Art and anthropology for a sustainable world
艺术与人类学：迈向可持续的世界

‘Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible’. So declared that most anthropological of artists, Paul Klee, in his Creative credo of 1920 (Klee 1961: 76). ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This article is also in the nature of a credo - or better, perhaps, a manifesto - and it rests on two propositions. First, Klee’s mantra applies just as well to anthropology as it does to art. It is no more for anthropology than for art, I contend, to hold a mirror to reality. It is rather to enter into the relations and processes that give rise to things so as to bring them into the field of our awareness. Secondly, only so long as these relations and processes carry on can the world offer a sustainable abode for its inhabitants. ‘Form is the end, death’, as Klee put it; ‘form-giving is life’ (Klee 1973: 269). I hold that the commitment of anthropology, as of art, must be to the reality of a world of life, one that is never finally formed but ever in formation. To establish these twin propositions, I shall proceed in three stages. I begin by reimagining the discipline of anthropology as fundamentally a speculative and experimental endeavour, oriented as much to the future as to the past, but by the same token, radically distinct in its objectives from ethnography. I then go on to consider what we mean by research. I shall argue that
“艺术不是复制可见的事物，而是使其显现。”这句话出自最具人类学气质的艺术家保罗·克利，他在 1920 年的《创作信条》中如此宣称（Klee 1961: 76）。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这篇文章本质上也是一种信条——或者更确切地说，是一份宣言——它基于两个命题。首先，克利的箴言同样适用于人类学，就像它适用于艺术一样。我认为，人类学并非是为了像艺术那样照镜子般反映现实，而是要进入那些产生事物的关系和过程，从而将它们带入我们的意识领域。其次，只有当这些关系和过程持续进行时，世界才能为其居民提供一个可持续的居所。正如克利所说：“形态是终结，是死亡”；“赋形是生命”（Klee 1973: 269）。我认为，人类学的使命，正如艺术的使命，必须致力于一个生命世界的现实，这个世界永远不会最终成形，而是不断形成之中。为了确立这两个命题，我将分三个阶段进行阐述。 我首先重新构想人类学这门学科，认为它本质上是一种推测性和实验性的努力，既面向未来，也面向过去，但同时在目标上与民族志有着根本的不同。接着，我将探讨我们所说的研究到底意味着什么。我将论证，
research has been diminished by its assimilation to the protocols of positive science, and that it is for art and anthropology to demonstrate its true promise. Finally, I return to the theme of sustainability, and to the question of how to imagine a world with room for everyone and everything. To do so, I argue, we must approach it, as artists and anthropologists do, from within. I shall conclude by reflecting on the implications of the proposed synergy of art and anthropology for education, democracy, and citizenship.
研究因被同化为实证科学的规范而被削弱，而艺术和人类学则有责任展示其真正的潜力。最后，我回到可持续发展的主题，以及如何想象一个容纳所有人和万物的世界的问题。为此，我认为我们必须像艺术家和人类学家那样，从内部去接近它。我将以反思艺术与人类学协同作用对教育、民主和公民身份的影响作为结尾。

Ostensibly, the disciplines of anthropology and art face in opposite directions: the first dedicated to describing and comparing forms of life as we find them; the second to the invention of forms never before encountered. This has not always been so, however. It was, after all, the Dutch masters of the seventeenth century, practitioners of what has aptly been called ‘the art of describing’ (Alpers 1983), who set the standards of observational accuracy and depictive fidelity, in their painterly compositions, which ethnographers would seek to emulate, three centuries later, in the medium of words, in effect by substituting verbal ‘thick description’ for the opacity of oils. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} But these standards hold little appeal to an art of the contemporary that is nothing if not speculative. We are inclined nowadays to judge a work as art not by the accuracy of its depiction but by the novelty of its conception. Yet no practice of art could carry force that was not already grounded in careful and attentive observation of the lived world. Nor, conversely, could anthropological studies of the manifold ways along which life is lived be of any avail if not brought to bear upon speculative inquiries into what the possibilities of life might be. Thus, far from the one looking only forward and the other only back, contemporary art and anthropology have in common that they both observe and speculate. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} Their orientations are as much towards human futures as towards human pasts; these are futures, however, that are not conjured from thin air but forged in the crucible of collective lives. I contend that for both art and anthropology, the aim is - or at least should be - to join with these lives in the common task of fashioning a world fit for coming generations to inhabit.
表面上，人类学和艺术这两个学科似乎面向相反的方向：前者致力于描述和比较我们所见的生活形态；后者则致力于创造前所未有的形式。然而，情况并非总是如此。毕竟，十七世纪的荷兰大师们，实践了被恰当地称为“描述的艺术”（Alpers 1983），他们在绘画构图中确立了观察的准确性和描绘的忠实度的标准，三百年后，民族志学者们试图在文字媒介中效仿这些标准，实际上是用口头的“厚重描述”替代了油画的晦涩。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 但这些标准对当代艺术几乎没有吸引力，当代艺术本质上是投机性的。如今，我们倾向于根据作品构思的新颖性而非描绘的准确性来评判艺术作品。然而，任何艺术实践的力量都必须建立在对现实生活世界的细致入微的观察基础之上。 反之，如果不将人类学对多样生活方式的研究应用于对生命可能性的推测性探讨，这些研究也毫无用处。因此，当代艺术和人类学并非一个只向前看，另一个只向后看的领域，它们的共同点在于既观察又推测。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 它们的关注点既指向人类的未来，也指向人类的过去；然而，这些未来并非凭空想象，而是在集体生活的熔炉中锻造而成。我主张，对于艺术和人类学来说，其目标——或者至少应该是——与这些生活共同参与塑造一个适合未来世代居住的世界的共同任务。

This task, I believe, is the most pressing and critical for our times. How ought we to live so that there can be life for those who come after us? It is not as though anyone already has the answers. Human ways of life - of doing and saying, thinking and knowing - are not handed down on a plate; they are neither preordained nor ever finally settled. Living, we could say, is the never-ending process of figuring out how to live, and harbours at every moment the potential to branch along different ways, no one of which is any more normal or natural than any other. Every way, then, is in the nature of a communal experiment. It is no more a solution to the problem of life than is the path a solution to the problem of how to reach a destination as yet unknown. But it is an approach to the problem. Anthropology, as I speak for it here, is a field of study that takes upon itself to learn from as wide a range of approaches as it can; one that seeks to bring to bear, on this problem of how to live, the wisdom and experience of all the world’s inhabitants, whatever their backgrounds, livelihoods, circumstances, and places of abode (Ingold 2018b). ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}
我相信，这项任务是我们这个时代最紧迫和关键的。我们应当如何生活，才能让后代有生命的可能？并不是说有人已经有了答案。人类的生活方式——做事和言说、思考和认知的方式——并不是现成的；它们既非预定，也从未最终确定。可以说，生活本身就是一个不断探索如何生活的过程，并且在每一刻都潜藏着走向不同道路的可能性，没有哪一条道路比其他道路更正常或更自然。因此，每一种生活方式本质上都是一种集体实验。它并不是生活问题的解决方案，就像路径并不是如何到达尚未知晓目的地的问题的解决方案一样。但它是一种解决问题的方法。人类学，正如我在这里所说的，是一门致力于从尽可能广泛的途径中学习的学科；它试图将世界上所有居民的智慧和经验，无论其背景、谋生方式、环境和居住地，应用于这个如何生活的问题（Ingold 2018b）。 ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4}

Of course, were I a practising artist rather than a professional anthropologist, I might well be thinking along parallel lines. I might even want to make the same claims for art that I have just championed for anthropology. After all, is art not also an experimental inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of life? Does it not also pose the question of how to live? I have no wish to be deflected into the academically specious exercise of
当然，如果我是一名从事艺术创作的艺术家，而不是一名专业的人类学家，我很可能也会有类似的思考。我甚至可能想为艺术提出与我刚才为人类学辩护的相同主张。毕竟，艺术难道不也是对生活条件和可能性的一种实验性探究吗？它难道不也提出了如何生活的问题吗？我无意被引入那种学术上牵强附会的区分“什么是艺术，什么不是艺术”的讨论。
distinguishing what is art from what is not. I do, however, think it is worth enumerating the principles upon which art and anthropology might potentially converge.
不过，我确实认为值得列举一下艺术与人类学可能汇聚的原则。

These, in my view, are fourfold. The first is generosity. This means listening and paying attention to what others do and say, receiving with good grace what is offered rather than seeking by subterfuge to extract or elicit what is not. Enshrined in the principle of generosity is an ontological commitment to give back what we owe to others for our own intellectual, practical, and moral formation, indeed for our very existence as beings in a world. The second principle is open-endedness. An inquiry that is open-ended seeks not to arrive at final solutions that would bring life to a close but to reveal ways along which it can keep going. Far from rendering the world habitable for some to the exclusion of others, it is about making room for everyone and everything, both now and for the indefinite future. That is what I mean by a sustainable world, and I shall return to it. The third principle is comparison. It is to recognize that no approach to life is the only possible one, and that for every approach you take, others could be taken which lead in different directions. Thus the question ‘why this direction rather than that?’ is always uppermost in our minds. The final principle calls on us to be critical, for we cannot be content with things as they are. By common consent, the organizations of production, distribution, governance, and knowledge that have dominated the modern era have brought the world to the brink of catastrophe. In finding ways to carry on, we need all the help we can get. But no one - no science, no philosophy, no indigenous people - already holds the key to the future if only we could find it. We have to make that future together. And this can only be achieved through conversation.
在我看来，这四点是相辅相成的。第一是慷慨。这意味着倾听并关注他人的言行，欣然接受所给予的，而不是通过诡计去获取或引出那些未被提供的东西。慷慨原则中蕴含着一种本体论承诺，即回馈我们因自身的智识、实践和道德形成，乃至作为世界中存在的生命本身而欠他人的一切。第二个原则是开放性。开放式的探究不寻求最终解决方案以终结生命，而是揭示生命得以持续的路径。它远非为了让某些人独占世界的宜居性而排斥他人，而是为所有人和万物腾出空间，无论是现在还是无限的未来。这就是我所说的可持续世界，我稍后会再谈及。第三个原则是比较。它意味着认识到没有哪种生活方式是唯一可能的，每一种选择都存在其他可能的路径，且这些路径会引向不同的方向。因此，“为何选择这条路而非那条？”这一问题始终萦绕在我们心头。 最后一个原则呼吁我们保持批判，因为我们不能满足于现状。普遍认为，主导现代时代的生产、分配、治理和知识组织已将世界推向灾难的边缘。在寻找继续前行的方式时，我们需要尽可能多的帮助。但没有任何人——无论是科学、哲学还是土著人民——已经掌握了未来的钥匙，只等我们去发现。我们必须共同创造那个未来。而这只能通过对话来实现。

In short, where art joins with anthropology is in making a conversation of human life itself (Ingold 2018c: 158). Not all art, of course, is anthropological in its orientation or philosophy, nor is it invariably signed up to the four principles I have just enumerated. But of art that is anthropological we can say that it, too, is generous, open-ended, comparative, and critical. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} Such art does not take a stand, or adopt an offensive or defensive posture towards others. It does not impose itself, or seek to intimidate by shock and awe. It does not set out to make a statement. It is inquisitive rather than interrogative, offering a line of questioning rather than demanding answers; it is attentional rather than fronted by prior intentions, modestly experimental rather than brazenly transgressive, critical but not given over to critique. Joining with the forces that give birth to ideas and things, rather than seeking to express what is already there, it conceives without being conceptual. Art that is anthropological is curious; it rekindles care and longing, allowing knowledge to grow from the inside of being in the conversations of life. Like a living, breathing body, what art takes in, it also gives out. It is vividly present yet intimately enmeshed with its surroundings. To echo Klee’s Credo, it does not reproduce the sensible, but makes sensible. That’s why practices like walking, drawing, calligraphy, instrumental music, dance, ways of making and working with materials - ways that tend to get bracketed at the ‘craft’ end of the spectrum - are exemplary for me. Artists engaging in these practices come closest, in my view, to doing anthropology, even if they do not self-consciously present their work as such. ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6}
简而言之，艺术与人类学相结合之处在于对人类生活本身进行对话（Ingold 2018c: 158）。当然，并非所有艺术在取向或哲学上都是人类学的，也并非所有艺术都必然遵循我刚才列举的四项原则。但对于那些具有人类学性质的艺术，我们可以说它同样是慷慨的、开放式的、比较性的和批判性的。 ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 这种艺术不采取立场，也不对他人采取进攻或防御的姿态。它不强加自身，也不通过震撼和威慑来恐吓。它不以发表声明为目的。它是探究性的，而非质问性的，提供一种提问的方式，而非强求答案；它是关注的，而非先入为主的，有节制的实验性，而非厚颜无耻的越界，批判性的，但不沉溺于批判。它与孕育思想和事物的力量结合，而非试图表达已存在的东西，它在无概念化的状态下进行构思。具有人类学性质的艺术是好奇的；它重新点燃关怀与渴望，使知识能够从生命对话的内在生长。 像一个有生命、有呼吸的身体，艺术所吸收的，也会回馈出去。它生动地存在着，却又与周围环境紧密交织。呼应克利的信条，艺术不是复制可感知的事物，而是使之变得可感知。这就是为什么像散步、绘画、书法、器乐、舞蹈、制作和材料加工等方式——这些往往被归类为“手工艺”范畴的实践——对我来说是典范。参与这些实践的艺术家，在我看来，最接近于进行人类学研究，即使他们并不自觉地将自己的作品呈现为人类学研究。 ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6}

But what of anthropologists themselves? Are they doing anthropology in the sense I have outlined, of calling on the wisdom and experience of people everywhere in the task of fashioning a common future? Have they joined the conversation? For the most part I fear they have not. ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} In a conversation, lines twist around one another as they go along, both answering and being answered to in a relation of what I have called correspondence (Ingold 2017). ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} The majority of practising anthropologists, however, have preferred to
那么，人类学家们自己呢？他们是否在我所描述的意义上进行人类学研究，即借助世界各地人们的智慧和经验，共同塑造一个共同的未来？他们是否加入了这场对话？我担心大多数情况下他们并没有。 ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} 在一场对话中，话语彼此交织，既回应又被回应，形成我所称的对应关系（Ingold 2017）。 ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} 然而，大多数从事人类学研究的人更倾向于
come at other lives along a tangent, momentarily aligning with them only to veer aside into the stance of interpretation and analysis. This is the stance of ethnography. Thus whereas anthropology carries on a correspondent relation with the world, ethnography’s relation is tangential. Its objective is not to study with people but to make studies of them. It is to listen to what they have to say, and to observe what they do, for what it tells us about them. Now I am not saying that ethnographic studies are wrong; indeed they have added immeasurably to the library of human knowledge. But their objectives are not those of anthropology, and to conflate the two is to the detriment of both. For where anthropology seeks to open up to coeval lives and differing ways of being, and to bring them into dialogue with our own, ethnography’s aim is to wrap them up into an account that transports us into a world whose contrived otherness leaves ours intact. As Stuart McLean has recently put it, the effect of collapsing anthropology into ethnography is to downsize questions of ontology by confining them within the explanatory or interpretative horizons of ‘society’, ‘culture’, or ‘history’ (McLean 2017: 147-55).
以切线的方式接触其他生命，短暂地与之对齐，然后偏离，进入解释和分析的立场。这就是民族志的立场。因此，尽管人类学与世界保持对应关系，民族志的关系却是切线式的。它的目标不是与人们一起研究，而是对他们进行研究。它是倾听他们所说的话，观察他们所做的事，以了解这些对我们关于他们的认识所提供的信息。我并不是说民族志研究是错误的；事实上，它们极大地丰富了人类知识的宝库。但它们的目标并非人类学的目标，将两者混为一谈对双方都有害。因为人类学旨在开放与同时代生命和不同存在方式的对话，并将其与我们自身对话，而民族志的目的是将它们包裹成一个叙述，将我们带入一个人为构造的他者世界，而这个世界保持了我们自身的完整。 正如斯图尔特·麦克莱恩最近所说，将人类学简化为民族志的结果，是通过将本体论问题限制在“社会”、“文化”或“历史”的解释或诠释视野内，从而缩小了这些问题的范围（McLean 2017: 147-55）。

Now art, too, can be either tangential or correspondent. A tangential art seeks to describe what it sees: such, indeed, was the art of the Dutch master-painters to which I have already referred. It touches the world only to draw away and put it in the frame. This is an aspiration shared by the ethnography for which it set a precedent. But an art that is truly anthropological - that makes sensible, in Klee’s terms, rather than reproducing the already sensed - is one that joins with the forces and flows of an ever-forming world. It is, in short, an art of correspondence. Yet most contemporary art that selfconsciously presents itself as anthropological has taken ethnography to be the glue that holds art and anthropology together. The resulting unions have been ill matched, to say the least, for the very reasons that render art compatible with anthropology also make it incompatible with ethnography. An art that is speculative and experimental, that explores the possibilities of being through open-ended conversation and comparison, cannot meet the standards of accuracy, of empirical depth and detail, expected of ethnography. Conversely, an ethnographic stance that gazes rearwards, to capture the already sensed in all its richness and complexity, cannot simultaneously join in the forward-going process by which the past - in the inimitable words of Henri Bergson (1911: 5) - ‘gnaws into the future and . . . swells as it advances’. Moreover, contemporary art’s embrace of ethnography brings in train two preoccupations that do much to undermine its anthropological promise. Already spelled out over twenty years ago by the art historian Hal Foster (1995), these are, first, an obsession with alterity, and, second, an insistence on placing everything in its social, cultural, and historical context.
现在艺术也可以是切线式的或对应式的。切线式艺术试图描述它所看到的：这正是我之前提到的荷兰大师画家的艺术。它触及世界只是为了抽离并将其置于画框中。这是民族志所共有的一个愿望，艺术为其树立了先例。但真正的人类学艺术——用克利的话说，是使之变得有意义，而不是复制已被感知的东西——是一种与不断形成的世界的力量和流动相结合的艺术。简而言之，这是一种对应艺术。然而，大多数自觉呈现为人类学艺术的当代艺术，将民族志视为连接艺术与人类学的粘合剂。结果，这种结合充其量是不匹配的，原因正是那些使艺术与人类学兼容的因素，也使其与民族志不兼容。一种投机性和实验性的艺术，通过开放式的对话和比较探索存在的可能性，无法达到民族志所期望的准确性、经验深度和细节标准。 相反，一种向后看的民族志立场，旨在捕捉已感知的丰富性和复杂性，无法同时参与那个向前推进的过程——正如亨利·柏格森（Henri Bergson，1911:5）那无可比拟的话语所言，过去“啃噬着未来……并随着前进而膨胀”。此外，当代艺术对民族志的拥抱带来了两大关注点，这些关注在很大程度上削弱了其人类学的承诺。正如艺术史学家哈尔·福斯特（Hal Foster，1995）二十多年前所指出的，首先是对他者性的痴迷，其次是坚持将一切置于其社会、文化和历史语境中。

Let me begin with the problem of alterity. Anthropologists like to impress their friends with stories of their encounter with what they call ‘radical alterity’. For some it is almost a badge of honour that confers the right to speak of otherness - of its political force or transgressive potential - with an authority denied to their less seasoned and adventurous cousins. It is a badge that many artists, consumed by what Foster calls ‘ethnographer envy’, would dearly love to wear. This does raise the question, however, of how ‘other’ the people have to be in order that their alterity should count as radical. The phrase ‘radical alterity’ in fact comes from the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It connotes an ethical stance which requires you to let others into your presence, to be themselves, without entertaining any preconceptions about the kinds of selves they are, and without in any way prejudging the terms in which you might begin to engage or converse with them. ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} Thus otherness, at least initially, is absolute. It cannot admit to
让我从他者性的问题开始。人类学家喜欢用他们所称的“激进他者性”的遭遇故事来给朋友们留下深刻印象。对一些人来说，这几乎是一种荣誉徽章，赋予他们以权威谈论他者性——其政治力量或越界潜力的权利，而这种权威是他们那些经验不足、缺乏冒险精神的同行所不具备的。许多艺术家深受福斯特所称的“民族志学家嫉妒症”所困扰，也非常渴望拥有这样的徽章。然而，这确实引发了一个问题：人们必须有多“他者”，他们的他者性才能被视为激进的。事实上，“激进他者性”这一短语源自埃马纽埃尔·列维纳斯的哲学。它意味着一种伦理立场，要求你让他人进入你的存在，让他们做他们自己，而不带有任何关于他们是什么样的自我的先入之见，也不以任何方式预先判断你可能开始与他们交往或对话的条件。 ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 因此，他者性，至少在最初，是绝对的。它不能容许
differences of degree, such that some people are more other than others. Yet in the very instant that anthropologists introduce society, history, or culture into their conception of alterity, this absoluteness is compromised. For to say that people are of another social background, historical provenance, or cultural tradition than one’s own is immediately to encompass their difference within the horizons of an imposed frame. There are people of our kind, and people of this other kind. We are setting them, the others, a priori, on the opposite side of a frontier between worlds, ours and theirs. And this, of course, is to prejudge how we engage with them.
差异是程度上的差别，有些人比其他人更“他者”。然而，当人类学家在他们对他者性的理解中引入社会、历史或文化时，这种绝对性便被削弱了。因为说某些人与自己有不同的社会背景、历史渊源或文化传统，意味着立即将他们的差异纳入一个被强加的框架视野之中。有人属于我们这一类，有人属于另一类。我们先验地将他们，即“他者”，置于我们与他们之间的世界边界的对立面上。当然，这也预设了我们与他们交往的方式。

That people are different goes without saying. But does their otherness make them so? Which comes first, alterity or difference? For Levinas, alterity is given from the start. But I am more inclined to the contrary view, which we owe to Gilbert Simondon and - after him - Gilles Deleuze, namely that otherness is ever-emergent from within the matrix of relations within which all are immersed $ab$$ab$aba b initio. That is to say, it is a function of ontogenesis, the becoming of being. ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} Here, differentiation is prior, alterity derivative. We are dealing, then, not with a world of beings radically other to one another, as with Levinas, but with a world of becomings that, like voices in a conversation, are ever differentiating themselves from one another even as they emerge and go along together. Karen Barad (2014) calls this ‘cutting together-apart’. People are different, then, not because they belong to other worlds but because they are fellow travellers with us in the same world, a world - nonetheless - of inexhaustible and interminable differentiation (Ingold 2018c). Ethnography, however, predisposes its practitioners to put alterity ahead of difference. There is, in what is often called the ‘ethnographic encounter’, an inherent schizochrony - to borrow a term from Johannes Fabian (1983: 37). In an encounter marked as ethnographic, we turn our backs on people even as we open out to them. This, in effect, is to convert others into surrogates for an idealized project of the anthropological or artistic self. It leads to the coding of difference as manifest identity and of otherness as outsideness. And as Foster intimates, this can be but a prelude for a politics of tangentialism that places others on the margins, rather than one of correspondence in which all can join on an equivalent footing (Foster 1995: 303).
人们彼此不同是不言而喻的。但他们的他者性是否正是因为如此？他者性和差异哪个先出现？对于列维纳斯来说，他者性是从一开始就存在的。但我更倾向于相反的观点，这一观点归功于吉尔伯特·西蒙东及其后的吉尔·德勒兹，即他者性是从所有人所浸润的关系矩阵中不断涌现的 $ab$$ab$aba b initio。也就是说，他者性是本体生成的一个功能，是存在的生成过程 ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 。在这里，差异先于他者性，他者性是衍生的。因此，我们面对的不是一个彼此根本不同的存在世界，如列维纳斯所说，而是一个生成的世界，这些生成如同对话中的声音，在彼此涌现并共同前行的同时，不断地相互区分。卡伦·巴拉德（2014）称之为“共同切割-分离”。那么，人们之所以不同，不是因为他们属于不同的世界，而是因为他们是与我们同处一个世界的同行者，这个世界——尽管如此——是一个无穷无尽且不断分化的世界（英戈尔德 2018c）。然而，民族志倾向于让其实践者将他者性置于差异之前。 在通常所说的“民族志遭遇”中，存在一种固有的时间错位——借用约翰内斯·法比安（Johannes Fabian，1983:37）的话来说。在被标记为民族志的遭遇中，我们在向他人敞开时，却背对着他们。实际上，这就是将他人转化为人类学或艺术自我理想化项目的替代品。这导致了将差异编码为显现的身份，将他者视为外在。正如福斯特所暗示的，这只能成为一种边缘主义政治的序曲，将他者置于边缘，而非一种所有人都能平等参与的对应关系（Foster 1995:303）。

This marginalization of others is further compounded by the insistence on placing them in context. This, too, is to put them into the frame, and in so doing to neutralize the force of their presence. What applies to people, here, applies equally to what they do and make: to performances and works of art. The ethnographic impulse is always to subject them to analysis. Thus understood and accounted for, disarmed and embedded, laid to rest, we are no longer troubled to attend to them or to what they have to tell. Their contextualization does not bring them forth to be themselves, but refers them back, to what Alfred Gell (1996: 37) has called the ‘complex intentionalities’ of which they are alleged to be the material expression. Gell’s view - to my mind entirely mistaken - is that for any work to qualify as art, it must be possible to trace a chain of causal connections, in reverse, from the final product to the initial intentions that motivated its production. It is then the specific job of the anthropologist-as-ethnographer to provide an ‘interpretative context’ (1996: 36) that unlocks the significance of the work by revealing the intentions that lie behind it. It is to join with the masters of contextualization, the art historian and the critic, as self-appointed gatekeepers to meaning. For anthropology to join with the practice of art, however, is to proceed in precisely the opposite direction. It is to engage in what Tobias Rees (2018) has recently called ‘the subtle art of decontextualization’. This is an art not of extraction but of unwrapping, of peeling away the layers of interpretative
对他者的边缘化进一步加剧于坚持将他们置于特定语境之中。这同样是将他们置入框架，从而中和他们存在的力量。这里适用于人的情况，同样适用于他们所做和所创造的：表演和艺术作品。民族志的冲动总是将它们置于分析之下。这样理解和解释后，它们被解除武装并嵌入其中，被安置妥当，我们便不再为关注它们或它们所传达的信息而烦恼。它们的语境化并非使它们得以展现自我，而是将它们指回到阿尔弗雷德·盖尔（Alfred Gell，1996:37）所称的“复杂意图”，据说它们是这些意图的物质表现。盖尔的观点——在我看来完全错误——是认为任何作品要被认定为艺术，必须能够逆向追溯一条因果链，从最终产品回溯到促使其创作的最初意图。然后，作为民族志学者的人类学家的具体任务，就是提供一个“解释性语境”（1996:36），通过揭示其背后的意图来解锁作品的意义。 这就是与语境化的大师们——艺术史学家和评论家——结盟，他们自封为意义的守门人。然而，人类学若要与艺术实践结合，则恰恰是朝着完全相反的方向前进。这是参与托比亚斯·里斯（Tobias Rees，2018 年）最近所称的“微妙的去语境化艺术”。这是一种非提取的艺术，而是剥开、剥离解释层层包裹的艺术，
context so as to restore the work to presence, in a world that is ours as well, so that we can once again feel its force, and correspond with it.
以恢复作品的当下存在，在一个同样属于我们的世界中，使我们能够再次感受到它的力量，并与之产生共鸣。

I now turn to the second part of my argument. This is about the call of research, and about what happens to research in anthropology when its vocation is aligned with that of art. Nowadays, of course, the default setting for research is science. Thus the researcher is presumed to be a scientist unless proven otherwise. And scientific research is normally taken to be a specialized mode of inquiry dedicated to testing hypotheses through the collection and analysis of data under controlled conditions, and to the advance of theory through conjecture and refutation. Even where practice deviates from these ideals, any scholar who purports to be engaged in a project of research is still expected to explain what it is intended to show, how the work will be carried out, and the anticipated contribution of its results to knowledge. Anthropologists have always felt uneasy about these expectations, knowing full well that the destination of their research can never be known in advance, that the conditions under which it is carried out are largely beyond their control, and that it never really reaches any conclusion. They worry obsessively about what counts as ‘anthropological knowledge’, and what it means to produce it. By the standards of science, anthropological research looks weak indeed. Yet anthropologists are still inclined to dress their inquiries in a scientific garb, masking conversation as elicitation, experiences of life as data for analysis, lessons learned as final results. As for artists, who find increasingly that they have to present what they are doing as research in order to access the institutional and financial support on which they depend, to present and justify their work as research takes an even greater stretch of credibility. Must they pretend to behave like scientists? If so, what are they trying to find out, and what kinds of knowledge do they think their art can contribute that science cannot?
我现在转向论点的第二部分。这部分涉及研究的召唤，以及当人类学的研究使命与艺术的使命相一致时，研究会发生什么。当然，如今研究的默认设定是科学。因此，研究者被假定为科学家，除非另有证明。科学研究通常被视为一种专门的探究方式，致力于通过在受控条件下收集和分析数据来检验假设，并通过猜想与反驳推动理论的发展。即使实践偏离了这些理想，任何声称从事研究项目的学者仍被期望解释其研究意图、工作如何开展，以及其结果对知识的预期贡献。人类学家一直对这些期望感到不安，他们深知研究的最终目的永远无法预先确定，研究进行的条件在很大程度上超出他们的控制范围，而且研究从未真正得出任何结论。 他们过分担忧什么才算是“人类学知识”，以及生产这种知识意味着什么。以科学的标准来看，人类学研究确实显得很薄弱。然而，人类学家仍倾向于将他们的探究披上科学的外衣，将对话伪装成引导，将生活体验视为分析数据，将所学教训当作最终结果。至于艺术家，他们越来越发现必须将自己的创作呈现为研究，才能获得他们所依赖的机构和资金支持，因此将作品作为研究来展示和辩护更是对可信度的极大考验。他们是否必须假装像科学家一样行事？如果是这样，他们试图发现什么，他们认为自己的艺术能贡献哪些科学无法提供的知识？

My aim in what follows is to reset the default. I want to show that art, and not science, is exemplary in the practice of research, and that anthropology could do well by explicitly following art’s example. Instead of expecting artists and anthropologists to be doing science, we should put the boot on the other foot. The onus should be on scientists to explain how what they are doing, in the harvesting and analysis of data, and in its industrial conversion into knowledge products, can conceivably be regarded as research. If scientists were really researchers, would we not expect them to act more like artists, or at least like anthropologists? Rather than seeking to hold the world to account, or to extract its secrets through force or deception, research would then mean going along with it, entering into its relations and processes and following their evolution from the inside. Some scientists, of course, are already doing this, but they remain a dissenting minority, swimming against the currents of the mainstream. Of scientists, it seems that these dissenters alone have absorbed the lesson that Alfred North Whitehead taught a century ago, in his Tarner Lectures of 1919, namely that ‘there is no holding nature still and looking at it’ (1964: 14-15). For them, as indeed for artists and anthropologists, research is an experimental practice, but one in which every experiment is not just an action done but an experience undergone, leaving neither the experimenter nor the things touched by it unchanged. Both have moved on, along with the world of which they are intrinsically part. In this, each move both doubles up on what was done before, but is yet an original intervention that invites a double in its turn.
我接下来要做的是重新设定默认标准。我想表明，艺术而非科学，在研究实践中才是典范，人类学如果明确效仿艺术的榜样，可能会有更好的发展。我们不应期待艺术家和人类学家去做科学研究，而应反过来。责任应落在科学家身上，让他们解释自己在数据收集与分析，以及将其工业化转化为知识产品的过程中，如何能被合理地视为研究。如果科学家真的是研究者，我们难道不应该期待他们更像艺术家，或者至少像人类学家吗？研究不应是试图追究世界的责任，或通过强制或欺骗来揭示其秘密，而应是顺应世界，进入其关系和过程，从内部跟随其演变。当然，部分科学家已经在这样做，但他们仍是持不同意见的少数，逆流而行于主流之中。 在科学家中，似乎只有这些持不同意见者吸取了阿尔弗雷德·诺斯·怀特海一百年前在 1919 年塔纳讲座中所传授的教训，即“没有办法让自然静止下来然后观察它”（1964：14-15）。对他们来说，正如对艺术家和人类学家一样，研究是一种实验性实践，但每一次实验不仅仅是一个完成的动作，更是一种经历，既不会让实验者保持原样，也不会让被触及的事物保持不变。两者都随着它们本质上所处的世界一同前进。在这一过程中，每一次行动既是对之前所做之事的重复，又是一个原创性的介入，进而邀请另一次重复。

This, after all, is what the word ‘research’ literally means: it is a second search, an act of searching again. To search again is not to repeat, exactly, what you did before. Between one search and the next there is always a differential. It is like walking the same path, or playing the same piece of music, over and over. No walk, no performance, can ever be identical to what went before. Every step is a new beginning. Or to adopt a handy distinction from Gilles Deleuze and his collaborator, Félix Guattari, research is a process not of iteration but of itineration (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 410). It carries on, as life does, not closing in on solutions but ever opening to new horizons. As you move, so does what you seek. But you press on undeterred, driven by a desire that seems as insatiable, and indeed as imperative, as the will to live. You call it curiosity. But you could also call it care, for both words are derived from the same Latin root, curare. It is about looking after, tending to things. Research, then, is not a technical operation, a particular thing you do in life, for so many hours each day. It is rather a way of living curiously: that is, with care and attention. As such, it pervades everything you do. And what are you looking for that so evades your grasp? What is it that always escapes, always overflows your most determined attempts to pin things down, and ever recedes beyond the horizon of conceptualization? I intend to argue that this slippery, fugitive, and ineffable quality is truth. In a world that is sustainable, research never ends because it is, most fundamentally, a search for truth.
毕竟，“research”这个词的字面意思就是“再次搜索”：即再次进行搜索。再次搜索并不是完全重复你之前所做的事情。每一次搜索之间总会有差异。这就像一次又一次地走同一条路，或反复演奏同一段音乐。没有一次的行走，没有一次的演出，能与之前完全相同。每一步都是一个新的开始。或者借用吉尔·德勒兹和他的合作者费利克斯·瓜塔里的一个方便区分，研究不是迭代的过程，而是游历的过程（Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 410）。它像生命一样继续前行，不是闭合于解决方案，而是不断向新的视野开放。你移动时，你所寻找的也在移动。但你毫不气馁地坚持前行，驱动力是一种似乎永不满足、确实如同生存意志般强烈的渴望。你称之为好奇心。但你也可以称之为关怀，因为这两个词都源自同一个拉丁词根 curare。它关乎照料，关乎关心事物。因此，研究并不是一项技术操作，也不是你每天花费许多小时去做的某件特定事情。它更是一种好奇地生活的方式：即以关怀和专注的态度生活。 因此，它渗透到你所做的一切中。你在寻找的是什么，总是难以捉摸？是什么总是逃脱，总是超出你最坚定的努力去确定的范围，并且永远远离概念化的地平线？我打算论证，这种难以捉摸、逃逸且难以言喻的特质就是“真理”。在一个可持续的世界中，研究永无止境，因为它最根本上是一场对真理的追寻。

For many today, truth is a scary word, better kept inside quotation marks. It conjures up terrifying images of the violent oppression wreaked, in the name of truth, by those who have appointed themselves as its worldly ambassadors. We should not, however, blame truth for the wrongs committed in its name. The fault lies in its totalization; its conversion into a monolith that stands eternal like a monument, timeless and fully formed. This rests on a delusion, on the part of its self-appointed guardians, that they are themselves above truth, that they are the masters of it, and that truth is theirs to command. Human history is studded with delusional projects of this kind, each catastrophic for those subjected to it, and each ultimately smothered by the sands of time. Research, to the contrary, rests on the acknowledgement that we can never conquer truth, any more than we can conquer life. Such conquest is for immortals. But for us mortal beings, truth is always greater than we are, always beyond what - at any moment - can be physically determined or grasped within the categories of thought. Truth is inexhaustible. Wherever or whenever we may be, we can still go further. Thus research affords no final release into the light. Remaining ever in the shadows, we stumble along with no end in sight, doggedly following whatever clues afford a passage (Lewis 2011: 592). This is hardly conducive to optimism, to the belief - common among theorists of progress - that the best of all worlds is only just around the corner, pending one or two final breakthroughs. ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} But while it may not be optimistic, research is always hopeful. For in converting every closure into an opening, every apparent solution into a new problem, it is the guarantor that life can carry on, of its sustainability. For this very reason, research is a primary responsibility of the living (Ingold 2018a: 71-4).
对于许多人来说，真理是一个令人害怕的词，最好放在引号内。它让人联想到那些自封为真理世俗使者的人，以真理之名施加的暴力压迫的可怕画面。然而，我们不应责怪真理本身造成以其名义犯下的错误。错误在于将真理绝对化；将其转化为一个永恒矗立如纪念碑般的单一体，永恒且完美无缺。这种观念源于其自封守护者的妄想，认为他们自身高于真理，是其主宰者，真理由他们支配。人类历史充斥着此类妄想项目，每一个对被其支配者都是灾难性的，最终都被时间的沙尘掩埋。相反，研究基于这样一种承认：我们永远无法征服真理，就如同我们无法征服生命一样。这样的征服只属于不朽者。而对于我们这些凡人来说，真理永远比我们更伟大，永远超出任何时刻能够被物理确定或用思维范畴把握的范围。真理是取之不尽的。无论我们身处何地、何时，我们总能走得更远。 因此，研究并不会最终带来光明的解脱。我们始终徘徊在阴影中，踉跄前行，前路未卜，顽强地追随任何能够通行的线索（Lewis 2011: 592）。这几乎不利于乐观，也不支持进步理论家们普遍持有的信念——即最美好的世界就在眼前，只差一两个关键突破。 ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} 但虽然这不算乐观，研究总是充满希望。因为它将每一次终结转化为新的开始，将每一个表面上的解决方案变成新的问题，它保证了生命能够继续存在，保证了生命的可持续性。正因如此，研究是活着的人的首要责任（Ingold 2018a: 71-4）。

Now if research, as I maintain, is the pursuit of truth, and if truth ever exceeds the given, then there must always be more to research than the collection and analysis of data. It must go beyond the facts. The fact stops us in our tracks, and blocks our way. ‘This is how it is’, it says to us, ‘proceed no further!’ But even if the facts of a case may be incontrovertibly established, its truth lives on. This is not to suggest that truth lies behind the facts, calling for a superior intelligence armed with theoretical power-tools capable of breaking through the surface appearances or ideological mirrors that deceive
如果研究，正如我所坚持的，是对真理的追求，而真理总是超越已知的，那么研究必定不仅仅是数据的收集和分析。它必须超越事实。事实让我们止步不前，阻挡我们的道路。“事情就是这样，”它对我们说，“不要再往前走了！”但即使一个案例的事实可以无可争辩地确立，其真理依然存在。这并不是说真理隐藏在事实背后，需要一种具备理论工具的高级智慧，能够突破表面现象或欺骗性的意识形态镜像。
the rest of us into thinking that we can already tell reality from illusion. ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} We have no need of theorists with heavy-duty equipment to clear the obstacles. Nor is it to suggest that truth lies within the facts, as some kind of unfathomable essence that will forever hide from us, sunk into itself, as self-proclaimed advocates of so-called ‘object-oriented ontology’ like to tell us. ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} It is rather to insist that what appear to us, in the first instance, as stoppages turn out, when we search again - that is, in our re-search - to be openings that let us in. It is as though the fact rotated by ninety degrees, like a door on opening, so that it no longer confronts us face-on but aligns itself longitudinally with our own movements. And where the fact leads, we follow. ‘Come with us’, it says. What had once put an end to our search then reappears, in re-search, as a new beginning, a way into a world that is not already formed, but itself undergoing formation. It is not that we have broken through the surface of the world to discover its hidden secrets. Rather, as the doors of perception open, and as we join with things in the relations and processes of their formation, the surface itself vanishes.
其余的人让我们相信，我们已经能够区分现实与幻觉。 ${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} 我们不需要那些配备重型设备的理论家来清除障碍。也不是说真理存在于事实之中，像某些自称“面向对象本体论”倡导者所说的那样，是某种永远隐藏于自身、难以捉摸的本质。 ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 而是要坚持认为，最初看似阻碍我们的东西，当我们再次探寻——也就是重新探究时——会变成让我们进入的开口。就好像事实旋转了九十度，像门打开一样，不再正面迎接我们，而是与我们的动作纵向对齐。事实引领我们，我们跟随。“跟我们来，”它说。曾经终结我们探索的东西，在重新探究中重新出现，成为新的开始，通向一个尚未形成、正在形成的世界。并不是说我们突破了世界的表面，发现了它隐藏的秘密。 相反，随着感知之门的开启，当我们与事物在其形成的关系和过程中相结合时，表面本身便消失了。

The truth of this world, then, is not to be found ‘out there’, established by reference to the objective facts, but is disclosed from within. It is indeed the very matrix of our existence as worldly beings. We can have no knowledge of this truth save by being in it. Knowing-in-being, in short, is of the essence. This conclusion will of course be anathema to those who hold that true knowledge of the world can be had only by taking ourselves out of it and by looking at it from a distance. For them, objectivity is the very hallmark of truth. It is indeed understandable that in a world where facts often appear divorced from any kind of observation, where they can be invented on a whim, propagated through mass media, and manipulated to suit the interests of the powerful regardless of their veracity, we should be anxious about the fate of truth. To many, it seems that in this era of post-truth, we are cast adrift without an anchor. We are right to insist that there can be no proper facts without observation. But we are wrong, I believe, to suppose that observation stops at objectivity. For to observe, it is not enough merely to look at things. We have to join with them, and to follow. And it is precisely as observation goes beyond objectivity that truth goes beyond the facts. This is the moment, in our observations, when the things with which we study begin to tell us how to observe. In allowing ourselves into their presence rather than holding them at arm’s length - in attending to them - we find that they are also guiding our attention. Attending to these ways, we also respond to them, as they respond to us. Research, then, becomes a practice of correspondence, and of care. It is a labour of love, giving back what we owe to the world for our own existence as beings within it.
那么，这个世界的真理并非存在于“外部”，通过客观事实来确立，而是从内在显现出来。它确实是我们作为世俗存在的根基。除非身处其中，否则我们无法认识这真理。简言之，存在中的认识是其本质。当然，这一结论对于那些认为只有将自己置身事外、从远处观察世界才能获得真正知识的人来说，是不可接受的。对他们而言，客观性正是真理的标志。确实可以理解，在一个事实常常与任何观察脱节、可以随意捏造、通过大众媒体传播并被操纵以符合权势者利益而不顾其真实性的世界里，我们会对真理的命运感到焦虑。对许多人来说，在这个后真相时代，我们似乎被抛弃了，没有锚点。我们坚持没有观察就没有真正的事实是正确的。但我认为，我们错误地认为观察止步于客观性。因为观察不仅仅是看事物。我们必须与它们结合，并跟随它们。 正是当观察超越客观性时，真理也超越了事实。这正是我们观察中，那些我们研究的事物开始告诉我们如何观察的时刻。当我们允许自己进入它们的存在，而不是将它们置于臂长之外——专注于它们时——我们发现它们也在引导我们的注意力。关注这些方式时，我们也回应它们，正如它们回应我们一样。因此，研究成为一种对应与关怀的实践。这是一种爱的劳动，回馈我们作为其中存在的生命对世界所负的债务。

Research as correspondence, in this sense, is not just what we do but what we undergo. It is a form of experience. For in experience, things are with us in our thoughts, dreams, and imaginings, and we with them. It is here, I believe, that we can begin to see where science can align with art, and indeed with anthropology. It means calling into question the division between fact and fantasy, truth and illusion, which has underpinned the development of science ever since the days of Francis Bacon and Galileo Galilei (Ingold 2013 b). ‘Let us learn to dream’, declared the chemist August Kekulé, in a lecture to celebrate his discovery of the structure of the benzene molecule, ‘then perhaps we shall find the truth. But let us beware of publishing our dreams till they have been tested by waking understanding.’ ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} For Kekulé, and for the majority who think like him, if science needs art, it is to fantasize, to give the mind freedom to roam, to come up with novel ideas. But only when tested against the facts can ideas born of the imagination lay any claim to truth. Now were research only about the establishment of such truth claims,
在这个意义上，作为通信的研究不仅是我们所做的事情，更是我们所经历的过程。这是一种体验的形式。因为在体验中，事物与我们的思想、梦境和想象同在，而我们也与它们同在。我相信，正是在这里，我们可以开始看到科学如何与艺术，甚至与人类学相结合。这意味着质疑事实与幻想、真理与幻觉之间的分界线，而这种分界线自弗朗西斯·培根和伽利略时代以来一直支撑着科学的发展（Ingold 2013 b）。“让我们学会做梦，”化学家奥古斯特·凯库勒在庆祝他发现苯分子结构的讲座中宣称，“也许我们就能找到真理。但在被清醒的理解检验之前，切勿轻易发表我们的梦境。” ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 对于凯库勒以及大多数与他思想相近的人来说，如果科学需要艺术，那是为了幻想，让思维自由驰骋，提出新颖的想法。但只有当这些由想象力孕育的想法经过事实检验后，才能声称拥有真理。现在，如果研究仅仅是关于确立这样的真理主张，
then, indeed, it would admit to neither imagination nor experience in its experimental operations. But if truth lies beyond the facts, then science can become research only insofar as it is willing to forgo objectivity and follow the way of art, and of anthropology, into a correspondence that unites experience and imagination in attending to a world that also attends to us. It would be for science, too, to join in the pursuit of truth as a way of knowing-in-being, through practices of curiosity and care. Therein, I contend, lies the proper vocation of research.
那么，确实，在其实验操作中它既不承认想象也不承认经验。但如果真理超越事实，那么科学只有在愿意放弃客观性，沿着艺术和人类学的道路，进入一种将经验与想象结合起来的对应关系，关注一个同样关注我们的世界时，才能成为研究。我认为，科学也应当通过好奇和关怀的实践，参与作为一种存在中认知方式的真理追求。在这里，我主张，这正是研究的真正使命。

I now turn to the third part of my argument. I mean to show that only if it is conceived as a conversation, or as a practice of correspondence, can research be conducive to the continuation of those relations and processes, of world-formation or renewal, on which our collective futures depend. In short, research as correspondence is a condition for sustainability. For many of us, I admit, the notion of sustainability has been devalued by overuse, and compromised through its co-option by powerful interests whose overriding concern has been for their own survival in a world of ever more intense competition for dwindling planetary resources. Yet I believe it is a notion we cannot do without, and that to give up on it would be tantamount to the abandonment of our responsibility towards coming generations. The challenge, then, is to give meaning to a term that paradoxically combines the idea of an absolute limit with the limitlessness of carrying on forever. Real sustainability, I argue, begins at the moment when the doors of perception swing open, when objectivity gives way to the search for truth, or finality to renewal, whereupon what appears from the outside as a limit opens up from within into a space of growth, movement, and transformation, to limitless possibility, or, in a word, to everything. Sustainability cannot be of some things and not others; it can countenance no boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. It must be of everything, or it is nothing. What kind of everything, then, can always surpass itself, always have room for more, without at any moment appearing partial or incomplete? What follows is my attempt at an answer.
我现在转向论点的第三部分。我想表明，只有当研究被视为一种对话，或一种通信的实践时，它才能有助于那些关系和过程的延续，即世界的形成或更新，而我们的集体未来正依赖于此。简而言之，作为通信的研究是可持续性的一个条件。坦白说，对我们许多人来说，可持续性的概念因过度使用而被贬值，并因被强大利益集团挟持而受损，这些集团最关心的是在资源日益稀缺、竞争日益激烈的世界中自身的生存。然而，我相信这是一个我们无法舍弃的概念，放弃它无异于放弃我们对未来世代的责任。因此，挑战在于赋予这个矛盾地将绝对界限与永续无限结合的术语以意义。 我认为，真正的可持续性始于感知之门开启的那一刻，当客观性让位于对真理的追求，或终结转向更新，此时外界看来像是限制的东西，从内在却展开成一个充满成长、运动和转变的空间，通向无限的可能，或者用一句话来说，通向一切。可持续性不能只属于某些事物而排斥其他；它不能容忍任何包容与排斥的界限。它必须属于一切，否则就什么都不是。那么，什么样的一切，能够不断超越自我，总有容纳更多的空间，而在任何时刻都不显得片面或不完整？以下是我对此的尝试性回答。

For those of us educated into the ways of modern science, our inclination is to conclude with everything rather than to begin from it. And we can reach a conclusion, we think, only by adding things up. We add and we add: numbers of people, numbers of species, numbers of objects of this or that kind, numbers of characters on the page, numbers of stars in the sky, numbers of cells in the body, numbers of atoms in a pinhead. We are bamboozled by numbers, many of a magnitude that defy comprehension. But to add things up, they have first to be broken off from the processes that gave rise to them, from the ebbs and flows of life. You must be able to tell where one thing ends and another begins. The world must be rendered discontinuous. We soon discover, however, that some things are difficult if not impossible to enumerate. Try counting clouds in the sky, waves in the ocean, trees in the woods, fungi. The difficulty is that these things are always forming and dissolving, growing and decomposing, appearing at some times to merge, at other times to break up. Take clouds, for example. Clouds are not discrete objects, suspended in the sky. They are rather folds of the sky itself - moisture-laden formations of the turbulent and crumpled mass of atmospheric air (Ingold 2015: 90). Waves, too, are folds, ever-forming at the surface where the ocean, in its intercourse with the sky, is whipped up by the wind. You could perhaps count waves as they wash up upon the shore, much as you could count footsteps, breaths, or heartbeats. But what would they amount to? A life, perhaps, with breaths, steps, and
对于我们这些接受过现代科学教育的人来说，我们的倾向是从整体出发得出结论，而不是从整体开始。我们认为，只有通过累加事物才能得出结论。我们不断地加：人数、物种数量、各种物体的数量、页面上的字符数、天空中的星星数、身体中的细胞数、针尖上的原子数。我们被这些数字迷惑了，其中许多数字的数量级令人难以理解。但要将事物加总，首先必须将它们从产生它们的过程、从生命的涨落中分离出来。你必须能够分辨出一件事物的结束和另一件事物的开始。世界必须被呈现为不连续的。然而，我们很快发现，有些事物难以甚至不可能被计数。试着数一数天空中的云朵、大海中的波浪、树林中的树木、真菌。困难在于这些事物总是在形成和消散、成长和分解，有时看起来融合，有时又分裂。以云朵为例。云朵并不是悬浮在天空中的离散物体。 它们更像是天空本身的褶皱——充满水汽的、动荡而皱褶的空气团块的形态（Ingold 2015: 90）。波浪也是褶皱，永远在海洋表面形成，在海洋与天空的交汇处，被风激起。你或许可以像数脚步、呼吸或心跳一样数着涌上岸边的波浪。但那又能算什么呢？也许是一种生命，带着呼吸、脚步和
heartbeats; all eternity with the waves. Counting would not be adding up a world but the rhythm of time passing.
心跳；与波浪共度的永恒。计数并不是在累积一个世界，而是在记录时间流逝的节奏。

With trees and fungi, addition is just as impracticable. Who can say how many trees there are in a wood? True, you could measure up, as foresters do, estimating the number and volume of trunks in the stack when a plot is felled. But in so doing you have already, in your mind’s eye, cut each and every tree from all that nourishes it and gives it life: the soil, the fungi that wrap around its roots, the air and sunlight that fuel its growth. And to count fungi is merely to enumerate the fruiting bodies, ignoring the underground mesh of the mycelium from which they spring. But is it really any different with people? Are they any easier to add up than clouds, waves, trees, and fungi? Can you arrive at everybody by counting heads? In a crude sense, of course you can, as in the taking of a census, but only by abstracting every head from the living, breathing body of which it is intrinsically a part. Topologically, the body is not a closed container but an open vessel, its surfaces so intricately infolded that it is practically impossible to distinguish its interior and exterior regions. Normally, we see only one part of every person: namely the fleshy part. The part we don’t see is the breath, the air we inhale and exhale, and without which we could not live. Like trees in the wood, people intermingle with one another - they ‘go in and out of each other’s bodies’, in Maurice Bloch’s (2012: 120) beguiling phrase - even as they breathe the air. And their voices, carried on the breath and permeating the atmosphere, mingle also, sometimes joining, as in the unison of song, sometimes splitting apart as they ‘lift-up-over’ one another without ever separating into discrete sounds (Feld 1996: 100). You may, through an act of differential attention, be able to tell one voice from another, to split them along the grain of their becoming. But you cannot count them up.
对于树木和真菌来说，加法同样是不切实际的。谁能说一片树林里有多少棵树？确实，你可以像林务员那样测量，估算砍伐地块中树干的数量和体积。但在这样做的过程中，你已经在脑海中将每一棵树从滋养它、赋予它生命的一切中切割开来：土壤、缠绕其根部的真菌、促进其生长的空气和阳光。而计数真菌仅仅是枚举其子实体，忽略了它们生长的地下菌丝网。但人类真的有什么不同吗？他们比云、浪、树和真菌更容易被加总吗？你能通过数头来统计所有人吗？从粗略意义上讲，当然可以，比如进行人口普查，但这只是将每个头颅从其本质上属于的活生生的身体中抽象出来。从拓扑学角度看，身体不是一个封闭的容器，而是一个开放的容器，其表面错综复杂地折叠，以至于几乎无法区分其内部和外部区域。通常，我们只看到每个人的一部分：即肉体部分。 我们看不见的部分是呼吸，是我们吸入和呼出的空气，没有它我们无法生存。就像树林中的树木一样，人们彼此交织——用莫里斯·布洛赫（2012:120）那句迷人的话来说，他们“进出彼此的身体”——同时呼吸着空气。他们的声音随着呼吸传播，弥漫在空气中，也相互交融，有时合而为一，如合唱的齐唱，有时又分开，彼此“升起-越过”，却从未分离成独立的声音（费尔德 1996:100）。通过差异化的注意力，你或许能分辨出一个声音与另一个声音，沿着它们生成的脉络将它们区分开来。但你无法将它们一一数清。

In the correspondence of voices - in the conversation - everyone, like everything, is an intermingling: not a totality, arrived at by the addition of its individual elements, but what I shall call a plenum. The plenum is not a space filled up to capacity with things. It is fullness itself. The things we find there - as we have seen with clouds, waves, trees, and people - emerge as folds, ever-forming by way of the turbulence of lively materials. We have many words to describe the plenum: world, cosmos, nature, earth. But does the world contain holes that remain to be filled? Are there gaps in the cosmos, voids in nature, empty spaces in the earth? We might regard a patch of ground as a site on which to build. It must first be cleared of obstructions like trees and boulders, foundations must be dug, materials gathered and assembled. To clear the ground, however, is not to leave a void but to smooth it out, as when you remove a crease from a fabric. And to build is not to refill the space but once again to crease the ground, pressing it into the rising forms of walls and the vault of the roof. Thus every infill is, in reality, a reworking, a doubling up that introduces a kink, twist, or knot into the very fabric of the earth. To put it in the terms of physicist David Bohm (2002 [1980]), the order of the plenum is implicate. In the implicate order, according to Bohm, ‘everything is enfolded into everything’ (2002 [1980]: 225). Things that to our senses might appear solid, tangible, and stable - a building here, a tree or a boulder there, even a human being or an animal, each occupying its particular region of space or moment in time - are truly but the envelopes of the spatio-temporal ‘holomovement’ wherein everything is formed.
在声音的对应——在对话中——每个人，像一切事物一样，都是一种交融：不是通过其个别元素的相加而成的整体，而是我所称之为的充盈。充盈并不是一个被事物填满的空间。它本身就是充实。我们在那里发现的事物——正如我们在云、波浪、树木和人身上所见——以褶皱的形式出现，通过充满活力的物质的湍流不断形成。我们有许多词语来描述充盈：世界、宇宙、大自然、地球。但世界中是否存在尚待填补的空洞？宇宙中是否有缝隙，大自然中是否有空隙，地球上是否有空白的空间？我们可能将一块土地视为建造的场所。它必须首先清除诸如树木和巨石等障碍物，挖掘地基，收集并组装材料。然而，清理土地并不是留下一个空洞，而是将其抚平，就像你去除织物上的褶皱一样。而建造也不是重新填满空间，而是再次给土地打褶，将其压成墙壁的上升形态和屋顶的拱顶。 因此，每一个填充实际上都是一种重新加工，是一种叠加，在地球的结构中引入了弯曲、扭转或结。用物理学家大卫·博姆（David Bohm，2002 [1980]）的话来说，充满秩序是隐含的。根据博姆的说法，在隐含秩序中，“一切都包裹在一切之中”（2002 [1980]: 225）。那些在我们感官看来似乎坚固、可触摸且稳定的事物——这里的一座建筑，那里的一棵树或一块巨石，甚至是一个人或一只动物，各自占据其特定的空间区域或时间瞬间——实际上只是时空“全动”运动的包络，在其中一切都被形成。

I would like to take Bohm’s insight one step further, however, to argue that the order of the plenum is not so much implicate as complicate. Whereas implication connotes a folding inward, from side to side, complication carries the sense of folding forward:
然而，我想将博姆的见解更进一步，主张充满秩序与其说是隐含的，不如说是复杂的。隐含意味着向内折叠，从一侧到另一侧，而复杂则带有向前折叠的意味：
that is, of things convoluting longitudinally, braiding or plaiting along the lines of their own growth and movement. This is material folding on itself as it goes along. ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} As it does so, it endlessly overflows any formal envelopes within which it may appear temporarily to have been pulled aside or detained. The plenum, then, is limitless, not because its capacity can always be increased, but because it forever carries on. We do not ask the ocean whether it has room to accommodate a few more waves; nor does the ocean respond like an overbooked hotelier: ‘Unfortunately we are full up.’ ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} For the waves are ever-forming, even as they break on the shore. The plenum, in short, belongs to time; perhaps, indeed, it is time. Everything, in the sense of the plenum, is not an ultimate conclusion, not the sum total when all is added up, but pure beginning. Let us recall Whitehead’s words: ‘There is no holding nature still and looking at it’. For Whitehead, nature was always self-surpassing, or, in a word, concrescent (Whitehead 1929: 410). ‘Con’ literally means together, ‘crescent’ means undergoing creation rather than already created. In a concrescent world, then, everything is perpetually undergoing creation together: trees growing together in the wood, people living together in society, their voices carrying on together in conversation. This does not mean, of course, that the plenary world is only half-formed, or incomplete. For incompletion can only be judged in relation to a state of finality. In the plenum, by contrast, nothing is final, and every ending is an unfinishing.
也就是说，事物沿着自身的生长和运动轨迹纵向缠绕、编织或辫结。这是物质在运动过程中自身的折叠。 ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} 在此过程中，它不断溢出任何形式的包络，哪怕这些包络暂时被拉开或拘留。于是，充盈体是无限的，不是因为其容量可以不断增加，而是因为它永远在继续。我们不会问海洋是否还有空间容纳更多的波浪；海洋也不会像一个订满客房的旅馆老板那样回应：“很抱歉，我们已满员。” ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} 因为波浪即使在冲击岸边时也在不断形成。简言之，充盈体属于时间；或许，它本身就是时间。从充盈体的意义上讲，一切都不是最终的结论，不是所有加总后的总和，而是纯粹的开始。让我们回忆怀特海的话：“没有办法让自然静止下来然后观察它。”对怀特海来说，自然总是在自我超越，或者用一个词来说，就是“凝聚”（Whitehead 1929: 410）。“Con”字面意思是“共同”，而“crescent”意味着正在创造中，而非已被创造。 在一个融合的世界中，一切都在不断地共同创造：树林中的树木一起生长，社会中的人们共同生活，他们的声音在对话中共同传递。当然，这并不意味着充满的世界只是半成品或不完整的。因为不完整只能相对于某种终结状态来判断。相反，在充盈的世界中，没有什么是终结的，每一个结束都是未完成的延续。

With this, I return to my theme of sustainability, and to the question with which I began: how can we imagine a world that is sustainable for everyone and everything, for now and evermore? William James, in a lecture delivered in 1908, already gave a hint as to the answer. We have to think of the world, he said, as a pluralistic universe, or, in short, as a pluriverse (James 2012 [1909]). The pluriverse is not many rather than one, a collection of separate worlds rather than a singular universe. It is, instead, one in its openness, in its admission to infinite differentiation: that is, in its multiplicity. This world, as James put it, is ‘not rounded in and closed’, like a globe, but ‘strung along’, ever-ramifying along the multiple kinks, creases, and folds of emergent form (2012 [1909]: 170). For Arturo Escobar, writing for us today but with acknowledgement to James, sustainability is precisely about designing for a pluriverse - in his words, for ‘the Earth as a living whole that is always emerging out of the manifold biophysical, human, and spiritual elements that make it up’ (Escobar 2011: 139; 2018). Far from ending with the world as a totality, joined up and complete, this would be a practice of design that begins with the world as a plenum whose very mode of existence lies in the perpetual unfinishing of things, in the digestion of ends and their extrusion into pure beginning. And at the threshold, turning endings into beginnings, easing the passage of things from old life to new, stands the figure of the designer, the maker, or the artist (Ingold 2015: 120-3). In design for a pluriverse, sustainability is not about the preservation of form. It is about the continuity of life.
由此，我回到可持续性的主题，以及我一开始提出的问题：我们如何想象一个对所有人和万物都可持续的世界，无论现在还是永远？威廉·詹姆斯在 1908 年发表的一次讲座中，已经给出了答案的暗示。他说，我们必须将世界视为一个多元宇宙，简而言之，就是一个多元世界（James 2012 [1909]）。多元世界不是“多”而非“一”，不是一堆分离的世界，而非单一宇宙。它恰恰是在其开放性中，在承认无限差异性中，即在其多样性中，是“一个”。正如詹姆斯所说，这个世界“不是封闭圆满的”，像一个球体，而是“串联起来的”，沿着新生形态的多重弯折、褶皱和折叠不断分支（2012 [1909]: 170）。对于阿图罗·埃斯科巴来说，他今天为我们写作，同时致敬詹姆斯，认为可持续性正是关于为多元世界设计——用他的话说，是为“作为一个活生生整体的地球，这个整体总是从构成它的多样生物物理、人类和精神元素中不断涌现出来”（Escobar 2011: 139；2018）。 这不仅仅是以世界作为一个整体、连贯且完整的存在而告终，而是一种设计实践，它从世界作为一个充满的状态开始，其存在方式就在于事物的不断未完成，在于终结的消化及其被挤压成纯粹的开始。在这个门槛上，将结束转化为开始，促进事物从旧生命到新生命的过渡，站立着设计师、制造者或艺术家的身影（Ingold 2015: 120-3）。在多元宇宙的设计中，可持续性并非关于形式的保存，而是关于生命的延续。

The contrast between this view and the mainstream, science-based rationale of sustainability could not be more pronounced. For the aim of the latter is to harness or capture the power of world-renewal, and to put it to use in the production of socalled ‘renewables’. This is to turn beginnings into endings, the transformative power of a living earth into goods and services for human consumption. In the rationale of sustainable development, the world is understood not as a plenum to be inhabited but as a totality to be managed, much as a company manages its portfolio, by balancing the books. At the point of balance, the supply of renewables precisely matches consumer demand. Now in theory, if the world and everything in it could be poised on this point,
这种观点与主流的、基于科学的可持续性理由形成了鲜明对比。后者的目标是利用或捕捉世界更新的力量，并将其用于生产所谓的“可再生资源”。这意味着将起点转变为终点，将一个有生命的地球的变革力量转化为供人类消费的商品和服务。在可持续发展的理念中，世界被理解为一个需要被管理的整体，而非一个供人居住的充盈空间，就像公司管理其投资组合一样，通过平衡账目来实现。在平衡点上，可再生资源的供应恰好满足消费者的需求。理论上，如果世界及其中的一切都能处于这一平衡点，
then it could be kept forever in a state of dynamic equilibrium. Sustainability, however, would then have been bought at the expense of putting life and history permanently on hold. The future could be no more than a protraction of the present. To design for such a future would, indeed, be self-defeating. If our predecessors had succeeded in designing a sustainable world, what future would remain for us, save to fall in line with their already imposed imperatives? Alternatively, were it to fall to us to design sustainability for our successors, then they in turn would become mere users, or consumers, tied to the implementation of a design already made for them. Design, it seems, must fail if every generation is to look forward to a future that it can call its own: that is, for every generation to begin afresh, to be a new generation. To adapt a maxim from the environmental pundit Stewart Brand: all designs are predictions; all predictions are wrong (Brand 1994: 75; see Ingold 2013a: 233).
那么它就可以永远保持在动态平衡的状态中。然而，可持续性将以永久搁置生命和历史为代价来实现。未来不过是对现在的延续而已。为这样的未来进行设计，确实是自我挫败的。如果我们的前辈成功设计了一个可持续的世界，那么我们还能有什么未来，除了顺应他们已经强加的必然性？或者，如果由我们来为后代设计可持续性，那么他们反过来也将只是被设计所束缚的使用者或消费者。设计似乎必然失败，如果每一代人都希望拥有一个属于自己的未来：也就是说，每一代都能重新开始，成为新的一代。借用环境学者斯图尔特·布兰德的一句格言：所有设计都是预测；所有预测都是错误的（Brand 1994: 75；参见 Ingold 2013a: 233）。

This hardly sounds like a formula for sustainable living. The sustainability of everything, I have argued, is about keeping life going. Yet design based on the science of sustainability seems intent on bringing life to a stop, by specifying moments of completion when things fall into line with prior projections. If design brings predictability and foreclosure to a life-process that is inherently open-ended, then is it not the very antithesis of life? Remember Klee: ‘Form is the end, death . . . formgiving is life’. How, then, can we think of design as part of a process of life whose outstanding characteristic is not that it tends to a limit but that it carries on? To do so, we will have to think differently of the world and of our place in it. I return to my earlier observation, that in the plenum every apparent infill is really a reworking. What goes for building in the plenum also goes, as I have shown, for research. The claim of scientific research - that it aims to fill the gaps in understanding - rests on a logic of addition, on the idea that our knowledge of the world, though currently incomplete, will ultimately add up to a totality. But for an itinerant practice of research that follows the ways of the world from within, there are no gaps to fill. Every journey, as we have seen, is both an original movement and a doubling up, a reworking, in which we differentiate emergent phenomena even as we join with them. It is, to recall the words of Karen Barad, a ‘cutting together-apart’. To research the plenum, as she writes in another context, is to become ‘part of the world in its differential becoming’ (Barad 2007: 185). Experienced thus, as a way of life, research continually surpasses itself. It is not an addition but a concrescence.
这听起来几乎不像是可持续生活的公式。我曾论证过，一切的可持续性在于维持生命的延续。然而，基于可持续性科学的设计似乎意图让生命停止，通过规定完成的时刻，使事物符合先前的预测。如果设计为本质上开放的生命过程带来了可预测性和终结性，那么它不正是生命的对立面吗？记住克利的话：“形式是终结，是死亡……赋形是生命”。那么，我们如何能将设计视为生命过程的一部分，而生命过程的显著特征不是趋向于极限，而是持续进行？要做到这一点，我们必须以不同的方式思考世界及我们在其中的位置。我回到之前的观察，在充满的空间中，每一个表面上的填充实际上都是一种重新加工。正如我所展示的，充满空间中的建筑同样适用于研究。科学研究的主张——旨在填补理解的空白——基于一种加法逻辑，基于这样一个观念：尽管我们对世界的认知目前不完整，但最终将汇聚成一个整体。 但对于一种从内部追随世界运行方式的流动性研究实践来说，没有需要填补的空白。正如我们所见，每一次旅程既是一次原创的运动，也是一次重复和重塑，在其中我们区分新兴现象的同时又与之融合。用 Karen Barad 的话来说，这是一种“共同切割-分离”。正如她在另一个语境中所写，研究充盈体就是“成为世界差异生成过程中的一部分”（Barad 2007: 185）。以此方式体验，作为一种生活方式，研究不断超越自身。它不是一种附加，而是一种凝聚。

With that, we can return to anthropology, and to art. I have just three final points to make concerning, respectively, education, democracy, and citizenship. ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} First, research in art, as in anthropology, would be mere solipsism - a gratuitous journey of self-discovery were it not more fundamentally a practice of education. It is incumbent on us to give to the coming generation in return for the gift we have received, in our own formation, from the past. The commitment of education, as John Dewey taught more than a century ago, is to the continuity of life (1966 [1916]: 2). This, however, is to take the meaning of education quite literally, as a way of ‘leading out’ (from the Latin ex, meaning ‘out’, plus ducere, ‘to lead’), a de-positioning or exposure, the aim of which is not to furnish every student with a destiny in life but rather to undestine and unfinish, so that each can begin anew. In the words of educational philosopher Jan Masschelein, it is to seek after truth: ‘not the truth about the real, but the truth that comes out of the real . . . in the experience’ (2010:285). It is for art as it is for anthropology to offer experience as an
有了这些，我们可以回到人类学和艺术。我有三个最后的观点，分别关于教育、民主和公民身份。 ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} 首先，艺术研究，正如人类学研究，如果不是更根本地作为一种教育实践，那将只是纯粹的唯我主义——一种无意义的自我发现之旅。我们有责任将我们从过去的形成中所获得的馈赠回馈给下一代。正如约翰·杜威一个多世纪前所教导的，教育的承诺是生命的延续（1966 [1916]: 2）。然而，这需要将教育的意义字面理解为一种“引导出”（拉丁语 ex，意为“出”，加上 ducere，意为“引导”）的方式，一种去定位或暴露，其目的不是为每个学生提供人生的命运，而是去除命运和未完成，使每个人都能重新开始。用教育哲学家扬·马谢莱因的话来说，就是追求真理：“不是关于现实的真理，而是从现实中……在体验中显现的真理”（2010:285）。艺术和人类学一样，都是为了提供一种体验，作为一种...
imaginative opening to truth. This does not amount to a programme of emancipation, or for transforming the world. Art and anthropology, in their educational mission, are rather touchstones for the world’s transformation of itself. This transformation, as we have seen, unfolds along multiple pathways. It is, in essence, a conversation. Like life, conversations carry on; they have no particular beginning point or end point, no one knows in advance what will come out of them, nor can their conduct be dictated by any one partner. They are truly collective achievements. But they are potentially life-changing for all involved.
通向真理的富有想象力的开端。这并不等同于解放计划，或是改造世界的方案。艺术与人类学在其教育使命中，更像是世界自我转变的试金石。正如我们所见，这种转变沿着多条路径展开。本质上，它是一场对话。像生命一样，对话持续进行；它们没有特定的起点或终点，没有人能预先知道结果，也无法由任何一方主导其进程。它们是真正的集体成果。但对所有参与者来说，这种对话都有可能改变生命。

Let us think of the art of sustainability, then, as a conversation, embracing not only human beings but all the other constituents of the living world - from nonhuman animals of all sorts to trees, rivers, mountains, and the earth. This brings me to my second point, namely that the conversation is not just processual and open-ended but fundamentally democratic. I do not mean democracy in the sense of a head-count, which sorts everyone into those with common or opposed interests. In a sustainable democracy - one with room for everyone and everything, now and forever - people cannot be counted, and nor can things. Yet in their conjoint action and affective resonance, they constitute a public. As Jane Bennett writes, after Dewey (2012 [1927]), ‘[P]ublics are groups of bodies with the capacity to affect and be affected’ (Bennett 2010: 101). Whether human or nonhuman, these are bodies in correspondence, not yet separated from their voices or from the medium in which they mix and mingle. In the democratic conversation, each has something to give, something to contribute, precisely because all are different. Together they comprise what Alphonso Lingis (1994), in an apt turn of phrase, calls ‘the community of those who have nothing in common’. My third point follows from this. It concerns citizenship. For within a democratic community that is open-ended and unbounded rather than closed in the defence of common interests, citizenship arises not as a right or entitlement, given from the start, but as something we have to work at. This is the work of commoning, not the discovery of what we have in common to begin with, but the imaginative act of casting our experience forward, along ways that join with others in carrying on a life together. Only then can citizenship be truly sustainable. The road to sustainability, in short, lies in correspondence (Ingold 2017: 14-15).
那么，让我们将可持续性的艺术视为一种对话，这种对话不仅涵盖人类，还包括所有其他生命世界的组成部分——从各种非人类动物到树木、河流、山脉和大地。这引出了我的第二点，即这种对话不仅是过程性的、开放式的，更是根本上的民主。我所说的民主并非指以人数统计的方式，将每个人划分为拥有共同或对立利益的群体。在一个可持续的民主中——一个为所有人和万物留有空间的民主，无论现在还是永远——人们无法被简单计数，事物也无法被计数。然而，在它们的共同行动和情感共鸣中，它们构成了一个公共体。正如简·贝内特在借鉴杜威（2012 [1927]）的观点时所写：“公共体是具有影响和被影响能力的身体群体”（贝内特 2010: 101）。无论是人类还是非人类，这些都是相互对应的身体，尚未与它们的声音或它们混合交融的媒介分离。在这场民主的对话中，每一个都有所给予，有所贡献，正因为所有人都不同。 它们共同构成了 Alphonso Lingis（1994 年）用一个恰当的表达所称的“没有共同点者的共同体”。我的第三点由此而来。它涉及公民身份。在一个开放且无边界的民主共同体中，而非封闭于共同利益的防御中，公民身份不是一种从一开始就赋予的权利或资格，而是我们必须努力争取的东西。这是“共事”的工作，不是发现我们最初共有的东西，而是将我们的经验向前投射的想象行为，通过与他人相连，共同延续生活。只有这样，公民身份才能真正可持续。简言之，通往可持续性的道路在于对应关系（Ingold 2017: 14-15）。

Art and anthropology, I suggest, potentially afford new ways of thinking about democracy and citizenship - ways that could give hope to future generations. At the present juncture, however, they have been pushed to the margins, above all by the relentless expansion of big science, aided and abetted by multinational corporations and neoliberal globalization. And with them has gone the question from which all inquiry must begin and indeed from which I began this article: how ought we to live? Big science is not interested in this question because it believes it can already deliver the answers, or if not already, then within the not too distant future. These answers offer totalizing solutions that would fix the planet, once and for all, for the benefit of humanity. But mega-projects of geoengineering, were they ever implemented, will not secure the sustainability of everything but more likely its opposite, the ultimate extinction of life. When the dinosaurs went extinct, it was the small mammals that inherited the earth, among them the weasel. Perhaps the most famous weasel in history will turn out to be the one that bit through an electric cable, putting the largest machine ever built - CERN’s Large Hadron Collider - out of action for a week. ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} The Collider is perhaps the greatest expression of scientific hubris we have yet seen, dedicated as it is to discovering the final truth of the universe, one that will leave us mortals with no place
我认为，艺术与人类学有可能为民主与公民身份提供新的思考方式——这些方式或许能为未来世代带来希望。然而，在当前阶段，它们已被边缘化，主要是由于大科学的无情扩张，而这一扩张又得到了跨国公司和新自由主义全球化的助推。随之消失的，还有所有探究必须从中出发的问题，正如我在本文开头所提出的：我们应当如何生活？大科学对这个问题不感兴趣，因为它相信自己已经能够给出答案，或者即使尚未完全给出，也将在不远的将来实现。这些答案提供了整体性的解决方案，旨在一劳永逸地修复地球，造福人类。但如果地球工程的超级项目真的得以实施，它们不会保障一切的可持续性，反而更可能导致相反的结果——生命的最终灭绝。当恐龙灭绝时，是小型哺乳动物继承了地球，其中就有黄鼠狼。 也许历史上最著名的黄鼠狼，竟然是那只咬断电缆的黄鼠狼，它让有史以来最大的机器——欧洲核子研究中心的大型强子对撞机——停摆了一周。 ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} 这台对撞机或许是我们迄今见过的科学傲慢的极致体现，它致力于发现宇宙的终极真理，而这个真理将使我们凡人无处容身。
to be. It is the delusional project of our time, truly a machine for the end of the world. But when big science collapses - as it is bound to do, along with the global economy that sustains it - art and anthropology, like that famous weasel, will be left to usher in the future. We must be ready for it.
这是我们时代的妄想工程，真正是一台世界末日的机器。但当大科学崩溃时——这必然会发生，就像支撑它的全球经济一样——艺术和人类学，就像那只著名的黄鼠狼，将被留下来引领未来。我们必须为此做好准备。

This article is based on the text of a keynote address presented to the Royal Anthropological Institute Conference on ‘Art, Materiality and Representation’, at the British Museum, London, on 1 June 2018. I am especially grateful to the RAI, and to the organizers, for giving me the honour of addressing the conference. Much of the thinking behind my presentation was developed within the project ‘Knowing From the Inside: Anthropology, Art, Architecture and Design’, funded by an Advanced Grant from the European Research Council (323677-KFI, 2013-18). I am grateful to participants in the project for ideas and inspiration, and to the Council for its support, as well as to the Editor of the JRAI, Elizabeth Hallam, along with two anonymous reviewers, for encouragement and critical suggestions.
本文基于 2018 年 6 月 1 日在伦敦大英博物馆举行的皇家人类学会“艺术、物质性与表现”会议上的主题演讲稿。我特别感谢皇家人类学会及组织者给予我在会议上发言的荣誉。我的演讲思路大多源自“从内部认知：人类学、艺术、建筑与设计”项目，该项目由欧洲研究理事会高级资助（323677-KFI，2013-18）支持。我感谢项目参与者提供的思想和灵感，感谢理事会的支持，以及《皇家人类学杂志》编辑 Elizabeth Hallam 和两位匿名审稿人的鼓励与批评建议。
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} In the original German, Klee wrote: ‘Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar’. This lends itself to translation in many ways; the one I use here comes from the English-language version of his notebooks.
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 在原德文中，克利写道：“Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar”。这句话有多种翻译方式；我这里采用的是他笔记英文版中的译法。
${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} The idea of ‘thick description’ comes from the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1971) and was famously introduced into anthropology by Clifford Geertz (1973: 6). On the comparison with oil painting, see Ingold (2011: 222).
${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} “厚描述”这一概念源自哲学家吉尔伯特·赖尔（Gilbert Ryle，1971 年），并由克利福德·格尔茨（Clifford Geertz，1973 年：6 页）著名地引入人类学。关于与油画的比较，见英戈尔德（Ingold，2011 年：222 页）。
${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} The relation between contemporary art and anthropology has been much discussed in recent literature, from a range of different perspectives. Representative sources include Bakke & Peterson (2016), Laine (2018), Rutten, van Dienderen & Soetaert (2013), Sansi (2014), Schneider (2017), Schneider & Wright (2006; 2010; 2013), and Van der Grijp & Fillitz (2018).
${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 当代艺术与人类学之间的关系在近期文献中被广泛讨论，涵盖了多种不同视角。具有代表性的文献包括巴克和彼得森（Bakke & Peterson，2016 年）、莱恩（Laine，2018 年）、鲁滕、范迪恩德伦和索塔特（Rutten, van Dienderen & Soetaert，2013 年）、桑西（Sansi，2014 年）、施奈德（Schneider，2017 年）、施奈德与赖特（Schneider & Wright，2006 年；2010 年；2013 年）以及范德格里普和菲利茨（Van der Grijp & Fillitz，2018 年）。
${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} This is not to deny that some approaches may be found to be either incoherent or repugnant. But rather than taking refuge in an apologetic relativism, the onus is then on us to show, in all sincerity, why we find them so, and to submit our contributions to public scrutiny for others to judge as they will.
${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 这并不是否认某些方法可能被认为是不连贯或令人反感的。但与其躲进辩解性的相对主义，我们更应真诚地说明为何会有此看法，并将我们的观点提交公众审视，让他人自行评判。
${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} Here and in what follows, I am returning to, and extending, an argument originally set out in Ingold (2018a: 65-8).
${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 在此及以下内容中，我回归并扩展了最初在英戈尔德（Ingold，2018a：65-68 页）中提出的论点。
${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} Any inventory of artists engaged in anthropological practices of this kind would be impossibly long, and I can do no more than mention a few exemplary figures and movements that, for me, have been inspirational. In my view the Bauhaus was fundamentally an anthropological project, and its luminaries - besides Klee included Wassily Kandinsky (1982), Anni Albers (2017 [1965]), and László Moholy-Nagy (1947). I have been inspired by the Italian Arte Povera movement, and especially by the work of one of its key founders, Giuseppe Penone (2009). David Nash - like Penone, a sculptor of trees - has been another strong influence, and the fact that Nash, in a ‘Life Statement’ accompanying a recent exhibition, declares that his work has drawn him ‘into the science and anthropology of trees’ (2010: 19), suggests that the influence may be reciprocal. Equally anthropological in its ambition is the walking art of Richard Long (2002), and the studies on place and nature, latterly focusing on water and ice, of environmental artist Elizabeth Ogilvie (2017). In music and sound art, the works and writings of John Cage (2011 [1961]) continue to cast a long shadow. In architecture, I am with those who look back for inspiration to the extraordinarily prescient writings of John Ruskin (Spuybroek 2011). But there is much, much more.
任何涉及此类人类学实践的艺术家清单都会长得令人难以置信，我只能提及一些对我而言具有启发性的典范人物和运动。在我看来，包豪斯本质上是一个人类学项目，其杰出人物除了克利外，还包括瓦西里·康定斯基（1982 年）、安妮·阿尔伯斯（2017 年[1965 年]）和拉斯洛·莫霍利-纳吉（1947 年）。我受到了意大利贫穷艺术运动的启发，尤其是其主要创始人之一朱塞佩·佩诺内（2009 年）的作品。大卫·纳什——像佩诺内一样是一位树木雕塑家——也是另一位重要影响者，纳什在最近一次展览的“生命声明”中表示，他的作品使他“进入了树木的科学和人类学领域”（2010 年：19 页），这表明这种影响可能是相互的。理查德·朗（2002 年）的行走艺术同样具有明确的人类学志向，环境艺术家伊丽莎白·奥格尔维（2017 年）则专注于地点与自然的研究，近年来聚焦于水和冰。在音乐与声音艺术领域，约翰·凯奇（2011 年[1961 年]）的作品和著作依然影响深远。 在建筑领域，我支持那些回顾约翰·罗斯金（John Ruskin）极具预见性的著作以寻求灵感的人（Spuybroek 2011）。但这远远不止于此。
${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} A recent departure, which could indicate a welcome turning point in this regard, is the volume Anthropologies and futures, edited by Juan Francisco Salazar, Sarah Pink, Andrew Irving, and Johannes Sjöberg (2017).
${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} 最近的一项新进展，可能标志着这一领域一个受欢迎的转折点，是由胡安·弗朗西斯科·萨拉查（Juan Francisco Salazar）、莎拉·平克（Sarah Pink）、安德鲁·欧文（Andrew Irving）和约翰内斯·舍伯格（Johannes Sjöberg）编辑的《人类学与未来》（Anthropologies and futures，2017 年）。
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} I do not mean this in the logical or mathematical sense of matching the elements in one series with those in another. On the distinction between this transverse sense of correspondence, as matching, with the longitudinal sense, adopted here, of answering and being answered to while going along together, see Ingold (2017: 14).
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} 我这里的意思并非逻辑或数学意义上将一个序列中的元素与另一个序列中的元素一一对应。关于这种横向对应意义上的匹配，与本文采用的纵向意义上的相互回应和共同前行的区别，详见英戈尔德（Ingold，2017：14）。
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} The key passage is perhaps the following:
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 关键段落或许是以下内容：
Pluralism implies a radical alterity of the other, whom I do not simply conceive by relation to myself, but confront out of my egoism. The alterity of the Other is in him and not relative to me; it reveals itself. But I have access to it proceeding from myself and not through a comparison of myself with the other. I have access to the alterity of the Other from the society I maintain with him, and not by quitting this relation in order to reflect on its terms (Levinas 1979: 121, original emphases).
多元主义意味着他者的根本异质性，我并非仅仅通过与自我的关系来理解他者，而是超越自我主义去面对他者。他者的异质性存在于他自身，而非相对于我；它自我显现。但我对它的接触是从自身出发，而非通过将自己与他者比较。我对他者异质性的接触来自我与他者维持的社会关系，而不是通过放弃这种关系去反思其条款（Levinas 1979: 121，原文强调）。
${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} Simondon (1993) equated this becoming of being, or ontogénèse, with the process he otherwise called ‘individuation’. For Deleuze, it leads to an insistence on the distinction between difference and diversity: ‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse’ (1994: 222).
${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} Simondon（1993）将这种存在的生成，或称本体发生，等同于他所称的“个体化”过程。对于德勒兹来说，这导致了对差异与多样性之间区别的坚持：“差异不是多样性。多样性是被给予的，但差异是使被给予的成为被给予的那个东西，是使被给予的成为多样性的那个东西”（1994: 222）。
${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} Others, of a Popperian persuasion, might hold that while the truth is always beyond us, it is nevertheless fixed as an asymptote towards which we come ever nearer. Research, in this view, approximates to the truth. But this, too, would be an optimistic scenario. For the world it proposes is ready-formed, in its totality; only our knowledge of it is partial.
${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11} 其他持波普尔主义观点的人可能认为，虽然真理总是超出我们的掌握，但它仍然是一个固定的渐近线，我们不断接近它。在这种观点中，研究是对真理的逼近。但这同样是一个乐观的情景。因为它所提出的世界是完整形成的；只有我们对它的认知是部分的。
${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} Didier Fassin, for example, distinguishes truth from reality in precisely these terms. Reality, he writes, is what exists or has happened, but what is true ‘has to be regained from deception or convention. Reality is horizontal, existing on the surface of fact. Truth is vertical, discovered in the depths of inquiry’ (Fassin 2014: 41).
${}^{12}$${}^{12}$^(12){ }^{12} 例如，迪迪埃·法辛正是用这样的术语区分真理与现实。他写道，现实是存在的或已经发生的事物，而真理“必须从欺骗或惯例中重新获得。现实是水平的，存在于事实的表面。真理是垂直的，在探究的深处被发现”（Fassin 2014: 41）。
${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} Advocates of object-oriented ontology have been vociferous and prolific, and a large literature has grown up around it. A useful summary can be found in Harman (2011). For a critique, see Ingold (2015: 16-17).
${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 面向对象本体论的倡导者们声音响亮且著述丰富，围绕这一理论形成了大量文献。Harman（2011）中有一篇有用的总结。批评见 Ingold（2015: 16-17）。
${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} The citation is from an English translation of Kekulé’s address by O. Theodore Benfey (1958).
${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 引文来自 O. Theodore Benfey（1958）对 Kekulé演讲的英文翻译。
${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} In The fold, his study of Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze depicts matter thus as a maelstrom of vortices within vortices, yielding an ‘infinitely porous, spongy or cavernous texture … caverns endlessly contained in other caverns’ (1993: 5).
${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} 在《折叠》中，他对莱布尼茨和巴洛克的研究中，德勒兹将物质描绘为漩涡中的漩涡的漩涡，形成一种“无限多孔、海绵状或洞穴状的质地……洞穴无尽地包含在其他洞穴中”（1993：5）。
${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} The rationale of modelling the ocean as a totality, with a capacity to accommodate a finite number of waves, is nicely illustrated in an anecdote told by anthropologist Stefan Helmreich. At the First International Australasian Conference on Wave Science, held in Newcastle, Australia, in 2014, Helmreich put the question ‘How many waves are there in the ocean?’ to scientist Alexander Babanin. Without a moment’s hesitation, Babanin proceeded to work out that if oceanic waves are, on average, 100 metres long, and if their crests are spaced, again on average, 100 metres apart, then the average wave covers an area of ${10}^4$${10}^4$10^(4)10^{4} square metres. Given that the world’s oceans extend over ${10}^{16}$${10}^{16}$10^(16)10^{16} square metres, Babanin arrived at an estimate of ${10}^{12}$${10}^{12}$10^(12)10^{12} : a trillion waves (Helmreich 2014: 266).
${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16} 将海洋建模为一个整体，能够容纳有限数量的波浪的理由，在人类学家斯特凡·赫尔姆赖希讲述的一个轶事中得到了很好的说明。2014 年，在澳大利亚纽卡斯尔举行的第一届国际澳大拉西亚波浪科学会议上，赫尔姆赖希向科学家亚历山大·巴巴宁提出了“海洋中有多少波浪？”的问题。巴巴宁毫不犹豫地计算出，如果海洋波浪的平均长度为 100 米，且波峰的平均间距也是 100 米，那么平均每个波浪覆盖的面积为 ${10}^4$${10}^4$10^(4)10^{4} 平方米。鉴于世界海洋面积达 ${10}^{16}$${10}^{16}$10^(16)10^{16} 平方米，巴巴宁得出了一个估计数： ${10}^{12}$${10}^{12}$10^(12)10^{12} ，即一万亿个波浪（赫尔姆赖希 2014：266）。
${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} These themes are massive, and I can only touch on each of them here. I do so to indicate their fundamental relevance to the matter at hand. I have treated the question of anthropology as education at length elsewhere (Ingold 2018a).
${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} 这些主题非常庞大，我在这里只能略作触及。我这样做是为了表明它们与当前问题的根本相关性。我在其他地方详细探讨过人类学作为教育的问题（Ingold 2018a）。
${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} The animal in question was in fact a beech marten, a member of the weasel family. This attack, on 29 April 2016, was only the first. A few months later, on 21 November, another marten struck. Instantly electrocuted on contact with the 18,000 -volt cable, the animal’s singed body was recovered and put on display at the Rotterdam Natural History Museum (see Sample 2017).
${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} 这只动物实际上是一只榛貂，属于鼬科。2016 年 4 月 29 日的这次袭击只是第一次。几个月后，即 11 月 21 日，又有一只榛貂发动了攻击。该动物一接触到 1.8 万伏的电缆便被瞬间电击致死，其烧焦的尸体被回收并陈列在鹿特丹自然历史博物馆（参见 Sample 2017）。

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Cet article envisage l’art et l’anthropologie comme deux disciplines tournées vers l’avenir et unies par une tâche commune : façonner un monde en mesure d’accueillir les générations futures. La première étape pour établir cette proposition consiste à montrer en quoi les objectifs de l’anthropologie different de ceux de l’ethnographie. L’anthropologie, affirme l’auteur, établit un rapport au monde qui est davantage correspondant que tangentiel, qui privilégie la différence à l’altérité et qui place la présence avant la contextualisation interprétative. La deuxième étape consiste à repenser ce que l’on entend par « recherche», afin de montrer comment, lorsqu’elle se fait exploration ouverte de la vérité et pratique de la correspondance, la recherche dépasse inévitablement les limites de l’objectivité. Au contraire des sciences naturelles, l’art et l’anthropologie sont donc représentatifs d’une recherche de la vérité en tant que connaissance par l’existence. La troisième étape consiste à montrer que c’est uniquement en concevant la recherche de cette manière que celle-ci pourra favoriser les processus de renouvellement dont dépend notre avenir collectif. La recherche en tant que correspondance est donc une condition de la durabilité. Mais la durabilité n’est rien si elle ne forme pas un tout. Nous devons donc commencer par l’idée du tout comme un plénum, dans lequel chaque ajout apparent est en réalité un remaniement. L’article se termine par une série de réflexions sur la proposition de synergie entre art et anthropologie dans les domaines de l’éducation, de la démocratie et de la citoyenneté.
本文将艺术与人类学视为面向未来的两门学科，并由一项共同任务联系在一起：塑造一个能够容纳未来世代的世界。确立这一观点的第一步是展示人类学的目标如何不同于民族志。作者指出，人类学建立了一种与世界更为对应而非表面的关系，强调差异而非他者性，并将存在置于解释性语境化之前。第二步是重新思考“研究”的含义，以展示当研究作为对真理的开放探索和对应实践时，必然超越客观性的界限。与自然科学相反，艺术和人类学代表了一种通过存在获得知识的真理追求。第三步则表明，只有以这种方式构想研究，研究才能促进我们集体未来所依赖的更新过程。 研究作为对应关系因此是可持续性的一个条件。但如果可持续性不能形成一个整体，它就毫无意义。因此，我们必须从整体的概念开始，视其为一个充盈体，其中每一个表面上的新增实际上都是一种重组。文章最后以一系列关于艺术与人类学在教育、民主和公民领域协同作用的思考作为结尾。

Tim Ingold is Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Aberdeen. He has carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Lapland, and has written on environment and social organization in the circumpolar North, on evolutionary theory in anthropology, biology, and history, on the role of animals in human society, on language and tool use, and on environmental perception and skilled practice. He is currently exploring issues on the interface between anthropology, art, architecture, and design.
Tim Ingold 是阿伯丁大学社会人类学名誉教授。他曾在拉普兰进行民族志田野调查，撰写过关于北极圈北部环境与社会组织、进化理论在人类学、生物学和历史中的应用、动物在人类社会中的角色、语言与工具使用，以及环境感知与熟练实践的文章。他目前正在探讨人类学、艺术、建筑与设计交叉领域的问题。

Department of Anthropology, School of Social Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, UK. tim.ingold@abdn.ac.uk
英国阿伯丁大学社会科学学院人类学系，邮编 AB24 3QY。邮箱：tim.ingold@abdn.ac.uk