BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
February 26, 1982 1982 年 2 月 26 日
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Operating earnings of $39.7 million in 1981 amounted to 15.2% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost) compared to 17.8% in 1980. Our new plan that allows stockholders to designate corporate charitable contributions (detailed later) reduced earnings by about $900,000 in 1981. This program, which we expect to continue subject to annual evaluation of our corporate tax position, had not been initiated in 1980.
1981 年的运营收益为 3,970 万美元，相当于年初股本的 15.2%（证券按成本估值），而 1980 年为 17.8%。我们允许股东指定公司慈善捐款的新计划（详见后文）使 1981 年的收益减少了约 90 万美元。我们预计将继续执行该计划，但需每年评估我们的公司税务状况，该计划在 1980 年尚未启动。
Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings
非控股权益收益
In the 1980 annual report we discussed extensively the concept of non-controlled ownership earnings, i.e., Berkshire’s share of the undistributed earnings of companies we don’t control or significantly influence but in which we, nevertheless, have important investments. (We will be glad to make available to new or prospective shareholders copies of that discussion or others from earlier reports to which we refer in this report.) No portion of those undistributed earnings is included in the operating earnings of Berkshire.
在 1980 年的年度报告中，我们广泛讨论了非控股权益收益的概念，即伯克希尔在我们不控制或不重大影响但我们仍然拥有重要投资的公司的未分配收益中所占的份额。（我们将很乐意向新的或潜在的股东提供该讨论的副本，或我们在本报告中提及的早期报告中的其他讨论。）这些未分配收益的任何部分均未包含在伯克希尔的运营收益中。
However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and, therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained - and reported - similar earnings.
然而，我们相信，总体而言，这些未分配的，因此未记录的收益将转化为伯克希尔股东的有形价值，就像我们控制的子公司已经获得、保留并报告了类似的收益一样。
We know that this translation of non-controlled ownership earnings into corresponding realized and unrealized capital gains for Berkshire will be extremely irregular as to time of occurrence. While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously. Market recognition of retained earnings also will be unevenly realized among companies. It will be disappointingly low or negative in cases where earnings are employed non- productively, and far greater than dollar-for-dollar of retained earnings in cases of companies that achieve high returns with their augmented capital. Overall, if a group of non-controlled companies is selected with reasonable skill, the group result should be quite satisfactory.
我们知道，非控股权益收益转化为伯克希尔相应的已实现和未实现资本收益，在发生时间上将非常不规律。虽然市场价值在长期内与企业价值的追踪情况良好，但在任何一年中，这种关系都可能变化无常。市场对留存收益的认可在各公司之间也将不均衡地实现。在收益未用于生产性用途的情况下，它将令人失望地低或为负，而在那些以增加的资本获得高回报的公司中，它将远大于留存收益的每一美元。总体而言，如果以合理的技巧选择一组非控股公司，则该组的结果应该会非常令人满意。
In aggregate, our non-controlled business interests have more favorable underlying economic characteristics than our controlled businesses. That’s understandable; the area of choice has been far wider. Small portions of exceptionally good businesses are usually available in the securities markets at reasonable prices. But such businesses are available for purchase in their entirety only rarely, and then almost always at high prices.
总体而言，我们非控股的商业权益比我们控股的商业权益具有更有利的潜在经济特征。这是可以理解的；选择范围要广泛得多。在证券市场上，通常可以以合理的价格获得极好的企业的一小部分。但是，这样的企业只能很少地被整体购买，而且几乎总是以高价购买。
General Acquisition Behavior
一般收购行为
As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments - “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well”.) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities.
正如我们的历史所表明的那样，我们既乐于完全拥有企业，也乐于拥有代表企业一小部分的有价证券。我们不断寻找在每个领域投入大量资金的方法。（但是我们尽量避免小额承诺——“如果某件事根本不值得做，那么就不值得做好”）。的确，我们的保险和集邮业务的流动性要求需要在有价证券方面进行大量投资。
Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)
我们的收购决策将旨在最大化实际经济利益，而不是最大化管理领域或出于会计目的而报告的数字。（从长远来看，强调会计外观而非经济实质的管理层通常两者都做得很少。）
Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.
无论对直接报告的盈利产生何种影响，我们宁愿以每股 X 元的价格购买 Wonderful Business T 公司 10%的股份，也不愿以每股 2X 元的价格购买 T 公司 100%的股份。大多数公司经理的做法恰恰相反，而且他们为自己的行为提供了充分的理由。
However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination, the important ones in most high- premium takeovers:
然而，我们怀疑以下三种动机——通常是不言而喻的——在大多数高溢价收购中，单独或组合起来，才是重要的动机：
(1) Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.
(1) 领导者，无论是商业领域的还是其他领域的，很少缺乏进取精神，而且往往喜欢增加活动和挑战。在伯克希尔，公司脉搏跳动最快的时候莫过于即将进行收购的时候。
(2) Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)
(2) 大多数组织，无论是商业组织还是其他组织，衡量自己、被他人衡量以及对管理人员的薪酬，更多的是以规模来衡量，而不是以其他任何标准来衡量。（问问一位《财富》500 强企业的经理，他的公司在那份著名的榜单上排名第几，得到的回答总是按销售额规模排名的榜单上的数字；他甚至可能不知道他的公司在《财富》杂志同样忠实地编制的按盈利能力对同一 500 家公司进行排名的榜单上排名第几。）
(3) Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).
(3) 许多管理层显然在容易受影响的童年时期过度接触了那个被囚禁的英俊王子被美丽公主的吻从蟾蜍的身体中解救出来的故事。因此，他们确信他们的管理之吻会对 T(arget)公司的盈利能力产生奇迹。
Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?
这种乐观是必不可少的。如果没有这种乐观的看法，A(cquisitor)公司的股东为什么要以 2 倍的收购成本拥有 T 公司的权益，而不是以 X 的市场价格直接购买呢？
In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.
换句话说，投资者总是可以按蟾蜍的现行价格购买蟾蜍。如果投资者转而资助那些希望支付双倍价格以获得亲吻蟾蜍权利的公主，那么这些吻最好能带来真正的奇迹。我们观察到许多吻，但很少有奇迹。然而，许多管理层的公主仍然对她们的吻在未来的效力充满信心——即使在她们的公司后院里已经满是毫无反应的蟾蜍。
In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.
公平地说，我们应该承认一些收购记录是令人眼花缭乱的。其中有两个主要类别脱颖而出。
The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.
第一类公司是指那些通过设计或偶然机会，购买的业务特别能适应通货膨胀环境的公司。这种受青睐的业务必须具备两个特点：（1）能够比较容易地提高价格（即使在产品需求平稳且产能未充分利用的情况下），而不用担心市场份额或单位销量的显著损失；（2）能够适应业务中大量的美元金额增长（通常更多是由通货膨胀而非实际增长产生），而只需少量额外的资本投资。能力普通的管理者，如果只专注于符合这些标准的收购机会，近几十年来也取得了优异的成绩。然而，很少有企业同时具备这两个特点，而且购买这些企业的竞争现在已经变得非常激烈，以至于适得其反。
The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)
第二类是管理界的超级明星——他们能够识别伪装成癞蛤蟆的罕见王子，并且拥有能够剥去伪装的管理能力。我们向西北工业的本·海涅曼、泰莱达因的亨利·辛格尔顿、国家服务工业的欧文·扎班，尤其是首都城市传播的汤姆·墨菲（一位真正的管理“双料冠军”，他的收购努力恰当地集中在第一类，而且他的运营才能也使他成为第二类的领导者）致敬。从直接和间接的经验来看，我们认识到这些高管成就的难度和稀有性。（他们也一样；这些冠军近年来很少达成交易，而且经常发现回购自己的股票是企业资本最明智的运用。）
Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)
不幸的是，您的主席不符合第二类的标准。而且，尽管对迫使集中在第一类的经济因素有相当好的理解，但我们在该类别的实际收购活动是零星且不足的。我们的说教比我们的表现更好。（我们忽略了诺亚原则：预测下雨不算数，建造方舟才算数。）
We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.
我们偶尔尝试以低廉的价格购买癞蛤蟆，结果已在过去的报告中有所记载。显然，我们的吻没有奏效。我们与几个王子合作得很好——但他们在购买时就是王子。至少我们的吻没有把他们变成癞蛤蟆。最后，我们偶尔在以类似癞蛤蟆的价格购买容易识别的王子的部分权益方面取得了相当大的成功。
Berkshire Acquisition Objectives
伯克希尔的收购目标
We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past. We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting. But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.
我们将继续寻求以合理的价格整体收购企业，即使被收购企业的未来发展与其过去的发展轨迹大致相同。如果我们对所获得的东西有合理的信心，我们很可能会为第一类企业支付相当高的价格。但我们通常不会在任何收购中为我们应该带来的东西支付很多，因为我们发现我们通常不会带来很多。
During 1981 we came quite close to a major purchase involving both a business and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer.
1981 年，我们非常接近达成一项重大收购，涉及一家我们非常喜欢的企业和一位我们非常喜欢的经理人。然而，考虑到所涉资金的其他用途，最终要求的价格会使我们的所有者比收购前更糟。帝国会更大，但公民会更穷。
Although we had no success in 1981, from time to time in the future we will be able to purchase 100% of businesses meeting our standards. Additionally, we expect an occasional offering of a major “non-voting partnership” as discussed under the Pinkerton’s heading on page 47 of this report. We welcome suggestions regarding such companies where we, as a substantial junior partner, can achieve good economic results while furthering the long-term objectives of present owners and managers.
尽管我们在 1981 年没有取得成功，但在未来的某个时候，我们将能够 100%收购符合我们标准的企业。此外，我们预计会不时提供主要的“无投票权合伙企业”，如本报告第 47 页 Pinkerton’s 标题下所述。我们欢迎有关此类公司的建议，在这种公司中，作为重要的初级合伙人，我们可以在促进现有所有者和管理人员的长期目标的同时，取得良好的经济成果。
Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.
目前，我们发现最容易获得价值的方式是通过公开市场购买那些拥有卓越业务特许权和能干、诚实管理层的公司的零散股份。我们从不期望运营这些公司，但我们期望从它们身上获利。
We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either: (1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.
我们预计，来自这些公司的未分配收益将为 Berkshire 及其股东带来全部价值（在实现时需缴纳税款）。如果它们没有做到这一点，那么我们在以下方面犯了错误：（1）我们选择加入的管理层；（2）业务的未来经济状况；或（3）我们支付的价格。
We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes - sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion - now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.
我们已经犯了很多这样的错误——无论是在购买非控股权益还是控股权益的企业中。第（2）类错误计算是最常见的。当然，有必要深入挖掘我们的历史才能找到此类错误的例证——有时甚至可以追溯到两三个月前。例如，去年，你们的主席自愿就铝业务的光明前景发表了他的专家意见。此后，对该意见进行了一些小的调整——现在总计约 180 度——是必要的。
For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries. Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.
然而，出于个人以及更客观的原因，我们通常能够更快地纠正此类错误，在非控股企业（有价证券）的情况下比在控股子公司的情况下更快。实际上，缺乏控制往往已成为一种经济优势。
As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our non-recorded “ownership” earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category - GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company - our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance.
正如我们去年提到的，我们未入账的“所有权”收益的规模已经增长到其总额大于我们报告的运营收益的程度。我们预计这种情况将持续下去。仅在 GEICO Corporation、General Foods Corporation、R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.和 The Washington Post Company 这四个所有权头寸中，我们在 1982 年未分配因而未入账的收益中所占的份额可能将超过 3500 万美元。完全忽略这些未分配收益的会计准则降低了我们年度股本回报率计算或任何其他单一年份经济绩效指标的效用。
Long-Term Corporate Performance
长期公司业绩
In measuring long-term economic performance, equities held by our insurance subsidiaries are valued at market subject to a charge reflecting the amount of taxes that would have to be paid if unrealized gains were actually realized. If we are correct in the premise stressed in the preceding section of this report, our unreported ownership earnings will find their way, irregularly but inevitably, into our net worth. To date, this has been the case.
在衡量长期经济绩效时，我们保险子公司持有的股票按市场价值估值，但需扣除反映如果未实现收益实际实现时必须支付的税款金额的费用。如果我们在本报告前一节中强调的前提是正确的，那么我们未报告的所有权收益将不规则但不可避免地进入我们的净值。到目前为止，情况一直是这样。
An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and non-insurance held equities at market. However, GAAP accounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance companies, we will report its effect to you.
对业绩进行更纯粹的计算将涉及按市场价值评估债券和非保险持有的股票。但是，GAAP 会计准则并未规定此程序，并且增加的纯度只会略微改变结果。如果任何估值差异扩大到显着比例（如大多数主要保险公司的情况），我们将向您报告其影响。
On a GAAP basis, during the present management’s term of seventeen years, book value has increased from $19.46 per share to $526.02 per share, or 21.1% compounded annually. This rate of return number is highly likely to drift downward in future years. We hope, however, that it can be maintained significantly above the rate of return achieved by the average large American corporation.
按照通用会计准则（GAAP），在本届管理层执政的十七年期间，账面价值已从每股 19.46 美元增至每股 526.02 美元，或每年复合增长 21.1%。这个回报率数字在未来几年很可能会下降。然而，我们希望它能保持在远高于美国大型公司平均回报率的水平。
Over half of the large gain in Berkshire’s net worth during 1981 - it totaled $124 million, or about 31% - resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side.
在 1981 年伯克希尔净资产的大幅增长中，超过一半——总计 1.24 亿美元，约占 31%——来自于一项单一投资，即 GEICO 公司的市场表现。总的来说，我们当年从证券中获得的市场收益大大超过了基础业务价值的增长。这种市场波动并不总是令人愉快的。
In past reports we have explained how inflation has caused our apparently satisfactory long-term corporate performance to be illusory as a measure of true investment results for our owners. We applaud the efforts of Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and note the currently more moderate increases in various price indices. Nevertheless, our views regarding long-term inflationary trends are as negative as ever. Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.
在过去的报告中，我们已经解释了通货膨胀如何导致我们看似令人满意的长期公司业绩，实际上是对我们所有者真实投资结果的一种错觉。我们赞赏美联储主席沃尔克的努力，并注意到目前各种价格指数的增长较为温和。然而，我们对长期通胀趋势的看法仍然像以往一样消极。就像贞操一样，稳定的价格水平似乎能够维持，但不能恢复。
Despite the overriding importance of inflation in the investment equation, we will not punish you further with another full recital of our views; inflation itself will be punishment enough. (Copies of previous discussions are available for masochists.) But, because of the unrelenting destruction of currency values, our corporate efforts will continue to do a much better job of filling your wallet than of filling your stomach.
尽管通货膨胀在投资等式中至关重要，但我们不会再用一篇完整的观点陈述来惩罚您；通货膨胀本身就足以成为惩罚。（之前的讨论副本可供受虐狂使用。）但是，由于货币价值的持续破坏，我们公司的努力将继续在充实您的钱包方面做得更好，而不是充实您的胃。
Equity Value-Added 股权增值
An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasm you may retain regarding our long-term rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns - interest on fixed-income securities - will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive forms of investment, it is “entitled” to higher returns. A “value-added” bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain.
还有一个因素会进一步抑制您可能对我们长期回报率抱有的任何剩余热情。证明股权投资合理的经济理由是，总体而言，通过将管理和创业技能与股权资本相结合，可以获得高于被动投资回报（固定收益证券利息）的额外收益。此外，理由是，由于股权资本头寸与高于被动投资形式的风险相关，因此它“有权”获得更高的回报。来自股权资本的“增值”红利似乎是自然而然且确定的。
But is it? Several decades back, a return on equity of as little as 10% enabled a corporation to be classified as a “good” business - i.e., one in which a dollar reinvested in the business logically could be expected to be valued by the market at more than one hundred cents. For, with long-term taxable bonds yielding 5% and long-term tax-exempt bonds 3%, a business operation that could utilize equity capital at 10% clearly was worth some premium to investors over the equity capital employed. That was true even though a combination of taxes on dividends and on capital gains would reduce the 10% earned by the corporation to perhaps 6%-8% in the hands of the individual investor.
但事实果真如此吗？几十年前，仅 10% 的股权回报率就足以让一家公司被归类为“好”企业——即，在业务中再投资 1 美元，从逻辑上讲，市场预期其价值将超过 100 美分。因为，在长期应税债券收益率为 5% 且长期免税债券收益率为 3% 的情况下，能够以 10% 的收益率利用股权资本的商业运营显然对投资者来说比所使用的股权资本更有价值。即使股息和资本收益的税收组合会将公司赚取的 10% 减少到个人投资者手中的 6%-8%，情况也是如此。
Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period, American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capital employed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were “good” businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on long-term passive money). The value-added produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial.
投资市场认识到这一事实。在早期，美国企业平均从所使用的股权资本中获得约 11% 的收益，并且股票总体上以远高于该股权资本（账面价值）的估值出售，平均每美元超过 150 美分。大多数企业都是“好”企业，因为它们赚取的收益远远超过了它们的维持成本（长期被动资金的回报）。总体而言，股权投资产生的增值是巨大的。
That day is gone. But the lessons learned during its existence are difficult to discard. While investors and managers must place their feet in the future, their memories and nervous systems often remain plugged into the past. It is much easier for investors to utilize historic p/e ratios or for managers to utilize historic business valuation yardsticks than it is for either group to rethink their premises daily. When change is slow, constant rethinking is actually undesirable; it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday’s assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has become breathtaking.
那段日子已经过去了。但是，在那段日子里学到的教训却难以抛弃。虽然投资者和管理者必须立足于未来，但他们的记忆和神经系统往往仍然与过去相连。投资者利用历史市盈率或管理者利用历史业务估值标准，远比他们每天重新思考其前提要容易得多。当变化缓慢时，不断的反思实际上是不可取的；它收效甚微，而且会减慢反应时间。但是，当变化巨大时，只有付出巨大的代价才能保留昨天的假设。而经济变化的步伐已经变得惊人。
During the past year, long-term taxable bond yields exceeded 16% and long-term tax-exempts 14%. The total return achieved from such tax-exempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor.
在过去的一年中，长期应税债券收益率超过 16%，长期免税债券收益率超过 14%。当然，从这些免税债券中获得的总回报直接进入个人所有者的口袋。与此同时，美国企业的股权收益率仅为 14%左右。而这 14%的收益在被个人所有者存入银行之前，将被税收大幅削减。这种缩减的程度取决于公司的股息政策和适用于投资者的税率。
Thus, with interest rates on passive investments at late 1981 levels, a typical American business is no longer worth one hundred cents on the dollar to owners who are individuals. (If the business is owned by pension funds or other tax-exempt investors, the arithmetic, although still unenticing, changes substantially for the better.) Assume an investor in a 50% tax bracket; if our typical company pays out all earnings, the income return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% tax- exempt bond. And, if conditions persist - if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14% - the 7% tax-exempt equivalent to the higher-bracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a tax-exempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% tax-exempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the dollar as this is written.
因此，被动投资的利率在 1981 年末处于 在 1981 年的水平下，一家典型的美国企业对于个人所有者而言，已经不再值面值一百美分了。（如果企业由养老基金或其他免税投资者所有，那么计算结果虽然仍然不具吸引力，但会发生显著的改善。）假设一位投资者处于 50%的税级；如果我们的典型公司支付所有收益，那么投资者的收入回报将相当于 7%的免税债券的回报。而且，如果情况持续存在——如果所有收益都被支付，并且股本回报率保持在 14%——那么对于高税级个人投资者而言，相当于 7%的免税回报就像免税债券的息票一样被冻结了。这样一种永久性的 7%免税债券，在撰写本文时，可能只值面值的 50%。
If, on the other hand, all earnings of our typical American business are retained and return on equity again remains constant, earnings will grow at 14% per year. If the p/e ratio remains constant, the price of our typical stock will also grow at 14% per year. But that 14% is not yet in the pocket of the shareholder. Putting it there will require the payment of a capital gains tax, presently assessed at a maximum rate of 20%. This net return, of course, works out to a poorer rate of return than the currently available passive after-tax rate.
另一方面，如果一家典型的美国企业的所有收益都被留存，且股本回报率保持不变，那么收益将以每年 14% 的速度增长。如果市盈率保持不变，我们典型股票的价格也将以每年 14% 的速度增长。但 14% 的收益尚未进入股东的口袋。要实现这一点，需要支付资本利得税，目前最高税率为 20%。当然，这一净回报率低于目前可获得的被动投资税后收益率。
Unless passive rates fall, companies achieving 14% per year gains in earnings per share while paying no cash dividend are an economic failure for their individual shareholders. The returns from passive capital outstrip the returns from active capital. This is an unpleasant fact for both investors and corporate managers and, therefore, one they may wish to ignore. But facts do not cease to exist, either because they are unpleasant or because they are ignored.
除非被动投资收益率下降，否则对于那些每股收益每年增长 14% 但不支付现金股息的公司来说，对它们的个人股东而言，是一种经济上的失败。被动资本的回报超过了主动资本的回报。这对投资者和公司管理者来说都是一个令人不快的事实，因此，他们可能希望忽略它。但事实并不会因为它们令人不快或被忽视而消失。
Most American businesses pay out a significant portion of their earnings and thus fall between the two examples. And most American businesses are currently “bad” businesses economically - producing less for their individual investors after-tax than the tax-exempt passive rate of return on money. Of course, some high-return businesses still remain attractive, even under present conditions. But American equity capital, in aggregate, produces no value-added for individual investors.
大多数美国企业都会支付很大一部分收益，因此介于这两个例子之间。而且，目前大多数美国企业在经济上都是“糟糕”的企业——它们为个人投资者创造的税后收益低于免税的被动投资回报率。当然，即使在目前的情况下，一些高回报的企业仍然具有吸引力。但总体而言，美国股权资本并没有为个人投资者创造任何附加值。
It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occur because corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most companies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly; there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity.
应该强调的是，这种令人沮丧的情况并非因为公司的经济增长低于以往。事实上，它们的增长略高于以往：过去十年，股本回报率提高了几个百分点。但被动投资回报的门槛提高得更快。不幸的是，大多数公司只能寄希望于门槛大幅降低；很少有行业的股本回报率前景看起来光明。
Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not the only) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of long-term inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically “bad” would be restored to the “good” category under such circumstances.
通货膨胀的经验和预期将是影响未来几年横杆高度的主要（但不是唯一的）因素。如果能够缓和长期通货膨胀的原因，被动回报可能会下降，美国股权资本的内在地位应该会显著改善。在这样的情况下，许多现在必须被归类为经济上“不良”的企业将被恢复到“良好”类别。
A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the “bad” business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low- return business usually must retain much of its earnings - no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.
通货膨胀环境对“不良”企业的所有者施加了进一步的，特别具有讽刺意味的惩罚。为了以目前的模式继续运营，这种低回报的企业通常必须保留大部分收益——无论这种政策对股东产生什么样的惩罚。
Reason, of course, would prescribe just the opposite policy. An individual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar for more 5% bonds while similar bonds are available at, say, forty cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and - if inclined to reinvest - looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad.
当然，理性会规定完全相反的政策。一个持有 5%债券且在到期前还有很多年的人，不会从该债券中提取息票，并以 1 美元的价格购买更多的 5%债券，而类似的债券可以以比如 40 美分的价格获得。相反，他会从他的低回报债券中提取这些息票，并且——如果倾向于再投资——寻找目前可获得的安全的最高回报。好钱不会追逐坏钱。
What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for the shareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective high returns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised - “wicked and slothful” - but also is required to redirect all of his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30)
对债券持有人有意义的事情对股东也有意义。从逻辑上讲，一家具有历史和预期高股权回报的公司应该保留大部分或全部收益，以便股东可以在增加的资本上获得溢价回报。相反，公司股权的低回报率表明应该支付非常高的股息，以便所有者可以将资本导向更具吸引力的领域。（《圣经》也同意这一点。在塔兰特的比喻中，两个高收入的仆人获得了 100%的收益保留，并被鼓励扩大他们的业务。然而，不赚钱的第三个仆人不仅受到惩罚——“邪恶和懒惰”——而且还被要求将他的所有资本重新导向表现最佳的人。马太福音 25 章： 14-30)
But inflation takes us through the looking glass into the upside-down world of Alice in Wonderland. When prices continuously rise, the “bad” business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past - and most entities, including businesses, do - it simply has no choice.
但通货膨胀会带我们穿过镜子，进入爱丽丝梦游仙境般的颠倒世界。当价格持续上涨时，“不良”企业必须保留每一分钱。不是因为它作为股权资本的储存库具有吸引力，而是恰恰因为它如此缺乏吸引力，低回报企业必须遵循高留存政策。如果它希望在未来继续像过去一样运营——包括企业在内的大多数实体都是如此——它别无选择。
For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollars regardless of the health of the host organism. Whatever the level of reported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume of the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm.
因为通货膨胀就像一条巨大的企业绦虫。无论宿主有机体的健康状况如何，这条绦虫都会先发制人地消耗其每日所需的投资资金。无论报告的利润水平如何（即使为零），企业都需要持续投入更多的资金用于应收账款、库存和固定资产，才能仅仅匹配上一年的单位销量。企业越不景气，绦虫所占用的可用维持生计的比例就越大。
Under present conditions, a business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or “real” dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company’s inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of “dividends” that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)
在目前的情况下，一家股权回报率为 8% 或 10% 的企业通常没有剩余资金用于扩张、减少债务或支付“真正”的股息。通货膨胀这条绦虫会把盘子里的东西一扫而空。（低回报公司无力支付股息的情况，是可以理解的，但往往会被掩盖。美国企业越来越多地转向股息再投资计划，有时甚至包含一种几乎迫使股东再投资的折扣安排。其他公司则向彼得出售新发行的股票，以便向保罗支付股息。谨防只能在有人承诺替换已分配资本的情况下才能支付的“股息”。）
Berkshire continues to retain its earnings for offensive, not defensive or obligatory, reasons. But in no way are we immune from the pressures that escalating passive returns exert on equity capital. We continue to clear the crossbar of after- tax passive return - but barely. Our historic 21% return - not at all assured for the future - still provides, after the current capital gain tax rate (which we expect to rise considerably in future years), a modest margin over current after-tax rates on passive money. It would be a bit humiliating to have our corporate value-added turn negative. But it can happen here as it has elsewhere, either from events outside anyone’s control or from poor relative adaptation on our part.
伯克希尔公司继续保留盈利是为了进攻，而不是为了防御或义务。但我们绝不会免受被动回报不断上升对股权资本造成的压力。我们继续勉强跨越税后被动回报的横杆。我们过去 21% 的回报率——未来完全没有保证——在扣除目前的资本利得税率（我们预计未来几年会大幅上升）后，仍然比目前被动资金的税后利率略高。如果我们的企业增值变成负数，那就有点丢脸了。但这种情况可能会发生在我们身上，就像在其他地方发生的那样，要么是由于任何人都无法控制的事件，要么是由于我们相对适应能力较差。
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告盈利来源
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table and are not included in operating earnings. Net Earnings Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax -------------------------------------- ------------------ Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ 1981 1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- (000s omitted) Operating Earnings: Insurance Group: Underwriting ............ $ 1,478 $ 6,738 $ 1,478 $ 6,737 $ 798 $ 3,637 Net Investment Income ... 38,823 30,939 38,823 30,927 32,401 25,607 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (2,669) (508) (2,669) (508) (1,493) 202 Associated Retail Stores .. 1,763 2,440 1,763 2,440 759 1,169 See’s Candies ............. 21,891 15,475 13,046 9,223 6,289 4,459 Buffalo Evening News ...... (1,057) (2,777) (630) (1,655) (276) (800) Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 3,642 7,699 2,171 4,588 2,134 3,060 Wesco Financial - Parent .. 4,495 2,916 2,145 1,392 1,590 1,044 Mutual Savings and Loan ... 1,605 5,814 766 2,775 1,536 1,974 Precision Steel ........... 3,453 2,833 1,648 1,352 841 656 Interest on Debt .......... (14,656) (12,230) (12,649) (9,390) (6,671) (4,809) Other* .................... 1,895 1,698 1,344 1,308 1,513 992 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Sub-total - Continuing Operations ............. $ 60,663 $ 61,037 $ 47,236 $ 49,189 $ 39,421 $ 37,191 Illinois National Bank** .. -- 5,324 -- 5,200 -- 4,731 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Operating Earnings .......... 60,663 66,361 47,236 54,389 39,421 41,922 Sales of securities and unusual sales of assets .. 37,801 19,584 33,150 15,757 23,183 11,200 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- Total Earnings - all entities $ 98,464 $ 85,945 $ 80,386 $ 70,146 $ 62,604 $ 53,122 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== *Amortization of intangibles arising in accounting for purchases of businesses (i.e. See’s, Mutual and Buffalo Evening News) is reflected in the category designated as “Other”.
下表显示了伯克希尔公司报告的收益来源。伯克希尔拥有 Blue Chip Stamps 约 60% 的股份，而 Blue Chip Stamps 又拥有 Wesco Financial Corporation 80% 的股份。该表显示了各个业务实体的总运营收益，以及伯克希尔公司在这些收益中所占的份额。所有因任何业务实体不寻常的资产出售而产生的重要收益和损失，都与证券交易一起汇总在表格底部的行中，不包括在运营收益中。 净收益 税前收益 税后收益 -------------------------------------- ------------------ 总额 伯克希尔股份 伯克希尔股份 ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ 1981 1980 1981 1980 1981 1980 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- （千美元省略） 运营收益： 保险集团： 承保 ............ $ 1,478 $ 6,738 $ 1,478 $ 6,737 $ 798 $ 3,637 净投资收益 ... 38,823 30,939 38,823 30,927 32,401 25,607 Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (2,669) (508) (2,669) (508) (1,493) 202 Associated Retail Stores .. 1,763 2,440 1,763 2,440 759 1,169 See’s Candies ............. 21,891 15,475 13,046 9,223 6,289 4,459 Buffalo Evening News ...... (1,057) (2,777) (630) (1,655) (276) (800) Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 3,642 7,699 2,171 4,588 2,134 3,060 Wesco Financial - Parent .. 4,495 2,916 2,145 1,392 1,590 1,044 Mutual Savings and Loan ... 1,605 5,814 766 2,775 1,536 1,974 Precision Steel ........... 3,453 2,833 1,648 1,352 841 656 债务利息 .......... (14,656) (12,230) (12,649) (9,390) (6,671) (4,809) 其他* .................... 1,895 1,698 1,344 1,308 1,513 992 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 小计 - 持续经营 ............. $ 60,663 $ 61,037 $ 47,236 $ 49,189 $ 39,421 $ 37,191 Illinois National Bank** .. -- 5,324 -- 5,200 -- 4,731 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 运营收益 .......... 60,663 66,361 47,236 54,389 39,421 41,922 出售证券和非经常性资产出售 .. 37,801 19,584 33,150 15,757 23,183 11,200 -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 总收益 - 所有实体 $ 98,464 $ 85,945 $ 80,386 $ 70,146 $ 62,604 $ 53,122 ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== *因会计处理产生的无形资产摊销 收购企业（例如 See’s、Mutual 和 Buffalo） 晚间新闻）体现在指定为 “其他”。
**Berkshire divested itself of its ownership of the Illinois National Bank on December 31, 1980. Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 38-50 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1981 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
**伯克希尔公司出售了其在伊利诺伊州的股份 1980 年 12 月 31 日国民银行。 蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）和 Wesco 公司都是上市公司，有各自的报告要求。在本报告的第 38-50 页，我们转载了两家公司主要负责人的叙述性报告，他们在报告中描述了 1981 年的运营情况。任何伯克希尔股东如需蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）的完整年度报告，请致函 Robert H. Bird 先生，地址为 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040；如需 Wesco 金融公司（Wesco Financial Corporation）的完整年度报告，请致函 Jeanne Leach 女士，地址为 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109。
As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of earnings, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.
正如我们之前指出的，在我们不控制的公司中，未分配利润现在与前表详述的已报告运营收益同样重要。当然，收益的分配部分主要通过保险集团收益的净投资收益部分进入该表。
We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings. No. of Shares Cost Market ------------- ---------- ---------- (000s omitted) 451,650 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ........ $ 3,297 $ 14,114 703,634 (a) Aluminum Company of America .......... 19,359 18,031 420,441 (a) Arcata Corporation (including common equivalents) ..... 14,076 15,136 475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ........ 12,942 14,362 441,522 (a) GATX Corporation ..................... 17,147 13,466 2,101,244 (b) General Foods, Inc. .................. 66,277 66,714 7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation .................... 47,138 199,800 2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ....................... 21,825 36,270 711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,531 23,202 282,500 (a) Media General ........................ 4,545 11,088 391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather International Inc. ... 3,709 12,329 370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. .................... 12,144 19,675 1,764,824 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. ...... 76,668 83,127 785,225 (b) SAFECO Corporation ................... 21,329 31,016 1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company .......... 10,628 58,160 ---------- ---------- $335,615 $616,490 All Other Common Stockholdings ...................... 16,131 22,739 ---------- ---------- Total Common Stocks ................................. $351,746 $639,229 ========== ==========
我们在下面列出了伯克希尔在那些非控股企业中的持股比例，这些企业的收益（股息）仅包括已分配收益。 股份数量 成本 市值 ------------- ---------- ---------- (省略 000) 451,650 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ........ $ 3,297 $ 14,114 703,634 (a) Aluminum Company of America .......... 19,359 18,031 420,441 (a) Arcata Corporation (包括普通股等价物) ..... 14,076 15,136 475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ........ 12,942 14,362 441,522 (a) GATX Corporation ..................... 17,147 13,466 2,101,244 (b) General Foods, Inc. .................. 66,277 66,714 7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation .................... 47,138 199,800 2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ....................... 21,825 36,270 711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,531 23,202 282,500 (a) Media General ........................ 4,545 11,088 391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather International Inc. ... 3,709 12,329 370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. .................... 12,144 19,675 1,764,824 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. ...... 76,668 83,127 785,225 (b) SAFECO Corporation ................... 21,329 31,016 1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company .......... 10,628 58,160 ---------- ---------- $335,615 $616,490 所有其他普通股持股 ...................... 16,131 22,739 ---------- ---------- 普通股总额 ................................. $351,746 $639,229 ========== ==========
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries. (b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All numbers represent Berkshire’s net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.
(a) 全部由伯克希尔或其保险子公司拥有。(b) Blue Chip 和/或 Wesco 拥有这些公司的股份。所有数字代表伯克希尔在该集团较大总持股中的净权益。
Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum of activities that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much additional financial information is included in Management’s Discussion on pages 34-37 and in the narrative reports on pages 38-50. However, our largest area of both controlled and non-controlled activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area, and commentary on important developments in that industry is appropriate.
我们的受控和非受控业务涵盖范围广泛，在此进行详细评论将过于冗长。更多财务信息包含在第 34-37 页的管理层讨论中以及第 38-50 页的叙述性报告中。然而，我们最大的受控和非受控活动领域一直是，并且几乎肯定将继续是财产-意外伤害保险领域，因此对该行业的重要发展进行评论是适当的。
Insurance Industry Conditions
保险业状况
“Forecasts”, said Sam Goldwyn, “are dangerous, particularly those about the future.” (Berkshire shareholders may have reached a similar conclusion after rereading our past annual reports featuring your Chairman’s prescient analysis of textile prospects.)
萨姆·戈德温曾说过：“预测是危险的，尤其是对未来的预测。”（伯克希尔的股东们在重读我们过去的年度报告，特别是主席对纺织业前景的先见之明分析后，可能也得出了类似的结论。）
There is no danger, however, in forecasting that 1982 will be the worst year in recent history for insurance underwriting. That result already has been guaranteed by present pricing behavior, coupled with the term nature of the insurance contract.
然而，预测 1982 年将是近期历史上保险承保最糟糕的一年，这并没有什么危险。由于目前的定价行为，加上保险合同的期限性质，这一结果已经得到了保证。
While many auto policies are priced and sold at six-month intervals - and many property policies are sold for a three-year term - a weighted average of the duration of all property- casualty insurance policies probably runs a little under twelve months. And prices for the insurance coverage, of course, are frozen for the life of the contract. Thus, this year’s sales contracts (“premium written” in the parlance of the industry) determine about one-half of next year’s level of revenue (“premiums earned”). The remaining half will be determined by sales contracts written next year that will be about 50% earned in that year. The profitability consequences are automatic: if you make a mistake in pricing, you have to live with it for an uncomfortable period of time.
虽然许多汽车保单的定价和销售周期为六个月，许多财产保单的销售周期为三年，但所有财产意外保险保单的加权平均期限可能略低于十二个月。当然，保险的定价在合同有效期内是固定的。因此，今年的销售合同（用业内术语来说是“已承保保费”）决定了明年大约一半的收入水平（“已赚保费”）。剩下的一半将由明年签订的销售合同决定，这些合同将在当年实现约 50%的收入。盈利能力的结果是自动的：如果你在定价上犯了错误，你必须在一段不舒服的时间内忍受它。
Note in the table below the year-over-year gain in industry- wide premiums written and the impact that it has on the current and following year’s level of underwriting profitability. The result is exactly as you would expect in an inflationary world. When the volume gain is well up in double digits, it bodes well for profitability trends in the current and following year. When the industry volume gain is small, underwriting experience very shortly will get worse, no matter how unsatisfactory the current level.
请注意下表所示的整个行业保费收入的同比增长以及它对当年和次年承保盈利水平的影响。结果正如您在通货膨胀的世界中所预期的那样。当销量增幅达到两位数时，预示着当年和次年的盈利趋势良好。当行业销量增幅较小时，承保经验很快就会恶化，无论目前的水平多么令人不满意。
The Best’s data in the table reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio indicates total operating and loss costs as compared to premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. Yearly Change Yearly Change Combined Ratio in Premium in Premium after Policy- Written (%) Earned (%) holder Dividends ------------- ------------- ---------------- 1972 ............... 10.2 10.9 96.2 1973 ............... 8.0 8.8 99.2 1974 ............... 6.2 6.9 105.4 1975 ............... 11.0 9.6 107.9 1976 ............... 21.9 19.4 102.4 1977 ............... 19.8 20.5 97.2 1978 ............... 12.8 14.3 97.5 1979 ............... 10.3 10.4 100.6 1980 ............... 6.0 7.8 103.1 1981 ............... 3.6 4.1 105.7
表中的 Best's 数据反映了几乎整个行业的经验，包括股份制公司、互助公司和互惠公司。综合比率表示总运营和损失成本与保费之比；低于 100 的比率表示承保利润，高于 100 的比率表示亏损。 年度变化 年度变化 综合比率 保费变化 保费变化 保单生效后 书面 (%) 已赚取 (%) 股东股息 ------------- ------------- ---------------- 1972 ............... 10.2 10.9 96.2 1973 ............... 8.0 8.8 99.2 1974 ............... 6.2 6.9 105.4 1975 ............... 11.0 9.6 107.9 1976 ............... 21.9 19.4 102.4 1977 ............... 19.8 20.5 97.2 1978 ............... 12.8 14.3 97.5 1979 ............... 10.3 10.4 100.6 1980 ............... 6.0 7.8 103.1 1981 ............... 3.6 4.1 105.7
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
来源：Best’s Aggregates and Averages。
As Pogo would say, “The future isn’t what it used to be.” Current pricing practices promise devastating results, particularly if the respite from major natural disasters that the industry has enjoyed in recent years should end. For underwriting experience has been getting worse in spite of good luck, not because of bad luck. In recent years hurricanes have stayed at sea and motorists have reduced their driving. They won’t always be so obliging.
正如波戈所说，“未来已非昔比。”目前的定价行为预示着灾难性的结果，特别是如果近年来该行业所享有的免受重大自然灾害影响的喘息之机结束的话。因为 尽管承保经验良好，但情况却越来越糟 运气好，而不是因为运气不好。近年来，飓风一直停留在海上，驾车人士也减少了驾驶。他们不会总是这么配合。
And, of course the twin inflations, monetary and “social” (the tendency of courts and juries to stretch the coverage of policies beyond what insurers, relying upon contract terminology and precedent, had expected), are unstoppable. Costs of repairing both property and people - and the extent to which these repairs are deemed to be the responsibility of the insurer - will advance relentlessly.
当然，货币和“社会”的双重通货膨胀（法院和陪审团倾向于将保单的覆盖范围扩大到超出保险公司依赖合同术语和先例所预期的范围）是不可阻挡的。修复财产和人员的成本——以及这些修复被认为是保险公司责任的程度——将持续上升。
Absent any bad luck (catastrophes, increased driving, etc.), an immediate industry volume gain of at least 10% per year probably is necessary to stabilize the record level of underwriting losses that will automatically prevail in mid-1982. (Most underwriters expect incurred losses in aggregate to rise at least 10% annually; each, of course, counts on getting less than his share.) Every percentage point of annual premium growth below the 10% equilibrium figure quickens the pace of deterioration. Quarterly data in 1981 underscore the conclusion that a terrible underwriting picture is worsening at an accelerating rate.
如果没有发生任何坏运气（灾难、驾驶增加等），可能需要立即实现至少每年 10% 的行业销量增长，才能稳定 1982 年中期将自动出现的创纪录水平的承保亏损。（大多数承销商预计总的已发生损失每年至少增加 10%；当然，每个人都指望获得低于其份额的损失。）低于 10% 平衡数字的每年保费增长的每一个百分点都会加速恶化的速度。1981 年的季度数据强调了一个结论，即糟糕的承保情况正在以加速的速度恶化。
In the 1980 annual report we discussed the investment policies that have destroyed the integrity of many insurers’ balance sheets, forcing them to abandon underwriting discipline and write business at any price in order to avoid negative cash flow. It was clear that insurers with large holdings of bonds valued, for accounting purposes, at nonsensically high prices would have little choice but to keep the money revolving by selling large numbers of policies at nonsensically low prices. Such insurers necessarily fear a major decrease in volume more than they fear a major underwriting loss.
在 1980 年的年度报告中，我们讨论了破坏了许多保险公司资产负债表完整性的投资政策，迫使他们放弃承保纪律，并以任何价格承保业务，以避免负现金流。很明显，持有大量债券的保险公司，出于会计目的，以荒谬的高价估值，除了以荒谬的低价出售大量保单外，别无选择。与重大承保损失相比，此类保险公司必然更害怕销量大幅下降。
But, unfortunately, all insurers are affected; it’s difficult to price much differently than your most threatened competitor. This pressure continues unabated and adds a new motivation to the others that drive many insurance managers to push for business; worship of size over profitability, and the fear that market share surrendered never can be regained.
但不幸的是，所有保险公司都受到了影响；定价很难与最受威胁的竞争对手有太大差异。这种压力持续不断，并为其他因素增加了一种新的动力，促使许多保险经理争取业务；崇拜规模而非盈利能力，以及担心失去的市场份额永远无法挽回。
Whatever the reasons, we believe it is true that virtually no major property-casualty insurer - despite protests by the entire industry that rates are inadequate and great selectivity should be exercised - has been willing to turn down business to the point where cash flow has turned significantly negative. Absent such a willingness, prices will remain under severe pressure.
无论出于何种原因，我们认为，几乎没有一家主要的财产意外险公司——尽管整个行业都在抗议费率不足，应该进行严格的选择——愿意拒绝业务，以至于现金流出现显著的负增长。如果没有这种意愿，价格将继续承受巨大的压力。
Commentators continue to talk of the underwriting cycle, usually implying a regularity of rhythm and a relatively constant midpoint of profitability Our own view is different. We believe that very large, although obviously varying, underwriting losses will be the norm for the industry, and that the best underwriting years in the future decade may appear substandard against the average year of the past decade.
评论员们继续谈论承保周期，通常暗示着规律的节奏和相对恒定的盈利能力中点。我们自己的观点则不同。我们认为，对于整个行业来说，非常大的、虽然明显不同的承保损失将成为常态，而且未来十年中最好的承保年份，与过去十年的平均年份相比，可能会显得不合格。
We have no magic formula to insulate our controlled insurance companies against this deteriorating future. Our managers, particularly Phil Liesche, Bill Lyons, Roland Miller, Floyd Taylor and Milt Thornton, have done a magnificent job of swimming against the tide. We have sacrificed much volume, but have maintained a substantial underwriting superiority in relation to industry-wide results. The outlook at Berkshire is for continued low volume. Our financial position offers us maximum flexibility, a very rare condition in the property- casualty insurance industry. And, at some point, should fear ever prevail throughout the industry, our financial strength could become an operational asset of immense value.
我们没有神奇的公式来保护我们控制的保险公司免受这种日益恶化的未来的影响。我们的经理们，特别是 Phil Liesche、Bill Lyons、Roland Miller、Floyd Taylor 和 Milt Thornton，在逆流而上方面做得非常出色。我们牺牲了大量的业务量，但相对于整个行业的结果，我们保持了相当大的承保优势。伯克希尔的前景是持续的低业务量。我们的财务状况为我们提供了最大的灵活性，这在财产意外险行业中是一种非常罕见的情况。而且，在某个时候，如果恐惧真的在整个行业蔓延，我们的财务实力可能会成为一种具有巨大价值的运营资产。
We believe that GEICO Corporation, our major non-controlled business operating in this field, is, by virtue of its extreme and improving operating efficiency, in a considerably more protected position than almost any other major insurer. GEICO is a brilliantly run implementation of a very important business idea.
我们认为，GEICO 公司是我们在该领域运营的主要非控股企业，凭借其极高且不断提高的运营效率，与几乎任何其他主要保险公司相比，都处于一个受到更大保护的地位。GEICO 是对一个非常重要的商业理念的出色执行。
Shareholder Designated Contributions
股东指定捐款
Our new program enabling shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate charitable contributions was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. A copy of the letter sent October 14, 1981 describing this program appears on pages 51-53. Of 932,206 shares eligible for participation (shares where the name of the actual owner appeared on our stockholder record), 95.6% responded. Even excluding Buffet-related shares, the response topped 90%.
我们推出了一项新计划，使股东能够指定公司慈善捐款的接受者，该计划受到了极大的热情欢迎。1981 年 10 月 14 日发出的描述该计划的信件副本见第 51-53 页。在有资格参与的 932,206 股股份（股东记录上显示实际所有者姓名的股份）中，有 95.6%做出了回应。即使不包括与巴菲特相关的股份，回应率也超过了 90%。
In addition, more than 3% of our shareholders voluntarily wrote letters or notes, all but one approving of the program. Both the level of participation and of commentary surpass any shareholder response we have witnessed, even when such response has been intensively solicited by corporate staff and highly paid professional proxy organizations. In contrast, your extraordinary level of response occurred without even the nudge of a company-provided return envelope. This self-propelled behavior speaks well for the program, and speaks well for our shareholders.
此外，超过 3%的股东自愿写信或笔记，除了一个之外，都赞成该计划。参与度和评论水平都超过了我们所见证的任何股东回应，即使这种回应是由公司员工和高薪专业代理机构积极征集的。相比之下，你们非凡的回应水平甚至没有公司提供的回邮信封的推动。这种自我驱动的行为对该计划有利，也对我们的股东有利。
Apparently the owners of our corporation like both possessing and exercising the ability to determine where gifts of their funds shall be made. The “father-knows-best” school of corporate governance will be surprised to find that none of our shareholders sent in a designation sheet with instructions that the officers of Berkshire - in their superior wisdom, of course - make the decision on charitable funds applicable to his shares. Nor did anyone suggest that his share of our charitable funds be used to match contributions made by our corporate directors to charities of the directors’ choice (a popular, proliferating and non-publicized policy at many large corporations).
显然，我们公司的所有者似乎既喜欢拥有，也喜欢行使决定其资金捐赠去向的能力。“老爸最懂”式的公司治理模式会惊讶地发现，没有一位股东提交指定单，指示伯克希尔的管理者——当然，凭借他们卓越的智慧——就适用于其股份的慈善资金做出决定。也没有人建议将其在我们慈善基金中的份额用于匹配公司董事向董事选择的慈善机构捐款（这是许多大型公司中一种流行的、不断扩散且未公开的政策）。
All told, $1,783,655 of shareholder-designed contributions were distributed to about 675 charities. In addition, Berkshire and subsidiaries continue to make certain contributions pursuant to local level decisions made by our operating managers.
总计，1,783,655 美元的股东指定捐款被分配给大约 675 家慈善机构。此外，伯克希尔及其子公司继续根据我们运营经理在当地层面做出的决定进行某些捐款。
There will be some years, perhaps two or three out of ten, when contributions by Berkshire will produce substandard tax deductions - or none at all. In those years we will not effect our shareholder designated charitable program. In all other years we expect to inform you about October 10th of the amount per share that you may designate. A reply form will accompany the notice, and you will be given about three weeks to respond with your designation. To qualify, your shares must be registered in your own name or the name of an owning trust, corporation, partnership or estate, if applicable, on our stockholder list of September 30th, or the Friday preceding if such date falls on a Saturday or Sunday.
在十年中，可能会有两到三年，伯克希尔的捐款产生的税收减免低于标准——或者根本没有。在那些年份，我们将不执行股东指定的慈善计划。在所有其他年份，我们预计在 10 月 10 日左右通知您每股可指定的金额。通知将附带回复表格，您将有大约三周的时间回复您的指定。要符合资格，您的股份必须 以您自己的名义或拥有信托的名义注册， 公司、合伙企业或遗产（如适用），在我们的 9 月 30 日的股东名册，或者如果 9 月 30 日是周末，则使用之前那个周五的股东名册。 如果该日期是星期六或星期日。
Our only disappointment with this program in 1981 was that some of our shareholders, through no fault of their own, missed the opportunity to participate. The Treasury Department ruling allowing us to proceed without tax uncertainty was received early in October. The ruling did not cover participation by shareholders whose stock was registered in the name of nominees, such as brokers, and additionally required that the owners of all designating shares make certain assurances to Berkshire. These assurances could not be given us in effective form by nominee holders.
1981 年，这个项目唯一让我们感到失望的是，由于一些股东自身的原因，他们错失了参与的机会。财政部允许我们在没有税务不确定性的情况下继续进行该项目的裁决是在 10 月初收到的。该裁决不包括以代理人（如经纪人）名义注册股票的股东的参与，并且还要求所有指定股份的所有者向伯克希尔做出某些保证。代理持有人无法以有效的形式向我们提供这些保证。
Under these circumstances, we attempted to communicate with all of our owners promptly (via the October 14th letter) so that, if they wished, they could prepare themselves to participate by the November 13th record date. It was particularly important that this information be communicated promptly to stockholders whose holdings were in nominee name, since they would not be eligible unless they took action to re-register their shares before the record date.
在这种情况下，我们试图及时与所有所有者沟通（通过 10 月 14 日的信函），以便他们如果愿意，可以做好准备在 11 月 13 日的登记日参与。对于那些以代持人名义持有股份的股东来说，及时传达这一信息尤为重要，因为除非他们在登记日之前采取行动重新登记他们的股份，否则他们将没有资格参与。
Unfortunately, communication to such non-record shareholders could take place only through the nominees. We therefore strongly urged those nominees, mostly brokerage houses, to promptly transmit our letter to the real owners. We explained that their failure to do so could deprive such owners of an important benefit.
不幸的是，与此类非登记股东的沟通只能通过代持人进行。因此，我们强烈敦促这些代持人（主要是经纪公司）及时将我们的信函转交给真正的所有者。我们解释说，他们未能这样做可能会剥夺这些所有者的一项重要利益。
The results from our urgings would not strengthen the case for private ownership of the U.S. Postal Service. Many of our shareholders never heard from their brokers (as some shareholders told us after reading news accounts of the program). Others were forwarded our letter too late for action.
我们的敦促结果并不能加强美国邮政私有化的理由。许多股东从未收到他们经纪人的来信（正如一些股东在阅读了有关该计划的新闻报道后告诉我们的那样）。另一些人则在太晚的时候才收到我们的信，无法采取行动。
One of the largest brokerage houses claiming to hold stock for sixty of its clients (about 4% of our shareholder population), apparently transmitted our letter about three weeks after receipt - too late for any of the sixty to participate. (Such lassitude did not pervade all departments of that firm; it billed Berkshire for mailing services within six days of that belated and ineffectual action.)
一家声称代表其六十位客户持有股票（约占我们股东总数的 4%）的最大经纪公司，显然在收到我们的信后大约三周才将其转发——对于这六十位客户来说，已经太晚了，无法参与。（这种懈怠并没有蔓延到该公司的所有部门；它在迟迟且无效的行动后六天内就向伯克希尔公司开具了邮寄服务的账单。）
We recite such horror stories for two reasons: (1) if you wish to participate in future designated contribution programs, be sure to have your stock registered in your name well before September 30th; and (2) even if you don’t care to participate and prefer to leave your stock in nominee form, it would be wise to have at least one share registered in your own name. By so doing, you can be sure that you will be notified of any important corporate news at the same time as all other shareholders.
我们讲述这些可怕的故事有两个原因：（1）如果您希望参与未来指定的捐赠计划，请务必在 9 月 30 日之前将您的股票以您的名义注册；（2）即使您不关心参与并希望将您的股票以代持形式持有，明智的做法是以您自己的名义注册至少一股。 这样做，您可以确保您与其他所有股东同时收到任何重要的公司新闻。
The designated-contributions idea, along with many other ideas that have turned out well for us, was conceived by Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and Chairman of Blue Chip. Irrespective of titles, Charlie and I work as partners in managing all controlled companies. To almost a sinful degree, we enjoy our work as managing partners. And we enjoy having you as our financial partners.
指定捐赠的想法，以及许多其他对我们有利的想法，都是由伯克希尔公司副董事长兼蓝筹公司董事长查理·芒格提出的。 不管头衔如何，查理和我都是作为合伙人来管理所有控股公司的。 我们几乎带着罪恶感享受着我们作为管理合伙人的工作。 我们也很高兴有您作为我们的财务合伙人。
Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特 董事会主席