The effect of family business professionalization on dividend payout 家族企业专业化对股利支付的影响
Anneleen MichielsResearch Center for Entrepreneurship and Family Firms, Hasselt University, Diepenbeek, Belgium 哈塞尔特大学创业与家族企业研究中心，比利时迪彭贝克Lorraine Uhlaner 洛林·乌兰纳Department of Management and Strategy, EDHEC Business School, Roubaix, France, and Julie Dekker 管理与战略系，EDHEC 商学院，鲁贝，法国，以及朱莉·德克尔Hasselt University, Diepenbeek, Belgium 哈瑟尔特大学，迪彭贝克，比利时
Abstract 摘要
Purpose - The topic of dividend policies of private family-controlled firms has aroused the interest of corporate finance and governance scholars and practitioners alike. However, a lot of questions concerning the dividends in privately held family firms remain unanswered. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether a private family firm’s dividend payout is influenced by its degree of professionalization. Design/methodology/approach - The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 492 small to medium-sized Belgian family-controlled businesses with Tobit regression models. Findings - The results show that professionalized family-controlled firms pay higher dividends to their shareholders than do less-professionalized firms. In particular, the use of financial control systems, non-family involvement in governance systems, and the use of human resource control systems have a positive significant impact on the average level of dividend payout. Practical implications - This study may be of interest to family business consultants and (potential) investors, as the results contradict the assumption that family businesses (especially those privately held) will always have a no or low dividend policy. Originality/value - Investigating dividend payout in the context of other components than family ownership (in this case, professionalization) can broaden our understanding of dividend payout. 目的——私人家族控制企业的股利政策问题引起了公司财务与治理学者及实践者的广泛关注。然而，关于私人家族企业股利问题的许多关键问题仍未得到解答。本文旨在探讨私人家族企业股利支付是否受其专业化程度的影响。研究设计/方法/思路 - 本研究采用托比特回归模型，对 492 家比利时中小型家族控制企业样本进行了假设检验。研究发现 - 研究结果表明，专业化程度较高的家族控制企业向股东支付的股息高于专业化程度较低的企业。具体而言，财务控制系统、非家族成员参与治理系统以及人力资源控制系统的使用对股息支付水平具有显著正向影响。实践意义 - 本研究可能对家族企业顾问及（潜在）投资者具有参考价值，因其结果挑战了“家族企业（尤其是私营企业）必然采取无股息或低股息政策”的传统假设。原创性/价值 - 在家族所有权之外的其他变量（本研究为专业化程度）背景下探讨股息支付，可拓展我们对股息支付机制的理解。
Keywords SME, Family firm, Dividend, Professionalization 关键词 中小企业，家族企业，股息，专业化
Paper type Research paper 论文类型 研究论文
1. Introduction 1. 引言
The topic of dividend policies in private family firms has aroused the interest of corporate finance and governance scholars and practitioners alike. However, many questions concerning the dividends in privately held family firms remain unanswered. While past research has investigated the influence of family ownership and/or management on dividend policies (e.g. Chen et al., 2005; Farinha, 2003; Gugler, 2003; Huang et al., 2012; Pindado et al., 2011; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009, 2010; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010), it typically focuses on listed family firms and ignores the much larger and more diverse group of privately held family-owned and managed firms. Studying the dividend behavior of this heterogeneous group of firms may be very interesting, since these types of firms are assumed to follow a logic that is driven by both economic and non-economic motives (Gallo et al., 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Koropp et al., 2014). The desire to maintain family control may influence decision making in private family firms, specifically financial decisions such as dividend payouts (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007; Gallo et al., 2004; Romano et al., 2000). For example, private family firms often postpone growth-promising investment opportunities rather than issue external equity, to avoid the possible threat of weakened family control (Koropp et al., 2014; Mahérault, 2000; Wu et al., 2007). So agency 家族企业中的股利政策问题引起了公司财务与治理领域学者及实践者的广泛关注。然而，关于家族控股企业股利政策的相关问题仍存在诸多未解之谜。尽管过往研究已探讨了家族所有权与/或管理对股利政策的影响（例如陈等，2005；法里纳，2003；古格勒，2003；黄等，2012；Pindado 等，2011；Setia-Atmaja 等，2009，2010；Yoshikawa 和 Rasheed，2010），但这些研究通常聚焦于上市公司，忽视了规模更大、类型更丰富的私营家族企业群体。研究这一异质性企业群体的股利行为可能非常有趣，因为此类企业被假设遵循由经济与非经济动机共同驱动的逻辑（Gallo et al., 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Koropp et al., 2014）。维持家族控制的愿望可能影响私营家族企业的决策，尤其是财务决策，如股利支付（Blanco-Mazagatos 等，2007；Gallo 等，2004；Romano 等，2000）。例如，私人家族企业往往推迟具有增长潜力的投资机会，而非发行外部股权，以避免可能削弱家族控制的威胁（Koropp 等，2014；Mahérault，2000；Wu 等，2007）。因此，代理
costs, for example due to altruism, nepotism, or self-control problems within the controlling family, may influence financial decisions in family firms. 成本，例如由于利他主义、裙带关系或控制家庭内部的自我控制问题，可能影响家族企业的财务决策。
A recent stream of literature has started to open the black box of dividend payments in privately held family firms, investigating the effect of family influence in ownership and management (González et al., 2014; Vandemaele and Vancauteren, 2015) and the use of family governance practices (Michiels et al., 2015) on a firm’s dividend policy. However, our understanding of other antecedents of dividend payouts is still quite limited. We address this by examining the effects of family firm professionalization. Since some of the determinants of the dividend payout level found in earlier studies (for instance, generational stage or the presence of a non-family CEO) (González et al., 2014; Vandemaele and Vancauteren, 2015) are in fact aspects of professionalization in a family firm, the aim of the present study is to target family business professionalization in a more holistic manner. 近期的一系列研究开始揭开家族企业股利支付的“黑箱”，探讨家族在所有权和管理中的影响（González 等，2014；Vandemaele 和 Vancauteren，2015）以及家族治理实践（Michiels 等，2015）对企业股利政策的影响。然而，我们对股利支付的其他影响因素的理解仍较为有限。本文通过考察家族企业专业化程度的影响来填补这一空白。由于先前研究中发现的某些股利支付水平的决定因素（例如代际阶段或非家族 CEO 的存在）（González et al., 2014; Vandemaele and Vancauteren, 2015）实际上是家族企业专业化的方面，本研究旨在以更全面的方式聚焦家族企业专业化。
More specifically, as professionalization helps deal with the conflicts of interest that emerge at a family level, we expect dividends to be an outcome of professionalization. In other words, we expect firms with a higher degree of professionalization to have higher dividend payouts. Recent academic work has broadened the professionalization concept beyond the sole presence of a non-family CEO toward a more multidimensional understanding of its content. Authors such as Hall and Nordqvist (2008), Stewart and Hitt (2012), and Dekker et al. (2013) have pointed to the importance of formal governance systems, board activeness, and formal control systems as important pieces of the professionalization puzzle. We adopt this family business professionalization perspective, as it not only encompasses increased non-family involvement in management and governance, but also these other aspects. 更具体地说，随着专业化帮助解决家庭层面出现的利益冲突，我们预期专业化将带来股息作为其结果。换言之，我们预期专业化程度更高的企业将拥有更高的股息派发水平。近期学术研究已将专业化概念从单纯存在非家族 CEO 的状态，扩展至对其内涵的更维度化理解。Hall 和 Nordqvist（2008）、Stewart 和 Hitt（2012）以及 Dekker 等人（2013）等学者指出，正式治理体系、董事会活跃度和正式控制体系是专业化拼图中的重要组成部分。我们采纳这一家族企业专业化视角，因为它不仅涵盖了非家族成员在管理和治理中的参与度提升，还包含了这些其他方面。
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 492 small to medium-sized Belgian family firms[1]. The results suggest that professionalized family firms pay higher dividends to their shareholders than less-professionalized family firms. More specifically, the results support our hypothesis that the use of formal financial and human resource control systems may lessen or prevent agency problems related to altruism or nepotism, as seen by their significant positive impact on the average dividend payout. Next, our findings show that dividends are an outcome of effective governance systems (in this case, non-family involvement in governance systems) rather than a substitute, which is in line with the results of La Porta et al. (2000). 我们通过对 492 家比利时中小型家族企业样本进行测试，验证了我们的假设[1]。研究结果表明，专业化程度较高的家族企业向股东支付的股息高于专业化程度较低的家族企业。更具体地说，研究结果支持我们的假设：采用正式的财务和人力资源控制系统可能减轻或防止与利他主义或裙带关系相关的代理问题，这体现在这些系统对平均股息支付率的显著积极影响上。此外，我们的研究发现，股息是有效治理体系（在本研究中指非家族成员参与治理体系）的结果，而非替代品，这与 La Porta 等（2000）的研究结果一致。
This study makes a number of contributions to the academic literature. First, while professionalization research emanates mainly from the management literature, and dividend research from the corporate finance literature, we integrate insights from both disciplines advancing both streams of literature. In particular, as our results indicate that professionalized family firms pay higher dividends, we add an important management variable which future finance research should take into account when examining payout policies. Second, while prior research on dividend payouts compares publicly held family and non-family firms (e.g. Chen et al., 2005; Farinha, 2003; Gugler, 2003; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009), we investigate differences in dividend payout within the group of privately held family firms. More specifically, our paper provides an extended understanding of dividend policy that takes into account different types of private family businesses, thereby answering recent calls for researchers to go beyond comparisons between family and non-family firms and focus on the heterogeneous nature of family firms (Chua et al., 2012; Nordqvist et al., 2014) and on the financial consequences of private family ownership (Carney et al, 2013). Third, by adopting a broader family business professionalization perspective, we contribute to the family business literature as our reasoning goes beyond the effect of family involvement on dividend payout alone, as was investigated by González et al. (2014). As a successful application of a more extended operationalization of professionalization, this study should also provide guidance on this topic for entrepreneurship researchers more generally. Fourth, it may be of interest to family business consultants and 本研究为学术文献做出了多项贡献。首先，尽管专业化研究主要源于管理学文献，而股利研究主要源于公司财务文献，但我们整合了两个学科的洞见，推动了这两个研究领域的进展。特别是，我们的研究结果表明，专业化的家族企业支付更高的股利，这为未来财务研究在考察股利政策时提供了一个重要的管理变量。其次，尽管先前关于股利支付的研究主要比较了公开上市的家族企业和非家族企业（例如 Chen 等，2005；Farinha，2003；Gugler，2003；Setia-Atmaja 等，2009），但我们探讨了私营家族企业内部股利支付的差异。更具体地说，本文通过考虑不同类型的私营家族企业，对股利政策提供了更全面的理解，从而回应了近期研究者提出的呼吁，即超越家族与非家族企业之间的比较，关注家族企业的异质性（Chua et al., 2012；Nordqvist et al., 2014）以及私营家族所有权的财务后果（Carney et al., 2013）。第三，通过采用更广泛的家族企业专业化视角，我们为家族企业研究做出了贡献，因为我们的分析超越了 González 等（2014）仅关注家族参与对股利支付的影响。作为对专业化概念更广泛 operationalization 的成功应用，本研究也应为创业研究者在该领域提供指导。第四，本研究可能对家族企业顾问和
(potential) investors, as the results clarify the conditions in which family-controlled firms have a high or low dividend payout policy. Finally, the findings enhance our understanding of the varying preconditions for dividend policy, such as the objectives of patient (financial) capital and the reinvestment of equity to achieve business growth. Investigating dividend payout in the context of components other than family ownership (in this case, professionalization) can therefore broaden our understanding of dividend payout. （潜在）投资者，因为研究结果明确了家族控制企业采取高或低股利政策所处的条件。最后，研究发现深化了我们对股利政策不同先决条件的理解，例如耐心（财务）资本的目标以及通过股权再投资实现业务增长。在家族所有权以外的其他因素（本研究中为专业化）背景下探讨股利支付，因此可以拓宽我们对股利支付的理解。
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on professionalization and dividend payout in familycontrolled firms and subsequently develop hypotheses. Next, we explain our methodology and present the empirical results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications for both researchers and practitioners. 本文结构如下。在下一节中，我们将简要概述家族控制企业中专业化与股利支付的理论与实证文献，并在此基础上提出假设。随后，我们将阐述研究方法并呈现实证结果。最后，我们将对研究结果进行讨论，并探讨其对研究者和实践者的启示。
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 2. 文献综述与假设构建
2.1 The importance of dividend payouts in family-controlled firms 2.1 家族控制企业中股利分配的重要性
Family-controlled private companies often use dividend payouts as a tool to enhance internal business financing, i.e. to keep family investors happy. Such firms prefer internal business financing as opposed to relying on external equity, as it enables them to maintain tight control and keep decision making within the owning family so as to preserve the firm’s socioemotional wealth (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007; Gallo et al., 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The desire to retain control stems from the will to preserve the power to exercise authority and shape strategy in one’s own business, which is a very common characteristic of family businesses (Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Gersick et al., 1997; Yildirim-Öktem and Üsdiken, 2010). 家族控制的私营企业常将股息分配作为提升内部业务融资的工具，即通过此方式满足家族投资者的需求。此类企业更倾向于内部融资而非依赖外部股权融资，因为这使它们能够保持严格控制并确保决策权留在家族手中，从而维护企业的社会情感财富（Blanco-Mazagatos 等，2007；Gallo 等，2004；Gómez-Mejía 等，2007）。对控制权的渴望源于希望在自己的企业中保留行使权威和制定战略的能力，这是家族企业非常普遍的特征（Gedajlovic 等，2004；Gersick 等，1997；Yildirim-Öktem 和Üsdiken，2010）。
Different forces may influence dividend payouts in privately held family-controlled firms. On the one hand, some argue that privately held firms are more likely than publicly held firms to retain earnings (leading to a reduced dividend payout) in order to avoid external funding (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Poutziouris, 2001). By retaining earnings, the firm has more resources for reinvestment in improvements without resorting to external funding (whether with loans or equity). This will result in a lower dividend payout. Furthermore, due to highly concentrated ownership, the agency problems associated with free cash flow between majority and minority shareholders are traditionally considerably lower, thereby reducing the likelihood of dividend payments (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982). 不同因素可能影响家族控制的私营企业股息分配。一方面，有观点认为，与上市公司相比，私营企业更倾向于保留利润（导致股息支付减少），以避免外部融资（Carney 和 Gedajlovic，2002；Poutziouris，2001）。通过保留利润，企业可以拥有更多资源用于改善业务的再投资，而无需依赖外部融资（无论是贷款还是股权融资）。这将导致股息支付率降低。此外，由于所有权高度集中，多数股东与少数股东之间与自由现金流相关的代理问题传统上显著较低，从而降低了股息支付的可能性（Easterbrook，1984；Jensen，1986；Rozeff，1982）。
On the other hand, a more recent stream of literature argues that concentrated family ownership and owner management is associated with substantial agency costs which are caused by altruism and self-control problems (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). When investigating dividend policy in light of these agency costs, researchers find that paying out dividends can be a way to alleviate agency problems between family and minority shareholders (Pindado et al., 2011) and between active and passive family shareholders (Michiels et al., 2015). 另一方面，近期的一系列研究认为，集中家族所有权和家族管理与显著的代理成本相关，这些成本源于利他主义和自我控制问题（Lubatkin 等，2005；Schulze 等，2001，2003）。在考虑这些代理成本时，研究人员发现，派发股息可以缓解家族股东与少数股东之间的代理问题（Pindado 等，2011）以及活跃家族股东与被动家族股东之间的代理问题（Michiels 等，2015）。
2.2 The professionalization construct 2.2 专业化构念
Firm professionalization is generally understood in an organizational development context. As a firm evolves from a start-up through the growth and maturity life cycle phases, the complexity of its operations increases, as well as the necessity for more sophisticated management, governance, and control systems. It therefore needs to professionalize in order to advance to the next level (Dekker et al., 2013; Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Gabrielsson, 2007; Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Whisler, 1988). 企业专业化通常在组织发展背景下被理解。随着企业从初创阶段发展到成长和成熟的生命周期阶段，其运营复杂性不断增加，对更复杂的管理、治理和控制系统也变得愈发必要。因此，企业需要通过专业化来实现向更高层次的发展（Dekker 等，2013；Flamholtz 和 Randle，2007；Gabrielsson，2007；Gedajlovic 等，2004；Whisler，1988）。
To identify and explain the differences in the level of dividend payout in private family businesses, we adopt a family business professionalization perspective. The modern 为了识别并解释私人家族企业中股利支付水平的差异，我们采用家族企业专业化视角。现代
interpretation of this construct is that it not only encompasses the level of non-family involvement in management, but also other important related aspects such as formal control systems, governance systems, and board activity, which can, individually or combined, affect dividend payout. Recent researchers have demonstrated the importance of approaching family business professionalization as a multidimensional construct (Dekker et al., 2013; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Songini, 2006; Stewart and Hitt, 2012). Based on their extensive review of key studies, Hall and Nordqvist (2008) and Dekker et al. (2013) assert that the extant research on professionalization, especially in family businesses, tends to equate professionalization with the presence or absence of an external, non-family manager (e.g. Berenbeim, 1990; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Gulbrandsen, 2005; Fletcher, 2002). In other words, family business researchers tend to operationalize the professionalization concept as a binary variable, lacking depth and providing an oversimplified representation of reality. Songini (2006) stresses the importance of going beyond this single item, also including such variables as the presence of formal governance mechanisms, and formal strategic planning and control systems. Dekker et al. (2013) developed an even broader conceptualization and operationalization of the professionalization construct, including additional dimensions such as formal training, meritocratic values, formalized structures, and use of independent directors (Stewart and Hitt, 2012). 该构念的解释在于，它不仅涵盖了非家庭成员参与管理程度的层面，还包括其他重要相关方面，如正式控制系统、治理系统及董事会活动，这些因素可单独或综合作用于股利支付。近期研究者已证明，将家族企业专业化视为一个多维度构念具有重要意义（Dekker 等，2013；Hall 和 Nordqvist，2008；Songini，2006；Stewart 和 Hitt，2012）。基于对关键研究的系统回顾，Hall 和 Nordqvist（2008）以及 Dekker 等（2013）指出，现有关于专业化的研究，尤其是在家族企业中，倾向于将专业化等同于外部非家族经理的存在与否（例如 Berenbeim，1990；Bloom 和 Van Reenen，2007；Daily 和 Dollinger，1992；Gulbrandsen，2005；弗莱彻，2002）。换言之，家族企业研究者倾向于将专业化概念 operationalize 为二元变量，缺乏深度且对现实的描述过于简化。宋尼（2006）强调需超越这一单一维度，纳入正式治理机制的存在、正式战略规划与控制系统等变量。德克尔等人（2013）进一步提出了更广泛的专业化概念框架与 operationalization，新增了正式培训、功绩制价值观、正式化结构以及独立董事的使用等维度（斯图尔特和希特，2012）。
For the present research, we adopt the five dimensions proposed by Dekker et al. (2013) as aspects of professionalization, including financial control systems, human resource control systems, non-family involvement in governance systems, top-level activeness, and decentralization of authority. We elaborate further on the importance of each of these dimensions as aspects of professionalization in the following section. 本研究采用 Dekker 等（2013）提出的五个维度作为专业化的维度，包括财务控制系统、人力资源控制系统、非家庭成员参与治理系统、高层积极性以及权限下放。我们在下一节中将进一步阐述这些维度作为专业化维度的重要性。
2.3 Hypotheses and rationale 2.3 假设与理论依据
Professionalization of control systems and dividend payout. One way to examine family firm professionalization is by looking at the level of formal control systems present in the business. We distinguish between financial controls, such as budget systems, planning systems and firm performance evaluation systems, and human resource control systems which are more people related, like formal recruitment, training, personnel evaluation, and reward systems. 控制系统专业化与股利分配。考察家族企业专业化的一种方式是分析企业中正式控制系统的水平。我们区分了财务控制系统（如预算系统、规划系统和企业绩效评估系统）与人力资源控制系统（更侧重于人员管理，包括正式招聘、培训、人员评估和奖励制度）。
First, numerous authors consider finance-related control systems as an aspect of professionalization (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Giovannoni et al., 2011; García Pérez de Lema and Duréndez, 2007; Samuelsson et al., 2016; Songini, 2006). Formal financial control systems, such as the use of formal budgets or the existence of a budget evaluation system, reduce the likelihood that corporate insiders will secretly divert assets for personal use or use corporate resources for unprofitable projects (La Porta et al., 2000) at the expense of other owners. Thus, we contend that an increased level of formal financial control makes it more difficult for corporate insiders to benefit privately. This, in turn, might lead to greater retained earnings and thus more funds available for payouts. The presence of formal financial controls is thus likely to be associated with increasing dividend payouts. We therefore hypothesize that: 首先，许多学者将与财务相关的控制系统视为专业化的一部分（Daily 和 Dollinger，1992；Flamholtz 和 Randle，2007；Giovannoni 等，2011；García Pérez de Lema 和 Duréndez，2007；Samuelsson 等，2016；Songini，2006）。正式的财务控制系统，如使用正式预算或存在预算评估系统，会降低公司内部人员秘密挪用资产用于个人用途或将公司资源用于无利可图的项目（La Porta et al., 2000）而损害其他所有者利益的可能性。因此，我们认为，正式财务控制水平的提高会使公司内部人员更难获得私人利益。这反过来可能导致保留盈余增加，从而有更多资金用于派息。正式财务控制的存在因此可能与股息派息增加相关。我们因此假设：
H1a. Formalization of finance control systems leads to a higher dividend payout in family firms. H1a. 财务控制系统的正式化会导致家族企业派发更高股息。
Besides financial control systems, people-related control systems also appear to be an important aspect when professionalizing a business, especially in the family business context (De Kok et al., 2006; Dyer, 2006; Kopriva and Bernik, 2009; Kotey and Folker, 2007; Reid et al., 2002). Previous research has found the use of these human resource practices to 除了财务控制系统外，与人员相关的控制系统似乎也是企业专业化过程中一个重要方面，尤其是在家族企业背景下（De Kok 等，2006；Dyer，2006；Kopriva 和 Bernik，2009；Kotey 和 Folker，2007；Reid 等，2002）。先前研究发现，采用这些人力资源管理实践
vary widely among small (family) firms (De Kok and Uhlaner, 2001; Michiels, 2017), and their adoption has been found to positively affect firm performance (Dekker et al., 2015). Problems relating to parental altruism or nepotism are not uncommon in the family business context (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004). Using formal human resource control systems might lessen or prevent these problems. 在小型（家庭）企业中，人力资源管理实践存在显著差异（De Kok 和 Uhlaner，2001；Michiels，2017），且其采用被发现对企业绩效具有积极影响（Dekker 等，2015）。与父母利他主义或裙带关系相关的问题在家族企业中并不罕见（Kellermanns 和 Eddleston，2004）。采用正式的人力资源控制系统可能减轻或预防这些问题。
More specifically, the use of formal human resource control systems can reduce the likelihood that excessive salaries or exorbitant perquisites will be offered to family members due to altruism or nepotism. Formal control systems such as non-personalized evaluation and incentive pay will discourage managers from investing in low-return showcase projects or providing unjust payment to family members (Ward, 1997; Chua et al., 2009; Michiels et al., 2013). The implementation of these controls will therefore likely result in higher retained earnings and, again, more funds available for dividend payouts. The presence of formal HR controls is thus likely to be associated with increasing dividend payout. We therefore hypothesize that: 更具体地说，正式的人力资源控制系统可以降低因利他主义或裙带关系而向家庭成员提供过高薪酬或过分福利的可能性。正式的控制系统，如非个性化的评估和激励性薪酬，将阻止管理者投资于回报率低的展示性项目或向家庭成员提供不公正的报酬（Ward, 1997; Chua et al., 2009;Michiels et al., 2013）。实施这些控制措施将因此可能导致更高的留存收益，进而有更多资金可用于股息分配。正式人力资源控制的存在因此可能与股息支付率的提高相关。因此，我们假设：
H1b. Formalization of HR control systems leads to a higher dividend payout in family firms. H1b. 人力资源控制系统的正式化导致家族企业股息支付率更高。
Professionalization of top-level functions and dividend payout. The three remaining dimensions of family firm professionalization relate to a shift in decision making away from the CEO and core family members and toward the inclusion of (more) non-family members on the board of directors and the top management team, a more active board of directors and management team, and greater decentralization or delegation of authority. 高管职能的专业化与股利分配。家族企业专业化的剩余三个维度涉及决策权从 CEO 和核心家族成员向董事会及高管团队中纳入（更多）非家族成员的转移，董事会及高管团队的积极性提升，以及权限的进一步下放或授权。
First, the degree of professionalization of the board of directors and the management team reflects the extent to which family businesses have opened up their governance bodies to non-family members. It encompasses the presence of non-family board members, independent board members, non-family managers, and even a non-family CEO, all of which are typically related to the overall level of professionalization of family businesses (Dekker et al., 2013; Songini, 2006; Stewart and Hitt, 2012), has been found to positively impact firm performance (Dekker et al., 2015). Non-family managers and board members can bring relevant expertise into the company (García Pérez de Lema and Duréndez, 2007) and can also reduce some of the agency hazards due to familial altruism and self-control issues among family firm owners (Carney, 2005; Dyer, 1989; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008). The same holds for non-family and independent directors, who can increase the effectiveness of the monitoring function of the board of directors and bring more diverse perspectives and experiences to the board (Filatotchev et al., 2005). This way, they can prevent powerful insiders from holding excessive cash within the firm when a payout would be more appropriate. Based on the previous arguments, we hypothesize that: 首先，董事会和管理团队的专业化程度反映了家族企业在多大程度上向非家族成员开放了治理机构。这包括非家族董事会成员、独立董事会成员、非家族经理，甚至非家族首席执行官的存在，所有这些通常与家族企业整体专业化水平相关（Dekker 等，2013；Songini，2006；Stewart 和 Hitt，2012），已被证实对企业绩效产生积极影响（Dekker 等，2015）。非家族经理和董事会成员可以为公司带来相关专业知识（García Pérez de Lema 和 Duréndez，2007），并能减少由于家族企业所有者之间的家族利他主义和自我控制问题而产生的代理风险（Carney，2005；Dyer，1989；Sciascia 和 Mazzola，2008）。同样，非家族成员和独立董事可以提高董事会监督职能的有效性，并为董事会带来更多元化的视角和经验（Filatotchev 等，2005）。这样，他们可以防止公司内部有权势的人在分红更合适的情况下囤积过多现金。基于上述论点，我们假设：
H2a. Non-family involvement in governance systems leads to a higher dividend payout in family firms. H2a. 非家庭成员参与治理体系会导致家族企业派发更高股息。
Professionalization of top-level functions can also be assessed through the concept of toplevel activeness of both the board and management team, i.e. whether these groups meet on a regular basis and fulfill an “active” role in advising and supervising the firm’s activity (Dekker et al., 2013; Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Lane et al., 2006). This contrasts with lessprofessionalized family businesses, in which a board is often only present to meet legal requirements, sometimes referred to as “rubber stamp” boards (Pieper et al., 2008), and where the management team has no formal meetings. 高层职能的专业化程度也可通过董事会和管理团队的“高层活跃度”概念进行评估，即这些群体是否定期召开会议并发挥“积极”作用，对公司运营提供建议和监督（Dekker 等，2013；Flamholtz 和 Randle，2007；Lane 等，2006）。这与专业化程度较低的家族企业形成鲜明对比，在后者中，董事会往往仅为满足法律要求而存在，有时被称为“橡皮图章”董事会（Pieper et al., 2008），且管理团队没有正式会议。
Dominant shareholders often pursue their private interests to the detriment of minority shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). When a business lacks an effective monitoring body, powerful insiders can hold excessive cash within the firm, allowing the family to 控股股东常常为了自身利益而损害少数股东的利益（安德森和里布，2004）。当企业缺乏有效的监督机构时，有权势的内部人士可以在企业内部囤积过多现金，从而使家族能够
Figure 1. 图 1.
Research design 研究设计
freely exploit these resources for their private benefits (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000). Increased board activeness can counteract such phenomena. A well-functioning board of directors can monitor and restrict opportunistic behavior within the controlling family (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). As research shows, the presence of an active board influences the quality of decision making in family firms (Gersick et al., 1997; Ward, 1997), and thus also affects important financial decisions, such as the level of dividend payouts. For example, the board can increase dividend payout in order to reduce free cash flows that might otherwise be expropriated (La Porta et al., 2000). 自由地利用这些资源以谋取私利（DeAngelo 和 DeAngelo，2000）。董事会活跃度的提升可以抵消此类现象。一个运作良好的董事会能够监督并限制控制家族内的机会主义行为（Anderson 和 Reeb，2004）。研究表明，活跃的董事会对家族企业决策质量具有影响（Gersick 等，1997；Ward，1997），进而影响重要财务决策，如股利支付水平。例如，董事会可通过提高股利支付率来减少可能被侵占的自由现金流（La Porta 等，2000）。
We argue that as a family firm’s board and management becomes more professionalized, they will also become increasingly aware of the fact that they can use a dividend policy to alleviate possible conflicts of interests between the shareholders of the firm. This way, they could see dividend payouts as a mechanism to reduce conflicts between minority and majority (Pindado et al., 2011) or active and passive (Michiels et al., 2015) shareholders. For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis: 我们认为，随着家族企业董事会和管理层的专业化程度不断提高，他们将越来越意识到，可以通过股利政策来缓解企业股东之间的潜在利益冲突。这样，他们可以将股利支付视为减少少数股东与多数股东（Pindado 等，2011）或积极股东与消极股东（Michiels 等，2015）之间冲突的机制。基于此，我们提出以下假设：
H2b. Top-level activeness leads to a higher dividend payout in family firms. H2b. 高层活跃度导致家族企业股息支付率更高。
Finally, the decentralization of authority is also often mentioned as an important indication of professionalization (Dyer, 1989; Flamholtz and Randle, 2007; Stewart and Hitt, 2012; Whisler, 1988). According to Daily and Dollinger (1992), failing to share and delegate power could even lead to the firm’s demise. After all, when an entrepreneur is able to successfully delegate operational decisions, he or she can invest more time in making essential strategic or financial decisions, for example setting up a dividend policy. Therefore, we formulate our last hypothesis as follows: 最后，权力的分散化也常被视为专业化的重要标志（Dyer, 1989；Flamholtz 和 Randle, 2007；Stewart 和 Hitt, 2012；Whisler, 1988）。根据 Daily 和 Dollinger（1992）的观点，未能分享和授权权力甚至可能导致企业的衰落。毕竟，当企业家能够成功授权运营决策时，他们就能将更多时间投入到制定关键战略或财务决策中，例如制定股利政策。因此，我们提出最后一个假设如下：
H2c. Decentralization of authority leads to a higher dividend payout in family firms. H2c. 权力下放导致家族企业股息派发比例更高。
Figure 1 shows the expected relationship between various dimensions of professionalization and dividend payout. 图 1 显示了专业化各个维度与股利支付之间的预期关系。
3. Method 3. 方法
3.1 Sample and data collection 3.1 样本与数据收集
The empirical data that are used to assess the effect of family business professionalization on dividend payout belong to a wider survey exploring family business professionalization within the group of small and medium-sized enterprises located in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium. These data were gathered by means of an electronic questionnaire, which was e-mailed to all privately held SMEs with at least ten employees in order to exclude micro-organizations. The population criteria led to a final selection of 6,556 firms, which were drawn from the Bel-First database, a financial database held by 用于评估家族企业专业化对股利支付影响的实证数据，来源于一项更广泛的调查，该调查旨在探索比利时北部佛兰德斯地区中小型企业（SMEs）中家族企业专业化的情况。这些数据通过电子问卷收集，该问卷通过电子邮件发送给所有拥有至少十名员工的私营 SMEs，以排除微型企业。根据人口统计标准，最终选取了 6,556 家企业，这些企业来自 Bel-First 数据库，这是一个由
Bureau Van Dijk containing detailed financial information on all non-listed companies in Belgium. In 2010, we e-mailed the questionnaire to all the chief executives of the firms in the sample. After three waves of e-mails, we received a total of 890 completed questionnaires, corresponding to a response rate of 13.58 percent. Subsequently, to extract the family businesses from the response group, we applied the following definition of a family-controlled firm: more than 50 percent of ordinary voting shares are owned by members of the largest single family group related by blood or marriage (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chua et al., 1999; Westhead and Howorth, 2007). This resulted in a final response group of 532 family-controlled firms. Bureau Van Dijk 包含比利时所有未上市公司的详细财务信息。2010 年，我们通过电子邮件向样本中所有公司的首席执行官发送了问卷。经过三轮电子邮件发送后，我们共收到 890 份完整问卷，对应的回复率为 13.58%。随后，为了从响应群体中筛选出家族企业，我们采用了以下家族控制企业的定义：超过 50%的普通投票权股份由血缘或婚姻关系联结的最大单一家族集团成员持有（Chrisman 等，2004；Chua 等，1999；Westhead 和 Howorth，2007）。最终，我们得到了 532 家家族控制企业的响应样本。
In order to assess our dependent variable, i.e. dividend payout, we used the Bel-First database to collect additional financial information on these 532 family-controlled firms for the three-year period (2010-2012) following questionnaire data collection. The information retrieved from the financial statements was merged with the existing data set. After omitting the cases that reported missing values for the dividend payout, we obtained a final useable data set of 492 private family-owned SMEs. 为了评估我们的因变量，即股息支付率，我们使用 Bel-First 数据库收集了这 532 家家族控制企业在问卷调查数据收集后的三年期间（2010-2012 年）的额外财务信息。从财务报表中提取的信息与现有数据集进行了合并。在剔除股利支付率存在缺失值的案例后，我们最终获得了包含 492 家私营家族控制型中小企业的可用数据集。
The data set in this study combines both survey data and secondary data. Thus, as we measured the dependent and independent variables (and several of the control variables) using different instruments, the problem of possible common method bias is minimized. Also, to improve consistency in the responses, we targeted a single respondent (CEO). Furthermore, in order to assess potential non-response bias, we tested for differences between early and late respondents, as the latter are more similar to non-respondents (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Oppenheim, 2000). TT-tests revealed no significant differences between early and late respondents, or between the three different waves of reminders that were sent out. In addition, an insignificant FF-value for Levene’s test for equality of variances supports the conclusion of equal variance in the groups of early and late respondents. Based on this, we expect the chance of biased responses to be very small (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). 本研究的数据集结合了调查数据和二手数据。因此，由于我们使用不同的测量工具来测量因变量、自变量（以及部分控制变量），潜在的共同方法偏差问题得到了最小化。此外，为了提高回答的一致性，我们针对单一受访者（CEO）进行了调查。此外，为评估潜在的非响应偏误，我们对比了早期和晚期受访者的差异，因后者更可能与未响应者相似（Kanuk 和 Berenson，1975；Oppenheim，2000）。t 检验结果显示，早期和晚期受访者之间，以及三次不同提醒波段的受访者之间均无显著差异。此外，Levene 检验方差齐性的 FF 值不显著，支持早期和晚期受访者群体方差相等的结论。基于此，我们预计偏倚响应的概率非常小（Kanuk 和 Berenson，1975）。
3.2 Measures 3.2 措施
This section lists the definitions of the dependent, independent, and control variables used in the present study. A summary is provided in Table I. 本节列出了本研究中使用的因变量、自变量和控制变量的定义。表 I 中提供了摘要。
Dividend payout 股息支付
The amount of dividend payout divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) 股利支付额除以总资产，取 2010 年至 2012 年三年平均值。
Financial control systems ^(a){ }^{\mathrm{a}} 财务控制系统 ^(a){ }^{\mathrm{a}}
P1, includes items on the use of financial control systems in family firms P1，包括关于家族企业中财务控制系统应用的相关内容。
Human resource control systems ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} 人力资源控制系统 ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }}
P 2 , includes items on the use of human resource control systems in family firms P 2，包括关于在家族企业中使用人力资源控制系统的相关内容。
Non-family involvement in governance systems ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} 非家庭成员参与治理体系 ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }}
P3, includes items on non-family involvement in the governance systems of family firms P3，包括关于非家庭成员参与家族企业治理体系的相关内容。
P5, includes items on the decentralization of authority in family firms P5，包括关于家族企业中权力下放的条款。
Firm age 公司年龄
Firm age in 2010 公司成立年份（2010 年）
Firm size 公司规模
Total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) 过去三年（2010-2012 年）的平均总资产
Profitability 盈利能力
Return on assets, calculated by income before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) 资产回报率，即息税折旧及摊销前利润除以总资产，取 2010 年至 2012 年三年平均值。
Leverage 利用
Long-term debt divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) 长期负债与总资产之比，取 2010 年至 2012 年三年平均值。
Liquidity 流动性
Short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables) divided by short-term liabilities (debt and payables), averaged over three years (2010-2012) 流动资产（现金、存货、应收账款）除以流动负债（债务和应付账款），取 2010 年至 2012 年三年平均值。
Growth 增长
Growth rate of assets in 2011(dA_(t)//A_(t))2011\left(d A_{t} / A_{t}\right) 资产增长率在 2011(dA_(t)//A_(t))2011\left(d A_{t} / A_{t}\right)
Generation 世代
Dummy variable, equals one for first-generation family firms, zero otherwise (later-generation family firms) 虚拟变量，对于第一代家族企业取值为 1，否则取值为 0（后续代家族企业）
Number of owners 所有者数量
Number of shareholders in 2010 2010 年股东人数
Sector controls 行业控制
Four dummy variables (wholesale, services, construction, and industry) 四个虚拟变量（批发业、服务业、建筑业和制造业）
Dividend payout The amount of dividend payout divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012)
Financial control systems ^(a) P1, includes items on the use of financial control systems in family firms
Human resource control systems ^("a ") P 2 , includes items on the use of human resource control systems in family firms
Non-family involvement in governance systems ^("a ") P3, includes items on non-family involvement in the governance systems of family firms
Top-level activeness ^("a ") P4, includes items on the top-level activeness in family firms
Decentralization of authority ^("a ") P5, includes items on the decentralization of authority in family firms
Firm age Firm age in 2010
Firm size Total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012)
Profitability Return on assets, calculated by income before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012)
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012)
Liquidity Short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables) divided by short-term liabilities (debt and payables), averaged over three years (2010-2012)
Growth Growth rate of assets in 2011(dA_(t)//A_(t))
Generation Dummy variable, equals one for first-generation family firms, zero otherwise (later-generation family firms)
Number of owners Number of shareholders in 2010
Sector controls Four dummy variables (wholesale, services, construction, and industry)| Dividend payout | The amount of dividend payout divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Financial control systems ${ }^{\mathrm{a}}$ | P1, includes items on the use of financial control systems in family firms |
| Human resource control systems ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | P 2 , includes items on the use of human resource control systems in family firms |
| Non-family involvement in governance systems ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | P3, includes items on non-family involvement in the governance systems of family firms |
| Top-level activeness ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | P4, includes items on the top-level activeness in family firms |
| Decentralization of authority ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | P5, includes items on the decentralization of authority in family firms |
| Firm age | Firm age in 2010 |
| Firm size | Total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) |
| Profitability | Return on assets, calculated by income before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) |
| Leverage | Long-term debt divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012) |
| Liquidity | Short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables) divided by short-term liabilities (debt and payables), averaged over three years (2010-2012) |
| Growth | Growth rate of assets in $2011\left(d A_{t} / A_{t}\right)$ |
| Generation | Dummy variable, equals one for first-generation family firms, zero otherwise (later-generation family firms) |
| Number of owners | Number of shareholders in 2010 |
| Sector controls | Four dummy variables (wholesale, services, construction, and industry) |
Note: ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} See Appendix for more detailed descriptions of the items 注： ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} 详见附录中对各项内容的详细说明。
Table I. 表 I.
Descriptions of the variables 变量描述
Dependent variable. Consistent with previous empirical research investigating dividend payouts (e.g. González et al., 2014; Lee, 2010; Lipson et al., 1998), we use a dividend ratio which is defined as the amount of dividend payout divided by total assets. This variable is averaged for three years (2010-2012). 因变量。与先前关于股利支付的实证研究一致（例如 González 等，2014；Lee，2010；Lipson 等，1998），我们使用股利比率，定义为股利支付额除以总资产。该变量取 2010 年至 2012 年三年的平均值。
Independent variables. We extracted all five dimensions of family firm professionalization from an exploratory factor analysis by Dekker et al. (2013). Their five-dimensional framework is based on an extensive literature review, encompassing multiple professionalization components, and converted into a numeric scale that assesses the level of professionalization for a family business per dimension. The five professionalization (P)(\mathrm{P}) dimensions derived from the principal component analysis are: financial control systems (P1, Cronbach’s alpha\alpha : 0.78 ); human resource control systems (P2, Cronbach’s alpha\alpha : 0.61 ); non-family involvement in governance systems (P3, Cronbach’s alpha\alpha : 0.65 ); top-level activeness (P4, Cronbach’s alpha\alpha : 0.55); and decentralization of authority (P5, Cronbach’s alpha\alpha : 0.57)[2]. Although Cronbach’s alpha\alpha values for dimensions P4 and P5 are slightly below the general threshold value of 0.60 for exploratory factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006), it is argued that a value of 0.50 can be acceptable for social science data (Kline, 2013). The exact wording of these items, as well as measures of reliability and validity are included in the Appendix. All five dimensions are included in the Tobit regression model based on the derived standardized factor scores, which present how each company scores on the group of items with high loadings on a specific factor. We computed the factor scores for each of the five revealed professionalization dimensions, for each company in the data set. These factor scores then represent each company’s scores on the group of items with high loadings on a factor. By using Barlett approach, we generated orthogonal factor scores with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 . 自变量。我们从 Dekker 等（2013）的探索性因子分析中提取了家族企业专业化的五个维度。他们的五维框架基于广泛的文献综述，涵盖了多个专业化组成部分，并转化为一个数值量表，用于评估家族企业在每个维度上的专业化水平。通过主成分分析得出的五个专业化维度为：财务控制系统（P1，克朗巴赫系数：0.78）；人力资源控制系统（P2，克朗巴赫系数：0.61）；非家族成员参与治理系统（P3，克朗巴赫系数：0.65）；高层活跃度（P4，克朗巴赫系数：0.55）；以及权限下放（P5，克朗巴赫系数：0.57）[2]。尽管维度 P4 和 P5 的 Cronbach’s α值略低于探索性因子分析的一般阈值 0.60（Hair 等，2006），但有研究指出，对于社会科学数据，0.50 的值可被接受（Kline，2013）。这些项目的具体措辞，以及可靠性和有效性测量指标均收录于附录中。所有五个维度均纳入基于衍生标准化因子得分的托比特回归模型，该模型展示了各公司在特定因子高负荷项目组中的得分情况。我们为数据集中的每家公司计算了五个专业化维度的因子得分。这些因子得分代表了每家公司在一组高负荷因子项目中的得分。通过巴特勒方法，我们生成了均值为 0、标准差为 1 的正交因子得分。
Control variables. Consistent with prior research, we included several firm characteristics that might influence the dividend payout ratio. The analyses include the natural logarithm of firm age in 2010 as a proxy for a firm’s maturity. Older firms are typically in later growth phases, which gives rise to excess cash, and are thus more likely to pay dividends (González et al., 2014; Sharma, 2011; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). 控制变量。与先前研究一致，我们纳入了若干可能影响股利支付率的 firms 特征。分析中使用了 2010 年 firms 年龄的自然对数作为 firms 成熟度的代理变量。较老的公司通常处于增长的后期阶段，这会导致现金过剩，因此更倾向于支付股息（González et al., 2014; Sharma, 2011; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010）。
As larger firms tend to pay out higher dividends (Fama and French, 2001; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Sharma, 2011; González et al., 2014), the natural log of total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012), is included as a proxy for firm size. Moreover, larger firms are found to be positively associated with professionalization (e.g. De Kok et al., 2006) and thus should be included as a control variable in this study. 由于大型企业倾向于支付更高股息（Fama 和 French，2001；Fenn 和 Liang，2001；Sharma，2011；González 等，2014），因此将过去三年（2010-2012）总资产的自然对数取平均值作为企业规模的代理变量。此外，研究发现大型企业与专业化程度呈正相关（例如德科克等，2006），因此应在本研究中将其作为控制变量纳入分析。
Profitability has proven to be positively related with a firm’s dividend payout ratio (e.g. González et al., 2014; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2001; Sharma, 2011). Thus, we include the firm’s return on assets, which is measured as income before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012). 盈利能力已被证明与企业的股利支付率呈正相关关系（例如，González 等，2014；DeAngelo 等，2004；Fama 和 French，2001；Sharma，2011）。因此，我们纳入了企业的资产回报率，该指标定义为息税折旧及摊销前利润除以总资产，并取 2010 年至 2012 年三年平均值。
The model controls for (long-term) leverage as higher debt means higher interest payments and, consequently, less remaining cash to pay out in the form of dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2004; González et al., 2014; Sharma, 2011). Additionally, banking covenants and restrictions imposed by debtholders can limit the firm’s ability to pay out dividends (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Baker, 1989; Farinha, 2003; Hu and Kumar, 2004). The variable leverage is calculated as longterm debt divided by total assets, averaged over three years (2010-2012). 该模型控制了（长期）杠杆水平，因为债务水平越高，利息支出越高，相应地，用于派发股息的剩余现金越少（DeAngelo 等，2004；González 等，2014；Sharma，2011）。此外，银行契约和债权人施加的限制可能限制企业支付股息的能力（Jensen 和 Meckling，1976；Baker，1989；Farinha，2003；Hu 和 Kumar，2004）。变量杠杆率计算为长期债务除以总资产，取 2010 年至 2012 年三年平均值。
According to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), higher cash holdings should lead to higher dividend payouts (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Farinha, 2003). Thus, the model controls for a firm’s ability to pay back its short-term liabilities (debt and payables) with its short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables) with the variable liquidity, averaged over three years (2010-2012). 根据自由现金流假说（Jensen，1986），较高的现金持有量应导致较高的股息支付率（DeAngelo 等，2006；Farinha，2003）。因此，该模型控制了企业通过短期资产（现金、存货、应收账款）偿还短期负债（债务和应付账款）的能力，使用的是三年平均流动性变量（2010-2012 年）。
Next, a firm’s investment opportunities can be expected to negatively influence the level of dividend payouts because they give a strong incentive for the firm to retain cash (and thus not to pay out dividends). Consistent with prior research (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Fama and French, 2001; Michiels et al., 2015; Naceur et al., 2006), growth rate of assets in 2011(dA_(t)//A_(t))2011\left(d A_{t} / A_{t}\right) is a proxy for a firm’s investment opportunities, because greater growth indicates superior investment opportunities (DeAngelo et al., 2004). 接下来，一家公司的投资机会预计会对股息支付水平产生负面影响，因为这会给公司保留现金（从而不支付股息）提供强有力的激励。这与先前研究一致（Carney 和 Gedajlovic，2002；Denis 和 Osobov，2008；Fama 和 French，2001；Michiels 等，2015；Naceur 等，2006），资产增长率在 2011(dA_(t)//A_(t))2011\left(d A_{t} / A_{t}\right) 中是企业投资机会的代理变量，因为更高的增长率表明投资机会更优（DeAngelo 等，2004）。
The generational phase of a family firm might also influence the decision to pay dividends because agency problems are likely to differ between controlling-owner and next generation family firms (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). We control for this possible influence by including a dummy variable which equals one for first-generation family firms and zero for later-generation family firms. 家族企业的代际阶段也可能影响派息决策，因为代理问题在控股股东与下一代家族企业之间可能存在差异（Lubatkin 等，2005；Blanco-Mazagatos 等，2007）。我们通过引入一个虚拟变量来控制这一潜在影响，该变量在第一代家族企业中取值为 1，在后续代家族企业中取值为 0。
Consistent with many other studies on dividend payout (e.g. Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Farinha, 2003), we control for ownership dispersion and include the number of owners in 2010. 与许多其他关于股利支付的研究一致（例如 Carney 和 Gedajlovic，2002；Farinha，2003），我们控制了所有权分散程度，并纳入了 2010 年的所有者数量。
Finally, we control for competitive environment since it dictates the profit potential of a business (Porter, 1980) and can in turn indirectly influence the ability to pay dividends. Four sector dummy variables are included (wholesale, construction, manufacturing, and services). 最后，我们控制了竞争环境变量，因为它决定了企业的盈利潜力（Porter, 1980），并可能间接影响企业的分红能力。模型中纳入了四个行业虚拟变量（批发业、建筑业、制造业和服务业）。
3.3 Data analysis 3.3 数据分析
Our sample includes many firms that paid no dividends during the years analyzed. More specifically, 69 percent of all firms did not pay out a dividend during the period 2010-2012. As our dependent variable (dividend payout) cannot have negative values, it has the special feature that it has two possible outcomes: zero, when no dividends are paid, and a positive value, when dividends are paid. In other words, our dependent variable is left censored at zero. As indicated by Wooldridge (2009), when the dependent variable is constrained and there is a clustering of observations at this constraint (in our case, non-negative and clustering at zero), estimates based on ordinary least squares regressions will be biased and inconsistent. The suggested solution at this point is to use a probit or Tobit model. We prefer to use a Tobit model, because it does not throw away any information (Tobin, 1958). The Tobit model supposes that there is an unobservable (latent) variable that linearly depends on the independent variables. It can thus be expressed by the following equation: 我们的样本中包含许多在分析期间未派发股息的公司。具体而言，2010 年至 2012 年期间，69%的公司未派发股息。由于我们的因变量（股息派发）不能取负值，它具有特殊特征：仅有两种可能的取值——0（未派发股息）和正值（派发股息）。换言之，我们的因变量在零处左截断。如 Wooldridge（2009）所指出的，当因变量受约束且在该约束点存在观测值聚集（在本研究中为非负且在零处聚集）时，基于普通最小二乘回归的估计将存在偏误且不一致。此时建议采用 Probit 或 Tobit 模型。我们更倾向于使用托比特模型，因为它不会丢弃任何信息（Tobin，1958）。托比特模型假设存在一个不可观察的（潜在）变量，该变量与自变量呈线性依赖关系。因此，它可以表示为以下方程：
y_(i)={[y_(i)^(**)" if "y_(i)^(**) >= 0],[0" if "y_(i)^(**) <= 0]:}y_{i}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
y_{i}^{*} \text { if } y_{i}^{*} \geqslant 0 \\
0 \text { if } y_{i}^{*} \leqslant 0
\end{array}\right.
where y_(i)^(**)y_{i}^{*} is the latent variable ( y_(i)^(**)=betax_(i)+u_(i),∼N(0,sigma^(2))y_{i}^{*}=\beta x_{i}+u_{i}, \sim N\left(0, \sigma^{2}\right) ) 其中 y_(i)^(**)y_{i}^{*} 是潜在变量（ y_(i)^(**)=betax_(i)+u_(i),∼N(0,sigma^(2))y_{i}^{*}=\beta x_{i}+u_{i}, \sim N\left(0, \sigma^{2}\right) ）
The coefficients are interpreted as the combination of the change in y_(i)y_{i} of those above the zero limit, weighted by the probability of being above zero and the change in the probability of being above zero, weighted by the expected value of y_(i)y_{i}, if above zero (McDonald and Moffit, 1980). 系数被解释为以下两部分的组合：对于那些高于零限值的变量，其零限值变化量乘以高于零的概率；对于那些高于零限值的变量，其高于零的概率变化量乘以高于零时变量值的期望值（McDonald 和 Moffit，1980）。
4. Results 4. 结果
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses 4.1 描述性统计与单变量分析
Table II reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. The mean values and standard deviations for the five professionalization factors are not reported as they are standardized factor scores with a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. The mean (median) sample firm is about 27 (23) years old, employs 29 (19) people and is owned by 2.26 (2) owners. A total of 61 percent of all sample firms are second- or later-generation family firms. About 20 percent of the sample firms pay out dividends (19.92 percent in 2010; 20.73 percent 表 II 报告了所有变量的描述性统计和相关性。由于五个专业化因素的得分是标准化因子得分，均值为零，标准差为一，因此未报告其均值和标准差。样本企业的平均（中位数）年龄约为 27（23）岁，雇佣 29（19）人，由 2.26（2）位所有者拥有。样本企业中，61%为第二代或更晚代家族企业。约 20%的样本企业支付股息（2010 年为 19.92%；20.73%）
Table II. 表 II.
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables 所有变量的描述性统计和相关性分析
Variables 变量
Mean 平均值
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1. Dividend payout 1. 股利分配
0.02
0.04
1.00
2 . Financial control systems 2. 财务控制系统
0.02
1.00
3. Human resource control systems 3. 人力资源控制系统
0.14**
0.00
1.00
4. Non-family involvement in governance systems 4. 非家庭成员参与治理体系
in 2011, and 20.33 percent in 2012). These percentages correspond to previous studies on Belgian private firms (Michiels et al., 2015; Rommens et al., 2012). About 31 percent of the sample firms paid a dividend at least once during the period 2010-2012. 2011 年为 19.77%，2012 年为 20.33%。这些百分比与此前对比利时私营企业的研究结果一致（Michiels 等，2015；Rommens 等，2012）。在 2010 年至 2012 年期间，样本企业中有约 31%至少支付过一次股息。
The dependent variable (dividend payout) is significantly and positively correlated with P2 (non-family involvement in governance systems), P3 (human resource control systems), and profitability. The variable leverage is significantly and negatively correlated with the dividend payout ratio. The highest absolute correlation between the explanatory variables is 0.34 (in absolute value), which is well below the 0.80 threshold above which multicollinearity problems could arise (Gujarati, 2003). Also, the variance inflation factor (VIF) values indicate no multicollinearity problems as the largest VIF of 1.54 is again considerably less than the 10 threshold (Gujarati, 2003). 因变量（股利支付率）与 P2（非家族成员参与治理体系）、P3（人力资源控制体系）及盈利能力显著正相关。杠杆率与股利支付率显著负相关。解释变量之间最高的绝对相关系数为 0.34（绝对值），远低于 0.80 的阈值（Gujarati, 2003），表明不存在多重共线性问题。此外，方差膨胀因子（VIF）值表明不存在多重共线性问题，因为最大的 VIF 值为 1.54，远低于 10 的阈值（Gujarati, 2003）。
4.2 The impact of family firm professionalization on dividend payout ratio 4.2 家族企业专业化对股利支付率的影响
In order to investigate the factors that influence the level of dividend payout in a family firm, we use a Tobit model (also called a censored regression model) in STATA. All regression results are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 为了研究影响家族企业股利支付水平的因素，我们采用 Tobit 模型（也称为截尾回归模型）在 STATA 中进行分析。所有回归结果均基于异方差一致的标准误差。
As indicated in Table III, three out of five professionalization dimensions have a positive significant influence on the level of dividend payout in private family firms. More specifically, the use of financial control systems, non-family involvement in governance systems, and the use of HR control systems lead to a higher dividend payout ratio. Thus, H1a, H1b and H2a are supported by our results. Neither decentralization of authority nor top-level activeness has a significant relationship with dividend payments. Although the signs of their coefficients are positive as expected, they are not statistically significant and thus we find no support for H2bH 2 b and H2cH 2 c based on our analyses. 如表 III 所示，五个专业化维度中有三个对私人家族企业股利支付水平具有显著正向影响。具体而言，财务控制系统的使用、非家族成员参与治理系统以及人力资源控制系统的使用均导致股利支付比率更高。因此，H1a、H1b 和 H2a 的假设均得到本研究结果的支持。无论是权限下放还是高层活跃度，均与股利支付不存在显著关系。尽管其系数符号如预期为正，但统计上不显著，因此基于我们的分析，我们未发现对 H2bH 2 b 和 H2cH 2 c 的实证支持。
As far as the control variables are concerned, we find a significant positive effect of firm age and profitability. We thus find that older, more profitable family firms pay 就控制变量而言，我们发现企业年龄和盈利能力对薪酬水平具有显著正向影响。因此，我们得出结论：年龄较长且盈利能力较高的家族企业支付的薪酬更高。
Table IV. 表 IV.
Robustness check: Tobit regression models without single-owner firms 稳健性检验：排除单一所有者企业的托比特回归模型
out higher dividends than younger or less profitable family firms, a result which is in line with previous payout studies. Firm leverage has a significant negative influence on the payout ratio, also similar to previous research (DeAngelo et al., 2004; González et al., 2014; Sharma, 2011). This confirms the suggestion that debt might be considered as an alternative mechanism to minimize potential free cash flow problems (Farinha, 2003; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2007). 与年轻或盈利能力较低的家族企业相比，家族企业倾向于派发更高的股息，这一结果与以往的派息研究一致。企业杠杆率对派息比率具有显著负面影响，这与先前研究结果一致（DeAngelo 等，2004；González 等，2014；Sharma，2011）。这证实了债务可能被视为缓解潜在自由现金流问题的替代机制的建议（Farinha，2003；Renneboog 和 Trojanowski，2007）。
Next, similar to the findings of previous research, a firm’s investment opportunities (proxied by growth rate of assets) significantly negatively affects dividend payout. Firm size, liquidity, and the number of owners do not significantly influence the dividend payout ratio. In contrast to previous research (Vandemaele and Vancauteren, 2015), the variable generation has no significant effect on dividend payout. 接下来，与先前研究的发现一致，企业的投资机会（以资产增长率为代理变量）对股利支付率具有显著的负面影响。企业规模、流动性和所有者数量对股利支付率没有显著影响。与先前研究（Vandemaele 和 Vancauteren，2015）不同，变量生成对股利支付率没有显著影响。
Although some studies investigating family businesses exclude single-owner firms, we decided to keep these firms in our sample so as not to needlessly reduce the sample size. Additionally, the control variable number of owners has no (univariate or multivariate) significant influence on dividend payout. As a robustness test, we performed the Tobit analyses with a reduced sample size, excluding 167 family firms with only one owner. As shown in Table IV, the results remain similar, which indicates that our results are robust for single-owned firms as well as family firms with multiple owners. 尽管一些研究在考察家族企业时排除了单一所有者企业，但我们决定将这些企业纳入样本，以避免不必要地缩小样本规模。此外，控制变量“所有者数量”对股利支付率既不存在单变量显著影响，也不存在多变量显著影响。为验证结果的稳健性，我们对样本进行了缩减，剔除了 167 家仅由单一所有者经营的家族企业，并重新进行了 Tobit 分析。如表 IV 所示，分析结果保持一致，这表明我们的研究结论对单一所有者企业以及多所有者家族企业均具有稳健性。
5. Discussion 5. 讨论
The results support our first three hypotheses: firms with advanced financial control systems (e.g. formalized financial goals and objectives), formalized human resource control systems (e.g. incentive pay), and non-family involvement in governance systems (on the board of directors and the management team) pay out higher dividends. Our results do not support the last two hypotheses since we find that neither decentralization of authority nor top-level activeness has a significant effect on dividend payout. 研究结果支持我们的前三个假设：拥有先进财务控制体系（如正式化的财务目标和指标）、正式化的人力资源控制体系（如激励性薪酬）以及非家族成员参与治理体系（在董事会和管理团队中）的企业支付更高股息。我们的研究结果不支持最后两个假设，因为我们发现，无论是权限下放还是高层活跃度，均对股利支付没有显著影响。
We posit that agency problems relating to parental altruism or nepotism are more likely to occur when there are weaker control systems. Our results are consistent with this interpretation, given that we find that the use of formal (both financial and human resource) control systems in family firms results in higher dividend payouts. Furthermore, 我们认为，与父母的利他主义或裙带关系相关的代理问题更可能在控制体系较弱的情况下发生。我们的研究结果支持这一解释，因为我们发现，家族企业在采用正式的（包括财务和人力资源）控制体系时，股息支付率更高。此外，
Model 1 模型 1
Robust SE 强大的 SE
Model 2 模型 2
Robust SE 强大的 SE
Constant 恒定
-0.1172*
0.0482
-0.0965*
0.04478
Family firm professionalization 家族企业专业化
P1 - Financial control systems P1 - 财务控制系统
0.0086***
0.0050
P2 - Human resource control systems P2 - 人力资源控制系统
0.0115*
0.0048
P3 - Non-family involvement in governance systems P3 - 非家庭成员参与治理体系
Notes: n=325n=325. ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} Natural logarithm. ^(**)p < 0.05{ }^{*} p<0.05; ^(****)p < 0.01{ }^{* *} p<0.01; ^(******)p < 0.10{ }^{* * *} p<0.10 (2-tailed test) 注释： n=325n=325 . ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} 自然对数。 ^(**)p < 0.05{ }^{*} p<0.05 ; ^(****)p < 0.01{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ; ^(******)p < 0.10{ }^{* * *} p<0.10 (双尾检验)
formal control systems may reduce agency costs related to parental altruism because they reduce the amount of cash available to use for excessive salary or perquisites for family members. 正式控制系统可能通过减少用于支付家庭成员过高薪酬或福利的现金金额，从而降低与父母利他主义相关的代理成本。
Next, as non-family involvement in governance systems positively influences dividend payout, our results provide additional support for the suggestion that non-family involvement in the firm can reduce some of the agency costs related to, for example, parental altruism or self-control problems (Carney, 2005; Dyer, 1989; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008). After all, non-family involvement in the firm seems to reduce possible misuse of excess cash within the firm since more cash is paid out in the form of dividends. Our results also support the outcome hypothesis of La Porta et al. (2000), which states that dividends can be considered as substitutes as well as outcomes of governance mechanisms. In this case, dividends in family firms might be seen as an outcome of non-family involvement in governance systems. 接下来，由于非家族成员参与治理体系对股息支付具有积极影响，我们的研究结果进一步支持了以下观点：非家族成员参与公司治理可以降低与父母利他主义或自我控制问题等相关的代理成本（Carney, 2005; Dyer, 1989; Sciascia 和 Mazzola, 2008）。毕竟，非家族成员参与公司治理似乎能减少公司内部对过剩现金的滥用，因为更多现金以股息形式分配给股东。我们的研究结果还支持 La Porta 等（2000）的成果假设，即股息既可视为治理机制的替代品，也可视为其结果。在此情况下，家族企业中的股息可能被视为非家族成员参与治理体系的结果。
Previous family business research concluded that professionalization leads to better financial lending terms (Barden et al., 1984) and a higher likelihood of obtaining private equity funding (Dawson, 2011). Our study adds another financial argument for professionalization to this list, which is especially interesting for passive shareholders in family firms: professionalization appears to increase the likelihood that excess cash will be distributed on a pro rata basis to all shareholders (i.e. via dividend payouts), thereby reducing possible agency costs related to altruism, self-control, or nepotism. 先前对家族企业研究的结论指出，专业化能够带来更优的财务贷款条件（Barden 等，1984）以及获得私募股权融资的可能性更高（Dawson，2011）。本研究为专业化增添了另一个财务论据，这对家族企业的被动股东尤为重要：专业化似乎会增加超额现金按比例分配给所有股东的可能性（即通过股息分配），从而减少与利他主义、自我控制或裙带关系相关的潜在代理成本。
5.1 Limitations and suggestions for future research 5.1 限制与未来研究的建议
This study has several limitations which could provide avenues for future research. First, using longitudinal data on the level of professionalization will allow us to investigate the impact of changes in professionalization on dividend payout over time, which might provide additional interesting insights. Second, the sample consists only of Belgian privately held family firms. Even though this might seem like a limitation, the sample has the advantage of providing objective financial data for privately held family firms via the Bel-First database (Bureau Van Dijk), which is uncommon in most countries. Third, data from a larger sample of family firms, or from a different country, could be used to test the generalizability of our results. Fourth, although intercorrelations between the different dimensions of professionalization are very low, future research might examine possible moderator effects among these variables. Finally, the results indicate that the level of professionalization impacts dividend policy. This result could inspire many future research directions, for example, investigating the impact of professionalization on different financial decisions, such as capital structure. These new research topics derived from this study could be of interest to both family business and corporate finance scholars. 本研究存在以下几点局限性，这些局限性可能为未来研究提供方向。首先，使用纵向数据来衡量专业化程度，将使我们能够研究专业化变化对股息支付的影响，这可能提供额外的有趣见解。其次，样本仅包含比利时私营家族企业。尽管这看似是局限性，但该样本通过 Bel-First 数据库（Bureau Van Dijk）提供了私营家族企业的客观财务数据，而此类数据在多数国家较为罕见。第三，未来可使用更大样本的家族企业数据，或来自不同国家的数据，以检验本研究结果的普适性。第四，尽管专业化不同维度之间的相关性非常低，未来研究可探讨这些变量之间的潜在调节效应。最后，研究结果表明专业化水平影响股利政策。这一发现可启发未来研究方向，例如探讨专业化对不同财务决策（如资本结构）的影响。本研究衍生出的这些新研究议题，对家族企业研究与公司财务学者均具有重要参考价值。
5.2 Theoretical and practical implications 5.2 理论与实践意义
This study makes a number of valuable contributions to the academic literature. First, while professionalization research emanates mainly from management studies, and dividend research from corporate finance, we integrate insights from both disciplines. This could significantly advance family business and finance research. Second, while prior work has mainly focused on the difference between family and non-family firms or public and private firms, we investigate the impact of professionalization on dividend payout within the group of privately held family firms. Third, by adopting a broader family business professionalization perspective, we contribute to the family business literature as our reasoning goes beyond the effect of family involvement on dividend payout alone, as was investigated by González et al. (2014). As a successful application of a more extended operationalization of professionalization, this scale could also be used to explore 本研究为学术文献做出了若干重要贡献。首先，尽管专业化研究主要源于管理学，而股利研究主要源于公司财务，但我们整合了这两个学科的见解。这有望显著推动家族企业与财务研究的发展。其次，尽管先前研究主要关注家族企业与非家族企业或上市公司与非上市公司之间的差异，但我们探讨了专业化对家族企业内部股利支付的影响。第三，通过采用更广义的家族企业专业化视角，我们为家族企业研究做出了贡献，因为我们的分析超越了 González 等（2014）仅关注家族参与对股利支付影响的范畴。作为对专业化概念更广泛 operationalization 的成功应用，该量表也可用于探索
professionalization in other SME contexts. Finally, the results of this study may also be of interest to family business practitioners or consultants, as they show that different modes of professionalization in family firms influence the level of dividend payout. 其他中小企业背景下的专业化发展。最后，本研究的结果也可能对家族企业从业者或顾问具有参考价值，因为研究表明，家族企业中不同专业化模式会影响股息支付水平。
6. Conclusion 6. 结论
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about dividend payments in family-controlled firms. These firms are assumed to follow financial logic that is driven by both economic and non-economic motives (Gallo et al., 2004; Koropp et al., 2014), and several studies have already investigated the influence of family ownership and/or management on dividend policies (e.g. Chen et al., 2005; Farinha, 2003; Gugler, 2003; Pindado et al., 2011; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). Recently, the subgroup of privately held family firms has also attracted attention from several researchers (González et al., 2014; Michiels et al., 2015; Vandemaele and Vancauteren, 2015). Although these studies have started to open the black box of dividend payments in privately held family firms by investigating the influence of family governance practices (Michiels et al., 2015) and family influence in ownership and management (González et al., 2014; Vandemaele and Vancauteren, 2015) on a firm’s dividend policy, there is still much work to do before we thoroughly understand why, when, and how private family firms pay dividends. We contribute to this debate by exploring in more detail the relationship between family firm professionalization and dividend payout. Our results indicate that three out of five dimensions of professionalization, including the use of financial and human resource control systems, and high levels of non-family involvement in governance, significantly and positively influence the dividend payout ratio. According to these results, the level to which a family firm has professionalized in these aspects significantly influences the dividend payout, suggesting that professionalization seems to reduce agency costs related to parental altruism or nepotism. Our study therefore adds an important variable to the dividend literature alongside the traditional determinants (firm size, firm age, leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth) and clearly indicates the need to take into account the heterogeneity of private family firms to explain why, how, and when family firms pay out dividends. 本文为关于家族控制企业股利支付的持续讨论做出了贡献。这些企业被假设遵循由经济和非经济动机共同驱动的财务逻辑（Gallo 等，2004；Koropp 等，2014），已有研究探讨了家族所有权和/或管理对股利政策的影响（例如 Chen 等，2005；Farinha，2003；Gugler，2003；Pindado 等，2011；Setia-Atmaja 等，2009；Yoshikawa 和 Rasheed，2010）。近期，私人持有的家族企业这一子群体也引起了研究者的关注（González 等，2014；米歇尔斯等，2015；范德马埃勒和范卡特伦，2015）。尽管这些研究已开始揭开家族企业股利支付的“黑箱”，通过考察家族治理实践（米歇尔斯等，2015）以及家族在所有权和管理中的影响（冈萨雷斯等，2014；范德马埃勒和范卡特伦，2015）对企业股利政策的影响，但要彻底理解私营家族企业为何、何时以及如何支付股利，仍需进一步研究。我们通过更详细地探讨家族企业专业化与股利支付之间的关系，为这一讨论做出贡献。研究结果表明，专业化五个维度中的三个——包括财务和人力资源控制系统的使用，以及治理中非家族成员的高参与度——对股利支付率具有显著正向影响。根据这些结果，家族企业在这些方面的专业化程度越高，股利支付率越高，这表明专业化似乎能降低与父母利他主义或裙带关系相关的代理成本。 因此，本研究在股利研究领域中引入了一个重要变量，与传统决定因素（企业规模、企业年龄、杠杆率、盈利能力、流动性、增长率）并列，并明确指出，为了解释家族企业为何、如何以及何时支付股利，有必要考虑家族企业的异质性。
Notes 说明
By family firms, we are in this paper referring to firms where the majority ownership is held by one family (i.e. family-controlled firms). 本文中所指的家族企业，特指由一个家族持有多数股权的企业（即家族控制的企业）。
For more detail concerning the development and validity of the five factors see Dekker et al. (2013). 有关五个因素的开发和有效性详情，请参见 Dekker 等（2013）。
For a more detailed description of the factors see Dekker et al. (2013). 有关这些因素的更详细描述，请参见 Dekker 等（2013）。
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Centralized individual decision making (R) 集中式个人决策（R）
0.681
Centralization of authority (R) 权力集中化（R）
0.584
0.805
KMO index KMO 指数
0.000
Bartlett's significance test of sphericity 巴特利特球形度显著性检验
Dimension Cronbach's alpha Item Factor loading
P1 - Financial control systems 0.78 Use of budgets 0.870
Budget evaluation system 0.842
Formalized financial goals and objectives 0.642
Firm performance evaluation system 0.553
P2 - Non-family involvement in governance systems 0.65 Family involvement in board of directors (R) ^("a ") 0.816
External board members 0.738
Family involvement in management team (R) ^("b ") 0.625
Non-family CEO 0.623
P3 - Human resource control systems 0.62 Formal recruitment system 0.655
Formal training system 0.622
Incentive payment system 0.532
Personnel performance evaluation system 0.503
Formal scheduled staff meetings ^("a ") 0.459
P4 - Top-level activeness 0.55 Board activeness 0.829
Management activeness 0.637
P5 - Decentralization of authority 0.57 Delegation of control 0.813
Centralized individual decision making (R) 0.681
Centralization of authority (R) 0.584
0.805 KMO index
0.000 Bartlett's significance test of sphericity | Dimension | Cronbach's $\alpha$ | Item | Factor loading |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| P1 - Financial control systems | 0.78 | Use of budgets | 0.870 |
| | | Budget evaluation system | 0.842 |
| | | Formalized financial goals and objectives | 0.642 |
| | | Firm performance evaluation system | 0.553 |
| P2 - Non-family involvement in governance systems | 0.65 | Family involvement in board of directors (R) ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 0.816 |
| | | External board members | 0.738 |
| | | Family involvement in management team (R) ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 0.625 |
| | | Non-family CEO | 0.623 |
| P3 - Human resource control systems | 0.62 | Formal recruitment system | 0.655 |
| | | Formal training system | 0.622 |
| | | Incentive payment system | 0.532 |
| | | Personnel performance evaluation system | 0.503 |
| | | Formal scheduled staff meetings ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 0.459 |
| P4 - Top-level activeness | 0.55 | Board activeness | 0.829 |
| | | Management activeness | 0.637 |
| P5 - Decentralization of authority | 0.57 | Delegation of control | 0.813 |
| | | Centralized individual decision making (R) | 0.681 |
| | | Centralization of authority (R) | 0.584 |
| 0.805 | KMO index | | |
| 0.000 | Bartlett's significance test of sphericity | | |
Notes: ® indicates that the item was reverse coded. ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} Measured as percentage of family directors to total number of directors in the board; ^("b "){ }^{\text {b }} measured as a percentage of family managers to total number of managers in the management team 注释：® 表示该项为反向编码。 ^("a "){ }^{\text {a }} 以家庭董事人数占董事会总人数的百分比计算； ^("b "){ }^{\text {b }} 以家庭经理人数占管理团队总人数的百分比计算。
Table AI. 表格 AI。
Factor loadings for varimax rotated five-factor model 五因素旋转因子分析的因子载荷
Survey questions for the five dimensions of professionalization 专业化五个维度的调查问题
Is there a report or document in which the company objectives with reference to next year’s sales are fully and accurately computed? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing formalized financial goals and objectives). 公司是否有一份报告或文件，其中对明年销售目标进行了全面且准确的计算？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估正式的财务目标和指标）。
Does the company own reports in which the proposed budgets of the company are compared with the actual figures? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of budgets). 公司是否拥有将公司提出的预算与实际数据进行比较的报告？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估预算的使用情况）。
Are the deviations from the budgeted targets monitored to perhaps undertake future actions? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of budget evaluation system). 是否对预算目标的偏差进行监控，以便可能采取未来行动？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估预算评估系统使用情况）。
Does management prepare quarterly reports? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of firm performance evaluation system). 管理层是否编制季度报告？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估公司绩效评估系统的使用情况）。
(2) Factor 2 - human resource control systems: (2) 因素 2 - 人力资源控制系统：
Are the staff meetings usually formally prepared and planned in advance? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing formal scheduled staff meetings). 员工会议通常是否会提前正式准备和规划？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估正式安排的员工会议）。
Does the company use incentive payments based on performance, for example through bonuses? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of incentive payment system). 公司是否采用基于绩效的激励支付方式，例如通过奖金？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估激励支付系统的使用情况）。
Are the periodical performance reviews with the managers of the company drawn up in reports? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of personnel performance evaluation system). 公司与经理进行的定期绩效评估是否以报告形式记录？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估人员绩效评估系统的使用情况）。
Are the procedures regarding the recruitment of new staff noted down in a document? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of formal recruitment system). 新员工招聘程序是否以书面形式记录在案？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估是否使用正式招聘系统）。
Does the company provide formal internal or external training programs for their employees? 0=0= no; 1=1= yes (assessing use of formal training system). 公司是否为员工提供正式的内部或外部培训计划？ 0=0= 否； 1=1= 是（评估正式培训系统的使用情况）。
(3) Factor 3 - non-family involvement in governance systems: (3) 因素 3 - 非家庭成员参与治理体系：
Are you, as CEO, part of the family? 0=0= yes; 1=1= no (assessing nature of CEO). 作为首席执行官，您是否属于公司家族成员？ 0=0= 是； 1=1= 否（评估首席执行官的性质）。
How many managers are part of the management team (including CEO)? 管理团队中包含多少名经理（包括首席执行官）？
How many managers of this management team are connected by blood bonds? (assessing non-family involvement in management - reverse coded). 该管理团队中，有多少名经理存在血缘关系？（评估管理层中非家庭成员的参与情况 - 反向编码）
How many board directors are connected by blood bonds? (assessing non-family involvement in board - reverse coded). 有多少名董事会成员存在血缘关系？（评估董事会中非家族成员的参与情况——反向编码）
How many people ( == natural individuals) are part of the board of directors? 董事会由多少人（ == 自然人）组成？
How many external people ( = non-relatives and not working for the company) are there on this board of directors? (assessing involvement of external, independent members in board). 董事会中共有多少名外部人员（即非亲属且不为公司工作的成员）？（评估外部独立成员在董事会中的参与程度）
(4) Factor 4 - top-level activeness: (4) 因素 4 - 高层活跃度：
How often does the management team officially meet on an annual basis? (assessing management activeness). 管理团队每年正式召开会议的频率是多少？（评估管理层的活跃度）
How often does the board of directors officially meet on an annual basis? (assessing board activeness). 董事会每年正式召开会议的频率是多少？（评估董事会活跃度）
(5) Factor 5 - decentralization of authority: (5) 因素 5 - 权力下放：
Does the CEO of the company individually decide which organizational strategy must be followed? 0=0= yes; 1=1= no (assessing centralized decision making). 公司首席执行官是否单独决定必须遵循的组织战略？ 0=0= 是； 1=1= 否（评估集中决策）。
Do all employees within the company directly report to the CEO (without using an intermediary)? 0=0= yes; 1=1= no (assessing centralization of authority). 公司内所有员工是否直接向 CEO 汇报（不通过中间人）？ 0=0= 是； 1=1= 否（评估权力集中程度）。
Are all major decisions within the company autonomously made by the CEO, and then communicated downwards? 0=0= yes; 1=1= no (assessing possible delegation of control). 公司内所有重大决策是否均由首席执行官（CEO）独立做出，并随后向下传达？ 0=0= 是； 1=1= 否（评估可能的决策权下放）。
Corresponding author 通讯作者
Anneleen Michiels can be contacted at: anneleen.michiels@uhasselt.be 安内琳·米歇尔斯（Anneleen Michiels）的联系方式为：anneleen.michiels@uhasselt.be
