和参与度将它们相互关联。但这种自由并未改变一个基本事实：我们并非——也不应期待成为——记忆游戏的主宰者。唯有在记忆术中，凭借其形式化和可操控的特性，才勉强接近某种掌控；但即便对最杰出的记忆术士，我们仍怀有矛盾心理，这反映在"记忆怪才"的称谓中——仿佛他们对记忆的显性掌控是怪异或畸形的：过分炫技，却缺乏实质。 ^(31){ }^{31} 我们由此被告诫要承认自身记忆能力的内在局限。单纯复述事实数据乃至完整经历的能力，并不能公正衡量真正的记忆实力，更完全无法捕捉其自主性的厚重本质。 再次地，被视为理想参数的准确性与数量性未能达标；它们无法揭示现象的真实维度。
But unfreedom connotes more than lack of control or mastery. It also signifies sheer repetition-blind, meaningless reinstatement of the selfsame. “Those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it.” This familiar proverb distills the essence of the situation. Failure to remember involves unfreedom in the precise form of being “condemned to repeat” a given circumstance rather than understanding it or creatively varying it. It is therefore not surprising to learn that Freud contrasts remembering and repeating in his description of the unfree, symptomatic “acting out” of the psychoanalytic patient: “The patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he repeats it.” ^(32){ }^{32} If the therapeutic goal of psychoanalysis is “to fill in gaps in memory,” ^(33){ }^{33} this goal is adopted in order to overcome the unfreedom of impulsively or compulsively repetitive actions. And if Freud himself came to abandon the explicit aim of abreactive recollecting-which is a matter of replay ultimately modeled on visual re-enactment-and to replace it with the much more diffuse co-remembering effected in transference, it was because he realized that such recollection is itself merely repetitive in its 但不自由所蕴含的远不止缺乏控制或掌控力。它还意味着纯粹的重复——盲目而无意义地重现同一事物。"那些不铭记历史的人注定要重蹈覆辙。"这句耳熟能详的谚语精辟地概括了这种境况的本质。未能记住会导致不自由，其确切形式就是"注定要重复"某种既定情境，而非理解它或创造性地改变它。因此，当弗洛伊德在描述精神分析患者那种不自由的、症状性的"行动化"时，将记忆与重复对立起来就不足为奇了："患者完全不记得那些被遗忘和压抑的内容，而是将其行动化。他不是以记忆的形式再现，而是以行动的方式重现；他在重复，当然，他并不知道自己在重复。" ^(32){ }^{32} 如果精神分析的治疗目标是"填补记忆的空白"， ^(33){ }^{33} 那么采用这一目标正是为了克服冲动性或强迫性重复行为所导致的不自由。 如果弗洛伊德本人最终放弃了宣泄式回忆的明确目标——这种回忆本质上是以视觉重现为终极模板的重演——转而以移情中实现的更为弥散的共同回忆取而代之，那是因为他意识到这种回忆本身只是机械的重复。
operation. The true telos of remembering, of a remembering that liberates us from the future as well as from the past, cannot be achieved by any form of strictly “secondary” memory, not even that which embodies exact replication. ^(34){ }^{34} 真正的回忆目的，那种将我们从未来与过去中解放出来的回忆，无法通过任何严格意义上的"次级"记忆形式实现，即便是那些体现精确复制的记忆也不例外。 ^(34){ }^{34}
Freud’s position on this matter brings with it another crucial lesson: we come to the freedom of remembering only from the unfreedom of repetition. For everyone, and not only the patient, is in the same predicament when it comes to early childhood memories. Not remembering these self-formative memories (thanks to “infantile amnesia”), ^(35){ }^{35} we act them out as adolescents and adults, repeating their inherent patterns endlessly and thoughtlessly. Only as finally remembering them-which is not tantamount to recollecting them-do we become free from them and thus free for the future as well: free for what we shall have been for what we are in the process of becoming. 弗洛伊德对此问题的立场带来了另一个关键启示：我们唯有从重复的不自由中，才能抵达记忆的自由。无论是患者还是普通人，在涉及童年早期记忆时都面临同样的困境。由于无法忆起这些自我塑造的记忆（归因于"婴儿期遗忘"），我们在青少年和成年阶段不断重演这些记忆，无意识地重复其固有模式。唯有最终记住它们——这不等同于回忆——我们才能从中解脱，从而也为未来赢得自由：自由地接纳我们曾是的模样，自由地成为我们正在生成的自己。
Such a liberating movement from unfreedom to freedom by means of the right remembering is by no means confined to what happens in psychoanalysis. The same movement is at play in the domain of artistic creation. The artist, too, must free himself from merely repeating others (and even himself) if he is to forge a style that is genuinely his own; his task is no less one of liberating himself from the burden of an inadequately remembered past so as not simply to repeat it. The accomplishment of this task is not guaranteed by recourse to the exact recollections of art history: repainting the relevant past, experiencing it in body memory and commemorating it as Cézanne and Picasso did, is a much more veridical way of remembering it, of being true to it, than recollecting dates or revisualizing forms. In philosophy as well, we can trace out much the same trajectory from unfreedom in repeating to freedom in remembering. What Plato would term doxa or “everyday belief” and Husserl the “natural attitude” refers to the situation in which we merely repeat the opinions of others instead of thinking things out for ourselves. To move beyond this situation-which is as universal as infantile amnesia-requires the right kind of remembering, one which cannot be reduced to secondary memory. Doxic repetition gives way to noetic or eidetic insight when the free thinking necessary for such insight is made possible by free remembering. 通过正确的记忆方式，从束缚走向自由的解放运动绝非仅限于精神分析领域。同样的动态过程也存在于艺术创作中。艺术家若要锻造真正属于自己的风格，也必须摆脱单纯模仿他人（甚至自我重复）的桎梏；其使命同样是从记忆残缺的过往重负中解放自我，以避免机械重复。这项任务的完成不能仅依赖艺术史的确切记载：像塞尚和毕加索那样重新描绘相关历史、用身体记忆体验它并加以纪念，远比回忆日期或重构形式更能实现真实的记忆与忠诚。哲学领域同样可见这条从重复的束缚通往记忆自由的轨迹。柏拉图所称的"doxa"（日常信念）与胡塞尔所谓的"自然态度"，都指向我们只会重复他人观点而不自主思考的状态。 要超越这种普遍如婴儿期遗忘的状况，需要正确的记忆方式——一种不能被简化为次级记忆的回忆。当自由的回忆为自由思考创造条件时，教条式的重复就会让位于直觉或本质的洞见。
The burden of repetition does not, however, pass easily from our shoul-ders-as Freud and Jung, Cézanne and Picasso, Plato and Husserl would all hasten to remind us. Even after we have made the liberating movements just outlined, this burden remains in our lives. It does so in the form of forgetting, which is at once the most pervasive and the most insidious kind of memorial unfreedom. Not only can many modes of repetitive behavior themselves be understood as types of forgetting-of “amnesia” in its literal meaning of “not-remembering,” the privation of memory ^(36){ }^{36}-but our ordinary lives are riddled with the vacuities, the pockets as well as the long stretches, of oblivion. Perhaps such oblivion is, in Kundera’s phrase, “the heaviest of burdens.” But, as is suggested by the conception of forgetting as a 然而，重复的重负并不会轻易从我们肩头卸下——弗洛伊德与荣格、塞尚与毕加索、柏拉图与胡塞尔都会急切地提醒我们这点。即便我们已做出上述解放性举动，这种重负仍存留于生活中。它以遗忘的形式存在，这既是记忆不自由最普遍的表现，也是最隐蔽的形态。不仅多种重复行为模式本身可被理解为遗忘的类型——即"失忆"字面意义上的"不记得"，是记忆的匮乏 ^(36){ }^{36} ——我们的日常生活也充斥着遗忘的空洞、间隙与漫长空白。或许如昆德拉所言，这种遗忘是"最沉重的负担"。但将遗忘视为......
matter of “gaps in memory,” it may also betoken “the lightness of being.” How can this be? How are we to understand a paradoxical situation in which forgetting is at once light and heavy, a blessing and a curse? 这不仅是"记忆的空白"问题，也可能预示着"生命之轻"。何以至此？我们该如何理解这种矛盾情境——遗忘既是轻盈又是沉重，既是恩赐也是诅咒？
To resolve the paradox, it is not sufficient to recall the blissfully oblivious state of the bovine being with whose description by Nietzsche the Introduction to this book opened. The beast who forgets to answer that he always forgets what he was going to say-who is thus locked into double oblivionmay be quite happy in his own manner. But he singularly lacks the possibility of gaining that happiness which stems from free remembering, a remembering that triumphs over oblivion itself. The answer to the paradox is not to recommend forgetfulness, much less narcotization. Nevertheless, Nietzsche may be right when he comments that “life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness.” ^(37){ }^{37} Indeed, as we know, Nietzsche advocates an active forgetfulness to be set over against an overactive remembering: hypomnesia rather than hypermnesia. If forgetting results in the lightening of the burden of our existence, then it may certainly be a good thing: the lightness of being may be (again in Kundera’s word) “unbearable,” but it can disburden this existence in important ways. From this point of view, it would be remembering that is the heavy matter, the activity that “crushes us.” ^(38){ }^{38} By the same token, however, this heaviest activity is “simultaneously an image of life’s most intense fulfillment” ^(39){ }^{39}-a fulfillment to which the beast cannot even begin to aspire. 要解决这一悖论，仅靠回忆尼采在本书导言中描述的那种幸福无知的家畜状态是不够的。那头因总是忘记自己要说什么而陷入双重遗忘的牲畜，或许以其特有的方式活得相当快乐。但它显然无法获得那种源自自由记忆的幸福——那种战胜遗忘本身的记忆。悖论的答案并非提倡遗忘，更不是建议麻醉自我。然而尼采的论断或许不无道理："任何真正意义上的生活，若没有遗忘都绝无可能。" ^(37){ }^{37} 诚如我们所知，尼采主张用主动遗忘来对抗过度活跃的记忆：提倡记忆减退而非记忆亢进。倘若遗忘能减轻生存的重负，那它无疑是件好事：生命之轻或许（用昆德拉的话说）"不能承受"，但它能以重要方式为存在卸下重担。 从这个角度来看，记忆才是沉重的负担，是那种"压垮我们"的活动。 ^(38){ }^{38} 然而同样地，这种最沉重的活动"同时也是生命最强烈实现的写照" ^(39){ }^{39} ——这种实现是野兽甚至无法企及的。
A response to the paradox I have posed thus emerges. Perhaps forgetting and remembering are equiprimordial in human experience; both are valuable, both are required. If so, the unfreedom of forgetting is not to be regretted vis-à-vis the freedom of remembering. Each is essential to human existence. 由此浮现出对我所提出悖论的一种解答。或许遗忘与记忆在人类经验中具有同等原初性；两者都珍贵，两者都不可或缺。若是如此，遗忘的不自由便无需与记忆的自由相对照而懊悔。二者对人类存在都至关重要。
To value forgetting instead of vilifying it is to recognize that the forgetting of many details of daily life is not only practically useful-in order to become less distracted or preoccupied-but, in fact, necessary to our well-being, a basis for being-in-the-world. Far from being a matter for regret or something merely to overcome, forgetting may be salutary in itself. Indeed, it can be a condition for remembering: 重视遗忘而非诋毁它，意味着承认日常生活中诸多细节的遗忘不仅具有实际效用——能让我们减少分心或执念——事实上更是我们幸福安康的必要条件，是存在于世的基础。遗忘远非令人遗憾或仅需克服之事，其本身可能就具有疗愈作用。事实上，它可能成为记忆的前提条件：
It is this ‘mass of the forgotten’, it is the forgotten [itself] which seems to be the first intuition of the past, to constitute the essential basic material upon which memory comes to embroider the remembrances of isolated events. Forgetting is thus not simply memory failure. It appears to us now in its positive value. . . . From this point of view, the vision that everything is destined to be forgotten seems much more natural, much more appeasing, than the fact that it can be reproduced again as an isolated event. ^(40){ }^{40} 正是这"被遗忘的庞然大物"，正是遗忘本身，似乎构成了对过去的第一直觉，形成了记忆得以在其上绣出孤立事件回忆的本质基础材料。因此，遗忘不仅仅是记忆的失败。它现在以其积极价值呈现在我们面前......从这个角度看，认为一切终将被遗忘的洞见，比起事物能作为孤立事件被重现的事实，似乎更为自然，更令人心安。 ^(40){ }^{40}
If these claims of Minkowski’s are true, we might even be tempted to speak of a freedom to forget that is the analogue of the freedom to remember. However possible or desirable such a freedom to forget may be, it is 如果闵可夫斯基的这些主张属实，我们甚至可能忍不住要谈论一种与记忆自由相对应的遗忘自由。然而无论这种遗忘自由多么可能或可取，它
nonetheless severely curtailed at critical points. No more than we can remember everything-except precisely in a freakish condition such as that from which " SS " so acutely suffered-are we able to forget everything. Unless we are subject to the extreme amnesia of amentia, Korsakoff syndrome, or chronic temporal lobe epilepsy, ^(41){ }^{41} we cannot forget certain devastating experiences such as the death of a parent or a friend, or battle scenes in Vietnam. The same is true of exhilarating experiences: the first moment of falling in love, the birth of a child, the publication of a book impose themselves upon our remembrance. 然而在关键时刻，记忆能力仍会受到严重限制。正如我们无法记住所有事情——除非处于" SS "患者所遭受的那种极端异常状态——我们同样无法遗忘所有事情。除非罹患严重的精神错乱性遗忘症、科尔萨科夫综合征或慢性颞叶癫痫等极端失忆症， ^(41){ }^{41} 某些刻骨铭心的经历——如父母或朋友的离世、越南战场的惨烈场景——将永远烙印在记忆中。令人振奋的经历同样如此：初坠爱河的悸动、新生命诞生的喜悦、著作出版的成就感，都会强行闯入我们的记忆殿堂。
On the other hand, the incursion of unwilled and uncontrolled forgetting into remembering serves to delimit the latter in drastic ways. Whether it assumes the comparatively benign (but highly frustrating) form of our being unable to remember a proper name or the much more momentous form of losing contact with whole tracts of our remembered past as a result of a stroke (which can lead to the undermining of our personal identity), such involuntary forgetting-especially in its more monstrous displays-acts to remind us of our contingency and frailty as rememberers. No wonder that so many models of remembering attempt to underwrite its efficiency and reliability by demonstrating the rigor of the stages through which the formation of a single memory must presumably pass. Indeed, the recourse of many memory theorists to notions such as cognitive “levels of processing” or neural memory-traces can be seen as part of a determined effort to shore up (and to defend against) the faulty workings of memory, its liability to error and breakdown, the ever-present possibility of falling into temporary or even permanent oblivion. Considered in this light, forgetting is indeed a condition of remembering: its constant specter inspires the neurologist (as well as the idealist) to a vision of perfect retention. As Minkowski admonishes, however, it is far from certain that we should ever wish to achieve an error-free memorial life. Not only is erring always likely to occur; it is itself something actively to be desired. Physiological models-abetted by computer paradigms-project a state which it is doubtful we would wish to attain once we consider the consequences of having an infallible memory: for " SS " it was a continual curse. 另一方面，非意愿且不受控制的遗忘对记忆的侵入，会以极端方式对后者形成制约。无论这种遗忘表现为相对温和（却令人极度沮丧）的遗忘专有名词，还是因中风导致与过往记忆片段彻底失联（这可能危及个人身份认同）等更为严重的形态——此类非自主性遗忘，尤其是其更骇人的表现形式，都在不断提醒我们作为记忆主体的偶然性与脆弱性。难怪众多记忆模型都试图通过论证单个记忆形成必经阶段的严密性，来确保记忆的效能与可靠性。事实上，许多记忆理论家诉诸"认知加工层次"或神经记忆痕迹等概念，可视为一种坚定努力：既要巩固记忆机制（同时防范其失效），又要应对记忆易出错、易崩溃的特性，以及随时可能陷入暂时甚至永久遗忘的风险。 从这个角度看，遗忘确实是记忆的条件：它如影随形的威胁促使神经学家（以及唯心论者）追求完美保存的愿景。然而正如明科夫斯基所告诫的，我们是否真该追求毫无差错的记忆生活，这点远未可知。错误不仅总是可能发生；它本身正是我们应当主动追求的东西。生理学模型——在计算机范式的推波助澜下——投射出一种我们未必愿意达成的状态：当我们考虑到拥有绝对可靠记忆的后果时，因为" SS "那将是一种持续的诅咒。
Despite its intrinsic importance and its undeniably salutary effects, the fact of forgetting underscores the inherent imperfection of our operative memory. From the standpoint of this memory, forgetting is indeed a matter of unfreedom. To be forgetful beyond the reach of any available act of remembering-and beyond the aid of any serviceable technological de-vice-is to come up against a foreclosure upon our freedom as rememberers. This freedom cannot be assimilated to the limitless freedom of a Kantian noumenal self-or to the ethereal freedom of imagining, which is limitless in a quite different sense. Nor can it be reduced to the “secondary autonomy” of the ego as conceived in post-Freudian ego psychology. As memory moves 尽管遗忘具有内在的重要性与无可否认的积极效果，但这一事实凸显了我们运作记忆与生俱来的不完美性。从记忆运作的立场来看，遗忘确实关乎某种不自由。当遗忘超出任何可及回忆行为的范围——也超越任何实用技术设备的辅助时——我们便遭遇了作为记忆者所面临的自由剥夺。这种自由既不能被等同于康德式本体自我的无限自由，也不能与想象的缥缈自由相提并论（后者在截然不同的意义上具有无限性）。它同样无法被简化为后弗洛伊德自我心理学所构想的"次级自主性"。当记忆流动时
us beyond mind, it also moves us beyond any such ego and its techniques of adaptation-to and control-of the immediate environment. The massive presence of forgetting in our lives shows decisively that we are not egological masters in our own memorial houses, much less in the many mansions that memory enables us to inhabit. If in imagining there is considerable assurance of self-incurred success, in remembering there is no comparable assurance: the titular author of such success, the ego, here becomes buried in the thick mass of the forgotten as well as surpassed in the realm of the remembered. In both respects, the ego is itself mastered, out-remembered. 它不仅将我们带离心智，也使我们超越任何自我及其对即时环境的适应与控制技巧。遗忘在我们生活中无处不在，这明确表明我们并非自己记忆之屋的自我主宰，更遑论记忆让我们栖居的众多殿堂。如果说想象中尚能确保自我导向的成功，那么在回忆中则无此等保证：这种成功名义上的作者——自我，在此既被埋没于遗忘的厚重堆积中，也在记忆的领域里被超越。从这两方面看，自我本身被征服，被记忆所超越。
Where does this leave us as rememberers? Not altogether in submission to the unfreedom introduced by forgetting, and thus merely cast adrift in the vicissitudes of the memorial life. If we cannot be said to make our own memories-if we cannot remember endlessly or flawlessly any more than we can remember pointlessly-this does not make us into mere pawns in a vast and indifferent memory game. Let us say instead that we are made of our memories: that our psyche, our body, our life with others, our place in the world, is memorial through and through. To be made of memories is to be made of something that mind alone cannot fabricate nor its representations contain. It is also to be composed in a way that machine design, however ingenious, is unlikely ever to match-especially when the machines are themselves dependent upon our own unconditionally necessary neurons, and upon our equally necessary conscious intentions, for their conception, design, and use. 作为记忆者，我们究竟处于何种境地？我们并非全然屈从于遗忘带来的不自由，因而也不会仅仅漂泊于记忆生活的无常之中。如果说我们无法声称能自主制造记忆——如果我们既不能无止境地记忆，也不能完美无缺地记忆，正如我们无法毫无意义地记忆——这并不意味着我们只是庞大而冷漠的记忆游戏中的棋子。不如说，我们是由记忆构成的：我们的心灵、身体、与他人的共处、在世的位置，彻头彻尾都是记忆性的存在。由记忆构成意味着由某种心灵无法伪造、其表征也无法容纳之物构成。这种构成方式也使得无论多么精巧的机器设计都难以企及——尤其是当这些机器从概念构思、设计制造到实际运用，都始终依赖于我们无条件必需的神经元，以及我们同样不可或缺的清醒意识时。
VI 第六章
But now, after reclaiming remembering for the individual human sub-ject-after showing memories to be genuinely mine, whatever threats are posed by forgetting-we must return memory to the world. The need to undertake such a return first became evident in Parts Two and Three of this book. It re-emerged in the present chapter when we discovered that the freedom to be ourselves as rememberers requires that we leave ourselvesourselves as egological, self-centered subjects-in order to find ourselves. Another way of putting this is to say that, in being made of our memories (rather than being their makers), we are also beyond ourselves in our own memories. Instead of sucking us into a tight container of the mind or the brain, memories take us continually outside ourselves; and they do so in the very midst of the enactment of their own distinctive in-gathering action. 但此刻，在将记忆重新归属于人类个体主体之后——在证明记忆确凿属于"我"之后，无论遗忘带来何种威胁——我们必须将记忆归还给世界。这种回归的必要性最初在本书第二、第三部分已显端倪。当本章发现"作为记忆者的自我实现自由"需要我们放弃自我——即放弃作为自我中心的主体——才能重新找回自我时，这种必要性再次浮现。换言之，由于我们是由记忆构成（而非记忆的制造者），我们也在自身记忆之中超越了自我。记忆并非将我们禁锢于心灵或大脑的密闭容器，而是持续引领我们向外延展；这种超越恰恰发生在记忆实施其独特聚合作用的过程中。
How is this possible? We may take a final clue from Heidegger. In Being and Time he discusses “being-in” (In-Sein) as a mode of existing in the world that cannot be construed as being situated within mind or brain and their representational contents. Just as the circumambient world cannot be ade- 这如何成为可能？我们可以从海德格尔那里获得最终启示。在《存在与时间》中，他讨论的"在世存在"（In-Sein）作为一种生存模式，不能被理解为囿于心灵或大脑及其表征内容之中。正如周遭世界无法被简化为...
quately mirrored in such contents, so we do not have to climb out of them in order to reach the world: 这些内容并不能充分映照现实，因此我们无需从中抽身以触及世界：
When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered . . . even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside. ^(42){ }^{42} 当此在（Dasein）指向某物并把握它时，并非首先从某个最初被封闭的内在领域脱身；其原初的存在方式始终是"在外"的——与那些已被发现的、属于世界的存在者比邻而居……即使在感知、保留和保存的认知活动中，知性的此在依然驻留在外部。 ^(42){ }^{42}
The remembered past also remains outside-outside the confinement of “the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness.” ^(43){ }^{43} Memories, making us, refuse to be cabined, cribbed, and confined in the manner described by most theories of memory from Cartesianism to cognitive psychology, where “progress” in the latter consists mainly in introducing one type of containment (that offered by the computer) in place of another (that provided by the mind or brain). And making us as they do, these same memories take us out of ourselves and into the world; or more exactly, they show us that we have always already been there-and precisely in and through remembering itself. 被忆起的往昔同样驻留在外部——超脱于"意识'橱柜'"的禁锢。 ^(43){ }^{43} 记忆在塑造我们的同时，拒绝被笛卡尔主义至认知心理学等大多数记忆理论所描述的框架所束缚，后者的所谓"进步"不过是用计算机提供的容器替代了心灵或大脑构筑的牢笼。正是这些塑造我们的记忆，将我们带离自我、引入世界；更准确地说，它们向我们揭示：我们始终早已驻留彼处——恰恰是通过回忆本身达成的在场。
Think of it: memory not in brain or mind but in the world, and thus in the things that belong to the world such as lived bodies, places, and other people. Indeed, there is no reason not to suppose that even mute material things, inanimate as well as animate, can be thoroughly memorial in status: they, too, can embody memories and are not limited to evoking them. So can machines, not excluding information processing machines once they are divested of their pretension to model human memory itself. Any thinganything in the world, even the frailest footprint-can become memorial: can become a bearer of memories with as much right as a monument built to stand forever. The fact is that memory is more a colander than a container, more porous than enframing. Its final freedom of in-gathering is a freedom of letting the world in through its many subtle pores (and this in many fashions) only in order to allow us to realize how richly we already in-habit the world without. Ramifying through such being-in-the-world, tying together its diverse facets in incomparably multiple ways, remembering deflates the ambitions of sheer activism just as it undermines the purposes of a resigned passivism. For the world that memory makes known to us in terms of the world’s own “things”-its constituents or elements conceived as forms of “subdued being, non-thetic being” ^(44){ }^{44}-serves to undercut any such divisive dualism as the active/passive dyad itself exemplifies. As memory moves us beyond mind, it moves us before the dualisms that mind itself begets in its incessant cogitations, whether these dualisms be those of the active and the passive, mind and body, mind and brain, self and other, ego and reality . . . or of memory and perception, memory and imagination, memory and thought. The thick autonomy of remembering ensures that the mutual 试想：记忆并非存在于大脑或心灵中，而是栖居于世界之中，栖居于那些属于世界的存在——鲜活的身体、场所与他人之中。事实上，我们完全有理由认为，即便是沉默的物质存在，无论有无生命，都可能彻底成为记忆的载体：它们同样能具象化记忆，而不仅限于唤起记忆。机器亦复如是，当信息处理机器褪去模拟人类记忆的傲慢外壳后亦然。世间万物——哪怕最脆弱的足迹——都能成为记忆的纪念碑：它们与那些为永恒而建的丰碑同样有权成为记忆的承载者。记忆的本质更似滤网而非容器，其多孔性远胜于封闭性。它最终自由汇聚的能力，正是通过无数细微孔窍（以多种方式）让世界涌入的自由，只为让我们意识到自己早已丰盈地栖居在这外在世界。记忆在"在世存在"中枝蔓延伸，以无可比拟的多元方式联结世界的各个面向，既消解了激进主义的野心，也瓦解了消极宿命论的意图。 记忆通过世界自身的"物"——那些被视为"被抑制的存在、非主题性存在" ^(44){ }^{44} 的构成要素或元素——向我们揭示的世界，消解了诸如主动/被动二元对立这类分裂性概念。当记忆将我们带离心智时，它也将我们置于心智在持续思考中产生的各种二元对立之前，无论是主动与被动的对立、心灵与身体的对立、心智与大脑的对立、自我与他者的对立、自我与现实的对立......还是记忆与感知的对立、记忆与想象的对立、记忆与思维的对立。记忆那厚重的自主性确保了这些本不相干要素之间的
emeshment of these otherwise disparate items is thorough and deep-as thorough and deep as our involvement in our own being-in-the-world. 相互交织是彻底而深刻的——就如同我们自身"在世存在"的彻底性与深刻性。
Remembering goes on and we go on with it; we could not go on without it even if we do not make it or control it; crucial contributors to it and continuing collaborators in its company, we act to return remembering to the world. For it is in the world that memories are begotten, and it is in the world that they find their natural destiny. To acknowledge this is to decenter and de-individuate remembering as we usually think of it-namely, as the possession of individual selves-and it is to consider that things, not just representations of things, may be thoroughly steeped in memory. 记忆持续发生，我们随之延续；即便无法创造或掌控记忆，我们也无法脱离它而存在。作为记忆的关键贡献者与持续协作者，我们致力于将记忆归还给世界。因为记忆正是在世界中诞生，亦在世界中找到其自然归宿。承认这一点，便是要消解我们通常对记忆的个体化中心认知——即视记忆为个体自我的专属物——并思考事物本身（而不仅是其表象）可能完全浸透着记忆。
We can only conclude that memory is co-extensive with world. “Everything,” as Piaget says, “participates in memory.” ^(45){ }^{45} Nothing is not memorial in some manner; everything belongs to some matrix of memory, even if it is a matrix which is remote from human concerns and interests. It might even be that things can remember us as much as we remember them. Perhaps they even remember themselves: "I did not have to remember these things; they have remembered themselves all these years. ^(46){ }^{46} Black Elk’s words resonate with the possible cosmological implications of a more capacious view of memory, a view which refuses constriction to the human sphere. Could it be that “the hold is held” by things as much as by minds-and by places as much as by brains or machines? Is it possible that remembering goes on, in some fashion, in things and places as well as among human beings? If so, it goes on in such intricate and indirect ways that we hesitate even to think of it as a matter of memory. But how else are we to understand the way in which trees in a grove reflect each other’s presence in their patterns of growing, or the way that marks left on boulders indicate receding glaciers? It requires a semiologically attuned observer to interpret such patterns or marks as express memorials of earlier events. Human beings are adept at just such discernment, though perhaps not as uniquely capable of it as was once thought. Yet neither the fact of such sensitivity to memorially suggestive signs, nor the fact that humankind continually engages in remembering, gives to human beings any ultimately privileged position in the realm of memory. Privileged as articulate participants in the process of their own remembering and as acute explorers of its structure, they are nonetheless not entitled to assume that their own remembering conveys the essence of every kind of remembering. If memory in some significant sense is truly to be found in things and their implacement in the world, we cannot presume that an exclusive-or even the most inclusive-paradigm of all memory is provided by the remembering which is characteristic for the human species alone. 我们只能得出这样的结论：记忆与世界同延。正如皮亚杰所言，"万物皆参与记忆。"没有任何事物不以某种方式被铭记；一切皆属于某种记忆矩阵，即便这个矩阵与人类的关切和兴趣相去甚远。甚至可能事物对我们的记忆与我们对其的记忆同样多。或许它们还能自我记忆："我本不必记住这些事物；它们自己多年来一直记得。"黑麋鹿的这番话，与一种更广阔记忆观可能蕴含的宇宙论意义产生共鸣——这种观点拒绝将记忆局限在人类领域。难道"持有"既来自心灵也来自物事，既源于大脑或机器也源于场所？是否有可能记忆以某种方式不仅存在于人类之间，也存在于物事与场所之中？若真如此，它必定以如此错综复杂且迂回的方式进行，以至于我们甚至不愿将其视为记忆问题。但除此之外，我们又如何理解丛林中树木通过生长模式相互映照彼此的存在，或是巨石上留下的痕迹昭示着消退的冰川？ 要解读这些图案或标记作为过往事件的表达性纪念物，需要具备符号学敏锐度的观察者。人类确实精于此种辨识能力，尽管或许不像曾经认为的那样具有独特性。然而，无论是人类对记忆暗示性符号的敏感特质，还是人类持续进行回忆活动的事实，都未能使人类在记忆领域获得任何终极特权地位。作为自身回忆过程中清晰的参与者及其结构的敏锐探索者，人类固然享有特权，但无权认定自身的记忆方式能传达所有记忆类型的本质。若记忆在某种重要意义上确实存在于事物及其在世界中的位置，我们就不能假定所有记忆的排他性——甚至最包容性的——范式仅由人类特有的记忆方式所提供。
One must nonetheless begin somewhere-and best of all with what one knows most intimately. Thus the present study began without embarrassment by scrutinizing a miscellaneous set of casual memories experienced by the author. These all-too-human memories were themselves remembered as a starting point. Their immediate analysis into eidetic traits and intentional structures exemplified yet another finitude-not just that of authorial subjectivity but that of the constraints of phenomenological method. The extension of this analysis into mnemonic modes that do not fit the pattern of intentionality with the exactitude achievable in the traditionally favored case of recollection represented a step away from the inherent limitations of mentalism as this has been practised from Descartes through Husserl. When such decidedly extra-mental phenomena as body and place memories, along with forms of commemoration, were taken up in what Plato might term a “third wave” ^(47){ }^{47} of consideration the compass of memory was broadened still more: neither the human mind, nor even the individual rememberer in his or her self-identical being, could any longer claim to be the unique vehicle of memories. Instead, remembering can be said to be going on between the embodied human rememberer and the place he or she is in as well as with the others he or she is in the presence of. 然而，人总得有个起点——最理想的莫过于从最熟悉的领域开始。因此本研究毫不避讳地以检视作者亲历的零散日常记忆作为开端。这些充满人性温度的记忆本身被作为起点重新记取。当它们被直接分析为本质特征与意向结构时，又展现出另一种有限性——不仅是作者主观性的局限，更是现象学方法本身的约束。将这种分析延伸至不符合传统偏好的回忆模式中那种精确意向性的记忆类型，标志着从笛卡尔到胡塞尔所沿袭的心智主义内在局限中迈出的一步。当身体记忆、场所记忆以及各种纪念形式这类明显超心智的现象——用柏拉图的话说是"第三波"考量——被纳入研究范畴时，记忆的疆域得到了进一步拓展：无论是人类心智，甚至保持自我同一性的个体记忆者，都不再能宣称是记忆的唯一载体。 相反，可以说记忆活动发生在具身化的记忆者与其所处场所之间，也发生在记忆者与在场他人之间。
Thanks to our ruminations on thick autonomy, we should be prepared to take a final step in this de-subjectification of memory. That which has been regarded since the seventeenth century as unambiguously outside the human subject-and consequently as capturable only in the mind regarded as the “mirror of nature,” including memory as a main mirror of the external world-is to be understood as altogether continuous with this subject. As immersed in the world, human beings are as much ‘outside’ as ‘inside’. If this is so, the world and its elemental things are themselves matters of memory: not simply there to be entrapped and pictured in recollections, but there as distinctively memorable on their own and from the beginning. What had seemed to be ineluctably dependent on human mentation-and, by extension, on human brains and human-designed machines-turns out to have its own autonomy, densely enacted and yet diaphanously exhibited. Memorial power resides as much in the things of the world as in ourselves or our inventions. The autonomy of remembering goes on not only inside human beings, nor even only between such beings and the world’s things, but outside in the midst of things themselves-those very Sachen selbst that Husserl had posited as the ultimate objects of phenomenological method. 得益于我们对"厚实自主性"的沉思，现在我们应该准备好迈出记忆去主体化的最后一步。自十七世纪以来被视为明确外在于人类主体的存在——因而只能被捕捉于被视为"自然之镜"的心灵中（包括作为外部世界主要镜像的记忆）——现在应当被理解为与这个主体完全连续的。作为沉浸于世界中的存在，人类既是"外在"的也是"内在"的。若果真如此，世界及其基本元素本身就是记忆的载体：它们不仅是被回忆捕获和描绘的对象，更是从一开始就具有独特可记忆性的自在之物。那些曾被认为不可避免地依赖于人类心智——进而依赖于人类大脑和人造机器——的事物，实则拥有其自身的自主性，这种自主性既密集地运作着，又以半透明的方式显现着。记忆的力量既栖居于我们自身或我们的造物中，也同样存在于世界的诸般事物里。 记忆的自主性不仅存在于人类内部，也不仅存在于人类与世界事物之间，更外在于事物本身的场域之中——这些正是胡塞尔所设定的现象学方法的终极对象：物自身（Sachen selbst）。
“To be is to participate”: this formula of Lévy-Bruhl’s ^(48){ }^{48} is to be remembered a last time. If to be is to participate, and if everything participates in memory-inanimate things as well as their human percipients-this can only mean that everything is memorial through and through. As in the case of commemoration (that most encompassing form of human remembering), the key is provided by the notion of participation. Memory not only registers modes of participation between animate and inanimate things, minds and "存在即参与"：列维-布留尔的这个公式 ^(48){ }^{48} 值得我们最后重温一次。如果存在即参与，如果万物（无论无生命体还是人类感知者）都参与记忆，这只能意味着万物从本质上都具有记忆属性。正如纪念活动（人类记忆最包罗万象的形式）所展现的，理解这一点的关键就在于"参与"概念。记忆不仅记录着生命体与非生命体之间、心灵与...
bodies, selves and others, persons and places; it also contributes its own re-enlivening capacities to the festival of cosmic participation. Its very porousness, its open-endedness and ongoingness, its ability to bond deeply across remotenesses of time and space, its own virtual dimension-all of these help to make memory a powerful participatory force in the world. Or more exactly: as the world. Just as everything participates in memory, so memory participates in everything: every last thing. In so doing, it draws the world together, re-membering it and endowing it with a connectiveness and a significance it would otherwise lack-or rather, without which it would not be what it is or as it is. 身体、自我与他者，人与场所；它还为宇宙共舞的庆典注入了自身独特的复苏活力。记忆的多孔性、开放性与持续性，跨越时空阻隔的深刻联结能力，以及其虚拟维度——这一切都使记忆成为世间一股强大的参与性力量。更准确地说：记忆即世界本身。正如万物皆参与记忆，记忆也参与万物：每一细微存在。在此过程中，记忆将世界凝聚，重新整合并赋予其原本缺失的关联性与意义——或者说，若缺此特质，世界便不成其为当下模样。
This page intentionally left blank 此页留白
NOTES 注释
Preface 前言
Paul Rozin, “The Psychobiological Approach to Human Memory” in M. R. Rosenzweig and E. L. Bennett, eds., Neural Mechanisms of Learning and Memory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), p. 6. Rozin is summarizing the case of M. K. as originally reported in A. Starr and L. Phillips, “Verbal and Motor Memory in the Amnesic Syndrome,” Neuropsychologica 8 (1970):75-88. 保罗·罗津，《人类记忆的心理生物学研究》，收录于 M·R·罗森茨威格与 E·L·班尼特合编的《学习与记忆的神经机制》（剑桥：麻省理工出版社，1976 年），第 6 页。罗津在此总结了 M·K 的病例，该病例最初由 A·斯塔尔与 L·菲利普斯在《健忘症候群中的言语与运动记忆》（《神经心理学》第 8 卷，1970 年）第 75-88 页中报道。
A. R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist, trans. L. Solotaroff (Chicago: Regnery, 1976), p. 11; his italics. The Dante example is reported on p. 45. A·R·鲁利亚，《记忆大师的心灵》，L·索洛塔罗夫译（芝加哥：里格纳瑞出版社，1976 年），第 11 页（斜体为原作者所加）。关于但丁的案例记载于第 45 页。
Ibid., p. 65. 同上，第 65 页。
See R. N. Haber and R. B. Haber, “Eidetic Imagery: I. Frequency,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 19 (1964):131-38. 参见 R·N·哈伯与 R·B·哈伯，《遗觉意象研究Ⅰ：出现频率》，《感知与运动技能》第 19 卷（1964 年）第 131-138 页。
On hypermnesia, see M. Erdelyi, “The Recovery of Unconscious (Inaccessible) Memories: Laboratory Studies of Hypermnesia” in G. Bower, ed., The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory (New York: Academic Press, 1984). 关于超记忆现象，参见 M.厄尔德利《无意识（不可访问）记忆的恢复：超记忆实验室研究》，收录于 G.鲍尔主编《学习与动机心理学：研究与理论进展》（纽约：学术出版社，1984 年）。
Edward S. Casey Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976). 爱德华·S·凯西《想象：一项现象学研究》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年）。
On this neologism, see Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 8, 9, 11, 15-16, 45. 关于这个新造词，参见雅克·德里达《散播》，芭芭拉·约翰逊译（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1981 年），第 8、9、11、15-16、45 页。
For a related sense of the inadequacy of intentionality as a basis for understanding memory, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 243-44. 关于意向性作为理解记忆基础之不足的相关论述，参见莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂《可见的与不可见的》，A.林吉斯译（伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1968 年），第 243-44 页。
An important exception is Marcia K. Johnson’s essay, “The Origins of Memories,” Advances in Cognitive-Behavioral Research and Therapy 4 (1985): 1-27. 一个重要的例外是马西娅·K·约翰逊的论文《记忆的起源》，发表于《认知行为研究与治疗进展》第 4 卷（1985 年）：1-27 页。
George Steiner, After Babel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 134. 乔治·斯坦纳，《巴别塔之后》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1975 年），第 134 页。
“Tantum scimus, quantum memoria tenemus”: cited as an epigram in Johann Grafen Mailath, Mnemonils oder Kunst, das Gedächtnis nach Regeln zu stärken (Vienna, 1842). "Tantum scimus, quantum memoria tenemus"（我们知道的仅是我们所记住的）：作为题词引用自约翰·格拉芬·迈拉特的《记忆术或按规则增强记忆力的艺术》（维也纳，1842 年）。
Introduction 导论
Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 60-61. 弗里德里希·尼采，《历史对人生的利弊》，载于《不合时宜的沉思》，R·J·霍林代尔译（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1983 年），第 60-61 页。
On the survival of an oral epic tradition in certain regions of Yugoslavia, see Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales, Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature, 24 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), passim. 关于南斯拉夫部分地区口头史诗传统的存续情况，参见阿尔伯特·B·洛德《故事的歌者》，哈佛比较文学研究第 24 辑（剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1960 年），散见各处。
Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” p. 62. I here follow the translation of A. Collins in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 7. 尼采，《历史对人生的利弊》，第 62 页。此处采用 A·柯林斯在弗里德里希·尼采《历史的用途与滥用》（印第安纳波利斯：鲍勃斯-梅里尔出版社，1957 年）第 7 页的译文。
Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, trans. M. H. Heim (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 5. 米兰·昆德拉，《不能承受的生命之轻》，M·H·海姆译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1985 年），第 5 页。
Ibid. 同上
Ibid. 同上
Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” p. 61 (Hollingdale translation). 尼采，《历史对于人生的利弊》，第 61 页（霍林代尔译本）。
Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, p. 5. 昆德拉，《生命中不能承受之轻》，第 5 页。
For an elaborate and ingenious effort to conceive memory on the model of a specific computer program, see J. Anderson and G. H. Bower, Human Associative Memory (Washington, D.C.: Winston, 1973). See also G. R. Loftus and E. F. Loftus, Human Memory: The Processing of Information (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1976). 关于将记忆构想为特定计算机程序的详尽而巧妙的尝试，可参阅 J.安德森与 G.H.鲍尔合著的《人类联想记忆》（华盛顿：温斯顿出版社，1973 年）。另见 G.R.洛夫特斯与 E.F.洛夫特斯所著《人类记忆：信息处理》（新泽西州希尔斯代尔：厄尔鲍姆出版社，1976 年）。
Sigmund Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth, 1953-74), 7:24; his italics. (Hereafter cited as Standard Edition.) Compare Neisser’s remark: “Until we know more about memory in the natural contexts where it develops and is normally used, theorizing is premature” (Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality [San Francisco: Freeman, 1976], p. 142). Here psychoanalyst and cognitive psychologist join hands in a common suspicion of artificial models of human memory. 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德，《标准版西格蒙德·弗洛伊德心理学著作全集》（伦敦：霍加斯出版社，1953-74 年）第七卷第 24 页中《一例癔症分析的片段》一文（斜体为原作者所加，后文简称《标准版》）。对比奈瑟的评论："除非我们更了解记忆在其发展及通常使用的自然语境中的运作，否则理论建构为时过早"（乌尔里克·奈瑟，《认知与现实》[旧金山：弗里曼出版社，1976 年]，第 142 页）。在此，精神分析学家与认知心理学家对人类记忆人工模型的共同质疑不谋而合。
I have drawn this list of words, itself only a partial sampling, from the Oxford English Dictionary, abbreviating the definitions given therein. 本词表摘录自《牛津英语词典》并简化了其中释义，所列词汇仅为局部样本。
“Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word. In principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word” (J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” in Austin’s Philosophical Papers [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961], p. 133; his italics). "诚然，普通语言并非终极真理。原则上它处处都能被补充、改进乃至取代。但请谨记，它始终是最初的根基"（J.L.奥斯汀《为辩解辩》，收录于《奥斯汀哲学论文集》[牛津大学出版社，1961 年]，第 133 页；斜体为原作者所加）。
On the significance of the transition from a primarily oral culture to one in which chirography and typography predominate, see Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 5-15, 93-103, and passim. 关于从主要依赖口述的文化向手写与印刷占主导地位的文化转型的重要意义，可参阅沃尔特·J.翁的《口语文化与书面文化：语词的技术化》（伦敦：Methuen 出版社，1982 年），第 5-15 页、93-103 页及各章节相关内容。
In American education, the main method of memorizing used to be that of rote repetition, which, since William James’s critique, has become recognized as the least efficient method. See William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover, 1950), 1:663-68. 在美国教育体系中，死记硬背曾是记忆的主要方式，但自威廉·詹姆斯提出批判后，这已被公认为效率最低下的方法。参见威廉·詹姆斯《心理学原理》（纽约：Dover 出版社，1950 年）第 1 卷第 663-668 页。
A recent report of the United States Office of Educational Research and Improvement states that memorizing such things as historical dates and passages of literature can “help students absorb and retain the factual information on which understanding and critical thought are based” (cited in New York Times, March 1, 1986, p. 12). 美国教育研究与改进办公室最新报告指出，记忆历史日期和文学选段等内容能"帮助学生吸收并保留作为理解与批判性思维基础的事实信息"（引自《纽约时报》1986 年 3 月 1 日第 12 版）。
Harry Lorayne and Jerry Lucas, The Memory Book (New York: Ballantine, 1974). 哈里·洛拉尼与杰瑞·卢卡斯，《记忆之书》（纽约：巴兰坦出版社，1974 年）。
William Stokes, Memory (London: Houlston & Wright, 1888), p. 37. Cited by Lucas & Lorayne, The Memory Book, pp. 3-4. 威廉·斯托克斯，《记忆》（伦敦：豪斯顿与莱特出版社，1888 年），第 37 页。引自卢卡斯与洛拉尼《记忆之书》第 3-4 页。
Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 3; my italics. For a fascinating attempt to trace the fate of the ars memorativa tradition during its introduction to China in the sixteenth century by Matteo Ricci, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (New York: Viking, 1984). 弗朗西斯·叶芝，《记忆的艺术》（伦敦：劳特利奇与基根·保罗出版社，1966 年），第 3 页；斜体为笔者所加。关于 16 世纪利玛窦将记忆术传统引入中国时其命运轨迹的精彩研究，可参阅史景迁《利玛窦的记忆宫殿》（纽约：维京出版社，1984 年）。
See Friedrich Nietzsche, " ‘Guilt’, ‘Bad Conscience’, and Related Matters," in The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golfing (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 189-94, especially sections 1-3. 参见弗里德里希·尼采《"罪疚"、"坏良心"及其相关概念》，载《论道德的谱系》，弗朗西斯·戈尔芬译（纽约：双日出版社，1956 年），第 189-94 页，尤见第 1-3 节。
Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” p. 61. 尼采，《论历史对生活的利弊》，第 61 页。
“It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood; memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess” (Freud, “Screen Memories,” in Standard Edition, 3:322; his italics). "确实可以质疑我们是否真的拥有任何童年记忆；我们所拥有的可能只是与童年相关的记忆"（弗洛伊德，《屏蔽记忆》，标准版第 3 卷第 322 页；斜体为原文所有）。
On childhood amnesia, see Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Psy- 关于童年失忆症，参见弗洛伊德《性学三论》，
chosexuality, in Standard Edition, 7:174-76, 189. See also the still earlier statement that “forgetting is often intentional and desired” (ibid., 4:1114: 111 ). 标准版第 7 卷第 174-76 页及 189 页。另见更早的论述："遗忘常常是刻意且被期望的"（同上， 4:1114: 111 ）。
Ibid., 12:147-48: “The aim of [psychoanalytic] technique has remained the same. Descriptively speaking, it is to fill in the gaps in memory; dynamically speaking, it is to overcome resistances due to repression.” 同上，12:147-48："[精神分析]技术的目的始终未变。从描述性角度而言，是填补记忆中的空白；从动力学角度而言，是克服由压抑产生的阻抗。"
Ibid., 10:243. (This is taken from the case history of the “Rat Man.”) 同上，10:243。（此段引自"鼠人"个案史）
Ibid., 2:117 n. 同上，2:117 注。
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & C. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 21. The words in italics represent the title of the first section of the Introduction. The sentence that follows is the first statement in the section. 马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》，J.麦奎利与 C.罗宾逊英译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 21 页。斜体字部分代表导论第一节的标题。随后句子是该节开篇第一陈述。
Ibid., pp. 398-99; his italics. 同上，第 398-99 页；斜体为原作者所加。
See Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 4, 11, 143, 146-47, 150-51, and 244. See also J. Glenn Gray, “Heidegger on Remembering and Remembering Heidegger,” Man and World 10 (1977):62-78. 参见马丁·海德格尔《何谓思？》，J·格伦·格雷英译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1968 年），第 4、11、143、146-47、150-51 及 244 页。另见 J·格伦·格雷《海德格尔论记忆与记忆海德格尔》，载《人与世界》第 10 卷（1977 年）：62-78 页。
Hermann Ebbinghaus, Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology, trans. H. A. Ruger & C. E. Bussenius (New York: Dover, 1964). 赫尔曼·艾宾浩斯《记忆：实验心理学研究》，H·A·鲁格与 C·E·布塞纽斯英译（纽约：多佛出版社，1964 年）。
For a candid assessment of such self-enclosure and an admirable attempt to suggest how experimental psychology might reconnect with the concerns of everyday remembering, see Ulric Neisser, “Memory: What Are the Important Questions?” in Ulric Neisser, ed., Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982), pp. 3-19. 关于对这种自我封闭性的坦率评价，以及将实验心理学重新与日常记忆关切相联系的卓越尝试，参见乌尔里克·奈瑟《记忆：哪些是核心问题？》，载乌尔里克·奈瑟编《被观察的记忆：自然情境中的记忆》（旧金山：弗里曼出版社，1982 年），第 3-19 页。
Freud, Standard Edition, 12:153: “For [the psychoanalyst], remembering in the old manner-reproduction in the psychical field-is the aim to which he adheres.” 弗洛伊德，《标准版全集》第 12 卷第 153 页：“对[精神分析学家]而言，以旧有方式记忆——在心理领域再现——是他坚持追求的目标。”
A. R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist, trans. Lynn Solotaroff (Chicago: Regnery, 1976). A·R·卢里亚，《记忆大师的心灵》，林恩·索洛塔罗夫译（芝加哥：雷格纳里出版社，1976 年）。
Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 169. 沃尔特·J·翁，《口语文化与书面文化》，第 169 页。
Plato, Phaedrus 275 a (Hackforth translation). “Recipe” translates pharmakon, drug or remedy. On writing as pharmakon, see J. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 95-116. 柏拉图，《斐德罗篇》275a（哈克福斯译本）。“配方”对应希腊语 pharmakon，指药物或疗法。关于书写作为 pharmakon 的讨论，参见雅克·德里达《播撒》中“柏拉图的药房”一文，芭芭拉·约翰逊译（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1981 年），第 95-116 页。
“In the ancient world, devoid of printing, without paper for note-taking or on which to type lectures, the trained memory was of vital importance. And the ancient memories were trained by an art . . . which could depend on faculties of intense visual memorization which we have lost. The word ‘mnemotechnics’, though not actually wrong as a description of the classical art of memory, makes this very mysterious subject seem simpler than it is” (Yates, The Art of Memory, p. 4.) On the oral aspects of early Greek memorizing, see the now-classical work of Milman Parry, The Making of Homeric Verse, ed. A. Parry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), esp. pp. 325-42; as well as Ong, Orality and Literacy, pp. 16-30, 57-67. "在古代世界，既无印刷之术，亦无纸张可供记录或誊写讲稿，训练有素的记忆力至关重要。而古人的记忆是通过一种技艺来训练的……这种技艺依赖于我们已丧失的强烈视觉记忆能力。'记忆术'一词虽作为古典记忆艺术的描述并无实质错误，却使这个极其神秘的课题显得比实际更为简单。"（耶茨，《记忆的艺术》，第 4 页）关于早期希腊记忆的口传特性，可参阅米尔曼·帕里现已成经典的著作《荷马史诗的创作》，A.帕里编（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1971 年），特别是第 325-342 页；另见翁，《口语与文字》，第 16-30 页，57-67 页。
See the account by Robert Graves, The Greek Myths (Baltimore: Penguin, 1955), 2:292 (as based on Tzetzes and Plutarch). 参见罗伯特·格雷夫斯的记述，《希腊神话》（巴尔的摩：企鹅出版社，1955 年），第 2 卷第 292 页（基于策策斯与普鲁塔克的记载）。
Jean Pierre Vernant, “Aspects Mythiques de la mémoire et du temps,” in Vernant’s Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Paris: Maspero, 1965), p. 85. In what follows, I am indebted to Vernant’s account of the place of memory in ancient Greek culture. 让·皮埃尔·韦尔南，《记忆与时间的神话面向》，收录于韦尔南《希腊人的神话与思想》（巴黎：马斯佩罗出版社，1965 年），第 85 页。在下文中，笔者受惠于韦尔南对记忆在古希腊文化中地位的阐述。
Poets in particular were credited with the ability to intuit the past directly and without any mediation other than their own inspired words. These words not merely depict the past but transport us into it: they make us contemporaries of the events described, and their order is the order of these events. As Socrates says to Ion, the rhapsode: 诗人尤其被认为具备直接直觉感知过去的能力，除却他们自身灵感的言辞外无需任何媒介。这些言辞不仅描绘过去，更将我们带入其中：使我们与所述事件处于同一时代，其行文顺序即事件发生之序。正如苏格拉底对吟游诗人伊昂所言：
When you chant these [verses of Homer], are you in your senses? Or are you carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy conceive herself to be engaged in the actions you relate, whether they are in Ithaca, or Troy, or wherever the story puts them? (Plato, Ion 535b-c535 \mathrm{~b}-\mathrm{c}; my italics.) 当你吟诵这些[荷马诗句]时，你是清醒的吗？还是已神游物外，你的灵魂在狂喜中想象自己正经历着诗中描述的场景，无论这些故事发生在伊萨卡、特洛伊还是其他任何地方？（柏拉图《伊安篇》 535b-c535 \mathrm{~b}-\mathrm{c} ；着重号为笔者所加。）
39. Vernant, Mythe et Pensée, p. 87. 39. 韦尔南，《神话与思想》，第 87 页。
40. See Karl Kerenyi, "Mnemosyne-Lesmosyne. On the Springs of ‘Memory’ and ‘Forgetting’ " Spring, (1977):120-30, esp. 129-30. 40. 参见卡尔·凯雷尼《记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅与遗忘之泉——论"记忆"与"遗忘"的源头》，载《春天》（1977 年）第 120-30 页，尤见第 129-30 页。
41. Ibid., pp. 129-30; his italics. 41. 同上，第 129-30 页；着重号为原作者所加。
42. Plato, Ion 533 e . 42. 柏拉图，《伊安篇》533e。
43. Ibid., 536b: “One poet is suspended from one Muse, another from another; we call it being ‘possessed’ but the fact is much the same, since he is held” (emphasis in the translation of Lane Cooper). Ong reminds us that “rhapsodize” derives from rhapsóidein, “to stitch songs together” (Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 13). 43. 同上，536b：“一位诗人受一位缪斯附体，另一位则受另一位缪斯附体；我们称之为‘着魔’，但实质几乎相同，因为他被掌控着”（莱恩·库珀译本中强调）。翁提醒我们，“吟诵”（rhapsodize）一词源自 rhapsóidein，意为“将歌曲缝合在一起”（翁，《口语与书面语》，第 13 页）。
44. Plato, Ion 536a. On Mnemosyne as loadstone, see ibid., 533d-e, 535e-536b. 44. 柏拉图，《伊安篇》536a。关于作为磁石的谟涅摩绪涅，参见同书 533d-e，535e-536b。
45. Hesoid, Theogony, 32 and 38. Note that the Muses have such knowledge of past, present, and future too: see Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology (New York: Prometheus Press, 1960), pp. 127-29. 45. 赫西俄德，《神谱》第 32 行及 38 行。需注意缪斯们同样知晓过去、现在与未来之事：参见《拉鲁斯神话百科全书》（纽约：普罗米修斯出版社，1960 年），第 127-29 页。
46. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 11. Heidegger adds that “this is why poesy is the water that at times flows backwards toward the source, toward thinkingback” (ibid.). (“Thinking-back” translates An-denken, commemorative thought.) 46. 海德格尔，《何谓思？》，第 11 页。海德格尔补充道："这就是为何诗歌时而会逆流回溯源头，朝向追忆之思"（同上）。（"追忆之思"是对 An-denken 的翻译，即纪念性思考。）
47. On this point, see Vernant, Mythe et Pensée, pp. 80-81. In further tribute to their perception of memory’s invaluable role in the lives of men, the Greeks accorded to Mnemosyne a critical position in the scheme of things. Mnemosyne is one of only twelve Titans, the offspring of Gaea (Earth) and Uranus (Heaven, Sky); along with their siblings, the 100 -headed giants and the Cyclops, the Titans represent the tumultuous forces of Nature, headstrong beings who overthrew Uranus. Cronus, the castrator of Uranus, was the brother of Mnemosyne; the latter became in turn the lover of Zeus, Cronus’ youngest son and the chief of the Olympian gods. It was said that nine nights of love between Zeus and Mnemosyne led forthwith to the birth of the nine muses. Since at least three of these latter are directly, and three others indirectly, concerned with poetry, the close tie between memory and poetry is recognized and preserved in this mythical form-just as the liaison between Mnemosyne and Zeus ensures Mnemosyne’s intrinsic power: her capacity to seize poets, rhapsodes, and listeners alike with “the Bacchic transport.” (Plato, Ion 534a). 47. 关于这一点，可参阅维尔南《神话与思想》第 80-81 页。希腊人进一步颂扬记忆在人类生命中的珍贵作用，赋予谟涅摩绪涅（Mnemosyne）在宇宙秩序中的关键地位。作为盖亚（大地）与乌拉诺斯（天空）所生的十二泰坦神之一，谟涅摩绪涅与百首巨人和独眼巨人等兄弟姐妹共同象征着自然的狂暴力量——这群桀骜不驯的存在曾推翻乌拉诺斯的统治。阉割乌拉诺斯的克洛诺斯是谟涅摩绪涅的兄弟，而后者又成为宙斯（克洛诺斯幼子、奥林匹斯众神之首）的爱侣。传说宙斯与谟涅摩绪涅九夜缠绵后，便诞生了九位缪斯女神。鉴于其中至少三位缪斯直接主管诗歌，另有三位间接相关，记忆与诗歌的紧密联系通过这种神话形式得到确认与传承——正如谟涅摩绪涅与宙斯的结合确保了她掌控诗人、吟游者与听众的固有力量："令人沉醉的酒神式迷狂"（柏拉图《伊安篇》534a）。
48. In Plato’s view, previous lives are presipposed as the basis for present recollection; but they are not themselves remembered, thanks to the forgetfulness induced by the river Ameles (i.e., “mindlessness”). See Plato, Republic 621a-d. 48. 在柏拉图看来，前世被预设为当下回忆的基础；但由于阿梅勒斯河（即"无心之河"）引发的遗忘，这些前世记忆本身并未被记起。参见柏拉图《理想国》621a-d 节。
49. Thus the invocation of divine inspiration at the end of the Meno offers only a pseudo-solution, an aporetic conclusion, to an inquiry into the nature of virtue: see Plato, Meno 99 c-e. 49. 因此《美诺篇》结尾对神灵启示的祈求，只是为德性本质探究提供了一个伪解决方案——一个充满困惑的结论。参见柏拉图《美诺篇》99c-e 节。
50. Vernant, Mythe et Pensée, p. 103. 50. 韦尔南，《神话与思想》，第 103 页。
51. See Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, trans. Richard Sorabji, in Aristotle On Memory (London: Duckworth, 1972). 51. 参见亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》，理查德·索拉布奇英译，收录于《亚里士多德论记忆》（伦敦：达克沃斯出版社，1972 年）。
52. Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 499 a 15 (Sorabji translation). 52. 亚里士多德，《论记忆与回忆》，499 a 15（索拉布吉译本）。
53. See ibid., 452 b 7-4537-453 a 3 . 53. 参见同上，452 b 7-4537-453 a 3。
54. Ibid., 451 a 15-16. 54. 同上，451 a 15-16。
55. Plato, Timaeus 37 d (Cornford translation). 55. 柏拉图，《蒂迈欧篇》37 d（康福德译本）。
56. See Plato, Meno 81 a (“searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection”) and Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 453 a 15-16 (“recollection is a search in something bodily for an image”). 56. 参见柏拉图《美诺篇》81a（"探索与学习整体而言就是回忆"）与亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》453a15-16（"回忆是在身体中寻找某种影像的过程"）。
57. See Pierre Janet, L’évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps (Paris: Chahine, 1928), esp. vol. 1; Sigmund Freud, “Constructions in Analysis,” in Standard Edition 23:257-69; F. C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and 57. 参见皮埃尔·雅内《记忆与时间概念的演变》（巴黎：夏希纳出版社，1928 年），尤见第一卷；西格蒙德·弗洛伊德《分析中的建构》，载于《标准版》第 23 卷第 257-269 页；F.C.巴特利特《记忆：一项实验与社会心理学研究》
Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 197-214; Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence, trans. A. J. Pomerans (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 1-26. 《社会心理学》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1964 年），第 197-214 页；让·皮亚杰与贝尔贝尔·英海尔德合著，《记忆与智力》，A·J·波默兰斯译（纽约：基础图书出版社，1975 年），第 1-26 页。
58. Cf. Plato, Theatetus 197d-199b; Freud, “Repeating, Remembering, and Working-Through,” in Standard Edition, 12:147-56. 58. 参见柏拉图《泰阿泰德篇》197d-199b；弗洛伊德《回忆、重复与修通》，载于标准版全集第 12 卷 147-56 页。
59. “I have chosen to end my history with Leibniz . . . because it may be that here ends the influence of the art of memory as a factor in basic European developments” (Yates, The Art of Memory, p. 389). 59. “我选择以莱布尼茨作为这段历史的终结……因为或许正是在这里，作为欧洲基本发展要素的记忆艺术之影响走向了终点”（耶茨，《记忆的艺术》，第 389 页）。
60. Descartes, Meditations On First Philosophy, trans. L. J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 23. Since this statement epitomizes modern skepticism toward memory-especially in contrast with Greek veneration toward the same power-I have used it as an epigraph to this Introduction. 60. 笛卡尔，《第一哲学沉思集》，L·J·拉弗勒译（印第安纳波利斯：鲍勃斯-梅里尔出版社，1960 年），第 23 页。由于这一论述集中体现了现代对记忆的怀疑态度——尤其与希腊人对记忆能力的崇敬形成鲜明对比——我将其用作本导言的题词。
61. See ibid., pp. 70, 71, 84-where it is simply assumed that memory is not altogether deceitful insofar as it is able to “join together present information with what is past” (p. 84). 61. 参见同书第 70、71、84 页，其中简单地假定记忆并非全然不可靠，因为它能够“将当下信息与过往之事联结起来”（第 84 页）。
62. Spinoza, The Ethics, bk. 2, prop. 18, note, in the translation of R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1951), 2:100; my italics. Cf. the commentary of H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (New York: Meridian, 1950), 2:80-90, where the rooting of Spinoza’s conception of memory in Aristotle’s De Memoria et Reminiscentia is stressed. The close link between memory and imagination which all of these compound terms imply is forcefully expressed by Hobbes: “Imagination and Memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names” (Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson [London: Pelican, 1968], p. 89; his italics). 62. 斯宾诺莎《伦理学》第二卷命题 18 附注，R.H.M.埃尔维斯译本（纽约：多佛出版社，1951 年）第 2 册第 100 页；着重号为笔者所加。参见 H.A.沃尔夫森《斯宾诺莎哲学》（纽约：子午线出版社，1950 年）第 2 册第 80-90 页的评述，其中强调了斯宾诺莎记忆观与亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》的渊源关系。霍布斯有力表达了这些复合术语所暗示的记忆与想象的紧密联系："想象与记忆实为一物，因考量角度不同而有异名"（《利维坦》，C.B.麦克弗森编注[伦敦：鹈鹕出版社，1968 年]，第 89 页；着重号为原作者所标）。
63. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 9. But see p. 85 for Hume’s own questioning of the criterion of order. 63. 休谟《人性论》，L.A.塞尔比-比格编（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1967 年），第 9 页。但参见第 85 页休谟本人对顺序标准的质疑。
64. Hume also speaks of “order and form” at ibid., p. 9. 64. 休谟在同书第 9 页亦提及"秩序与形式"。
65. “When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner” (ibid., p. 9). This is to be compared with what Hume calls the “gentle force” of imagination (p. 10). 65. "当我们回忆任何往事时，该事件的观念便以强烈方式涌入心灵"（同前引，第 9 页）。此说当与休谟所谓想象的"温和力量"（第 10 页）相对照。
66. For Hume’s explicit espousal of a copy model of memory, see ibid., p. 8. 66. 关于休谟明确支持记忆的复制模型，参见同上书第 8 页。
67. I am thinking here of such figures as de Condillac and Taine in France and the two Mills in England: all continue to conceive of remembering as copying. 67. 此处我想到法国思想家如孔狄亚克、泰纳以及英国的两位密尔：他们都继续将记忆视为复制过程。
68. See Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), pp. 132-33, 143-44, 146, 165, 183. Wolfson demonstrates that the very distinction between “reproductive” and “productive” imagination has its origins in medieval Arabic and Hebrew texts that distinguished “retentive” from “compositive” imagination. See Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 2:82. 68. 参见康德《纯粹理性批判》（N·K·史密斯译，纽约：圣马丁出版社，1965 年）第 132-33 页、143-44 页、146 页、165 页、183 页。沃尔夫森证明"再生性想象"与"生产性想象"的区分源自中世纪阿拉伯和希伯来文献中"保留性想象"与"组合性想象"的差异。见沃尔夫森《斯宾诺莎哲学》第 2 卷第 82 页。
69. On “productive imagination” see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 142-43, 145, 165 . Only productive imagination has a transcendental status. This is why Kant’s only direct discussion of memory (in his Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht [Könisberg: Nicolovius, 1798], sect. 34) treats it as a merely empirical faculty of human beings. 69. 关于"生产性想象"参见康德《纯粹理性批判》第 142-43 页、145 页、165 页。唯有生产性想象具有先验地位。这解释了为何康德对记忆的唯一直接讨论（见其《实用人类学》[柯尼斯堡：尼科洛维乌斯出版社，1798 年]第 34 节）仅将其视为人类的一种经验性能力。
70. Norman Malcolm, Memory and Mind (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977). 70. 诺曼·马尔科姆，《记忆与心灵》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1977 年）。
Part One 第一部分
1. First Forays 1. 初探
Kant’s analogy of “the light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight” occurs in The Critique of Pure Reason trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), 康德关于"轻盈的鸽子在自由飞翔时划破空气"的类比出自《纯粹理性批判》，N·K·史密斯译（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1965 年），
A5-B9. The contrast between “random groping” and “the secure path of a science” is found at ibid., B\mathbf{B} xiv and Bxxxi\mathbf{B} \mathbf{x x x i}. A5-B9. “随机摸索”与“科学的安全路径”之间的对比见于同书第 xiv 页和第 1 页。
2. R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (1977):232. 2. R. E. 尼斯贝特与 T. D. 威尔逊，《说出我们无法知晓之事：心理过程的言语报告》，《心理学评论》第 84 卷（1977 年）：第 232 页。
3. Edward S. Casey, “Imagination and Phenomenological Method” in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, eds. F. Elliston and P. McCormick (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 70-83; Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 25-26. 3. 爱德华·S. 凯西，《想象与现象学方法》，载《胡塞尔：阐释与评价》，F. 埃利斯顿与 P. 麦考密克编（南本德：圣母大学出版社，1977 年），第 70-83 页；凯西，《想象：一项现象学研究》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年），第 25-26 页。
4. Freud argues that this inalienable but puzzling presence of the self in one’s memories is a proof that they cannot be purely reproductive, for at the time we were not at all aware of ourselves as sheer spectators. See his early essay, “Screen Memories,” in Standard Edition, 3:321. 4. 弗洛伊德认为，自我在记忆中这种不可剥夺却又令人困惑的在场，证明记忆不可能是纯粹再现性的，因为当时我们根本没有作为纯粹旁观者意识到自我。参见其早期论文《屏蔽记忆》，载《标准版》第 3 卷第 321 页。
5. I refer to the moments in the film when the young protagonists are seen in a movie theater, and we are shown part of the movie which they are watching. 5. 我指的是电影中年轻主角们出现在电影院里的那些时刻，我们看到他们正在观看的影片片段。
6. This experience thus puts into question Freud’s strict division between “wordpresentations” and “thing-presentations” (Standard Edition, 14:202-4, 209-15). The presentation here, though manifesting itself explicitly as a word, is equally (though more implicitly) a presentation of the thing denoted by the word. Is this perhaps always true of memories of proper names? One is also struck by the fact that it is often proper names that return most suddenly in memory (and that, conversely, are just as suddenly lost, especially as we get older). Is this because phonological encoding occurs first and is most easily decoded as well as because encoding of proper names has a privileged position? 6. 这一体验因此对弗洛伊德严格区分的"词语呈现"与"事物呈现"提出了质疑（标准版，14:202-4, 209-15）。此处的呈现虽然明确表现为词语，但同样（尽管更隐晦地）也是该词语所指事物的呈现。这是否总是适用于对专有名词的记忆？另一个引人注目的事实是，专有名词往往最突然地重现于记忆中（反之也最突然地遗忘，尤其当我们年岁渐长时）。这是否因为语音编码最先发生且最易解码，同时也因为专有名词的编码具有特殊地位？
7. The word, however, was not only visible, but appeared to have an ambiguous status in my memory as visual and verbal at once and as a whole. 7. 然而这个词不仅可见，在我的记忆中似乎还具有双重属性——既是视觉的又是言语的，同时作为一个整体存在。
8. Contexts, even quite loose ones, always put constraints on what we experience, leading us to take the experienced item in one way or another, to disambiguate it in a certain fashion, etc. The more specific the context, however, the more delimiting and restrictive the constraints. 8. 语境，即便是相当宽松的语境，总会对我们所体验的内容施加限制，引导我们以某种方式理解被体验的对象，或按照特定模式消除其歧义等。然而语境越具体，这些限制就越具有界定性和约束性。
9. William James, Principles of Psychology (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1950), 1:643-52. 9. 威廉·詹姆斯，《心理学原理》（1890 年；重印版，纽约：多佛出版社，1950 年），第 1 卷 643-52 页。
10. See Robert Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1976), chap. 6. 10. 参见罗伯特·克劳德，《学习与记忆原理》（新泽西州希尔斯代尔：厄尔鲍姆出版社，1976 年），第 6 章。
11. The nature of place memory is treated at considerable length in chapter 9 herein. 11. 关于场所记忆的本质，本书第 9 章将进行详细探讨。
12. As Freud describes himself in The Interpretation of Dreams (Standard Edition, 4:105). 12. 正如弗洛伊德在《梦的解析》标准版第四卷第 105 页中对自身的描述。
2. Eidetic Features 2. 本质特征
Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 453 a 15-16. Here and elsewhere in this book I employ Richard Sorabji’s translation in his Aristotle on Memory (London: Duckworth, 1972). 亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》453a15-16。本书中相关引文均采用理查德·索拉布吉在其著作《亚里士多德论记忆》（伦敦：达克沃斯出版社，1972 年）中的译本。
A variation on this circumstance is described by Freud: “Something is ‘remembered’ which could never have been ‘forgotten’ because it was never at any time noticed-was never conscious” (Standard Edition, 13:149). Freud restricts this to “purely internal acts” (ibid.) such as fantasies and emotions, but there seems to be no reason for excluding sensory perceptions from this process. 弗洛伊德描述了这种情况的变体："某些被'记起'的东西其实从未被'遗忘'，因为它根本不曾被注意过——从未进入意识层面"（标准版第 13 卷第 149 页）。弗洛伊德将此限定于"纯粹的内在行为"（同上），如幻想和情感，但似乎没有理由将感官知觉排除在这一过程之外。
See chapter 4 under “The Mnemonic Presentation.” 参见第四章"记忆呈现"部分。
At least apparently disconnected: on further reflection (e.g., in psychoanalysis) one may well discover initially unsuspected connections after all. Thus my claim must be restricted to ostensibly disconnected memories. 至少表面上是断裂的：经过深入反思（例如在精神分析中），人们很可能会发现最初未曾察觉的联系。因此我的主张必须限于那些表面上不相关的记忆。
Yet what is expansion from one perspective is encapsulment from another: to remember the tea-tasting now, some time after it has occurred, is also to condense and encompass the original moment of the experience within the present moment. This holds even less ambiguously in the other examples, where entire stretches of previous experience are at once extended and encapsulated in the act of remembering them-thereby exhibiting the co-ordinate and even conterminous character of these two basic actions of remembering. 然而从一个角度看是扩展，从另一个角度看却是封装：在品茶事件发生后一段时间回忆它，同时也是将原始体验时刻浓缩并包含在当前时刻中。在其他例子中这种双重性表现得更为明确，当回忆过往经历时，整段经历既被延伸又被封装——由此展现出记忆这两种基本行为既协调又同步的特性。
William James, Principles of Psychology (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1950), 1:463. 威廉·詹姆斯，《心理学原理》（1890 年；重印版，纽约：多佛出版社，1950 年），第 1 卷第 463 页。
Of course, we need not be explicitly reminded; much of our past experience persists in a more insidious and subtle manner, as in the largely unacknowledged role of memories of my former movie-goings in the Lincoln Theater: these memories persisted under the cloak of the consciously entertained memory of viewing Small Change at this theater a short time ago. I return to the phenomenon of reminding in chapter 5. 当然，我们不必被明确提醒；我们过去的许多经历以一种更为隐蔽和微妙的方式持续存在着，就像林肯剧院里我昔日观影记忆所扮演的、很大程度上未被承认的角色那样：这些记忆披着不久前在这家影院观看《小玩意》的有意识记忆外衣持续存在着。我将在第五章重新讨论"提醒"这一现象。
It should be underscored that the actualities we remember are for the most part datable even if not necessarily dated. Indeed, it is comparatively rare that we remember the date as such; “1492,” “1066,” one’s birthdate, our anniversary: such contents of memory are few in number. In many cases, an approximate indication of the date is given with the memory: “a few weeks ago” (example #2), “several summers ago” (example #6). In other cases, not even this much of an indication is given, and we must institute a search to specify the date, as in example #1. In the cases of remembering “902” and “Culligan,” however, we encounter a limit of datability itself. Although these memories no doubt derive from datable events, they are not datable as such. This is not to say that they are out of time or timeless; they are perfectly well in time, but in such a manner as to resist being dated. 需要强调的是，我们所记忆的实际情况大多是可确定年代的，即使未必精确标注日期。事实上，我们很少会直接记住具体日期；诸如"1492 年"、"1066 年"、个人生日或结婚纪念日这类记忆内容其实相当有限。多数情况下，记忆会附带一个大致的时间范围："几周前"（案例 2）、"几年前夏天"（案例 6）。还有些记忆甚至不提供任何时间线索，我们必须通过追溯来确定日期，如案例 1 所示。然而在记忆"902"和"Culligan"这两个案例中，我们遭遇了可确定年代性本身的边界——虽然这些记忆无疑源自可确定年代的事件，但其本身却无法被准确定位年代。这并非意味着它们超脱于时间或永恒存在；它们确实存在于时间之中，只是以抗拒被标注年代的方式存在着。
Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 75. 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔，《内时间意识现象学》，J.S.丘吉尔译（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1964 年），第 75 页。
“We have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment . . . such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience.” (John Dewey, Art as Experience [New York: Capricorn Books, 1958], p. 35; his italics.) In what I have said just above I do not mean to deny that we can (and often do) have fragmentary memories. However incomplete such memories may be, they nonetheless count as memoriesi.e., can be identified as memorial in status-only if they manifest sufficient determinateness (“finishedness”) to be considered as conveying, in whole or in part, what Dewey calls “an experience.” "当所经历的材料完成其实现过程时，我们便拥有了一种经验……这样的经验是一个整体，带有其独特的个体化特质与自足性。这就是经验。"（约翰·杜威《艺术即经验》[纽约：摩羯座图书，1958 年]，第 35 页；原文为斜体。）我在上文所述并非要否认我们能够（且经常）拥有片段式记忆。无论这些记忆多么不完整，只要它们展现出足够的确定性（"完成性"）——即能够整体或部分地传递杜威所称的"一种经验"——它们就仍可被视为记忆，也就是能被确认为具有记忆状态。
James, Principles of Psychology, 1:650; my italics. See also p. 652, where “reality” corresponds to what I have been calling “actuality”: “The sense of a peculiar active relation in [an object] to ourselves is what gives to [this] object the characteristic quality of reality, and a merely imagined past event differs from a recollected one only in the absence of this peculiar feeling relation.” 詹姆斯《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 650 页；斜体为笔者所加。另见第 652 页，其中"现实性"对应于我所说的"实存性"："[对象]与我们自身之间那种特殊的主动关系感，正是赋予[该]对象以现实性特质的关键。而被想象的过去事件与被回忆的事件之间的区别，仅在于缺少这种特殊的感觉关系。"
Once more I must make exception of the " 902 " and “Culligan” memories. In such memories-which are generic rather than episodic in status-no significant sense of self-presence is operative. Put otherwise: no part of their manifest content includes myself-as-witness. 我必须再次将"902"和"Culligan"这类记忆排除在外。这类记忆属于类别性而非情节性记忆，其中不存在显著的自我在场感。换言之：其显性内容中没有任何部分包含作为见证者的我。
See Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, trans. G. Grabowicz (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 265-67, 330-39. 参见罗曼·英加登《文学作品》，G.格拉博维茨译（埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1973 年），第 265-67 页，330-39 页。
Even the hazy recollection of Aunt Leone can be construed as the unfocused ground for the name “Aunt Leone” as the focused figure. Such figure/ground analysis is applicable in all the other cases too. 即便是对利昂阿姨的模糊回忆，也可被解读为以"利昂阿姨"这个焦点名称为图形、以模糊印象为背景的构图。这种图形/背景分析同样适用于其他所有案例。
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (1896; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 18. 亨利·柏格森《物质与记忆》，N.M.保罗与 W.S.帕尔默译（1896 年初版；重印本，纽约：双日出版社，1959 年），第 18 页。
By this I mean that although the tasting itself is an episode and rememorable as such in recollection or “secondary memory,” I remembered it non-episodically as lingering in primary memory and thus as non-narratized. 我的意思是，虽然品尝本身是一个事件片段，可以在回忆或"次级记忆"中被记住，但我以非片段化的方式记住了它，因为它持续存在于初级记忆中，因此未被叙事化。
This is not to deny that the description per se of any given experience of remembering is always implicitly narrative in form insofar as it makes mention of relevant antecedents, surroundings, and consequences of the experience. All of my written descriptions above would count as narrations in this broad sense. But the same cannot be claimed of the specific content of the experiences thus described. 这并不是要否认，任何特定记忆体验的描述本身在形式上总是隐含着叙事性，因为它提到了体验的相关前因、环境和后果。我上面所有的书面描述在这种广义上都可算作叙事。但对于所描述体验的具体内容却不能这样说。
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), p. 279. The full statement is: “Being good at recalling is not being good at investigating, but being good at preserving. It is a narrative skill, if ‘narrative’ be allowed to cover non-prosaic as well as prosaic representations.” The issue of narration will be taken up again in chapter 6, where I shall also further explore the matter of self-recounting. 吉尔伯特·赖尔，《心的概念》(纽约：巴诺书店，1949 年)，第 279 页。完整陈述是："善于回忆不是善于调查，而是善于保存。它是一种叙事技能，如果允许'叙事'涵盖非散文体以及散文体的表现方式的话。"关于叙事的问题将在第 6 章再次讨论，届时我还将进一步探讨自我叙述的问题。
This is the Piagetian view. See Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence, trans. A. J. Pomerans (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 这是皮亚杰的观点。参见让·皮亚杰和贝尔·因海尔德，《记忆与智力》，A·J·波默兰斯译(纽约：基础图书出版社，1973 年)。
“Forsan et haec olim meminisse juvabit” (Virgil, Aeneid, I, p. 203). "或许有朝一日，回忆这些往事也会令人愉悦"（维吉尔，《埃涅阿斯纪》第一卷，第 203 页）。
From the essay “Screen Memories,” in Standard Edition, 3:317. Freud goes on to cite the quotation from Virgil given just above. 引自《标准版》第三卷第 317 页的论文《屏蔽记忆》。弗洛伊德随后引用了上文给出的维吉尔诗句。
I want to stress that these events, qua remembered content, may be intrinsically unpleasurable (e.g., disgusting, despairing, etc.). But as remembered at the present remove of time, they can take on a bittersweet quality that represents a compromise between their inherent painfulness and the equally inherent pleasure of ruminescence. This is not to deny situations in which the painfulness is such as to overwhelm any subsequent recollective pleasure. 我要强调的是，这些事件作为被记忆的内容，其本质可能是令人不快的（例如令人作呕、绝望等）。但在时间距离的作用下，当它们在当下被回忆时，会呈现出一种苦乐参半的特质——这是事件本身蕴含的痛苦与回忆行为固有愉悦感之间的妥协。当然，这并不否认某些痛苦程度足以压倒任何后续回忆快感的情况。
3. Remembering as Intentional: Act Phase 3. 作为意向行为的记忆：行动阶段
Importantly different is Freud’s use of “diphasic” as referring to sequential periods of development. See S. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in Standard Edition, 7:66, 100. 值得注意的是，弗洛伊德使用"双相性"一词指代发展的连续阶段。参见 S.弗洛伊德《性学三论》，标准版第 7 卷第 66、100 页。
For further discussion of the basic notions of act and object phases as component features of intentionality construed in a phenomenological sense, see Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 38ff. 关于从现象学角度将行为阶段与对象阶段作为意向性构成要素的进一步讨论，参见爱德华·S.凯西《想象：一项现象学研究》（布鲁明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年）第 38 页及以下。
The capacity to remember is our innate or acquired ability to do so; the disposition to remember is the tendency to do so on certain occasions. For further discussion of this distinction, see Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 1-2; and Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), p. 131 ff. 记忆能力是我们与生俱来或后天习得的记忆功能；记忆倾向则是在特定场合进行记忆的趋向。关于这一区分的深入探讨，参见理查德·索拉比《亚里士多德论记忆》（伦敦：达克沃斯，1972 年）第 1-2 页；以及吉尔伯特·赖尔《心的概念》（纽约：巴诺书店，1949 年）第 131 页及以下。
On short-term storage, see Robert G. Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976), chaps. 6, 7. On long-term storage, see ibid., chaps. 8-10. 关于短期存储，参见罗伯特·G.克劳德《学习与记忆原理》（新泽西州希尔斯代尔：劳伦斯·厄尔鲍姆，1976 年）第 6、7 章。关于长期存储，参见同书第 8-10 章。
For a discussion of these cases, see Brian Smith, Memory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 48: “There may be some memories which are constantly, as people say, at the back of their minds . . . in such cases we could equally well regard the memory as occurrent or as dispositional.” This is meant as a critique of Ryle’s original distinction between dispositional and occurrent senses of memory in The Concept of Mind, pp. 272-73. 关于这些案例的讨论，可参阅布莱恩·史密斯《记忆》（伦敦：艾伦与昂温出版社，1966 年）第 48 页："或许存在某些记忆，正如人们所言，始终潜藏于意识深处……在此类情形中，我们既可将其视为现时记忆，亦可看作倾向性记忆。"这一论述旨在批判赖尔在《心的概念》第 272-73 页对记忆倾向性意义与现时意义所作的原始区分。
Systematic amnesia such as is found in Korsakoff patients, for example, illuminates the distinction between short-term and long-term memory, both being aspects of memory capacity. See G. A. Talland, Disorders of Memory and Learning (New York: Penguin, 1968), esp. p. 126ff. 以科尔萨科夫综合征患者表现的系统性失忆为例，这种现象阐明了短时记忆与长时记忆的区分——二者皆为记忆能力的面向。参见 G·A·塔兰《记忆与学习障碍》（纽约：企鹅出版社，1968 年），尤见第 126 页及后续内容。
See inter alia C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, “Remembering,” reprinted in R. M. Chisholm and R. J. Swartz, eds., Empirical Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 306. 另见 C·B·马丁与马克斯·多伊彻合著《回忆》，该文重刊于 R·M·奇泽姆与 R·J·斯沃茨主编《经验知识》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德悬崖：普伦蒂斯霍尔出版社，1973 年）第 306 页。
On this notion, see Casey, Imagining, pp. 19, 60, 178, 200, 233. 关于这一概念，参见凯西《想象》第 19、60、178、200、233 页。
William James was the first to distinguish primary from secondary memory. He did so in his Principles of Psychology (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1950), I, pp. 606, 609-10, 613, 643-53. Bergson hints at primary memory in his notion of “a perception of the immediate past” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer [1896; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1959], p. 130). Influenced by James, Husserl discussed primary memory in his 1904-1905 lectures: The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), esp. secs. 8-13 and app. I. For treatments of primary memory in experimental settings, see Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory, ch. 6. 威廉·詹姆斯首次区分了初级记忆与次级记忆。这一区分见于他的《心理学原理》（1890 年；1950 年纽约多佛出版社重印版）第一卷，第 606、609-10、613、643-53 页。柏格森在其"对即时过去的感知"概念中暗示了初级记忆（亨利·柏格森《物质与记忆》，N·M·保罗与 W·S·帕尔默译[1896 年；1959 年纽约双日出版社重印版]，第 130 页）。受詹姆斯影响，胡塞尔在 1904-1905 年的讲座中探讨了初级记忆：《内时间意识现象学》，J·S·丘吉尔译（1964 年印第安纳大学出版社），尤见第 8-13 节及附录一。关于实验环境下对初级记忆的论述，参见克劳德《学习与记忆原理》第六章。
Hence it is misleading to refer to primary remembering as involving an “echo box” phenomenon, even if this term is accepted or suggested by subjects who are questioned on the point. See N. C. Waugh and D. A. Norman, “Primary Memory,” Psychological Review 72(1965):89-104. Any effects of reverberation or resounding are better considered under the designation of “iconic” or “echoic” memory, a special form of transient storage of strictly sensory aspects of experiences. Since we are not aware of such memory-it arises and vanishes extremely rapidly-I do not consider it as essential to a phenomenological study of memory. The classical source here is G . Sperling, “The Information Available in Brief Visual Presentations,” Psychological Monographs, 1960, no. 11. 因此，将初级记忆描述为涉及"回声盒"现象是误导性的，即便这一术语被受试者在相关提问中接受或提出。参见 N.C.沃与 D.A.诺曼《初级记忆》，载《心理学评论》第 72 卷(1965 年)第 89-104 页。任何关于回响或共鸣的效应，更适合归类于"图像式"或"回声式"记忆——这是对体验中严格感官层面的短暂储存的特殊形式。由于我们无法觉察这类记忆（其产生与消逝都极其迅速），我认为它并非记忆现象学研究的核心要素。该领域的经典文献可参阅 G.斯珀林《短暂视觉呈现中的可用信息》，载《心理学专刊》1960 年第 11 期。
“Retention” and “sinking away” are Husserl’s terms for this process. See Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, secs. 8-13. "滞留"与"沉没"是胡塞尔对这一过程的术语表述。参见《内时间意识现象学》第 8-13 节。
James, Principles of Psychology, 1:613. James also posits a “forward fringe” (ibid.)-as does Husserl in his notion of “protention” (see Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, sec. 24). 詹姆斯《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 613 页。詹姆斯还提出了"前缘"概念（同前）——胡塞尔在其"前摄"理论中也有类似表述（参见《内时间意识现象学》第 24 节）。
James posited 12 seconds as the normal nucleus of primary memory. See Principles of Psychology, I: 611ff. On more recent estimates and measurements, see Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory, p. 146ff., esp. the conclusion on p. 173: “The stability of primary memory capacity across measurement techniques . . . argues that it is quite a fundamental structural feature of human information processing.” 詹姆斯将 12 秒设定为初级记忆的标准核心时长。参见《心理学原理》第一卷 611 页及后续内容。关于更近期的评估与测量，可参阅克劳德所著《学习与记忆原理》146 页之后的内容，尤其是第 173 页的结论："初级记忆容量在不同测量技术中表现出的稳定性……表明这是人类信息处理中一个相当基础的结构性特征。"
See Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 52. 参见胡塞尔《内时间意识现象学》第 52 页。
On the specious present, see James, Principles of Psychology, 1:609ff., 647. For Husserl’s discussion of the living present, see Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart (The Hague: Nijhof, 1966). That the same phenomenon could be termed at once “living” and “specious” attests eloquently to its ephemeral and vanishing character. It also attests to its ready deconstructibility, as is brilliantly demonstrated by Jacques Derrida in Speech and Phenomena, trans. D. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 60 ff60 f f. I leave Derrida’s efforts out of consideration here, however, since they bear on the metaphysical premises at play in Husserl’s descriptions of primary memory rather than on these descriptions themselves. 关于"似是而非的当下"，参见詹姆斯《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 609 页及以下、647 页。胡塞尔对"活生生的当下"的讨论，可参阅克劳斯·赫尔德《活生生的当下》（海牙：尼霍夫出版社，1966 年）。同一现象能同时被称作"活生生"和"似是而非"，生动证明了其转瞬即逝的特性。这也印证了其易于解构的特点，正如雅克·德里达在《声音与现象》（D.艾利森英译，埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1973 年）第 60 ff60 f f 页精彩论证的那样。不过本文暂不考虑德里达的研究，因其关注的是胡塞尔描述初级记忆时涉及的形而上学前提，而非这些描述本身。
James, Principles of Psychology, 1:6461: 646. 詹姆斯《心理学原理》第 1:6461: 646 页。
See Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory, chaps. 7-8; Henry C. Ellis, Fundamentals of Human Learning, Memory, and Cognition (Dubuque, IA: Brown, 1978), chaps. 4-5. 参见克劳德《学习与记忆原理》第 7-8 章；亨利·C·埃利斯《人类学习、记忆与认知基础》（迪比克：布朗出版社，1978 年）第 4-5 章。
This distinction is made by E . Tulving and Z . Pearlstone in their essay, “Availability versus Accessibility of Information in Memory for Words,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 5 (1966):381-91. A thorough discussion of stage analysis is found in Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory, pp. 4-12. 这一区分由 E·图尔文和 Z·珀尔斯通在其论文《词语记忆中信息的可用性与可及性》中提出，该文发表于《言语学习与言语行为杂志》第 5 卷(1966 年)：381-91 页。关于阶段分析的详尽讨论可参见克劳德所著《学习与记忆原理》第 4-12 页。
Crowder differentiates between stage analysis, coding analysis, and task analysis as the three most fruitful means of approaching memory as a total phenomenon. 克劳德将阶段分析、编码分析和任务分析区分为研究记忆整体现象最有效的三种方法。
19. This phrase, originally from Shakespeare (Sonnet XXX, line 6), is used by James without quotation marks in Principles of Psychology, 1:662. 19. 这一短语最初出自莎士比亚（《十四行诗》第三十首第 6 行），詹姆斯在《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 662 页中未加引号直接引用。
20. This is entailed in information-processing and computer simulation models of memory. See, for example, John R. Anderson, Language, Memory, and Thought (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976). 20. 这是记忆的信息加工与计算机模拟模型所蕴含的观点。例如可参阅约翰·R·安德森所著《语言、记忆与思维》（新泽西州希尔斯代尔：劳伦斯·厄尔鲍姆出版社，1976 年）。
21. For Husserl’s use of Re-präsentation see Phenomenology of Internal TimeConsciousness, sec. 17. 21. 关于胡塞尔对"再现"（Re-präsentation）的运用，参见《内时间意识现象学》第 17 节。
22. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:647-48. 22. 詹姆斯，《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 647-48 页。
23. Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 66; my italics, where “it” refers not only to the pristine present but to its retention in primary memory as well. 23. 胡塞尔，《内时间意识现象学》第 66 页（斜体为译者所加，其中"它"不仅指原始当下，也包括其在初级记忆中的滞留）。
24. E.g., “World War II,” “the Guilford Green,” “my house,” “the Star-Spangled Banner,” etc. 24. 例如："第二次世界大战"、"吉尔福德绿地"、"我的房子"、"星条旗永不落"等。
25. Thus remembering simpliciter is to be distinguished from imaging, which is always sensuous. See Casey, Imagining, pp. 41-42. 25. 因此，单纯的记忆行为应与总是具有感官性质的想象活动区分开来。参见凯西《想象》第 41-42 页。
26. In fact, a formula or group of words is more likely to be given a sensuous form in memory than to be designated by abstract symbols, presumably as an aidemémoire. Imagery allows for what psychologists call “parallel processing,” that is, the representation of a plurality of items simultaneously and together. Hence its value in recalling multi-element bits of information. 26. 事实上，公式或词组在记忆中更可能以感官形式呈现，而非抽象符号指代——这大概是为了辅助记忆。意象能实现心理学家所称的"并行处理"，即同时整体呈现多个项目元素，故对回忆复合信息片段具有特殊价值。
27. On the predicational crease, see Robert Sokolowski, Presence and Absence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 104-5. 27. 关于谓述折痕，参见罗伯特·索科洛夫斯基《在场与缺席》（布鲁明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1978 年）第 104-5 页。
28. Such is Norman Malcolm’s term for the entire class of such memories. Cf. his “Three Kinds of Memory” in Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 204ff. See also Endel Tulving, “Episodic and Semantic Memory” in E. Tulving and W. Donaldson, eds., Organization of Memory (New York: Academic Press, 1972), pp. 381-403. 28. 此乃诺曼·马尔科姆对此类记忆的统称。参阅其《知识与确定性》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德悬崖：普伦蒂斯·霍尔出版社，1963 年）第 204 页及以下《三种记忆》一文。另见恩德尔·图尔文《情景记忆与语义记忆》，载于图尔文与唐纳森合编《记忆组织》（纽约：学术出版社，1972 年）第 381-403 页。
29. I may remember seeing paintings or photographs of some of the facts mentioned, and these may well furnish pictorial details. But the details still do not pertain to situations at which I was present: I can remember that I saw such representations, I can import details from them into my remembering of the situations in question (e.g., as decoration or support), and I can even delude myself into believing that I was present by confusing the representations with the situations they depict. Yet I cannot non-delusively remember that these situations took place with the sensuous features provided by the representations: such situations, which have the status of learned but unwitnessed facts, are consigned to non-sensuousness as contents of my acts of remembering-that. 29. 我或许记得曾看过提及某些事实的绘画或照片，这些图像很可能提供了细节。但这些细节仍不属于我亲身经历的场合：我能记得自己看过这些图像再现，能将其中细节引入对相关场合的回忆（例如作为装饰或佐证），甚至可能自欺欺人地将图像再现与其描绘的场景混淆，误以为自己亲临现场。然而我无法在不自欺的情况下，将这些场景记忆为具有图像再现所提供的感官特征：这类作为习得但未亲历事实的情境，在我的"记得-那"行为中，其内容被归入非感官性范畴。
30. Martin and Deutscher restrict their otherwise illuminating discussion of nonsensuous remembering-that to this single kind. Neither of the two types of re-membering-that which they discuss adequately reflects the second kind of nonsensuous remembering which I am about to describe. See “Remembering,” in Empirical Knowledge, pp. 303-5. 30. 马丁和多伊彻对他们关于非感官性"记得-那"的讨论（尽管在其他方面很有启发性）仅限于这一种类型。他们讨论的两种"记得-那"都未能充分反映我将要描述的第二类非感官性记忆。参见《经验知识》中"记忆"章节，第 303-5 页。
31. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, chap. 2. 31. 参见吉尔伯特·赖尔《心的概念》第二章。
32. Cf. Casey, Imagining, pp, 42-48. 32. 参见凯西《想象》第 42-48 页。
33. As Bergson implies in contrasting all recollective, visualized memory with “habit” or “motor” memory-the former being regarded as a matter of “spontaneity,” the latter of “repetition.” See Matter and Memory, pp. 69-77. I discuss Bergson’s conception of habit memory in my essay “Habitual Body and Memory in MerleauPonty,” Man and World 17 (1984):279-82. 33. 正如柏格森在对比所有回忆性的视觉化记忆与"习惯"或"运动"记忆时所暗示的——前者被视为"自发性"问题，后者则是"重复"问题。参见《物质与记忆》第 69-77 页。我在论文《梅洛-庞蒂理论中的习惯身体与记忆》中讨论了柏格森的习惯记忆概念，载《人与世界》第 17 卷（1984 年）：279-82 页。
34. By “do” I mean not only practical actions but actions of feeling and thinking as well. 34. 此处"做"不仅指实践行为，也包括感受和思考的行为。
35. Of course, cues of various sorts are employed at later stages of any learning process such as this one: but if the learning has been thorough, they are not then consciously needed as they must be at the stage of habituation. It is of interest to note here that New York City taxi drivers report that one of their critical cues is the sense of rapidity with which they pass through a given part of the town: i.e., the rate at which buildings or other landmarks “whiz by”; such cues are strictly kinematic. (I am indebted to Ray McDermott for this observation.) 35. 当然，在类似学习过程的后期阶段会运用各种提示线索：但如果学习足够深入，这些线索就不需要像习惯养成阶段那样被有意识地关注。值得注意的是，纽约市出租车司机报告称，他们判断位置的关键线索之一是通过城市某区域时的速度感：即建筑物或其他地标"掠过"的速率；这类线索完全是运动学性质的。（感谢雷·麦克德莫特提供这一观察。）
36. For a detailed discussion of habitual body memories, see chapter 8, secs. II and III herein; Casey, “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,” p. 282ff. 36. 关于习惯性身体记忆的详细讨论，参见本书第八章第二、三节；凯西《梅洛-庞蒂论习惯性身体与记忆》第 282 页及以下。
37. In Heideggerian language, it is a matter of the structure of the “in-order-to” (um-zu) in human experience. This structure is in turn part of an “equipmental totality” which provides its essential context. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and C. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), sec. 15. 37. 用海德格尔的术语来说，这关乎人类经验中"为了作"（um-zu）的结构。该结构本身又属于提供本质语境的"用具整体"。参见马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》（J.麦奎利与 E.罗宾逊英译，纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年）第 15 节。
38. Richard Sorabji is an exception. See his list of kinds of remembering in his Aristotle on Memory, pp. 1, 8, 13. But he only mentions remembering-to in passing and without giving any further discussion. 38. 理查德·索拉布杰是个例外。参见其《亚里士多德论记忆》第 1、8、13 页中列举的记忆类型。但他仅顺带提及了"记得去做"，未作进一步讨论。
39. This is an especially characteristic example, since many cases of rememberingto involve the performance of a duty or task. 39. 这是个特别典型的例子，因为许多"记得去做"的案例都涉及职责或任务的履行。
40. A notable exception is remembering-how to do. This, too, may be directed toward the present or the future, but in unequal measure. Its primary nisus is toward the future, i.e., toward a time when our action or movement will have realized its aim. Only secondarily is it directed toward the present alone; but an exception occurs when I remember how to swim for the sake of the activity of swimming itself (not to become a better swimmer or to impress others, etc.). Another exception will be treated below under “Subsidiary Types of Remembering” (“Remembering the Future”). 40. 一个显著的例外是关于"如何做"的记忆。这种记忆同样可能指向现在或未来，但比重并不均等。其主要倾向是面向未来，即指向我们的行动或运动实现其目标的时刻。仅次要地，它才单独指向现在；但当我为了游泳活动本身（而非成为更好的游泳者或给他人留下印象等）而记住如何游泳时，就会出现例外。另一个例外将在下文"记忆的附属类型"（"记忆未来"）部分讨论。
41. As in Roy Schafer’s theory of human behavior: see his A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), esp. Part III. 41. 正如罗伊·谢弗的人类行为理论所述：参见其著作《精神分析新语言》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1976 年），特别是第三部分。
42. My claim is not that this is always so-we do have distinct recollections on the occasions in question-but that there is a pronounced tendency in the direction of the amorphously recalled. 42. 我的主张并非总是如此——在相关场合我们确实有清晰的回忆——而是存在一种显著倾向于模糊回忆的趋势。
43. Commemoration is treated separately in chapter 10. 43. 纪念活动将在第 10 章单独讨论。
44. I say “happen” because we can also remember future events in which we are not personally engaged: e.g., in remembering an upcoming religious holiday that we do not ourselves observe. 44. 我使用"发生"一词，是因为我们也能记住那些与我们个人无关的未来事件：例如，记住一个我们并不参与的即将到来的宗教节日。
45. For further treatment of memory and the future, see chapter 5, section II. 45. 关于记忆与未来关系的进一步探讨，请参见第五章第二节。
46. James and Husserl belong together in their adherence to primary versus secondary memory, while Bergson allies himself with habitual versus recollective memory. M. I. Posner posits “verbal,” “imaginative,” and “enactive” remembering in his Cognition (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1973). 46. 詹姆斯与胡塞尔在坚持初级记忆与次级记忆的区分上立场一致，而柏格森则倾向于习惯记忆与回忆性记忆的划分。M·I·波斯纳在其《认知》一书中提出了"言语性"、"想象性"和"动作性"记忆类型（伊利诺伊州格伦维尤：斯科特·福斯曼出版社，1973 年）。
47. Bergson acknowledges recollective imagery to be of value in the very acquisition of habit memory: “We make use of the fugitive image [of habit memory] to construct a stable mechanism which takes its place” (Matter and Memory, p. 74). 47. 柏格森承认回忆意象对于习惯记忆的习得具有重要价值："我们利用[习惯记忆的]转瞬即逝意象，来构建一个取代它的稳定机制"（《物质与记忆》第 74 页）。
4. Remembering as Intentional: Object Phase 4. 作为意向性的记忆：客体阶段
Brian Smith, Memory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 45. 布莱恩·史密斯，《记忆》（伦敦：艾伦与昂温出版社，1966 年），第 45 页。
Thus William James says quite justifiably that "what memory goes with is . . . a very complex representation, that of the fact to be recalled plus its associates, the whole forming one ‘object’ " (Principles of Psychology [1890; reprint, New York: 因此威廉·詹姆斯非常合理地指出"记忆所伴随的是......一个极其复杂的表征，即待回忆的事实及其关联物，整体构成一个'客体'"（《心理学原理》[1890 年；重印本，纽约：
Dover, 1950], 1:650-51.) But I cannot agree with him that “there is nothing unique in the object of memory” (ibid., p. 652). This is true insofar as we do tend to remember the same sorts of things we perceive, ponder, etc.; but as remembered, the structure of their objecthood is modified significantly. 多佛出版社，1950 年]，1:650-51）。但我不能认同他所谓"记忆客体并无独特之处"的观点（同上，第 652 页）。就我们倾向于记忆与感知、思考等相同类型的事物而言，此说确有其理；但作为被记忆的客体，其客体性结构已发生显著改变。
3. So, too, are the act phase and the object phase themselves, which may not be distinguished in fact in many cases of remembering but which remain distinguishable upon reflection and by means of a nuanced description. For this reason, MerleauPonty’s objection to an “intentional analysis” of memory (namely, that “consciousness of” is an inadequate model for the recapture of a massive, “vertical” past) fails to be decisive. What counts in a descriptive analysis is not necessarily what one is immediately conscious of in an experience. (See M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968], pp. 243-44.) Later, however, when remembering will be considered as something other than mental in status, Merleau-Ponty’s critique will become apposite: see Parts two and three below, especially chapter 8. 3. 同样地，行为阶段与对象阶段本身在许多记忆实例中可能实际上难以区分，但通过反思和细致描述仍可辨别。正因如此，梅洛-庞蒂对记忆"意向性分析"的反对意见（即"关于……的意识"这一模式不足以把握庞大而"垂直"的过去）并不具有决定性。描述性分析的关键未必在于人在经验中直接意识到的内容。（参见 M.梅洛-庞蒂《可见的与不可见的》，A.林吉斯译[埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1968 年]，第 243-44 页。）不过在后文当记忆被视为非心理状态时，梅洛-庞蒂的批判将变得恰如其分：详见下文第二、三部分，特别是第八章。
4. Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 449 b, 21-23; my italics. 4. 亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》449b，21-23；着重号为笔者所加。
5. I say “specifiable” and not “specified,” for the specific content of a given act of remembering may not yet be specified verbally. But it must always be possible to do so eventually. Thus I cannot agree with Sorabji’s critique that the passage just cited invokes only a contingent criterion of remembering. See Richard Sorabji, Aristotle On Memory (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 9-10. 5. 我使用"可具体化的"而非"已具体化的"，因为特定记忆行为的具体内容可能尚未通过语言明确表达。但它最终必须能够被具体化。因此我无法认同索拉布吉的批评，即前述引文仅援引了记忆的偶然性标准。参见理查德·索拉布吉《亚里士多德论记忆》（伦敦：达克沃斯出版社，1972 年），第 9-10 页。
6. As James says, “Wherever, in fact, the recalled event does appear without a definite setting, it is hard to distinguish it from a mere creation of fancy. But in proportion as its image lingers and recalls associates which gradually become more definite, it grows more and more distinctly into a remembered thing” (Principles of Psychology, 1:657-58). I should make it clear that the case of oneiric memory is atypical insofar as the sense of a setting may occur independently of the dreamcontent itself-whereas in the other cases we shall be examining, the memory-frame forms part of the mnemonic presentation. 6. 正如詹姆斯所言："事实上，当被回忆的事件缺乏明确背景呈现时，很难将其与纯粹的幻想产物区分开来。但随着其意象持续存在并唤起逐渐明确的关联物，它就越来越清晰地成为被记忆的对象"（《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 657-658 页）。需要说明的是，梦境记忆具有非典型性特征——其背景感可能独立于梦境内容本身产生，而在我们将要探讨的其他案例中，记忆框架构成了记忆呈现的组成部分。
7. Even here exceptions occur. To remember a particular date may evoke an entire ambiance. This is especially true of anniversary dates and other commemorative occasions; this also holds for historical facts whose recollection evokes an entire life-world for us. 7. 即便在此也存在例外。回忆某个特定日期可能唤起整个氛围情境。这在周年纪念日和其他纪念性场合尤为明显；历史事实的回忆同样如此，它们能为我们唤起整个生活世界。
8. The ephemerality of these mini-worlds precludes their functioning as “fields” in any strict sense. See Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 50. 8. 这些微型世界的短暂性使其无法严格意义上作为"场域"发挥作用。参见爱德华·S·凯西，《想象：一项现象学研究》（布鲁明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年），第 50 页。
9. This term is Heidegger’s, although he intends it in a quite different way than that in which I am using it here. See Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), sec. 70. 9. 这个术语源自海德格尔，尽管他的使用意图与本文截然不同。参见《存在与时间》，J·麦奎利和 E·罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 70 节。
10. I am using “place” and “locus” here in a purely descriptive or formal sense, not in the much richer sense which will be the focus of attention in chapter 9. 10. 此处使用的"场所"和"位置"仅具描述性或形式意义，而非第 9 章将重点讨论的更为丰富的内涵。
11. See James, Principles of Psychology, 1:650-51, 654-55, 657-58. James also refers to these as “concomitants” on p. 655. 11. 参见詹姆斯《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 650-51、654-55、657-58 页。詹姆斯在第 655 页将这些现象称为"伴随物"。
12. It is not that they could not be thematized by a subtle shift of attention on our part. Think, for example, of the vaguely delineated but not wholly indefinite figures who surrounded me in the theater during the viewing of Small Change. Although I could not give anything like a full description of these figures, I could certainly say more than I did in my actual description of them. In particular, I could indicate the way in which they helped to situate me within the interior space of the theater by their manner of surrounding me. Nevertheless, precisely as unthematized, such surroundings contribute all the more powerfully to the worldhood of a given memory-frame. 12. 并非这些事物无法通过我们注意力的微妙转移而成为主题。例如，试想我在观看《小玩意》时剧院里那些轮廓模糊但并非完全不确定的周围人影。虽然我无法对这些形象进行完整描述，但肯定能比实际描述中提供更多细节。特别是，我能够指出他们环绕我的方式如何帮助我在剧院内部空间定位。然而，正是作为非主题化的存在，这些环境因素反而更强烈地构成了特定记忆框架的世界性。
13. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:239, 331, 333. 13. 詹姆斯《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 239、331、333 页。
14. As a result, self-presence is not discussed as a basic element in the imaginative presentation in Casey, Imagining, pp. 50-51. Indeed, the comparative infrequency of imagined self-presence is what led me to use the term “world-frame” for what I am here calling the “memory-frame” and to give to the former a somewhat more subordinate position within the imaginative presentation than I here assign to the latter within the mnemonic presentation. 14. 因此，在凯西的《想象》第 50-51 页中，自我呈现并未被讨论为想象呈现的基本要素。事实上，正是由于想象中自我呈现的相对罕见性，促使我使用"世界框架"一词来指代此处所称的"记忆框架"，并使前者在想象呈现中的地位略低于后者在记忆呈现中的地位。
15. See Bertrand Russell, Analysis of Mind (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 161. 15. 参见伯特兰·罗素《心灵分析》（伦敦：艾伦与昂温出版社，1921 年），第 161 页。
16. It is true, however, that a sense of familiarity may cling to the remembered facts or skilled actions here in question. But such familiarity derives exclusively from their repetition (in mind or in practical action), not from self-presence as such. It is to be noticed that the subtypes of remembering-that and remembering-how cited here also normally lack any factor of worldhood in their respective memory-frames. 16. 然而必须承认，对于此处讨论的记忆事实或熟练动作，确实可能伴随着熟悉感。但这种熟悉感完全源自它们的重复（在意识中或实践行动中），而非源于自我呈现本身。值得注意的是，这里列举的"记得什么"和"记得如何"这两种记忆子类型，通常也各自缺乏记忆框架中的世界性因素。
17. Birth-dates are an exception to this rule; but necessarily so, since it is expressly a question of the day of birth and this day needs to be specified as such in any explicit reference to it. In relation to ourselves, then, each of us is an historian faute de mieux. 17. 生日是这条规则的一个例外；但这是必然的，因为这里明确涉及的是出生之日，在任何明确提及的情况下，这一天都需要被特别指明。因此，就我们自身而言，我们每个人在某种程度上都是历史学家。
18. This is ultimately due to the symbolic status of a date. Any symbol, whether logical, mathematical, or verbal, has the same dual property: " 2 " includes a considerable (and still to be specified) range of phenomena having to do uniquely with the number 2, while it excludes its neighbors " 3 " and " 1 " definitively and without need of further specification. 18. 这归根结底源于日期的象征性地位。任何符号，无论是逻辑符号、数学符号还是语言符号，都具有同样的双重属性："2"包含了一系列与数字 2 独特相关（且仍有待具体说明）的现象，同时它明确排除了相邻的"3"和"1"，无需进一步说明。
19. As James says, “If we wish to think of a particular past epoch, we must think of a name or other symbol, or else certain concrete events, associated therewithal. Both must be thought of, to think the past epoch adequately” (Principles of Psychology, 1:650; my italics). “Other symbol” here includes date. 19. 正如詹姆斯所言："如果我们想思考一个特定的过去时代，我们必须想到一个名称或其他符号，或者与之相关联的具体事件。两者都必须被想到，才能充分思考那个过去的时代"（《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 650 页；斜体为笔者所加）。这里的"其他符号"包括日期。
20. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:650. 20. 詹姆斯，《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 650 页。
21. James, from whom I borrow the term “contiguous associates,” uses it more broadly to apply to spatial or temporal adjacency. But this is to presume a perfect parallelism between remembered time and space-a parallelism which I do not think exists. 21. 詹姆斯（我借用了他提出的"相邻关联"这一术语）在使用该概念时范围更广，适用于空间或时间上的相邻关系。但这是假定记忆中的时间与空间存在完美平行性——而我认为这种平行性并不存在。
22. Note that the first two examples also exhibit sameness of place in addition to similarity of time. Such a dual classification has a strong reinforcing effect, increasing the meaningfulness and unity of the memories belonging to such a group. On the grouping of memories, see Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (1896; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 155ff, 238. 22. 需注意的是，前两个例子除了时间相似性外，还体现出空间同一性。这种双重分类具有强大的强化效果，能显著提升同组记忆的意义完整性与统一性。关于记忆分组问题，可参阅亨利·柏格森《物质与记忆》第 155 页以降及 238 页（N·M·保罗与 W·S·帕尔默英译本，1896 年初版，1959 年纽约双日出版社重印本）。
23. The indefiniteness of these times themselves contributes further to their conjointly massing effects. 23. 这些时间本身的模糊性进一步强化了它们共同产生的集群效应。
24. Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 66. 24. 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔《内在时间意识现象学》第 66 页（J·S·丘吉尔英译本，1964 年布鲁明顿印第安纳大学出版社）。
25. Hence our feeling that such a place is somehow “haunted” by its past character; the place abides and as such solicits what formerly occupied it to return once more. 25. 因此我们感到这样的地方仿佛被其过往特质所"萦绕"；这个地方持续存在，并以此召唤曾经占据它的过往再次归来。
26. Except by distortion, imposition, or misconstrual. On this point, see my paper “Imagining and Remembering” Review of Metaphysics 31 (1977): esp. 200-204. 26. 除非通过扭曲、强加或误解。关于这一点，可参阅我的论文《想象与记忆》——《形而上学评论》31 卷（1977 年），特别是 200-204 页。
27. Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 21, 24. 27. 柏格森，《物质与记忆》，第 21、24 页。
28. Eugene Minkowski, Lived Time, trans. N. Metzel (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 155-56. 28. 尤金·明科夫斯基，《活生生的时间》，N.梅策尔译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1970 年），第 155-56 页。
29. See Casey, Imagining, pp. 53-55, 108-9, 120-21, 171. 29. 参见凯西，《想象》，第 53-55 页，108-9 页，120-21 页，171 页。
30. Minkowski, Lived Time, p. 163. This phrase is applied to “the past as forgotten,” but it pertains as well to the aura of the remembered past. 30. 明科夫斯基，《生活时间》，第 163 页。此短语原用于"被遗忘的过往"，但同样适用于记忆中的往昔所散发的光晕。
31. In all such cases, the dissolving is equivalent to the fading that occurs in primary memory-that is, to what Husserl calls the “sinking away phenom- 31. 在所有这些情形中，消散等同于初级记忆中的褪色现象——即胡塞尔所称的"沉没现象"。
enon” (Ablaufs-phänomen) in Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, sec. 10. 在《内时间意识现象学》第 10 节中提到的“流逝现象”（Ablaufs-phänomen）
32. See Casey, Imagining, pp. 194-95. 32. 参见凯西《想象》第 194-95 页。
33. On pure possibility, see Casey, Imagining, chap. 5. Strictly speaking, occurring in any particular spatial or temporal form is excluded from this notion. See especially ibid., pp. 117-19. 33. 关于纯粹可能性，参见凯西《想象》第五章。严格来说，任何特定空间或时间形式的出现都被排除在这一概念之外。特别参见同书第 117-19 页。
34. What I here call “atmosphere” is closely akin to what Walter Benjamin, commenting on Baudelaire, has called “aura” tout court. But Benjamin restricts aural phenomena to a special relationship between people and natural objects. See “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” in Illuminations, trans. H. Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), p. 189 ff. 34. 我在此所称的"氛围"与瓦尔特·本雅明评论波德莱尔时所称的"灵韵"（aura tout court）极为相似。但本雅明将灵韵现象限定为人与自然物体之间的特殊关系。参见《启迪》中"论波德莱尔的几个主题"，H·佐恩译（伦敦：丰塔纳出版社，1973 年），第 189 页及以下。
35. This involvement of the self in the atmosphere also distinguishes remembering from imagining: as actively projecting what we imagine, we are much less prone to be drawn into its atmospheric embrace. 35. 自我对氛围的这种参与也将记忆与想象区分开来：作为主动投射想象内容的主体，我们不太容易陷入其氛围的包围之中。
36. See Plato, Philebus 33b-36b. 36. 参见柏拉图《斐莱布篇》33b-36b。
37. Indeed, the very activity of remembering often serves to induce emotions of the sort that specify the atmosphere pervading the mnemonic presentation. Perhaps the primary such emotion thereby induced is nostalgia, which as a mood is especially pervasive. As we have seen, nostalgia is an important ingredient in “ruminescence,” the most distinctive state of mind that occurs when we remember. 37. 事实上，回忆行为本身往往能诱发特定类型的情感，这些情感界定了弥漫在记忆呈现中的氛围。其中最主要的诱发情感或许是怀旧——作为一种情绪状态，怀旧尤其具有弥漫性。如我们所见，怀旧是"反刍记忆"的重要成分，这种最独特的心智状态常伴随回忆过程出现。
38. “Monogram” is Kant’s term for the pure image. See Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965), A570-B598 (p. 487). 38. "单子图型"是康德对纯粹图像的称谓。参见《纯粹理性批判》（N·K·史密斯译，纽约：圣马丁出版社，1965 年）A570-B598 节（第 487 页）。
39. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 71. 39. 胡塞尔《内时间意识现象学》，第 71 页。
40. See ibid., p. 65 and sec. 20. For a treatment of the freedom of remembering, see chapter 12, herein. 40. 参见同上书第 65 页及第 20 节。关于记忆自由性的探讨，参见本书第 12 章。
41. Husserl attributes this non-contingent diminishing to the very constitution of the “absolute flux” that is the ultimate level of all time-consciousness. The “runningoff” of this flux, its gradual fading in continua of retentions, is in his view an “a priori temporal law.” Cf. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, secs. 10-13, 21, 34-36. 41. 胡塞尔将这种非偶然性的衰减归因于"绝对流"的构成——这是所有时间意识的终极层面。在他看来，这种流动的"消逝"，即其在滞留连续体中的逐渐淡化，是一条"先验的时间法则"。参见《内时间意识现象学》第 10-13 节、第 21 节、第 34-36 节。
42. On the notion of an unavoidable veiling in secondary memory, see ibid., p. 72. 42. 关于次级记忆中不可避免的遮蔽概念，参见同上书第 72 页。
43. A single memory may harbor within itself a number of different texturalities, held together by participating in a common aura. At the same time, the aura can possess its own felt texture. 43. 单个记忆可能包含多种不同的纹理特征，这些特征通过参与共同的光晕而维系在一起。与此同时，光晕本身也可以拥有其独特的可感纹理。
44. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964), p. xi. 44. 加斯东·巴什拉，《空间诗学》，玛丽亚·约拉斯译（纽约：猎户座出版社，1964 年），第 xi 页。
45. Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Point of View, trans. L. A. McAlister (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 78-91. 45. 弗朗茨·布伦塔诺，《从经验观点看心理学》，L·A·麦卡利斯特译（纽约：人文出版社，1973 年），第 78-91 页。
Part Two 第二部分
Prologue 序言
See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), esp. chap. 1 (“Descartes’ Myth”); and Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. chap. 1 (“The Invention of the Mind”) and Part two (“Mirroring”). 参见吉尔伯特·赖尔《心的概念》（纽约：巴诺书店，1949 年），尤见第一章（"笛卡尔的神话"）；以及理查德·罗蒂《哲学与自然之镜》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1979 年），尤见第一章（"心灵的发明"）与第二部分（"镜映"）。
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 79. 路德维希·维特根斯坦《哲学语法》，R.里斯编，A.肯尼译（牛津：布莱克威尔出版社，1974 年），第 79 页。
5. Reminding 5. 回忆
See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 95-121. 参见马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》，J.麦奎利与 E.罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 95-121 页。
Notice that I can also be reminded of a non-action: e.g., “don’t plug in here!” Refraining from action is nevertheless a genuine action, as is any form of intentional inaction or non-action. On this point, see Roy Schafer, “Claimed and Disclaimed Action,” in A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 127-54. 注意到我也可以被提醒不做某事：例如"别在这里插电！"克制行动本身也是一种真实的行动，任何形式的故意不作为或无行动都是如此。关于这一点，可参阅罗伊·谢弗的《主张与非主张行动》，收录于《精神分析新语言》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1976 年），第 127-154 页。
Thus it is misleading to say that “a reminder is that which evokes memory” (Norman Malcolm, Memory and Mind [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977], p. 105; my italics). Reminding, especially in the form of thinking of the past, does not simply evoke memories; it is itself a form of memory. 因此，说"提醒物是唤起记忆的东西"（诺曼·马尔科姆，《记忆与心灵》[伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1977 年]，第 105 页；着重号为笔者所加）是误导性的。提醒行为，尤其是以回忆过去的形式出现时，并不只是唤起记忆；它本身就是记忆的一种形式。
I often purchase postcards at museums to serve precisely as pictographic reminders of memorable experiences or objects. 我经常在博物馆购买明信片，正是为了将其作为难忘经历或物品的图像化提醒物。
Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 450 b 21-451 a 1. 亚里士多德，《论记忆与回忆》450b21-451a1。
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 1:270. 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔，《逻辑研究》，J·N·芬德利英译本（纽约：人文出版社，1970 年），第 1 卷，第 270 页。
Ibid; my italics. 同上；斜体为笔者所加。
Ibid; Husserl italicizes much of this passage. 同上；胡塞尔将这段话的大部分内容用斜体标示。
See ibid., pp. 269-75 for these examples and others. 相关示例及其他案例参见同书第 269-275 页。
By “remindand proper” I designate that of which we are consciously or explicitly reminded-in contrast with the implicit content of remembering-that as discussed above. The latter is genuinely real; but it cannot count as the indicatum in Husserl’s sense of the “objective correlate” of an indicative sign (ibid., p. 170). 所谓"提醒且恰当"，我指的是我们有意识或明确被提醒的内容——这与前文讨论的记忆中的隐含内容形成对比。后者是真正实在的；但它不能算作胡塞尔意义上的指示符号的"客观相关项"所指涉的内容（同上，第 170 页）。
On schēma as appearance, see Plato, Timaeus 61 d . 关于作为显现的"图式"，参见柏拉图《蒂迈欧篇》61d。
It is to be noted that “figure” translates (via the Latin figura) schēma. Moreover, the fig-root of “figure” is equally the origin of “feign” via fingere, which means to form, mould, conceive, or contrive and which is itself the etymon for “fiction” and “figment.” 值得注意的是，"figure"（形象）一词源自拉丁语"figura"，对应希腊语"schēma"。此外，"figure"的词根"fig-"通过拉丁语"fingere"（意为塑造、构想、虚构）同样衍生出"feign"（假装），而"fingere"本身也是"fiction"（虚构）和"figment"（臆造物）的词源。
In chapter 2 I detected a comparable schematical quality in many ordinary recollective memories. But where this quality is a secondary trait of these latter, it is a distinctly primary trait of reminders. 在第二章中，我发现许多日常回忆性记忆都具有类似的图式化特征。但这一特征对回忆性记忆而言只是次要属性，对提醒物而言却是显著的主要特征。
In Husserl’s terminology, the perceptually adumbrated constitutes a perceived object’s “internal and external horizons”; in Gurwitsch’s language, it makes up this object’s “perceptual implications.” (See E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973], p. 150ff.; and Aron Gurwitsch, “The Phenomenology of Perception: Perceptual Implications” in J. Edie, ed., An Invitation to Phenomenology [Chicago: Quadrangle, 1965], pp. 17-29). 用胡塞尔的术语来说，知觉轮廓构成了被感知对象的"内外视域"；古尔维奇则称之为该对象的"知觉蕴含"。（参见 E.胡塞尔《经验与判断》，J.S.丘吉尔与 K.阿梅里克斯译[埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1973 年]，第 150 页及以下；阿隆·古尔维奇《知觉现象学：知觉蕴含》，载于 J.埃迪主编《现象学导论》[芝加哥：四边形出版社，1965 年]，第 17-29 页）
Thus I must disagree with Paul Weiss when he claims that “strictly speaking, adumbration occurs only in perception” (Modes of Being [Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1958], p. 521). 因此我必须反对保罗·韦斯的主张，他认为"严格来说，轮廓暗示只存在于感知中"（《存在模式》[卡本代尔：南伊利诺伊大学出版社，1958 年]，第 521 页）。
Moreover, such obliqueness points as well to the often quite tacit relation between reminder and remindand. The former conveys the mind to the latter not so much by expressly referring to it (though it may do this at the level of verbal discourse) but more typically by a spontaneous allusion in which we are aware of what is evoked rather than of the activity of allusion itself. 此外，这种迂回性也指向了提醒物与被提醒物之间常常相当隐晦的关系。前者将心灵引向后者，更多不是通过明确指涉（尽管在语言论述层面可能如此），而是更典型地通过一种自发的暗示——在这种暗示中，我们意识到被唤起的内容，而非暗示活动本身。
E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p. 162; my italics. E. 胡塞尔，《经验与判断》，第 162 页；斜体为笔者所加。
We here confront a situation in which memories become reminders, even though reminders themselves constitute a subset of remembering itself. It is as if Mnemosyne were devoured by one of her own muses: I shall return at the end of the next chapter to the issue of memory’s remarkable recursiveness. 我们在此面临的情形是：记忆本身变成了提醒物，尽管提醒物本就构成记忆的子集。这就像谟涅摩绪涅被自己的某个缪斯吞噬了一般——我将在下一章末尾重新探讨记忆这种惊人的递归特性。
A systematic and pre-established usage of images employed as reminders can also be completely conventional; say, the American flag as a reminder of certain specific patriotic virtues. Whether this usage is itself ultimately parasitic on verbal language is a question which we must leave open here. 将图像系统化且预先确立为提醒物的使用方式也可以是完全约定俗成的；例如，美国国旗作为某些特定爱国美德的提醒物。这种使用方式本身是否最终依附于言语语言，是我们在此必须悬置的问题。
Thus I would resist imposing on reminders Peirce’s trichotomy of signs: indices, icons, and (verbal) symbols. See Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers, eds. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), vol. 2. Peirce himself seems to have regarded reminders as indexical signs: see ibid., vol. 2, 2.285, 2.288. Indeed, it appears that all memories are indicative in Peirce’s view: see ibid., vol. 1, 1.305. 因此，我反对将皮尔斯的符号三分法——指示符、像似符与（言语性）象征符——强加于提醒物之上。参见查尔斯·S·皮尔斯《论文集》，C·哈茨霍恩与 P·韦斯编（剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1960 年），第 2 卷。皮尔斯本人似乎将提醒物视为指示性符号：见同书第 2 卷 2.285、2.288 节。事实上，在皮尔斯看来所有记忆似乎都具有指示性：见同书第 1 卷 1.305 节。
Plato, Phaedo 73b-73d. 柏拉图《斐多篇》73b-73d。
Thus Plato speaks of the first moment of reminding as “the exercise of one’s senses upon sensible objects” (ibid., 75e). 因此柏拉图将提醒的第一时刻描述为"感官对可感对象的运用"（同前，75e）。
Ibid., 74c, 76a. 同上，74c，76a。
Plato, Meno 85d; my italics. On this theme, see also Phaedo 75e; Theatetus 198c; and Philebus 346a. 柏拉图，《美诺篇》85d；斜体为笔者所加。关于这一主题，另见《斐多篇》75e；《泰阿泰德篇》198c；以及《斐莱布篇》346a。
6. Reminiscing 6. 追忆
William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! (New York: Vintage, 1972), p. 9. In italics in the text. 威廉·福克纳，《押沙龙，押沙龙！》（纽约：Vintage 出版社，1972 年），第 9 页。原文为斜体。
Thus the first definition of “recount” in the Oxford English Dictionary is: “to relate or narrate; to tell in detail; to give a full or detailed account of (some fact, event, etc.).” 因此，《牛津英语词典》对"recount"的第一条定义是："叙述或讲述；详细说明；对（某些事实、事件等）进行完整详尽的描述。"
“Every good story must have a beginning that arouses interest, a succession of events that is orderly and complete, a climax that forms the story’s point, and an end that leaves the mind at rest” (E. P. St.-John, Stories and Story-Telling [New York: Pilgrim Press, 1910], p. 13). "每个好故事都必须有一个引人入胜的开端，一系列有序而完整的事件，一个构成故事高潮的转折点，以及一个让心灵得到安宁的结局"（E·P·圣约翰，《故事与讲故事》[纽约：朝圣者出版社，1910 年]，第 13 页）。
A further difference between reminiscing and story-telling involves the factor of audience. It is a singular fact that one almost never tells a story to oneself. To tell a story without any audience, actual or potential, is for story-telling to lose all point and purpose. In this respect story-telling is even more thoroughly social than is reminiscing. As we shall observe in some detail below, one can reminisce to oneself quite effectively. Further, when others are present, they are typically present as themselves participating: as co-reminiscers. The role of others in story-telling is, in contrast, solely that of listening: taking the story in. Hence the focus on the storyteller himself or herself as an indispensable preserver and purveyor of the story itself. 追忆与讲故事之间的另一个差异涉及听众因素。一个奇特的现象是，人们几乎从不给自己讲故事。若讲故事时没有任何实际或潜在的听众，这种行为就完全失去了意义和目的。在这方面，讲故事比追忆更具社会性。正如我们将在下文详细探讨的，独自追忆完全可以高效进行。此外，当有他人在场时，他们通常是以共同追忆者的身份参与其中。相比之下，他人在讲故事中的角色仅仅是倾听者：接收故事内容。因此，讲故事者本人作为故事不可或缺的保存者和传播者，始终处于核心地位。
E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 178: “Through associative linkage, the no longer living worlds of memory also get a kind of being, despite their no longer being actual.” E. 胡塞尔，《经验与判断》，J.S.丘吉尔与 K.阿梅里克斯译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1973 年），第 178 页："通过联想联结，那些不再鲜活的记忆世界也获得了一种存在形式，尽管它们已不再是实际存在的。"
I say “per se,” for we normally do re-enter the affective ambiance of the reminisced-about world, that is, its pervasive mood, its “Gestimmtheit” as Heidegger might say. This ambiance remains distinguishable both from a particular past emotion and from the present emotion generated in the reminiscing itself. 我说"就其本身而言"，因为我们通常会重新进入被回忆世界的情感氛围，即其弥漫的情绪，海德格尔可能会称之为"被调谐状态"。这种氛围既区别于特定的过去情感，也不同于回忆行为本身产生的当下情感。
C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, “Remembering” in Empirical Knowledge, ed. R. M. Chisholm and R. J. Swartz (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 306. C. B. 马丁与马克斯·多伊彻，《回忆》，收录于《经验知识》，R. M. 齐硕姆与 R. J. 斯沃茨编（新泽西州恩格尔伍德悬崖：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1973 年），第 306 页。
See Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 67 ff. 参见尼采，《历史对于人生的利弊》，R. J. 霍林代尔译（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1983 年），第 67 页及以下。
Gadamer’s notion of “horizon-fusing” (Horizontsverschmelzung) provides a 伽达默尔提出的"视域融合"（Horizontsverschmelzung）概念提供了
paradigm for the way in which one’s present consciousness is transformed by reconnecting with the past imaginatively. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 270ff. 一种范式，展示了通过富有想象力地重新连接过去，如何转变一个人当下的意识。参见汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔《真理与方法》（纽约：Seabury 出版社，1975 年），第 270 页及以下。
But they can be regarded as constitutive of that which they serve to supplement. For this view, see Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. D. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 89ff. 但它们可以被视为其所补充之物的构成性要素。关于这一观点，参见雅克·德里达《声音与现象》，D.艾利森译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1973 年），第 89 页及以下。
Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory (New York: Putnam’s, 1966), pp. 49-50. Nabokov is here writing of his mother, Elena Ivanovna Nabokov. 弗拉基米尔·纳博科夫《说吧，记忆》（纽约：Putnam 出版社，1966 年），第 49-50 页。此处纳博科夫写的是他的母亲叶莲娜·伊万诺芙娜·纳博科娃。
E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 66. E.胡塞尔《内时间意识现象学》，J.S.丘吉尔译（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1964 年），第 66 页。
This statement is attributed to George Haines by Webster’s Third International Dictionary. 这句话被《韦氏第三版国际词典》归为乔治·海恩斯所言。
All from the entry “wistful” in ibid. 均引自同前"wistful"词条。
Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom!, p. 66. 福克纳，《押沙龙，押沙龙！》，第 66 页。
Virgil, Aeneid, I, 203. Even Virgil might have to admit limits: e.g., the memory of overwhelmingly traumatic events. I return to this issue in chapter 8. 维吉尔，《埃涅阿斯纪》第一卷 203 行。即便维吉尔也不得不承认记忆的局限：例如对极度创伤事件的记忆。我将在第八章重新探讨这个问题。
I have treated this point in an unpublished essay “The World of Nostalgia.” 我在未发表的论文《怀旧的世界》中探讨过这一点。
“Discourse is existentially equiprimodial with state-of-mind and understanding” (M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson [New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 208; the entire passage is in italics). "话语与心境和理解在存在论上是同等原初的"（马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》，J.马奎尔与 E.罗宾逊译[纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年]，第 208 页；整段文字为斜体）。
Ibid., p. 205; Heidegger’s italics. 同上，第 205 页；海德格尔所用斜体。
On this point, see Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. W. Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 12ff.; and Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 62 ff . 关于这一点，可参阅费迪南·德·索绪尔《普通语言学教程》，W.巴斯金译（纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1966 年），第 12 页及以下；以及雅克·德里达《论文字学》，G.斯皮瓦克译（巴尔的摩：约翰霍普金斯大学出版社，1974 年），第 62 页及以下。
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 204. He adds: “But word-things do not get supplied with significations” (ibid.). 海德格尔，《存在与时间》，第 204 页。他补充道："但词语之物并未被赋予意义"（同上）。
“Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility” (ibid., pp. 203-4). "话语是可理解性的表达"（同上，第 203-4 页）。
A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 129. A. N. 怀特海，《过程与实在》，D. R. 格里芬与 D. W. 舍伯恩编（纽约：自由出版社，1978 年），第 129 页。
Plato, Sophist, 263e. 柏拉图，《智者篇》，263e。
It overlooks, for example, the blatant fact that we understand nonverbal works of art. On this point, consult especially Susanne Langer’s theory of art as a form of non-discursive symbolism: Feeling and Form (New York: Scribner’s, 1953). 例如，它忽略了这样一个显而易见的事实：我们能够理解非语言的艺术作品。关于这一点，可特别参考苏珊·朗格将艺术视为非推论性符号形式的理论：《情感与形式》（纽约：斯克里布纳出版社，1953 年）。
Arthur Rimbaud, letter to Paul Demeny, May 15, 1871. 阿尔蒂尔·兰波，1871 年 5 月 15 日致保罗·德梅尼的信。
Plato, Sophist, 263d. 柏拉图，《智者篇》，263d。
J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 68; Speech and Phenomena, pp. 129-30, 136-37. 雅克·德里达，《论文字学》，第 68 页；《声音与现象》，第 129-130 页，136-137 页。
This tendency may be pushed further by resorting to encrypted writing, as in the two notable cases of Leonardo da Vinci and Edmund Husserl. 这种倾向可能通过采用加密书写而进一步加剧，列奥纳多·达·芬奇和埃德蒙·胡塞尔这两个著名案例便是如此。
Linotte: The Early Diary of Anais Nin-1914-1920 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1978), pp. 432-34 (entry of Jan. 28, 1920). 《莉诺特：阿娜伊斯·宁早期日记（1914-1920）》（纽约：哈考特·布雷斯出版社，1978 年），第 432-34 页（1920 年 1 月 28 日条目）。
As in the case of Anaïs Nin herself. See also William Earle, Imaginary Memoirs (Evanston, IL: Great Expectations, 1986), Vols. I-III. 正如阿娜伊斯·宁本人的情况。另见威廉·厄尔所著《虚构回忆录》（伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿：远大前程出版社，1986 年）第一至三卷。
For details, see Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory, Foreword-esp. p. 14: “When after twenty years of absence I sailed back to Europe, I renewed ties. . . . At these family reunions, Speak, Memory was judged. Details of date and circumstance were checked and it was found that in many cases I had erred, or had not examined deeply enough an obscure but fathomable recollection. Certain matters were dismissed by my advisors as legends or rumors or, if genuine, were proven to be related to events or periods other than those to which frail memory had attached them.” We witness in such verifying activity yet another intersubjective aspect of reminiscence. 详见弗拉基米尔·纳博科夫《说吧，记忆》前言部分，特别是第 14 页："当我阔别二十年后乘船重返欧洲时，我重新建立了联系......在这些家族聚会上，《说吧，记忆》受到了评判。日期和环境细节被逐一核对，结果发现我在许多情况下都出现了错误，或未能深入探究某个晦涩但可理解的回忆。我的顾问们将某些事件视为传说或谣言而予以否定，即便确有其事，也被证明与脆弱记忆所关联的事件或时期不符。"我们在此类验证活动中见证了回忆的又一个主体间性特征。
See especially chapter 10 herein. 特别参见本书第十章。
Thomas Mann, Joseph and His Brothers, trans. R. Mannheim (New York: Knoph, 1948), 1:3. 托马斯·曼，《约瑟和他的兄弟们》，R.曼海姆译（纽约：克诺夫出版社，1948 年），第 1 卷第 3 页。
7. Recognizing 7. 识别
See E. Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), secs. 24, 26. On the existential-hermeneutical-as-structure, see M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 201-203. 参见 E.胡塞尔，《内时间意识现象学》，J.S.丘吉尔译（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1964 年），第 24、26 节。关于存在论-诠释学结构，参见 M.海德格尔，《存在与时间》，J.麦奎利和 E.罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 201-203 页。
This is Heidegger’s term in “Time and Being” for a basic activity of Dasein’s spatiality. See On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 15 ff. 这是海德格尔在《时间与存在》中用来描述此在空间性基本活动的术语。参见《论时间与存在》，J.斯坦鲍尔译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1972 年），第 15 页及以下。
See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), p. 193ff. On the notion of the “determinable xx,” see Edmund Husserl, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1975), secs. 131-33. 参见 L.维特根斯坦《哲学研究》，G.E.M.安斯康姆译（牛津：布莱克威尔出版社，1967 年），第 193 页及以下。关于"可确定性 xx "概念，参见埃德蒙德·胡塞尔《纯粹现象学通论》，W.R.博伊斯·吉布森译（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1975 年），第 131-133 节。
On the role of imagination in seeing-as, see Edward S. Casey, Imagining (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976) chap. 6, where I argue that imagining is involved in the experience of multiple-aspect seeing-as. 关于想象力在"看作"活动中的作用，参见爱德华·S·凯西《想象》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年）第 6 章，我在该章节论证了多重面向的"看作"体验中包含着想象活动。
J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 130. J.-P.萨特《存在与虚无》，黑兹尔·巴恩斯译（纽约：华盛顿广场出版社，1966 年），第 130 页。
William James, Principles of Psychology (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1950), 1:674n; his italics. 威廉·詹姆斯，《心理学原理》（1890 年；重印版，纽约：多佛出版社，1950 年），第 1 卷第 674 页注；斜体为原作者所加。
For a treatment of this point, see Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), vol. 1, secs. 1-10. 关于这一点的论述，参见胡塞尔《逻辑研究》，J.芬德利英译（纽约：人文出版社，1970 年），第 1 卷，第 1-10 节。
For penetrating remarks on the nudity of the face (le visage), see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 194-204. 关于面部裸露性（le visage）的深刻见解，参见埃马纽埃尔·列维纳斯《总体与无限》，A.林吉斯英译（匹兹堡：杜肯大学出版社，1969 年），第 194-204 页。
On auto-iconicity, see my essay “Communication and Expression in Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 30 (1971):197-207. 关于自我图像性，参见我的论文《艺术中的交流与表达》，载《美学与艺术批评杂志》第 30 期（1971 年）：197-207 页。
Husserl, Ideas, sec. 69, p. 181: “scharf erhellten Kreis der vollkommenen Gegebenheit.” 胡塞尔，《观念》第 69 节，第 181 页："清晰照亮的完全所与性之环"。
Ibid., p. 180; his italics. Compare the comment of William James: “It is, in short, the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention” (Principles of Psychology, 1:254). 同上书，第 180 页（原文为斜体）。对比威廉·詹姆斯的评论："简言之，我如此迫切想要提请注意的是：将模糊性重新确立为我们精神生活中应有的位置"（《心理学原理》第 1 卷，第 254 页）。
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 220: “Say that the things are structures, frameworks, the stars of our life.” 梅洛-庞蒂，《可见的与不可见的》，A·林吉斯译（埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1968 年），第 220 页："可以说事物是结构、框架，是我们生命中的星辰。"
For a highly literate-and quite entertaining-account of prosopagnosia, see Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat (New York: Summit Books, 1985), pp. 7-21. 关于面容失认症（prosopagnosia）的精彩且颇具趣味性的描述，可参阅奥利弗·萨克斯所著《错把妻子当帽子的人》（纽约：Summit 出版社，1985 年）第 7-21 页。
As James says, “We make search in our memory for a forgotten idea, just as we rummage our house for a lost object. In both cases, we visit what seems to us the probable neighborhood of that which we miss” (Principles of Psychology, 1:654). 正如詹姆斯所言："我们在记忆中搜寻遗忘的念头，就像在屋里翻找丢失的物品。这两种情况下，我们都会去往自认为最可能找到目标的地方"（《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 654 页）。
See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhof, 1960), esp. secs. 50-54. 参见胡塞尔《笛卡尔式的沉思》，D.凯恩斯译（海牙：Nijhof 出版社，1960 年），尤见第 50-54 节。
It will be noticed that this is also the case with deja vu experiences, with this difference only: that one simultaneously doubts the truthfulness of one’s conviction. In the déja vu situation one asks oneself, “but did it really take place before?” 值得注意的是，似曾相识（déjà vu）体验也是如此，唯一区别在于：人们会同时怀疑自身确信的真实性。在似曾相识的情境中，人们会自问："但这真的曾经发生过吗？"
I use the word “enactment” to indicate that the action in question need not be overt bodily action, but could be as well an act of thinking, feeling, calculating, or whatever. 我使用"具现化"一词来表示，所讨论的行为不必是明显的外在身体动作，也可以是思考、感受、计算等任何内在行为。
By the same token, it is not a matter of perceptual illusion, in which we actually take, e.g., the abstract form in the painting, to be that of a leering face. 同理，这并非知觉错觉的问题——在错觉中我们确实会将（例如）画中的抽象形式误认为是一张斜睨的面孔。
It is idealized to the extent that the mirror-image omits the inward travail and sense of gross awkwardness which accompany the infant’s first efforts to walk and to perform other skilled movements. See J. Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in Ecrits, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 1-7. 这种理想化体现在镜像会忽略婴儿初次尝试行走及完成其他精细动作时内在的挣扎感和严重笨拙感。参见 J.拉康《镜像阶段作为"我"的功能之构成要素——精神分析经验所揭示的现象》，载《文集》，A.谢里丹英译本（纽约：诺顿出版社，1977 年），第 1-7 页。
Perhaps this offers a clue as to why the only area of our lives in which self-recognition remains problematic is to be found is dreaming, that incessant activity of the nighttime self. In 'contrast with states of strict unconsciousness, for which self-recognition becomes an issue only after the termination of the state itself, we are confronted in dreams with a problem of self-recognition in medias res. During dreaming we may ask ourselves implicitly or explicitly: is this really me dreaming this? Am II really here? The identity of the dream-ego is a complex matter which cannot be fully addressed here; suffice it to say that one basis for the complexity is precisely the confusing character of self-recognition in relation to any such ego. Does this ego in recognizing itself recognize the dreamer’s actual self, or only a disguised version of the latter? And yet, despite such complications, self-recognition of some sort appears essential to dreaming as an analogue of daytime self-recognition; without it, it would be difficult to speak of one’s own dreams, much less to analyze and interpret them as meaningful self-expressions. For a discerning discussion of the dream-ego in its various roles, see James Hillman. The Dream and the Underworld (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 94-97, 107f., 156-58. 这或许揭示了为何我们生活中唯一持续存在自我认知困境的领域是梦境——那个夜间自我永不停歇的活动。与严格无意识状态（其自我认知问题仅在状态结束后才显现）形成鲜明对比的是，我们在梦境中直面着进行时的自我认知难题。梦中我们或隐或显地自问：这真是我在做梦吗？我真的身在此处吗？梦之自我的身份认同是个复杂议题，此处难以全面探讨；但足以说明这种复杂性的根源，正是梦境自我与真实自我在认知关系中的混乱特性。当这个梦中自我进行认同时，它识别的是做梦者真实的自我，还是后者经过伪装的模样？然而尽管存在这些纠葛，某种形式的自我认知对梦境而言似乎至关重要，正如白日的自我认知；若缺失这种认知，我们将难以言说自己的梦境，更遑论将其作为有意义的自我表达来分析与诠释。 关于梦境自我在不同角色中的精辟讨论，可参阅詹姆斯·希尔曼《梦与冥界》（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1979 年）第 94-97 页、107 页及以下、156-158 页。
James even speaks of the “mysterious emotional power” of recognizing and of its “psychosis” (Principles of Psychology, 1:252). 詹姆斯甚至谈到识别行为所具有的"神秘情感力量"及其引发的"精神异常"（《心理学原理》第 1 卷第 252 页）。
Tempting as this reduction is, it does no more than rename the mystery, since “recognizable” simply entails “familiar.” As James remarks: "Strong and characteristic as [recognizing] is . . . the only name we have for all its shadings is ‘sense of familiarity’ " (ibid., 1:252). 这种简化虽然诱人，却只是给神秘现象换了名称，因为"可识别性"本质上等同于"熟悉感"。正如詹姆斯所言："尽管[识别]具有强烈而独特的特征......我们描述其所有细微差别的唯一术语就是'熟悉感'"（同上，第 1 卷第 252 页）。
As is evident in the otherwise excellent collection of essays entitled Recall and Recognition, ed. J. Brown (New York: Wiley, 1976). 这一点在 J.布朗主编的《回忆与识别》（纽约：威利出版社，1976 年）这本其他方面堪称优秀的论文集中表现得尤为明显。
Between recognition and evocative memory comes “reconstruction.” See Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child, trans. H. Weaver (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 80-84. On recognition memory in children, see also Robert Kail, The Development of Memory in Children (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979), pp. 61-80. 在识别与唤起记忆之间存在着"重构"过程。参见让·皮亚杰与贝尔贝尔·英海尔德合著的《儿童心理学》，H·韦弗译（纽约：基础图书公司，1969 年），第 80-84 页。关于儿童的识别记忆，另见罗伯特·凯尔所著《儿童记忆发展》（旧金山：W·H·弗里曼出版社，1979 年），第 61-80 页。
Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence, trans. A. J. Pomerans (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 4-5. The premise of the “presence of the object” is actively at work in “signal detection” theories of recognition; see W. P. Banks, “Signal Detection Theory and Human Memory,” Psychological Bulletin 74 (1970):81-99. 让·皮亚杰与贝尔贝尔·英海尔德，《记忆与智力》，A·J·波默兰斯译（纽约：基础图书公司，1973 年），第 4-5 页。"客体在场"的前提在识别的"信号检测"理论中起着积极作用；参见 W·P·班克斯《信号检测理论与人类记忆》，《心理学公报》74 卷（1970 年）：81-99 页。
S. Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” in Standard Edition, 12:153. S·弗洛伊德，《回忆、重复与修通》，载于《标准版》第 12 卷，第 153 页。
Ibid. 同上。
A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 45, 108, 239-40, 248, 308, 316. There is a corresponding “physical pole” as well. A. N. 怀特海，《过程与实在》，D. R. 格里芬与 D. W. 舍伯恩编（纽约：自由出版社，1978 年），第 45、108、239-40、248、308、316 页。相应地也存在一个"物理极"。
On this notion, see Piaget and Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence, p. 11, where such indices are said to be “the most elementary signifiers.” 关于这一概念，参见皮亚杰与英海尔德合著的《记忆与智力》第 11 页，其中将这类索引称为"最基础的能指"。
Part Two-Coda 第二部分-终章
On this notion, see Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 244-49. Sartre is here drawing upon Heidegger’s idea of an “equipmental totality” in Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 109-13. 关于这一概念，参见让-保罗·萨特《存在与虚无》，黑兹尔·巴恩斯英译（纽约：华盛顿广场出版社，1966 年），第 244-49 页。萨特在此借鉴了海德格尔《存在与时间》（J. 麦奎利与 E. 罗宾逊英译，纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年）第 109-13 页中提出的"用具整体"概念。
Part Three 第三部分
Prologue 序言
See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 91-95. 参见马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》，J·麦奎利与 E·罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 91-95 页。
Ibid., pp. 95-107. 同上，第 95-107 页。
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. xviii, 418, 426, 429. 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，C·史密斯译（纽约：人文出版社，1962 年），第 xviii、418、426、429 页。
8. Body Memory 8. 身体记忆
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 102-5. 马丁·海德格尔，《存在与时间》，J·麦奎利与 E·罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 102-105 页。
I am referring to the case of “H. M.” as first reported by W. B. Scoville and B. Milner in “Loss of Recent Memory After Bilateral Hippocampal Lesion,” Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 20 (1957):11-21. 此处指 W·B·斯科维尔与 B·米尔纳在《双侧海马体损伤后的近期记忆丧失》（《神经病学、神经外科与精神病学杂志》第 20 卷，1957 年：11-21 页）中首次报道的"H·M"病例。
Hans Jonas, “The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses” in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward A Philosophical Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 135-56. 汉斯·约纳斯，《视觉的高贵：感官现象学研究》，收录于《生命现象：走向哲学生物学》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1966 年），第 135-156 页。
On habit memory as treated by Bergson, see his Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul & W. S. Palmer (1896; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 67-78. 关于柏格森对习惯记忆的论述，参见其著作《物质与记忆》，N·M·保罗与 W·S·帕尔默译（1896 年初版；重印本，纽约：双日出版社，1959 年），第 67-78 页。
See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. 142-47. 参见莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，C·史密斯译（纽约：人文出版社，1962 年），第 142-147 页。
Ibid., p. 206, p. 178 respectively. 同上书，分别见第 206 页与第 178 页。
This is not to deny that such recollections can be sufficient. Pertinent recollections of learning or relearning may sometimes be employed in the service of habitual body memory. In the vocabulary adopted earlier in this book, rememberingthat can be placed in the service of remembering-how, yet need not be. 这并非否认此类回忆可能足够充分。关于学习或重新学习的相关回忆，有时可被用于支持习惯性身体记忆。采用本书前文的术语，"记住什么"（remembering-that）可以被置于"记住如何"（remembering-how）的服务中，但并非必然如此。
But it may serve as a reminder of such remembering, and precisely in the sense discussed in chapter 5, namely as adumbrating in function. For a devastating critique of the mentalistic interpretation of habitual bodily actions as an “intellectualist legend,” see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), pp. 25-40. 但它可能作为此类记忆的提示，确切地说，正是第五章讨论的那种功能性的预示作用。关于将习惯性身体动作心理主义解释为"智识主义神话"的毁灭性批判，参见吉尔伯特·赖尔《心的概念》（纽约：巴诺书店，1949 年）第 25-40 页。
In chapter 3, I distinguish between “habitual” and “habituating/habituated” remembering-how as a way of marking the difference between a routinized body memory (i.e., a strictly “habitual” memory) from one that is more exploratory or provisional (i.e., “habituated,” “habituating”). In the present chapter, the term “habitual body memory” denotes the full phenomenon under discussion. As such, it includes both types of remembering-how, and is not reducible to one or the other. 在第三章中，我区分了"习惯性"与"习惯化/被习惯化"的"记住如何"，以此标示常规化身体记忆（即严格意义上的"习惯性"记忆）与更具探索性或暂时性记忆（即"被习惯化"、"习惯化"）之间的差异。本章中，"习惯性身体记忆"一词指代所讨论的完整现象，因此同时包含这两种"记住如何"类型，且不可简化为其中任何一种。
The proper vehicle for habitual body memories is what Merleau-Ponty technically terms the “customary body.” In contrast with the “momentary body,” which is the lived body as it operates to meet the particular demands of a given moment, the customary body acts in terms of continuing and general features of the surrounding world. The customary body is thus not importantly different from what MerleauPonty calls the “habitual body,” which serves to guarantee the actions of the momentary body. When an amputee continues to act as if his or her limb were not missing or a typist is able to master a new typewriter with only a few hours of practice, it is the customary or habitual body that makes possible such diverse things-one radically misguided, the other remarkably adaptive. The habituality enacted in both cases is “a power of dilating our being in the world” (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 143). Neither would be operative without habitual body memories, which are the means by which all bodily actions-whether innovative or routine, adaptive or maladap-tive-gain their momentum and pattern of deployment. (For further discussion of these matters, see ibid., pp. 81-82, 142-47 as well as my essay, “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,” Man and World 17 [1984]: 279-97.) 习惯性身体记忆的恰当载体，在梅洛-庞蒂的术语中被称为"习惯身体"。与"瞬时身体"（即应对特定时刻需求而运作的生存身体）不同，习惯身体依据周遭世界持续而普遍的特征来行动。因此，习惯身体与梅洛-庞蒂所称的"习性身体"并无本质区别，后者正是保证瞬时身体行动的基础。当截肢者仍表现得仿佛肢体尚存，或打字员仅需数小时练习就能驾驭新键盘时，正是这种习惯/习性身体使得如此迥异的现象成为可能——前者彻底错位，后者却展现出惊人的适应力。这两种情形中体现的习惯性，都是"扩展我们存在于世之能力"（《知觉现象学》第 143 页）。若没有习惯性身体记忆，这两种行为都无法实现——正是通过这种记忆，所有身体行动（无论创新或常规，适应或失调）才获得其展开的动力与模式。（关于这些问题的进一步讨论，参见同书第 81-82 页，142-47 页，以及我的论文《梅洛-庞蒂论习惯性身体与记忆》，载于《人与世界》第 17 卷（1984 年），第 279-97 页。）
10. “Though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious, any more than it is in illness; because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way [to start with], therefore the states are voluntary” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1114b-1115a; W. D. Ross translation). See also ibid. 1103b: “states of character arise out of like activities.” 10. "虽然我们掌控着品格状态的初始形成，但其渐进过程并不明显，就像疾病的发展一样；然而因为从一开始我们就有能力选择是否以某种方式行动，所以这些状态是自愿的"（亚里士多德，《尼各马可伦理学》1114b-1115a；W·D·罗斯译本）。另见同书 1103b："品格状态产生于相似的行为"。
11. “Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit” (ibid., 1103a). 11. "道德德性因习惯而形成"（同上，1103a）。
12. On the primacy effect in free recall experiments, see Robert G. Crowder, Principles of Learning and Memory, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976), pp. 136, 140-41, 146-50, 452-56. 12. 关于自由回忆实验中首因效应的论述，参见罗伯特·G·克劳德《学习与记忆原理》（新泽西州希尔斯代尔：劳伦斯·厄尔鲍姆出版社，1976 年），第 136 页，140-41 页，146-50 页，452-56 页。
13. Hēxis itself derives from ekhein, to have or to be conditioned in a certain way. See C. T. Onions, ed. The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), article on “habit.” 13. "Hēxis"一词本身源自"ekhein"，意为以某种方式拥有或受条件制约。参见 C·T·奥尼恩斯主编《牛津英语词源词典》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1966 年）中"habit"词条。
14. “Habitude” has the dictionary meanings of: customary manner of acting; mental constitution or disposition; bodily condition or constitution. (These are the only non-obsolete definitions given in The Oxford English Dictionary.) 14. "Habitude"的词典释义包括：惯常的行为方式；心理素质或性情；身体状态或体质。（这些是《牛津英语词典》中给出的全部非过时定义）
15. The oldest meaning of “habitual,” now obsolete, is “belonging to the inward disposition [of something]” (The Oxford English Dictionary). 15. "Habitual"最古老的词义（现已废弃）是"属于[某物的]内在特性"（《牛津英语词典》）
16. On this question, see “The History of the Human Body,” in The Dallas Institute Newsletter (Summer, 1985) with contributions by Illich, Sardello, Jager, Thomas et al. 16. 关于此问题的讨论，参见达拉斯研究所通讯 1985 年夏季刊《人体历史》专题，撰稿人包括伊里奇、萨尔多、雅格、托马斯等学者。
17. On tradition and effective-history, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), esp. pp. 267-74. Moreover, habitual body memories intersect with cultural traditions and are sometimes deeply influenced by such traditions in a complex dialectical interplay. 17. 关于传统与效果历史，参见汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔《真理与方法》（纽约：西伯里出版社，1975 年），特别是第 267-74 页。此外，习惯性身体记忆与文化传统相互交织，在复杂的辩证互动中有时会深受这些传统影响。
18. John Russell, “How Art Makes Us Feel At Home in the World,” New York Times, April 12, 1981. 18. 约翰·罗素，《艺术如何让我们在世界中感到自在》，《纽约时报》，1981 年 4 月 12 日。
19. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 82. 19. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 82 页。
20. The example is Merleau-Ponty’s; see ibid., pp. 145-46: the organist “settles into the organ as one settles into a house” and comes to “create a space of expressiveness.” 20. 此例引自梅洛-庞蒂，参见同书第 145-46 页：管风琴师"如同安家般融入管风琴"，进而"创造出一个表现性空间"。
21. In this particular respect-i.e., its all-at-once character-the revival of habitual body memories is to be compared to many cases of recognition. Both forms of memory are also typically involuntary, arising more as circumstance suggests than as sought for. When we “search our memory,” on the other hand, we are usually searching among our recollections-not among our habitual body memories or resources of recognition. 21. 就这一特定方面——即其即时涌现的特性而言，习惯性身体记忆的复苏可与诸多再认情形相提并论。这两种记忆形式通常都具有非自主性特征，更多由情境触发而非主动寻求。相反，当我们"搜寻记忆"时，通常是在追忆中检索——而非在习惯性身体记忆或再认资源中探索。
22. Igor Stravinsky, The Poetics of Music (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 68. 22. 伊戈尔·斯特拉文斯基，《音乐诗学》（纽约：兰登书屋，1960 年），第 68 页。
23. See Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965) A189 B233 ff. (Second Analogy). Such succession structures all causal sequence. 23. 参见康德《纯粹理性批判》，N·K·史密斯译（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1965 年）A189 B233 及后续（第二类比）。这种相继性构成了所有因果序列的结构。
24. See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I” in Écrits, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 1-7. 24. 参见雅克·拉康《作为"我"之功能形成要素的镜像阶段》，载于《文集》，A·谢里丹译（纽约：诺顿出版社，1977 年），第 1-7 页。
25. In fact, the body memory of the trauma leads not only into the past in which the trauma was situated but also into the future when one fears action will be inhibited or lost. This phenomenon is closely related to the anticipatory aspect of signal anxiety. 25. 事实上，创伤的身体记忆不仅将我们引向创伤发生的过去，也指向人们担忧行动能力会受到抑制或丧失的未来。这一现象与信号焦虑的预期特性密切相关。
26. Still another form of taming occurs when we transform genuine childhood memories into screen memories by substituting for the representation of a traumatic event a more idyllic scene, mistakenly taking this latter to have been the true state of affairs. In this case we play a ruse upon ourselves for the sake of transforming the memory of a painful event into the memory of a pleasant one. On screen memories, see Freud, “Screen Memories,” in Standard Edition, 3:303-22. 26. 另一种驯化形式表现为：我们将真实的童年记忆转化为屏蔽记忆，用田园诗般的场景替代创伤事件的表征，错误地将后者视为真实发生的事态。在此过程中，我们通过自我欺骗将痛苦事件的记忆转化为愉悦事件的记忆。关于屏蔽记忆，参见弗洛伊德《屏蔽记忆》，标准版第 3 卷第 303-322 页。
27. Thus Freud speaks of a memory of sexual assault as “a repetition [of the original trauma] in a mitigated form” (Standard Edition, 20:166). 27. 因此弗洛伊德将性侵记忆描述为"原初创伤的缓和形式再现"（标准版第 20 卷第 166 页）。
28. On this notion, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 133-35, 137-38, 143. 28. 关于这一概念，参见莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂《可见的与不可见的》（阿尔方斯·林吉斯英译，埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1968 年），第 133-135 页、137-138 页、143 页。
29. Cf. Bergson’s similar stress on the future-orientedness of “habit memories”: such memories are “always bent upon action, seated in the present and looking only to the future” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer [1896; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1959], p. 70). 29. 参见柏格森对"习惯记忆"未来导向性的类似强调：这类记忆"总是倾向于行动，立足于当下且只着眼于未来"（亨利·柏格森，《物质与记忆》，N·M·保罗与 W·S·帕尔默译[1896 年；纽约：双日出版社 1959 年重印]，第 70 页）。
30. See Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 108-9. 30. 参见海德格尔《存在与时间》第 108-109 页。
31. “The ownmost possibility, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped, and certain, is indefinite as regards its certainty” (ibid., p. 310 ; his italics). Heidegger is here speaking of death as anticipated by an individual human existent. On repeatable possibilities, see ibid., p. 438ff. 31. "最本己的可能性是非关联的、不可逾越且确定的，就其确定性而言却是不确定的"（同上，第 310 页；原文为斜体）。此处海德格尔论及作为此在个体所预期的死亡。关于可重复的可能性，参见同上第 438 页及以下。
32. "Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only insofar as Dasein, as being, is always coming toward itself’ (ibid., p. 373; his italics). 32. "预期使此在本真地将来，而这种方式下，预期本身只有在此在作为存在总是向它自身而来时才是可能的"（同上，第 373 页；原文为斜体）。
33. Any such division between recent and remote memories is notably lacking in the case of habitual body memories, for which the very distinction between recent and remote in origin is normally meaningless. As I have emphasized in the foregoing, it rarely matters at all to us exactly when we first learned a given habit or picked up a certain propensity. What matters is only that we now have the habit or propensity and can employ it in pursuing some particular project: it is the service-ability that counts here, not the comparative distance of the origin from the present moment. This distance does, however, count in the instance of traumatic memories-since the phenomenon of “after-glow” inheres in long-term samples only, while recent such memories are all too vivid and need no such assistance. 33. 在习惯性身体记忆的案例中，近期记忆与遥远记忆的划分尤为缺失，因为对这类记忆而言，源头的远近区分通常毫无意义。正如前文所强调的，我们很少在意某个习惯或倾向最初是何时习得的。重要的是我们现在拥有这种习惯或倾向，并能将其运用于特定目标：关键在于其可用性，而非起源时刻与当下的时间距离。然而，这种时间距离在创伤性记忆中确实至关重要——因为"余晖效应"仅存在于长期样本中，而近期的此类记忆往往过于鲜明，根本不需要这种辅助。
34. Recent research by A. Baddeley indicates that primary memory may itself be largely bodily in character. Such memory is analyzable into an “executive system” and several sensory-specific “slave systems” which “recruit” particular bodily organs or parts. The result is a quasi-autonomous operation; the functioning of primary or “working” memory goes on automatic pilot unless it is interfered with by an activity that competes directly with the slave system. See A. Baddeley, “Domains of Recollection,” Psychological Review (1981); and D. Riesberg, I. Rappaport, and M. O’Shaughnessy, “The Limits of Working Memory: The Digit Digit-span,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (1984). 34. A.巴德利的最新研究表明，初级记忆本身可能主要具有身体性特征。这种记忆可分解为一个"执行系统"和若干感觉特异的"从属系统"，后者会"征用"特定身体器官或部位。其运作呈现准自主性——初级或"工作"记忆的功能会处于自动运行状态，除非受到与从属系统直接竞争的活动干扰。参见 A.巴德利《回忆的领域》，载《心理学评论》（1981 年）；以及 D.里斯伯格、I.拉帕波特与 M.奥肖内西合著《工作记忆的极限：数字广度测验》，载《实验心理学杂志：学习、记忆与认知》（1984 年）。
35. Most notably in Alzheimer’s disease. For a detailed descriptive account, see Marion Roach, Another Name for Madness (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985). 35. 最典型的例子是阿尔茨海默病。详细描述可参阅玛丽昂·罗奇所著《疯狂的别称》（波士顿：霍顿米夫林出版社，1985 年）。
36. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 419 and p. 147 respectively. 36. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，分别见第 419 页与第 147 页。
37. For Dewey’s view, see Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Random House, 1950), pp. 14-88, esp. 42, 66, 172-80. 37. 关于杜威的观点，参见《人性与行为》（纽约：兰登书屋，1950 年）第 14-88 页，特别是第 42、66、172-180 页。
38. Such marginalizing may be usefully contrasted with Breuer and Freud’s notion of “abreacting” memories, i.e., re-engaging them so as to allow the affect strangulated beneath them to re-emerge. As a technique for “filling in the gaps in memory,” psychoanalysis tries to reverse our natural propensity for making the most painful memories marginal. It is not accidental that it began with an effort to abreact traumatic memories-as Breuer and Freud make clear in their “Preliminary Communication” of 1893. (See Standard Edition, 2:3-17.) To this beginning should be added the later notion of “undoing the defenses,” including the very denial, isolation, projecting, etc. which are so massively involved in keeping traumatic body memories at bay. We witness here, incidentally, the surprisingly parallel courses of psychical and physical traumatic memories: indeed, the very difficulty of drawing a hard and fast line between the two. (In the same “Preliminary Communication,” the authors move unhesitatingly from one to the other.) 38. 这种边缘化处理可与布洛伊尔和弗洛伊德提出的"宣泄"记忆概念形成有益对比——即通过重新激活记忆，让被压抑在记忆底层的情感得以释放。作为一种"填补记忆空白"的技术，精神分析试图逆转人类将最痛苦记忆边缘化的自然倾向。它始于对创伤记忆进行宣泄的努力并非偶然，正如布洛伊尔和弗洛伊德在 1893 年的《初步报告》中明确指出的（参见标准版第 2 卷第 3-17 页）。这一开端还应结合后来"解除防御机制"的概念，包括那些被大量用于阻挡创伤性身体记忆的否认、隔离、投射等手段。我们在此不无惊讶地注意到，心理创伤记忆与身体创伤记忆的发展轨迹竟如此相似：事实上，要在两者之间划出明确界限本身就极为困难。（在同一篇《初步报告》中，作者们毫不犹豫地从一种记忆过渡到另一种记忆。）
39. On erotic desire as insatiable-as a form of “fury mocking the abyss”-see Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, pp. 154-55, 301-2. 39. 关于情欲作为永不满足的渴望——作为"嘲弄深渊的狂怒"的一种形式——参见雅克·拉康《文集》第 154-55 页、301-2 页。
40. A characteristic statement of Berkeley’s is that “Looking at an object, I perceive a certain visible figure and color . . . which from what I have formerly observed, determine me to think that if I [were to] advance forward so many paces or miles, I shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch.” (George Berkeley, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision [London: Dent, 1934], pp. 32-33.) 40. 贝克莱的典型表述是："注视一个物体时，我感知到某种可见的形状和颜色......根据我以往的观察经验，这使我确信：如果我向前行进若干步或若干英里，就会获得这般那般的触觉观念。"（乔治·贝克莱《视觉新论》[伦敦：登特出版社，1934 年]，第 32-33 页）
41. Erwin Straus, The Primary World of Senses, trans. J. Needleman (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), p. 384. 41. 欧文·斯特劳斯《感官的原初世界》，J·尼德尔曼译（伊利诺伊州格伦科：自由出版社，1963 年），第 384 页。
42. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 264-65. 42. 梅洛-庞蒂《知觉现象学》，第 264-65 页。
43. See Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 70ff. On the metaphor of the past-aspyramid, see Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 393: “We are, as Proust declared, perched on a pyramid of past life.” 43. 参见柏格森《物质与记忆》第 70 页及以下。关于过去-金字塔的隐喻，参见梅洛-庞蒂《知觉现象学》第 393 页："正如普鲁斯特所言，我们栖息在由过往生命堆砌的金字塔上。"
44. Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 55; his italics. 44. 柏格森，《物质与记忆》，第 55 页；斜体为原作者所加。
45. Ibid., p. 70; his italics. 45. 同上，第 70 页；斜体为原作者所加。
46. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and T. Kilmartin (New York: Random House, 1981), I, 5. 46. 马塞尔·普鲁斯特，《追忆似水年华》，C·K·斯科特·蒙克里夫与 T·基尔马丁英译（纽约：兰登书屋，1981 年），第一卷，第 5 页。
47. Ibid., p. 6. 47. 同上，第 6 页。
48. Ibid. 48. 同上。
49. Ibid., p. 9. 49. 同上，第 9 页。
50. Ibid. 50. 同上。
51. Bergson makes “place” and “date” the two distinguishing marks of recollection. See Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 68-72. It is also striking that Bergson calls recollection “picture memory” (ibid.): pictures are eminently datable and placeable. 51. 柏格森将"地点"与"日期"作为回忆的两个标志性特征。参见柏格森《物质与记忆》第 68-72 页。值得注意的是柏格森将回忆称为"图像记忆"（同上）：图像具有显著的可追溯时间性与空间性。
52. Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, pp. 6-7. 52. 普鲁斯特，《追忆似水年华》，第 6-7 页。
53. The case of dream memory, which II have almost completely neglected in this book, is highly ambiguous. Is the “dream ego” (itself often quite marginal in a given dream) embodied and, if so, in which specific forms (e.g., as solely visual, or auditory, etc., in its mode of apprehension)? 53. 本书几乎完全忽略的梦境记忆案例具有高度模糊性。"梦之自我"（其本身在特定梦境中往往相当边缘化）是否具身化？若是，又以何种具体形式呈现（例如在感知模式上仅表现为视觉、听觉等）？
54. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Corrected Edition, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 142. 54. 阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特海，《过程与实在：论宇宙论》（修正版），D·R·格里芬与 D·W·舍伯恩编，纽约：自由出版社，1978 年，第 142 页。
55. See ibid., pp. 121-22. 55. 参见同上，第 121-122 页。
56. Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 35. 56. 阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特海，《象征：其意义与影响》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1959 年），第 35 页。
57. "The immediate present has to conform to what the past is for it [i.e., through objectification], and the mere lapse of time is an abstraction from the more concrete relatedness of ‘conformation’ " (ibid., p. 36). The basic action of conformation to the past does not preclude the capacity of the present to compose something new. 57. "当下必须符合过去对它的规定[即通过客体化]，而单纯的时间流逝是从更具体的'顺应'关系中抽象出来的"（同上，第 36 页）。这种对过去的基本顺应行为，并不妨碍当下创造新事物的能力。
58. Ibid. 58. 同上。
59. Whitehead, Symbolism, p. 37, p. 27 respectively. 59. 怀特海，《象征》，分别为第 37 页和第 27 页。
60. Ibid., p. 50. 60. 同上，第 50 页。
61. Ibid., p. 21. 61. 同上，第 21 页。
62. Ibid., p. 14 and pp. 43-44 respectively. 62. 同上，分别为第 14 页和第 43-44 页。
63. Nevertheless, repetition is crucial; it is precisely what Hume overlooks. On memory as repetition, see Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 135-37; as reproduction, ibid., pp. 237-39. 63. 然而，重复性至关重要；这正是休谟所忽视的。关于记忆作为重复的论述，参见怀特海《过程与实在》第 135-37 页；作为再现的论述，参见同书第 237-39 页。
64. Whitehead, Symbolism, p. 18. More completely: “Our most immediate environment is constituted by the various organs of our own bodies, our more remote environment is the physical world in the neighborhood” (ibid., pp. 17-18). 64. 怀特海，《象征主义》，第 18 页。更完整的表述是："我们最直接的环境由我们身体的各种器官构成，而更远的环境则是邻近的物理世界"（同上，第 17-18 页）。
65. Ibid., p. 43. 65. 同上，第 43 页。
66. Thus “our primitive perception is that of ‘conformation’ vaguely, and of the yet vaguer relata ‘oneself’ and ‘another’ in the undiscriminated background” (ibid., p. 43 ). Thus we can say that “our bodily efficacy is primarily an experience of the dependence of presentational immediacy upon causal efficacy” (Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 176). 66. 因此"我们最初的感知是对'符合'的模糊认识，以及对更模糊的关系项'自我'与'他者'在未区分的背景中的感知"（同上，第 43 页）。因此我们可以说"我们身体的效能首先是呈现直接性依赖于因果效能的体验"（怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 176 页）。
67. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 81. 67. 怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 81 页。
68. See ibid., p. 119: “The crude aboriginal character of direct perception is inheritance. What is inherited is feeling-tone with evidence of its origin.” This is not to deny the importance of “conceptual feelings” or of the “mental pole” generally: cf. pp. 239-40. But it remains the case that physical feelings are “the basis for conceptual origination” and that “the intellectual feelings must all be initially supplied with the content of the conformal physical feelings” (Nancy Frankenberry, “The Power of the Past,” Process Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 [1983], p. 135; her italics.) 68. 参见同书第 119 页："直接感知的原始粗粝本质在于传承。被传承的是带有起源证据的情感基调。"这并非否定"概念性感受"或普遍意义上的"精神极"之重要性：参见第 239-240 页。但物理感受始终是"概念产生的根基"，且"智力感受最初都必须从符合性物理感受中获取内容"（南希·弗兰肯贝里，《过去的力量》，《过程研究》第 13 卷第 2 期[1983 年]，第 135 页；斜体为原作者所加）。
69. “From this point of view, the body, or its organ of sensation, becomes the objective datum of a component feeling [i.e., bodily efficacy]; and this feeling has its own subjective form” (Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 312). In other words, the body is itself the objective datum for the very feeling of bodily efficacy by which we come to conform to the world beyond the body. 69. "从这个视角看，身体或其感觉器官成为复合感受[即身体效能]的客观资料；这种感受具有其独特的主观形式"（怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 312 页）。换言之，身体本身正是我们借以顺应体外世界的身体效能感受的客观资料。
70. Ibid., p. 119. See also: “The body, however, is only a peculiarly intimate bit of the world. Just as Descartes said, ‘this body is mine’; so he should have said, ‘this actual world is mine’” (ibid., p. 81). Nor does Whitehead’s stress on the “withness” of the perceiving body alleviate the paradoxicality of a two-tiered feeling situation. It is one thing to say that “we see the contemporary chair, but we see it with our eyes; and we touch the contemporary chair, but we touch it with our hands” (ibid., p. 62; his italics). “With” suggests transmission, means of conveyance-a suitable description for bodily organs in general. But it is quite another thing to claim that this withness is itself directly felt as causally efficacious: “we find here our direct knowledge of 'causal efficacy” " (ibid., p. 81). 70. 同上，第 119 页。另见："然而，身体只是世界中一个特别亲密的片段。正如笛卡尔所言'这个身体是我的'；同理他也应当说'这个现实世界是我的'"（同上，第 81 页）。怀特海对感知身体"共在性"的强调，也未能缓解双层感受情境的悖论性。说"我们看见当下的椅子，但我们是透过眼睛看见它；我们触摸当下的椅子，但我们是借助双手触摸它"（同上，第 62 页；斜体为原作者所标）是一回事。"借助"暗示着传递、传导方式——这对身体器官而言是恰当的普遍描述。但声称这种共在性本身被直接感受为具有因果效力则完全是另一回事："我们在此发现了对'因果效力'的直接认知"（同上，第 81 页）。
71. On the “withness” of the body, see ibid., p. 62. On “objective datum,” cf. ibid., pp. 164, 237, 240. 71. 关于身体的"共在性"，参见同上第 62 页。关于"客观材料"，对照同上第 164、237、240 页。
72. In the formula of a recent commentator, each actual occasion is “othercaused, self-caused, and other-causing” (Jorge Luis Nobo, “Transition in Whitehead: A Creative Process Distinct from Consciousness,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 19 [1979]:273). 72. 用一位当代评论者的公式表述，每个现实事态都是"他因引发、自因引发、引发他者"的（豪尔赫·路易斯·诺博，《怀特海哲学中的转变：区别于意识的创造过程》，《国际哲学季刊》第 19 卷[1979 年]：273 页）。
73. “Our immediate past is constituted by that occasion, or that group of fused occasions, which enters into experience devoid of any perceptible medium intervening between it and the present immediate fact. Roughly speaking, it is that portion of our past lying between a tenth of a second and half a second ago” (Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas [New York: Mentor, 1955], p. 181). 73. “我们直接的过去由那个场合，或那组融合的场合构成，它进入经验时与当下直接事实之间没有任何可感知的媒介介入。粗略地说，这是我们过去中大约十分之一秒到半秒前的那部分”（阿尔弗雷德·诺思·怀特海，《观念的冒险》[纽约：导师出版社，1955 年]，第 181 页）。
74. On bodily efficacy, see Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 312, 316. 74. 关于身体效能，参见怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 312、316 页。
75. See John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Putnam’s, 1934), pp. 35-57. 75. 参见约翰·杜威，《作为经验的艺术》（纽约：普特南出版社，1934 年），第 35-57 页。
76. Whitehead, Symbolism, p. 36. 76. 怀特海，《象征主义》，第 36 页。
77. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 119. 77. 怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 119 页。
78. Whitehead, Symbolism, p. 20. Cf. also Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 317: “mental and physical operations are incurably intertwined.” 78. 怀特海，《象征主义》，第 20 页。另参见怀特海《过程与实在》第 317 页："心智活动与物理活动不可避免地相互交织。"
79. Cf. Whitehead, Symbolism, pp. 18-20. 79. 参见怀特海，《象征主义》，第 18-20 页。
80. Just such precedence seems to be unequivocally endorsed in the following passage: “The direct relevence of this remote past [i.e., remote in comparison with the immediate past], relevant by reason of its direct objectification in the immediate subject, is practically negligible, so far as concerns prehensions of a strictly physical type” (Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 63). I take “direct objectification in the immediate subject” to be an act of recollection, a term which Whitehead rarely uses in Process and Reality and then mainly in reference to Hume (cf. ibid., pp. 242, 249, 271). Insofar as the relevance of the immediate past in instances of causal efficacy is direct, indeed massive, the importance of the body memory associated with it is commensurately intensified in comparison with any form of memory lacking such a relevance and such a basis. 80. 以下段落似乎明确支持这种优先性："相较于当下过去，这段遥远过去（即与当下过去相比显得遥远的过去）的直接关联性——通过其在当下主体中的直接客体化而体现——就严格物理类型的把握而言，实际上可忽略不计"（怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 63 页）。我认为"在当下主体中的直接客体化"是一种回忆行为，这个术语怀特海在《过程与实在》中极少使用，主要是在论及休谟时提及（参见同书第 242、249、271 页）。就因果效力中当下过去的关联性具有直接性（实际上是强烈性）而言，与之相关的身体记忆的重要性，相较于任何缺乏这种关联性和基础的记忆形式，相应地得到了强化。
81. Whitehead, Symbolism, p. 44. 81. 怀特海，《象征主义》，第 44 页。
82. Ibid. 82. 同上。
83. See ibid., pp. 43, 55, 57. 83. 参见同上，第 43、55、57 页。
84. Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, 1, pp. 5-6. 84. 普鲁斯特，《追忆似水年华》第一卷，第 5-6 页。
85. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 119. 85. 怀特海，《过程与实在》，第 119 页。
86. Whitehead, Symbolism, p. 23. 86. 怀特海，《象征主义》，第 23 页。
87. Ibid. 87. 同上。
88. For this view, see Edmund Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 107, and esp. p. 217: my living body is “given to me originally and meaningfully as ‘organ’ and as articulated into particular organs.” 88. 关于这一观点，参见埃德蒙德·胡塞尔，《欧洲科学的危机与先验现象学》，D·卡尔译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1970 年），第 107 页，尤其是第 217 页：“我的活生生的身体最初且有意义地被给予我作为‘器官’，并被分化为特定器官。”
89. Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 136, 157. 89. 参见梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 136、157 页。
90. Ibid., p. 265. For difficulties with Merleau-Ponty’s own conception of direct access to the past, however, see my essay “Habitual Body and Memory in MerleauPonty,” pp. 292-95. 90. 同上，第 265 页。然而关于梅洛-庞蒂本人对直接通达过去这一概念的困难，参见拙文《梅洛-庞蒂论习惯身体与记忆》，第 292-95 页。
91. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 129. 91. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 129 页。
92. On the notion of “subdued being” as this derives from Bachelard, see Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 267. 92. 关于源自巴什拉的"被抑制的存在"概念，参见梅洛-庞蒂，《可见的与不可见的》，第 267 页。
93. “In,” “from,” and “through” can be regarded as the three primary modes of Whitehead’s “withness” of the body. 93. "在"、"从"和"通过"可被视为怀特海身体"共在性"的三种基本模式。
94. Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences, p. 107. Husserl goes on to say that the meaning in question is precisely that “indicated by the word ‘organ’ (here used in its most primitive sense)” (ibid.). 94. 胡塞尔，《欧洲科学的危机》，第 107 页。胡塞尔进一步指出，这里讨论的意义正是"由'器官'一词所指示的（此处采用该词最原始的含义）"（同上）。
95. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 146. 95. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 146 页。
96. On this point, see Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences, p. 106: “Clearly the aspect-exhibitions of whatever body is appearing in perception, and the kinestheses, are not processes [simply running] alongside each other; rather, they work together in such a way that the aspects have the ontic meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the body only through the fact that they are those aspects continually required by the kinestheses.” 96. 关于这一点，参见胡塞尔《欧洲科学的危机》第 106 页："显然，任何在知觉中显现之物体的侧显展示与动觉并非[简单并列]的过程；相反，它们以这样的方式协同作用：只有当这些侧显是动觉持续要求的那些侧显时，它们才具有物体侧显的存在论意义或有效性。"
97. Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 131 and p. 66 respectively. 97. 柏格森，《物质与记忆》，分别见第 131 页和第 66 页。
98. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 194. 98. 梅洛-庞蒂，《可见的与不可见的》，第 194 页。
99. Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 168. 99. 柏格森，《物质与记忆》，第 168 页。
100. We can go still further and claim with Bergson that the body is itself already like mind or consciousness: “Concrete movement, capable, like consciousness, of prolonging its past into its present, capable, by repeating itself, of engendering sensible qualities, already possesses something akin to consciousness” (ibid., p. 243). 100. 我们甚至可以更进一步，与柏格森共同主张身体本身已然如同心灵或意识："具体运动能够像意识那样将过去延展至当下，通过自我重复而生成可感性质，已然具有某种类似意识的东西"（同上，第 243 页）。
9. Place Memory 9. 场所记忆
Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 449a 15 (Sorabji translation). 亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》449a15（索拉布吉译本）
E. Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 72. See also p. 47: “As the temporal object moves into the past, it is drawn together on itself and thereby also becomes obscure (dunkel).” E.胡塞尔《内时间意识现象学》，J.S.丘吉尔译（布鲁明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1964 年），第 72 页。另见第 47 页："当时态对象进入过去时，它会被自身吸引而凝聚，从而变得晦暗（dunkel）。"
Aristotle, Physics 221b 2. I am indebted to Peter Manchester for this translation. 亚里士多德《物理学》221b2。此处译文承蒙彼得·曼彻斯特提供。
See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), secs. 81-82. 参见马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》，J·麦奎利与 E·罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 81-82 节。
Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 6. 弗朗西丝·A·耶茨《记忆之术》（伦敦：劳特利奇与基根·保罗出版社，1966 年），第 6 页。
Cicero, De oratore, II, lxxxvi, 251-4 (cited by Yates at ibid., p. 2). 西塞罗《论演说家》第二卷第八十六章 251-4 节（耶茨在同书第 2 页引用）。
Plato, Theatetus 196d-200d. 柏拉图《泰阿泰德篇》196d-200d。
“Who is that man moving slowly in the lonely building, stopping at intervals with an intent face? He is a rhetoric student forming a set of memory loci” (Yates, The Art of Memory, p. 8). "那个在孤寂建筑中缓慢移动、时而驻足凝神的人是谁？他是一位修辞学学生，正在构建记忆轨迹体系"（耶茨，《记忆的艺术》，第 8 页）。
Cited by Reiner Schürmann in his essay, "Situating René Char: Hölderlin, Heidegger, Char and the ‘there is,’ " in Heidegger and the Question of Literature, ed. W. V. Spanos (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 173. 引自赖纳·许尔曼的论文《定位勒内·夏尔：荷尔德林、海德格尔、夏尔与"存在"》，收录于《海德格尔与文学问题》，W·V·斯帕诺斯编（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1979 年），第 173 页。
“Das denkende Dichten ist in der Wahrheit die Topologie des Seyns” (Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens [Pfullingen: Neske, 1965], p. 23). See also O. Pöggeler, “Heidegger’s Topology of Being” in On Heidegger and Language, ed. J. Kockelmans (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 107-33. "这种思辨性的诗意创作，实乃存在之拓扑学"（马丁·海德格尔，《思想经验录》[普富林根：内斯克出版社，1965 年]，第 23 页）。另见 O·珀格勒《海德格尔的存在拓扑学》，收录于《论海德格尔与语言》，J·科克尔曼斯编（伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1972 年），第 107-133 页。
A much more complete treatment is set forth in a monograph (tentatively entitled “Placing: Getting and Being Placed”) I am in the process of writing on the nature of place in human experience. 关于人类经验中场所本质的更完整论述，详见我正在撰写的专著（暂定名《定位：获取与存在之境》）。
Cited by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, as quoted in Max Jammer, “The Concept of Space in Antiquity” in J. J. C. Smart, ed. Problems of Space and Time (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 28. 引自辛普利西乌斯对亚里士多德《范畴篇》的评注，转引自马克斯·雅默尔《古代空间概念》，收录于 J.J.C.斯马特主编《时空问题》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1964 年），第 28 页。
Aristotle, Physics 208 b 33 (Hussey translation). 亚里士多德《物理学》208b33（赫西译本）。
Ibid., 208 b 34-36 (Hussey translation). 同上，208b34-36（赫西译本）。
“In nature each [place] is distinct” (ibid., 208 b 18; Hardie & Gaye translation). "在自然界中，每个[位置]都是独特的"（同上，208 b 18；哈迪与盖伊译本）。
Ibid., 212 a 20-120-1; translators’ italics. Hussey translates: “The first unchangeable limit of that which surrounds.” 同上，212 a 20-120-1 ；译者斜体。赫西译为："环绕物最初不可改变的界限。"
Ibid., 212 a 28-31 (Ross translation). 同上，212 a 28-31（罗斯译本）。
Jammer, “The Concept of Space in Antiquity,” p. 40; my italics. 贾默，《古代的空间概念》，第 40 页；本人斜体标注。
Réné Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, sec. V, trans. G. E. Anscombe and P. Geach in Descartes’ Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh & London: Nelson, 1959). 勒内·笛卡尔，《哲学原理》第五章，G·E·安斯康姆与 P·吉奇英译，收录于《笛卡尔哲学著作集》（爱丁堡与伦敦：纳尔逊出版社，1959 年）。
Ibid., sec. XIV. 同上，第十四章。
Aristotle, Physics 208 b 23-5 (Hardie & Gaye translation). Unless specified otherwise, I shall cite this translation of the Physics from here on. 亚里士多德，《物理学》208b23-25（哈迪与盖伊英译本）。除非特别说明，后文所引《物理学》内容均出自此译本。
Husserl posits these as existing at the lowest level of sensory perception: See E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill & K. Ameriks (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), sec. 17. 胡塞尔将这些设定为存在于最低层次的感觉知觉中：参见 E·胡塞尔《经验与判断》第 17 节，J·S·丘吉尔与 K·阿梅里克斯英译（伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1973 年）。
William James, Principles of Psychology (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1950), 1:654ff. 威廉·詹姆斯，《心理学原理》（1890 年；重印版，纽约：多佛出版社，1950 年），第 1 卷第 654 页及以下。
In devising this term, I am drawing on connotations of “preservation,” “reservation,” “holding in reserve,” “being reserved,” etc. 在构思这个术语时，我借鉴了"保存"、"保留"、"储备"、"含蓄"等词语的内涵意义。
With the notable exception of Marcia K. Johnson, who has begun a systematic exploration of place parameters in her recent research on a “reality monitoring” model of memory. See her “A Multiple-Entry, Modular Memory System,” Psychology of Learning and Motivation 17 (1983):81-123. 值得注意的例外是玛西亚·K·约翰逊，她近期在研究记忆的"现实监控"模型时，已开始系统探索场所参数。参见其论文《多重入口模块化记忆系统》，《学习与动机心理学》第 17 卷（1983 年）：81-123 页。
Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 451 a 15-16. 亚里士多德，《论记忆与回忆》451a15-16。
I adapt this term from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 264. 这个术语我引自莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂的《可见的与不可见的》，A.林吉斯译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1968 年），第 264 页。
For an examination of this two-fold dependency, see my essay “Getting Placed: Soul in Space,” Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology (1982): 17-19. 关于这种双重依赖性的探讨，可参阅我的论文《定位：灵魂在空间中的栖居》，载于《春天：原型心理学年刊》（1982 年）第 17-19 页。
In my unpublished manuscript, “Placing: Getting and Being Placed,” chaps. 4 and 5. 见我的未发表手稿《定位：获得与存在》第 4 章和第 5 章。
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 139; his italics. 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂《知觉现象学》，C·史密斯译（纽约：人文出版社，1962 年），第 139 页；斜体为原作者所加。
Aristotle, Physics, 210 a 24-5. 亚里士多德，《物理学》，210 a 24-5。
Ibid., 209 b 28. 同上，209 b 28。
Ibid., 212 a 28-9. Note that a vessel is the sort of container that is separable from what it contains and that the inner surface of a vessel is exactly coincident with the outer limit of what is contained within it. 同上，212 a 28-9。需注意容器是一种可与所盛装物分离的器皿，且容器的内表面恰好与其内容物的外缘完全重合。
Ibid., 212 a 13-14. 同上，212 a 13-14。
For a fascinating study of snugly fitting containers, see William C. Ketchum, Jr., Boxes (Washington: Cooper-Hewitt Museum, 1982). 关于严丝合缝容器的精彩研究，可参阅小威廉·C·凯彻姆所著《盒子》（华盛顿：库珀-休伊特博物馆，1982 年版）。
Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, p. 250. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 250 页。
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 203; my italics. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 203 页；斜体为笔者所加。
I here allude to familiar Heideggerian themes. On the In-Sein of In-der-Welt-Sein, see Being and Time, sec. 12. On dwelling, see “Building Dwelling Thinking,” trans. A. Hofstadter in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 143-62. 此处我援引了海德格尔的几个常见主题。关于"在世界之中存在"的"在之中"结构，参见《存在与时间》第 12 节。关于栖居概念，参见《筑·居·思》，A.霍夫施塔特英译，收录于《诗·语言·思》（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1971 年），第 143-162 页。
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 144. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 144 页。
See Erwin Straus, The Primary World of Senses, trans. J. Needleman (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), pp. 388-90, for a treatment of indifferent space in contrast with attuned space. On landscape versus geography, see ibid., pp. 318-23. 关于无差别空间与调谐空间的对比研究，参见欧文·斯特劳斯《感官的原初世界》（J·尼德尔曼译，伊利诺伊州格伦科：自由出版社，1963 年），第 388-390 页；关于景观与地理学的讨论，参见同书第 318-323 页。
Even a good a geometer as Pascal could nonetheless say that “ces espaces infinis m’effrayent” (Pensées, ed. L. Lafuma [Paris: Delmas, 1960], p. 114). 即便是帕斯卡尔这样优秀的几何学家，也不得不承认"这些无限的空间令我恐惧"（《思想录》，L.拉富马编[巴黎：德尔马斯出版社，1960 年]，第 114 页）。
Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, p. 82. 梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 82 页。
Ibid., p. 146. Merleau-Ponty alerts us in the very next sentence that he is not thinking of “customary” in the sense of “long-established custom,” which implies a passivity foreign to any basic bodily action. 同上，第 146 页。梅洛-庞蒂在紧接着的下一句话中提醒我们，他所说的"习惯性"并非指"长期形成的习俗"这一含义，后者暗含着与任何基本身体动作都格格不入的被动性。
Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and T. Kilmartin (New York: Random House, 1981), I, 8-9; my italics. I have analyzed this same passage at greater length in “The Memorability of Inhabited Place” (forthcoming). 马塞尔·普鲁斯特，《追忆似水年华》，C·K·斯科特·蒙克里夫与 T·基尔马丁译（纽约：兰登书屋，1981 年），第一卷，第 8-9 页；斜体为笔者所加。关于这段文字的更详细分析，可参见笔者即将发表的《栖居之地的可记忆性》一文。
“The good angel of certainty . . . had fixed approximately in their right places “确定性之善天使……已将它们大致安置在正确的位置上”
in the uncertain light, my chest of drawers, my writing-table, my fireplace . . .” (Remembrance of Things Past, I, 9). “在朦胧的光线中，我的五斗柜、我的写字台、我的壁炉……”（《追忆似水年华》第一卷，第 9 页）
Ibid., pp. 7-8. 同上，第 7-8 页。
Both citations are from ibid., p. 6. Cf. also ibid.: “My mind struggles in an unsuccessful attempt to discover where I was.” 两处引文均出自同上书第 6 页。另参见同书：“我的头脑在徒劳地试图回忆自己曾身处何地。”
On this contribution, see Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore, Body, Memory, and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and Christian NorbergSchulz, The Concept of Dwelling (New York: Rizzoli, 1985). 关于这一贡献，可参阅肯特·布卢默与查尔斯·摩尔的《身体、记忆与建筑》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1977 年）以及克里斯蒂安·诺伯格-舒尔茨的《栖居的概念》（纽约：里佐利出版社，1985 年）。
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (1896; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 69. It is distressing that Bergson consigns place entirely to recollection, which “leaves to each fact, to each gesture, its place and date” (ibid.). 亨利·柏格森在《物质与记忆》（N·M·保罗与 W·S·帕尔默译，1896 年初版；1959 年纽约双日出版社重印版，第 69 页）中将场所完全归属于回忆，认为回忆"为每个事实、每个姿态保留其位置与日期"（同前），这种观点令人不安。
Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 83: “This past, which remains our true present, does not leave us but remains constantly hidden behind our gaze instead of being displayed before it [i.e., as in recollection].” 参见梅洛-庞蒂《知觉现象学》第 83 页："这个作为我们真正当下的过去不会离开我们，而是持续隐匿在我们的视线之后，而非如回忆般展现在视线之前。"
John Russell, “How Art Makes Us Feel at Home in the World,” New York Times, April 12, 1981. I have cited part of this same passage early in the last chapter. 约翰·罗素在 1981 年 4 月 12 日《纽约时报》发表的《艺术如何让我们在世界中感到安适》一文中提出此观点。我在前一章开篇已引用过这段文字的局部内容。
Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 145; his italics. 柏格森，《物质与记忆》，第 145 页；斜体为原作者所加。
Straus, The Primary World of Senses, p. 319. 斯特劳斯，《感官的原初世界》，第 319 页。
The aim, however, need not be entirely explicit: “Every animate movement demands direction and goal. Whether the goal be a well-defined place lying before us, or a vaguely indeterminate ‘somewhere,’ it is still a goal and thus an Other, and thus a There toward which we are directed” (ibid., p. 391). 然而目标未必需要完全明确："每个有生命的运动都需要方向和目标。无论这个目标是眼前清晰可辨的地点，还是模糊不确定的'某处'，它始终是一个目标，因而是一个他者，一个我们朝向的'彼处'"（同上，第 391 页）。
Ibid., p. 317. 同上，第 317 页。
The first phrase comes from ibid., p. 325; the second, from ibid., p. 319. 第一句引文出自同上书第 325 页；第二句出自同上书第 319 页。
On the experience of gliding, see ibid., pp. 362-67. 关于滑翔体验的论述，参见同上书第 362 至 367 页。
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 266. 梅洛-庞蒂，《可见的与不可见的》，第 266 页。
Landscape painters once more bear witness to this: as in Constable’s rural scenes, where an entire countryside acts as such a field factor. 风景画家再次为此提供了佐证：例如康斯太勃尔的乡村场景中，整片乡野都充当着这样的场域要素。
Straus, The Primary World of Senses, p. 321. My italics. 斯特劳斯，《感官的原初世界》，第 321 页。斜体为笔者所加。
Lawrence Durrell, Spirit of Place: Letters and Essays on Travel (New York: Dutton, 1969), p. 157. 劳伦斯·达雷尔，《地方精神：旅行书信与随笔》（纽约：达顿出版社，1969 年），第 157 页。
On the idea of sympathetic (versus indifferent) space, see Straus, The Primary World of Senses, pp. 317ff, 388ff. 关于共鸣性（相对于冷漠性）空间的概念，参见斯特劳斯《感官的原初世界》第 317 页及后续、第 388 页及后续。
On this last point, see ibid., p. 317. 关于最后一点，参见同上，第 317 页。
Ibid., p. 322. 同上，第 322 页。
Johannes Hofer, “Medical Dissertation on Nostalgia,” trans. C. K. Anspach in the Bulletin of the History of Medicine 2 (1934):382. 约翰内斯·霍费尔，《论怀乡病的医学论文》，C·K·安斯帕奇译，载于《医学史通报》第 2 期（1934 年）：第 382 页。
Ibid., pp. 389-90. 同上，第 389-390 页。
Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (Könisberg: Nicolovius, 1798), sec. 32. Kant finds the source of nostalgia in an afflicted imagination, not in memory. 伊曼努尔·康德，《实用人类学》（柯尼斯堡：尼科洛维乌斯出版社，1798 年），第 32 节。康德认为怀乡病的根源在于受创的想象力，而非记忆。
Hofer, “Medical Dissertation,” p. 385. 霍弗，《医学论文》，第 385 页。
For a detailed account, see my forthcoming essay “The World of Nostalgia.” 详细论述请参阅我即将发表的论文《怀旧的世界》。
"‘Motion’ in its most general and primary sense is change of place, which we call ‘locomotion’ " (Aristotle, Physics, 208a 31-32). "运动在最普遍和最基本的意义上就是位置的改变，我们称之为'位移'"（亚里士多德，《物理学》，208a 31-32）。
The distinction between “common” and “special” places is found in the Physics: cf. 209a 32-209b 6. "普通"位置与"特殊"位置的区分见于《物理学》：参见 209a 32-209b 6。
Martin Heidegger, “On Time and Being” in Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) p. 15ff. 马丁·海德格尔，《时间与存在》中"论时间与存在"，J.斯坦鲍夫译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1972 年）第 15 页及以下。
Of course, the body is itself a forceful synthesizing power, foreshadowing (and doubtless underlying) the synthesizing properties of memory and place themselves: “It is not this epistemological subject [i.e., as in Kant] who brings about the 当然，身体本身就是一种强大的综合力量，预示着（且无疑是）记忆与场所自身综合特性的基础："并非这个认识论主体[如康德所言]促成了"
synthesis, but the body, when it escapes from dispersion, pulls itself together and tends by all means in its power toward one single goal of its activity” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 232). “综合并非由意识完成，而是当身体摆脱分散状态时，它会自我整合，并竭尽所能地趋向其活动的单一目标”（梅洛-庞蒂，《知觉现象学》，第 232 页）。
This distinction is made by Husserl in Experience and Judgment, sec. 33. I have elaborated on it in Imagining (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 153-64. 这一区分由胡塞尔在《经验与判断》第 33 节中提出。我在《想象》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年）第 153 至 164 页对其进行了详细阐述。
See Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, sec. 10. 参见胡塞尔，《内时间意识现象学》第 10 节。
Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p. 107. 胡塞尔，《经验与判断》第 107 页。
See Straus, The Primary World of Senses, p. 320: “As a rule, our journeys are planned and an itinerary mapped out.” Straus prefers to speak of “geographic space” where I talk of “sited space”; there is no fundamental difference between the two terms, which also resemble Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a “spatialized space” (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 244). 参见斯特劳斯，《感官的原初世界》第 320 页：“通常，我们的旅程是预先规划好的，路线图也已制定。”斯特劳斯倾向于使用“地理空间”这一表述，而我则采用“场所空间”；这两个术语并无本质区别，它们也类似于梅洛-庞蒂提出的“空间化的空间”概念（《知觉现象学》第 244 页）。
On the intricacies of association in memory, see John P. Anderson and Gordon Bower, Human Associative Memory (Washington, D.C.: Winston, 1973). 关于记忆联想机制的复杂性，参见约翰·P·安德森与戈登·鲍尔合著的《人类联想记忆》（华盛顿特区：温斯顿出版社，1973 年）。
St. Augustine, Confessions, Book X, chap. 8 (Pine-Coffin translation). For St. Augustine, memory is precisely place-like in its capacity-as is attested by an entire metaphorics of “cave,” “den,” “cavern,” “treasurehouse,” etc. In this view, memory is a super-place of storage. 圣奥古斯丁，《忏悔录》第十卷第八章（派恩-科芬译本）。对圣奥古斯丁而言，记忆因其储存能力而恰似场所——整个"洞穴"、"巢穴"、"地窖"、"宝库"等隐喻体系都印证了这一点。这种观点认为记忆是储存的超级场所。
Aristotle, Physics, 209 a 28-9. Recall as well Proust’s description of his narrator’s experience: “Everything revolved around me through the darkness: things, places, years . . .” Remembrance of Things Past, I, 6; my italics. 亚里士多德，《物理学》209a28-29。同时可参见普鲁斯特对其叙述者体验的描述："在黑暗中，万物围绕我旋转：事物、地点、年代......"《追忆似水年华》第一卷第六章；着重号为笔者所加。
Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, I, 51. 普鲁斯特，《追忆似水年华》第一卷第五十一章。
See A. R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist, trans. L. Solotaroff (Chicago: Reginery, 1968), esp. p. 41ff. 参见 A·R·鲁利亚《记忆大师的思维》，L·索洛塔罗夫译（芝加哥：瑞金纳瑞出版社，1968 年），尤见第 41 页及后续内容。
In the classical form, several such memory-houses are clustered together on a single street: see the reproduction in R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. viii. 在古典形式中，数个这样的记忆宫殿会聚集在同一条街道上：参见 R.索拉布吉《亚里士多德论记忆》（伦敦：达克沃斯出版社，1972 年）第 viii 页的复制图示。
On the disposition of images in the art of memory, see Yates, The Art of Memory, pp. 9-12. 关于记忆艺术中意象的布局安排，参见耶茨《记忆之术》第 9-12 页。
Edwin T. Morris, The Gardens of China: History, Art, and Meanings (New York: Scribner’s, 1983), p. xi. 埃德温·T·莫里斯《中国园林：历史、艺术与内涵》（纽约：斯克里布纳出版社，1983 年）第 xi 页。
Ibid. 同上。
Ibid., p. 96. 同上，第 96 页。
Ibid., p. 3. 同上，第 3 页。
Ibid., p. 47. 同上，第 47 页。
Ibid. 同上。
On the concept of borrowing, see ibid., p. 75f. Lakes were especially effective in this role. 关于借用的概念，参见同书第 75 页及以下。湖泊在这方面尤其有效。
On these means respectively, see ibid., p. 112, p. 90, p. 91. 关于这些方式，分别参见同书第 112 页、第 90 页、第 91 页。
Ibid., p. 91. By the same token, we can say that “all nature [is] a garden” (ibid., p. 55). It is important to realize, however, that this is not a matter of any simple, straightforward resemblance. If shan-shui, the Chinese word for landscape, means literally “mountains and water,” the plants, rocks, and ponds of a Chinese garden allude to a more encompassing landscape only as mediated by painting and poetry. At work here is a subtle blend of nature and culture. For example, a configuration of three stones in a garden may refer at one and the same time to the artificial “lion” peaks in the Lion Grove Garden in Suzhou; to the painting by Dao Ji entitled “Three Peaks of the Heavenly Realm”; and to the calligraphic sign for mountain, shan, which is the schematic representation of just such an arrangement of mountain peaks. In this case, therefore, the rememberata include another garden, a particular painting, and a written character-but no actual mountains. (On the relation between memory and literature, see Stephen Owen, Remembrances: The 同上，第 91 页。同理，我们可以说"整个自然[就是]一座园林"（同上，第 55 页）。但必须认识到，这并非简单的直接相似关系。中文"山水"一词虽字面意为"山与水"，但中国园林中的植物、山石与池塘，唯有通过绘画与诗歌的中介，才能唤起更宏阔的山水意境。这里体现的是自然与文化的精妙融合。例如，园中三块石头的组合可能同时指向：苏州狮子林中人工堆叠的"狮子"峰；道济所绘《天域三峰图》；以及"山"字的书法形态——其笔划正是对这种山峰排列的图式化表现。因此在此例中，被记忆物包含另一座园林、特定画作与文字符号，却未涉及真实山岳。（关于记忆与文学的关系，参见宇文所安《追忆：
Experience of the Past in Classical Chinese Literature [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986].) 古典中国文学中的过往体验[马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1986 年]。)
95. Morris, The Gardens of China, p. 57. 95. 莫里斯，《中国园林》，第 57 页。
96. The use of the covered arcade also aided in this process of sustenance: here in the specific form of protection from the elements. 96. 有顶连廊的运用也延续了这一设计理念：其具体功能在于遮风避雨。
97. Morris, The Gardens of China, p. 77. 97. 莫里斯，《中国园林》，第 77 页。
98. “Staggered perspectives also helped create distinct divisions. . . . One terrace rising above another tended to carry the imagination away into the empyrean; one roof visible in the distance beyond another suggested that the space went on ad infinitum” (ibid., p. 78). Once more, what Morris claims for imagination is valid for memory as well. 98. "错落的景深同样有助于形成空间区隔......层层抬升的台地将想象引向九霄云外；远处若隐若现的叠檐暗示着空间的无限延伸"（同上，第 78 页）。莫里斯对想象力的论述同样适用于记忆领域。
99. See Alfreda Murck & Wen Fong, A Chinese Garden Court: The Astor Court of The Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York: n.d.), p. 29. 99. 参见阿尔弗雷达·默克与方闻合著《中国庭院：大都会艺术博物馆阿斯特庭院》（纽约：出版时间不详），第 29 页。
100. Ibid. p. 42. Thus, if one looks through the Moon Gate at the Astor Court Garden, the outside wall is seen to give way to the inner wall of the vestibule, which opens further onto the perforated wall of the Ming Room-which in turn displays grilled windows giving onto a plant-and-rock grouping enclosed within yet another wall. See the photography of the Moon Gate at ibid., p. 31. 100. 同上，第 42 页。因此，若透过阿斯特庭院花园的月洞门观景，可见外墙逐渐过渡为门厅内墙，进而延伸至明厅的透空花墙——花墙上的格窗又将视线引向另一重围墙内的山石花木组合。相关月洞门摄影见同书第 31 页。
101. In larger gardens similar effects are achieved with water; a pond or lake establishes "a horizontal plane that contrasts with [the vertical space] of rock mountains and pavilions: (Morris, The Gardens of China, p. 87). One particular way of achieving depth or horizon was to bring about the impression that the water that disappeared under a bridge or a bank continued on indefinitely in unperceived parts. On the role of water, see Murck and Fong, A Chinese Garden Court, p. 13. 101. 在大型园林中，类似景深效果常借水体实现；池塘或湖泊营造出"与假山亭阁的垂直空间形成对比的水平面"（莫里斯《中国园林》第 87 页）。营造深远意境的特殊手法，是使水流在桥下或岸畔看似消失后仍于视线不及处无限延展。关于水景的运用，参见默克与方闻《中国庭院》第 13 页。
102. Murck and Fong, A Chinese Garden Court, p. 29. 102. 默克与方闻《中国庭院》，第 29 页。
103. Morris, The Gardens of China, p. 85. 103. 莫里斯，《中国园林》，第 85 页。
104. See also ibid., p. 199, for further discussion of this point. 104. 关于这一点的进一步讨论，另见同书第 199 页。
105. I should say “largely confined,” for there have been efforts to construct physical models of the method of loci, most notably that undertaken by Guilio Camillo in the sixteenth century. On this model, see Yates, The Art of Memory, pp. 129-72. 105. 我应该说"主要局限于"，因为历史上曾有人尝试构建位置记忆法的实体模型，最著名的是 16 世纪朱利奥·卡米洛的尝试。关于这个模型，参见耶茨《记忆之术》第 129-172 页。
106. A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 49. 106. A·N·怀特海，《科学与现代世界》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1953 年），第 49 页。
107. Ibid., p. 91. 107. 同上，第 91 页。
108. See ibid., p. 92ff. 108. 参见同上，第 92 页及以下。
109. The same point holds for time: if “there is nothing in the present fact which inherently refers either to the past or to the future” (ibid., p. 51), there can be no meaningful remembering. 109. 时间亦是同理：如果"当前事实中没有任何内在指向过去或未来的成分"（同上，第 51 页），就不可能有真正意义上的回忆。
110. Rainer Maria Rilke, Letter of Nov. 13, 1925, reprinted in R. M. Rilke, Duino Elegies, trans. J. B. Leishman and S. Spender (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 128. His italics. 110. 莱纳·玛利亚·里尔克 1925 年 11 月 13 日书信，重刊于《杜伊诺哀歌》（J.B.莱什曼与 S.斯彭德英译，纽约：诺顿出版社，1963 年），第 128 页。斜体为原作者所加。
111. Murck and Fong, A Chinese Garden Court, p. 40. 111. 默克与方，《中国园林庭院》，第 40 页。
112. Ibid. 112. 同上。
113. See Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” pp. 152-61 (on the bridge), and “The Thing,” pp. 167-77, trans. A. Hofstadter in Poetry, Language, and Thought. 113. 参见海德格尔《筑·居·思》第 152-61 页（关于桥的论述），以及《物》第 167-77 页，收录于霍夫施塔特英译本《诗·语言·思》。
114. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. M. Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964), p. 8. 114. 加斯东·巴什拉《空间诗学》，玛丽亚·若拉斯英译（纽约：猎户座出版社，1964 年），第 8 页。
115. Ibid. 115. 同上。
116. Frank Lloyd Wright sought to reverse this tendency: “I fought for outswinging windows . . . [which] gave free openings outward” (F. L. Wright, The Natural House [New York: Horizon, 1954], p. 38). 116. 弗兰克·劳埃德·赖特试图扭转这一趋势："我坚持采用外开窗...（它们）实现了向外的自由开合"（F·L·赖特，《自然住宅》[纽约：地平线出版社，1954 年]，第 38 页）。
117. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 6. 117. 巴什拉，《空间诗学》，第 6 页。
118. Wright, The Natural House, p. 40; Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 7. 118. 赖特，《自然住宅》，第 40 页；巴什拉，《空间诗学》，第 7 页。
119. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 9. On intimate immensity, see ibid., chap. 8. 119. 巴什拉，《空间诗学》，第 9 页。关于"亲密的无限"，参见同书第八章。
120. Ibid., p. 203. 120. 同上，第 203 页。
121. On this question, see my unpublished essay, “The Memorability of Inhabited Place,” and especially, Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore, Body, Memory, and Architecture, passim. 121. 关于这个问题，可参阅我未发表的论文《人居场所的可记忆性》，特别是肯特·布鲁默与查尔斯·摩尔的《身体、记忆与建筑》各处论述。
122. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, pp. 6-7; my italics. 122. 巴什拉，《空间诗学》，第 6-7 页；斜体为笔者所加。
123. Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper, 1972), p. 3. 123. 马丁·海德格尔，《何谓思？》，J·格伦·格雷译（纽约：哈珀出版社，1972 年），第 3 页。
124. Bachelard, Poetics of Space, p. xxxiii. 124. 巴什拉，《空间诗学》，第 xxxiii 页。
125. In the Leishman and Spender translation cited in n .110 above. 125. 见上文注释 110 所引用的莱什曼与斯彭德译本。
126. On this point, see Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 9. 126. 关于这一点，参见巴什拉《空间诗学》第 9 页。
127. Ibid., p. 9. A corollary is that “space is everything, for time ceases to quicken memory.” 127. 同上，第 9 页。一个必然推论是"空间即是一切，因为时间已不再激活记忆。"
128. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 66. 128. 胡塞尔，《内时间意识现象学》，第 66 页。
129. See Heidegger, Being and Time, sec. 70. 129. 参见海德格尔，《存在与时间》，第 70 节。
130. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 9. 130. 巴什拉，《空间诗学》，第 9 页。
131. T. S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton” (The Four Quartets), stanza II; his italics. (From T. S. Eliot, Collected Poems 1909-1962 [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963], p. 177.) 131. T. S. 艾略特，《烧毁的诺顿》（《四个四重奏》），第二节；斜体为原作者所加。（摘自 T. S. 艾略特《1909-1962 年诗集》[纽约：哈考特·布雷斯世界出版社，1963 年]，第 177 页。）
132. Ibid., stanza I, V. 132. 同上，第一节，第五节。
10. Commemoration 10. 纪念
See the entry under “commemorate” in C. T. Onions, ed. The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 194. 参见 C. T. 奥尼恩斯主编的《牛津英语词源词典》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1966 年）中"commemorate"词条，第 194 页。
I draw here on the Oxford English Dictionary, entry under “commemoration.” 此处我参考了《牛津英语词典》中"commemoration"词条下的释义。
Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 181. 埃德蒙·胡塞尔，《观念》，W·R·博伊斯·吉布森译（纽约：科利尔出版社，1962 年），第 181 页。
On the “in-order-to,” see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), secs. 14, 17. 关于"为了"概念，参见马丁·海德格尔《存在与时间》，J·麦奎利和 E·罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 14、17 节。
Indeed, commemorating combines readily with every form of remembering. Even a momentary recollection can cue in an experience of commemoration, or highlight it while in mid-course. The same is true of recognition, which may play an important supportive role. Reminiscing can serve an expressly commemorative function, e.g., when it forms part of a eulogy. Notice that in none of these instances can we reduce commemorating itself to the memorial activity with which it is conjoined. Whether as cuing, subserving, expressing, etc., the conjoined activity remains distinguishable from commemorating proper. In the case of body and place memories, we shall see that there is a still more intimate association with commemoration; each is even indispensable to complete commemorating, whose ritualistic aspect almost always requires bodily action in a particular place. Nevertheless, commemoration is not to be understood as a form of body memory or place memory: it remains unreducible to either. 的确，纪念与各种形式的记忆都能轻易结合。即便是瞬间的回忆也能触发纪念体验，或在过程中凸显其意义。识别记忆同样如此，它可能扮演重要的辅助角色。追忆可以明确发挥纪念功能，例如当它构成悼词的一部分时。值得注意的是，在这些情形中，我们都不能将纪念本身简化为与之结合的记忆活动。无论是作为触发、辅助还是表达，这些结合的活动始终与纯粹的纪念有所区别。就身体记忆和场所记忆而言，我们将看到它们与纪念活动存在更为紧密的联系；二者甚至对完成纪念仪式都不可或缺，因为纪念的仪式性特征几乎总是要求在特定场所进行身体行动。然而，纪念不应被理解为身体记忆或场所记忆的一种形式：它始终无法被简化为其中任何一种。
It needs to be emphasized that this limpidity is very much an ideal. In a passage I cited in the last chapter Husserl reminded us of the “veiled” character that inheres in recollection itself. My own notion of “aura” is another cautionary note. The ideal of limpidity itself belongs to a Cartesian conception of truth and evidence for truth. As such, it reflects the seventeenth century model of representations in 必须强调的是，这种澄明性很大程度上是一种理想。我在前一章引用的段落中，胡塞尔提醒我们回忆本身固有的"遮蔽"特性。我提出的"灵韵"概念则是另一种警示。澄明性理想本身属于笛卡尔式的真理观及其证明方式。就此而言，它反映了十七世纪表征模式中
general as mirroring the external world. This model is taken to task in Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 普遍被视为对外部世界的反映。这一模型在理查德·罗蒂的《哲学与自然之镜》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1979 年）中受到质疑。
The addition of my student’s words on the opposite side of the postcard"The origins of Western thought are indeed difficult to find in this extraordinary world of rubble and stone"-still do not suffice to convert the situation into a commemorative occasion. Such comments, however appropriate, lack certain features of commemorative texts which will be explored in sec. IV. 明信片背面我学生所写的话——“西方思想的起源确实难以在这片由碎石与岩石构成的非凡世界中被寻获”——仍不足以将这一情境转化为纪念性时刻。这类评论无论多么贴切，都缺失了某些纪念性文本的特征，我们将在第四节对此进行探讨。
On this aspect of writing, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 145, 351f. 关于写作的这一方面，参见汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔《真理与方法》（纽约：西伯里出版社，1975 年），第 145、351 页及以下。
On the ritualistic aspects of menus, see Mary Douglas, “Deciphering a Meal,” Daedalus (Winter 1972):61-81. On cockfights, see Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” ibid., pp. 1-37. 关于菜单的仪式性方面，参见玛丽·道格拉斯《解码一餐》，载《代达罗斯》（1972 年冬季刊）第 61-81 页。关于斗鸡活动，参见克利福德·格尔茨《深度游戏：巴厘岛斗鸡笔记》，同刊第 1-37 页。
On the notion of lil i, see Tu Wei-ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), chaps. 1, 2; and Herbert Fingarette, Con-fucius-The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), chaps. 3, 4. 关于 lil i 概念，参见杜维明《人性与自我修养》（伯克利：亚洲人文出版社，1979 年）第 1、2 章；以及赫伯特·芬格莱特《孔子：即凡而圣》（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1972 年）第 3、4 章。
Included in this category are what Foucault calls the “micropractices” of technique and utilization which have been taken over unthinkingly from the particular cultural tradition in which we find ourselves embedded. On these micropractices and their hermeneutic significance as modes of Heideggerian “fore-having,” see Hubert Dreyfus, “Holism and Hermeneutics,” Review of Metaphysics 34 (September 1980):6-23. 此类包括福柯所称的技术与运用的"微观实践"，它们被不加思索地从我们所处的特定文化传统中承袭而来。关于这些微观实践及其作为海德格尔"前有"模式的诠释学意义，参见休伯特·德雷福斯《整体论与诠释学》，载《形而上学评论》第 34 卷（1980 年 9 月）第 6-23 页。
Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 19. 维克多·特纳，《符号之林：恩登布仪式面面观》（伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1967 年），第 19 页。
Walter F. Otto, Dionysus: Myth and Cult, trans. Robert B. Palmer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 41-42. 瓦尔特·F·奥托，《狄俄尼索斯：神话与崇拜》，罗伯特·B·帕尔默译（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1973 年），第 41-42 页。
Ibid., p. 43; my italics. 同上，第 43 页；斜体为笔者所加。
For further consideration of these and related aspects of ritual, see my essay, “Reflections on Ritual,” Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology (1985), pp. 102-9. 关于仪式这些及相关维度的进一步探讨，参见拙文《对仪式的思考》，载《春天：原型心理学年刊》（1985 年），第 102-109 页。
Oxford English Dictionary. This is the second definition of commemoration. Webster’s Third International says only “to mark by some ceremony or observation.” 《牛津英语词典》。这是"纪念"的第二条释义。《韦氏第三版新国际词典》仅定义为"通过某种仪式或活动来标示"。
Oxford English Dictionary. 《牛津英语词典》
If I have denied repetition in remembering as a strict re-living of the past, ritualistic repetition-which does not pretend to anything like precise nachleben-is not subject to the same severe exclusion. 如果说我否认记忆中的重复是对过去的严格重现，那么仪式性重复——它并不假装要实现任何精确的复现——则不受同样严苛的排斥。
Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1959), p. 69. 米尔恰·伊利亚德，《神圣与世俗》（纽约：哈考特出版社，1959 年），第 69 页。
Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 29. 米尔恰·伊利亚德，《永恒回归的神话》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1974 年），第 29 页。
See S. Freud, “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices,” in Standard Edition, 9:117-27. 参见 S.弗洛伊德，《强迫行为与宗教实践》，载《标准版》第 9 卷，第 117-127 页。
Turner, The Forest of Symbols, p. 45. See also p. 20: “Performances of ritual [are] distinct phases in the social processes whereby groups become adjusted to internal changes and adapted to their external environment.” 特纳，《象征之林》，第 45 页。另见第 20 页：“仪式表演[是]社会进程中的独特阶段，通过它群体得以适应内部变化并调适其外部环境。”
On the relation between repetition and formality, see my essay “Imagination and Repetition in Literature: A Reassessment,” Yale French Studies 52 (1975), pp. 249-67. 关于重复与形式性之间的关系，参见拙文《文学中的想象与重复：再评估》，载《耶鲁法国研究》第 52 期（1975 年），第 249-267 页。
“Evidences of human passion and frailty are just not spoken about when the occasion is given up to public commemoration and reanimation of norms and values in their abstract purity” (Turner, The Forest of Symbols, p. 38). “当场合被让渡给对规范和价值之抽象纯粹性的公共纪念与重振时，人类激情与脆弱的证据恰恰不被言说”（特纳，《象征之林》，第 38 页）。
These are the last lines of Shelley’s “Ozymandias.” 这是雪莱《奥西曼提亚斯》的最后几行诗句。
One memorial volume speaks of itself as “a small material remembrance” 一本纪念文集自称是"一份微薄的有形纪念"
(Robert Palmer Knight 1902-1966-A Memorial [published privately for the Western New England Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1967]). （《罗伯特·帕尔默·奈特 1902-1966 纪念集》[新英格兰西部精神分析学会 1967 年私印版]）。
Plato, Timaeus 37 d (Cornford translation). 柏拉图，《蒂迈欧篇》37d（康福德译本）。
Typically, either eternity is made more timelike (as in Aquinas’s view of it as a “nunc stans”) or time is allowed to rise to the level of eternity as in those rare “moments of vision” (Augenblicken) on which Kierkegaard and Heidegger are so insistent. The following pages draw on material from my essay “Commemoration and Perdurance in The Analects, Books I, II,” Philosophy East and West 34 (1984):38999. On the three temporal modes contrasted above, see A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1953), pp. 86-87. 通常，要么将永恒描绘得更具时间性（如阿奎那将其视为"永恒的现在"），要么让时间提升至永恒的高度，就像克尔凯郭尔和海德格尔极力推崇的那些罕见的"顿悟时刻"。以下内容节选自我发表在《东西方哲学》1984 年第 34 期第 389-399 页的论文《论语第一、二篇中的纪念与持久性》。关于上述三种时间模式的对比，参见 A.N.怀特海《科学与现代世界》（纽约：自由出版社，1953 年）第 86-87 页。
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. J. Yolton (New York: Dutton, 1965), Bk. II, chap. 14, par. 3; my italics. 约翰·洛克《人类理解论》，J.约尔顿编（纽约：达顿出版社，1965 年），第二卷第 14 章第 3 段；斜体为笔者所加。
Ibid., chap. 15, par. 11. 同上，第 15 章第 11 段。
Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 461-62. 海德格尔《存在与时间》，第 461-462 页。
Heidegger, “Time and Being” in On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 12. 海德格尔，《时间与存在》，载于《论时间与存在》，J.斯坦鲍尔译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1972 年），第 12 页。
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “perdurance” curtly as: “permanence, duration.” 《牛津英语词典》将"perdurance"简要定义为："永久性，持续"。
But this latter occurs only gradually: “withstanding wear or decay” (Oxford English Dictionary) is indispensable to perdurance. 但后者是逐渐发生的："经受磨损或衰败"（《牛津英语词典》）是持久性不可或缺的条件。
“‘How is it possible to take [a] middleway?’ The Master said: 'by means of the li, the li. Yes, it is by the li that one may hold to the mean” (Li Chi, trans. J. Legge, in The Sacred Books of the East [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885], vol. 27, chap. 28). "'如何可能走[一条]中庸之道？'孔子说：'依于礼，依于礼。是的，正是通过礼才能持守中道'"（《礼记》，理雅各译，载《东方圣书》[牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1885 年]，第 27 卷，第 28 章）。
Confucius, The Analects, trans. D. C. Lau (New York: Penguin, 1979), bk. II, chap. 2 p. 63. 孔子，《论语》，刘殿爵译（纽约：企鹅出版社，1979 年），第二篇第二章，第 63 页。
On swerving and its relation to poetic creativity, see Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 44-45. 关于偏离及其与诗歌创造力的关系，参见哈罗德·布鲁姆，《影响的焦虑》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1975 年），第 44-45 页。
Indeed, the LiChi maintains the position that "the fundamental principles of the lil i remain unchanged, but their outward concrete manifestations in “the number of things and observances’ ever change with the times” (Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952], I, 340). 确实，《礼记》秉持"礼之本不变，而礼之文随世变易"的立场（冯友兰《中国哲学史》，德克·卜德英译本[普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1952 年]，第一卷，第 340 页）。
“Unless a man has the spirit of the rites, in being respectful he will wear himself out, in being careful he will become timid” (Confucius, The Analects, bk. 8, chap. 2 p. 92). "人而不仁，如礼何？人而不仁，如乐何？"（孔子《论语·八佾篇》第二章，第 92 页）
“Observe what a man has to do when his father is living, and then observe what he does when his father is dead” (ibid., bk. 1, chap. 11, p. 60-61; my italics). "父在，观其志；父没，观其行"（同上，第一篇第十一章，第 60-61 页；着重号为笔者所加）。
See Allan Ludwig, Graven Images (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1966) and Dickran and Ann Tashjian, Memorials for Children of Change (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1974). “Memento Mori” means literally “remember that you have to die.” 参见艾伦·路德维希《雕刻圣像》（米德尔顿：卫斯理大学出版社，1966 年）与迪克兰、安·塔什詹合著《变革时代的儿童纪念碑》（康涅狄格州米德尔顿：卫斯理大学出版社，1974 年）。“Memento Mori”字面意为"记住你终有一死"。
On reactualization, see Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 76. 关于重现化，参见埃利亚德《永恒回归的神话》第 76 页。
Ibid., p. 75. 同上，第 75 页。
Ibid., p. 82. 同上，第 82 页。
Cited at ibid. 转引自同上出处。
Cited at ibid., p. 83. 同前引书，第 83 页。
On the latter notion of supplementing, see Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. D. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 88-104. 关于补充概念的讨论，参见雅克·德里达《言语与现象》，D. 艾利森译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1973 年），第 88-104 页。
“Text means tissue; but whereas hitherto we have always taken this tissue as a product, a ready-made veil, behind which lies, more or less hidden, meaning (truth), we are now emphasizing, in the tissue, the generative idea that the text is made, is "文本即织物；然而迄今为止我们总是将这种织物视为成品，视为现成的面纱，其背后或多或少隐藏着意义（真理），如今我们则强调织物中蕴含的生成性理念——文本是被编织而成的"
worked out in a perpetual interweaving; lost in this tissue-this texture-the subject unmakes himself, like a spider dissolving in the constructive secretions of its web. Were we fond of neologisms, we might define the theory of the text as an hyphology (hyphos is the tissue and the spider’s web).” (Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. R. Howard [New York: Hill & Wang, 1975], p. 64. See also Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 263n.) 在永恒的编织中展开；迷失于这组织——这纹理——主体消解了自身，犹如蜘蛛消融于其蛛网的建构性分泌物中。若我们偏爱新词，或可将文本理论定义为一种"织网学"（hyphos 即组织与蛛网）。（罗兰·巴特《文之悦》，理查德·霍华德译，纽约：希尔与王出版社，1975 年，第 64 页。另见雅克·德里达《哲学的边缘》，艾伦·巴斯译，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1982 年，第 263 页注释。）
The same is true for many nonverbal works of art that are commemorative in their effects: say, the “1812 Overture,” Cézanne’s paintings of Mt. St. Victoire, Monet’s studies of Rouen Cathedral. The addition of labels and titles to these works is not helpful beyond providing bare identification. 许多具有纪念效果的非语言艺术作品也是如此：例如《1812 序曲》、塞尚的圣维克多山系列画作、莫奈的鲁昂大教堂研究。为这些作品添加标签和标题，除了提供基本识别信息外并无助益。
Confucius, The Analects, bk. 4, chap. 7, p. 73. 孔子，《论语·里仁第四》第七章，第 73 页。
Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 2, p. 63. 同上，《论语·为政第二》第二章，第 63 页。
Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 56. 冯友兰，《中国哲学史》，第 56 页。
I have treated this entire situation in more detail in “Commemoration and Perdurance in The Analects, Books I and II.” Since the role of ancestor worship in the Analects is well known, I have ignored it in the text above; but a brief consideration of it is given in section VIIII below. 我在《论语·学而篇与为政篇中的纪念与持久性》一文中更详细地探讨了这一整体情境。鉴于祖先崇拜在《论语》中的作用已广为人知，我在前文未予讨论；但下文第九节会对此进行简要探讨。
The same effect of mutual reinforcement is found in the case of image-cumtext; e.g., in gravestones with human faces, skeletons, angels, or animals sculpted on them, in addition to proper names and dates. The Civil War monument referred to earlier for the sake of its eloquent text is crowned by a Union soldier gazing southward with his rifle at rest. Depicted figures often accompany inscriptions on Egyptian and Greek stelae. In all such cases, we witness a complementarity of image and word as conjoined in a single material commemorabilium. One factor helps to make up for what the other lacks: simultaneous spatial display on the one hand and verbally encoded information on the other. As in the parallel case of the ars memorativa, image and sign empower each other. 图像与文字结合时同样会产生这种相互强化的效果，例如在刻有人脸、骷髅、天使或动物形象以及姓名日期的墓碑上。前文提及的那座以铭文著称的南北战争纪念碑，其顶部便矗立着一位持枪南望的联邦士兵雕像。埃及与希腊的石碑上也常见图像与铭文相伴而生。所有这些案例中，我们都见证了图像与文字在单一物质纪念载体中的互补关系：一方面通过空间并置呈现，另一方面通过语言编码传递信息。正如记忆术中的平行案例，图像与符号在此相互赋能。
See Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, trans. M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). 参见阿诺德·范热内普《过渡礼仪》，M.B.维泽多姆与 G.L.卡菲英译本（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1975 年）。
Turner, The Forest of Symbols, p. 98. 特纳，《象征之林》，第 98 页。
Ibid., pp. 96-97. 同上，第 96-97 页。
Victor Turner, The Ritual Process (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 101. 维克多·特纳，《仪式过程》（芝加哥：阿尔丁出版社，1969 年），第 101 页。
Ibid., p. 95. 同上，第 95 页。
In short, there is a suspension of “all attributes that distinguish categories and groups in the social order” (ibid., p. 103). 简言之，这里悬置了"社会秩序中区分各类别与群体的所有属性"（同上，第 103 页）。
This community is “the repository of the whole gamut of the culture’s values, norms, attitudes, sentiments, and relationships. Its representatives in the specific rites-and these may vary from ritual to ritual-represent the generic authority of tradition” (ibid.). 这个共同体是"文化中全部价值观、规范、态度、情感及关系的储存库。其在特定仪式中的代表者——这些代表者可能因仪式而异——体现着传统的普遍权威"（同上）。
“The neophyte in iminality must be a tabula rasa, a blank slate, on which is inscribed the knowledge and wisdom of the group, in those respects that pertain to the new status” (ibid.). "处于阈限阶段的新成员必须如同白板（tabula rasa），群体中与新身份相关的知识与智慧将被铭刻其上"（同上）。
Ibid., p. 105. 同上，第 105 页。
Ibid., p. 104. 同上，第 104 页。
Ibid., p. 101. Turner comments: “Even when a man has become a chief, he must still be a member of the whole community of persons (antu), and show this by ‘laughing with them,’ respecting their rights, ‘welcoming everyone,’ and sharing food with them” (ibid., pp. 104-5). 同上，第 101 页。特纳评论道："即使一个人已成为酋长，他仍必须是整个人群（antu）的一员，并通过'与他们一起欢笑'、尊重他们的权利、'欢迎每个人'以及与他们分享食物来体现这一点"（同上，第 104-5 页）。
Ibid., p. 96. 同上，第 96 页。
“Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage” is the title of the essay from which Turner’s developed reflections in The Ritual Process take their origin. See The Forest of Symbols, pp. 93-111. "阈限与过渡：通过仪式中的阈限期"是特纳在《仪式过程》中发展其思考所源自的论文标题。参见《符号的森林》，第 93-111 页。
On this point, see Gillian Feeley-Harnik, The Lord’s Table: Eucharist and Passover in Early Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), esp. chaps. 2, 3. 关于这一点，可参阅吉莉安·菲莉-哈尼克《主的筵席：早期基督教中的圣餐与逾越节》（费城：宾夕法尼亚大学出版社，1981 年），特别是第 2、3 章。
S. Freud, Totem and Taboo in Standard Edition, 13:142. S.弗洛伊德，《图腾与禁忌》标准版，第 13 卷，第 142 页。
See ibid., pp. 150-51. On the idea of the surrogate victim, see René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 197ff. 参见同上，第 150-151 页。关于替罪羊的概念，参阅勒内·吉拉尔《暴力与神圣》（巴尔的摩：约翰斯·霍普金斯大学出版社，1977 年），第 197 页及以下。
Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 143; my italics. 弗洛伊德，《图腾与禁忌》，第 143 页；斜体为笔者所加。
This formulation is from Freud, The Ego and the Id, Standard Edition, 20:29. 这一表述引自弗洛伊德《自我与本我》，标准版，第 20 卷，第 29 页。
Hans W. Loewald, “On Internalization,” in his Papers On Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 83. 汉斯·W·洛瓦尔德，《论内化》，收录于其《精神分析论文集》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1980 年），第 83 页。
Roy Schafer, Aspects of Internalization (New York: International Universities Press, 1968), p. 112. 罗伊·谢弗，《内化的诸面向》（纽约：国际大学出版社，1968 年），第 112 页。
S. Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” Standard Edition, 14:257. S. 弗洛伊德，《哀悼与忧郁》，标准版，第 14 卷，第 257 页。
Loewald, “On Internalization,” p. 83. 洛伊沃德，《论内化》，第 83 页。
Such an identification is “the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person” (Freud, Standard Edition, 18:105). 这种认同是"与他人建立情感纽带的最初表现"（弗洛伊德，《标准版》，第 18 卷：105 页）。
Freud, Standard Edition, 19:36. 弗洛伊德，《标准版》，第 19 卷：36 页。
Ibid., p. 34; my italics. 同上，第 34 页；着重号为笔者所加。
Ibid., p. 48. 同上，第 48 页。
“By giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents it perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its original” (ibid., p. 35 ). "通过永久性地表达父母的影响，它使那些造就其本源的因素得以延续存在"（同上，第 35 页）。
Other factors are at work as well of course: desexualization of libidinal ties with one’s parents, a sublimation of the resultant saving in energy, and an infusion of aggression from the id. The latter factor is increasingly stressed by Freud in the years 1920-1930. 当然还有其他因素在起作用：与父母力比多联结的去性化、由此节省能量的升华，以及来自本我的攻击性灌注。后一因素在 1920-1930 年间被弗洛伊德日益强调。
Freud, Standard Edition, 19:29. 弗洛伊德，《标准版》，第 19 卷，第 29 页。
Freud, Standard Edition, 21:133. 弗洛伊德，《标准版全集》第 21 卷第 133 页。
See Standard Edition, 7:170, 231, 239-40. 参见标准版第 7 卷：170, 231, 239-40 页。
Freud, Totem and Taboo, in Standard Edition 13:155. See also p. 158. 弗洛伊德，《图腾与禁忌》，标准版第 13 卷：155 页。另见 158 页。
It could also be shown that, within the vicissitudes of Freud’s own writings, there is much the same inversion of interests: as the importance of recollection wanes, the fortunes of non-recollective forms of remembering rise. For a more complete account of these vicissitudes, see my essay “The Changing Fate of Memory in Freud’s Work: Commemoration and Memorialization” (forthcoming). 同样可以证明的是，在弗洛伊德著作自身的演变过程中，也存在着几乎相同的兴趣逆转：随着回忆重要性的减弱，非回忆性记忆形式的地位逐渐上升。关于这些演变的更完整论述，可参阅拙文《弗洛伊德著作中记忆命运的变迁：纪念与铭记》（即将出版）。
On the immortality of the internalized object, see Schafer, Aspects of Internalization, pp. 220-36. 关于内化客体的不朽性，参见谢弗《内化的诸面向》第 220-236 页。
Freud, Totem and Taboo, in Standard Edition, 13:151. 弗洛伊德《图腾与禁忌》，标准版第 13 卷第 151 页。
As Louis Dupré says, “The self can only be remembered” (Transcendent Selfhood [New York: Seabury, 1976], p. 76). 正如路易·杜普雷所言："自我只能被记起"（《超越的自我性》[纽约：西伯里出版社，1976 年]，第 76 页）。
On identification via mirror images, see Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative Function of the I” in Ecrits, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 1-7. 关于通过镜像进行身份认同的讨论，参见雅克·拉康《书写集》中"作为自我形成功能的镜像阶段"一文，A.谢里丹英译（纽约：诺顿出版社，1977 年），第 1-7 页。
Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism,” in Standard Edition, 14:77. 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德，《论自恋》，载《标准版全集》第 14 卷第 77 页。
Arthur Rimband, letters to Paul Demeny, May 15, 1871. 阿尔蒂尔·兰波 1871 年 5 月 15 日致保罗·德梅尼的书信。
On the body as mediator between sacred and profane, see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), II, 228. 关于身体作为神圣与世俗中介的论述，参见恩斯特·卡西尔《符号形式的哲学》第二卷，R.曼海姆英译（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1955 年），第 228 页。
The body of the memorialized person may itself be depicted-as occurs in many stelae and in the case of the Civil War Memorial discussed above. 被纪念者的身体本身可能被直接描绘——正如许多石碑所示，以及上文讨论的内战纪念碑案例。
“Ritual” in Encyclopedia Brittanica, 15th Edition, vol. XV, p. 866. 《大英百科全书》第 15 版第 15 卷"仪式"词条，第 866 页。
See Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 28, 40, 43, 86. 参见雅克·德里达《立场》，艾伦·巴斯译（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1981 年），第 28、40、43、86 页。
I develop the distinction between “horizontal” and “vertical” communities in my paper, “Commemoration in the Eucharist,” in God: Experience or Origin?, ed. A. de Nicolas and E. Moutsopoulos (New York: Paragon, 1985), pp. 214-34. 我在论文《圣餐礼中的纪念》中阐述了"横向"与"纵向"社群的区别，该文收录于《上帝：经验或本源？》，A·德尼古拉斯与 E·穆索普洛斯编（纽约：典范出版社，1985 年），第 214-234 页。
Quoted in Jean Cazeneuve, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, trans. Peter Riviere (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 44. 转引自让·卡泽纳夫《吕西安·列维-布留尔》，彼得·里维埃尔译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1972 年），第 44 页。
Ibid., pp. 41-42; his italics. 同上，第 41-42 页；斜体为原作者所加。
On this point, see ibid., p. 42. 关于这一点，参见同书第 42 页。
Ibid. 同上。
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, trans. Peter Riviere (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 17. 吕西安·列维-布留尔，《原始思维笔记》，彼得·里维埃译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1978 年），第 17 页。
Cazeneuve, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, p. 43. 卡泽纳夫，《吕西安·列维-布留尔》，第 43 页。
See ibid., p. 60: “There is an identity of substance established between a man and what he eats; he becomes, he is what he eats and assimilates.” 见同书第 60 页："人与所食之物建立了实质上的同一性；人成为、且就是他所吃下并吸收的东西。"
Ibid., p. 51. 同书第 51 页。
Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, pp. 5-7. 列维-布留尔，《原始思维笔记》，第 5-7 页。
Ibid., p. 2. 同书第 2 页。
Ibid., p. 14. 同上，第 14 页。
This duality-unity may itself be regarded as a version of the corpse-and-ghost paradigm mentioned above. 这种二元统一性本身可被视为前述尸体与幽灵范式的变体。
Cazeneuve, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, p. 88. 卡泽纳夫，《吕西安·列维-布留尔》，第 88 页。
This phrase is taken from the first recorded use (1569) of “sempiternall” in the English language, as given by the Oxford English Dictionary (and as used in the epigram to this chapter). 该短语源自《牛津英语词典》记载的英语首次使用"sempiternall"一词的记录（1569 年），亦用作本章的题记。
Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, p. 2; his italics. 列维-布留尔，《原始思维笔记》第 2 页；斜体为原作者所加。
Ibid., p. 18; his italics. 同上，第 18 页；斜体为原作者所加。
Ibid., pp. 14-15. 同上，第 14-15 页。
Cazeneuve, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, p. 48. 卡泽纳夫，《吕西安·列维-布留尔》第 48 页。
Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, p. 1. 列维-布留尔《原始思维笔记》第 1 页
Moreover, just as we are the memories we possess in Locke’s view, so we are also defined by the private property we own: pieces of property thus being the exact analogues of memorial representations and both being the basis for a radical individualism. 此外，正如洛克认为我们是由所拥有的记忆构成的那样，我们同样由所拥有的私有财产来定义：财产片段因此成为记忆表征的精确对应物，二者共同构成了激进个人主义的基础。
Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and T. Kilmartin (New York: Random House, 1981), I, 50. 马塞尔·普鲁斯特《追忆似水年华》，C·K·斯科特·蒙克里夫与 T·基尔马丁合译（纽约：兰登书屋，1981 年），第一卷，第 50 页
Ibid. 同上
Ibid., pp. 50-51. 同上，第 50-51 页。
Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, p. 192; his italics. 列维-布留尔，《原始思维笔记》，第 192 页；斜体为原作者所加。
It could be argued further that the literal bi-presence of Marcel and Léonie in this scene symbolizes, by its very juxtaposition of representatives from two generations, the bi-presence of past and present themselves. The same could be ventured for the ceremonial bi-presence of priest and communicant in the Eucharist. It will be noted that I am using “bi-presence” here in a temporal sense, whereas Lévy-Bruhl originally proposed the idea in referring to a spatial setting (e.g., the case of Grubb and the Indian). But the term easily, and legitimately, invites generalization. 我们还可以进一步论证，马塞尔和莱奥妮在这个场景中的双重在场，通过两代人代表的并置，本身就象征着过去与现在的双重在场。同样的情况也适用于圣餐仪式中神父与领圣餐者的双重在场。值得注意的是，我在此处使用的"双重在场"具有时间性含义，而列维-布留尔最初提出这个概念时指的是空间场景（例如格拉布与印第安人的案例）。但这个术语很容易且合理地适用于更广泛的概括。
Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, p. 2. 列维-布留尔，《原始思维笔记》，第 2 页。
Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, I, 51; my italics. 普鲁斯特，《追忆似水年华》第一卷，第 51 页；斜体为笔者所加。
Cazeneuve, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, p. 42. 卡泽诺夫，《吕西安·列维-布留尔》，第 42 页。
On this interpretation, see J. N. Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1974). Cf. also the following passage from Whitehead: “The potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity” (in 关于这一解释，参见 J·N·芬德利所著《柏拉图：成文与未成文学说》（新泽西州大西洋高地：人文出版社，1974 年）。另参照怀特海以下论述："永恒客体的潜能实现于特定现实实体中，并构成该现实实体的确定性特征"（见
Process and Reality, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne [New York: Free Press, 1978], p. 23). 《过程与实在》，D·R·格里芬与 D·W·舍伯恩编[纽约：自由出版社，1978 年]，第 23 页）。
128. I say “proto-experiences” to underline the fact that for Plato one does not recollect personal experiences per se. One recollects only the kinds of experience that are necessary to the prior attainment of knowledge, which is itself the primary content recollected. 128. 我使用"原初体验"这一表述，是为了强调柏拉图认为人们回忆的并非个人经历本身。人们回忆的只是那些对先前获取知识所必需的体验类型，而知识本身才是被回忆的主要内容。
129. Plato, Meno 81 d. 129. 柏拉图，《美诺篇》81d。
130. That knowing is indeed commemorative is an explicit theme in the writings of Telesio, the Italian Renaissance philosopher: “[the mind] is able to discern the hidden conditions of those things of which but a single one is observed. . . . This power is commonly called understanding (intelligere), but is rather to be named judgment (existimari) or better commemorating (commemorari).” This passage is cited in J. H. Randall, Jr., The Career of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 205. Randall translates commemorari as “remembering together” and comments: “knowing is a remembering together (commemorari) the other qualities of an object associated with the one you observe” (ibid.). This statement overlooks the Platonic roots of Telesio’s thought. 130. 认知本质上是纪念性的——这一观点在意大利文艺复兴时期哲学家泰莱西奥的著作中得到了明确阐述："[心灵]能够辨别那些仅观察到单一特征之物的隐藏状态......这种能力通常被称为理解（intelligere），但更应命名为判断（existimari）或更准确地说纪念（commemorari）。"该引文出自 J·H·小兰德尔所著《哲学的历程》（纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社，1962 年）第 205 页。兰德尔将 commemorari 译为"共同回忆"并评论道："认知是对观察对象相关联的其他特质进行共同回忆（commemorari）的过程"（同上）。这一论述忽略了泰莱西奥思想的柏拉图主义根源。
131. Heidegger’s celebrated commemoration of the Greek origins of philosophy could be construed as a commemoration of an equally decisive ending. In his view metaphysics has had a quite determinate beginning-precisely in the Platonic doctrine of Forms-and a very definite ending: in Nietzsche’s doctrines of the will to power and eternal recurrence. There is something dramatic, peremptory, and decisive about such an ending-as is conveyed so eloquently in Nietzsche’s life and work, which Heidegger commemorates in his four volumes of lectures on this prophetic figure who first saw clearly that “philosophy is ending in the present age” (Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” in On Time and Being, p. 58). 131. 海德格尔对哲学希腊起源的著名纪念，亦可解读为对同样决定性终结的纪念。在他看来，形而上学有着极为明确的起点——确切而言始于柏拉图的理型论——以及极为确定的终点：尼采的权力意志与永恒轮回学说。这种终结具有某种戏剧性、专断性与决定性，正如尼采生平与著作所雄辩展现的那样。海德格尔在其四卷本讲座中纪念这位先知式人物时指出，尼采最先清晰认识到"哲学正在当今时代走向终结"（海德格尔《论时间与存在》中《哲学的终结与思的任务》第 58 页）。
132. Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, p. 15. 132. 海德格尔，《时间与存在》，收录于《论时间与存在》第 15 页。
133. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 103. 133. 马丁·海德格尔，《何谓思？》，J·格伦·格雷译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1972 年），第 103 页。
134. For a remarkable study of evanescing, see William Earle, Evanescence (Chicago: Regnery, 1984). 134. 关于消逝现象的杰出研究，参见威廉·厄尔《消逝论》（芝加哥：雷格纳里出版社，1984 年）。
135. On this point, see S. Freud, Standard Edition, 1:356; 3:154, 166 n . 135. 关于这一点，参见 S.弗洛伊德《标准版全集》第 1 卷第 356 页；第 3 卷第 154 页、第 166 页注释。
136. Nietzsche treats "the will’s revulsion against time and its ‘It was’ in Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingde (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), Part II, “Of Redemption,” pp. 159-63. Heidegger discusses the same point in What Is Called Thinking?, pp. 92-96. 136. 尼采在《查拉图斯特拉如是说》（R.J.霍林代尔译，巴尔的摩：企鹅出版社，1969 年）第二部分"论救赎"第 159-163 页中探讨了"意志对时间及其'过去'的厌恶"。海德格尔在《什么是思想？》第 92-96 页也讨论了相同观点。
137. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 29. See also p. 82: “the creature perishes and is immortal” (his italics). 137. 怀特海《过程与实在》第 29 页。另见第 82 页："受造物消逝了，却成为不朽"（原文为斜体强调）。
138. Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, p. 13. See also ibid., p. 15: “Futural approaching brings about what has been.” The priority of the future is already affirmed in Being and Time, sec. 68. 138. 海德格尔《时间与存在》，收录于《论时间与存在》第 13 页。另见同书第 15 页："未来的临近带来了曾在之物"。《存在与时间》第 68 节早已确认了未来的优先性。
139. Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 47. 139. 阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特海，《象征主义：意义与影响》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1959 年），第 47 页。
Part Three-Coda 第三部分-终章
M. Heidegger has pointed to the profound affinities between Gedächtnis (“memory”) and Gemüt (“heart”) in What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 139-41, 144, 148, 150. 海德格尔在《何谓思？》（J·格伦·格雷英译，纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1968 年）第 139-141 页、144 页、148 页、150 页中，指出了"记忆"（Gedächtnis）与"心灵"（Gemüt）之间的深刻亲缘关系。
All of the above etymologies are taken from the section on "Indo-European 上述所有词源考证均引自"印欧语系"章节。
Roots," article on “men-,” in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 1529. 词根"men-"词条，载于《美国传统英语词典》（波士顿：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1981 年），第 1529 页。
3. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 63; his italics. 3. A.N.怀特海，《过程与实在》，D.R.格里芬与 D.W.舍伯恩编（纽约：自由出版社，1978 年），第 63 页；斜体为原作者所加。
4. Ibid., p. 311; his italics. 4. 同上，第 311 页；斜体为原作者所加。
5. Ibid., p. 81. See also ibid., p. 312. 5. 同上，第 81 页。另见同书第 312 页。
6. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 5. 6. 海德格尔，《何谓思？》，第 5 页。
Part Four 第四部分
11. The Thick Autonomy of Memory 11. 记忆的厚重自主性
Among “major forms” I am including the three mnemonic modes of Part Two, the three forms just discussed in Part Three, as well as the following from Part One: primary and secondary remembering, remembering simpliciter, remembering-that, remembering-how, and remembering-to. 在"主要形式"中，我涵盖了第二部分的三种记忆模式、第三部分刚讨论过的三种形式，以及第一部分中的以下内容：初级与次级回忆、单纯回忆、回忆-事实、回忆-方法以及回忆-目的。
On this notion, see especially Aristotle, De Interpretatione 17 a 37-40. 关于这一概念，特别参见亚里士多德《解释篇》17a37-40。
See Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), Part I, esp. pp. 58-60. 参见爱德华·S·凯西《想象：一项现象学研究》（布鲁明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年）第一部分，特别是第 58-60 页。
Virgil, Aeneid, VII, 312. This statement forms the epigram on the title page of Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. 维吉尔《埃涅阿斯纪》第七卷第 312 行。此句作为弗洛伊德《梦的解析》扉页题词。
For a treatment of various senses of autonomy, see Casey, Imagining, pp. 177-88. 关于自主性多重含义的探讨，参见凯西《想象》第 177-188 页。
On Klärung, see E. Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1962), secs. 67-70. 关于"澄清"概念，参见 E.胡塞尔《观念》W.R.博伊斯·吉布森译本（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1962 年）第 67-70 节。
Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, trans. M. H. Heim (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 5. 米兰·昆德拉《不能承受的生命之轻》，M.H.海姆译本（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1985 年）第 5 页。
Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 451 a 15-16 (Sorabji translation). 亚里士多德《论记忆与回忆》451a15-16（索拉布吉译本）。
Bertrand Russell, “On Propositions” in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 315 and p. 309, respectively. 伯特兰·罗素《论命题》，收录于罗伯特·C·马什编《逻辑与知识》（伦敦：艾伦与昂温出版社，1956 年）第 315 页与第 309 页。
See, for example, C. B. Martin and M. Deutscher, “Remembering” in R. M. Chisholm and R. J. Swartz, eds., Empirical Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 302-31. 例如，参见 C. B. 马丁与 M. 多伊彻合著的《记忆》，收录于 R. M. 奇泽姆与 R. J. 斯沃茨主编的《经验知识》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1973 年），第 302-331 页。
On the verticalizing movement of imagination, see Gaston Bachelard, L’air et les songes (Paris: Corti, 1943). 关于想象力的垂直化运动，参见加斯东·巴什拉《空气与梦幻》（巴黎：科尔蒂出版社，1943 年）。
This is not to deny the possibility of hybrid combinations between imagination and memory in which the role of the image is genuinely “possibilizing.” This can occur in the midst of recollection itself, as when we employ an actively constructed mental image to remember better “what it might have looked like.” Such use of hypothetical imagining still falls short, however, of the fullest form of autonomy of which imagining is capable. On this point, see Casey, Imagining, pp. 114-16. 这并非否认想象与记忆之间存在图像真正发挥"可能性化"作用的混合形态。这种现象可能直接出现在回忆过程中，例如当我们主动构建心理图像来更好地回忆"当时可能的样貌"。然而，这种假设性想象的运用仍未能达到想象力所能实现的完全自主形态。关于此点，参见凯西《想象》第 114-116 页。
See J. Piaget & B. Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence, trans. A. J. Pomerans (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 参见 J. 皮亚杰与 B. 英海尔德合著的《记忆与智力》，A. J. 波默兰斯英译本（纽约：基础图书公司，1973 年）。
Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 449 a 15; my italics. 亚里士多德，《论记忆与回忆》449 a 15；斜体为笔者所加。
Nevertheless, this is precisely what Minkowski claims: “Memory creates our experiences”; “it seems equally justified to affirm that memory produces the past as to say that it reproduces it” (Lived Time, trans. N. Metzel [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970], p. 149 and p. 151 respectively). 然而，这正是闵可夫斯基所主张的："记忆创造了我们的经验"；"说记忆生产过去与说它再现过去，似乎同样合理"（《活生生的时间》，N. 梅策尔译[埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1970 年]，分别见第 149 页和第 151 页）。
E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill & K. Ameriks (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 108. E. 胡塞尔，《经验与判断》，J. S. 邱吉尔与 K. 阿梅里克斯合译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1973 年），第 108 页。
To be more precise, the Indo-European root is now considered to be mer- or smer-, “to be anxious, to grieve,” with the variants mar- and smar- along with mor-, mur-, and smur-. If this is so, the origin of “mourning” would be even more ancient than that of “remembering.” See Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 396. See also C. T. Onions, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 593. Unless otherwise specified, I shall be drawing on Partridge’s book in discussions below. 更准确地说，印欧语词根现被认定为 mer-或 smer-，意为"忧虑、悲伤"，其变体包括 mar-和 smar-以及 mor-、mur-和 smur-。若此说成立，"哀悼"一词的起源将比"回忆"更为古老。参见埃里克·帕特里奇《词源：现代英语简明词源词典》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1959 年），第 396 页；另见 C. T. 昂尼恩斯主编《牛津英语词源词典》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1966 年），第 593 页。除非特别说明，下文中词源讨论均引自帕特里奇的著作。
Com-, from cum, means “with”; but it may also act to intensify the verb onto which it is prefixed. "Com-"源自"cum"，意为"与"；但它也可以强化所接前缀的动词。
Oxford English Dictionary, entry under “remanent.” 《牛津英语词典》中"remanent"词条。
The link is through the mer-stem, a variant of the same mar-etymon which we have seen to underlie smárati, “he remembers.” See footnote 18 above. Note also the closely related Welsh marth, “sorrow,” “anxiety”; the Cornish moreth, “grief,” “regret”; the Gaelic smùr, “sadness”; and the Armenian mormok, “regret,” “sorrow.” 这种联系通过"mer"词干实现，它是我们之前讨论过的"mar"词源的变体，该词源构成"smárati"（"他记得"）的基础。参见上文脚注 18。另请注意与之密切相关的威尔士语"marth"（"悲伤"、"焦虑"）、康沃尔语"moreth"（"悲痛"、"悔恨"）、盖尔语"smùr"（"哀伤"）以及亚美尼亚语"mormok"（"遗憾"、"悲伤"）。
See Casey, Imagining, pp. 189-90. 参见凯西《想象》第 189-90 页。
The Greek adjective mermeros is yet another cognate of “memory.” The duplication of the mer- stem in mer/meros is striking; another intensification, a specifically semantic thickening, is here at work. If we were to indulge in what Derrida calls “semantic mirage,” we would divide mermeros into merm/eros and notice once more the rooting of memory in love. (On semantic mirage, see J. Derrida, Positions, trans. A. Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], p. 46.) 希腊形容词"mermeros"是"记忆"的另一个同源词。"mer-"词根在"mer/meros"中的重复引人注目；这里存在着另一种强化作用，一种特定的语义增厚。如果我们沉溺于德里达所说的"语义幻象"，就会将"mermeros"拆分为"merm/eros"，并再次注意到记忆植根于爱的事实。（关于语义幻象，参见 J.德里达《立场》，A.巴斯译[芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1981 年]，第 46 页。）
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 173. 马丁·海德格尔，《存在与时间》，J.麦奎利和 E.罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 173 页。
This becomes especially evident when we consider memory beyond mind; for celerity is an endemic mental virtue: “thought is quick” (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson [Baltimore: Penguin, 1968], p. 95). 当我们考虑超越心智的记忆时，这一点变得尤为明显；因为迅捷是心智固有的美德："思想是敏捷的"（托马斯·霍布斯《利维坦》，C.B.麦克弗森编[巴尔的摩：企鹅出版社，1968 年]，第 95 页）。
Sigmund Freud, Letter of December 6, 1896 (Standard Edition, 1:233; his italics). 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德，1896 年 12 月 6 日信件（标准版，1:233；斜体为原作者所加）。
Harold Bloom, Poetry and Repression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 287. See also Bloom’s A Map of Misreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), chap. 4, pp. 63-82. 哈罗德·布鲁姆，《诗歌与压抑》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1976 年），第 287 页。另见布鲁姆《误读地图》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1975 年）第四章，第 63-82 页。
The strongest statement of this circumstance occurs in Freud’s “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses” (1896): “Thanks to the change due to puberty, the memory will display a power which was completely lacking from the [original] event itself” (Standard Edition, 3:154). 关于这一情形最有力的表述见于弗洛伊德《遗传与神经症的病因学》（1896 年）:"由于青春期带来的变化，记忆将展现出原初事件本身完全不具备的力量"（标准版，3:154）。
Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 20ff, 37ff. 马丁·海德格尔，《技术的追问》，W·洛维特译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1977 年），第 20 页及以下，第 37 页及以下。
Stanley A. Leavy, The Psychoanalytic Dialogue (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 94. See also pp. 97, 110-111. 斯坦利·A·利维，《精神分析对话》（纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1980 年），第 94 页。另见第 97 页，第 110-111 页。
Pierre Janet, L’evolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps (Paris: Chahine, 1928), I, p. 87 ff. 皮埃尔·雅内，《记忆与时间概念的演变》（巴黎：夏希纳出版社，1928 年），第一卷，第 87 页及以下。
“Etymon” itself means, in its own Greek root (i.e., etumon) the true sense of a word (etumos is “true”). By a revealing reduction, etymon now means a word’s strictly historical origin or root. "词源"（Etymon）一词本身的希腊词根（即 etumon）意为词语的真实含义（etumos 即"真实"）。通过一个颇具启示性的简化过程，该词现在仅指词语严格历史意义上的起源或词根。
This might seem to make photography a mere instrument in the situation, just another case of “standing-reserve” via “enframing” (in Heidegger’s disparaging words). Yet, granting that photography is subject to reductive technological manipulations at every point, this is by no means its only possible fate. It can be, as it is designed to be in the present instance, an agency for opening a future of appreciation, for preserving the past in a maximally meaningful way. Here the paradox is that it is precisely the photograph that serves so naturally as a paradigm in passivist 这似乎使摄影沦为情境中的单纯工具，成为海德格尔贬义表述中"座架"（enframing）造就的"持存物"（standing-reserve）的又一例证。然而，尽管摄影技术在每个环节都面临简化性操控，但这绝非其唯一可能的宿命。正如当前实例所设计的，它可以成为开启鉴赏未来、以最具意义方式保存过去的能动载体。此处的悖论在于：恰恰是照片如此自然地成为被动记忆
models of memory: a paradox to which I shall return in the concluding pages of this chapter. 模式的典范——这个悖论我将在本章结尾处再次论及。
On the virtuality of remembering in contrast with its actuality, see chapter 2 and section VI below. 关于记忆的虚拟性与其现实性的对比，参见第二章及下文第六节。
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 41; his italics. 海德格尔，《存在与时间》，第 41 页；斜体为原作者所加。
See ibid., pp. 307, 387. 参见同上，第 307、387 页。
T. S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton,” Stanza I, The Four Quartets in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 175. T·S·艾略特，《烧毁的诺顿》第一节，《四个四重奏》收录于《1909-1962 年诗集》（纽约：哈考特、布雷斯与世界出版社，1963 年），第 175 页。
Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 86. 雅克·拉康，《文集》，A.谢里丹译（纽约：诺顿出版社，1977 年），第 86 页。
On this relationship, see Casey, Imagining, pp. 103-6. 关于这种关系，参见凯西，《想象》，第 103-6 页。
See David Farrell Krell, On the Verge (New York: Humanities Press, forthcoming). 参见大卫·法雷尔·克雷尔，《边缘之上》（纽约：人文出版社，即将出版）。
See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), II, Investigation VI, secs. 8-12, 36-39. 参见埃德蒙德·胡塞尔，《逻辑研究》，J.N.芬德利译（纽约：人文出版社，1970 年），第二卷，第六研究，第 8-12 节，第 36-39 节。
Autonomous remembering is not to be confused with spontaneous remembering, although the two can certainly overlap. Spontaneous remembering may include anything from Husserlian primary memory (especially in its “sinking back” character) to Proustian “involuntary memory” (e.g., the tea-tasting episode). 自主记忆不应与自发记忆混为一谈，尽管两者确实可能重叠。自发记忆可能涵盖从胡塞尔式初级记忆（尤其以其"沉入背景"的特性为特征）到普鲁斯特式"非自主记忆"（例如品茶片段）的各类现象。
But it is wrong to assert, as does R. S. Benjamin, that in all cases “a claim to remember is in principle falsifiable or verifiable by observations which are in no way connected with the state of mind of the person making the claim . . . memory claims are verifiable in principle by recourse to publicly ascertainable facts” (“Remembering,” in D. F. Gustafson, ed., Essays in Philosophical Psychology [New York: Doubleday, 1964], pp. 182-83). This is so only in one subclass of the category of “truth to the that” and does not apply to cases of “truth to the how” at all. Nor is it true that “we treat our memories of such things [as dreams, feelings, thoughts] as though they are verifiable independently” (ibid., p. 183n). As we know that they are not verifiable by others, we do not treat them as if they were: we keep them, and their grounds for confirmation or disconfirmation, within the self-system, where possibilities of self-deception are admittedly rife and where others can offer help only indirectly. 但 R·S·本杰明的论断是错误的，他认为在所有情况下"记忆主张原则上都可以通过与主张者心理状态毫无关联的观察来证伪或验证......记忆主张原则上可以通过诉诸公开可验证的事实来证实"（《记忆》，收录于 D·F·古斯塔夫森主编《哲学心理学文集》[纽约：双日出版社，1964 年]，第 182-83 页）。这种观点仅适用于"事实真实"的子类别，而完全不适用于"方式真实"的情况。所谓"我们对待（梦境、感受、思想等事物的）记忆时，仿佛它们能独立验证"的说法同样不成立（同上，第 183 页注释）。既然知道这些记忆无法被他人验证，我们自然不会如此对待：我们将这些记忆及其验证依据保留在自我系统内——尽管这个系统确实充满自我欺骗的可能，且他人只能提供间接帮助。
I borrow this term from Benjamin: see “Remembering,” pp. 188-91. 这个术语借用于本杰明，参见《记忆》第 188-91 页。
Imagining is characteristically indifferent to truth in any of its major senses since it pursues the purely possible and not the actual as such; and thinking, in its inferential, hypothesizing, and speculative moments, is not concerned with the issue of truth as such. 想象本质上对任何主要意义上的真理都漠不关心，因为它追求的是纯粹的可能性而非现实本身；而思维在其推理、假设和思辨的时刻，同样不关注真理本身的问题。
For the notion of “remaining over” see Husserl, Ideas, I, secs. 31-33; for that of “abiding possession,” see Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), secs. 27, 36. 关于"剩余"概念参见胡塞尔《观念 I》第 31-33 节；关于"持存占有"概念参见胡塞尔《笛卡尔式的沉思》（D.凯恩斯译，海牙：尼伊霍夫出版社，1960 年）第 27、36 节。
See A. R. Luria, The Mind of A Mnemonist, trans. L. Solotaroff (Chicago: Regnery, 1968), esp. pp. 149-59. 参见 A.R.卢里亚《记忆大师的心灵》（L.索洛塔罗夫译，芝加哥：雷格纳瑞出版社，1968 年），特别是第 149-159 页。
F. C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 208. See also p. 197: “the past operates as an organised mass.” F.C.巴特利特《记忆：实验与社会心理学研究》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1964 年）第 208 页。另见第 197 页："过去作为有组织的整体发挥作用。"
Hegel, The Science of Logic, section 112 (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences), Addendum; as translated by William Wallace, The Logic of Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 209. 黑格尔，《逻辑学》第 112 节（《哲学科学百科全书》），附录；威廉·华莱士译，《黑格尔的逻辑学》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1959 年），第 209 页。
For Derrida’s interpretation, see his Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (Stony Brook, NY: Nicolas Hays, 1978), pp. 76-106. On the repeatability of eidos in relation to memory, see my essay “Memory and Phenomenological Method” in W. S. Hamrick, ed., Phenomenology in Practice and Theory (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 35-52. 关于德里达的阐释，参见其著作《埃德蒙德·胡塞尔几何学起源导论》（纽约州石溪市：尼古拉斯·海斯出版社，1978 年），第 76-106 页。论及与记忆相关的"本质"可重复性，参阅拙文《记忆与现象学方法》，收录于 W.S.汉姆里克主编的《现象学的理论与实践》（海牙：尼霍夫出版社，1985 年），第 35-52 页。
See Martin Heidegger, “Der Satz der Identität” in Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 11-34. 参见马丁·海德格尔，《同一律》一文，载于《同一与差异》（普富林根：内斯克出版社，1957 年），第 11-34 页。
Reminiscing in words provides another instance of a medium-in this case, language-which, despite its aspirations to transparency, brings with it an inherent thickness. Consider only the ways in which various narrative forms may convey the same past event with important nuances of difference. As I have insisted in this chapter, neither words nor images are necessary to remembering. But both constitute valid and vital media of exchange between the remembering present and the remembered past: they, too, form part of memory’s thick autonomy. 语言性追忆展现了媒介的另一种样态——在此种情形下，语言虽追求透明性，却自带固有的稠密特质。只需想想不同叙事形式如何以微妙差异呈现同一过往事件便知。正如本章所强调的，记忆既不需要依赖文字，也不必然需要图像。但二者共同构成了当下记忆行为与被忆往昔之间有效且至关重要的交流媒介：它们同样构成了记忆厚重自主性的一部分。
12. Freedom in Remembering 12. 记忆中的自由
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 68. 马丁·海德格尔，《存在与时间》，J. 麦奎利与 E. 罗宾逊译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1962 年），第 68 页。
On “mineness,” see ibid., pp. 67-69. 关于"本己性"的讨论，参见同上书第 67-69 页。
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. J. Yolton (New York: Dutton, 1965), chap. 27, sec. 10. 约翰·洛克，《人类理解论》，J. 约尔顿编（纽约：达顿出版社，1965 年），第 27 章第 10 节。
For a contemporary discussion of multiple personality, see B. G. Baum, ed., The Psychiatric Clinics of North America: Symposium on Multiple Personality (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1984). 关于多重人格的当代讨论，可参阅 B·G·鲍姆主编的《北美精神病学临床：多重人格专题研讨会》（费城：桑德斯出版社，1984 年）。
On dissociation, see Bernard Hart, The Psychology of Insanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), chap. 4. 关于解离现象的研究，参见伯纳德·哈特《精神异常心理学》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1920 年）第四章。
“[In recollection] the immediate ‘I,’ already enduring in the enduring primordial sphere, constitutes in itself another as other. [It is a matter of] selftemporalization through de-presentation” (Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970], p. 185). "【在回忆中】那个直接的'我'——已然在持存的原初领域中持续存在——在自身内部将另一个构造为他者。【这涉及】通过去现前化实现的自我时间化"（埃德蒙德·胡塞尔，《欧洲科学的危机与先验现象学》，D·卡尔译，埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1970 年，第 185 页）。
“Consciousness [i.e., memory] of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity” (Joseph Butler, First Appendix to The Analogy of Religion [cited in J. Perry, ed. Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 100]). "对人格同一性的意识【即记忆】以人格同一性为前提，因此不能构成人格同一性"（约瑟夫·巴特勒，《宗教类比》第一附录，转引自 J·佩里编《人格同一性》，伯克利：加州大学出版社，1975 年，第 100 页）。
M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 3: “Das Gedächtnis ist die Versammlung des Denkens.” M. 海德格尔，《何谓思？》，J. 格伦·格雷译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1968 年），第 3 页：“记忆是思想的聚集。”
Heidegger, ibid., p. 151. 海德格尔，同上，第 151 页。
Heidegger traces this predominance to the fact that eidos, Plato’s preferred term for “form,” originally meant “visual aspect.” See his essay, “Plato’s Theory of Truth” in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, ed. W. Barrett & H. D. Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962), III, 367-98. 海德格尔将这种主导性追溯至柏拉图用于指代“形式”的术语 eidos 最初意为“视觉外观”。参见其论文《柏拉图的真理理论》，收录于《二十世纪哲学》，W. 巴雷特与 H. D. 艾肯编（纽约：兰登书屋，1962 年），第三卷，第 367-398 页。
I explore this matter further in my essay, “Keeping the Past in Mind,” Review of Metaphysics 37 (1983), pp. 77-95. 我在论文《将过去铭记于心》中对此问题进行了更深入探讨，载于《形而上学评论》第 37 期（1983 年），第 77-95 页。
Plato, Meno 85 d . Sorabji comments: “is not finding knowledge within oneself recollection?” (R. Sorabji, Aristotle On Memory [London: Duckworth, 1972], p. 40). 柏拉图，《美诺篇》85d。索拉布吉评论道："在自身中发现知识难道不就是回忆吗？"（R.索拉布吉，《亚里士多德论记忆》[伦敦：达克沃斯，1972 年]，第 40 页）
See Plato, Philebus 34 D: “When the soul that has lost the memory of a sensation or what it has learned resumes that memory within itself (ex hautou) and goes over the old ground, we regularly speak of ‘recollections’.” 参见柏拉图《斐莱布篇》34D："当灵魂重新在自身内部（ex hautou）恢复对某种感觉或所学之物的记忆，并重温旧事时，我们通常称之为'回忆'。"
Thus, a matrix is “a place or medium in which something is bred, produced, or developed”; “a place or point of origin and growth” (Oxford English Dictionary). 因此，matrix 被定义为"孕育、产生或发展某物的场所或媒介"；"起源与生长的场所或起点"（《牛津英语词典》）
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1114 b 17-1115 a 3. 亚里士多德，《尼各马可伦理学》1114 b 17-1115 a 3。
Freud, Standard Edition, 19:29. 弗洛伊德，《标准版》，第 19 卷，第 29 页。
Aristotle, Physics 210 a 13-25. 亚里士多德，《物理学》210 a 13-25。
On encoding specificity, see E. Tulving and D. M. Thomson, “Encoding Specificity and Retrieval Processes in Episodic Memory,” Psychological Review 80 (1973):352-73. 关于编码特异性，参见 E. Tulving 和 D. M. Thomson 合著的《情景记忆中的编码特异性和提取过程》，载《心理学评论》第 80 期（1973 年）：352-73 页。
George A. Miller, “The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information,” reprinted in N. J. Slamecka, ed., Human Learning and Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 233. It is to Miller’s credit that he does recognize “limits” on the model he first proposed in 1956. One of these limits is imagery: “Images seem much harder to get at operationally and to study experimentally than the more symbolic kinds of recoding” (ibid.). 乔治·A·米勒，《神奇数字七加减二：信息处理能力的某些限制》，重印于 N. J. 斯拉梅卡主编的《人类学习与记忆》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1967 年），第 233 页。值得肯定的是，米勒确实认识到了他在 1956 年首次提出的模型存在"限制"。其中一项限制就是意象："与更具符号性质的再编码相比，意象在操作层面上似乎更难把握，也更难进行实验研究"（同上）。
On this point, see J. Glenn Gray, “Heidegger on Remembering and Remembering Heidegger,” Man and World 10 (1977):62. 关于这一点，参见 J. Glenn Gray 所著《海德格尔论记忆与记忆海德格尔》，载于《人与世界》第 10 卷(1977 年)，第 62 页。
I have considered the same three regions in more detail with respect to the freedom of imagination in Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 207-31. 我在《想象：一项现象学研究》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1976 年）第 207-231 页中，就想象力的自由问题对这三个领域进行了更详细的探讨。
S. Freud, Standard Edition, 19:50n. Freud underlines the word “freedom.” S.弗洛伊德，《标准版全集》第 19 卷第 50 页注释。弗洛伊德特别强调了"自由"这个词。
Goethe, “Proverbs in Prose,” in The Permanent Goethe, ed. Thomas Mann (New York: Dial Press, 1948), p. 640. 歌德，《散文体箴言》，收录于托马斯·曼主编的《永恒的歌德》（纽约：戴尔出版社，1948 年），第 640 页。
On Harold Bloom’s analysis, the anxiety of influence results in a “misprision” of the works of predecessors. We could just as well say “misremembering” in the circumstance. (See Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975], pp. 63-80.) 根据哈罗德·布鲁姆的分析，影响的焦虑导致了对前人作品的"误读"。在此情境下，我们同样可以说这是"误记"。（参见哈罗德·布鲁姆《误读的地图》[牛津：牛津大学出版社，1975 年]，第 63-80 页。）
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 27. 弗里德里希·尼采，《善恶的彼岸》，W.考夫曼译（纽约：Vintage 出版社，1966 年），第 27 页。
On the idea of im-Griff-behalten, see Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), sec. 87. 关于"保持在握"（im-Griff-behalten）的概念，参见埃德蒙德·胡塞尔《经验与判断》，J.S.丘吉尔与 K.阿梅里克斯译（伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿：西北大学出版社，1973 年），第 87 节。
I have pursued this parallel between Husserl and Plato further in my essay, “Memory and Phenomenological Method,” in W. S. Hamrick, ed., Phenomenology in Practice and Theory (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 35-38. 我在论文《记忆与现象学方法》中进一步探讨了胡塞尔与柏拉图之间的这种平行关系，该文收录于 W.S.哈姆里克主编的《实践与理论中的现象学》（多德雷赫特：尼霍夫出版社，1985 年），第 35-38 页。
On reactivation, see Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 353-78. 关于重新激活，参见胡塞尔《欧洲科学的危机与先验现象学》，D.卡尔译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1970 年），第 353-78 页。
Aristotle, De Anima 427 b 16-17. 亚里士多德，《论灵魂》427b 16-17。
It is striking that the etymology of “monster” includes the Latin monère, “to remind,” “admonish.” A monster, by its very monstrosity, calls us back to our senses when it does not overcome us utterly. On the concept of the monster, see Catherine Keller, A Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and Self (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), chap. 2. 值得注意的是，"monster"（怪物）的词源包含拉丁语"monère"，意为"提醒"、"告诫"。怪物通过其骇人本质，在我们尚未被彻底击垮时唤醒我们的理智。关于怪物概念，参见凯瑟琳·凯勒《破碎之网：分离、性别歧视与自我》（波士顿：灯塔出版社，1986 年）第二章。
S. Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” Standard Edition, 12:150; his italics. S.弗洛伊德，《回忆、重复与修通》，标准版第 12 卷第 150 页；斜体为原作者所加。
Ibid., p. 148: “descriptively speaking [the goal] is to fill in gaps in memory; dynamically speaking, it is to overcome resistances due to repression.” 同上，第 148 页："从描述性角度而言[目标]是填补记忆中的空白；从动力学角度而言，则是克服由压抑产生的阻抗。"
For Freud’s own account of his change of views on this question, see ibid., p. 147. 关于弗洛伊德本人对此问题观点转变的论述，参见同上，第 147 页。
On infantile amnesia, see ibid., pp. 148-49, as well as the second of the Three Essays on the Theory of Psychosexuality, Standard Edition, 7:174-76. 关于婴儿期遗忘，参见同上第 148-149 页，以及《性学三论》的第二篇（标准版，7:174-76）。
It is to be noted, however, that Freud does not equate amnesia with forgetting. An item can be “‘remembered’ which could never have been ‘forgotten’ because it was never at any time noticed-was never conscious” (Standard Edition, 12:149). 但需注意的是，弗洛伊德并未将遗忘症等同于遗忘。有些内容"'被记起'的东西可能从未'被遗忘'过，因为它从未在任何时候被注意到——从未进入意识"（标准版，12:149）。
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. A. Collins (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 7; my italics. 弗里德里希·尼采，《历史的用途与滥用》，A.柯林斯译（印第安纳波利斯：鲍勃斯-梅里尔出版社，1957 年），第 7 页；斜体为笔者所加。
Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, trans. M. H. Heim (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), p. 5. 米兰·昆德拉，《不能承受的生命之轻》，M.H.海姆译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1985 年），第 5 页。
Ibid. 同上。
Eugene Minkowski, Lived Time, trans. N. Metzel (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 156. Heidegger makes a quite comparable claim: 尤金·明科夫斯基，《活时间》，N.梅策尔译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1970 年），第 156 页。海德格尔提出了一个相当类似的主张：
forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a ‘positive’ ecstatical mode of one’s having been-a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost ‘been’. . . . Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained. . . . Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa. (Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 388-89; his italics). 遗忘并非虚无，也绝非单纯的记忆失败；它毋宁是一种"积极"的出离状态，是人曾存在的一种独特模式。这种遗忘的出离（狂喜）具有在面对最本己的"曾在"时退缩的特性……唯有基于这种遗忘，任何事物才得以留存……正如期待只能以等待为基础，回忆也只能以遗忘为基础，而非相反。（海德格尔，《存在与时间》，第 388-89 页；斜体为原文所有）
For a general treatment, see G. Reed, The Psychology of Anomalous Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974). 相关通论可参阅 G.里德所著《异常经验心理学》（波士顿：霍顿米夫林出版社，1974 年）。
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 89; his italics. 海德格尔，《存在与时间》，第 89 页；斜体为原作者所加。
Ibid. 同上。
See M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 267 (working note of November, 1960). 参见 M.梅洛-庞蒂，《可见的与不可见的》，A.林吉斯译（埃文斯顿，伊利诺伊州：西北大学出版社，1968 年），第 267 页（1960 年 11 月的工作笔记）。
“Tout participe de la mémoire si l’on se place au point de vue de la mémoire au sens large” (J. Piaget & B. Inhelder, Mémoire et intelligence (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p. 476. "若从广义记忆的角度来看，万物皆参与记忆"（J.皮亚杰 & B.英海尔德，《记忆与智力》（巴黎：法国大学出版社，1968 年），第 476 页。
Black Elk, cited in Black Elk Speaks, ed. John G. Neihardt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 17. 引自《黑麋鹿如是说》，约翰·G·内哈特编（林肯市：内布拉斯加大学出版社，1961 年），第 17 页。
See Plato, Republic 472: “Perhaps you do not realize that, after I have barely escaped the first two waves, the third, which you are now bringing down upon me, is the most formidable of all” (Cornford translation). 参见柏拉图《理想国》472："也许你没有意识到，在我刚刚躲过前两波浪潮后，你现在掀起的第三波才是最可怕的"（康福德译本）。
The full formulation is “to be, to exist, is to participate.” This is the title of the entry of March 23, 1938, in Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, trans. Peter Rivière (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 16-17. 完整表述为"存在即参与"。这是吕西安·列维-布留尔《原始思维笔记》1938 年 3 月 23 日条目标题，彼得·里维埃尔译（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1978 年），第 16-17 页。
INDEX 索引
Accessibility, 280; and availability, 51, 300308 可达性，280；与可用性，51，300-308
Act-phase, 48-64; and object-phase, 83-85 行动阶段，48-64；与对象阶段，83-85
Action: immanence of the past in, 149-50; pre-, 60 行动：过去在其中的内在性，149-50；前行动，60
Actions, 56-58, 63, 150 行动，56-58，63，150
Adumbration, 97-98, 100 预示，97-98, 100
Agency, personal, 57, 59 个人能动性，57, 59
Allusion, 99 暗示，99
Amnesia, x,102\mathrm{x}, 102; vs. anamnesis, 4; childhood, 8; concerning memory, 2 失忆， x,102\mathrm{x}, 102 ；与回忆相对，4；童年失忆，8；关于记忆的失忆，2
Anamnesis, 4, 13-14, 102, 255 回忆，4，13-14，102，255
Archytas, 184, 213 阿契塔斯，184，213
Aristotle, 187, 202, 205, 295; memory in, 14-15, 17, 67, 181, 269; place in, 184-86, 188, 190-91, 203, 213; reminding in, 9498; time in, 181 亚里士多德，187，202，205，295；其记忆理论，14-15，17，67，181，269；其场所观，184-86，188，190-91，203，213；其提醒理论，94-98；其时间观，181
Aroundness, 259 周遭性，259
Art, 301-302, 303; of memory, 16, 182 艺术，301-302，303；关于记忆，16，182
Associationism, 17 联想主义，17
Atmosphere, 78, 114, 115, 328 氛围，78，114，115，328
Augustine, 1, 343 奥古斯丁，1，343
Aura, 204 灵韵，204
Autobiography, 11 自传，11
Autonomy, xi, 179; imaginative, 267; positive and negative, 280-82; thick, 262-87, 304, 310-12; thin, 266 自主性，xi，179；想象性自主，267；积极与消极自主，280-82；厚自主，262-87，304，310-12；薄自主，266
Bachelard, Gaston, 85, 211, 212, 214 加斯东·巴什拉，85，211，212，214
Being: forgetfulness of, 8; -in-place, 195, 200, 215; -in-the-world, 191, 215, 265, 267 存在：遗忘，8；-在场，195，200，215；-在世，191，215，265，267
Bergson, Henri, 17, 76, 147, 174; the body in, 179, 194, 195 亨利·柏格森，17，76，147，174；其理论中的身体，179，194，195
Berkeley, George, 166, 337 乔治·贝克莱，166，337
Body: continual re-synthesis of, 156, 34243; erotic, 157-62, 164-67; and experience of world, 179; human, 17; immanence of the past in, 149; -in-place, 213; as inter-place, 196; as intra-place, 196; lived, fragmentation of, 155 ; and mind, 18, 103, 180, 258; momentary, in Merleau-Ponty, 152; motor-memories in, 57; perception of, 162-63; philosophical treatment of, 147; as a “place” for memories, 178; and place memory, 162-162- 63; role in memory of place, 190-96 身体：持续再综合，156，34243；情欲身体，157-62，164-67；与世界的体验，179；人类身体，17；过去在身体中的内在性，149；-在场，213；作为间性场所，196；作为内在场所，196；生活身体的碎片化，155；与心灵，18，103，180，258；梅洛-庞蒂理论中的瞬时身体，152；运动记忆在身体中，57；身体知觉，162-63；哲学探讨，147；作为记忆的"场所"，178；与场所记忆， 162-162- 63；在场所记忆中的角色，190-96
-memory, xi, 101, 145, 146-80, 204; as apriori, 146; as the basis for memory in -记忆，xi, 101, 145, 146-80, 204；作为先验条件，146；作为记忆的基础
general, 172-73; and commemoration, 253-54; as effective history, 151; erotic, 157-62, 164-67; in Gestalt psychology, 163; habitual, 149-53, 163-64; importance to experience, 172; marginality of, 163-65, 172; and movement, through depth-as-distance, 167; as orienting, 151-52; the past and the present in, 167-69; phenomenon of “afterglow” in, 156-57; and place, 158, 182, 189-96, 218, 252; recognition of, in Western philosophy, 147; as prereflective, 149; and recollection, 171; self and other in, 158, 160; and selfpresence, 163; spatial and temporal features of, 169; traumatic, 154-57, 159, 164; and world, 149, 166, 178-79 一般而言，172-73；与纪念的关系，253-54；作为有效历史，151；情欲记忆，157-62，164-67；在格式塔心理学中，163；习惯性记忆，149-53，163-64；对经验的重要性，172；其边缘性，163-65，172；与运动的关系，通过深度即距离，167；作为定向功能，151-52；其中过去与现在的交织，167-69；"余晖"现象，156-57；与场所的关联，158，182，189-96，218，252；西方哲学对其的认知，147；作为前反思状态，149；与回忆的关系，171；其中自我与他者的互动，158，160；与自我在场，163；其空间与时间特征，169；创伤记忆，154-57，159，164；与世界的关系，149，166，178-79
Brentano, Franz, 85, 144 布伦塔诺，弗朗茨，85，144
Cartesian: conception of truth, 345-46; -Lockian notion of mind, 243; model of mind, 259-60. See also Descartes, René 笛卡尔：真理概念，345-46；洛克式心灵观念，243；心灵模型，259-60。另见勒内·笛卡尔
Ceremony, 218, 224-30, 260 仪式，218, 224-30, 260
Character, sustaining, 198, 208 性格，持续性，198, 208
Childhood, 48; and amnesia, 8; body trauma in, 156; memories, 71, 183, 205, 212, 336 童年，48；与失忆症，8；身体创伤，156；记忆，71, 183, 205, 212, 336
Clarity, 79-80, 219 清晰度，79-80, 219
Commemoration, xi, 62, 216-57; death in, 232; and identification, 240-46; as intensified remembering, 217, 257, 273; and interconnection, 251; participation in, 247-49; and the past, 256; as a phenomenon of restance, 220; presence of others in, 216-18; the present and the past in, 253-54; and remembering in general, 233, 253; and reminding, 219-20; ritual and text in, 221, 231-35; role of the body in, 245 纪念，xi，62，216-57；其中的死亡，232；与认同，240-46；作为强化的记忆行为，217，257，273；与相互联系，251；参与其中，247-49；与过去，256；作为抵抗现象，220；他者在场，216-18；当下与过去在其中，253-54；与普遍记忆，233，253；与提醒，219-20；仪式与文本在其中，221，231-35；身体的角色，245
Commemorative: language, 232-33; poetry as, 234; remembering-through, 218-19, 238, 256; ritual, 221-30, 233, 245; texts, 221, 231-35, 246-47; thought, in Heidegger, 8-9, 13 纪念性：语言，232-33；作为纪念的诗歌，234；通过纪念的记忆，218-19，238，256；仪式，221-30，233，245；文本，221，231-35，246-47；海德格尔思想中的纪念性思考，8-9，13
Confucius, 229, 234-35 孔子，229，234-35
Connection, and remembering, 63, 182. 联结，与记忆，63，182
See also World, memory rooted in 另见 世界，记忆植根于
D’Affigny, Marius, 144 达菲尼，马里乌斯，144
Density, 80 密度，80
Depth, of the body, 166-67 深度，身体的，166-67
Derrida, Jacques, 118, 188, 232, 246, 286, 353 雅克·德里达，118, 188, 232, 246, 286, 353
Descartes, René, 1,8,88,2101,8,88,210; memory in, 16-17, 146; mind in, 294; place as ‘site’ in, 185. See also Cartesian 勒内·笛卡尔， 1,8,88,2101,8,88,210 ；其记忆理论，16-17, 146；其心灵观，294；场所作为"位点"的概念，185。另见笛卡尔主义
Dewey, John, 164 约翰·杜威，164
Directedness, 81 指向性，81
Directionality, 190, 192, 194, 197 方向性，190, 192, 194, 197
Distance, 192, 194, 197 距离，192, 194, 197
Doolittle, Hilda, ix 杜利特尔，希尔达，ix
Dreaming, 115, 153, 333 梦境，115, 153, 333
Ebbinghaus, Hermann, 9 赫尔曼·艾宾浩斯，9
Eliade, Mircea, 224, 231 米尔恰·伊利亚德，224, 231
Eliot, 234, 278, 288 艾略特，234, 278, 288
Emotion, 13, 78, 130, 200 情感，13, 78, 130, 200
Environment, 141, 174 环境，141，174
Eternal Recurrence, doctrine of, 3-4, 231, 351 永恒轮回学说，3-4，231，351
Evocation, 98-99 唤起，98-99
Experience, 39, 112 经验，39，112
Expressiveness, 199, 201, 208 表现力，199, 201, 208
Familiarization, 191-92, 193, 195 熟悉化，191-92, 193, 195
Faulkner, William, 104, 106-107 福克纳，威廉，104, 106-107
Forgetting, 2, 4, 7-8, 12; vs. amnesia, in Freud, 356; in Nietzsche, 307; and remembering, in Heidegger, 357 遗忘，2, 4, 7-8, 12；弗洛伊德理论中与失忆症的区别，356；尼采理论中的遗忘，307；海德格尔理论中与记忆的关系，357
Freedom, 153, 300; to be oneself, 290-92; to forget, 307; of imagining, 308; of ingathering, 292-95, 301; in remembering, 18, 288 自由，153, 300；成为自己，290-92；遗忘，307；想象，308；内聚，292-95, 301；记忆中的自由，18, 288
Freud, Sigmund, 5, 89, 240-45; aims of psychoanalysis in, 300; character in, 295; commemoration in, 255-56; condensation in, 266; the ego in, 241; identification in, 240, 246; memory in, 274,302,305274,302,305; primal phantasies in, 241; primary process thinking in, 153; psychoanalysis and memory in, 8, 356; recollection of the past in, 47; super-ego in, 240-41, 244; transference in, 241 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德，5, 89, 240-45；精神分析的目标，300；性格，295；纪念，255-56；凝缩，266；自我，241；认同，240, 246；记忆， 274,302,305274,302,305 ；原始幻想，241；初级过程思维，153；精神分析与记忆，8, 356；对过去的回忆，47；超我，240-41, 244；移情，241
Future, 62-63, 92-93, 123, 230. See also Past; Present; Time 未来，62-63, 92-93, 123, 230。另见过去；现在；时间
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 330-31, 335 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔，330-31, 335
Garden, Chinese, 207-12, 260, 343-44 花园，中国式，207-12，260，343-44
Goddess, 258. See also Mnemosyne 女神，258。另见记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅
Goethe, 301 歌德，301
Habitation, 184 居住，184
Habitual. See Body memory, habitual 习惯性。参见身体记忆，习惯性
Habituation, 56-57 习惯化，56-57
Heart, 258 心灵，258
Heidegger, Martin, 90, 102, 123, 146, 217; being-with-others in, 105, 116; the body in, 147; commemorative thought in, 8-9, 海德格尔，马丁，90, 102, 123, 146, 217；其中关于共在的论述 105, 116；身体观 147；纪念性思想 8-9,
13, 318; Dasein in, 214, 228-29; discourse in, 116; “in-order-to” relation in, 161,325 ; the past in, 275 ; memorial autonomy in, 277; memory in, 292; mind in, 267; and Nietzsche, 351; sameness in, 286; topology of Being, 184, 211; world-hood in, 145 13, 318；此在概念 214, 228-29；话语理论 116；"为之"关系 161,325；过去时态 275；纪念自主性 277；记忆观 292；心灵论 267；与尼采的关系 351；同一性 286；存在拓扑学 184, 211；世界性 145
Hillman, James, xiv, 333 詹姆斯·希尔曼（James Hillman），xiv，333
Hofer, Johannes, 201 约翰内斯·霍费尔（Johannes Hofer），201
Homer, 10, 11 荷马（Homer），10，11
Horizon, 203-204, 206-209, 329 地平线，203-204，206-209，329
Horizontal, movement of the body, 167 身体的水平运动，167
Hume, David, 17 休谟，大卫，17
Husserl, Edmund, xii, 10, 17, 144, 178; act-intentional analysis in, 188; appresentation in, 133; clarification in, 268; de-presentation in, 292; essence in, 285, 303; the living body in, 268; imagination in, 303; the living present in, 50,52,12350,52,123; mind in, 267; passivity in, 272; perfect presentation in, 219; phenomenological description in, 129; the present in, 111, 213; primary memory in, 2-3,175,3542-3,175,354; remembering in, 79,181 ; reminding in, 96-97, 98, 100; timeconsciousness in, 123, 217, 328 胡塞尔，埃德蒙德，xii, 10, 17, 144, 178；行为意向分析 188；共现理论 133；澄清方法 268；去当下化 292；本质论 285, 303；活的身体 268；想象力 303；活的当下 50,52,12350,52,123 ；心灵论 267；被动性 272；完美呈现 219；现象学描述 129；当下观 111, 213；初级记忆 2-3,175,3542-3,175,354 ；回忆理论 79,181；提醒机制 96-97, 98, 100；时间意识 123, 217, 328
Identification, 240-46 识别，240-46
Identity, personal, ix, 176; self-, 136-37 身份，个人的，ix，176；自我认同，136-37
Images, in Plato and Aristotle, 14-15 意象，在柏拉图和亚里士多德中的，14-15
Imaginal, margin, 77 想象的，边缘，77
Imagination, xi, 17, 69, 267, 310 想象，xi, 17, 69, 267, 310
Imaginative presentation, 77 想象性呈现，77
Imagining, 55, 77, 115, 124, 137; vs. remembering, 328; and restance, 266-67 想象活动，55, 77, 115, 124, 137；与记忆相对，328；与抵抗性，266-67
Immanence, modes of, 180 内在性模式，180
Information, recollection of, 53 信息，关于回忆，53 页
In-gathering, 292-95, 301, 303 内聚，292-95 页，301 页，303 页
Inhabitation, 190, 193-95 栖居，190 页，193-95 页
Intentional, analysis of memory, 63-64, 85, 264, 267, 326 意向性，记忆分析，63-64 页，85 页，264 页，267 页，326 页
Intentionality: act-, 164, 178, 188, 267; circularity of, 65; classical model of, 144; corporeal, 149; of the mind, xi; operative, 145,164,175,178145,164,175,178; of remembering, 83 意向性：行为-，164, 178, 188, 267；其循环性，65；经典模式，144；身体意向性，149；心灵的，xi；运作的， 145,164,175,178145,164,175,178 ；记忆的，83
Intermediation, 141 中介性，141
James, William, 17, 122, 186, 203, 217; memory in, 31, 42, 49-50; time in, 73; recognition in, 125-27 威廉·詹姆斯，17, 122, 186, 203, 217；其记忆理论，31, 42, 49-50；时间观，73；再认理论，125-27
Janet, Pierre, 14, 275 皮埃尔·让内，14, 275
Johnson, Marcia, xiii, 315 约翰逊，玛西娅，xiii，315
Jung, Carl Gustav, 299-300, 306 荣格，卡尔·古斯塔夫，299-300，306
Kant, Immanuel, 146-47, 181, 201; forms of intuition in, 149; memory in, 17, 188; metaphysics of, 20; objective succession in, 154 康德，伊曼努尔，146-47，181，201；直观形式理论，149；记忆理论，17，188；形而上学体系，20；客观相继性理论，154
Keller, Catherine, xiii, 356 凯勒，凯瑟琳，xiii，356
Kierkegaard, Soren, 262, 347 克尔凯郭尔，索伦，262, 347
Kinesthesia, 178-80, 214 动觉，178-80, 214
Knowledge: as commemoration, 255; eidetic, 13-14, 102, 255; and memory, in Plato, 13-14 知识：作为纪念，255；本质的，13-14, 102, 255；与记忆，柏拉图论，13-14
Kundera, Milan, 3-4, 269, 306 昆德拉，米兰，3-4, 269, 306
Lacan, Jacques, 137, 278, 291 拉康，雅克，137，278，291
Landscape, 151, 197-201, 203, 210 景观，151，197-201，203，210
Language, 5-6, 105; in ancient Greek culture, 11; in commemoration, 232-33; and expression, 126; and reminiscing, 116-18 语言，5-6，105；在古希腊文化中，11；在纪念活动中，232-33；与表达，126；与回忆，116-18
Leavy, Stanley, 353 莱维，斯坦利，353
Level, 192, 194, 197 层次，192，194，197
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, 247-54, 312 列维-布留尔，吕西安，247-54，312
Locke, John, 114, 228, 243, 251, 259 洛克，约翰，114，228，243，251，259
Loewald, Hans, 349 洛伊沃尔德，汉斯，349
Malcolm, Norman, 17 马尔科姆，诺曼，17
Margin, imaginal vs. rememorative, 77 边缘，想象性记忆与回忆性记忆的对比，77
Matisse, Henri, 132-33 马蒂斯，亨利，132-33
Memorialization, 226-28, 230 纪念仪式，226-28, 230
Memorization, 6, 11-12 记忆，6，11-12
Memory: account of, xi, 2; act- intentional analysis of, 188; actuality and virtuality in, 41-43; in ancient Greece, 11-13; art of, 16, 182; autonomy of, thick, 262-87, 304, 310-12, thin, 266; bodily basis of, 35; body. See Body, memory; connective capacity of, 141; content of, and sensation, 31; as cosmic, vs. mental, 179; and depth, 24 ; descriptive approach to, x,xii\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{xii}, 90 ; devaluation of, 6 ; development of, 138; eidetic, x\mathbf{x}; encapsulment and expansion in, 38-39; and experience, 20,49 ; fantasies disguised as, 8 ; freedom in, 18 ; indefiniteness in, 22, 26; limits of, x ; long-term, 71-72; as mental, 179; mind of, and world, 258-59; models of, 4-6, 14,16,18314,16,183; as motionless, 215 ; multisensory, 35; narrative voice in, 44; neurological view of, 269-70; origin in time, 75 ; and the past, xii, 12,14,3312,14,33; the past and the present in, 24,30-31,3524,30-31,35; persistence and pastness in, 39-41; pervasiveness in the present, 43; photographic, 4, 10, 269, 353; and place, 22, 183, 188, 189-96; of place, 183-87, 201, 202; of pleasure and pain, 157-58; and poetry, 46; primary, and secondary, 202. See also Remembering, primary and secondary; primary traits of, 37-43; quasinarrative form of, 43-45; reconnective capacity of, 182; remembering of, 10,18 ; roots of, in world, 144,289,310,313;144,289,310,313 ; and ruminescence, 46-47; schematicalness of, 45; search and display in, 37-38; 记忆：关于记忆的论述，xi, 2；对记忆行为的意向性分析，188；记忆中的现实性与虚拟性，41-43；古希腊时期的记忆观，11-13；记忆术，16, 182；记忆的自主性——厚自主性，262-87, 304, 310-12，薄自主性，266；记忆的身体基础，35；身体记忆（参见"身体，记忆"）；记忆的连接能力，141；记忆内容与感觉，31；作为宇宙性（相对于心理性）的记忆，179；记忆与深度，24；描述性记忆研究方法， x,xii\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{xii} , 90；记忆的贬值，6；记忆的发展，138；本质记忆， x\mathbf{x} ；记忆中的封装与扩展，38-39；记忆与经验，20,49；伪装成记忆的幻想，8；记忆中的自由，18；记忆的模糊性，22, 26；记忆的限度，x；长期记忆，71-72；作为心理活动的记忆，179；记忆心智与世界，258-59；记忆模型，4-6, 14,16,18314,16,183 ；静止的记忆，215；多感官记忆，35；记忆中的叙事声音，44；记忆的神经学观点，269-70；记忆在时间中的起源，75；记忆与过去，xii, 12,14,3312,14,33 ；记忆中的过去与现在， 24,30-31,3524,30-31,35 ；记忆中的持续性与过去性，39-41；记忆在当下的渗透性，43；照相式记忆，4, 10, 269, 353；记忆与场所，22, 183, 188, 189-96；场所记忆，183-87, 201, 202；愉悦与痛苦的记忆，157-58；记忆与诗歌，46；初级记忆与次级记忆，202。 另见记忆，初级与次级；其基本特征，37-43；其准叙事形式，43-45；其再连接能力，182；对记忆的回忆，10,18；其世界根源， 144,289,310,313;144,289,310,313 ; 与反刍现象，46-47；其图式性，45；其中的搜索与呈现，37-38；
secondary traits of, 43-47; and self and other, 18, 144; semi-, 34, 35; sense of self-presence in, 29; time in, 22; transformative powers of, xii, 15, 113, 272; two-track character of, 27; weight of, 4, 18; -within-memory, 26-28, 35; and world, ix, xi-xii, 18, 141, 179, 258 其次级特征，43-47；与自我及他者，18, 144；半记忆，34, 35；其中自我临现感，29；其中的时间，22；其转化力量，xii, 15, 113, 272；其双轨特性，27；其分量，4, 18；记忆中的记忆，26-28, 35；与世界，ix, xi-xii, 18, 141, 179, 258
Memory-frame, 65, 68-76 记忆框架，65, 68-76
Mental, multiplicity of, 63, 90 心理的，其多重性，63, 90
Mental pole, 144 精神极，144
Mentalism, 88, 105, 144, 164 心灵主义，88, 105, 144, 164
Merging, 127 融合，127
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 145, 147, 150, 166; the body in, 159, 164, 190-92, 267; “memory of the world” in, 180 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂，145, 147, 150, 166；身体理论，159, 164, 190-92, 267；"世界记忆"概念，180
Metaphor, 129 隐喻，129
Mind: intentional analysis of, 48,262 ; intentionality of, xi; representationalist view of, 264 心灵：其意向性分析，48,262；其意向性，xi；表征主义观点，264
Mnemonic presentation: aura of, 65, 76-79; memory-frame in, 65, 68-76; spatiality and temporality of, 70 ; specific content of, 65, 66-68; texturality in, 80 记忆呈现：其氛围，65,76-79；其中的记忆框架，65,68-76；其空间性与时间性，70；其具体内容，65,66-68；其中的纹理特性，80
Mnemosyne, 2, 12-13, 18, 318. See also Goddess 记忆女神谟涅摩绪涅，2,12-13,18,318。另见女神
Morris, Edwin, 207 莫里斯，埃德温，207
Movement, 150, 152, 159, 186, 189-90 运动，150，152，159，186，189-90
Nabokov, Vladimir, 119 纳博科夫，弗拉基米尔，119
Narrative: of remembered time, 43-45, 75; order, in reminiscing, 106 叙事：关于被记忆的时间，43-45，75；在回忆中的顺序，106
Neisser, Ulrich, ix, 316, 317 尼瑟, 乌尔里希, ix, 316, 317
Newton, Isaac, 16, 185 牛顿, 艾萨克, 16, 185
Newtonian: conception of absolute space, 194; world-view, 169 牛顿学说: 绝对空间概念, 194; 世界观, 169
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1-4, 7, 110, 217; forgetfulness in, 307; philosophy in, 302; the will to power in, 351 尼采, 弗里德里希, 1-4, 7, 110, 217; 遗忘理论, 307; 哲学思想, 302; 权力意志论, 351
Nostalgia, 201, 328 怀旧，201，328
Object-phase, 65-85 客体阶段，65-85
Other. See Self, and other 他者。参见"自我与他者"
Painter, William, 216 画家威廉，216
Participation, 265 参与，265 页
Past: in commemoration, 218-19, 230, 237; finality of, 112-13; and the future, 92-93; immediate and non-immediate, 52; personal, 115,119 ; and the present, 123 , 230, 237; in psychoanalysis, 120-21; records of, 110 ; reliving the, 107-10107-10; in remembered time, 73-74; representation of, in memory, 72; revivification of, 10910; understanding of, through reminiscing, 117 过去：在纪念中，218-19 页，230 页，237 页；其终结性，112-13 页；与未来的关系，92-93 页；直接与非直接的，52 页；个人的，115 页，119 页；与现在的关系，123 页，230 页，237 页；在精神分析中的体现，120-21 页；记录，110 页；重新体验， 107-10107-10 ；在被记忆的时间中，73-74 页；在记忆中的再现，72 页；复苏，109-10 页；通过回忆理解，117 页
Pastness, 112 过去性，112 页
Pathway, 204-205, 206, 209 路径，204-205 页，206 页，209 页
Perdurance, 228-30, 277 持久性，228-30, 277
Phenomenological: analysis of memory, xxi, 83-84, 88; description, 66, 129; investigation, xii 现象学的：记忆分析，xxi, 83-84, 88；描述，66, 129；研究，xii
Phenomenology: history of, 144; and intentional analysis, 267; of remembering, x-xi 现象学：其历史，144；与意向性分析，267；关于记忆的现象学，x-xi
Philosophy, and memory, 2, 16-17, 103, 302-303 哲学，与记忆，2, 16-17, 103, 302-303
Piaget, Jean, 14, 138-40, 271, 311 皮亚杰，让，14, 138-40, 271, 311
Picasso, Pablo, 132-33, 301-302, 306 毕加索，巴勃罗，132-33, 301-302, 306
Place: appropriation of, 192; in Aristotle, 184-86, 188, 190-91, 203, 213; attunement of the body in, 192; body as, 178 ; body-in-, 213; in commemoration, 246; familiar, 191-92; importance to memory, 184, 197-201; inter-, 196; intra-, 196; and memory, 22, 183, 188, 189-96; vs. site, 185-86; and the soul, 189 场所：对场所的占有，192；亚里士多德理论中的场所，184-86, 188, 190-91, 203, 213；身体在场所中的调适，192；作为场所的身体，178；置身场所的身体，213；纪念活动中的场所，246；熟悉的场所，191-92；对记忆的重要性，184, 197-201；场所间，196；场所内，196；与记忆的关系，22, 183, 188, 189-96；与地点的区别，185-86；与灵魂的关系，189
-memory, 33, 149, 181-215; and the body, 162-62; and commemoration, 25354 ; notion of, xi 场所记忆，33, 149, 181-215；与身体的关系，162-62；与纪念活动的关系，25354；概念阐述，xi
Plato, 8, 11, 88, 89; anamnesis in, 13-14, 102-103, 294, 302-303; the soul in, 14, 302-303; knowledge in, 13-14; memory and desire in, 78; reminding in, 103; time in, 228; the universe in, 254 柏拉图，8, 11, 88, 89；其中的回忆说，13-14, 102-103, 294, 302-303；灵魂观，14, 302-303；知识论，13-14；记忆与欲望，78；提醒说，103；时间观，228；宇宙论，254
Platonic: dialogues, 121; doctrine of Forms, 140, 254, 351 柏拉图式：对话体，121；理型学说，140, 254, 351
Poetry, 13, 317 诗歌，13, 317
Present: constitution of, 123; and the future, 93; in Husserl, 50, 52, 111, 123, 213; and the past, 112-13, 167-69; and remembering, 50 当下：构成，123；与未来，93；胡塞尔理论中的，50, 52, 111, 123, 213；与过去，112-13, 167-69；与回忆，50
Presentness, 124-27, 129, 135 在场性，124-27, 129, 135
Proust, Marcel, 169-71, 177, 192-93, 206 普鲁斯特，马塞尔，169-71, 177, 192-93, 206
Psyche, 257 心灵，257
Psychoanalysis, 8, 14-15, 120-21, 214, 24344 精神分析，8, 14-15, 120-21, 214, 24344
Psychology: cognitive, 2, 14, 310; depth, 299-300, 303; experimental, models of memory in, 5, 138; Gestalt, 98, 163 心理学：认知，2，14，310；深度，299-300，303；实验心理学中的记忆模型，5，138；格式塔心理学，98，163
Recognition, dim and dawning, 130-32; as an intermediary, 140-41; presentness of, 124-27; vs. recollection, 126, 138-39; self-, 136-37 识别，模糊与初现，130-32；作为中介，140-41；当下性，124-27；与回忆相对，126，138-39；自我识别，136-37
Recognizing, xi, 122-40, 204; -as, 133-35; -in, 132-33; as an intermediary, 140 ; the past and the present in, 125-27; temporality of, 141; -x-as-a-fact, 135 识别过程，xi，122-40，204；识别为，133-35；识别于，132-33；作为中介，140；过去与现在在识别中的关系，125-27；时间性，141；识别某事实，135
Recollection, 138, 207, 272; insufficiency of, 213-14; of the past, 219; in psychoanalysis, 14; temporality of, 24; transparency of, 268,272,285268,272,285; world-frame of, 171 回忆，138，207，272；不足性，213-14；对过去的回忆，219；精神分析中的回忆，14；时间性，24；透明性， 268,272,285268,272,285 ；世界框架，171
Remaindering, 266-68, 277, 284 残存物，266-68, 277, 284
Remainders, 277 残余，277
Remembered, the: actuality of, 41-42; 被记忆之物：其现实性，41-42；
temporality of, 73-76; topology of, 184; unity of, 41; world of, 69 其时间性，73-76；其拓扑结构，184；其统一性，41；其世界，69
Rememberer, xi, 2, 44, 73-76, 262 记忆者，xi, 2, 44, 73-76, 262
Remembering: account of, descriptive, xi, xii; act of, 22; act-phase of, 48-53, and object-phase, 48; -as, 60-61; as commemorative, 233; connective, 260; dimensions of, capacitative and dispositional, 48-49; and experience of world, 264; and forgetting, 12; freedom in, 18, 79, 288; the future, 62-63; -how, 55-59, 149; vs. imagining, 328; and knowledge, xii; multi-modal, 31; nonsensuous, 54-55; and nostalgia, 201; object-phase of, 65-85; on-the-occasionof, 62; and place, 186-87; primary and secondary, 49-52, 63; retrieval in, 51-52; and sense of self, 75-76; -simpliciter, 5254, 60, 61; -that, 53-55, 58, 60, 61; -to, 58-60; -through, 218-21, 259; quasinarrative structure of, 54; -what, 61 记忆：描述性说明，xi, xii；记忆行为，22；记忆的行为阶段，48-53，与对象阶段，48；作为...的记忆，60-61；作为纪念性记忆，233；连接性记忆，260；记忆的维度，容量性与倾向性，48-49；与对世界的体验，264；与遗忘，12；记忆中的自由，18, 79, 288；关于未来的记忆，62-63；如何记忆，55-59, 149；与想象的对比，328；与知识，xii；多模态记忆，31；非感官记忆，54-55；与怀旧，201；记忆的对象阶段，65-85；特定场合下的记忆，62；与地点，186-87；初级与次级记忆，49-52, 63；记忆中的检索，51-52；与自我意识，75-76；纯粹记忆，52-54, 60, 61；关于...的记忆，53-55, 58, 60, 61；为...而记忆，58-60；通过...记忆，218-21, 259；记忆的准叙事结构，54；记忆内容，61
Reminders, 90-103, 329, 330 提示物，90-103, 329, 330
Reminding, xi, 90-103, 204; adumbrative model of, 100, 101, 264; in Aristotle, 9496; temporality of, 141 提醒，xi, 90-103, 204；预示性提醒模式，100, 101, 264；亚里士多德理论中的提醒，94-96；提醒的时间性，141
Reminiscence: co-, 114-15, 118, 207; verbal, 119-21, 167; written, 118-19 回忆：共同回忆，114-15 页，118 页，207 页；言语回忆，119-21 页，167 页；书面回忆，118-19 页
Reminiscing, xi, 104-21, 204; the past in, 110,117 ; and story-telling, 106, 113, 330 追忆，序言，104-21 页，204 页；其中的过往，110 页，117 页；与讲故事的关系，106 页，113 页，330 页
Renaissance, 11, 16, 17 文艺复兴时期，11 页，16 页，17 页
Representation, xi, 153, 260, 345-46 再现，序言，153 页，260 页，345-46 页
Reservative, 187-88, 203, 212, 301 保留性，187-88, 203, 212, 301
Restance, xi, 220, 266-67, 268 抵抗性，xi, 220, 266-67, 268
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 210, 213 里尔克，莱纳·玛丽亚，210, 213
Rimbaud, Arthur, 118 兰波，阿尔蒂尔，118
Rorty, Richard, 88, 345 罗蒂，理查德，88, 345
Ruminescence, 156-57, 275, 328 回忆现象，156-57, 275, 328
Russell, Bertrand, 195 罗素，伯特兰，195
Ryle, Gilbert, 88, 322 赖尔，吉尔伯特，88, 322
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 125 萨特，让-保罗，125
Seeing-as, 124-25, 133-34 视为，124-25，133-34
Self: -image, 57; and other, 103, 141, 247, 256, and the body, 158-60; -presence, 23, 29, 42, 69-70, 81; sense of, and remembering, 75-76 自我：-形象，57；与他者，103，141，247，256，以及与身体，158-60；-在场，23，29，42，69-70，81；自我感，与记忆，75-76
Solemnization, 223-26 神圣化，223-26
Soul, 118, 226; and memory, 16, 67, 144; recollection of, in place, 189; remembering, 294; in Plato, 14, 103, 302-303 灵魂，118，226；与记忆的关系，16，67，144；在场所中的回忆，189；记忆行为，294；柏拉图理论中的论述，14，103，302-303
Space: inhabited, 211-12; physical vs. poetical, 208; remembered, 70-72, 183 空间：被栖居的，211-12；物理空间与诗意空间，208；被记忆的空间，70-72，183
Spatiality, 71-72, 214 空间性，71-72，214
Spontaneity, 153 自发性，153
Story-telling, 106, 113, 330 讲故事，106, 113, 330
Straus, Erwin, 166, 197 斯特劳斯，欧文，166, 197
Stravinsky, Igor, 153 斯特拉文斯基，伊戈尔，153
Suffusion, 126-29, 135, 264 弥漫，126-29, 135, 264
Text, 221, 231-35, 246-47, 347-48 文本，221，231-35，246-47，347-48 页
Texturality, 80 纹理性，80 页
Things, 205-206, 209 事物，205-206，209 页
Throughness, 259 贯穿性，259 页
Time, 112, 121, 190; continuity of, in place, 194; dispersiveness of, 182; and eternity, 228; -lapse, in memory, 14; in memory, 201-202; modernistic perspective on, 202; monolinear view of, 182-83; and place, in Kant, 202; remembered, 73-76; and site, 186; and space, 227 时间，112，121，190；在场所中的连续性，194；分散性，182；与永恒，228；记忆中的时间流逝，14；记忆中的时间，201-202；现代主义视角下的时间，202；单线性的时间观，182-83；康德哲学中时间与场所的关系，202；被记忆的时间，73-76；与地点，186；与空间，227
Truth: memorial, 283-84; to the how, 281; to the that, 281-82 真理：纪念性的，283-84；关于"如何"的真理，281；关于"那个"的真理，281-82
Turner, Victor, 236 维克多·特纳，236
Whitehead, Alfred North, 117, 173-78, 257; the body in, 174-76,182,259,338174-76,182,259,338; causal efficacy and presentational immediacy 阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特海, 117, 173-78, 257; 其中关于身体的论述, 174-76,182,259,338174-76,182,259,338 ; 因果效验与表象直接性
in, 173-76; cosmology of, 173; experience and the past in, 176; mental pole in, 140 , vs. physical pole, 176 ; objective immortality in, 256; simple location in, 210; time in, 173-74, 181-82; romantic view of nature in, 210 中，173-76 页；宇宙观，173 页；经验与过去的关系，176 页；心智极，140 页，与物理极的对比，176 页；客观不朽性，256 页；简单定位，210 页；时间观，173-74 页，181-82 页；浪漫自然观，210 页
Williams, William Carlos, 288 威廉·卡洛斯·威廉斯，288 页
Withness, 338, 339 同在感，338 页，339 页
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 89, 124, 132 路德维希·维特根斯坦，89 页，124 页，132 页
Wordsworth, William, 13, 227 华兹华斯，威廉，13, 227
World: being-in-the-, 149-50, 191, 215; and body, 149, 151, 179; circumambient, 138, 151; connection to, 149; -frame, 169, 171; -hood, 68-69; implacement, 145, 311; life-, of the rememberer, xi ; and memory, xi, xii, 18, 141, 179, 258; memory rooted in, 144,289,310,313144,289,310,313; and mind, 140-41; and place, 179; sense of, 69; -space, and world-time, 169 ; -view, postKantian, 202 世界：在世存在，149-50, 191, 215；与身体，149, 151, 179；周遭环境，138, 151；与之连接，149；-框架，169, 171；-性，68-69；处所化，145, 311；记忆者的生活世界，xi；与记忆，xi, xii, 18, 141, 179, 258；根植于世界的记忆， 144,289,310,313144,289,310,313 ；与心灵，140-41；与地方，179；世界感，69；-空间，与世界时间，169；-观，后康德式，202
Wright, Frank Lloyd, 211, 344 赖特，弗兰克·劳埃德，211, 344
Writing, 118-19 书写，118-119
Yates, Frances, 1, 16, 183, 317 弗朗西斯·叶芝, 1, 16, 183, 317
EDWARD S. CASEY is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is author of Imagining: A Phenomenological Study, Second Edition; Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World; and The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History. 爱德华·S·凯西是纽约州立大学石溪分校哲学教授。著有《想象：现象学研究（第二版）》、《重返场所：重新理解场所世界》以及《场所的命运：一部哲学史》。
This page intentionally left blank 此页留白
This page intentionally left blank 此页留白
导出提示
谨慎下载超过 300 页以上 PDF，容易内存溢出。
PDF Pro 下载需借用浏览器的打印功能，出现打印界面后，在【打印机】处选择【另存为 PDF】，最后点击【保存】即可。
